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    Anaheim, California

    California Builders Right To Repair Current Law Summary:

    Current Law Summary: SB800 (codified as Civil Code §§895, et seq) is the most far-reaching, complex law regulating construction defect litigation, right to repair, warranty obligations and maintenance requirements transference in the country. In essence, to afford protection against frivolous lawsuits, builders shall do all the following:A homeowner is obligated to follow all reasonable maintenance obligations and schedules communicated in writing to the homeowner by the builder and product manufacturers, as well as commonly accepted maintenance practices. A failure by a homeowner to follow these obligations, schedules, and practices may subject the homeowner to the affirmative defenses.A builder, under the principles of comparative fault pertaining to affirmative defenses, may be excused, in whole or in part, from any obligation, damage, loss, or liability if the builder can demonstrate any of the following affirmative defenses in response to a claimed violation:


    Construction Expert Witness Contractors Licensing
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    Commercial and Residential Contractors License Required.


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    Building Industry Association Southern California - Desert Chapter
    Local # 0532
    77570 Springfield Ln Ste E
    Palm Desert, CA 92211
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    Building Industry Association Southern California - Riverside County Chapter
    Local # 0532
    3891 11th St Ste 312
    Riverside, CA 92501


    Building Industry Association Southern California
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    Irvine, CA 92614
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    Building Industry Association Southern California - Orange County Chapter
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    Building Industry Association Southern California - Baldy View Chapter
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    http://www.biabuild.com

    Building Industry Association Southern California - LA/Ventura Chapter
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    Construction Expert Witness News and Information
    For Anaheim California

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    Arizona Court of Appeals Decision in $8.475 Million Construction Defect Class Action Suit

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    Corporate Profile

    ANAHEIM CALIFORNIA CONSTRUCTION EXPERT WITNESS
    DIRECTORY AND CAPABILITIES

    The Anaheim, California Construction Expert Witness Group is comprised from a number of credentialed construction professionals possessing extensive trial support experience relevant to construction defect and claims matters. Leveraging from this considerable body of experience, BHA provides construction related trial support and expert services to the nation's most recognized construction litigation practitioners, Fortune 500 builders, commercial general liability carriers, owners, construction practice groups, and a variety of state and local government agencies.

    Construction Expert Witness News & Info
    Anaheim, California

    Retaining Wall Contractor Not Responsible for Building Damage

    July 20, 2011 — CDJ Staff

    The Court of Appeals of Indiana ruled on July 8 in the case of Rollander Enterprises, Inc. v. H.C. Nutting Co. Judge Baily wrote the opinion affirming the decision of the trial court.

    The case involved an unfinished condominium complex, the Slopes of Greendale, in Greendale, Indiana. Rollander is a real estate development company incorporated in Ohio. One of the issues in the case was whether the case should be settled in the Indiana courts or be tried in Ohio. The project was owned by a special purpose entity limited liability corporation incorporated in Indiana.

    Rollander hired Nutting to determine the geological composition of the site. Nutting’s report described the site as “a medium plastic clay containing pieces of shale and limestone.” The court summarized this as corresponding with “slope instability and landslides.” Rollander then hired Nutting to design the retaining walls, which were constructed by Scherziner Drilling.

    After cracking was discovered on State Route 1, the walls were discovered to be inadequate. More dirt was brought in and a system of tie-backs was designed to anchor the walls. Not only were the tie-backs unsightly, local officials would not approve the complex for occupancy. Further, the failure of the wall below one building lead to damage of that building.

    The court concluded that since almost all events occurred in Indiana, they rejected Rollander’s contention that the case should be tried in Ohio. Further, the court notes “the last event making Nutting potentially liable on both claims was an injury that occurred in Indiana and consequently, under the lex loci delicti analysis, Indiana law applies.”

    Nor did the court find that Nutting was responsible for the damage to the rest of the project, citing an Indiana Supreme Court ruling, that “there is no liability in tort to the owner of a major construction project for pure economic loss caused unintentionally by contractors, subcontractors, engineers, design professionals, or others engaged in the project with whom the project owner, whether or not technically in privity of contract, is connected through a network or chain of contracts.”

    The court concluded:

    Because Rollander was in contractual privity with Nutting, and Indy was connected to Nutting through a chain of contracts and no exception applies, the economic loss rule precludes their recovery in tort. Damage to Building B was not damage to "other property," and the negligent misrepresentation exception to the economic loss rule is inapplicable on these facts. The trial court therefore did not abuse its discretion by entering judgment on the evidence in favor of Nutting on the Appellants' negligence and negligent misrepresentation claims.

    Read the court’s decision…


    California Supreme Court Binds Homeowner Associations To Arbitration Provisions In CC&Rs

    September 13, 2012 — Stephen A. Sunseri and Aarti Kewalramani, Gatzke Dillon & Ballance LLP (http://www.gdandb.com).

    The California Supreme Court ruled in Pinnacle Museum Tower Assn. v. Pinnacle Market Development (August 16, 2012, S186149) __ Cal.4th __ [2012 WL 3516134], that arbitration provisions within the covenants, conditions, and restrictions (“CC&Rs”) for condominium projects are enforceable against their homeowner associations. The ruling — two years in the making — was based on legislative history of laws governing common interest developments, and decades of decisional authority involving contracts and arbitration provisions.

    In Pinnacle, a homeowners association sued a condominium builder for construction defects and resultant property damage to the common areas, and to the separate property interests held by the individual members. The builder moved to compel arbitration, based on a provision contained in the CC&Rs which required resolution of all construction disputes through binding arbitration. The association argued it could not be compelled to arbitrate these claims because it was not a party to the agreement to arbitrate, asserting “the Association did not bargain with [the builder] over the terms of the Project CC&R's or participate in their drafting.”

    The Supreme Court rejected the association's argument on the grounds that the builder-authored CC&Rs complied with the Davis-Stirling Act (“the Act”) (Civil Code §1350, et seq.) ? the law that governs all common interest developments in California. Under the Act, builders and sellers of common interest residential units are required to provide a copy of the CC&Rs to all purchasers, as well as copies of the Department of Real Estate's public report, which informs purchasers of their rights and remedies as members of the association, and encourages each prospective purchaser to review the terms carefully before entering into any agreement. Further, the Act states all CC&Rs are enforceable, unless unreasonable, and inure to the benefit of and bind all owners in the development. (Civ. Code, §1354, subd. (a).) The Court found each owner who purchased a condominium in the project either expressly consented to the terms and provisions of the CC&Rs or was deemed to have consented to the terms at the time of purchase.

    The Court also did not find the arbitration provision to be unconscionable. The Court indicated the provision was drafted and recorded in accordance with the Act, which allowed each prospective purchaser to make an informed decision prior buying a condominium unit. The provision also limited arbitration to construction defect disputes. The Court did not find any evidence the provision “shocked the conscience” or was “oppressive” in any way.

