Nevada Budget Remains at Impasse over Construction Defect Law
June 1, 2011 — CDJ Staff
Negotiations for the Nevada state budget have stalled over proposals to amend the state’s construction defect laws. Assembly Republicans had offered changes to the law to make it friendlier to contractors; however, after a state Supreme Court ruling that the state could not move a local government entity’s funds into state coffers, pressure has increased on the governor to lift the expiration dates of taxes approved in 2009.
The Reno Gazette-Journal quotes John Madole, a construction industry lobbyist, “We agree with them that you have to address the issue of the attorney fees, and for all practical purposes, they are automatically awarded when anybody brings any kind of suit.”
Speaker of the Assembly, John Oceguera, a Democrat, has proposed a bill that “makes it absolutely crystal clear that the only time you get attorney's fees is if you're the prevailing party.”
Read the full story…
California Appeals Court Remands Fine in Late Completion Case
November 18, 2011 — CDJ Staff
The California Court of Appeals in Stanislaus County has reversed the decision of the lower court in Greg Opinski Construction Inc. v. City of Oakdale. The earlier court had awarded the city of judgment of $54,000 for late completion, $3,266 for repair of construction defects and interest, and $97,775 in attorneys’ fees. The late completion of the project was due to actions by the City of Oakdale, however, the court rejected Opinski’s argument that the California Supreme Court decision in Kiewit did not allow this, as his contract with the city established a procedure for claiming extensions.
The appeals court noted that the Kiewit decision has been “criticized as an unwarranted interference in the power of contracting parties to shift the risk of delays caused by one party onto the other party by forcing the second party to give the first notice of any intention to claim an extension of time based on delays caused by first.” They cited Sweet, a professor at Boalt Hall, UC Berkeley’s law school, that Kiewit “gutted” the “provision that conditions the contractor’s right to claim an extension of time for delays beyond his control.”
Further changes in California law in response to the Kiewit decision lead to the current situation which the court characterized as “if the contractor wished to claim it needed an extension of time because of delays caused by the city, the contractor was required to obtain a written change order by mutual consent or submit a claim in writing requesting a formal decision by the engineer.”
Opinski also argued that the lower court misinterpreted the contract. The Appeals court replied that “Opinski is mistaken.” He cited parts of the contract regarding the increase of time, but the court rejected these, noting that “an inability to agree is not the same as an express rejection.”
The court also rejects Opinski’s appeal that “the evidence the project was complete earlier than September 30, 2005, is weightier than the evidence to the contrary,” which they describe as “not a winning appellate argument.” The court points out that the role of an appeals court is not to reweigh the evidence, but to determine “whether the record contains substantial evidence in support of the judgment.”
The court did side with Opinski on one question of the escrow account. They rejected most of his arguments, repeating the line “Opinski is mistaken” several times. They decided that he was mistaken on the timing of the setoff decision and on whether the city was the prevailing party. However, the appeals court did find that Opinski was not liable for interest on the judgment.
The appeals court rejected the awarding of prejudgment interest to the city as the funds from which the judgment was drawn was held in an escrow account. The court noted that the city had access to the funds and could “access the funds when it determined that Opinski had breached the contract.” The appeals court noted that the judgment exhausted the escrow balance and remanded the case to the lower court to determine the amount own to Opinski.
Read the court’s decision…
HOA Has No Claim to Extend Statute of Limitations in Construction Defect Case
October 28, 2011 — CDJ Staff
The California Court of Appeals ruled on September 20, 2011 in the case of Arundel Homeowners Association v. Arundel Green Partners, a construction defect case involving a condominium conversion in San Francisco. Eight years after the Notice of Completion was filed, the homeowners association filed a lawsuit alleging a number of construction defects, including “defective cabinets, waterproofing membranes, wall-cladding, plumbing, electrical wiring, roofing (including slope, drainage and flashings), fire-rated ceilings, and chimney flues.” Three years of settlement negotiations followed.
Negotiations ended in the eleventh year with the homeowners association filing a lawsuit. Arundel Green argued that the suit should be thrown out as California’s ten-year statute of limitations had passed. The court granted judgment to Arundel Green.
The homeowners then filed for a new trial and to amend its complaint, arguing that the statute of limitations should not apply due to the doctrine of equitable estoppel as Arundel Green’s actions had lead them to believe the issues could be solved without a lawsuit. “The HOA claimed that it was not until after the statute of limitations ran that the HOA realized Arundel Green would not keep its promises; and after this realization, the HOA promptly brought its lawsuit.” The trial court denied the homeowners association’s motions, which the homeowners association appealed.
In reviewing the case, the Appeals Court compared Arundel to an earlier California Supreme Court case, Lantzy. (The homeowners also cited Lantzy as the basis of their appeal.) In Lantzy, the California Supreme Court set up a four-part test as to whether estoppel could be applied. The court applied these tests and found, as was the case in Lantzy, that there were no grounds for estoppel.
In Arundel, the court noted that “there are simply no allegations that Arundel Green made any affirmative statement or promise that would lull the HOA into a reasonable belief that its claims would be resolved without filing a lawsuit.” The court also cited Lesko v. Superior Court which included a recommendation that the plaintiffs “send a stipulation?Ķextending time.” This did not happen and the court upheld the dismissal.
