Florida Contractor on Trial for Bribing School Official
October 28, 2011 — CDJ Staff
Lloyd Whann, an executive in M. M. Parrish Construction, a Gainesville, Florida firm, is going to trial over claims that he bribed a school district official with more than $50,000 in gifts. The trial has been pushed to March of 2012, in order for his defense to review documents.
Bob Williams, the former school official, plead guilty to conspiracy to commit bribery. He agreed to testify against Whann and M.M. Parrish Construction.
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More Charges in Las Vegas HOA Construction Defect Scam
May 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
VegasInc.com reports that U.S. District Judge James Mahan has unsealed fourteen more criminal cases in the ongoing Las Vegas HOA corruption probe. One of the fourteen is Lisa Kim, whose Platinum Community Services managed communities in which Nancy Quon and Leon Benzer were involved.
Two attorneys were also named. Brian Jones had previously been named in civil litigation as working to rig HOA elections in favor of the straw buyers. Jeanne Winkler had done legal work for one of the communities and for the developer before her disbarment.
Eight of the names released were of alleged straw buyers. These individuals are said to have bought fractional shares of homes so they could stand for election on the HOA boards. One of the individuals named, Arnold Meyers, had sued the Jasmine Homeowners Association, claiming that their HOA elections were tainted. Myers claimed that homeowners received postcards stating that he did not own his condo. His suit was dropped after two homeowners claimed that their names had been forged on Meyer’s affidavits.
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Florida Appeals Court Rules in Favor of Homeowners Unaware of Construction Defects and Lack of Permits
December 9, 2011 — CDJ Staff
The Florida Court of Appeals has ruled that a homeowner is not liable for defects in unpermitted alterations, reversing a lower court’s decision in Jensen v. Bailey. The Jensens sold their house to the Baileys. During the sale, the Jensens filled out a property disclosure statement, checking “no” to a question about “any improvement or additions to the property, whether by your or by others that have been constructed in violation of building codes or without necessary permits.”
After moving in, the Baileys discovered several problems with the home. One involved a defective sewer connection leading to repeated backups. The Baileys also found problems with remodeling the Jensens had done in the kitchen, master bath, and bedroom. The remodeling work was not done with required permits nor was it up to code.
The court noted that an earlier case, Johnson v. Davis, established four criteria: “the seller of a home must have knowledge of a defect in the property; the defect must materially affect the value of the property; the defect must not be readily observable and must be unknown to the buyer; and the buyer must establish that the seller failed to disclose the defect to the buyer.” The court found that the first of these criteria was crucial to determining the case.
In the Johnson ruling, the then Chief Justice dissented, fearing that the courts “would ultimately construe Johnson’s requirement of actual knowledge to permit a finding of liability based on constructive knowledge,” quoting Justice Boyd, “a rule of constructive knowledge will develop based on the reasoning that if the seller did not know of the defect, he should have known about it before attempting to sell the property.” The Appeals Court concluded that the lower court hit this point in ruling on Jensen v. Bailey.
Citing other Florida cases, the court noted that the Johnson rule does require “proof of the seller’s actual knowledge of the defect.” The court cited a case in which it was concluded that the seller “should have known” that there was circumstantial evidence was that the seller did know about the defects, as the seller had been involved in the construction of the home.
In the case of the Jensens, the lower court concluded that they did not know that the work was defective, nor did they know that they were obligated to obtain permits for it. The Appeals Court found this one fact sufficient to reverse the decision and remand the case to the lower court for a final judgment in favor of the Jensens.
