The Hidden Dangers of Construction Defect Litigation
March 28, 2012 — David M. McLain, Colorado Construction Litigation
David M. McLain, writing at Colorado Construction Litigation, has an interesting blog post republishing his article in Common Interests magazine, the monthly periodical of the Rocky Mountain Chapter of the Community Associations Institute. In his article, he touches on a number of pitfalls in construction defect litigation, including the potential conflicts of interests facing HOAs. He also considers the problems homeowners can face, including both “strong-arm tactics” taken by attorneys to compel homeowners to join the lawsuit, or situations in which the interests of the HOA do not match those of the homeowners. He writes:
There is also a conflict of interest with individual owners who attempt to opt out of the case. This can lead to shocking strong-arm tactics on the part of plaintiffs’ attorneys. In one instance, a plaintiffs’ attorney sent a letter to an individual homeowner that stated that as a 1/58th owner of the common elements, if he refused to go along with the suit, and there was ultimately a finding in favor of the HOA which was in any way limited by his refusal to participate, he would be personally liable for 1/58th of the HOA’s total damages. In another instance, a different plaintiffs’ attorney sent a letter to a homeowner who wanted the builder to perform warranty repairs, informing the owner that if he let the builder perform any repairs, the attorney would bill the HOA according to the fee agreement entered by the HOA board (without knowledge or consent of non-board members) and that the HOA would assess the homeowner for that expense. These are just two examples of conflicts which may arise between the HOA board and individual homeowners when the HOA pursues CD cases.
Another example of a conflict which will arise as a result of CD litigation occurs post-settlement. When an HOA settles for less than 100% of the amount necessary to fund all repairs outlined by its experts, plus attorneys’ fees and litigation costs, there will obviously be a shortfall in the amount necessary to fix the development. The HOA board must then choose to impose a special assessment to cover the shortfall or to make some, but not all, of the repairs outlined by its experts. In choosing the latter, the conflict arises with respect to which homes get fixed and which do not. In this situation, the HOA board has acted as the attorney-in-fact for the individual owners by bringing claims on their behalf, and has compromised those claims without their knowledge or consent.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of David M. McLain of Higgins, Hopkins, McClain & Roswell, LLC. Mr. McClain can be contacted at mclain@hhmrlaw.com.
California insured’s duty to cooperate and insurer’s right to select defense counsel
April 14, 2011 — April 14, 2011 - CDCoverage.com
In Travelers Property Casualty Co. v. Centex Homes, No. C 10-02757 (N.D. Cal. April 1, 2011), general contractor Centex was sued by homeowners for construction defects. Centex tendered its defense to Travelers as an additional insured under policies issued by Travelers to two Centex subcontractors. Travelers agreed to defend Centex under a reservation of rights and selected defense counsel to defend Centex. Centex refused to accept the defense, asserting that it was entitled to select defense counsel. Travelers filed suit against Centex seeking a declaratory judgment that Centex had breached the duty to cooperate condition in the Travelers’ policy.
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of CDCoverage.com
Australian Developer Denies Building Problems Due to Construction Defects
June 15, 2011 — CDJ Staff
The Sunland Group, the developer, is objecting to claims that it is responsible for corrosion damage in a residential building in Gold Coast, Australia, as reported in the Courier & Mail. Residents of Q1, the world’s tallest residential tower, are suing the developer, claiming that defects and corrosion “compromise the long-term durability and appearance of” the six-year-old building.
The developer has not only denied that there are defects in the building, but has also stated that the construction contract “did not warrant that the construction would be defects-free.” Sunland claimed that corrosion was due to the homeowners association having “failed to carry out the maintenance requirements.”
Repair of the building is expected to cost millions of dollars. Sunland denies that it should pay any of that.
Read the full story…
Construction Defect Not a RICO Case, Says Court
August 4, 2011 — CDJ Staff
The US District Court of North Carolina has rejected an attempt by a homeowner to restart her construction defect claim by turning it into a RICO lawsuit. Linda Sharp, the plaintiff in the case of Sharp v. Town of Kitty Hawk, attempted to amend a claim under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and argued that her case belonged in the federal courts.