Read the court’s decision…
District Court Awards Summary Judgment to Insurance Firm in Framing Case
August 4, 2011 — CDJ Staff
In the case of Continental Western Insurance Company v. Shay Construction Inc., Judge Walker Miller has granted a summary judgment against Shay Construction and their co-defendant, Milender White Construction Company.
Shay was the framing subcontractor for Milender White on what the court described as “a major construction project in Grand County, Colorado.” Two of Shay’s subcontractors, Wood Source Inc. and Chase Lumber Company furnished materials, labor, and equipment to Shay. They subsequently sued for nonpayment and sought to enforce mechanic’s liens, naming both Shay and Milender as defendants. Milender White alleged that Shay had “breached its obligation under its subcontracts with Milender White.”
Shay’s insurance provider, Continental Western, stated that its coverage did not include “the dispute between Shay, its subcontractors, particularly the cross claims asserted by Milender White.” Shay then sued Continental Western, alleging breach of contract and statutory bad faith.
The court, however, has found with Continental Western and has granted them a summary judgment. They found “no genuine issue as to any material fact.” The judge did not side with Continental Western on their interpretation of the phrase “those sums that the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as damages.” The court found that the Colorado courts have not limited this to tort actions only. However, as Milender’s cross claim included claims of faulty workmanship on the part of Shay, Judge Miller found for Continental.
Read the court’s decision…
Exclusions Bar Coverage for Damage Caused by Chinese Drywall
July 5, 2011 —
Tred R. Eyerly,
Insurance Law HawaiiThe insured homeowners were unsuccessful in arguing around the policy's exclusions when seeking coverage for damage caused by Chinese drywall. Ross v. C. Adams. Constr. & Design, L.L.C., 2011 La. App. LEXIS 769 (La. Ct. App. June 14, 2011).
Before the insureds purchased and moved into their home, it was renovated. After moving in, the insures discovered foreign gypsum drywall, or Chinese drywall. The insureds submitted a claim to Louisiana Citizens Property Insurance Company. In an investigation, the insurer confirmed the presence of Chinese drywall and damage to the metal surfaces caused by corrosion. Louisiana Citizens refused coverage and the insureds sued. The trial court denied the insured's motion for summary judgment and granted summary judgment to Louisiana Citizens.
The court of appeal affirmed. Initially, the court determined the insureds sustained a direct physical loss. The inherent qualities of the Chinese drywall created a physical loss to the home and required that the drywall be removed and replaced.
Four exclusions, however, barred coverage. First, damages due to faulty or defective materials were excluded from coverage. The Chinese drywall emitted high levels of sulfuric gas which caused the damage to the insured's plumbing, electrical wiring and metal components.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
West Hollywood Building: Historic Building May Be Defective
August 16, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The Sunset Lanai apartment building in West Hollywood, California has its fans, it also has its detractors. Designed by Edward H. Flickett and built in 1952 by George Alexander, the building isn’t wearing its years lightly. Its owner has opposed a move by the West Hollywood Preservation Commission that the building is a “local cultural resource.” Instead, Edwin Silver, the building’s owner says the group has overstated the building’s significance. His lawyer points to “design and construction flaws,” and says the building is prone to flooding and leaks. Repairs to the building have an estimated cost of $2.3 million, according to the L.A. Times.
The West Hollywood City Council decided to table the question of a historical designation as that might impede repairs. However, they did decide that if Silver seeks to demolish the building, they will grant the protection.
Read the full story…
The Ever-Growing Thicket Of California Civil Code Section 2782
January 6, 2012 — Michael D. Worthing, Borton Petrini
California Civil Code section 2782 imposes limits on indemnity and defense provisions in construction contracts. Since the initial adoption of S.B. 8001 in 2002 (eff. January 1, 2003) section 27822 has been revised several times, and legislative history suggests that interest groups representing builders, developers and sub-contractors, as well as the insurance industry, have seen legislative action on these indemnity and defense issues as part of the overall response to the same economic pressures resulting from construction defect litigation that gave rise to S.B. 800. Amendments in 2005, 2007, 2008 and 2011 (each effective January 1 of the following year) have increasingly entangled the provisions of Section 2782 with various provisions of S.B. 800. The application of section 2782 to construction contracts, and in particular contracts between developer-builders and subcontractors, executed after January 1, 2006, will require a concurrent reading and understanding of S.B. 800, the application of which is itself still in flux.
The time a construction contract was executed will likely determine which version of section 2782, read in connection with provisions of S.B.800, is applicable. Because of the nature of construction defect litigation, the determination of relative rights and liabilities of developer-builders vis-à-vis subcontractors under construction contracts does not become the subject of litigation, and legal and judicial interpretation, until years after the contracts were entered and work performed. As of the date this article is submitted, there has been no case law interpreting or applying any of the post S.B. 800 amendments, in part, and perhaps primarily, because litigation arising from construction contracts executed after January 1, 2006, has not yet reached the appellate courts.
SECTION 2782 AT THE TIME S.B. 800 WAS ENACTED
Section 2782 was originally enacted in 1967 and amended several times to the version in effect when S.B. 800 became law, at which time the section was relatively simple and straightforward. It then consisted of two subdivisions, which have essentially remained unchanged until the most recent amendment during the 2011 legislative session.
