Insurance Company Must Show that Lead Came from Building Materials
August 17, 2011 — CDJ Staff
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals for Louisiana has reversed the summary judgment of a lower court in the case of Widder v. Louisiana Citizens Property Insurance Company. Judge Roland L. Belsome wrote the opinion for the panel of three judges. Ms. Widder discovered that her home and its content were contaminated by lead. She applied to her insurer, Louisiana Citizens Property Insurance, which denied her claim.
In response to Ms. Widder’s suit, LCPIC applied for a summary judgment on the grounds that there was no physical loss and that the policy did not cover defective material, latents defects, and pollution damage.
The appeals court found that the lead contamination of Widder’s home did meet the standards of a direct physical loss, citing a recent Chinese Drywall case. There, it was found, “when a home has been rendered unusable or uninhabitable, physical damage is not necessary.”
The lower court addressed only one of LCPIC’s exclusions, addressing only the exclusion on basis of “faulty, inadequate or defective material.” The appeals court noted that the evidence offered at trial does not show that the building materials were the source of the lead. This provided the appeals court with a matter of fact to remand to the lower court.
Read the court’s decision…
Hospital Construction Firm Settles Defect Claim for $1.1 Million
September 13, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Law360 reports that Bovis Lend Lease has settled claims of $10 million in damages for $1.1 million. Bovis was building three annexes to a hospital in Oklahoma. The hospital alleged that a faulty moisture barrier system lead to damage throughout the hospital.
Bovis is a division of the Lend Lease Group, a multinational construction firm based Sydney, Australia.
Read the full story…
Nevada Bill Aims to Reduce Legal Fees For Construction Defect Practitioners
March 21, 2011 — March 21, 2011 Construction Defect Journal Staff
Assemblyman Ira Hansen and twelve additional members of Nevada’s Assembly are sponsoring Assembly Bill 285. AB 285 Revises provisions governing an award of attorney’s fees in causes of action for constructional defects. Existing law generally provides that a claimant may recover reasonable attorney’s fees as part of the claimant’s damages in a cause of action for constructional defects. (NRS 40.655)
This bill removes this provision and instead authorizes a court to award reasonable attorney’s fees to a prevailing party involved in such a cause of action if an independent basis for the award exists pursuant to existing law which authorizes a court to award attorney’s fees in certain circumstances, or Rule 68 of the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides for the payment of reasonable attorney’s fees by an offeree who rejects an offer and subsequently fails to obtain a more favorable judgment.
In an AP report published in Business Week it is suggested that the target objective of legislators centers on what it refers to as Nevada’s "Rampant construction defect lawsuits".
According to Business Week "The suits bring in hundreds of millions of dollars for lawyers and have put construction companies out of business. Hansen says fewer construction firms mean higher prices for Nevada consumers."
Click Here To Read Full Text and Revisions of Assembly Bill 285
Hovnanian Increases Construction Defect Reserves for 2012
January 6, 2012 — CDJ Staff
In their fourth quarter earnings call, executives of Hovnanian Enterprises made some projections for investors, covering the company’s plans for 2012. During the call, Ara K. Hovnanian, the firm’s CEO, discussed their reserves to meet construction defect claims. The firm does an annual actuarial study of their construction defect reserves.
Mr. Hovnanian noted that there have been no changes for the past several years, but this year they are increasing their reserves by about $6.3 million. Additionally, the firm has added $2.5 million to their legal reserves. Mr. Hovnanian stated “we do not anticipate that changes of this magnitude will be recurring as we look forward to 2012.”
Read the full story…
State Audit Questions College Construction Spending in LA
August 17, 2011 — CDJ Staff
A state audit of the Los Angeles Community College District found many problems with their construction spending. Their report, as described in the Los Angeles Times, found construction money spent for other purposes, such as promotional photography and public relation tours, $28.3 million spent on projects that were later cancelled, and oversight committees that provided no oversight.
Earlier this year, the LA Times ran a series of articles detailing problems with the Los Angles Community College District’s construction program. The LA Times reported that the State Controller’s audit reached many of the same conclusions.
The Community College District disputed the findings.
Read the full story…
Court Grants Summary Judgment to Insurer in HVAC Defect Case
August 4, 2011 — CDJ Staff
The US District Court in Colorado has determined in the case of RK Mechanical, Inc. v. Travelers Property Casualty Company of America that Travelers did not breach its insurance contract when it refused to cover RK Mechanical.