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Construction Law Client Alert: Hirer Beware - When Exercising Control Over a Job Site’s Safety Conditions, You May be Held Directly Liable for an Independent Contractor’s Injury
April 6, 2011 — April 6, 2011 - By Mark VonderHaar and Yvette Davis in the Haight Brown & Bonesteel Blog
On February 24, 2011, the California Court of Appeal held in Jeffrey Tverberg, et al v. Fillner Construction, Inc. that the imposition of direct liability on a hirer turns on whether the hirer exercised retained control of worksite safety in such a manner that affirmatively contributed to the independent contractor’s injury. Twice, Tverberg, an independent contractor hired by a general contractor's subcontractor, asked the general contractor to make the job site safe by covering up open holes created by another unrelated subcontractor while Tverberg was working at the site. After Tverberg was injured at the site by falling in a hole, he sued both the general contractor and the subcontractor which had hired him.
The Court of Appeal reasoned that when the general contractor instructed another subcontractor to create a condition that was potentially dangerous (i.e., creating open and uncovered bollard holes), and simultaneously required Tverberg to perform unrelated work near the open holes, the general contractor s conduct may have constituted a negligent exercise of its retained control which affirmatively contributed to Tverberg’s injury. The Court also reasoned that the general contractor affirmatively assumed responsibility for the safety of the workers near the holes by only requiring stakes and safety ribbon, and negligently discharged that responsibility which resulted in injury.
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Reprinted courtesy of Mark VonderHaar and Yvette Davis of Haight Brown & Bonesteel. Mr. VonderHaar can be contacted at mvonderhaar@hbblaw.com and Ms. Davis at ydavis@hbblaw.com.
District Court’s Ruling Affirmed in TCD v American Family Mutual Insurance Co.
May 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
In the case, TCD, Inc. v American Family Mutual Insurance Company, the district court’s summary judgment was in favor of the defendant. In response, the Plaintiff, TCD, appealed “on the ground that the insurance company had no duty to defend TCD under a commercial general liability (CGL) insurance policy.” The appeals court affirmed the decision.
The appeals ruling provides a brief history of the case: “This case arises out of a construction project in Frisco, Colorado. The developer, Frisco Gateway Center, LLC (Gateway), entered into a contract with TCD, the general contractor, to construct a building. TCD entered into a subcontract with Petra Roofing and Remodeling Company (Petra) to install the roof on the building. The subcontract required Petra to "indemnify, hold harmless, and defend" TCD against claims arising out of or resulting from the performance of Petra’s work on the project. The subcontract also required Petra to name TCD as an additional insured on its CGL policy in connection with Petra’s work under the subcontract.”
Furthermore, “TCD initiated this case against Petra and the insurance company, asserting claims for declaratory judgment, breach of insurance contract, breach of contract, and negligence. The district court entered a default judgment against Petra, and both the remaining parties moved for summary judgment. The court granted summary judgment on the entirety of the action, in favor of the insurance company, concluding that the counterclaims asserted by Gateway against TCD did not give rise to an obligation to defend or indemnify under the CGL policy.”
The appeals court rejected each contention made by TCD in turn. First, “TCD contend[ed] that Gateway’s counterclaims constitute[d] an allegation of ‘property damage,’ which is covered under the CGL policy.” The appeals court disagreed. Next, “TCD argue[d] that [the court] should broaden or extend the complaint rule, also called the ‘four corners’ rule, and allow it to offer evidence outside of the counterclaims to determine the insurance company’s duty to defend in this case.” The appeals court was not persuaded by TCD’s argument.
The judgment was affirmed. Judge Roman and Judge Miller concur.
Read the court’s decision…
Construction Firm Charged for Creating “Hail” Damage
June 19, 2012 — CDJ Staff
A Burlington County, Pennsylvania judge has sentenced a firm and its employee for insurance fraud. In the scam, representatives of Precision Builders visited homes after hailstorms and advised homeowners that they could get new roofs and sidings covered by insurance. Many of the homeowners noted that they had not noticed any hail damage.
After homeowners filed claims, employees of Precision Builders would visit the homes and damage the roofs and sidings consistent with the adjusters’ reports.
One employee of Precision Builders, Dominik Sadowski, has pleaded guilty to third-degree insurance fraud. He has been sentenced to four years probation and 100 hours of community service. Another defendant, Marcin Gradziel, is alleged to have visited and damaged properties. He has plead not guilty.