Section 2782 (a) prohibited, and still prohibits, provisions in construction contracts that “purport to indemnify the promisee against liability for damages for death or bodily injury to persons, injury to property, or any other loss, damage or expense arising from the sole negligence or willful misconduct of the promise.” This provision essentially prohibits what had been referred to as so-called Type I or “specific” indemnity provisions. In such agreements, the indemnitor [the promisor, that is, the person or entity indemnifying] will indemnify the indemnitee [the promisee, that is, the person or entity being protected by the indemnity] for the indemnitee’s own negligence, whether active or passive, whether the indemnitee is solely negligent or concurrently negligent with the indemnitor. (See, MacDonald & Kruse, Inc. v. San Jose Steel Co. (1972) 29 Cal.App.3d 413, 419.)3 Section 2782 (a) has remained essentially intact since the enactment of S.B. 800. It still must be considered and applied to interpret a construction contract. Generally, it will apply to contracts not involving a public agency; the next part of section 2782 specifically governs such contracts.
The second subdivision prohibits provisions in any construction contract with a public agency which purport to impose on the contractor, or relieve the public agency from, liability for the active negligence of the public agency. Subdivision (b) has been revised by the 2011 amendment, discussed below. If a construction contract with the public agency is for residential construction, the standards of S.B. 800 likely apply.4
This was the extent of section 2782 on January 1, 2003, when S.B. 800 went into effect, and remained so until January 1, 2006. This version will govern interpretation and application of indemnity and defense provisions in construction contracts executed before January 1, 2006.5
2005 AMENDMENT
The first “post S.B. 800” change to Section 2782 was in enacted in 2005, effective January 1, 2006, and added two new sections. Subdivision (c) stated (in somewhat greater detail than paraphrased here) that for residential construction contracts, or amendments thereto, entered into after January 1, 2006, a subcontractor cannot be required to indemnify (including the cost to defend) a builder for construction defects that arise out of negligence or design defects of the builder or other independent contractors, or that do not arise out of the scope of the subcontractor=s scope of work. The term “residential construction” was defined by reference to S.B.800 generally, and the term “builder” was defined by reference to section 911 (a part of S.B. 800), for the first time expressly connecting provisions of section 2782 to S.B. 800. Contractual provisions not expressly prohibited were reserved to the agreement of the parties.
What subdivision (c) took away was partially given back by subdivision (d). It stated that “subdivision (c) does not prohibit a subcontractor and builder from mutually agreeing to the timing or immediacy of the defense and provisions for reimbursement of defense fees and costs, so long as that agreement, upon final resolution of the claims, does not waive or modify the provisions of subdivision (c).”6 In addition, it stated that this subdivision (c) did not affect the obligations of an insurance carrier under Presley Homes, Inc. v. American States Insurance Company (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 571, which holds that where an insurer has a duty to defend a developer pursuant to an additional insured endorsement obtained under a subcontractor’s policy, that duty generally applies to the entire action, even if the suit involves both covered and uncovered claims, or a single claim only partially covered by the policy. Finally, subdivision (d) stated that the amendment did not affect the builder’s or subcontractor’s obligations under S.B. 800. Both of these latter provisions, relating to the Presley Homes case, and obligations under S.B. 800, have been carried forward essentially intact in subsequent amendments of section 2782.
This version of section 2782 will be applicable to any contract between a builder as defined by section 911 (see fn. 4, above) and a subcontractor executed between January 1, 2006, and December 31, 2008. Thus, a general contractor, etc., who is not a builder is not subject to the provisions added by the 2005 amendment; this changed with the next amendment.
It is not clear whether this version would apply to a contract entered before January 1, 2006, but amended after that date. Subdivision (c) applies to “all construction contracts, and amendments thereto, entered into after January 1, 2006, for residential construction.” It would seem that the clearest and most logical construction would apply it only to contracts originally made after January 1, 2006, and thereafter amended, but there has been no judicial determination of this issue.
In addition, logically it would seem that this version of section 2782 should be applicable to construction contracts for residential construction between a builder and a subcontractor, entered between January 1, 2006, and December 31, 2008; however, legislative history relating to the 2008 amendment discussed below suggests a different result might occur.
2007 AMENDMENT
The second “post S.B. 800” amendment in 2007 (effective January 1, 2008), added subdivisions (e)(1) and (e)(2).
Subdivision (e)(1) added general contractors and subcontractors not affiliated with the builder and imposed essentially the same restrictions on provisions to indemnify, including the cost to defend, them as had been imposed on the “builder” by the 2005 amendment. The amendment refers to section 911 (b), again part of S.B. 800, to define general contractors, etc., not affiliated with the builder.
Subdivision (e)(1) essentially repeated the provisions of subdivision (d) permitting agreement to the timing and immediacy of the defense, the reference to the Presley Homes case, and the general contractor’s or subcontractor’s obligations under S.B. 800.
It appears this amendment was an attempt to harmonize the new restrictions on indemnity and defense provisions with S.B. 800. The 2005 amendment, whether by oversight or intent, covered only builders and not general contractors, although both classes are subject to the provisions of S.B. 800; the 2007 amendment added non-builder-affiliated general contractors.
Again, logically, it would seem that this version of section 2782 should be applicable to construction contracts for residential construction between a general contractor or contractor not affiliated with a builder and a subcontractor, entered between January 1 and December 31, 2008; however, legislative history relating to the 2008 amendment discussed below suggests a different result might occur. The same potential uncertainty regarding applicability to a contract entered before January 1, 2008, but amended after that date, exists for this provision as for the prior amendment, discussed above.