Ms. Sharp sued in November, 2010 claiming construction defects. She sued in federal court, although the court noted that as she and most of the defendants are citizens of North Carolina, the state court would have been the appropriate jurisdiction. Further, the court noted that one federal claim Sharp made was dismissed with prejudice, leaving only the state law claims. These the court dismissed without prejudice, declining to exercise jurisdiction over North Carolina law.
After the dismissal, Ms. Sharp attempted to amend her complaint after the deadline. To do so, according to the court, she would be required to obtain consent from defendants or leave of the court. She did neither.
In his opinion, Judge W. Earl Britt rejected her motion for leave to amend. He also granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The clerk was directed to close the case.
Read the court’s decision…
Policing Those Subcontractors: It Might Take Extra Effort To Be An Additional Insured
June 14, 2011 — Douglas Reiser, Builders Council Blog
I just came across a case that I think truly paints the insurance dilemma for contractors. Thanks to this recent Illinois case, I don’t have to make up any factual scenarios—so kudos to Attorney Robert Boylan for posting it.
In reading over my RSS feeds this weekend, I noticed a great writeup on long-time blogger Josh Glazov’s Construction Law Today. Attorney Robert Boylan’s post describes a recent Illinois case where a general contractor was denied its additional insured status on a second-tier subcontractor’s insurance. The reason for the denial: the general contractor failed to procure an agreement in writing with the second-tier subcontractor, requiring it to be listed as an additional insured.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of Douglas Reiser of Reiser Legal LLC. Mr. Reiser can be contacted at info@reiserlegal.com
Renovation Contractors: Be Careful How You Disclose Your Projects
December 9, 2011 — Derek J. Lindenschmidt, Colorado Construction Litigation
In Palu and Beyer v. Toney, 2011 WL 2560249 (Bankr. D. Colo.), the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado determined that a Colorado District Court order granting summary judgment in favor of plaintiff home buyers was binding on the Bankruptcy Court in the defendant contractor’s bankruptcy proceeding based on issue preclusion.
Pertinent to this column is the subject matter of the summary judgment motion: Colorado’s Seller’s Property Disclosure (Form LC-18-5-04). In the underlying state court action, the plaintiff home buyers filed a motion for summary judgment contending that the defendant contractor represented to them, through the Seller’s Property Disclosure, that there were no present or past conditions involving moisture or water problems, roof problems or leaks, skylight problems, or gutter downspout problems.
In granting plaintiffs’ motion, the state court determined that the defendant contractor made these representations on her Seller’s Property Disclosure despite witnessing water leaking from the skylight onto the floor and being aware of repairs to the roof, skylight, and interior drywall prior to the sale of the property.
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Reprinted courtesy of Derek J. Lindenschmidt of Higgins, Hopkins, McClain & Roswell, LLP. Mr. Lindenschmidt can be contacted at lindenschmidt@hhmrlaw.com
Surveyors Statute Trumps Construction Defect Claim in Tennessee
June 19, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The Tennessee Court of Appeals has issued an opinion in the case of Dale v. B&J Enters. (Tenn. App., 2012), affirming the ruling of the Chancery Court for Knox County. The homeowners purchased properties in Knoxville, Tennessee in 2007 and 2008. Subsequently, according to the complaint, they found “significant sink holes and depressions throughout the subdivision.” The plaintiffs determined that a previous developer in 2004 had been aware of the sink holes. The Knox County Metropolitan Planning Commission, upon giving approval, made requirements that included that sink holes, even if they were filled, had to be designated on the site plans. The developer did not indicate these locations on the final plans. The plaintiffs made claims of “failure to disclose, misrepresentation, misrepresentation by concealment, and violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act.” They filed their suit in June 2009.
The defendants in the initial case, argued that they did not create the final plat, the site plan indicating the features and lot lines. This had been the work of the previous developer. In September, 2009, the plaintiffs amended their complaint to include the previous developer and its engineering firm. The engineering firm disavowed any responsibility. The developer noted that the surveyor, Benchmark Associates, had “failed to properly include the sink holes and/or depressions on the final plat.” In June, 2010, the plaintiffs added Benchmark.
