Gut Feeling Does Not Disqualify Expert Opinion
July 6, 2011 — CDJ Staff
The New Jersey Supreme Court issued a ruling in June on the case of Nevins v. Toll in which they reversed an earlier decision and remanded the case to a lower court for retrial. At issue in the case was the testimony of the plaintiff’s expert, J. Anthony Dowling. In depositions, Mr. Dowling said that his estimates for repair were based on a “gut feeling.” Dowling said he had “very little” experience in cost estimates for single-family homes. The defendants sought to bar Dowling’s testimony which was granted by the judge. Without an expert, Ms. Nevin’s case was dismissed.
Describing Dowling’s report as “far from a model of how an expert’s opinion in a construction case should be presented,” the court noted that Dowling is not a professional expert witness. However, the court did note that Dowling is a professional cost estimator. Despite Mr. Dowling using his “gut feeling” to construct his estimate, the New Jersey Supreme Court felt that whether his estimate is convincing is “a question for the jury.”
Read the court’s opinion…
New Jersey Court Rules on Statue of Repose Case
May 26, 2011 — CDJ Staff
A three-judge panel issued a per curium ruling on May 23 in Fairview Heights Condo. v. Investors (N.J. Super., 2011), a case which the members of a condominium board argued: “that the judge erred by: 1) dismissing plaintiff’s claims against RLI based upon the statute of repose; 2) dismissing the breach of fiduciary duty claims against the Luppinos based upon a lack of expert opinion; 3) barring the testimony of Gonzalez; and 4) barring the May 23, 1989 job site report.” The court rejected all claims from the condominium board.
The court found that the building must be unsafe for the statute of repose to apply. They noted, “the judge made no findings on whether the water seepage, or the property damage caused by such seepage, in any way rendered the building, or any of the units, unsafe.” Further, “without a specific finding on the question of whether the defects had rendered the building ‘unsafe,’ defendants were not entitled to the benefit of the ten-year statute of repose.“
On the second point, the court also upheld the lower court’s findings regarding the management company:
“The report submitted by Berman establishes that the EIFS product was defective in its design and would therefore have failed from the outset. The defects in that product were, according to Berman, not prone to repair or other mitigation. Therefore, even if defendants did not appropriately inspect or repair the EIFS, their failure to do so would have had no impact on the long-term performance of the EIFS exterior cladding. As plaintiff failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact on these questions, the judge properly granted summary judgment to the Luppinos on plaintiff’s breach of fiduciary duty claim.”
On the final two points, the judges noted “plaintiff maintains that the judge committed reversible error when he excluded the Gonzalez certification and the 1989 job site report prepared by Raymond Brzuchalski.” They saw “no abuse of discretion related to the exclusion of the Gonzalez certification, and reject plaintiff’s arguments to the contrary.” Of the job site report, they found, “no abuse of discretion in the judge's finding that the Brzuchalski 1989 job site report did not satisfy the requirements of N.J.R.E.803(c)(6).”
Read the court’s decision
Harsh New Time Limits on Construction Defect Claims
April 26, 2011 — April 26, 2011 by Scott F. Sullan, Esq., Mari K. Perczak, Esq., and Leslie A. Tuft, Esq. of
Sullan2, Sandgrund, Smith & Perczak, P.C. in the
HindemanSanchez blogA recent Colorado Supreme Court decision, Smith v. Executive Custom Homes, Inc., 230 P.3d 1186 (Colo. 2010), considerably shortens the time limit for bringing many construction defect lawsuits. Homeowners and homeowner associations risk losing the right to seek reimbursement from builders, developers and other construction professionals unless they carefully and quickly act upon discovery of evidence of any potential construction defect.
The Statute of Limitations for Construction Defect Claims
Colorado’s construction defect statute of limitations limits the time for homeowners and homeowners associations to bring lawsuits for construction defects against “construction professionals,” including developers, general contractors, builders, engineers, architects, other design professionals, inspectors and subcontractors. The statute requires homeowners and associations to file suit within two years “after the claim for relief arises.” A claim for relief “arises” when a homeowner or association discovers or reasonably should have discovered the physical manifestation of a construction defect.