2008 AMENDMENT
The third “post S.B. 800” amendment in 2008 (effective January 1, 2009), reorganized the language relating to prohibited indemnity provisions, added a reference to insurance in that same prohibition, extensively rewrote the provisions governing agreements relating to the timing or immediacy of defense, added language preserving equitable indemnity claims, and added language defining “construction defect” by reference to the standards set forth in S.B. 800.
Subdivisions (a) and (b) remained unchanged.
Subdivision (c) now made a combined reference to builders (again by reference to section 911), as well as general contractors or contractors not affiliated with the builder (again by reference to section 911 (b)), rather than dealing with the two groups in separate but nearly identical subdivisions as previously. It otherwise restated the same limitations that were previously set forth separately in subdivisions (c) and (e), as well as the reference to the Presley Homes case, and the general contractor’s or subcontractor’s obligations under S.B. 800, but with one important addition. The word “insure” was added to the description of prohibited provisions, to-wit: “provisions? that purport to insure or indemnify, including the cost to defend, the builder, [etc.]? are unenforceable” to the extent they arise out of claims of the type previously described.
It is unclear what impact the addition of this single word “insure” will have; and, it will have to be read in light of the preservation of the language that it shall not affect the obligations of an insurance carrier under the holding of the Presley Homes case. Suppose a carrier had issued an additional insured endorsement under which it would otherwise be required to defend a builder or general contractor consistent with the Presley Homes rule: would this newly added single word (restricting the construction contract, to which the carrier is not a party) give the carrier a basis for denying coverage under the insurance contract? Or would the continued inclusion of the express language that it does not affect the obligations of an insurance carrier under Presley Homes control? That is surely an issue that will have to be worked out by the courts.
The new subdivision (d) addressed defense obligations. Again it permitted parties to agree to the timing and immediacy of the defense and provision for reimbursement of defense fees and costs, but imposed a very detailed scheme that appears to limit the extent of such agreement. A subcontractor owes no defense or indemnity obligation until the builder or general contractor provides a written tender of the claim, which has the same force and effect as notice of commencement of a legal proceeding. Upon that tender the subcontractor shall elect to follow one of two ways of performing: subdivision (d) (1) permits the subcontractor to defend with counsel of its choice and to control the defense, if the subcontractor gives written notice of this election within a reasonable time after receipt of the written tender and in no event later than 90 days following that receipt; subdivision (d) (2) provides an alternative by which the subcontractor pays a reasonable allocated share of the builder’s or general contractor’s defense fees and costs within 30 days of receipt of an invoice, subject to reallocation upon final resolution of the claim by settlement or judgment. Subdivision (e) sets forth remedies available to the builder or general contractor if a subcontractor fails to timely and adequately perform its obligations under either of the two alternatives in subdivision (d), including compensatory and consequential damages, reasonable attorneys’ fees in connection with the first alternative, and interest on defense and indemnity costs in connection with the second alternative. Subdivision (e) ends with provisions relating to reallocation of defense costs, and damages for failure to reallocate.
Application of these requirements in actual litigation is likely to be cumbersome and potentially fraught with conflicts. If retained pursuant to subdivision (d) (1) does the attorney represent the builder, the subcontractor, or both? To whom does the attorney owe his or her fiduciary duty? Can an appropriate informed written consent be formulated, for example, under Rule 3-310 of the California Rules of Professional Conduct, or Rule 1.7, ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct? Could an attorney retained by a subcontractor blame the subcontractor if that is in the developer’s best interests? If multiple subcontractors elect to defend directly, how would the defense be coordinated among the potentially multiple attorneys so retained? Would an attorney retained by one subcontractor be able, or inclined, to blame another subcontractor who also chose to defend directly, in other words, what would prevent inconsistent defense positions amongst the various counsel retained by subcontractors for the developer? There may be solutions to such practical and professional considerations but it seems an ethical thicket awaits any attorney involved in such circumstances.
Subdivision (e) and (f) preserve equitable indemnity claims for the builder, general contractor or subcontractor, the first in general, the second as against any supplier, design profession, or product manufacturer. Finally, the 2008 amendment added for the first time, in subdivision (h), language defining "construction defect" as used in section 2782 as a violation of standards set forth in S.B. 800.
The inclusion of these last three subsections would seem to work against simplification of litigation. A builder or general contractor is likely to allege a claim for equitable indemnity against any and all subcontractors in addition to claims for contractual indemnity and defense (however limited by the other provisions of section 2782). Nothing in the section suggests the subcontractor should, or even can, somehow take on the representation of the builder, etc., in connection with a claim of equitable indemnity back against the subcontractor.
And the limited definition of “construction defect” in subdivision (h) appears to raise an issue of the applicability of the limitations set forth in subdivision (c). Although there is a school of thought that section 941 limits residential construction defect claims only to breach of the performance standards under S.B. 800, it is still common for CD complaints to plead other legal theories, e.g., breach of contract, breach of warranty, negligence, etc., in addition to violation of S.B. 800 standards. With the addition of subdivision (h) it is arguable that the restrictions on indemnity and defense provisions spelled out in subdivisions (c) and (d), both of which relate to claims for residential construction defects, are applicable only to claims for violation of S.B. 800 standards, and not other residential construction defect claims. In other words, a developer might conceivably still be entitled to a broader scope of indemnity and concomitant defense for other types of claims, such as breach of contract, breach of warranty, negligence, etc., so long as the indemnity does not violate the limitation of subdivision (a) against Type I indemnity, which as noted above, has remained intact through these revisions.