    Pinnacle settles a decades-long conflict over whether arbitration provisions in CC&Rs for condominium projects are enforceable against homeowner associations and their members. It remains unclear, however, whether Pinnacle’s rationale will be applied to cases involving homeowner associations for single-family residences (as opposed to condominiums), assuming those CC&Rs have similar arbitration requirements. Regardless, the result of Pinnacle is clear, if arbitration provisions contained in condominium CC&Rs meet the fairness and unconscionability tests set out by the Court, more condominium construction defect cases brought by homeowner associations will be resolved through the arbitration process.

    Read the court’s decision…

    Printed courtesy of Stephen A. Sunseri and Aarti Kewalramani, Gatzke Dillon & Ballance LLP. Mr. Sunseri can be contacted at ssunseri@gdandb.com and Ms. Kewalramani can be contacted at akewalramani@gdandb.com.


    Another Colorado District Court Refuses to Apply HB 10-1394 Retroactively

    October 28, 2011 — David M. McLain, Colorado Construction Litigation

    In Martinez v. Mike Wells Construction Company, 09CV227, Teller County District Court Judge Edward S. Colt refused to apply C.R.S. § 13-20-808 retroactively to provide coverage for the underlying construction defect allegations. According to the recitation of facts in Judge Colt’s March 2011 order, Martinez contracted with Mike Wells Construction to serve as the general contractor for the construction of a home. At that time, Mike Wells Construction was insured through ProBuilders Specialty Insurance Company, RRG. Disputes arose between Martinez and Mike Wells Construction, resulting in Martinez ordering it off of the project in mid-November 2007 and terminating its right to work there by letter dated November 28, 2007.

    Mike Wells, the owner of the corporation, subsequently died. Martinez sued Mike Wells Construction in July 2009 for breach of contract and various claims relating to alleged defecting workmanship. Martinez provided notice of the suit to the special administrator of the probate estate. No answer having been filed, the court entered a default judgment against Mike Wells Construction and Martinez sought to garnish Mike Wells Construction’s ProBuilders insurance policy.

    Read the full story...

    Reprinted courtesy of Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC. Mr. McClain can be contacted at mclain@hhmrlaw.com


    Michigan Supreme Court Concludes No Statute of Repose on Breach of Contract

    July 19, 2011 — CDJ Staff

    Judge Marilyn Kelly of the Michigan Supreme Court has remanded the case of Miller-Davis Co. v. Ahrens Constr. Inc. (Mich., 2011) to the Court of Appeals, after determining that the court had improperly applied the statute of repose. She reversed their judgment, pending a new trial.

    Ahrens Construction was a subcontractor, hired by Miller-Davis to build and install a natatorium room at a YMCA camp in Kalamazoo, Michigan. After its installation, the YMCA discovered a severe condensation problem, causing moisture to “rain” from the roof. The architect, testifying for Miller-Davis, alleged that the problems were due to improper installation by Ahrens. Ahrens claimed that the condensation problem was due to a design error.

    When the roof was removed and reconstructed, the moisture problem ended. Ahrens argued that the alleged defects were caused by the removal. Further, in trial Ahrens raised the issue of the statute of repose. The court found in favor of Miller-Davis and did not address the statute of repose.

    The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, determining that the statute of repose had barred the suit. This rendered the other issues moot.

    The Michigan Supreme concluded that the issue at hand was “a suit for breach of contract,” and that the Michigan statute of repose is limited to tort actions. They remanded the case to the Court of Appeals to address the issues that had been mooted by the application of the statute of repose.

    Read the court’s decision…


    Joinder vs. Misjoinder in Colorado Construction Claims: Roche Constructors v. One Beacon

    July 10, 2012 — David McLain, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC

    Often, those practicing in the construction defect field have faced questions concerning the joinder of a party. Recently, the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado weighed in on the requirements for joinder under the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure. See Roche Constructors, Inc. v. One Beacon America Ins. Co., 2012 WL 1060000 (D. Colo. 2012). Roche secured a construction contract to build a detention facility for the Lincoln County Sheriff’s Office in Lincoln County, Nebraska. In turn, Roche entered into a subcontract with Dobberstein Roofing Company, Inc. in October 2009 to install the roofing system and other related work at the detention facility. The subcontract agreement required Dobberstein to maintain adequate commercial general liability insurance and to add Roche as an additional insured under the policy. Roche maintained a builder’s risk policy issued by OneBeacon America Insurance Company and Dobberstein secured a certificate of liability insurance underwritten by Transportation Insurance Company (“TIC”). Id. at *1.

    Roche alleged that Dobberstein constructed the roofing system in a negligent manner in violation of the subcontract. Roche claims it incurred additional costs to repair structural damage to the roofing system as a result of Dobberstein’s negligent work. In order to cover said damage, Roche tendered insurance claims to OneBeacon and TIC.

    Read the full story…

    Reprinted courtesy of David McLain, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC. Mr. McLain can be contacted at mclain@hhmrlaw.com


    Texas exclusions j(5) and j(6).

    April 27, 2011 — April 27, 2011, by CDCoverage.com

    In Evanston Ins. Co. v. D&L Masonry of Lubbock, Inc., No. 07-10-00358-CV (Tex. Ct. App. April 18, 2011), insured masonry subcontractor D&L sued its CGL insurer Evanston to recover costs incurred by D&L for the replacement of window frames damaged by D&L while performing masonry work adjacent to the window frames. The trial court granted summary judgment for D&L.

    Read the full story…

    Reprinted courtesy of CDCoverage.com


    Limiting Plaintiffs’ Claims to a Cause of Action for Violation of SB-800

    November 18, 2011 — Samir R. Patel, Esq. and Todd E. Verbick, Esq., Lorber, Greenfield & Polito, LLP

    There has been a fair share of publicity about the SB-800 amendments to the Civil Code (Civil Code section 896, et seq.) that codified construction defect litigation in 2002. Most of the publicity is geared toward the pre-litigation standards allowing a builder the right to repair before litigation is commenced by a homeowner. Less focus and attention has been given to the fact that violation of the SB-800 performance standards is being used by plaintiff’s counsel as an additional tool in the plaintiff’s pleading tool box against builders. Closer scrutiny to SB-800 reveals that those provisions should in fact act as a limitation to the pleading tools available to plaintiffs and an additional tool for builders in the defense of cases governed by SB-800.

    The typical construction defect complaint contains the boiler plate versions of numerous causes of action. These causes of action include Strict Liability, Negligence, Negligence Per Se, Breach of Contract, Breach of Contract – Third-Party Beneficiary, Breach of Express Warranties, Breach of Implied Warranties, among others. The wide array of causes of action leave a defendant “pinned to the wall” because they require a complex defense on a multitude of contract and tort related causes of action. Furthermore, the statutes of limitations as to these claims widely differ depending upon if the particular defect is considered latent or patent. The truth of the matter remains, no matter what the circumstances, if a construction defect matter ultimately goes to trial, it is inevitable that plaintiffs will obtain a judgment on at least one of these causes of action.

