Anti-Concurrent Causation Clause Bars Coverage for Landslide and Water Leak
June 19, 2012 — Tred Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
The insured unsuccessfully attempted to get around the policy’s anti-concurrent causation clause by arguing a covered cause of loss was a contributing factor. See Stor/Gard, Inc. v. Strathmore Ins. Co., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63217 (D. Mass. May 4, 2012).
A building at the insured’s storage facility was damaged when heavy rain caused a mass of soil to slide down a slope, causing soil and a retaining wall to fall on the building. The accident caused a partial collapse of the building. The insurer hired two soil engineers, each of whom concluded that a landslide caused the accident. The reports also noted, however, that a leak from the property’s drainage system resulted in a very small percentage of water infiltrating the ground.
The insurer denied coverage based upon an exclusion for landslides.
Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
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Former New York Governor to Head Construction Monitoring Firm
September 13, 2012 — CDJ Staff
David Paterson, who succeeded Eliot Spitzer as Governor of New York, has started a new venture after leaving the Governor’s office in construction integrity monitoring. WNYC reports that Paterson will be the majority owner of Icon Compliance Services, LLC, which will both conduct investigations and work with law enforcement officials. Paterson says that in government projects “often concessions are made for political reasons in the public sector and then you never really get a product that you paid for.”
Paterson will be working with a former vice president of Bovis Construction, Brian Aryai, who is also a former U.S. Treasury Agent. Aryai said that “it is astounding that some of the fraud that has come to the surface in the recent past,” and describes it as “almost laughable they were not detected.” Aryai tipped federal prosecutors that Bovis had been over billing on projects for at least a decade.
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Death of Construction Defect Lawyer Ruled a Suicide
June 19, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The Clark County Coroner’s Office has concluded that Nancy Quon, the construction defect attorney implicated in the wide-ranging HOA scandal, died by her own hand. The cause of death was a combination of anti-anxiety and insomnia medication mixed with alcohol. Quon survived an earlier incident in which she took GHB and her apartment was set on fire. Quon denied that it was a suicide attempt.
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Can We Compel Insurers To Cover Construction Defect in General Liability Policies?
December 9, 2011 — Douglas Reiser, Builders Counsel
Recently, I read an article on Engineering News-Record that outlines a remarkable movement by as many as four states, to mandate coverage of construction defects in contractor general liability insurance policies. Say what? Is this a reality? What will become of affordable insurance?
Commercial General Liability insurance, or CGL, is your basic liability insurance. Every contractor doing business in the State of Washington, and most likely those abroad, has this insurance. Contractors buy this insurance to protect them from unforeseen liabilities arising from their negligence - and right now it’s reasonably affordable.
Why is it so affordable in such a risk-heavy industry? Because CGL policies significantly limit the scope of their coverage. Coverage is generally afforded for damages resulting from negligence (The roofer put a hammer through the drywall contractor’s wall) or which resulted from your defective construction (the roof leaked and flooded the rest of the house). But, that coverage does not include replacement of your faulty construction (the contents of the home might be protected by your leaky roof - the leaky roof itself is not).
The debate over coverage typically stems from the definition of “occurrence,” a term used to describe the event from which coverage arises, “resulting loss,” a term used to describe the type of loss covered.
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Reprinted courtesy of Douglas Reiser of Reiser Legal LLC. Mr. Reiser can be contacted at info@reiserlegal.com
Construction Case Alert: Appellate Court Confirms Engineer’s Duty to Defend Developer Arises Upon Tender of Indemnity Claim
January 27, 2010 — By
Steven M. Cvitanovic,
Haight Brown & Bonesteel, LLP, January 27, 2010
In the recent case of UDC-Universal Development, L.P. v. CH2M Hill, 2010 Cal.App.LEXIS 47 (filed January 15, 2010), the Sixth District Court of Appeal provided a stunning illustration of the far-reaching effects of the California Supreme Court’s holding in Crawford v. Weather Shield Manufacturing Inc. (2008) 44 Cal.4th 541. In Crawford, the Court held the duty to defend under an indemnity agreement arose upon the mere tender of defense of a claim covered by the indemnity.
In the UDC case, CH2M Hill provided engineering and environmental planning services to developer UDC on a project that ultimately wound up in a construction defect lawsuit by the homeowners association ( HOA ). UDC tendered its defense to CH2M Hill, the tender was rejected, and UDC filed a cross-complaint for negligence, breach of contract and indemnity against CH2M Hill and others. After the HOA’s construction defect claims were settled, UDC proceeded to trial against CH2M Hill. The jury found in favor of CH2M Hill on the claims for negligence and breach of contract. At the request of the parties prior to trial, the trial court ruled on the application of the indemnity agreement in light of Crawford and, in so doing, found that the defense obligation arose upon the tender and that CH2M Hill breached that duty despite the jury finding in favor of CH2M Hill.