Benchmark argued that the plaintiffs’ claims should be dismissed, as Tennessee has a four-year statute of limitations on claims against surveyors. The final plat was recorded on May 19, 2006, and the plaintiff filed their claims against Benchmark on June 16, 2010, slightly less than a month over four years. The plaintiffs argued that “the real issue [was] the tortious misrepresentation by Benchmark.” The Chancery Court found for Benchmark.
On appeal, the plaintiffs raised three issues. They argued that the trial court applied the wrong section of the law, and should have applied the section applying to construction and not surveyors. They also argued that the timeliness of the claim should be based on when the defects were discovered. The also raised the question of whether the laws concerning surveyors bar claims for misrepresentation. The appeals court upheld the decision of the Chancery Court.
For the plaintiff’s first claim, although the statute addressing deficiencies in construction mentions surveying, an earlier court ruling found that the legislature had removed a reference to surveyors in one part of the statute, but failed to do so in the second part. The earlier court had concluded that the “obvious intent of the legislature was to place all limits on actions against surveyors into the new statute.” As the applicable statute states that “any such action not instituted within this four (4) year period shall be forever barred,” the court held that the plaintiffs’ claims must be time barred. Further, as the intent of the legislature was determined to “place all limits on actions against surveyors into one statute,” the court felt that it could not apply the Consumer Protection Act.
Read the court’s decision…
Defective Drains Covered Despite Water Intrusion Exclusion
July 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The US District Court in Washington State has granted a summary judgment in Hiller v. Allstate Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. The Hillers bought a new home in Wenatchee, Washington and insured it with an “all risk” policy from Allstate. Subsequently, Mr. Hiller discovered that the carpet in the basement was saturated with water. Hiller notified Allstate who requested that he determine the source of the water intrusion. Hiller poured water into a downspout drain and found this caused water to leak into the home’s basement.
Further investigation with the homes original excavation contractor revealed that “the end of the drain pipe was partially blocked by rocks and had been wrapped with fabric landscaping material.” Additionally, “a ‘T’ pipe installed at the foot of the drain was directing water toward the house’s concrete foundation.” Allstate denied the claim “under the policy’s surface water, subsurface water, inherent vice, and latent defect exlusions.” After the denial, Hiller “discovered that the foundation had not been treated with waterproof sealant and that several concrete form pins were still in place.”
The court noted that “there is no genuine dispute about the cause of the claimed loss.” This left the court concluding that “the only relevant question for the purposes of the instant cross-motions for summary judgment is whether a loss caused by defective construction is covered under the Hillers’ ‘all risk’ insurance policy.” Under Washington’s “efficient proximate cause” rule, “where an insured risk itself sets into operation a chain of causation in which the last step may have en an excepted risk, the excepted risk will not defeat recovery.” The court found that a loss caused by defective construction is in fact covered under the policy, noting that “the policy does not contain an exclusion for defective construction.”
The court concluded that the defective drain was not an inherent vice, as it “cannot properly be characterized as defects ‘inherent [in the] nature of the commodity which will cause it to deteriorate with a lapse of time.” Nor was it a latent defect, “one that could not have been discovered by inspection.” The court concluded that “both of the construction defects at issue could have been discovered by a reasonable inspection.”
With these facts determined, the court found for the Hillers.
Read the court»s decision…
Tenth Circuit Finds Insurer Must Defend Unintentional Faulty Workmanship
December 9, 2011 — Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
Applying Colorado law, the Tenth Circuit found a duty to defend construction defect claims where the faulty workmanship was unintentional. Greystone Const. Inc. v. National Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 22053 (10th Cir. Nov. 1, 2011). A prior post [here] discussed the Tenth Circuit’s certified question to the Colorado Supreme Court in this matter, a request that was rejected by the Colorado court.
In two underlying cases, Greystone was sued by the homeowner for damage caused to the foundation by soil expansion. In both cases, the actual construction was performed by subcontractors. Further, in neither case was the damage intended or anticipated. Nevertheless, National Union refused to defend, contending property damage resulting from faulty construction was not an occurrence.
Relying on a Colorado Court of Appeals case, General Security Indemn. Co. of Arizona v. Mountain States Mut. Cas. Co., 205 P.3d 529 (Colo. App. 2009), the district court granted summary judgment to National Union.
