US Courts in Nevada Busy with Yellow Brass
August 2, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Judge Robert C. Jones, the chief judge of the United States District Court of Nevada, and Judge Peggy A. Leen, a magistrate judge with the same court, have issued orders in cases involving allegations of high-zinc yellow brass plumbing components. Judge Jones issued orders on Waterfall Homeowners Association v. Viega, Inc. and Greystone Nevada, LLC v. Anthem Highlands Community Association on July 9, 2012. Judge Leen issued orders on Southern Terrace Homeowners Association v. Viega, Inc. on July 10, and The Seasons Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Richmond American Homes of Nevada, Inc. on July 19.
Chief Judge Jones held an omnibus hearing on Waterfall v. Viega on June 12. During that hearing “Chief Judge Jones had already agreed that the claims against the product manufacturers should be be severed from the majority of the other claims and that discovery should proceed on different tracks.” Judge Leen ordered that the Southern Terrace claims be referred to Chief Judge Jones to determine if it should be consolidated with other yellow brass cases.
Chief Judge Jones’s decision in Greystone Nevada rests on issues of whether the affected homeowners had signed arbitration agreements. The judge found that the “Defendant’s claims that the seven homeowners they have identified are subsequent purchasers who need not arbitrate with Greystone is definitively refuted by the evidence.”
Judge Leen cites the Greystone decision in her ruling on Seasons Homeowners Association v. Richmond American Homes of Nevada. Richmond seeks to compel individual arbitration, stating that “the arbitration clause used singular rather than plural terms, and therefore, class arbitration was foreclosed.” Judge Leen determined that “under Nevada law, a homeowners association has statutory authority to represent homeowners associations in these types of actions. She did, however, accept Richmond’s argument that they could compel arbitration.
The Waterfall order involves an attempt by two homeowners associations to seek a class action against seventeen defendants, the first twelve of whom are described as “the Viega Defendants” and “the Uponor Defendants.” Chief Judge Jones notes that “many of these Defendants have been sued in identical class actions by the same law firms, but with different named defendants.” The homeowner association seek to “represent their own 998 members directly but also wish to represent up to 10,000 homeowner associations representing up to 250,000 similarly situated homeowner members throughout the Las Vega area via this class action.”
The judge has denied the Viega Defendants’ attempt to deny class certification, noting that the plaintiffs “argue that they intend to argue for class certification under Rule 23(b)(3). He also denied the motions by the two groups of the Viega Defendants. The U.S. Viega Defendants sought to be dismissed from the case for a variety of reasons. The judge noted of the claim that the plaintiffs had no injury of fact and are not alleging actual damage is contradicted by the allegations of actual damage made by the plaintiffs. ”They have alleged that the parts are defective and have already begun to corrode in at least a few sample circumstances, even if they have not yet failed.” To the argument that there re not particular claims made against defendants, the judge notes, “it is clear from the Complaint which Defendants are alleged to have manufactured and sold which brands of allegedly defective products, and which Defendants are alleged to have installed them.”
The German Viega firms also sought to be dismissed from the suit, noting that “they have no property, employees, accounts, advertisements, etc. in Nevada and have not sold any products in Nevada.” However, the judge notes that “at least Waterfall, and perhaps Red Bluff, was still under construction when Viega, Inc. became the sole shareholder of Vanguard Industries, Inc.”
Finally, both of Chief Judge Jones’s rulings cite a related case in the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota involving a class action settlement for those with F1807 systems. He notes in both these cases that “Plaintiffs disclaimed any claims based upon F1807 components.”
Read the courts' decisions…
Waterfall Homeowners Association v. Viega, Inc.
Greystone Nevada, LLC v. Anthem Highlands Community Association
Southern Terrace Homeowners Association v. Viega, Inc.
The Seasons Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Richmond American Homes of Nevada, Inc.
Residential Construction Down in San Diego
September 13, 2012 — CDJ Staff
While new home construction is on the rise in some parts of the country, San Diego has seen a fall, comparing the first seven months of 2012 with the first seven months of 2011, dropping nine percent, according to an article in the San Diego Business Journal. The news isn’t all bad, since although July residential construction dropped sharply, nonresidential construction increased thirty-six percent.