The Court of Appeal affirmed, noting that the defense obligation arose as soon as the defense was tendered and did not depend on the outcome of the litigation, and that the HOA’s general description of the defects along with an allegation that Doe engineers were negligent triggered the duty to defend.
Although this case did not expand the crushing impact of Crawford’s holding, it is
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Colorado Senate Bill 12-181: 2012’s Version of a Prompt Pay Bill
May 10, 2012 — W. Berkeley Mann, Jr., Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC
A potentially important legislative bill has been introduced in waning days of the 2012 legislative session, which would change many of the commercial practices that prevail in the construction industry. Senate Bill 12-181 applies to all building and construction contracts and would prohibit any contract provision that requires a contractor, subcontractor, or supplier to waive their lien in advance of payment. It also would ban any “choice of law” provisions that make a Colorado-based construction contract subject to enforcement only in another state, or under the laws of another state.
The bill also seeks to change many existing commercial practices between contractors, subcontractors, and suppliers. It is presently unclear whether the bill allows parties to contract around these payment procedure provisions, or whether these requirements are simply “gap filling” provisions that pertain if there are no written contract terms specified on these issues. The proposed statute would mandate payment to subcontractors and material suppliers due within seven days in the absence of a dispute about the work or materials being billed. After this seven day period, the bill would require the payment of interest at the rate of 1.5% monthly (18% annually). In any later suit for payment, the creditor would also be able to collect reasonable attorneys’ fees. Additionally, non-payment to a subcontractor or supplier who is later found to be entitled to prompt payment would excuse the subcontractor or supplier, and its surety bond provider, from any further performance under the contract.
It is presently unclear whether the bill allows parties to contract around these payment procedure provisions. However, it is clear that the bill provides some leeway for change orders, as long as there is (1) negotiation in good faith between the parties concerning the changed scope of work, and (2) a 50% payment of a subcontractor’s costs by the changing party within 30 days of the change order work being done. Additionally, the bill provides for retainage, but in an amount of no more than 5%.
The bill is presently set for hearing before the Colorado Senate Committee on Business, Labor, and Technology Committee on May 2, 2012 at 1:30 p.m.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of W. Berkeley Mann, Jr. of Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC. Mr. Mann can be contacted at mann@hhmrlaw.com.
Court Strikes Down Reasonable Construction Defect Settlement
December 20, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The Court of Appeals of Washington has struck down a construction defect settlement between a building owner and the companies she hired to repair the siding, among other repairs to bring the building up to code. Yuan Zhang hired Hawk Construction LLC to do repair work. Hawk, in turn, hired Ready Construction LLC for some aspects of the project. Hawk and Ready were both insured by Capital Specialty Insurance Corporation.
There were several problems with Ready’s work. After removing old siding, they did not protect the building, nor did they remove all of the damaged layers. Ready covered, but did not fix, a mildew problem under the old siding. When new siding was reattached, the nails used were too short to adequately attach it.
After paying for an inspection of the work, Zhang had Hawk and Ready begin the repairs again, but the work was abandoned without being completed. Zhang sued Hawk for breach of contract. Hawk then sued Ready, claiming that “Ready was liable to Hawk to the extent that Hawk was liable to Zhang.” Capitol retained defense for both contractors.
Zhang settled with Hawk, in an agreement that gave her “the right to collect and/or pursue all costs and attorney fees paid by Hawk or its insurance company defending against the Zhang’s claims and pursuing claims against Ready.” Subsequently, she also settled with Ready. Both companies ceased operations.
Zhang had the settlements reviewed by a court, which concluded that the settlements were reasonable. Capital was allowed to appeal, claiming that the settlement included costs that were Zhang’s responsibility. The appeals court did not examine the question of the reasonableness of the settlement, concluding that Capitol’s interests were relevant only to “questions of bad faith, collusion, and fraud.”
In the case of Zhang, the court concluded that the relationship between Zhang and her former contractors was collusive. The court noted that “bad faith or collusion may exist when the evidence indicates a joint effort to create, in a non-adversarial atmosphere, a resolution beneficial to both parties, yet highly prejudicial to the insurer as intervener.” The court noted that both companies had minimal assets which were, in any case, exempted from the agreement. Further, the court found that the agreements failed to determine “what amount of the repairs related to preexisting water damage.” Zhang’s calculation of costs also included her expenses for architectural and engineering services, which the court points out, “where always Zhang’s costs to bear.”