Finally, it would seem that this version of section 2782 should be applicable to contracts executed between builders, general contractors, etc., on the one hand and subcontractors on the other hand on and after January 1, 2009. And, as noted above in connection with the 2005 and 2007 amendments, logic would suggest that those versions would ordinarily apply to contracts executed during the time periods mentioned above. But, the Legislative Counsel’s Digest for the 2008 amendment as it finally was enacted into law includes the following statements:
This bill would delete the provisions applicable to construction contracts entered into on or after January 1, 2008, that purport to indemnify the general contractor or contractor not affiliated with the builder. The bill would revise the provisions applicable to contracts entered into after January 1, 2006, to instead apply to contracts entered into after January 1, 2009, and to apply to agreements that purport to insure or indemnify the builder or the general contractor or contractor not affiliated with the builder, as described.
Although it seems a startling result, this legislative history suggests an argument can be made that the 2008 amendment retroactively nullified the effect of the 2005 and 2007 amendments, so that contracts executed from January 1, 2006, as to builders or January 1, 2008, for general contractors, etc., through December 31, 2008, are still governed by the provisions of section 2782 as it was on the books prior to the first post-S.B. 800 amendment in 2005.
2011 AMENDMENT
Section 2782 has been amended yet again in the 2011 session of the California Legislature, effective January 1, 2012; however, the substantive changes affect certain contracts entered on or after January 1, 2013. All of the provisions contained in the 2008 amendment have been carried forward in the most recent amendment, although re-numbered: (c) became (d), etc., through (h) becoming (i). So, the law governing construction contracts entered into after January 1, 2009, for residential construction, as between a builder, or a general contractor, etc., not affiliated with a builder, and regarding insurance, indemnity or defense relating to claims for construction defects, remains the same as in the 2008 amendment.
As noted above the substantive changes to section 2782 all affect contracts entered into on or after January 1, 2013. Subdivision (b) has been amended such that any provision in a contract with a public agency that purports to impose on any contractor, etc., or relieve the public agency from, liability for the active negligence of the public agency will be void and unenforceable. A new subdivision (c) has been added that imposes a similar restriction on construction contracts with the owner of privately owned real property to be improved and as to which the owner is not acting as a contractor or supplier of materials or equipment to the work. This new restriction in subdivision (c) does not apply to a homeowner performing a home improvement project on his or her own single family dwelling.
The 2011 bill amending section 2782 also added a new section 2782.05, which will make void and unenforceable any provision in any construction contract (again, entered on or after January 1, 2013) that purports to insure or indemnify, including the cost to defend, a general contractor, construction manager, or other subcontractor, by a subcontractor for claims that arise out of the active negligence or willful misconduct of the general contractor, etc., or other independent contractors, etc., or to the extent the claims do not arise out of the scope of work of the subcontractor. However, the section also includes a long list of situations to which it does not apply, including all of those covered by section 2782 (residential construction subject to S.B. 800, public agency contracts subject to section 2782 (b), and direct contracts with private property owners subject to the new section 2782 (c)) as well as eight other categories. This apparently is intended to serve as a “catch-all” to extend a limitation on indemnity agreements to all construction contracts not previously swept into this widening legislative scheme, although the exact phrasing is slightly different.7
The new section 2782.05 then permits a mutual agreement to the timing or immediacy of a defense under a scheme essentially identical to that imposed in the 2008 amendment to section 2782: defend with counsel of choice, and maintain control of the defense; or, pay a reasonable allocated share of defense fees and costs. The same logistical and ethical difficulties presented by the 2008 scheme discussed above would likely be present in cases that fall under the new section 2782.05.
CONCLUSION
The California Legislature has been revising section 2782 since shortly after the adoption of S.B. 800. Each revision has been more complicated than the last, and each has tied certain provisions of section 2782 more closely to S.B. 800. In particular, with regard to construction defect claims relating to residential dwellings which are subject to S.B. 800, the Legislature has apparently attempted to exercise more and more control over the scope of allowable indemnity and dictated a very narrow scheme to govern how the defense obligation arising from a contractual indemnity is to be implemented. It seems likely that any attempt to manage the defense of a construction defect case under the options that allow a subcontractor to defend directly and control the defense will create a logistical problem and an ethical difficulty for any attorney attempting to defend a developer at the behest and direction of a subcontractor. Finally, as set forth in the current version of section 2782 relating to contractual indemnity and defense of S.B. 800 type cases (subdivisions (c) through (h) in the 2008 version, now subdivisions (d) through (i) in the 2011 amendment), the Legislature has apparently narrowed the application to only claims of violation of S.B. 800 standards. This may have, in essence, removed the restrictions on indemnity and defense provisions as they relate to other theories pleaded against developers in construction defense cases, e.g., breach of contract, breach of warranty, negligence, and the like. It is not at all clear that the Legislature has accomplished what it set out do accomplish. Rather, the law may have come full circle back to where it began, except for one legal theory, i.e. violation of S.B. 800 standards, currently being used in residential construction defect cases. For any other legal theory the limitation of section 2782 (a) may be solely controlling.