    On its own, the Strict Liability cause of action can be a thorn in a defendant’s side. A builder is obviously placing a product into the stream of commerce and strict liability is a tough standard to defend against, particularly when it concerns intricate homes comprised of multiple components that originally sold for hundreds of thousands of dollars. A Negligence cause of action can also be difficult to defend because the duty of care for a builder is what a “reasonable” builder would have done under the circumstances. An interpretation of this duty of care can easily sway a jury that will almost always consist of sympathetic homeowners. A Negligence Per Se cause of action can also leave a defendant vulnerable to accusations that a builder violated the Uniform Building Code or a multitude of other obscure municipal construction-related code provisions during the construction of the home. Lastly, the Breach of Contract cause of action leaves a builder relying on dense and intricate purchase and sale agreements with dozens of addenda which leave the skeptical jurors turned off by what they view as one-side, boilerplate provisions. Ultimately, when a matter is about to go to trial, the complexity of these complaints can benefit a plaintiff and increase a plaintiff’s bargaining power against a defendant who is attempting to avoid a potentially large judgment.

    Enter the SB-800 statutes. The SB-800 statutes apply to all homes sold after January 1, 2003. Civil Code section 938 specifically states that “[t]his title applies only to new residential units where the purchase agreements with the buyer was signed by the seller on or after January 1, 2003.” (Civil Code §, 938.) As time progresses, more residential construction defect cases will exclusively fall under the purview of SB-800. Slowly but surely more SB-800 governed litigation is being filed, and its exclusive application is looming on the horizon.

    On its surface, this “right to repair” regime has left builders with a lot to be desired despite the fact that it is supposed to allow the builder the opportunity to cure any deficiencies in their product before litigation can be filed by potential plaintiffs. However, the application of the time line for repair has shown to be impractical for anything but the most minor problems involving only small numbers of residential units. Moreover, the fact that the fruits of the builder’s investigation into the claimed defects in the pre-litigation context can freely be used as evidence against it in litigation makes builders proceed with trepidation in responding with a repair. For these reasons, more SB-800 litigation can be expected to result due to the shortcomings of the pre-litigation procedures, and savvy defense counsel should anticipate the issues to be dealt with in presenting the defense of such cases at trial.

    This fact should not necessarily be met with fear or disdain. Within the SB-800 statutes, the legislature made it clear that they were creating a new cause of action for construction defect claims, but it further made it clear that this cause of action is a plaintiff’s exclusive remedy. The legislature giveth, but at the same time, the legislature taketh away. Throughout numerous provisions within the SB-800 statutes, the Civil Code states that claims for construction defects as to residential construction are exclusively governed by the Civil Code, and that the Civil Code governs any and all litigation arising under breaches of these provisions. Civil Code section 896 specifically states:

    In any action seeking recovery of damages arising out of, or related to deficiencies in, the residential construction … the claimant’s claims or causes of action shall be limited to violation of, the following standards, except as specifically set forth in this title. (Civil Code §, 896.)

    Civil Code section 896 then provides approximately fifty-plus standards by which a construction defect claim is assessed under that provision. Civil Code section 896 covers everything from plumbing to windows, and from foundations to decks, and in several instances expressly dictates statutes of limitations as to specific areas of construction that severely truncate the 10-year latent damage limitations period. As for any construction deficiencies that are not enumerated within Civil Code section 896, Civil Code section 897 explicitly defines the intent of the standards and provides a method to assess deficiencies that are not addressed in Civil Code section 896. Civil Code section 897 states:

    Intent of Standards

    The standards set forth in this chapter are intended to address every function or component of a structure. To the extent that a function or component of a structure is not addressed by these standards, it shall be actionable if it causes damage. (Civil Code §, 897.)

    Therefore, Civil Code section 897 acts as a catch-all by which defects that are not covered within Civil Code section 896 can be evaluated on a damage standard mirroring the Aas case (damages must be present and actual). The result of sections 896 and 897 being read in combination is a comprehensive, all-inclusive set of performance standards by which any defect raised by Plaintiffs can be evaluated and resolved under a single SB-800 based cause of action.

    Civil Code section 943 makes clear that a cause of action for violation of SB-800 performance standards is a plaintiff’s sole remedy for a residential construction defect action. Specifically, Civil Code section 943 states:

    Except as provided in this title, no other cause of action for a claim covered by this title or for damages recoverable under 944 is allowed. In addition to the rights under this title, this title does not apply to any action by a claimant to enforce a contract or express contractual provision, or any action for fraud, personal injury, or violation of a statute. (Civil Code §, 943.)

    Civil Code section 944 provides the method for computing damages within a construction defect action, as follows:

    If a claim for damages is made under this title, the homeowner is only entitled to damages for the reasonable value of repairing any violation of the standards set forth in this title, [and] the reasonable cost of repairing any damages caused by the repair efforts… . (Civil Code §, 944.)

    A cursory review of these statutes yields the conclusion that the legislature was attempting to create an exclusive cause of action that trumps all other causes of action where SB-800 applies. The remedy available to plaintiffs is limited to that allowed by the Civil Code. As noted above, “[n]o other cause of action for a claim covered by this title…is allowed.” (Civil Code §, 943.) Therefore, Civil Code sections 896, 897, 943, and 944 specifically prohibit the contract-based and tort-based causes of action typically pled by plaintiffs.

    Plaintiff’s counsel has seized upon the language of section 943 to advance the argument that SB-800 still allows a plaintiff to advance typical contract and tort based causes of action. On the surface, this argument may seem compelling, but a minimum of scrutiny of the express language of section 943 dispels this notion. Section 943 says that it provides rights “[i]n addition” to those under the SB-800 Civil Code provisions. Clearly, the language in section 943 is intended to expressly underscore the fact that a plaintiff is not precluded from seeking relief in addition to that allowed under SB-800 for damages not arising from a breach of the SB-800 standards or for damages in addition to those recoverable under Section 944. This language does not provide an unfettered license to bring a Strict Liability, Negligence or other cause of action against a builder where SB-800 applies.

    In fact, this language only keeps the door open for plaintiffs to pursue such causes of action not arising from a breach of the SB-800 standards should there be such supporting allegations. For example, if a plaintiff alleges that a builder breached an “express contractual provision” related to the timing of the completion of the home and close of escrow, and the contract specifies damages in this regard, a plaintiff may have a viable separate cause of action for Breach of Contract for recovery of those damages precisely because that is not an issue expressly dealt with in SB-800 in the performance standards under sections 896 and 897, or in the damage recovery terms under 944. As it stands, the vast majority of complaints are seeking redress for violation of the same primary right; that is, defects specifically outlined in Section 896 and 897 or which result in damages as stated in Section 944.