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Developer’s Fraudulent Statements Are His Responsibility Alone in Construction Defect Case
February 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The Texas Court of Appeals ruled on December 21 in the case of Helm v Kingston, a construction defect case. After purchasing what was described as “an extremely well-built” two-bedroom townhouse, Mr. Kingston made complaints of construction defects. Greenway Development did not repair the defects to Kingston’s satisfaction, and he filed notice of suit. In his suit, he claimed that GDI and its president, John Helm, had committed fraud and negligent misrepresentation. Kingston claimed that Helm “fraudulently induced Kingston to believe that the townhouse evidenced the highest quality of workmanship when in fact the quality of workmanship was atrocious.” Helms brought a counterclaim that Kingston’s suit was frivolous.
About four years after Kingston purchased the townhome, the suit proceeded to trial. The trial court determined that Helm was not “liable in his individual capacity,” but this was reversed at appeal.
A second trial was held ten years later on the question of whether Kingston’s unit was a townhome or an apartment. A jury found that Helm “engaged in a false, misleading or deceptive act or practice that Kingston relied on to his detriment.” Kingston was awarded $75,862.29 and an additional $95,000 in attorney fees by the jury. Helms made an unsuccessful appeal to the Appeals Court, after which Kingston was awarded an additional $10,000. Helms then made an unsuccessful appeal to the Texas Supreme Court, which lead to an additional $3,000 for Kingston. There was also a verdict of $48,770.09 in pre-judgment interest and “five percent post-judgment interest accruing from the date of the judgment until the time the judgment is paid. Helm appealed.
In his appeal, Helm raised seven issues, which the court reorganized into five Kingston raised one issue on cross-appeal.
Helms’ first claim was that Kingston “failed to satisfy the requirement of” Texas’s Residential Construction Liability Act and that by not filing under the RCLA, Kingston’s fraud and misrepresentation claims were preempted. Further Helms claimed that the RCLA limited Kingston’s damages. The court rejected this, as the RCLA deals with complaints made to a contractor and not only did Helm fail to “conclusively establish” his “status as a ‘contractor’ under the statutory definition,” Helm testified that he was “not a contactor” at the pre-trial hearing.
Helms’s second claim was that Kingston’s later claim of a misconstructed firewall should be barred, claiming that Kingston “‘had knowledge of a defect in the firewall’ as early as 1997 but did not assert them until 2007.” The court rejected this because Kingston’s claim was that “Helm ‘fraudulently induced Kingston to believe that the townhouse evidenced the highest quality of workmanship when in fact the quality of the workmanship was atrocious.’”
Helms also challenged whether his statements that the residence was of “good quality” constituted fraud and misrepresentation under Texas’s Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act. The court concluded that Helm was in a position to make knowledgeable statements and further that “residential housing units are not artistic works for which quality is inherently a matter of subjective judgment.” Helm also claimed that Kingston could have avoided certain repair expenses through the “exercise of reasonable care.” Helms argued that the repairs could have been made for $6,400. The court disagreed, as these claims were cited only to invoke the DTPA, and that later petitions established additional defects.
Helms’s next claim was that he was not allowed to designate responsible third parties. The court rejected this because there GDI represented matters concerning the residence only through Helm’s statements. The court noted that “Helm is correct that?third parties may be liable for fraud if they ‘participated in the fraudulent transactions and reaped the benefits,’” but they note that “Helm never specifically alleged that GDI or CREIC participated in Helm’s alleged fraudulent transactions.
The final issue in the decision was about court costs, and here the court denied claims on both sides. Helm argued that the award of legal fees were excessive, as they exceeded the actual damages. The court noted that they “may not substitute our judgment for that of the jury,” and also that “the ratio between the actual damages awarded and the attorney’s fees is not a factor that determines the reasonableness of the fees.” But the court also rejected Kingston’s claim for post-judgment interest on $10,312.30 that Helm had deposited in the trial court’s registry. The court noted that the monies were to be paid out upon final judgment, but the mandate did not include any reference to interest.