- California Civil Code section 43.99, and sections 895 to 945.5.
- All statutory references in this article are to the California Civil Code unless otherwise specified.
- Type I or specific indemnity does not exactly match the scope of proscribed indemnity as described in section 2782 (a) but it is the closest. More recent case law in California has eschewed a mechanical application of the MacDonald & Kruse typology in favor of examining the precise text of the actual contract (See, e.g., St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Frontier Pacific Ins. Co. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1234, 1246, n. 6) but some recent cases still use the Type I, II and II classifications. And, an understanding of that “historical” typology is useful as an aid to evaluating and understanding express indemnity in general.
- The provisions of S.B. 800 other than the prelitigation procedures of sections 910 through 938 apply to general contractors, subcontractors, etc., pursuant to section 936. The prelitigation procedures generally involve a “builder,” which is specifically defined in section 911 (a) by reference to entities or individuals in the business of selling residential units to the public or of building, developing, or constructing residential units for public purchase. Pursuant to section 911 (b) the term builder does not include general contractors, etc., not affiliated with the builder. Thus, a general contractor who constructs residential housing pursuant to a contract with a public agency is still subject to claims for violation of the standards set forth in sections 896 and 897, resulting from its negligent act or omission or breach of contract, pursuant to section 936.
- As noted above, there has been no case law yet interpreting any of the “post S.B. 800” changes to Section 2782. One of the most important legal decisions relating to express indemnity and defense obligations and rights between developer-builders and sub-contractors was published after two of the amendments but based upon contracts executed and the language of section 2782 prior to January 1, 2006. (See, Crawford v. Weather Shield Mfg., Inc. (2008) 44 Cal.4th 541, 547, 566-67, fn. 14).
- Subcontractor dissatisfaction with the perceived inadequacy of protection afforded by this provision apparently became the impetus for a 2008 amendment to section 2782, discussed below, at least based upon the numerous (form) letters submitted to legislators in connection therewith.
- Section 2782 (a), where we started, and which has continued without change, prohibits indemnity for claims arising out of the sole negligence or willful misconduct of the promisee; sole negligence can be either active or passive. The various versions relating to residential construction prohibit indemnity for the negligence of the builder, etc., suggesting there is no express contractual indemnity for the negligence of the subcontractor if the builder, etc., is at all negligent. This is tempered a bit by the preservation of the right to equitable indemnity, which will now be found in section 2782 (g) and (h).
Courtesy of Michael D. Worthing of Borton Petrini, LLP. Mr. Worthing can be contacted at mworthing@bortonpetrini.com.
Court Clarifies Sequence in California’s SB800
December 20, 2012 — CDJ Staff
As California’s Right-To-Repair law, SB800, nears its ninth birthday, it has remained “largely untested in the legal system” as noted by Megan MacNee of Wood, Smith, Henning & Berman LLP on the site RealEstateRama. She writes that some homeowners have requested documents prior to filing a claim, which she describes as an attempt to “game the system,” and “analogous to requiring a party to litigation to comply with discovery before a complaint is filed.”
The court determined that homeowners may not request documents from the builder until they have actually filed a claim. The court noted that SB800 lacks any clear indication that homeowners may request documents before filing a claim (and also does not indicate that a builder would have to provide documents in these circumstances). The court concluded that the section that sets up the prelitigation procedures occurs before they section on documents discovery.¬? “Because the document request is part of the prelitigation procedure, and the prelitigation procedure does not begin until the homeowner has served notice of a claim, it follows that there can be no prelitigation obligation to produce documents under section 912, subdivision (a) unless the homeowner has commenced the prelitigation procedure by serving notice of a claim.”
Read the full story…
New Buildings in California Soon Must Be Greener
June 19, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The California Energy Commission has approved new energy efficiency standards for new homes and commercial buildings. The 2013 Building Energy Efficiency Standards are set to go into effect on January 1, 2014, and will require 30% more energy efficiency for non-residential construction and 25% more for homes. The standards do not affect hospitals, nursing homes, or prisons.
Buildings covered under the standard will have to have roofs that ready for the installation of solar panels. Additionally, non-residential buildings will require high-performance windows, advanced lighting controls, and cool-roof technologies. Residential requirements include insulated hot-water pipes, whole house fans, and more efficient windows.
The new standards are expected to add 3,500 new building industry jobs. One thing these construction workers won’t be building are power plants, since over the next thirty years, the standards are expected to save as much as six power plants.
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Sometimes It’s Okay to Destroy Evidence
August 17, 2011 — CDJ Staff
The Minnesota Supreme Court has ruled in the case of Miller v. Lankow that Mr. Miller was within his rights to remediate his home, even though doing so destroyed the evidence of water intrusion.
Linda Lankow built a home in 1992. In 2001 or 2002, Lankow discovered a stucco problem at the garage which she attributed to moisture intrusion. She asked the original contractor to fix the wall. In 2003, Lankow attempted to sell her home, but the home inspection revealed fungal growth in the basement. Lankow made further repairs, including alterations to the landscaping.
In 2004, Lankow put her house on the market once again and entered into an agreement with David Miller. Miller declined to have an independent inspection, as the home had been repaired by professional contractors.
In 2005, Miller put the house on the market. A prospective buyer requested a moisture inspection. The inspection firm, Private Eye, Inc. found “significant moisture intrusion problems.”