    So, how does a builder defend against a complaint that contains multiple causes of action regarding construction defects for a home sold after January 1, 2003? There are numerous ways to approach this. First and foremost, these superfluous and improper causes of action can be attacked by demurrer seeking dismissal of all causes of action other than the cause of action alleging violation of SB-800. If the the time period within which to file a demurrer has passed already, a motion for judgment on the pleadings can be utilized to attack the improper causes of action in the same way as a demurrer can be used for this purpose.

    The limitation to a demurrer or motion for judgment on the pleadings is that the judge is restricted to viewing only the four corners of the pleading when making a ruling. It is typical for plaintiffs’ counsel to cleverly (or one might even say, disingenuously) leave the complaint purposely vague to avoid a successful defense attack on the pleadings by not including the original date the residence was sold. In that instance, a motion for summary adjudication can be used to attack a plaintiff’s complaint. By simply providing evidence that the homes were originally sold after January 1, 2003, the improper causes of action should be subject to dismissal by summary adjudication. If the plaintiff is a subsequent purchaser, the builder still has recourse to enforce the pleading limitations under SB-800. Civil Code section 945 states that “[t]he provisions, standards, rights, and obligations set forth in this title are binding upon all original purchasers and their successors-in-interest.” (Civil Code §, 945.)

    Attacking a plaintiff’s complaint to eliminate multiple causes of action can have numerous benefits. The practical result is that a plaintiff will only have one viable cause of action. The advantage is that the SB-800 performance standards include the defined performance standards and shortened statutes of limitations periods with regard to specific issues. Furthermore, as to defects which are not specifically provided for in Civil Code section 896, Civil Code section 897 requires a proof of actual damages. Therefore, a plaintiff must provide evidence of current damages and not simply conditions that may potentially cause damage in the future.

    The Appellate Courts have yet to directly address and interpret these SB-800 provisions. The time for that is undoubtedly drawing near. For now, however, plaintiffs will have to find ways to accurately plead construction defect claims within the confines of one cause of action for breach of the performance standards enumerated within the Civil Code.

    Printed courtesy of Lorber, Greenfield & Polito, LLP. Mr. Patel can be contacted at spatel@lorberlaw.com and Mr. Verbick at tverbick@lorberlaw.com.


    Texas Law Bars Coverage under Homeowner’s Policy for Mold Damage

    July 13, 2011 — Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii

    Although the insurer paid for some of the mold damage at the insured’s home, the Fifth Circuit eventually determined the homeowner’s policy did not cover such damage. Rooters v. State Farm Lloyds, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 12306 (5th Cir. June 15, 2011).

    The policy excluded loss caused by hail to personal property unless the direct force of wind or hail made an opening in the roof allowing rain to enter. Further, the policy excluded loss caused by mold or other fungi.

    In 1999, hail and rain caused water damage to the roof and interior of the residence. State Farm paid $19,000 to repair the roof. Another $1,800 was paid for repairs to the interior of the building. In 2002, the insured noticed black mold. State Farm issued an additional check for $4,402 for mold abatement.

    Read the full story…

    Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com


    State Farm Too Quick To Deny Coverage, Court Rules

    July 22, 2011 — CDJ Staff

    On July 13, 2011, Judge Sarah S. Vance of the US District Court issued a rule in the case of Travelers Cas. & Surety Co. of Am. v. Univ. Facilities, Inc. (E.D. La., 2011). In this case, Stanley Smith Drywall was contracted by Capstone Building Corporation to “perform undisclosed work at the facility believed to involve the installation of drywall.” The project involved the design and construction of student residences for the Southeastern Louisiana University in Hammond, Louisiana. In May, 2009, University Facilities, Inc. (UFI) sued Capstone Development Corporation and Capstone On-Campus Management.

    State Farm insured Stanley Smith Drywall and they sought a declaration that they have no duty: “(1) to insure Stanley Smith or CBC, or (2) to defend or indemnify any party against UFI's claims in the pending arbitration.” State Farm contends “(1) there is no "occurrence" to trigger coverage under the policy; (2) only breach of contract claims are asserted; (3) there is no property damage alleged; and (4) various coverage limitations and exclusions apply to prevent coverage.’

    The court concluded that “whether State Farm has a duty to defend in the arbitration must be determined by considering the claims asserted in the arbitration.” However, the arbitration claims were not made part of the record. There, “, the Court cannot determine as a matter of law State Farm's duty to defend on the present record.” The same was true of State Farm’s duty to indemnify. “Stanley Smith and CBC assert that State Farm's motion for summary judgment was filed before any discovery was conducted in the arbitration proceeding or in this case. The Court finds that State Farm has failed to develop the record sufficiently to establish that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to its duty to indemnify Stanley Smith or CBC in the arbitration.’

    The court denied State Farm’s motion for a summary judgment on its duty to defend and indemnify.

    Read the court’s decision…


    The Ever-Growing Thicket Of California Civil Code Section 2782

    January 6, 2012 — Michael D. Worthing, Borton Petrini

    California Civil Code section 2782 imposes limits on indemnity and defense provisions in construction contracts. Since the initial adoption of S.B. 8001 in 2002 (eff. January 1, 2003) section 27822 has been revised several times, and legislative history suggests that interest groups representing builders, developers and sub-contractors, as well as the insurance industry, have seen legislative action on these indemnity and defense issues as part of the overall response to the same economic pressures resulting from construction defect litigation that gave rise to S.B. 800. Amendments in 2005, 2007, 2008 and 2011 (each effective January 1 of the following year) have increasingly entangled the provisions of Section 2782 with various provisions of S.B. 800. The application of section 2782 to construction contracts, and in particular contracts between developer-builders and subcontractors, executed after January 1, 2006, will require a concurrent reading and understanding of S.B. 800, the application of which is itself still in flux.

    The time a construction contract was executed will likely determine which version of section 2782, read in connection with provisions of S.B.800, is applicable. Because of the nature of construction defect litigation, the determination of relative rights and liabilities of developer-builders vis-à-vis subcontractors under construction contracts does not become the subject of litigation, and legal and judicial interpretation, until years after the contracts were entered and work performed. As of the date this article is submitted, there has been no case law interpreting or applying any of the post S.B. 800 amendments, in part, and perhaps primarily, because litigation arising from construction contracts executed after January 1, 2006, has not yet reached the appellate courts.

    SECTION 2782 AT THE TIME S.B. 800 WAS ENACTED

    Section 2782 was originally enacted in 1967 and amended several times to the version in effect when S.B. 800 became law, at which time the section was relatively simple and straightforward. It then consisted of two subdivisions, which have essentially remained unchanged until the most recent amendment during the 2011 legislative session.