Read the court’s decision…
No Coverage for Counterclaim Alleging Construction Defects Pled as Breach of Contract
September 13, 2012 — Tred Eyerley, Insurance Law Hawaii
The Colorado Court of Appeals considered whether counterclaims against the insured for alleged faulty construction work were based in contract or constituted allegations of an "accident" under the policy. TCD, Inc. v. Am. Family Mutual Ins. Co., 2012 WL 1231964 (Colo. Ct. App. April 12, 2012).
The developer, Frisco Gateway Center, LLC, contracted with TCD, the general contractor, to construct a building. TCD, in turn, subcontracted with Petra Roofing to install the roof. The subcontract required Petra to "indemnify, hold harmless, and defend" TCD against claims arising out of resulting from the performance of Petra's work on the project. Petra was also required to name TCD as an additional insured on its CGL policy.
After a dispute arose between TCD and Gateway regarding payment and performance on the project, TCD sued Gateway and other parties seeking payment. Gateway counterclaimed against TCD for breach of contract and negligence. TCD demanded coverage from Petra's insurer, but coverage was denied.
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
Is There a Conflict of Interest When a CD Defense Attorney Becomes Coverage Counsel Post-Litigation?
September 1, 2011 — Chad Johnson of Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC
In Weitz Co., LLC v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado was asked to rule on a motion to disqualify counsel in an insurance coverage action. 11-CV-00694-REB-BNB, 2011 WL 2535040 (D. Colo. June 27, 2011). Motions to disqualify counsel are viewed with suspicion, as courts “must guard against the possibility that disqualification is sought to ‘secure a tactical advantage in the proceedings.’” Id. at *2 (citing Religious Technology Center v. F.A.C.T. Net, Inc., 945 F. Supp. 1470, 1473 (D. Colo. 1996).
Weitz Company, LLC (“Weitz”) is a general contractor and defendant in an underlying construction defect suit which had concluded before the action bringing rise to this order. In the underlying action, Weitz made third-party claims against subcontractors, including NPW Contracting (“NPW”). Weitz was listed as an additional insured under NPW’s policies with both Ohio Casualty Insurance Company and Mountain States Mutual Casualty Company (collectively “the Carriers”). The Carriers accepted Weitz’s tender of defense under a reservation of rights. However, neither insurance carrier actually contributed to Weitz’s defense costs in the underlying action. At the conclusion of the construction defect action, the parties unsuccessfully attempted to apportion the attorney’s fees and costs. Eventually, Weitz brought suit against the recalcitrant carriers. The Lottner firm, which had previously represented Weitz in the underlying construction defect action, continued to represent Weitz in this coverage action.
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Reprinted courtesy of Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC. Mr. Johnson can be contacted at johnson@hhmrlaw.com
Discovery Ordered in Nevada Construction Defect Lawsuit
August 16, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Gemstone LVS was sued by the Manhattan Homeowners Association in Las Vegas, after which Chartis Specialty Insurance informed Gemstone that they “had no duty to defend or indemnify Gemstone under the Commercial Umbrella Liability Policy.” Gemstone “asserts that at the time the Policy was purchased, it was understood that Chartis would provide insurance coverage for a construction defect lawsuit” and now seeks discovery “to prove Chartis’ bad faith purpose in drafting an illusory Policy.”
The opinion notes that “the Court conducted a preliminary peek at the pending motion for partial summary judgment and finds that Chartis has not made the strong showing necessary to support the requested stay.” Further, the court notes that “when ambiguity in the language of a policy exists, the court may consider not only the language of the policy but also the ‘intent of the parties, the subject matter of the policy, and the circumstances surrounding its issuance.’” The court concludes that “this type of discovery is relevant to understanding the intent of the parties, more specifically, whether it was understood that Chartis would provide insurance coverage given the construction defect lawsuit.”