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit first considered whether Colorado legislation enacted to overturn General Security could be applied retroactively. The statute, section 13-20-808, provided courts "shall presume that the work of a construction professional that results in property damage, including damage to the work itself or other work, is an accident unless the property damage is intended and expected by the insured."
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
In Colorado, Primary Insurers are Necessary Parties in Declaratory Judgment Actions
December 9, 2011 — Heather M. Anderson, Colorado Construction Litigation
The United States District Court for the District of Colorado recently ruled that primary insurers are necessary parties, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 19, in a declaratory judgment action being pursued by an excess carrier. See Insurance Co. of State of Pennsylvania v. LNC Communities II, LLC, 2011 WL 5548955 (D. Colo. 2011). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19 is almost identical to Colorado Rule of Civil Procedure 19 and pertains to the joinder of persons needed for “just adjudication.” The Insurance Co. of the State of Pennsylvania (“ICSOP”) sought a declaratory judgment that it did not have a duty to defend or indemnify the defendants (collectively referred to as “Lennar Companies”) with regard to the underlying lawsuit brought by The Falls at Legend Trail Owners Association, Inc. (the “HOA”). Id. at *2. In its lawsuit, the HOA alleged Lennar Companies were liable for construction defects at The Falls at Legend Trail residential development.
Lennar Companies held two primary insurance policies, one issued by OneBeacon Insurance Company f/k/a General Accident Insurance Company (“General Accident”) and the other issued by American Safety Risk Retention Group, Inc. (“American Safety”). Lennar Companies also carried excess policies issued by ICSOP and Ohio Casualty Insurance Company (“Ohio Casualty”).
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Reprinted courtesy of Heather M. Anderson of Higgins, Hopkins, McClain & Roswell, LLP. Ms Anderson can be contacted at anderson@hhmrlaw.com
Excess Carrier Successfully Appeals Primary Insurer’s Summary Judgment Award
December 9, 2011 — Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
Although the excess carrier was given inadequate notice of the underlying arbitration, the trial court determined it shared responsibility with the primary carrier for the arbitration award. Finding disputed issues of fact, the Washington Court of Appeals reversed in Am. States Ins. Co. v. Century Surety Co., 2011 Wash. App. LEXIS 2488 (Wash. Ct. App. Oct. 31, 2011).
The primary insurer, American States, issued two liability policies to Professional Home Builders (PHB), a siding contractor. The policies were for successive years, 1998-1999 and 1999-2000. Each policy had annual limits of $1 million per occurrence. PHB also had a commercial excess liability policy for 1999-2000 with Century Surety Company.
PHB was sued by Residential Investment Partners (RIP) for construction defects after moisture entered the building envelope, causing decay and damage. Century’s expert determined the decay started before the 1999-2000 policy period.
RIP and PHB went to arbitration.
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
Federal Court Denies Summary Judgment in Leaky Condo Conversion
August 4, 2011 — CDJ Staff
In the US District Court for Illinois, Judge William Hibber has rejected the request for summary judgment sought by the developers of a condominium building in the case of Nautilus Ins. Co. v. 1735 W. Diversey, LLC (the insureds). The insureds renovated a building at 1735 W. Diversey, Chicago, converting it into condominiums. After the project was completed and all units sold, and a condominium association form, one of the owners found that unit suffered leaks during rainstorms. The condo board hired a firm, CRI, to investigate the cause of the leakage. CRI found “water infiltration through the exterior brick masonry walls, build-up of efflorescence on the interior surfaces of the masonry, and periodic spalling of portions of the brick masonry.”
The redevelopment firm had purchased coverage from Nautilus. “Shortly after the Board filed its first complaint, the Insureds tendered the mater to Nautilus and requested that it indemnify and defend them from the Board's underlying claims. Nautilus, however, rejected the Insureds’ tender and denied coverage under both insurance policies.” Nautilus stated that the water leakage did not constitute an occurrence under the policies. The court cited these policies in which an occurrence is defined as “an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful conditions.” The Illinois courts have determined that construction defects are not accidents.
The court concluded that the insured did not bring forth claims within the coverage of the policies and denied the motion for summary judgment.