Miller hired an attorney who sent letters to the contractors and to Lankow and her husband. Lankow’s husband, Jim Betz, an attorney, represented his wife and sent a letter to Miller’s attorney that Miller had declined an opportunity to inspect the home.
In 2007, Miller’s new attorney sent letters to all parties that Miller had decided to begin remediation work on the house. All stucco was removed. Miller then filed a lawsuit against the prior owners, the builders, and the realtors.
Two of the contractors and the prior owners moved for summary judgment on the grounds that Miller had spoliated evidence by removing the stucco. They requested that Miller’s expert reports be excluded. The district court found for the defendants and imposed sanctions on Miller.
The Minnesota Supreme court found that “a custodial party’s duty to preserve evidence is not boundless,” stating that “it may be particularly import to allow remediation in cases such as the one before us.” Their reasoning was that “remediation of the moisture intrusion problem in the home may be necessary, even essential, to address immediate health concerns.”
Given that Miller needed to remediate the problem in order to continue living there, and that he had given the other parties a “full and fair opportunity to inspect,” the court found that he was within his rights. The court reversed the judgment of the lower court and remanded it to them for review.
Read the court’s decision…
Lower Court “Eminently Reasonable” but Wrong in Construction Defect Case
July 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Noting that “circuit court’s orders are eminently reasonable, logical and just” the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia has granted a writ to halt enforcement of these orders and to compel arbitration instead in the case of State v. Tucker. The initial case concerned claims that an HVAC system had been improperly designed, constructed, manufactured, or maintained, leading to serious problems. Glenmark Holding, the owner of the Suncrest Executive Plaza brought a lawsuit against seven defendants. Three of the defendants, Morgan Keller, Inc, York International Corporation, and Johnson Controls, Inc. argued that Glenmark was obligated to enter into arbitration.
Glenmark and the other defendants argued that the motions for arbitration should be denied “so all the claims and cross-claims of the parties could be litigated in one forum, in one proceeding.” The circuit court noted that arbitration is preferred over litigation because of its supposed “expeditious, economic resolution of issues,” but that in this case, “the petitioners would expend additional, not fewer resources responding to the parties’ claims and cross-claims.” As “compulsory arbitration would be insufficient and inequitable” the court denied the request, finding the arbitration clauses “unconscionable and, therefore, unenforceable.”
Morgan Keller, York, and Johson argued that “the interpretation of arbitration clauses is governed exclusively by the Federal Arbitration Act.” The appeals court found that “the circuit court was within its authority to consider Glenmark’s claim that the arbitration clauses were unenforceable.” However, the appeals court rejected the circuit court’s conclusion about the “piecemeal” resolution of the conflict, as it contradicts a Supreme Court ruling. The Supreme Court stated in 1983 that the FAA “requires piecemeal resolution when necessary to give effect to an arbitration agreement.” In a 1985 decision, the Court held that a court could “not substitute [its] own views of economy and efficiency.”
Nor could the court find the arbitration clause to be unconscionable or unenforceable. The court noted that the contract was a standard AIA form, and was amended by the parties involved, whom the court characterized as “commercially sophisticated.” The court found that the agreement limited the rights of all parties and was not one-sided.
As the arbitration clause was neither unconscionable nor unenforceable, and Supreme Court rulings preclude a court from substituting its own procedures, even when these are “eminently reasonable, logical and just,” the appeals court halted the order of the circuit court, sending the matter to arbitration.
Read the court’s decision…
Consumer Protection Act Whacks Seattle Roofing Contractor
July 21, 2011 — Douglas Reiser, Builders Council
It’s been over 1 year since we last visited the CertainTeed Corp. v. Seattle Roof Brokers lawsuit. After my original post, the contractor, James Garcia, appeared at Builders Counsel in a comment to defend himself. It appears that 1 year later, the court decided to side with CertainTeed and award them significant attorneys’ fees. Ready for the whole story? Its a pricey one.
Back in July 2010, good friend Mike Atkins (Seattle Trademark Attorney) authored a post about a Seattle roofing contractor who had been sued for false advertising on his website. The lawsuit was raised by CertainTeed, a roofing material producer, whose products were the target of a Seattle contractor’s ire. Seattle Roof Brokers, owned by James Garcia, published content on its website, remarking that CertainTeed products have a history of “premature failure” and that they “will fail?.resale inspection after 15-20 years.”
CertainTeed filed its action to obtain an injunction and damages under the Consumer Protection Act.
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Reprinted courtesy of Douglas Reiser of Reiser Legal LLC. Mr. Reiser can be contacted at info@reiserlegal.com
Vegas Hi-Rise Not Earthquake Safe
July 12, 2011 — CDJ Staff
If an earthquake hit Las Vegas, the Harmon Tower would not withstand it. A report from Weidlinger Associates told MGM Resorts that “in a code-level earthquake, using either the permitted or current code specified loads, it is likely that critical structural members in the tower will fail and become incapable of supporting gravity loads, leading to a partial or complete collapse of the tower.” The inspection came at the request of county officials, according to the article in Forbes.
According to Ronald Lynn, directory of the building division in the county’s development services division, “these deficiencies, in their current state, make the building uninhabitable.” The county is concerned about risks to adjacent buildings.
MGM Resorts is currently in litigation, separate from the stability issues, with Perini Corp., the builders of Harmon Tower.