Accordingly, the court denied Chartis’ motion for stay of discovery and established a schedule for discovery, expert designations, rebuttal expert designations, and other matters related to the trial.
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New OSHA Fall Rules to Start Early in Minnesota
June 14, 2011 — CDJ Staff
Minnesota has elected to implement the new OSHA rules concerning fall prevention in residential construction on June 20, well before OSHA’s September 15 deadline. Brian Johnson, reporting in Finance and Commerce, quotes Pam Perri, the executive vice president of the Builders Association of Minnesota, “this is the worst time to implement a new rule.” Ms. Perri notes “In Minnesota, education time for the residential construction industry is between November and March 1, not in the middle of the construction season.”
Mike Swanson of Rottlund Homes estimated that the new regulations would add between $200 to $500 to the cost of a house and that he felt the current safety regulations were adequate. OSHA officials are quoted that there continues “to be a high number of fall-related deaths in construction.”
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New Jersey Court Rules on Statue of Repose Case
May 26, 2011 — CDJ Staff
A three-judge panel issued a per curium ruling on May 23 in Fairview Heights Condo. v. Investors (N.J. Super., 2011), a case which the members of a condominium board argued: “that the judge erred by: 1) dismissing plaintiff’s claims against RLI based upon the statute of repose; 2) dismissing the breach of fiduciary duty claims against the Luppinos based upon a lack of expert opinion; 3) barring the testimony of Gonzalez; and 4) barring the May 23, 1989 job site report.” The court rejected all claims from the condominium board.
The court found that the building must be unsafe for the statute of repose to apply. They noted, “the judge made no findings on whether the water seepage, or the property damage caused by such seepage, in any way rendered the building, or any of the units, unsafe.” Further, “without a specific finding on the question of whether the defects had rendered the building ‘unsafe,’ defendants were not entitled to the benefit of the ten-year statute of repose.“
On the second point, the court also upheld the lower court’s findings regarding the management company:
“The report submitted by Berman establishes that the EIFS product was defective in its design and would therefore have failed from the outset. The defects in that product were, according to Berman, not prone to repair or other mitigation. Therefore, even if defendants did not appropriately inspect or repair the EIFS, their failure to do so would have had no impact on the long-term performance of the EIFS exterior cladding. As plaintiff failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact on these questions, the judge properly granted summary judgment to the Luppinos on plaintiff’s breach of fiduciary duty claim.”
On the final two points, the judges noted “plaintiff maintains that the judge committed reversible error when he excluded the Gonzalez certification and the 1989 job site report prepared by Raymond Brzuchalski.” They saw “no abuse of discretion related to the exclusion of the Gonzalez certification, and reject plaintiff’s arguments to the contrary.” Of the job site report, they found, “no abuse of discretion in the judge's finding that the Brzuchalski 1989 job site report did not satisfy the requirements of N.J.R.E.803(c)(6).”
Read the court’s decision
Ohio Court of Appeals Affirms Judgment in Landis v. Fannin Builders
April 20, 2011 — April 20, 2011 Beverley BevenFlorez - Construction Defect Journal
The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment in Landis v. William Fannin Builders. Landis contracted Fannin Builders to build their home. The case involved staining problems on the T1-11 siding chosen by the plaintiffs.
After a year and a half of discussion on how to resolve the problem of uneven staining on the siding, Landis filed suit “against Fannin Builders, alleging claims for breach of contract, breach of the express limited warranty, and violation of the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act (“OCSPA”). Fannin Builders, in turn, filed a third-party complaint against 84 Lumber, alleging claims for breach of contract and indemnification. With the trial court’s leave, Fannin Builders also later amended its answer to add a counterclaim against appellees for breach of contract and unjust enrichment. In the counterclaim, Fannin Builders alleged that appellees still owed it $3,908.98 for the construction of appellees’ home.”