RK Mechanical performed an HVAC installation for a residential project for which J.E. Dunn Rocky Mountain was the general contractor. As part of the work, RK “installed approximately one hundred seventy-one CPVC flanges, which were manufactured by Charlotte Pipe and Foundry Company.” Two of these flanges failed in June, 2009 leading to water damage. RK replaced the cracked flanges and engaged in water remediation. “Travelers paid Dunn and RK for the costs associated with the water damage associated with the Flange Failure.” The court notes that Travelers did not pay for the cracked flanges, however.
Subsequently, RK examined the remaining flanges, finding many cracked ones. These were replaced with new ones. Later, all the Charlotte flanges were replaced with ones from another manufacturer. RK applied for coverage.
All sides brought in their experts: “Microbac Laboratories, Inc. prepared a report on behalf of RK concluding that the Flange Failure was due, in part, to an assembly or workmanship defect in addition to manufacturing defects in the flanges. Higgins & Associates prepared a report on behalf of Travelers concluding that the flanges failed due to improper installation. Plastic Failure Labs prepared a report on behalf of the flange manufacturer concluding that the flanges failed due to improper installation by RK.”
At this point, Travelers denied coverage. RK sued alleging that the coverage for flange failure and water damage implicitly includes mitigation costs. The court rejected this claim, noting it would do so even if Travelers had paid for the replacement of the first two flanges. Nor did the court find that replacement of the faulty flanges is not "a covered cause of loss." RK also argued that as it was required to mitigate, Travelers was obligated to cover costs. However, the court found that “the mitigation costs expended by RK were not incurred in an effort to avoid damages from a potential breach of contract by Travelers.” The court additionally noted that despite RK’s claims, the Colorado courts have not found a common law duty to mitigate. Finally, the court found that the exclusions in the policy were not in violation of public policy.
Read the court’s decision…
SB800 Cases Approach the Courts
July 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
California’s Right to Repair Law turns ten this year and cases under the statute are finally coming to trial, as John V. O’Meara of Bremer Whyte Brown & O’Meara writes for the Martindale-Hubble Legal Library. Mr. O’Meara notes that SB800 eliminated “the traditional definitions of construction defect,” replacing them with “functionality standards.” He argues that these standards are not uniform: “some standards require damage and others do not.” He also wonders what terms like “significant cracks,” “intended water” and “materially comply” mean in a court.
Mr. O’Meara states that “defendants in construction defect cases have a right to know the standards that apply to a case, the definitions that will be presented to the jury, and the burden of proof that attaches.”
Read the full story…
Partial Settlement in DeKalb Construction Management Case
July 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The DeKalb County School District has made a partial settlement in a lawsuit over their claims of mismanagement of construction projects. The Atlanta Journal-Constitution reports that the school board settled with E. R. Mitchell & Co., the smaller of two firms that they have sued. As part of the settlement, Mitchell will be testifying against their former partner. Claims from the other side of the lawsuit are that the school board improperly fired the Heery/Mitchell partnership. The superintendant who fired the company, Crawford Lewis, and his chief operations office, Pat Reid, have since been charged with criminal conspiracy to defraud the construction program. A lawyer for Heery said that “we believe that when presented to a jury, Heery will be vindicated.”
Read the full story…
When is a Construction Project truly “Complete”? That depends. (law note)
August 2, 2012 — Melissa Dewey Brumback, Construction Law North Carolina
Long-time readers of the blog may remember my earlier post on substantial completion. However, in looking over my blog stats to see what search terms lead people here, it looks like this is hot topic. The blog searches came in two general categories:
1. Those searching strictly for a definition of substantial completion. Some examples:
- What does “substantial completion” mean?
- when does a building achieve substantial completion
- contracts “substantial completion”
- substantial completion undefined
- when is a project substantially complete
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of Melissa Dewey Brumback of Ragsdale Liggett PLLC. Ms. Brumback can be contacted at mbrumback@rl-law.com.
Florida County Suspends Impact Fees to Spur Development
November 18, 2011 — CDJ Staff
Hernando County, just north of Tampa on Florida’s west coast, has suspended impact fees for a year, hoping to spur development. Hernando Today reports that the move drew applause from the audience at the county commissioners meeting. Many of those in attendance were builders or members of the Greater Hernando Chamber of Commerce.
Not all were convinced. Frankie Burnett, the mayor of Brooksville, told the commissioners that his city council were not convinced that this would spur development. “Development should pay its fair share, even in slow economic times.” Burnett’s letter to the board warned that “if lowering impact fees succeeded in stimulating more residential overbuilding, it would only further depress the current real estate market.”