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Insurance Company Must Show that Lead Came from Building Materials
August 17, 2011 — CDJ Staff
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals for Louisiana has reversed the summary judgment of a lower court in the case of Widder v. Louisiana Citizens Property Insurance Company. Judge Roland L. Belsome wrote the opinion for the panel of three judges. Ms. Widder discovered that her home and its content were contaminated by lead. She applied to her insurer, Louisiana Citizens Property Insurance, which denied her claim.
In response to Ms. Widder’s suit, LCPIC applied for a summary judgment on the grounds that there was no physical loss and that the policy did not cover defective material, latents defects, and pollution damage.
The appeals court found that the lead contamination of Widder’s home did meet the standards of a direct physical loss, citing a recent Chinese Drywall case. There, it was found, “when a home has been rendered unusable or uninhabitable, physical damage is not necessary.”
The lower court addressed only one of LCPIC’s exclusions, addressing only the exclusion on basis of “faulty, inadequate or defective material.” The appeals court noted that the evidence offered at trial does not show that the building materials were the source of the lead. This provided the appeals court with a matter of fact to remand to the lower court.
Read the court’s decision…
Construction Law Client Alert: California Is One Step Closer to Prohibiting Type I Indemnity Agreements In Private Commercial Projects
June 15, 2011 — Haight Brown & Bonesteel, LLP
On June 1, 2011 by majority vote, the California Senate passed Senate Bill 474, which would amend Civil Code section 2782, and add Civil Code section 2782.05. The passage of this new law is a critical development for real estate developers, general contractors and subcontractors because it will affect how these projects are insured and how disputes are resolved.
Civil Code section 2782 was amended in 2007 to prohibit Type I indemnity agreements for residential projects only. Since 2007, various trade associations and labor unions have lobbied to expand those very same restrictions to other projects. These new provisions apply to contracts, entered into after January 1, 2013, that are not for residential projects, and that are not executed by a public entity. The revisions provide that any provision in a contract purporting to indemnify, hold harmless, and defend another for their negligence or other fault is against public policy and void. These provisions cannot be waived.
A provision in a contract requiring additional insured coverage is also void and unenforceable to the extent it would be prohibited under the new law. Moreover, the new law does not apply to wrap-up insurance policies or programs, or a cause of action for breach of contract or warranty that exists independently of the indemnity obligation.
The practical impact of this new law is that greater participation in wrap-up insurance programs will likely result. While many wrap-up programs suffer from problems such as insufficient limits, and disputes about funding the self-insured retention, the incentive for the developer or general contractor to utilize wrap-up insurance will be greater than ever before because they will no longer be able to spread the risk of the litigation to the trades and the trade carriers.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of Steve Cvitanovic of Haight Brown & Bonesteel, LLP.
Important Information Regarding Colorado Mechanic’s Lien Rights.
November 7, 2012 — David McLain, Colorado Construction Litigation
With payment problems in the construction economy having accelerated over the past few years, there has been a substantial increase in mechanic’s lien activity and associated litigation. The typical mechanic’s lien claimant is a material supplier, a trade subcontractor, or even a general contractor that has not been paid by the developer/owner of the construction project. The reason for filing a mechanic’s lien claim is that it offers the prospect in many cases to make the unpaid construction professional a priority creditor, with a lien on the real estate that is superior to the construction lender.
One of the primary rules governing a mechanic’s lien claim is that the creditor’s formal written “Notice of Intent to File a Mechanic’s Lien” (hereafter “Lien Notice”) must be (1) served on the owner of the property for which the work was done or the materials used, and (2) served at the same time on the general contractor who has handled the construction project. After the creditor has made service of the lien claim by USPS certified mail (using the green return receipt card for proof of service) or separate personal delivery of the notice to the property owner and general contractor, ten full days must pass (not including the date of mailing of the notices) before the lien notice is filed in the public records.