“In its decision, the trial court found in appellees’ favor on their breach of contract claim and against appellees on their claims for breach of the express limited warranty and violation of the OCSPA. Additionally, the trial court found in Fannin Builders’ favor on its counterclaim for breach of contract and against Fannin Builders on its third-party claims for breach of contract and indemnity. The trial court determined that appellees’ damages amounted to $66,906.24, and after setting off the $3,908.98 that appellees owed Fannin Builders under the construction contract, the trial court awarded appellees $62,997.26. The trial court reduced its decision to judgment on May 18, 2010.”
Fannin Builders appealed this judgment and assigned the following errors:
[1.] The Trial Court Erred as a Matter of Law by Concluding that Appellant Breached its Contract with Appellees when it provided a Semi-Transparent Oil-Based Stain that Simply did not Meet their Approval.
[a.] The Contract does not Contain a Satisfaction Clause.
[b.] Even if the Court Implies a Satisfaction Clause, the Court Should Apply an Objective Standard.
[2.] The Trial Court Erred as a Matter of Law by Failing to Consider Appellant’s Right to Cure.
[3.] The Trial Court committed Reversible Error by not Assessing Damages Using “Diminished Value Standard,” and by Creating a Remedy that Constitutes Economic Waste.
[4.] The Trial Court Erred as a Matter of Law by Concluding that Appellant is Barred from Seeking Indemnification When 84 [Lumber] Never Fulfilled its Obligations Pursuant to the Settlement Agreement Entered on August 2, 2005.
In response to the first assigned error, the Court of Appeals stated: “Because the failure to provide siding of a uniform color, not appellees’ displeasure, breached the contract, we reject Fannin Builders’ contention that the trial court implied a satisfaction clause into the contract and found a breach of that clause. Accordingly, we overrule Fannin Builders’ first assignment of error.”
The Court of Appeals overruled the second assignment of error and provided the following reasoning: “Although Fannin Builders depends upon a term of the limited warranty for its right to cure, the trial court concluded that no breach of the limited warranty occurred. Fannin Builders breached the duty of workmanlike conduct implicit in the construction contract, not the limited warranty requiring it to satisfy the BIA’s Quality Standards. Consequently, the limited warranty does not apply to this case, and thus, it does not prevent appellees’ recovery of damages.”
The Appeals Court found “the trial court’s award of damages” was “both reasonable and supported by competent, credible evidence,” and therefore concluded “that the trial court did not err in setting appellees’ damages at $62,997.26.” The Fannin Builders third assignment of error was overruled.
The fourth and final assignment of error was also overruled by the Court of Appeals. “While Fannin Builders correctly asserts that 84 Lumber never installed the replacement siding, it ignores the fact that it ordered 84 Lumber to remove the replacement siding from appellees’ property. Thus, Fannin Builders precluded 84 Lumber from completely performing under the August 2, 2005 letter agreement. […] Consequently, Fannin Builders cannot now claim that the letter agreement is unenforceable or that it is entitled to indemnification from 84 Lumber. Because Fannin Builders assumed all liability for the defective siding in the letter agreement, it is responsible for appellees’ damages.”
James A. Zitesman, Columbus, Ohio Business Attorney, compared the case to Jones v. Centex (Ohio App. 2010), which had a different verdict:
“The common thread is the implied warranty of good workmanship. In the Jones case, the Court found that the buyers had in fact waived all implied warranties, including the implied warranty of good workmanship. In the contract between Jones and Centex, the builder stated that it “…would not sell the property to Purchasers without this waiver.” Probably should have been a sign to the buyers.
In the Landis case, the Court stated, “Contracts for the future construction of a residence include a duty, implied by law, that the builder must perform its work in a workmanlike manner.” The Court gave significant weight to the concept of the implied warranty of good workmanship. The builder relied upon the BIA Warranty which limits builders’ liability and exposure to legal issues. The trial court concluded there was no breach of the limited warranty, rather the builder “breached the duty of workmanlike conduct implicit in the construction contract, not the limited warranty requiring it to satisfy the BIAs Quality Standards.”