The two-year time limitation applies to each construction defect separately, and will begin to run upon the appearance of a “manifestation” of a construction defect (which may include, for example, a condition as simple as a roof leak or drywall cracks), even if the homeowner or association does not know the cause of the apparent problem.
The Smith Opinion and its Effect on the Statute of Limitations
In Smith v. Executive Custom Homes, Inc., the plaintiff homeowner, Mrs. Smith, slipped on ice that had accumulated on her sidewalk because of a leaking gutter and suffered injury. When she first noticed the leak, she reported it to her property manager, who reported it to the builder. The builder attempted to repair the gutter, unbeknownst to Mrs. Smith, and she did not notice further problems until approximately one year after she first observed the leak, when she fell and suffered serious injury. She sued the builder within two years of her injury, but nearly three years after she first learned of the leak.
The Colorado Supreme Court dismissed Mrs. Smith’s claims as untimely and held that under the construction defect statute of limitations, the two-year period for suing for injuries due to construction defects begins when the homeowner first observes the physical manifestation of the defect, even if the resulting injury has not yet occurred. The court acknowledged that this ruling could result in “unfair results,” especially if a serious and unforeseeable injury occurs more than two years after the first time the homeowner noticed the problem, and as a result the victim is unable to seek redress from those responsible for the defect.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of Scott F. Sullan, Esq., Mari K. Perczak, Esq., and Leslie A. Tuft, Esq. of Sullan2, Sandgrund, Smith & Perczak, P.C., and they can be contacted through their web site.
Contractor’s Home Not Covered for Construction Defects
September 13, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The US District Court in Seattle has rejected most of the claims made by a Des Moines man over insurance coverage for water damage to his home. Judge John C. Coughenour granted summary judgment to Liberty Northwest in Ayar v. Liberty Northwest Insurance Corporation.
Sayad Ayar was the general contractor for the construction of his house. As a homeowner held a $1.5 million insurance policy from Liberty Northwest (LNW) that excluded “faulty, inadequate, or defective construction.”
In 2008, less than three years after his house was constructed, Mr. Ayar filed a claim after water leaked through his living room ceiling. LNW hired an engineering firm to investigate the damage. The engineering firm, CASE Forensics, concluded that the water intrusion was due to “the failure to install an adequate and continuous waterproof membrane, flashing, and drainage system within the balcony at the time of construction.” Ayar’s expert attributed the leakage to “damage done to the weather deck waterproofing during a storm event with high winds,” which would be covered under the policy. CASE Forensics reviewed these conclusions and rejected them. LNW denied coverage.
Further problems lead to further investigations, and in each case, LNW attributed the problems to construction defects. During this process, LNW “authorized Ayar to cut into the ceiling’s drywall in order to assist in determining the source of the water intrusion.” Mr. Ayar moved his family to a rental home. He requested that LNW cover the rental and other other costs.
LNW’s adjuster concluded that no coverage was available, but recommended paying Mr. Ayar $19,648.68 to reinstall drywall and repair the hole in the ceiling. The insurance company paid $2,000 to cover the cost of cutting into the ceiling. The also claimed the amount of drywall he removed was “excessive” and would not cover his relocation as “his home had been livable and because the loss was not covered.”
Ayar made four claims to the court in support of the argument that LNW misrepresented “pertinent facts or insurance policy provisions.” The court rejected three of these, noting that as all water damage was excluded, LNW’s citation of other sources of water intrusion was not a misrepresentation. “LNW did not rely on this provision as the reason for denying coverage.” Nor was LNW’s reference to “fungi, wet or dry rot” a misrepresentation. As for their reference to construction defects, it “was clearly appropriate given that the construction defect exclusion was the principal basis or denying the claim.” However, the court found that regarding the removal of drywall, “a triable issue of the facts exists.”