Read the court’s decision…
Washington Supreme Court Sides with Lien Claimants in Williams v. Athletic Field
September 30, 2011 — Douglas Reiser, Builders Counsel
The Washington Supreme Court issued their opinion today on Williams v. Athletic Field, perhaps the most talked about construction law case in the past few years. I have discussed this case exhaustively here on Builders Counsel. Today we have a resolution.
In an unanimous opinion issued today, the high court sided with lien filers who followed a sample form provided in RCW 60.04.091. Additionally, the court found that a lien company - and presumably other persons - could sign the lien for the lien claimant, as an agent, without invalidating the lien.
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Reprinted courtesy of Douglas Reiser of Reiser Legal LLC. Mr. Reiser can be contacted at info@reiserlegal.com
Construction Defect Case Not Over, Despite Summary Judgment
November 7, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The Supreme Court of Oregon has concluded in an en banc decision that a motion to reconsider a summary judgment is not a motion for a new trial. In coming to their conclusion the court overturned an earlier Oregon Supreme Court case, Carter v. U.S. National Bank. Although the decision does not bear on construction defects, the underlying case did. Due to the decision, these claims can now be evaluated in a trial.
The case, Association of Unit Owners of Timbercrest Condominiums v. Warren, came about after an apartment complex was converted into condominium units. The developers hired Big Al’s Construction for some of the remodeling work. The condominium association later sued the developer and the contractor over claims of construction defects. The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, which the court granted.
But that wasn’t the end of things. The plaintiff soon filed a “motion to reconsider,” noting that the summary judgment seemed to be in conflict with both law and other recent rulings, and additionally, the grounds for the decision were not in the order. The judge then notified the parties that the court had “pulled the trigger too quickly” and had seven questions for the parties to answer.
The court dismissed all claims against the defendants. The defendants filed their responses, objecting that that “‘there is no such thing’ as a motion for reconsideration.” Further, while “the rules do allow for post-judgment review of pre-judgment rulings through a motion for a new trial,” the plaintiffs had not filed for a new trial. But did they need one? They did file an appeal.
The judge in the case admitted that there was no such thing as a motion to reconsider, and felt bad about prematurely signing the judgment. The case was sent to the Court of Appeals to determine if the motion to reconsider was a request for a new trial. The Court of Appeals concurred.
In reviewing the decision, the Oregon Supreme Court concluded that there were a maximum of three questions to address. Was the motion for reconsideration a motion for a new trial? If so, was the later notice of appeal premature? And if so, was the plaintiff required to file a new appeal? The court determined that the answer to the first question was no.
Prior decisions pointed to the conclusion “that a motion for reconsideration of a summary judgment amounts to a motion for a new trial,” but here the court concluded that “our prior cases erred,” and turned to the summary judgment rule for clarification. The court noted that “the rule contemplates that summary judgment and trial are separate and distinct events.” With this conclusion, the Oregon Supreme Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings.
Read the court’s decision…
Arizona Court of Appeals Decision in $8.475 Million Construction Defect Class Action Suit
May 9, 2011 — May 9, 2011 Beverley BevenFlorez - Construction Defect Journal
In the case of Leflet v. Fire (Ariz. App., 2011), which involved an $8.475 million settlement in a construction defect class action suit, the question put forth to the Appeals court was “whether an insured and an insurer can join in a Morris agreement that avoids the primary insurer’s obligation to pay policy limits and passes liability in excess of those limits on to other insurers.” The Appeals court provided several reasons for their decision to affirm the validity of the settlement agreement as to the Non-Participatory Insurers (NPIs) and to vacate and remand the attorney fee awards.
First, the Appeals court stated, “The settlement agreement is not a compliant Morris agreement and provides no basis for claims against the NPIs.” They conclude, “Appellants attempt to avoid the doctrinal underpinnings of Morris by arguing that ‘the cooperation clause did not prohibit Hancock from assigning its rights to anyone, including Appellants.’ This narrow reading of the cooperation clause ignores the fact that Hancock did not merely assign its rights — it assigned its rights after stipulating to an $8.475 million judgment that neither it nor its Direct Insurers could ever be liable to pay. Neither Morris nor any other case defines such conduct as actual ‘cooperation’—rather, Morris simply defines limited circumstances in which an insured is relieved of its duty to cooperate. Because Morris agreements are fraught with risk of abuse, a settlement that mimics Morris in form but does not find support in the legal and economic realities that gave rise to that decision is both unenforceable and offensive to the policy’s cooperation clause.”