    Section 2782 (a) prohibited, and still prohibits, provisions in construction contracts that “purport to indemnify the promisee against liability for damages for death or bodily injury to persons, injury to property, or any other loss, damage or expense arising from the sole negligence or willful misconduct of the promise.” This provision essentially prohibits what had been referred to as so-called Type I or “specific” indemnity provisions. In such agreements, the indemnitor [the promisor, that is, the person or entity indemnifying] will indemnify the indemnitee [the promisee, that is, the person or entity being protected by the indemnity] for the indemnitee’s own negligence, whether active or passive, whether the indemnitee is solely negligent or concurrently negligent with the indemnitor. (See, MacDonald & Kruse, Inc. v. San Jose Steel Co. (1972) 29 Cal.App.3d 413, 419.)3 Section 2782 (a) has remained essentially intact since the enactment of S.B. 800. It still must be considered and applied to interpret a construction contract. Generally, it will apply to contracts not involving a public agency; the next part of section 2782 specifically governs such contracts.

    The second subdivision prohibits provisions in any construction contract with a public agency which purport to impose on the contractor, or relieve the public agency from, liability for the active negligence of the public agency. Subdivision (b) has been revised by the 2011 amendment, discussed below. If a construction contract with the public agency is for residential construction, the standards of S.B. 800 likely apply.4

    This was the extent of section 2782 on January 1, 2003, when S.B. 800 went into effect, and remained so until January 1, 2006. This version will govern interpretation and application of indemnity and defense provisions in construction contracts executed before January 1, 2006.5

    2005 AMENDMENT

    The first “post S.B. 800” change to Section 2782 was in enacted in 2005, effective January 1, 2006, and added two new sections. Subdivision (c) stated (in somewhat greater detail than paraphrased here) that for residential construction contracts, or amendments thereto, entered into after January 1, 2006, a subcontractor cannot be required to indemnify (including the cost to defend) a builder for construction defects that arise out of negligence or design defects of the builder or other independent contractors, or that do not arise out of the scope of the subcontractor=s scope of work. The term “residential construction” was defined by reference to S.B.800 generally, and the term “builder” was defined by reference to section 911 (a part of S.B. 800), for the first time expressly connecting provisions of section 2782 to S.B. 800. Contractual provisions not expressly prohibited were reserved to the agreement of the parties.

    What subdivision (c) took away was partially given back by subdivision (d). It stated that “subdivision (c) does not prohibit a subcontractor and builder from mutually agreeing to the timing or immediacy of the defense and provisions for reimbursement of defense fees and costs, so long as that agreement, upon final resolution of the claims, does not waive or modify the provisions of subdivision (c).”6 In addition, it stated that this subdivision (c) did not affect the obligations of an insurance carrier under Presley Homes, Inc. v. American States Insurance Company (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 571, which holds that where an insurer has a duty to defend a developer pursuant to an additional insured endorsement obtained under a subcontractor’s policy, that duty generally applies to the entire action, even if the suit involves both covered and uncovered claims, or a single claim only partially covered by the policy. Finally, subdivision (d) stated that the amendment did not affect the builder’s or subcontractor’s obligations under S.B. 800. Both of these latter provisions, relating to the Presley Homes case, and obligations under S.B. 800, have been carried forward essentially intact in subsequent amendments of section 2782.

    This version of section 2782 will be applicable to any contract between a builder as defined by section 911 (see fn. 4, above) and a subcontractor executed between January 1, 2006, and December 31, 2008. Thus, a general contractor, etc., who is not a builder is not subject to the provisions added by the 2005 amendment; this changed with the next amendment.

    It is not clear whether this version would apply to a contract entered before January 1, 2006, but amended after that date. Subdivision (c) applies to “all construction contracts, and amendments thereto, entered into after January 1, 2006, for residential construction.” It would seem that the clearest and most logical construction would apply it only to contracts originally made after January 1, 2006, and thereafter amended, but there has been no judicial determination of this issue.

    In addition, logically it would seem that this version of section 2782 should be applicable to construction contracts for residential construction between a builder and a subcontractor, entered between January 1, 2006, and December 31, 2008; however, legislative history relating to the 2008 amendment discussed below suggests a different result might occur.

    2007 AMENDMENT

    The second “post S.B. 800” amendment in 2007 (effective January 1, 2008), added subdivisions (e)(1) and (e)(2).

    Subdivision (e)(1) added general contractors and subcontractors not affiliated with the builder and imposed essentially the same restrictions on provisions to indemnify, including the cost to defend, them as had been imposed on the “builder” by the 2005 amendment. The amendment refers to section 911 (b), again part of S.B. 800, to define general contractors, etc., not affiliated with the builder.

    Subdivision (e)(1) essentially repeated the provisions of subdivision (d) permitting agreement to the timing and immediacy of the defense, the reference to the Presley Homes case, and the general contractor’s or subcontractor’s obligations under S.B. 800.

    It appears this amendment was an attempt to harmonize the new restrictions on indemnity and defense provisions with S.B. 800. The 2005 amendment, whether by oversight or intent, covered only builders and not general contractors, although both classes are subject to the provisions of S.B. 800; the 2007 amendment added non-builder-affiliated general contractors.

    Again, logically, it would seem that this version of section 2782 should be applicable to construction contracts for residential construction between a general contractor or contractor not affiliated with a builder and a subcontractor, entered between January 1 and December 31, 2008; however, legislative history relating to the 2008 amendment discussed below suggests a different result might occur. The same potential uncertainty regarding applicability to a contract entered before January 1, 2008, but amended after that date, exists for this provision as for the prior amendment, discussed above.

    2008 AMENDMENT

    The third “post S.B. 800” amendment in 2008 (effective January 1, 2009), reorganized the language relating to prohibited indemnity provisions, added a reference to insurance in that same prohibition, extensively rewrote the provisions governing agreements relating to the timing or immediacy of defense, added language preserving equitable indemnity claims, and added language defining “construction defect” by reference to the standards set forth in S.B. 800.

    Subdivisions (a) and (b) remained unchanged.

    Subdivision (c) now made a combined reference to builders (again by reference to section 911), as well as general contractors or contractors not affiliated with the builder (again by reference to section 911 (b)), rather than dealing with the two groups in separate but nearly identical subdivisions as previously. It otherwise restated the same limitations that were previously set forth separately in subdivisions (c) and (e), as well as the reference to the Presley Homes case, and the general contractor’s or subcontractor’s obligations under S.B. 800, but with one important addition. The word “insure” was added to the description of prohibited provisions, to-wit: “provisions? that purport to insure or indemnify, including the cost to defend, the builder, [etc.]? are unenforceable” to the extent they arise out of claims of the type previously described.