Read the full story…
Court Rules on a Long List of Motions in Illinois National Insurance Co v Nordic PCL
May 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The case Illinois National Insurance Co. v Nordic PCL, et al. “involves a dispute about whether insurance benefits are available to a general contractor who built structures that allegedly have construction defects. Plaintiffs Illinois National Insurance Company (‘Illinois National’) and National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, PA (‘National Union’) (collectively, the ‘Insurers’), commenced this action for declaratory relief against Defendant Nordic PCL Construction, Inc., f/k/a Nordic Construction, Ltd. ("Nordic"), on August 23, 2011.”
The court was asked to rule on a long list of motions: “Counterclaim Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice in Support of Their (1) Motion to Dismiss the Counterclaim and (2) Motion to Strike Portions of the Counterclaim, ECF No. 16 (‘Request for Judicial Notice’); Counterclaim Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Counterclaim Filed October 24, 2011, ECF No. 14 (‘Motion to Dismiss Counterclaim’); Counterclaim Defendants’ Motion to Strike Portions of the Counterclaim Filed October 24, 2011, ECF No. 15 (‘Motion to Strike’); Third-Party Defendant Marsh USA, Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Stay Proceedings in Favor of Pending State Action, ECF No. 33 (‘Marsh’s Motion To Dismiss Or Stay’); Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff Nordic PCL Construction, Inc., f/k/a Nordic Construction Ltd.’s Substantive Joinder to Third-Party Defendant Marsh USA Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Stay Proceedings in Favor of Pending State Action, ECF No. 36 (‘Nordic’s Joinder’); and Third-Party Defendant Marsh USA, Inc.’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings on Counts V and VI of Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff Nordic PCL Construction, Inc.’s Third-Party Complaint, ECF No. 29 (‘Marsh’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings’).”
In result, the court reached the following decisions: “The court GRANTS IN RELEVANT PART the Insurers’ Request for Judicial Notice to the extent it covers matters relevant to these motions; GRANTS IN PART the Insurers’ Motion to Dismiss Counterclaim, but gives Nordic leave to amend the Counterclaim in certain respects; DENIES the Insurers’ Motion to Strike; DENIES Marsh’s Motion To Dismiss Or Stay and Nordic’s Joinder; and GRANTS Marsh’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.”
The court provides a bit of background on the case: “This action arises out of alleged construction defects involving two projects on which Nordic acted as the general contractor. Nordic is a defendant in a pending state court action with respect to one of the projects and says it spent more than $400,000 on repairs with respect to the other project. Nordic tendered the defense of the pending state court action to the Insurers and sought reimbursement of the cost of repairs already performed. The Insurers responded by filing this action to determine their rights under the insurance policies issued to Nordic.”
Furthermore, the court presented a brief procedural history: “The Insurers commenced this declaratory action in this court on August 23, 2011. The Complaint asserts two claims, one seeking a declaration that the Insurers have no duty to provide a defense or indemnification regarding the Safeway Action, the other seeking such a declaration regarding the Moanalua Claims. Along with its Answer, Nordic filed a Counterclaim against the Insurers. The Counterclaim asserts breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, misrepresentations and omissions of material fact, and bad faith, and seeks declaratory relief against the Insurers.”
The procedural history continues: “Nordic also filed a Third-Party Complaint against Marsh, the broker that had procured the Policies from the Insurers for Nordic. Nordic alleges that it reasonably believed that the Policies would provide completed operations insurance coverage for the types of construction defects alleged in the Safeway Action and Moanalua Claims. The Third-Party Complaint asserts breach of contract, negligence, promissory estoppel, breach of fiduciary duties, implied indemnity, and contribution and equitable subrogation.”
In conclusion, “The court GRANTS IN RELEVANT PART the Insurers’ Request for Judicial Notice. With regard to the Insurers’ Motion to Dismiss Counterclaim, the court GRANTS the motion as to Count I (breach of contract), Count II (duty of good faith and fair dealing), Count III (fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation), the portion of Count IV (bad faith) premised on fraud, and Count IV (declaratory relief). The court DENIES the motion as to Count IV (bad faith) that is not premised on fraud. Except with respect to the "occurrence" issue, which the court disposes of here on the merits, and Count V, which concerns only a form of relief, Nordic is given leave to amend its Counterclaim within three weeks of the date of this order. The court DENIES the Insurers’ Motion to Strike, DENIES Marsh’s Motion to Dismiss or Stay and Nordic’s Joinder, and GRANTS Marsh’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings with respect to Counts V and VI of the Third-Party Complaint.”