After ten days have expired following the date of mailing using certified mail, or personal delivery of the notice to the property owner and the general contractor, the lien notice can be filed to make the lien valid.
Reprinted courtesy of David M. McLain, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC. Mr. McLain can be contacted at mclain@hhmrlaw.com
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Insurer Has Duty to Defend in Water Intrusion Case
July 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has upheld a summary judgment against an insurance company in a construction defect suit. Lagestee-Mulder, Incorporated (LMI) was hired by Crown Centre to construct a multi-story office building in Franfort, Illinois. LMI hired Frontrunner Glass & Metal to supply and install windows and doors. Frontrunner purchased an insurance policy from Consolidated which named LMI as an additional insured. The project experienced water intrusion and other construction defects and Crown sued LMI. Consolidated denied coverage. LMI sued Consolidated and the US District Court granted a summary judgment against Consolidated.
The appeals court reviewed the grounds for summary judgment and determined that under Illinois law, Consolidated had a duty to defend. The court cited an earlier opinion that “if the underlying compliant alleges facts within or potentially within policy coverage, an insurer is obligated to defend its insured even if the allegations are groundless, false, or fraudulent.”
Read the court’s decision…
Construction Defects Are Occurrences, Says South Carolina High Court
December 20, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The South Carolina Supreme Court has left the legislature’s new, expanded definition of “occurrence” in place, declining to declare it unconstitutional. South Carolina included faulty workmanship as an occurrence in response to a Supreme Court decision, which the court later reversed. One of the parties in that earlier decision, Harleysville Insurance, challenged the new law, claiming that the legislature didn’t have the power to pass a law to overturn a court ruling. The court did not concur.
However, the court did determine that the law was not retroactive and covered only claims filed after the law became effective in May 2011. The Chief Justice of South Carolina noted that “insurance coverage for construction liability lacks clarity, particularly with respect to whether construction defects constitute ‘occurrences’ under construction general insurance policies.”
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No Coverage Under Ensuing Loss Provision
September 9, 2011 — Tred Eyerley, Construction Law Hawaii
The cost of removing and replacing cracked flanges to prevent future leakage was not covered as an ensuing loss under a builder’s risk policy in RK Mechanical, Inc. v. Travelers Prop. Casualty Co. of Am., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83958 (D. Colo. Aug. 1, 2011).
The insured, RK Mechanical Inc., was a subcontractor hired to install plumbing for a residential construction project. RK was an additional insured on the general contractor’s policy with Travelers. RK installed approximately 170 CPVC flanges on the project. Subsequently, two of the flanges cracked, allowing water to overflow and causing water damage to the project. Travelers was notified of the flange failure and resulting water damage.
RK subsequently removed and replaced the two cracked flanges and began water remediation. Travelers paid for the cost of the water damage due to the cracked flanges.
RK then examined all of the flanges installed in the project and discovered many were cracked and/or showed signs of potential failure. RK removed and replaced the cracked flanges. RK tendered a claim and demand for indemnity to Travelers for these repair costs. Travelers denied the claim. RK then sued for breach of contract and declaratory relief. The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment.
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
Coverage for Construction Defects Barred by Business Risk Exclusions
September 1, 2011 — Tred Eyerley, Insurance Law Hawaii
Although the court determined there was an occurrence, coverage was excluded by the business risk exclusions. See Cont’l W. Ins. Co. v. Shay Constr. Co., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82839 (D. Colo. July 28, 2011).
White was the general contractor on the project. White had three subcontracts with Shay to provide framing, siding, and related work on the project. Shay was insured under a CGL policy issued by Continental Western.
Two of Shay’s subcontractors furnished materials, labor and equipment to Shay. These subcontractors filed suit in state court alleging they had not been compensated for the work and materials. White and Shay were named as defendants. White cross claimed against Shay, alleging Shay had breached its obligations under the subcontracts. Several allegations sounded in contract. Other allegations, however, contended Shay had performed defective work and had damaged the work of other trades in correcting deficiencies in its own performance.