    It is unclear what impact the addition of this single word “insure” will have; and, it will have to be read in light of the preservation of the language that it shall not affect the obligations of an insurance carrier under the holding of the Presley Homes case. Suppose a carrier had issued an additional insured endorsement under which it would otherwise be required to defend a builder or general contractor consistent with the Presley Homes rule: would this newly added single word (restricting the construction contract, to which the carrier is not a party) give the carrier a basis for denying coverage under the insurance contract? Or would the continued inclusion of the express language that it does not affect the obligations of an insurance carrier under Presley Homes control? That is surely an issue that will have to be worked out by the courts.

    The new subdivision (d) addressed defense obligations. Again it permitted parties to agree to the timing and immediacy of the defense and provision for reimbursement of defense fees and costs, but imposed a very detailed scheme that appears to limit the extent of such agreement. A subcontractor owes no defense or indemnity obligation until the builder or general contractor provides a written tender of the claim, which has the same force and effect as notice of commencement of a legal proceeding. Upon that tender the subcontractor shall elect to follow one of two ways of performing: subdivision (d) (1) permits the subcontractor to defend with counsel of its choice and to control the defense, if the subcontractor gives written notice of this election within a reasonable time after receipt of the written tender and in no event later than 90 days following that receipt; subdivision (d) (2) provides an alternative by which the subcontractor pays a reasonable allocated share of the builder’s or general contractor’s defense fees and costs within 30 days of receipt of an invoice, subject to reallocation upon final resolution of the claim by settlement or judgment. Subdivision (e) sets forth remedies available to the builder or general contractor if a subcontractor fails to timely and adequately perform its obligations under either of the two alternatives in subdivision (d), including compensatory and consequential damages, reasonable attorneys’ fees in connection with the first alternative, and interest on defense and indemnity costs in connection with the second alternative. Subdivision (e) ends with provisions relating to reallocation of defense costs, and damages for failure to reallocate.

    Application of these requirements in actual litigation is likely to be cumbersome and potentially fraught with conflicts. If retained pursuant to subdivision (d) (1) does the attorney represent the builder, the subcontractor, or both? To whom does the attorney owe his or her fiduciary duty? Can an appropriate informed written consent be formulated, for example, under Rule 3-310 of the California Rules of Professional Conduct, or Rule 1.7, ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct? Could an attorney retained by a subcontractor blame the subcontractor if that is in the developer’s best interests? If multiple subcontractors elect to defend directly, how would the defense be coordinated among the potentially multiple attorneys so retained? Would an attorney retained by one subcontractor be able, or inclined, to blame another subcontractor who also chose to defend directly, in other words, what would prevent inconsistent defense positions amongst the various counsel retained by subcontractors for the developer? There may be solutions to such practical and professional considerations but it seems an ethical thicket awaits any attorney involved in such circumstances.

    Subdivision (e) and (f) preserve equitable indemnity claims for the builder, general contractor or subcontractor, the first in general, the second as against any supplier, design profession, or product manufacturer. Finally, the 2008 amendment added for the first time, in subdivision (h), language defining "construction defect" as used in section 2782 as a violation of standards set forth in S.B. 800.

    The inclusion of these last three subsections would seem to work against simplification of litigation. A builder or general contractor is likely to allege a claim for equitable indemnity against any and all subcontractors in addition to claims for contractual indemnity and defense (however limited by the other provisions of section 2782). Nothing in the section suggests the subcontractor should, or even can, somehow take on the representation of the builder, etc., in connection with a claim of equitable indemnity back against the subcontractor.

    And the limited definition of “construction defect” in subdivision (h) appears to raise an issue of the applicability of the limitations set forth in subdivision (c). Although there is a school of thought that section 941 limits residential construction defect claims only to breach of the performance standards under S.B. 800, it is still common for CD complaints to plead other legal theories, e.g., breach of contract, breach of warranty, negligence, etc., in addition to violation of S.B. 800 standards. With the addition of subdivision (h) it is arguable that the restrictions on indemnity and defense provisions spelled out in subdivisions (c) and (d), both of which relate to claims for residential construction defects, are applicable only to claims for violation of S.B. 800 standards, and not other residential construction defect claims. In other words, a developer might conceivably still be entitled to a broader scope of indemnity and concomitant defense for other types of claims, such as breach of contract, breach of warranty, negligence, etc., so long as the indemnity does not violate the limitation of subdivision (a) against Type I indemnity, which as noted above, has remained intact through these revisions.

    Finally, it would seem that this version of section 2782 should be applicable to contracts executed between builders, general contractors, etc., on the one hand and subcontractors on the other hand on and after January 1, 2009. And, as noted above in connection with the 2005 and 2007 amendments, logic would suggest that those versions would ordinarily apply to contracts executed during the time periods mentioned above. But, the Legislative Counsel’s Digest for the 2008 amendment as it finally was enacted into law includes the following statements:

    This bill would delete the provisions applicable to construction contracts entered into on or after January 1, 2008, that purport to indemnify the general contractor or contractor not affiliated with the builder. The bill would revise the provisions applicable to contracts entered into after January 1, 2006, to instead apply to contracts entered into after January 1, 2009, and to apply to agreements that purport to insure or indemnify the builder or the general contractor or contractor not affiliated with the builder, as described.

    Although it seems a startling result, this legislative history suggests an argument can be made that the 2008 amendment retroactively nullified the effect of the 2005 and 2007 amendments, so that contracts executed from January 1, 2006, as to builders or January 1, 2008, for general contractors, etc., through December 31, 2008, are still governed by the provisions of section 2782 as it was on the books prior to the first post-S.B. 800 amendment in 2005.

    2011 AMENDMENT

    Section 2782 has been amended yet again in the 2011 session of the California Legislature, effective January 1, 2012; however, the substantive changes affect certain contracts entered on or after January 1, 2013. All of the provisions contained in the 2008 amendment have been carried forward in the most recent amendment, although re-numbered: (c) became (d), etc., through (h) becoming (i). So, the law governing construction contracts entered into after January 1, 2009, for residential construction, as between a builder, or a general contractor, etc., not affiliated with a builder, and regarding insurance, indemnity or defense relating to claims for construction defects, remains the same as in the 2008 amendment.

    As noted above the substantive changes to section 2782 all affect contracts entered into on or after January 1, 2013. Subdivision (b) has been amended such that any provision in a contract with a public agency that purports to impose on any contractor, etc., or relieve the public agency from, liability for the active negligence of the public agency will be void and unenforceable. A new subdivision (c) has been added that imposes a similar restriction on construction contracts with the owner of privately owned real property to be improved and as to which the owner is not acting as a contractor or supplier of materials or equipment to the work. This new restriction in subdivision (c) does not apply to a homeowner performing a home improvement project on his or her own single family dwelling.