The court concluded that “the overall structure of the settlements is highly probative of collusion, fraud, or bad faith.” Zhang’s agreements with Hawk and Ready allowed her to collect compensation from Hawk and then collect Ready’s compensation to Hawk for their portion of the settlement, allowing Zhang to collect the monies twice. Further, she was allowed to pursue Capitol for Hawk’s attorney expenses, even though Hawk had none. “The right to recover Hawk’s fees merely set up a windfall recovery for Zhang.” The court described the agreements among Zhang, Hawk, and Ready as “precisely the type of manipulation [the law] is intended to preclude.”
Read the court’s decision…
Construction Demand Unsteady, Gains in Some Regions
June 29, 2011 — CDJ Staff
The Associated General Contractors of America reported Tuesday, June 28 that construction employment increased in 120 of the 337 metropolitan areas surveyed between May 2010 and May 2011.
‘While construction employment has stopped plunging, any sign of a recovery remains spotty at best,” said Ken Simonson, the association’s chief economist. ‘The close to even split between areas adding and losing jobs is a reminder that for every market doing well, there is another market that is still hurting.”
The largest number of jobs created was in the Dallas, Texas region, with 5,600 new jobs, a five percent increase. The northern Massachusetts/southern New Hampshire region near Haverhill saw the greatest percentage increase, although that twenty-two percent increase represents only 800 new jobs. The Chicago, Illiinois area added 4,600 jobs, a four percent increase.
Other regions were not so lucky. The Atlanta, Georgia area saw a loss of 7,400 jobs, an eight percent loss. Las Vegas also lost 7,400 jobs, which there represented a sixteen percent decline. The New York City area lost 6,700 jobs, a six percent reduction. The Riverside, California area lost 5,300 jobs, a nine percent loss.
Stephen E. Sandherr, the association’s chief executive officer, blamed a combination of regulation and budget squeezes. "Some in Washington never met a regulation they didn’t like and others never found a penny they didn’t want to pinch. Together that makes for a bad way to boost employment and a great way to stifle the private sector and neglect critical economic infrastructure.”
Read the full story…
Limiting Plaintiffs’ Claims to a Cause of Action for Violation of SB-800
November 18, 2011 — Samir R. Patel, Esq. and Todd E. Verbick, Esq., Lorber, Greenfield & Polito, LLP
There has been a fair share of publicity about the SB-800 amendments to the Civil Code (Civil Code section 896, et seq.) that codified construction defect litigation in 2002. Most of the publicity is geared toward the pre-litigation standards allowing a builder the right to repair before litigation is commenced by a homeowner. Less focus and attention has been given to the fact that violation of the SB-800 performance standards is being used by plaintiff’s counsel as an additional tool in the plaintiff’s pleading tool box against builders. Closer scrutiny to SB-800 reveals that those provisions should in fact act as a limitation to the pleading tools available to plaintiffs and an additional tool for builders in the defense of cases governed by SB-800.
The typical construction defect complaint contains the boiler plate versions of numerous causes of action. These causes of action include Strict Liability, Negligence, Negligence Per Se, Breach of Contract, Breach of Contract – Third-Party Beneficiary, Breach of Express Warranties, Breach of Implied Warranties, among others. The wide array of causes of action leave a defendant “pinned to the wall” because they require a complex defense on a multitude of contract and tort related causes of action. Furthermore, the statutes of limitations as to these claims widely differ depending upon if the particular defect is considered latent or patent. The truth of the matter remains, no matter what the circumstances, if a construction defect matter ultimately goes to trial, it is inevitable that plaintiffs will obtain a judgment on at least one of these causes of action.
On its own, the Strict Liability cause of action can be a thorn in a defendant’s side. A builder is obviously placing a product into the stream of commerce and strict liability is a tough standard to defend against, particularly when it concerns intricate homes comprised of multiple components that originally sold for hundreds of thousands of dollars. A Negligence cause of action can also be difficult to defend because the duty of care for a builder is what a “reasonable” builder would have done under the circumstances. An interpretation of this duty of care can easily sway a jury that will almost always consist of sympathetic homeowners. A Negligence Per Se cause of action can also leave a defendant vulnerable to accusations that a builder violated the Uniform Building Code or a multitude of other obscure municipal construction-related code provisions during the construction of the home. Lastly, the Breach of Contract cause of action leaves a builder relying on dense and intricate purchase and sale agreements with dozens of addenda which leave the skeptical jurors turned off by what they view as one-side, boilerplate provisions. Ultimately, when a matter is about to go to trial, the complexity of these complaints can benefit a plaintiff and increase a plaintiff’s bargaining power against a defendant who is attempting to avoid a potentially large judgment.