Ayar also claimed that LNW did not conduct a reasonable investigation, but the court found no evidence to support this conclusion. “This is not a case where the insurer failed to investigate or did so only half-heartedly.” Although the thoroughness of the investigation could not questioned, the court concluded that its timing could. Ayar claimed that LNW engaged in unreasonable delays. LNW counters that the delays were due to “Ayar’s own obstructive behavior and failure to cooperate with LNW’s investigation.”
The court dismissed all of Ayar’s claims, with the exception of whether LNW should have informed him that they would not pay for drywall repair unless there was damage, and whether LNW’s investigation failed to conclude its investigation within a thirty-day time line.
Read the court’s decision…
Important Information Regarding Colorado Mechanic’s Lien Rights.
November 7, 2012 — David McLain, Colorado Construction Litigation
With payment problems in the construction economy having accelerated over the past few years, there has been a substantial increase in mechanic’s lien activity and associated litigation. The typical mechanic’s lien claimant is a material supplier, a trade subcontractor, or even a general contractor that has not been paid by the developer/owner of the construction project. The reason for filing a mechanic’s lien claim is that it offers the prospect in many cases to make the unpaid construction professional a priority creditor, with a lien on the real estate that is superior to the construction lender.
One of the primary rules governing a mechanic’s lien claim is that the creditor’s formal written “Notice of Intent to File a Mechanic’s Lien” (hereafter “Lien Notice”) must be (1) served on the owner of the property for which the work was done or the materials used, and (2) served at the same time on the general contractor who has handled the construction project. After the creditor has made service of the lien claim by USPS certified mail (using the green return receipt card for proof of service) or separate personal delivery of the notice to the property owner and general contractor, ten full days must pass (not including the date of mailing of the notices) before the lien notice is filed in the public records.
After ten days have expired following the date of mailing using certified mail, or personal delivery of the notice to the property owner and the general contractor, the lien notice can be filed to make the lien valid.
Reprinted courtesy of David M. McLain, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC. Mr. McLain can be contacted at mclain@hhmrlaw.com
Read the full story…
Florida Contractor on Trial for Bribing School Official
October 28, 2011 — CDJ Staff
Lloyd Whann, an executive in M. M. Parrish Construction, a Gainesville, Florida firm, is going to trial over claims that he bribed a school district official with more than $50,000 in gifts. The trial has been pushed to March of 2012, in order for his defense to review documents.
Bob Williams, the former school official, plead guilty to conspiracy to commit bribery. He agreed to testify against Whann and M.M. Parrish Construction.
Read the full story...
After Construction Defect Case, Repairs to Austin Building
August 2, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The Austin Business Journal reports that remediation is about to begin on Met Center 10, a building that was “at the center of a complex structural defect case.” Claims were made that Grubb & Ellis failed to disclose known structural defects to a group of investors who purchased the building. The brokerage was ordered to pay $6.75 million. Repairs will take an estimated six months at a cost of $3.7 million.
Read the full story…
Virginia Chinese Drywall and pollution exclusion
May 27, 2011 — CDCoverage.com
In Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. The Overlook, LLC, No. 4:10cv69 (E.D. Va. May 13, 2011), homeowner Edmonds sued insured developer/general contractor Overlook seeking damages resulting from defective Chinese drywall installed in Edmonds’ home. Overlook’s CGL insurer Nationwide defended Overlook under a reservation of rights and filed a declaratory judgment action. The federal district trial court granted Nationwide’s motion for summary judgment.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of CDCoverage.com
Homeowners Must Comply with Arbitration over Construction Defects
January 6, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The California Court of Appeals has upheld a decision by the Superior Court of Kern County that homeowners must comply with arbitration procedures in their construction defect claim. The California Court of Appeals ruled on December 14 in the case of Baeza v. Superior Court of Kern County, denying the plaintiff’s petition that the trial court vacate its order.