    The 2011 bill amending section 2782 also added a new section 2782.05, which will make void and unenforceable any provision in any construction contract (again, entered on or after January 1, 2013) that purports to insure or indemnify, including the cost to defend, a general contractor, construction manager, or other subcontractor, by a subcontractor for claims that arise out of the active negligence or willful misconduct of the general contractor, etc., or other independent contractors, etc., or to the extent the claims do not arise out of the scope of work of the subcontractor. However, the section also includes a long list of situations to which it does not apply, including all of those covered by section 2782 (residential construction subject to S.B. 800, public agency contracts subject to section 2782 (b), and direct contracts with private property owners subject to the new section 2782 (c)) as well as eight other categories. This apparently is intended to serve as a “catch-all” to extend a limitation on indemnity agreements to all construction contracts not previously swept into this widening legislative scheme, although the exact phrasing is slightly different.7

    The new section 2782.05 then permits a mutual agreement to the timing or immediacy of a defense under a scheme essentially identical to that imposed in the 2008 amendment to section 2782: defend with counsel of choice, and maintain control of the defense; or, pay a reasonable allocated share of defense fees and costs. The same logistical and ethical difficulties presented by the 2008 scheme discussed above would likely be present in cases that fall under the new section 2782.05.

    CONCLUSION

    The California Legislature has been revising section 2782 since shortly after the adoption of S.B. 800. Each revision has been more complicated than the last, and each has tied certain provisions of section 2782 more closely to S.B. 800. In particular, with regard to construction defect claims relating to residential dwellings which are subject to S.B. 800, the Legislature has apparently attempted to exercise more and more control over the scope of allowable indemnity and dictated a very narrow scheme to govern how the defense obligation arising from a contractual indemnity is to be implemented. It seems likely that any attempt to manage the defense of a construction defect case under the options that allow a subcontractor to defend directly and control the defense will create a logistical problem and an ethical difficulty for any attorney attempting to defend a developer at the behest and direction of a subcontractor. Finally, as set forth in the current version of section 2782 relating to contractual indemnity and defense of S.B. 800 type cases (subdivisions (c) through (h) in the 2008 version, now subdivisions (d) through (i) in the 2011 amendment), the Legislature has apparently narrowed the application to only claims of violation of S.B. 800 standards. This may have, in essence, removed the restrictions on indemnity and defense provisions as they relate to other theories pleaded against developers in construction defense cases, e.g., breach of contract, breach of warranty, negligence, and the like. It is not at all clear that the Legislature has accomplished what it set out do accomplish. Rather, the law may have come full circle back to where it began, except for one legal theory, i.e. violation of S.B. 800 standards, currently being used in residential construction defect cases. For any other legal theory the limitation of section 2782 (a) may be solely controlling.

    1. California Civil Code section 43.99, and sections 895 to 945.5.
    2. All statutory references in this article are to the California Civil Code unless otherwise specified.
    3. Type I or specific indemnity does not exactly match the scope of proscribed indemnity as described in section 2782 (a) but it is the closest. More recent case law in California has eschewed a mechanical application of the MacDonald & Kruse typology in favor of examining the precise text of the actual contract (See, e.g., St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Frontier Pacific Ins. Co. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1234, 1246, n. 6) but some recent cases still use the Type I, II and II classifications. And, an understanding of that “historical” typology is useful as an aid to evaluating and understanding express indemnity in general.
    4. The provisions of S.B. 800 other than the prelitigation procedures of sections 910 through 938 apply to general contractors, subcontractors, etc., pursuant to section 936. The prelitigation procedures generally involve a “builder,” which is specifically defined in section 911 (a) by reference to entities or individuals in the business of selling residential units to the public or of building, developing, or constructing residential units for public purchase. Pursuant to section 911 (b) the term builder does not include general contractors, etc., not affiliated with the builder. Thus, a general contractor who constructs residential housing pursuant to a contract with a public agency is still subject to claims for violation of the standards set forth in sections 896 and 897, resulting from its negligent act or omission or breach of contract, pursuant to section 936.
    5. As noted above, there has been no case law yet interpreting any of the “post S.B. 800” changes to Section 2782. One of the most important legal decisions relating to express indemnity and defense obligations and rights between developer-builders and sub-contractors was published after two of the amendments but based upon contracts executed and the language of section 2782 prior to January 1, 2006. (See, Crawford v. Weather Shield Mfg., Inc. (2008) 44 Cal.4th 541, 547, 566-67, fn. 14).
    6. Subcontractor dissatisfaction with the perceived inadequacy of protection afforded by this provision apparently became the impetus for a 2008 amendment to section 2782, discussed below, at least based upon the numerous (form) letters submitted to legislators in connection therewith.
    7. Section 2782 (a), where we started, and which has continued without change, prohibits indemnity for claims arising out of the sole negligence or willful misconduct of the promisee; sole negligence can be either active or passive. The various versions relating to residential construction prohibit indemnity for the negligence of the builder, etc., suggesting there is no express contractual indemnity for the negligence of the subcontractor if the builder, etc., is at all negligent. This is tempered a bit by the preservation of the right to equitable indemnity, which will now be found in section 2782 (g) and (h).

    Courtesy of Michael D. Worthing of Borton Petrini, LLP. Mr. Worthing can be contacted at mworthing@bortonpetrini.com.


    Public Relations Battle over Harmon Tower

    October 23, 2012 — CDJ Staff

    Tutor Pernini claims that CityCenter is portraying the construction firm as “the scum of the earth” in an attempt to influence eventual jurors, according to an article at Vegas Inc. The contractor’s attorneys have requested information regarding the public relations efforts of MGM Resorts and CityCenter, characterizing CityCenter’s PR as a “litigation spin doctor.”

    CityCenter has requested that at least one subpoena be canceled. Judge Elizabeth Gonzales has already allowed one to go through, although she has noted that Perini cannot request documents from CityCenter’s lawyers to the litigation consultants under attorney/client privilege. Tutor Perini claims that in 2010, Patricia Glaser, who has represented CityCenter, said her goal was to portray Perini as “the scum of the earth,” and make that certain that judges and juries would not “adopt the world view espoused by the opposing party.”

    Read the full story…


    Construction Bright Spot in Indianapolis

    March 1, 2012 — CDJ Staff

    The downtown Indianapolis area is the site of about 85 major building projects that are from groundbreaking to just complete. The Indianapolis Star reports that the cumulative worth of the projects is about $3 billion, a level of construction that Indianapolis has seen only once before.

    About thirty of the projects are residential. The main commercial project is a $754 million hospital building. The boom in downtown Indianapolis is not matched elsewhere, with the Indianapolis Star reporting that in the rest of Central Indiana, construction has slowed.