Enter the SB-800 statutes. The SB-800 statutes apply to all homes sold after January 1, 2003. Civil Code section 938 specifically states that “[t]his title applies only to new residential units where the purchase agreements with the buyer was signed by the seller on or after January 1, 2003.” (Civil Code §, 938.) As time progresses, more residential construction defect cases will exclusively fall under the purview of SB-800. Slowly but surely more SB-800 governed litigation is being filed, and its exclusive application is looming on the horizon.
On its surface, this “right to repair” regime has left builders with a lot to be desired despite the fact that it is supposed to allow the builder the opportunity to cure any deficiencies in their product before litigation can be filed by potential plaintiffs. However, the application of the time line for repair has shown to be impractical for anything but the most minor problems involving only small numbers of residential units. Moreover, the fact that the fruits of the builder’s investigation into the claimed defects in the pre-litigation context can freely be used as evidence against it in litigation makes builders proceed with trepidation in responding with a repair. For these reasons, more SB-800 litigation can be expected to result due to the shortcomings of the pre-litigation procedures, and savvy defense counsel should anticipate the issues to be dealt with in presenting the defense of such cases at trial.
This fact should not necessarily be met with fear or disdain. Within the SB-800 statutes, the legislature made it clear that they were creating a new cause of action for construction defect claims, but it further made it clear that this cause of action is a plaintiff’s exclusive remedy. The legislature giveth, but at the same time, the legislature taketh away. Throughout numerous provisions within the SB-800 statutes, the Civil Code states that claims for construction defects as to residential construction are exclusively governed by the Civil Code, and that the Civil Code governs any and all litigation arising under breaches of these provisions. Civil Code section 896 specifically states:
In any action seeking recovery of damages arising out of, or related to deficiencies in, the residential construction … the claimant’s claims or causes of action shall be limited to violation of, the following standards, except as specifically set forth in this title. (Civil Code §, 896.)
Civil Code section 896 then provides approximately fifty-plus standards by which a construction defect claim is assessed under that provision. Civil Code section 896 covers everything from plumbing to windows, and from foundations to decks, and in several instances expressly dictates statutes of limitations as to specific areas of construction that severely truncate the 10-year latent damage limitations period. As for any construction deficiencies that are not enumerated within Civil Code section 896, Civil Code section 897 explicitly defines the intent of the standards and provides a method to assess deficiencies that are not addressed in Civil Code section 896. Civil Code section 897 states:
Intent of Standards
The standards set forth in this chapter are intended to address every function or component of a structure. To the extent that a function or component of a structure is not addressed by these standards, it shall be actionable if it causes damage. (Civil Code §, 897.)
Therefore, Civil Code section 897 acts as a catch-all by which defects that are not covered within Civil Code section 896 can be evaluated on a damage standard mirroring the Aas case (damages must be present and actual). The result of sections 896 and 897 being read in combination is a comprehensive, all-inclusive set of performance standards by which any defect raised by Plaintiffs can be evaluated and resolved under a single SB-800 based cause of action.
Civil Code section 943 makes clear that a cause of action for violation of SB-800 performance standards is a plaintiff’s sole remedy for a residential construction defect action. Specifically, Civil Code section 943 states:
Except as provided in this title, no other cause of action for a claim covered by this title or for damages recoverable under 944 is allowed. In addition to the rights under this title, this title does not apply to any action by a claimant to enforce a contract or express contractual provision, or any action for fraud, personal injury, or violation of a statute. (Civil Code §, 943.)
Civil Code section 944 provides the method for computing damages within a construction defect action, as follows:
If a claim for damages is made under this title, the homeowner is only entitled to damages for the reasonable value of repairing any violation of the standards set forth in this title, [and] the reasonable cost of repairing any damages caused by the repair efforts… . (Civil Code §, 944.)
A cursory review of these statutes yields the conclusion that the legislature was attempting to create an exclusive cause of action that trumps all other causes of action where SB-800 applies. The remedy available to plaintiffs is limited to that allowed by the Civil Code. As noted above, “[n]o other cause of action for a claim covered by this title…is allowed.” (Civil Code §, 943.) Therefore, Civil Code sections 896, 897, 943, and 944 specifically prohibit the contract-based and tort-based causes of action typically pled by plaintiffs.