The Appeals court further concluded that “even if the agreement had qualified under Morris, plaintiffs did not provide the required notice to the NPIs.” The court continued, “Because an insurer who defends under a reservation of rights is always aware of the possibility of a Morris agreement, the mere threat of Morris in the course of settlement negotiations does not constitute sufficient notice. Instead, the insurer must be made aware that it may waive its reservation of rights and provide an unqualified defense, or defend solely on coverage and reasonableness grounds against the judgment resulting from the Morris agreement. The NPIs were not given the protections of this choice before the agreement was entered, and therefore can face no liability for the resulting stipulated judgment.”
Next, the Appeals court declared that “the trial court abused its discretion in awarding attorney’s fees under A.R.S § 12-341.” The Appeals court reasoned, “In this case, the NPIs prevailed in their attack on the settlement. But the litigation did not test the merits of their coverage defenses or the reasonableness of the settlement amount. And Plaintiffs never sued the NPIs, either in their own right or as the assignees of Hancock. Rather, the NPIs intervened to test the conceptual validity of the settlement agreement (to which they were not parties) before such an action could commence. In these circumstances, though it might be appropriate to offset a fee award against some future recovery by the Plaintiff Leflet v. Fire (Ariz. App., 2011) class, the purposes of A.R.S. § 12-341.01 would not be served by an award of fees against them jointly and severally. We therefore conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding fees against Plaintiffs ‘jointly and severally.’”
The Appeals court made the following conclusion: “we affirm the judgment of the trial court concerning the validity of the settlement agreement as to the NPIs. We vacate and remand the award of attorney’s fees. In our discretion, we decline to award the NPIs the attorney’s fees they have requested on appeal pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-341.01(A).”
Read the court’s decision…
New Construction Laws, New Forms in California
July 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
New construction laws came into effect in California on July 1. Writing for the Martindale-Hubble Legal Library, Glenn Mau, J. Michael McGuire, and John Tonsing, all of Archer Norris, discuss these changes. They note that the most important part of the changes to California construction law is that “all mechanics liens, stop notices and bond claims recorded after July 1, 2012 must use the new standardized forms and follow the new definitions, notice prerequisites and statutory release form language.”
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District Court Awards Summary Judgment to Insurance Firm in Framing Case
August 4, 2011 — CDJ Staff
In the case of Continental Western Insurance Company v. Shay Construction Inc., Judge Walker Miller has granted a summary judgment against Shay Construction and their co-defendant, Milender White Construction Company.
Shay was the framing subcontractor for Milender White on what the court described as “a major construction project in Grand County, Colorado.” Two of Shay’s subcontractors, Wood Source Inc. and Chase Lumber Company furnished materials, labor, and equipment to Shay. They subsequently sued for nonpayment and sought to enforce mechanic’s liens, naming both Shay and Milender as defendants. Milender White alleged that Shay had “breached its obligation under its subcontracts with Milender White.”
Shay’s insurance provider, Continental Western, stated that its coverage did not include “the dispute between Shay, its subcontractors, particularly the cross claims asserted by Milender White.” Shay then sued Continental Western, alleging breach of contract and statutory bad faith.
The court, however, has found with Continental Western and has granted them a summary judgment. They found “no genuine issue as to any material fact.” The judge did not side with Continental Western on their interpretation of the phrase “those sums that the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as damages.” The court found that the Colorado courts have not limited this to tort actions only. However, as Milender’s cross claim included claims of faulty workmanship on the part of Shay, Judge Miller found for Continental.
Read the court’s decision…
Hilton Grand Vacations Defect Trial Delayed
October 23, 2012 — CDJ Staff
A settlement agreement between Conti Electric and Westgate Resorts has lead to a delay in starting the trial over construction defect claims and billing disputes over Hilton Grand Vacations a time share tower in Las Vegas. According to the Las Vegas Review-Journal, the dispute includes claims of $23.3 million owed to the general contractor against which the developer has placed $30 million in construction defect claims.
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