    Read the full story…


    Bar to Raise on Green Standard

    November 7, 2012 — CDJ Staff

    Next June, members of the U.S. Green Building Council will be voting on changes to the LEED green building standard. “The bar is getting raised,” said Navad Malin of BuildingGreen, a consulting and publishing firm, in an article in USA Today. Under the proposed guidelines, builders would have to project energy and water use for five years as part of the certification process. However, if the occupants aren’t as green as the builders anticipated, the buildings will not lose their certification.

    The new rules will include higher energy standards, award points for avoiding potentially hazardous materials, and even determine what kind of plumbing items can be used.

    Read the full story…


    Contractor’s Home Not Covered for Construction Defects

    September 13, 2012 — CDJ Staff

    The US District Court in Seattle has rejected most of the claims made by a Des Moines man over insurance coverage for water damage to his home. Judge John C. Coughenour granted summary judgment to Liberty Northwest in Ayar v. Liberty Northwest Insurance Corporation.

    Sayad Ayar was the general contractor for the construction of his house. As a homeowner held a $1.5 million insurance policy from Liberty Northwest (LNW) that excluded “faulty, inadequate, or defective construction.”

    In 2008, less than three years after his house was constructed, Mr. Ayar filed a claim after water leaked through his living room ceiling. LNW hired an engineering firm to investigate the damage. The engineering firm, CASE Forensics, concluded that the water intrusion was due to “the failure to install an adequate and continuous waterproof membrane, flashing, and drainage system within the balcony at the time of construction.” Ayar’s expert attributed the leakage to “damage done to the weather deck waterproofing during a storm event with high winds,” which would be covered under the policy. CASE Forensics reviewed these conclusions and rejected them. LNW denied coverage.

    Further problems lead to further investigations, and in each case, LNW attributed the problems to construction defects. During this process, LNW “authorized Ayar to cut into the ceiling’s drywall in order to assist in determining the source of the water intrusion.” Mr. Ayar moved his family to a rental home. He requested that LNW cover the rental and other other costs.

    LNW’s adjuster concluded that no coverage was available, but recommended paying Mr. Ayar $19,648.68 to reinstall drywall and repair the hole in the ceiling. The insurance company paid $2,000 to cover the cost of cutting into the ceiling. The also claimed the amount of drywall he removed was “excessive” and would not cover his relocation as “his home had been livable and because the loss was not covered.”

    Ayar made four claims to the court in support of the argument that LNW misrepresented “pertinent facts or insurance policy provisions.” The court rejected three of these, noting that as all water damage was excluded, LNW’s citation of other sources of water intrusion was not a misrepresentation. “LNW did not rely on this provision as the reason for denying coverage.” Nor was LNW’s reference to “fungi, wet or dry rot” a misrepresentation. As for their reference to construction defects, it “was clearly appropriate given that the construction defect exclusion was the principal basis or denying the claim.” However, the court found that regarding the removal of drywall, “a triable issue of the facts exists.”

    Ayar also claimed that LNW did not conduct a reasonable investigation, but the court found no evidence to support this conclusion. “This is not a case where the insurer failed to investigate or did so only half-heartedly.” Although the thoroughness of the investigation could not questioned, the court concluded that its timing could. Ayar claimed that LNW engaged in unreasonable delays. LNW counters that the delays were due to “Ayar’s own obstructive behavior and failure to cooperate with LNW’s investigation.”

    The court dismissed all of Ayar’s claims, with the exception of whether LNW should have informed him that they would not pay for drywall repair unless there was damage, and whether LNW’s investigation failed to conclude its investigation within a thirty-day time line.

    Read the court’s decision…


    Eighth Circuit Remands to Determine Applicability of Collapse Exclusion

    January 6, 2012 — Tred Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii

    The Eighth Circuit determined a jury instruction regarding the applicability of the "all-risk" policy’s exclusion for "collapse" was inadequate. See KAAPA Ethanol, LLC v. Affiliated FM Ins. Co., 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 22158 (8th Cir. Nov. 3, 2011).

    KAAPA had nine large, cylindrical, stainless steel tanks fabricated at its location. Soon after operations began in 2003, some of the tanks experienced unusual movement and began to shift. A geotechnical engineer found "silty clay" had been used for infill instead of compacted granular fill called for in engineering drawings. A year long plan to repair all nine tanks was implemented.

    Affiliated’s "all-risk" policy excluded damage caused by faulty workmanship. It also excluded damage caused by settling or cracking. The settling exclusion went on to provide, "This exclusion will not apply to loss or damage resulting from collapse of: a building or structure; or material part of a building or structure." Affiliated denied coverage because of the faulty workmanship and settling exclusions.

    Read the full story…

    Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com


    Loose Bolts Led to Sagging Roof in Construction Defect Claim

    February 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff

    Though the sagging roof is neither leaking nor a safety hazard, the town of Waynesville, North Carolina is suing the builder of its new fire station, as reported in the Smoky Mountain News. The engineers who examined the roof found a substantial number of loose bolts in the roof trusses. Additionally, the trusses themselves have become bent.

    Tom Galloway, Waynesville’s Town Manager said “it needs to be remedied and fixed.” He said that the builder, Construction Logic, “never indicated a willingness to fix the roof.” The town is seeking the cost of repair, which Galloway estimated could be $400,000, and an additional $30,000 in damages. The suit states that Construction Logic failed to follow the plan specifications for the roof.

    Read the full story…


    Houses Can Still Make Cents: Illinois’ Implied Warranty of Habitability

    March 1, 2011 — Original Story by Marisa L. Saber Cozen O’Connor Subrogation & Recovery Law Blog

    In a report published earlier this week Marisa L. Saber writes about the implied warranty of habitability in the context of construction defect litigation. The piece speaks of the difficulties in alleging tort theories against builders and vendors in light of Illinois’ expansion of the economic loss doctrine, and how the implied warranty of habitability may provide another avenue for recovery.

    Read Full Story...


    Court Clarifies Sequence in California’s SB800

    December 20, 2012 — CDJ Staff

    As California’s Right-To-Repair law, SB800, nears its ninth birthday, it has remained “largely untested in the legal system” as noted by Megan MacNee of Wood, Smith, Henning & Berman LLP on the site RealEstateRama. She writes that some homeowners have requested documents prior to filing a claim, which she describes as an attempt to “game the system,” and “analogous to requiring a party to litigation to comply with discovery before a complaint is filed.”

    The court determined that homeowners may not request documents from the builder until they have actually filed a claim. The court noted that SB800 lacks any clear indication that homeowners may request documents before filing a claim (and also does not indicate that a builder would have to provide documents in these circumstances). The court concluded that the section that sets up the prelitigation procedures occurs before they section on documents discovery.¬? “Because the document request is part of the prelitigation procedure, and the prelitigation procedure does not begin until the homeowner has served notice of a claim, it follows that there can be no prelitigation obligation to produce documents under section 912, subdivision (a) unless the homeowner has commenced the prelitigation procedure by serving notice of a claim.”

    Read the full story…