Read the court’s decision…
In Re Golba: The Knaubs v. Golba and Rollison, Debtors
June 19, 2012 — Brady Iandiorio
Now comes another cautionary tale for builders and developers, especially those using single purpose business entities to handle individual construction projects. The United States Bankruptcy Court in Denver, Colorado, through the Honorable Michael Romero, provided an order regarding plaintiffs’ problems with a home they purchased from an entity controlled or represented by defendants. Plaintiffs, Kelvin and Holly Knaub (the “Knaubs”) filed adversary proceedings against debtor Robert Golba in his bankruptcy proceeding and against debtor Greg Rollison in his separate bankruptcy proceeding. The adversary proceedings were partially consolidated to proceed in parallel but not substantively.
The Knaubs purchased a home from Gemm Homes (“Gemm”) in May 2003. Problems stemming from the foundation caused the Knaubs to seek an explanation and ultimately a solution from Gemm and then from Avalon Homes (“Avalon”), which the Knaubs claim is just a continuation of Gemm. Through their complaint, the Knaubs seek relief for 1) damages caused by fraudulent representations and false pretenses under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A), based on Golba’s misrepresentation that Gemm and Rollison were not involved in Avalon; 2) damages caused by actual fraud under § 523(a)(2)(A), based on Golba’s and Rollison’s alleged conspiracy fraudulently to convey the assets of Gemm to the Avalon entities; and 3) damages caused by breach of fiduciary duty under § 523(a)(4), alleging Gemm was an insolvent company which owed a fiduciary duty to its creditors, and alleging Golba participated in transferring Gemm’s assets to Avalon for no consideration. In the Golba action, the third claim for relief was dismissed.
The facts of the case are important and somewhat convoluted. In an effort to make the cases clear, the evidence, allegations, and facts will be laid out in detail below. The Knaubs’ house was purchased from Gemm and soon after both Gemm and Rollison had an engineering company perform an analysis which discovered the foundation was not laid on stable ground.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of Brady Iandiorio, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC. Mr. Iandiorio can be contacted at iandiorio@hhmrlaw.com
The U.S. Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals Rules on Greystone
November 18, 2011 — Derek J. Lindenschmidt, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC
On November 1, 2011, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled on the certified question of whether property damage caused by a subcontractor’s faulty workmanship is an “occurrence” for purposes of a commercial general liability (CGL) insurance policy. In Greystone Const., Inc. v. National Fire & Marine Ins. Co., No. 09-1412 (10th Cir. Nov. 1, 2011), the Tenth Circuit determined that because damage to property caused by poor workmanship is generally neither expected nor intended, it may qualify under Colorado law as an occurrence and liability coverage should apply. Id. at 2.
The short history of the Greystone case is as follows. In Greystone Const., Inc. v. National Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 649 F. Supp. 2d 1213 (D. Colo. 2009), two contractors and one of their insurers brought an action against a second insurer after the second insurer refused to fund the contractors’ defense in construction defect actions brought by separate homeowners. Id. at 1215. The U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado, relying on General Sec. Indem. Co. of Arizona v. Mountain States Mut. Cas. Co., 205 P.3d 529 (Colo. App. 2009), granted summary judgment in favor of the second insurer on the basis that the homeowners’ complaints did not allege accidents that would trigger covered occurrences under the second insurer’s policies. Id. at 1220. Notably, the Greystone, General Security, and other similar decisions prompted the Colorado General Assembly to enact C.R.S. § 13-20-808, which was designed to provide guidance for courts interpreting perceived coverage conflicts between insurance policy provisions and exclusions. The statute requires courts to construe insurance policies to favor coverage if reasonably and objectively possible. C.R.S. § 13-20-808(5).