The plaintiffs in the case are homeowners in various developments built by Castle & Cook. The homes were sold with a contract that provided for “nonadversarial prelitigation procedures, including mediation, and judicial reference.” The homeowners made defect claims and argued that Castle & Cooke failed to comply with statutory disclosure requirements and that some of the contracts violate related statutes.
The appeals court found that there was no ground for appeal of the lower court’s order to continue with prelitigation procedures. The court noted that the plaintiffs could not seek a review of the mediation until a judgment was issued, but that then the issue would be moot. The court felt that there were issues presented that needed clarification, and so they reviewed this case. This was cleared for publication.
The court considered the intent of the legislature in passing the Right to Repair Act, noting that “under the statutory scheme, the builder has the option of contracting for an alternative nonadversarial prelitigation procedure,” as established in Chapter 4. The court noted that Chapter 4 “contains no specifics regarding what provisions the alternative nonadversarial contractual provisions may or must include.”
The plaintiffs contended that the builder was in violation of the standards set out in Section 912, however the court responded that these sections set out one set of procedures, but they concluded that “if the Legislature had intended the section 912 disclosure provisions…it could have made the requirements applicable to all builders by locating them in a section outside Chapter 4.”
Read the court’s decision…
Changes To Indemnification Statute Are Here! Say Hello To Defense Duties
June 19, 2012 — Douglas Reiser, Builders Counsel
A months back, I discussed the passage of SHB 1559. The law changes the existing statutory indemnification regulation to include the costs of defense and to rid contracts of unfair indemnification for someone else’s sole negligence. The law went into effect last week!
Check back to my recent article on the changes set forth in the new law. The amendments to RCW 4.24.115 will broaden the existing law and clarify what types of indemnification are unenforceable. In short, an “up the chain” contractor (such as a general contractor) cannot expect to pass 100% of the defense and indemnification obligations downward if it is partially liable.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of Douglas Reiser of Reiser Legal LLC. Mr. Reiser can be contacted at info@reiserlegal.com
Was Jury Right in Negligent Construction Case?
September 30, 2011 — CDJ Staff
Yes, said the South Carolina Court of Appeals in Pope v. Heritage Communities, Inc. Heritage Communities developed Riverwalk, a community in South Carolina. During the earlier trial, HCI “conceded that construction defects existed at Riverwalk, and repairs needed to be made.” The trial court found that the construction was negligent, awarding the property owners association $4.25 million in actual damages and $250,000 in punitive damages, with the class of owners awarded $250,000 in actual damages and $750,000 in punitive damages. HCI appealed on nine issues. All were rejected by the appeals court.
The court rejected HCI’s claim that the judge’s instruction to the jury suggested to the jury that “the court had already determined that Appellants were willful, wanton, and reckless.” But here, the appeals court found “no reversible error.”
The general contractor for Riverwalk was BuildStar. Off-site management and sale were managed by Heritage Riverwalk, Inc., which also owned title to the property. Both these companies were owned by Heritage Communities, Inc. During the trial, an HCI employee testified that “the three corporations shared the same officers, directors, office, and telephone number.” The trial court found that the three entities were amalgamated. This was upheld by the appeals court.
Nor did the appeals agree with the HCI that the trial court had improperly certified a class. The owners were seen as properly constituting a class. Further, the court held that the property owners’ losses were properly included by the trial court. HCI objected at trial to the inclusion of evidence of subsequent remedial measures, however, as they did not object that it was inadmissible, the issue could not be addressed at appeal.
HCI argued on appeal that the trial court should not have allowed evidence of defects at other HCI developments. The appeals court noted that “the construction defects at the other HCI developments were substantially similar to those experienced by Riverwalk.”
The court additionally found that the negligence claims, the estimated damages (since full damage could not be determined until all defective wood was removed), and the award of punitive damages were all properly applied.