Shay sought coverage under Continental Western’s policy. Continental Western filed suit for a declaratory judgment and moved for summary judgment.
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
The U.S. Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals Rules on Greystone
November 18, 2011 — Derek J. Lindenschmidt, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC
On November 1, 2011, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled on the certified question of whether property damage caused by a subcontractor’s faulty workmanship is an “occurrence” for purposes of a commercial general liability (CGL) insurance policy. In Greystone Const., Inc. v. National Fire & Marine Ins. Co., No. 09-1412 (10th Cir. Nov. 1, 2011), the Tenth Circuit determined that because damage to property caused by poor workmanship is generally neither expected nor intended, it may qualify under Colorado law as an occurrence and liability coverage should apply. Id. at 2.
The short history of the Greystone case is as follows. In Greystone Const., Inc. v. National Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 649 F. Supp. 2d 1213 (D. Colo. 2009), two contractors and one of their insurers brought an action against a second insurer after the second insurer refused to fund the contractors’ defense in construction defect actions brought by separate homeowners. Id. at 1215. The U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado, relying on General Sec. Indem. Co. of Arizona v. Mountain States Mut. Cas. Co., 205 P.3d 529 (Colo. App. 2009), granted summary judgment in favor of the second insurer on the basis that the homeowners’ complaints did not allege accidents that would trigger covered occurrences under the second insurer’s policies. Id. at 1220. Notably, the Greystone, General Security, and other similar decisions prompted the Colorado General Assembly to enact C.R.S. § 13-20-808, which was designed to provide guidance for courts interpreting perceived coverage conflicts between insurance policy provisions and exclusions. The statute requires courts to construe insurance policies to favor coverage if reasonably and objectively possible. C.R.S. § 13-20-808(5).
The Tenth Circuit began its analysis by determining whether C.R.S. § 13-20-808, which defines the term “accident” for purposes of Colorado insurance law, would have a retroactive effect, and thereby settle the question before the court. The Tenth Circuit gave consideration to several Colorado district court orders issued since the enactment of C.R.S. § 13-20-808 which have suggested that the statute does not apply retroactively, including Martinez v. Mike Wells Constr., No. 09cv227 (Colo. Dist. Ct., Mar. 1, 2011), and Colo. Pool. Sys., Inv. V. Scottsdale Ins. Co., No. 09cv836 (Colo. Dist. Ct., Oct. 4, 2010). The Tenth Circuit also attempted to ascertain the General Assembly’s intent behind the term “all insurance policies currently in existence...” Greystone, No. 09-1412, at 12. The Tenth Circuit determined that the General Assembly would have more clearly stated its intentions for the term if it was supposed to apply retroactively to expired policies, rather than those still running. Id. at 12-13. Ultimately, the Tenth Circuit decided that C.R.S. § 13-20-808 did not apply retroactively, but noted that “the retrospective application of the statute is not necessarily unconstitutional.” Id. at 9, 11-14. As such, the Tenth Circuit advised that it was required to decide the question presented in the appeal under the principles of Colorado insurance law. Id. at 15.
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Reprinted courtesy of Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC. Mr. Lindenschmidt can be contacted at lindenschmidt@hhmrlaw.com
In Colorado, Primary Insurers are Necessary Parties in Declaratory Judgment Actions
December 9, 2011 — Heather M. Anderson, Colorado Construction Litigation
The United States District Court for the District of Colorado recently ruled that primary insurers are necessary parties, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 19, in a declaratory judgment action being pursued by an excess carrier. See Insurance Co. of State of Pennsylvania v. LNC Communities II, LLC, 2011 WL 5548955 (D. Colo. 2011). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19 is almost identical to Colorado Rule of Civil Procedure 19 and pertains to the joinder of persons needed for “just adjudication.” The Insurance Co. of the State of Pennsylvania (“ICSOP”) sought a declaratory judgment that it did not have a duty to defend or indemnify the defendants (collectively referred to as “Lennar Companies”) with regard to the underlying lawsuit brought by The Falls at Legend Trail Owners Association, Inc. (the “HOA”). Id. at *2. In its lawsuit, the HOA alleged Lennar Companies were liable for construction defects at The Falls at Legend Trail residential development.