The Tenth Circuit began its analysis by determining whether C.R.S. § 13-20-808, which defines the term “accident” for purposes of Colorado insurance law, would have a retroactive effect, and thereby settle the question before the court. The Tenth Circuit gave consideration to several Colorado district court orders issued since the enactment of C.R.S. § 13-20-808 which have suggested that the statute does not apply retroactively, including Martinez v. Mike Wells Constr., No. 09cv227 (Colo. Dist. Ct., Mar. 1, 2011), and Colo. Pool. Sys., Inv. V. Scottsdale Ins. Co., No. 09cv836 (Colo. Dist. Ct., Oct. 4, 2010). The Tenth Circuit also attempted to ascertain the General Assembly’s intent behind the term “all insurance policies currently in existence...” Greystone, No. 09-1412, at 12. The Tenth Circuit determined that the General Assembly would have more clearly stated its intentions for the term if it was supposed to apply retroactively to expired policies, rather than those still running. Id. at 12-13. Ultimately, the Tenth Circuit decided that C.R.S. § 13-20-808 did not apply retroactively, but noted that “the retrospective application of the statute is not necessarily unconstitutional.” Id. at 9, 11-14. As such, the Tenth Circuit advised that it was required to decide the question presented in the appeal under the principles of Colorado insurance law. Id. at 15.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC. Mr. Lindenschmidt can be contacted at lindenschmidt@hhmrlaw.com
Court Voids Settlement Agreement in Construction Defect Case
September 1, 2011 — CDJ Staff
A U.S. District Court Judge in Florida has ruled in favor of a company that sought to void a settlement agreement. The case, Water v. HDR Engineering, involved claims of construction defects at Florida’s C.W. Bill Young Regional Reservoir. The Tampa Bay Water Authority attributed these to both HDR Engineering’s design and Bernard Construction Company which had built the embankment. Bernard Construction filed a complaint against their subcontractor, McDonald.
Tampa Bay Water settled with Bernard Construction and McDonald, in an agreement that set a minimum and maximum settlement, but also would “prohibit Barnard and McDonald from presenting any evidence on several claims and positions of TBW, to require Barnard to call certain witnesses at trial, to preclude Barnard and McDonald from calling other witnesses, and to restrict the filing of trial and post-trial motions.” HDR Engineering moved to void the agreement as collusive.
The judge that the agreement¬? contained “133 paragraphs of ‘Agreed Facts’ that the parties stipulated would survive any order declaring the Settlement Agreement void or unenforceable.” He characterized these as stipulating “that Barnard neither caused nor contributed to TBW’s damages.” HDR motioned that a summary judgment be given to Barnard Engineering.
The court found that “the evidence identified by TBW is patently insufficient to survive summary judgment.” Further, TBW’s expert initially held Barnard responsible for “lenses, pockets, streaks and layers within the embankment,” but then later withdrew this assigning the responsibility to HDR. Further, the court notes that, “TBW’s arguments that lenses, pockets, streaks, and layers in the soil wedge caused or contributed to its damages and that Barnard is liable for those damages have been foreclosed by the Agreed Facts.”
As TBW failed to provide sufficient evidence to withstand summary judgment, the court granted summary judgment, mooted the claim against McDonald, and terminated the agreement between TBW and the other parties.
Read the court’s decision…
Certificate of Merit to Sue Architects or Engineers Bill Proposed
May 3, 2011 — May 3, 2011 Beverley BevenFlorez - Construction Defect Journal
North Carolina may become the twelfth state to require a Certificate of Merit to sue an architect or engineer. If North Carolina Senate Bill 435 (SB435) passes, then plaintiffs when filing a complaint will need to also attach an affidavit of a third-party licensed professional engineer or architect stating that the case has merit.
SB435 is a short two pages in its current form. The bill states that the “third-party licensed professional engineer or licensed architect shall (i) be competent to testify and hold the same professional license and practice in the same area of practice as the defendant design professional and (ii) offer testimony based upon knowledge, skill, experience, education, training, and practice. The affidavit shall specifically state for each theory of recovery for which damages are sought, the negligence, if any, or other action, error, or omission of the design professional in providing the professional service, including any error or omission in providing advice, judgment, opinion, or a similar professional skill claimed to exist and the factual basis for each such claim. The third-party licensed professional engineer or licensed architect shall be licensed in this State and actively engaged in the practice of engineering or architecture respectively.”
A few of the amendments allude to disciplining design professionals who certify civil actions that are without merit. The bill has been referred to the Committee on Judiciary I.
While North Carolina is considering enacting a Certificate of Merit law, eleven other states already require one, including Arizona, California, Colorado, Georgia, Maryland, Minnesota, New Jersey, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Texas. Christopher D. Montez, a partner with Thomas, Feldman & Wilshusen, LLP, has written a useful summary for each state’s certificate of merit scheme.