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Five Years of Great Legal Blogging at Insurance Law Hawaii
December 9, 2011 — CDJ Staff
Our congratulations to Tred Eyerly who has been blogging at Insurance Law Hawaii for five years now. Over the years, he has posted more than five hundred posts and has provided us all with fascinating insights into the laws on insurance coverage. He describes his blog as “a commentary on insurance coverage issues in Hawaii and beyond.” We are grateful that the “beyond” has just in the last few weeks included Colorado, Illinois, Washington, Minnesota, and Rhode Island (about as far from the island of Hawaii as you can get).
You can read his blog at Insurance Law Hawaii.
Fourteen More Guilty Pleas in Las Vegas Construction Defect Scam
June 19, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The ongoing case over claims that a group fixed homeowner board elections in order to supply the conspirators with a stream of construction defect cases and repairs has lead to fourteen guilty pleas. The judge recently issued charges against fifteen of the accused; one defendant did not join in the group as he was recovering from pneumonia. The prosecutors have asked the judge to delay sentencing, as the investigation is continuing. Prosecutors note that another dozen people may be indicted.
Along with an earlier group who plead guilty, this brings the total number of guilty pleas in the case to twenty-five. All have promised to cooperate with authorities.
The case has also involved four deaths, although authorities have not suspected foul play in the deaths. Nancy Quon, one of the four, was the construction defect attorney suspected to be at the center of the conspiracy.
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Federal District Court Predicts Florida Will Adopt Injury In Fact Trigger
October 23, 2012 — Tred Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
The U. S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida was confronted with determining whether Florida would follow the manifestation or injury in fact trigger in Axis Surplus Ins. Co. v. Contravest Constr. Co., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104502 (D. Fla. June 5, 2012).
The homeowner's association sued the insureds for alleged negligent construction and development of individual dwelling units and common areas of their condominium. Due to this negligence, severe damage was caused by water intrusion. The Association's members only became aware of the defects through the retention of construction experts.
The insured had CGL coverage with Axis, with policies issued from 2003 to 2007. Coverage was denied for the periods 2003-2004 and 2004-2005. Axis provided a defense under the policies issued for 2005-2006 and 2006-2007, but under a reservation of rights. Axis sought a declaration that it had no duty to defend or indemnify because the damage manifested before its policy periods.
For coverage to exist, "property damage" must have "occurred" during Axis' policy period.
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
Construction Law: Unexpected, Fascinating, Bizarre
April 25, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Guy Randles offers an amusing set of odd construction law cases in the Daily Journal of Commerce, which he describes as “the unexpected, the fascinating and even the bizarre.” He noted that in one case “a whistleblower claimed he was terminated for reporting to the owner that the contractor’s painters had not applied the required coating thickness.” The whistleblower was the project manager and “was responsible for ensuring the proper coating thickness.”
A less amusing case was that of an architect who was arrested for manslaughter. Gerard Baker “told investigators that the considered the fireplaces to be merely decorative.” Randles notes that “the mansion’s fireplaces were built of wood framing and lined with combustible drywall.” Further, a “gas fireplace even vented into the house’s interior.” Building officials called the house “a death trap.” According to the LA police chief this may be the only case in which building defects lead to a manslaughter charge.
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Court Grants Summary Judgment to Insurer in HVAC Defect Case
August 4, 2011 — CDJ Staff
The US District Court in Colorado has determined in the case of RK Mechanical, Inc. v. Travelers Property Casualty Company of America that Travelers did not breach its insurance contract when it refused to cover RK Mechanical.
RK Mechanical performed an HVAC installation for a residential project for which J.E. Dunn Rocky Mountain was the general contractor. As part of the work, RK “installed approximately one hundred seventy-one CPVC flanges, which were manufactured by Charlotte Pipe and Foundry Company.” Two of these flanges failed in June, 2009 leading to water damage. RK replaced the cracked flanges and engaged in water remediation. “Travelers paid Dunn and RK for the costs associated with the water damage associated with the Flange Failure.” The court notes that Travelers did not pay for the cracked flanges, however.
Subsequently, RK examined the remaining flanges, finding many cracked ones. These were replaced with new ones. Later, all the Charlotte flanges were replaced with ones from another manufacturer. RK applied for coverage.
All sides brought in their experts: “Microbac Laboratories, Inc. prepared a report on behalf of RK concluding that the Flange Failure was due, in part, to an assembly or workmanship defect in addition to manufacturing defects in the flanges. Higgins & Associates prepared a report on behalf of Travelers concluding that the flanges failed due to improper installation. Plastic Failure Labs prepared a report on behalf of the flange manufacturer concluding that the flanges failed due to improper installation by RK.”
At this point, Travelers denied coverage. RK sued alleging that the coverage for flange failure and water damage implicitly includes mitigation costs. The court rejected this claim, noting it would do so even if Travelers had paid for the replacement of the first two flanges. Nor did the court find that replacement of the faulty flanges is not "a covered cause of loss." RK also argued that as it was required to mitigate, Travelers was obligated to cover costs. However, the court found that “the mitigation costs expended by RK were not incurred in an effort to avoid damages from a potential breach of contract by Travelers.” The court additionally noted that despite RK’s claims, the Colorado courts have not found a common law duty to mitigate. Finally, the court found that the exclusions in the policy were not in violation of public policy.
Read the court’s decision…