Lennar Companies held two primary insurance policies, one issued by OneBeacon Insurance Company f/k/a General Accident Insurance Company (“General Accident”) and the other issued by American Safety Risk Retention Group, Inc. (“American Safety”). Lennar Companies also carried excess policies issued by ICSOP and Ohio Casualty Insurance Company (“Ohio Casualty”).
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Reprinted courtesy of Heather M. Anderson of Higgins, Hopkins, McClain & Roswell, LLP. Ms Anderson can be contacted at anderson@hhmrlaw.com
Tucson Officials to Discuss Construction Defect Claim
July 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The mayor of Tucson, Arizona and the city council scheduled a meeting on June 26, 2012 in order to consult with the city’s attorneys concerning possible construction defect litigation involving the Martin Luther King, Jr. apartment building in that city. The memorandum was authored by Richard Miranda, the Tucson city manager.
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Texas covered versus uncovered allocation and “legally obligated to pay.”
April 27, 2011 — April 27, 2011, by CDCoverage.com
In Markel American Ins. Co. v. Lennar Corp., No. 14-10-00008-CV (Tex. Ct. App. April 19, 2011), insured homebuilder Lennar filed suit against its insurer Markel seeking recovery of costs incurred by Lennar to repair water damage to homes resulting from defective EIFS siding. Following a jury trial, judgment was entered in favor of Lennar and against Markel. On appeal, the intermediate appellate court reversed. Applying Texas law, the court first held that Lennar failed to satisfy its burden of allocating damages between covered and uncovered. In a prior decision, the court had held that, while the costs incurred by Lennar for the repair of the resulting water damage
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Reprinted courtesy of CDCoverage.com
After Construction Defect Case, Repairs to Austin Building
August 2, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The Austin Business Journal reports that remediation is about to begin on Met Center 10, a building that was “at the center of a complex structural defect case.” Claims were made that Grubb & Ellis failed to disclose known structural defects to a group of investors who purchased the building. The brokerage was ordered to pay $6.75 million. Repairs will take an estimated six months at a cost of $3.7 million.
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Construction Worker Dies after Building Collapse
November 18, 2011 — CDJ Staff
A Bronx construction worker died when the pillars gave way in the basement where he was working. The two-story commercial building collapsed, burying Mr. Kebbeh under about six feet of rubble. The New York Times reports that firefighters dug him out with their bare hands. Mr. Kebbeh was taken to Jacobi Medical Center where he died. Two other construction workers escaped unharmed.
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Consumer Protection Act Whacks Seattle Roofing Contractor
July 21, 2011 — Douglas Reiser, Builders Council
It’s been over 1 year since we last visited the CertainTeed Corp. v. Seattle Roof Brokers lawsuit. After my original post, the contractor, James Garcia, appeared at Builders Counsel in a comment to defend himself. It appears that 1 year later, the court decided to side with CertainTeed and award them significant attorneys’ fees. Ready for the whole story? Its a pricey one.
Back in July 2010, good friend Mike Atkins (Seattle Trademark Attorney) authored a post about a Seattle roofing contractor who had been sued for false advertising on his website. The lawsuit was raised by CertainTeed, a roofing material producer, whose products were the target of a Seattle contractor’s ire. Seattle Roof Brokers, owned by James Garcia, published content on its website, remarking that CertainTeed products have a history of “premature failure” and that they “will fail?.resale inspection after 15-20 years.”
CertainTeed filed its action to obtain an injunction and damages under the Consumer Protection Act.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of Douglas Reiser of Reiser Legal LLC. Mr. Reiser can be contacted at info@reiserlegal.com
Court Grants Summary Judgment to Insurer in HVAC Defect Case
August 4, 2011 — CDJ Staff
The US District Court in Colorado has determined in the case of RK Mechanical, Inc. v. Travelers Property Casualty Company of America that Travelers did not breach its insurance contract when it refused to cover RK Mechanical.