Read the text of SB435
Track the progress of SB435
Read more from Christopher D. Montez’s article on Thomas, Feldman & Wilshusen, LLP site
Contractor Sues License Board
June 30, 2011 — CDJ Staff
Judge Kendall J. Newman of the US District Court handed down a decision on June 24 on the case of Kent v California Department of Consumer Affairs. Mr. Kent, appearing as his own counsel, had brought the suit against the California Department of Consumer Affairs and the Contractors State Licensing Board after he was arrested in a sting operation and, as the plaintiff put it, “was absurdly arrested and uncooperatively detained for a time longer than necessary or allowed by law under the false pretense of contracting with out a license.” Mr. Kent’s alleged that Rick Lopez, one of the defendants, formed him to read allow from the California Business and Professions Code. He said he was later handcuffed and placed in an uncomfortable chair, “enduring physical pain and emotional agony.”
Although Kent was given a Notice to Appear, he alleged that a further defendant, Stuart Rind, “closed the plaintiff’s case marked citation A7773 without giving written notice to anyone.” As a result, the Placer County District Attorney’s Office had no record of his Notice to Appear.
Kent alleged that subsequently his firm was essentially shut down for two years and that he was prevented from “legally contracting or selling services for any other contractor or qualifying for any other licensed capacity governed by the CSLB.” After this, the CSLB suspended the license for his firm, DSI Construction. He was assessed a $1,500 fine, after which he claims he sent a letter to the CSLB demanding money damages. The judge noted that the letter was not included in the plaintiff’s Ninth Amended Complaint.
Judge Kendall recommended that the plaintiff’s Complaints be dismissed, although he did allow that sixth, and perhaps the eighth and ninth, could be amended with a tenth amended complaint.
Read the court’s decision…
South Carolina Legislature Redefining Occurrences to Include Construction Defects in CGL Policies
April 1, 2011 — April 1, 2011 Beverley BevenFlorez - Construction Defect Journal
The question of what circumstances must be in place for construction defects to be covered in a general commercial liability (CGL) policies is being raised by the courts and the legislature in South Carolina. The Insurance Journal reports that the American Insurance Association as well as the Property and Casualty Insurers Association of America are speaking out on the issue.
The problem seems to be centered on what defines an “occurrence.” CGL policies were not meant to cover faulty workmanship, according to the filing by the South Carolina Supreme Court. In January of this year, the South Carolina Supreme Court reversed the ruling in Crossmann Communities v Harleysville Mutual declaring that “Respondents cannot show the damage here was the result of an occurrence. Rather, the damage was a direct result and the natural and expected consequence of faulty workmanship; faulty workmanship did not cause an occurrence resulting in damage.” They focused their attention on the word “accident,” stating that there is a fortuity element that is not diminished.
The South Carolina legislature reacted by producing a bill that would add new language directly negating the ruling by the Supreme Court. The South Carolina bill S-431 would change the definition of an occurrence in regards to construction defects as follows: “For a liability insurance policy issued to a construction professional, an ‘occurrence’ means, at a minimum: (1) an accident; or (2) continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful condition or substance. No additional requirement of a fortuitous event is needed to constitute an ‘occurrence.’”
S-431 is currently residing in the House Committee on Labor, Commerce and Industry.
Read the full story...
Arbitrator May Use Own Discretion in Consolidating Construction Defect Cases
September 1, 2011 — CJD Staff
The Mississippi Court of Appeals has ruled in the case of Harry Baker Smith Architects II, PLLC v. Sea Breeze I, LLC. Sea Breeze contracted with Harry Baker Smith Architects II, PLLC (HBSA) to design a condominium complex, which would be built by Roy Anderson Corporation. All parties agreed to arbitration.
Subsequently, Sea Breeze alleged defects and sought arbitration against the architectural firm and started a separate arbitration proceeding against the contractor. The special arbitrator appointed by the American Arbitrators Association determined that it would be proper to consolidate the two actions “since they arose from a common question of fact or law.” HBSA filed in chancery court seeking injunctive relief and a reversal of the decision. Sea Breeze and Roy Anderson filed a motion to compel the consolidated arbitration.
The court noted that the special arbitrator “established that the contract between Sea Breeze and Roy Anderson expressly allowed for consolidation of the two cases.” Further, the arbitrator “concluded that HBSA expressly agreed to consolidation by written consent through its 2008 letter, through which it insisted upon Roy Anderson’s involvement ‘in any mediation and/or arbitration.’”
The court concluded that the chancery court “did not have the power to fulfill HBSA’s request.” The court affirmed the chancery court’s judgment.
Read the court’s decision…