Read the court’s decision…
Construction Defect Case Not Over, Despite Summary Judgment
November 7, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The Supreme Court of Oregon has concluded in an en banc decision that a motion to reconsider a summary judgment is not a motion for a new trial. In coming to their conclusion the court overturned an earlier Oregon Supreme Court case, Carter v. U.S. National Bank. Although the decision does not bear on construction defects, the underlying case did. Due to the decision, these claims can now be evaluated in a trial.
The case, Association of Unit Owners of Timbercrest Condominiums v. Warren, came about after an apartment complex was converted into condominium units. The developers hired Big Al’s Construction for some of the remodeling work. The condominium association later sued the developer and the contractor over claims of construction defects. The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, which the court granted.
But that wasn’t the end of things. The plaintiff soon filed a “motion to reconsider,” noting that the summary judgment seemed to be in conflict with both law and other recent rulings, and additionally, the grounds for the decision were not in the order. The judge then notified the parties that the court had “pulled the trigger too quickly” and had seven questions for the parties to answer.
The court dismissed all claims against the defendants. The defendants filed their responses, objecting that that “‘there is no such thing’ as a motion for reconsideration.” Further, while “the rules do allow for post-judgment review of pre-judgment rulings through a motion for a new trial,” the plaintiffs had not filed for a new trial. But did they need one? They did file an appeal.
The judge in the case admitted that there was no such thing as a motion to reconsider, and felt bad about prematurely signing the judgment. The case was sent to the Court of Appeals to determine if the motion to reconsider was a request for a new trial. The Court of Appeals concurred.
In reviewing the decision, the Oregon Supreme Court concluded that there were a maximum of three questions to address. Was the motion for reconsideration a motion for a new trial? If so, was the later notice of appeal premature? And if so, was the plaintiff required to file a new appeal? The court determined that the answer to the first question was no.
Prior decisions pointed to the conclusion “that a motion for reconsideration of a summary judgment amounts to a motion for a new trial,” but here the court concluded that “our prior cases erred,” and turned to the summary judgment rule for clarification. The court noted that “the rule contemplates that summary judgment and trial are separate and distinct events.” With this conclusion, the Oregon Supreme Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings.
Read the court’s decision…
Coverage for Construction Defects Barred by Business Risk Exclusions
September 1, 2011 — Tred Eyerley, Insurance Law Hawaii
Although the court determined there was an occurrence, coverage was excluded by the business risk exclusions. See Cont’l W. Ins. Co. v. Shay Constr. Co., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82839 (D. Colo. July 28, 2011).
White was the general contractor on the project. White had three subcontracts with Shay to provide framing, siding, and related work on the project. Shay was insured under a CGL policy issued by Continental Western.
Two of Shay’s subcontractors furnished materials, labor and equipment to Shay. These subcontractors filed suit in state court alleging they had not been compensated for the work and materials. White and Shay were named as defendants. White cross claimed against Shay, alleging Shay had breached its obligations under the subcontracts. Several allegations sounded in contract. Other allegations, however, contended Shay had performed defective work and had damaged the work of other trades in correcting deficiencies in its own performance.
Shay sought coverage under Continental Western’s policy. Continental Western filed suit for a declaratory judgment and moved for summary judgment.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
Avoid Gaps in Construction Defect Coverage
July 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The language may be standardized, but the way different states’ courts interpret it is not. That’s the problem discussed by William F. Knowles and Brendan Winslow-Nason in an article in Business Insurance. One of the major issue through the country is whether a construction defect claim and the resultant damage are an occurrence. Additionally, there are questions whether certain exclusions apply, such as “your work” or “your product” exclusions. They note that many courts “ agree that they are intended to exclude defective construction itself, while providing coverage for unintended consequences.” They further note that these are not the only insurance issues, “making it difficult for construction companies operating across state lines to ensure adequate coverage.”