The Supreme Court of Ohio has accepted the Jones v. Centex Homes case for review.
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A Lien Might Just Save Your Small Construction Business
April 4, 2011 — Douglas Reiser in the Builders Counsel Blog
Many owners incorrectly believe that payment to the general contractor gets the owner off the hook for payment to subcontractors and suppliers. This assumption sometimes fosters the irresponsible owner, who fails to ensure that everyone is getting paid. Fortunately for those contractors further down the contracting chain, this assumption is incorrect.
Suppliers and subcontractors can file a lien to secure payment for their labor and materials. A filing party must offer proper notice (if applicable) and file an adequate and timely lien in the County where the work is performed. You can read our earlier posts on these topics by following this link.
A lien notice and a lien put an owner on notice that your business has provided labor and/or materials for the improvement of the owner’s property (See RCW 60.04.031 for more info). If the owner fails to take care to ensure that your business is paid the law mandates that the owner may have to pay twice.
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Reprinted courtesy of Douglas Reiser of Reiser Legal LLC. Mr. Reiser can be contacted at info@reiserlegal.com
Continuous Trigger of Coverage Adopted for Loss Under First Party Policy
August 2, 2012 — Tred Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
The Seventh Circuit predicted that the Wisconsin Supreme Court would adopt the continuous injury trigger for first party property loss that extends over several policy periods. Miller v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 12940 (7th Cir. June 25, 2012).
A home inspection report performed before the Millers purchased their home showed a soft spot on the roof. The stucco's finish color was also uneven and stained. Further, some water damage was found in the study and skylights above the kitchen sink. But the report advised that the exterior walls, chimney, grass roof, flashings, floor joists/beams and columns, garage walls and floor appeared serviceable. A roof specialist determined the soft spot was not significant and could be repaired for $1,500.
The Millers purchased a homeowner's policy from Safeco on June 30, 2005. The policy went into effect the next day when the Millers closed on the property. But the Millers did not see the policy's terms until Safeco mailed them a copy of the policy at the end of July.
Before receiving the policy, the Millers discovered severe inner wall water leaks and significant water infiltration on three of the home's exterior walls.
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
Partial Settlement in DeKalb Construction Management Case
July 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The DeKalb County School District has made a partial settlement in a lawsuit over their claims of mismanagement of construction projects. The Atlanta Journal-Constitution reports that the school board settled with E. R. Mitchell & Co., the smaller of two firms that they have sued. As part of the settlement, Mitchell will be testifying against their former partner. Claims from the other side of the lawsuit are that the school board improperly fired the Heery/Mitchell partnership. The superintendant who fired the company, Crawford Lewis, and his chief operations office, Pat Reid, have since been charged with criminal conspiracy to defraud the construction program. A lawyer for Heery said that “we believe that when presented to a jury, Heery will be vindicated.”
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CC&Rs Not the Place for Arbitration Agreement, Court Rules
May 24, 2011 — CDJ Staff
In January, the California Court of Appeals ruled that an arbitration clause inserted in a development’s CC&Rs by the developer could not be enforced. The case, Villa Vicenza Homeowners Association v. Noble Court Development, involved a case in which, according to the opinion, “following the first sale Nobel controlled the board of directors of the Association and because the initial condominium buyers noticed defects in common areas and common facilities and did not believe Nobel had provided a reserve fund sufficient to repair the defects, the condominium owners brought a derivative action on behalf of the Association against Nobel.”
The court concluded, “The use of CC&R's as a means of providing contractual rights to parties with no interest in or responsibility for a common interest development is also problematic from the standpoint of determining what if any consideration would support such third-party agreements. By their terms the CC&R's bind all successors, even those with whom a third party such as Nobel has never had any contractual relationship and to whom Nobel has not provided any consideration.” The court determined that “the trial court did not err in denying Nobel's motion to compel arbitration.”
Read the court’s decision