RK Mechanical performed an HVAC installation for a residential project for which J.E. Dunn Rocky Mountain was the general contractor. As part of the work, RK “installed approximately one hundred seventy-one CPVC flanges, which were manufactured by Charlotte Pipe and Foundry Company.” Two of these flanges failed in June, 2009 leading to water damage. RK replaced the cracked flanges and engaged in water remediation. “Travelers paid Dunn and RK for the costs associated with the water damage associated with the Flange Failure.” The court notes that Travelers did not pay for the cracked flanges, however.
Subsequently, RK examined the remaining flanges, finding many cracked ones. These were replaced with new ones. Later, all the Charlotte flanges were replaced with ones from another manufacturer. RK applied for coverage.
All sides brought in their experts: “Microbac Laboratories, Inc. prepared a report on behalf of RK concluding that the Flange Failure was due, in part, to an assembly or workmanship defect in addition to manufacturing defects in the flanges. Higgins & Associates prepared a report on behalf of Travelers concluding that the flanges failed due to improper installation. Plastic Failure Labs prepared a report on behalf of the flange manufacturer concluding that the flanges failed due to improper installation by RK.”
At this point, Travelers denied coverage. RK sued alleging that the coverage for flange failure and water damage implicitly includes mitigation costs. The court rejected this claim, noting it would do so even if Travelers had paid for the replacement of the first two flanges. Nor did the court find that replacement of the faulty flanges is not "a covered cause of loss." RK also argued that as it was required to mitigate, Travelers was obligated to cover costs. However, the court found that “the mitigation costs expended by RK were not incurred in an effort to avoid damages from a potential breach of contract by Travelers.” The court additionally noted that despite RK’s claims, the Colorado courts have not found a common law duty to mitigate. Finally, the court found that the exclusions in the policy were not in violation of public policy.
Read the court’s decision…
Mobile Home Owners Not a Class in Drainage Lawsuit
March 1, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Comparing it to a “complex construction defect action,” the California Court of Appeals for Orange County has rejected the claims of a group of mobile home owners that they should be certified as a class in their lawsuit against Huntington Shorecliffs Mobilehome Park. The Appeals court sustained the judgment of the lower court. The court issued a decision in the case of Criswell v. MMR Family LLC on January 17, 2012.
The claims made by the group were that the owners and operators of the mobile home park had known of an “on-going and potentially worsening shallow groundwater condition on the property” and had “exacerbated the problem by changing ‘the configuration and drainage related to the hillside that abuts’ the park.” The homeowners claimed that the class should consist of “any past or current homeowner during the same time frame” who had experienced “the accumulation of mold, fungus, and/or other toxins,” “property damage to his/her mobilehome and/or other property resulting from drainage problems, water seepage, water accumulation, moisture build-up, mold, fungus, and/or other toxins,” emotional distress related to drainage problems or mold, and finally health problems “resulting from exposure to drainage problems, water seepage, water accumulation, moisture build-up, mold, fungus, and/or other toxins, in or around one’s home, lot, or common areas of the park.”
The lower court concluded that while the limits of the class were identifiable, they failed to constitute a class in other ways. First, the people affected were small enough in number that they could be brought together. They “are not so numerous that it would be impracticable to bring them all before the Court.”
The court noted that while many of the homeowners would have issues in common, they did not find “a well-defined community of interest among the class members.” The Appeals Court wrote that “the individual issues affecting each mobile home and homeowner will predominate over the common issue of the presence of standing or pooling water in and around the park.” The court noted that each home would be affected differently by water and “the ‘accumulation of mold, fungus, and/or other toxins.’”
While the court conceded that there would be common issues, such as the “defendants’ alleged concealment of excess moisture conditions and their allegedly negligent roadwork and landscaping,” they noted that “these common issues would be swamped by the swarm of individual determinations of property damage, emotional distress, and personal injury.” The Appeals Court cited an earlier case that ruled against certification “if a class action ‘will splinter into individual trials.’” The court affirmed the judgment of the lower court that they could not proceed as a class.
Read the court’s decision…