Their recommendations to contractors are that they pay careful attention to where they’ve done business and “if the states have issued decisions or if there is legislation in place address the scope of coverage under additional insured endorsements.” Additionally, they suggest determining whether a contractor can negotiate a choice of law provision in their policy. The conclude that “construction companies can take proactive steps to protect themselves by identifying the applicable states’ laws, determining whether insurance is adequate under those laws, and then taking steps to resolve any gaps in their coverage.”
Read the full story…
Changes to Arkansas Construction and Home Repair Laws
September 30, 2011 — CDJ Staff
A new law, set to take effect in 2012, lowers the ceiling on when work must be done by a licensed contractor. Through the end of the year, projects costing $20,000 or more had to be done by an Arkansas licensed contractor. As of January 1, 2012, that new limit will be $2,000.
This will apply to all single-family residences and according to Lovely County Citizen, covers “construction, alteration, renovation, repair, modification, improvement, removal, demotion, or addition to a pre-existing structure.” Residential building contractors will be required to have workers compensation insurance, as will home improvement contactors if they take jobs worth more than $20,000.
Morris Dillow, a building inspector in Holiday Island, said, “It will get these scammers out of here who are ripping people off.” He cited the example of a contractor who after getting paid for roof repairs and painting, left the job unfinished.
Read the full story…
Washington Court of Appeals Upholds Standard of Repose in Fruit Warehouse Case
August 4, 2011 — CDJ Staff
On July 28, the Washington Court of Appeals ruled in Clasen Fruit & Cold Storage v. Frederick & Michael Construction Co., Inc. that more than six years had passed since a contractor had concluded work and so granted a summary dismissal of the suit.
Frederick & Michael Construction Co., Inc. (F&M) was contracted to construct several buildings for Clasen Fruit and Cold Storage. These were completed in March, 1999. The buildings suffered wind damage to the roofs in 2001, 2003, 2005, and 2006. In the first two incidents, F&M repaired the roofs with Clasen paying for repairs.
In 2005, Clasen hired Continuous Gutter to make repairs. The final incident was the collapse of the roof of one building. This was attributed to “excessive moisture in the roof’s vapor barriers.” At this point, Clasen demanded that F&M pay for repair and replacement costs. In 2008, Clasen sued F&M for damages for breach of contract and negligent design and construction of the roof.
The decision then covered the meanings, in Washington law, of “termination of services” and “substantial completion.” The panel concluded that construction was “substantially completed in 1997” and “relevant services” by 2001. “But Clasen did not sue until 2008, some seven years after termination of any roof related services.”
Read the court’s decision…
Nevada Court Adopts Efficient Proximate Cause Doctrine
February 10, 2012 — Tred Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
Although the Nevada Supreme Court adopted the efficient proximate cause doctrine, it determined it did not apply to salvage coverage under an all-risk policy for a rain-damaged building. Fourth Street Place, LLC v. The Travelers Indemn. Co., 2011 Nev LEXIS 114 (Nev. Dec. 29, 2011).
Fourth Street owned an office building which was insured by an all-risk policy issued by Travelers. Fourth Street hired Above It All Roofing to repair the roof of the office building. Above It All removed the waterproof membrane on the roof and prepared to replace the membrane the following week. Over the weekend, however, substantial rain hit. On Sunday, Above It All returned to cover the exposed portions of the roof with tarps, but wind later blew the tarps away. The building suffered significant interior damage as it continued to be exposed to the rain.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
Geometrically Defined Drainage Cavities in EIFS as a Guard Against Defects
July 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The blog Stucco & Insulation Contractor writes up some details on a “relatively new modification to modern Exterior Insulation Finish Systems,” known as “geometrically defined insulation boards.” They note that the insulation has grooves cut in the back to provide a route for water to drain, instead of getting trapped. They note that when EIFS is installed by a skilled applicator, this is unnecessary. However, with less experienced (and cheaper) installers, problems are more likely.
By cutting these channels, the application of EIFS is rendered “idiot proof,” as they note. Their preference would be that EIFS installers take the time to do the job right, but call this “a step in the right direction.”
Read the full story…