Plaintiff’s counsel has seized upon the language of section 943 to advance the argument that SB-800 still allows a plaintiff to advance typical contract and tort based causes of action. On the surface, this argument may seem compelling, but a minimum of scrutiny of the express language of section 943 dispels this notion. Section 943 says that it provides rights “[i]n addition” to those under the SB-800 Civil Code provisions. Clearly, the language in section 943 is intended to expressly underscore the fact that a plaintiff is not precluded from seeking relief in addition to that allowed under SB-800 for damages not arising from a breach of the SB-800 standards or for damages in addition to those recoverable under Section 944. This language does not provide an unfettered license to bring a Strict Liability, Negligence or other cause of action against a builder where SB-800 applies.
In fact, this language only keeps the door open for plaintiffs to pursue such causes of action not arising from a breach of the SB-800 standards should there be such supporting allegations. For example, if a plaintiff alleges that a builder breached an “express contractual provision” related to the timing of the completion of the home and close of escrow, and the contract specifies damages in this regard, a plaintiff may have a viable separate cause of action for Breach of Contract for recovery of those damages precisely because that is not an issue expressly dealt with in SB-800 in the performance standards under sections 896 and 897, or in the damage recovery terms under 944. As it stands, the vast majority of complaints are seeking redress for violation of the same primary right; that is, defects specifically outlined in Section 896 and 897 or which result in damages as stated in Section 944.
So, how does a builder defend against a complaint that contains multiple causes of action regarding construction defects for a home sold after January 1, 2003? There are numerous ways to approach this. First and foremost, these superfluous and improper causes of action can be attacked by demurrer seeking dismissal of all causes of action other than the cause of action alleging violation of SB-800. If the the time period within which to file a demurrer has passed already, a motion for judgment on the pleadings can be utilized to attack the improper causes of action in the same way as a demurrer can be used for this purpose.
The limitation to a demurrer or motion for judgment on the pleadings is that the judge is restricted to viewing only the four corners of the pleading when making a ruling. It is typical for plaintiffs’ counsel to cleverly (or one might even say, disingenuously) leave the complaint purposely vague to avoid a successful defense attack on the pleadings by not including the original date the residence was sold. In that instance, a motion for summary adjudication can be used to attack a plaintiff’s complaint. By simply providing evidence that the homes were originally sold after January 1, 2003, the improper causes of action should be subject to dismissal by summary adjudication. If the plaintiff is a subsequent purchaser, the builder still has recourse to enforce the pleading limitations under SB-800. Civil Code section 945 states that “[t]he provisions, standards, rights, and obligations set forth in this title are binding upon all original purchasers and their successors-in-interest.” (Civil Code §, 945.)
Attacking a plaintiff’s complaint to eliminate multiple causes of action can have numerous benefits. The practical result is that a plaintiff will only have one viable cause of action. The advantage is that the SB-800 performance standards include the defined performance standards and shortened statutes of limitations periods with regard to specific issues. Furthermore, as to defects which are not specifically provided for in Civil Code section 896, Civil Code section 897 requires a proof of actual damages. Therefore, a plaintiff must provide evidence of current damages and not simply conditions that may potentially cause damage in the future.
The Appellate Courts have yet to directly address and interpret these SB-800 provisions. The time for that is undoubtedly drawing near. For now, however, plaintiffs will have to find ways to accurately plead construction defect claims within the confines of one cause of action for breach of the performance standards enumerated within the Civil Code.
Printed courtesy of Lorber, Greenfield & Polito, LLP. Mr. Patel can be contacted at spatel@lorberlaw.com and Mr. Verbick at tverbick@lorberlaw.com.
Mississippi exclusions j(5) and j(6) “that particular part”
June 7, 2011 — CDCoverage.com
In Lafayete Ins. Co. v. Peerboom, No. 3:10cv336 (S.D. Miss. June 2, 2011), claimant homeowner Peerboom hired insured contractor Absolute to raise Peerboom’s house two feet to avoid future flooding. While Absolute was raising the house, it fell, resulting in physical injury to the home. Peerboom sued Absolute for negligence, breach of contract, and fraud, seeking damages for the destruction of the home. Absolute’s CGL insurer Lafayette defended under a reservation of rights and filed a declaratory judgment action.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of CDCoverage.com
Insurance Firm Under No Duty to Defend in Hawaii Construction Defect Case
September 13, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The US District Court for Hawaii has granted a motion for summary judgment in Evanston Insurance v. Nagano. The case is related to a construction defect claim, Hu v. Nagano, and the issue at hand is whether Evanston Insurance is obligated to defend the Naganos in the underlying case.
The Hus hired Eric Nagano and his firm PMX to construct a house. Mr. Nagano’s firm was insured by Evanston, however, he lost his contractor’s license in “approximately March 2006.” Mr. Nagano sought the Hus’ authorization to allow HC Builders to take over the contract. HC Builders is headed by Mr. Nagano’s wife, Hiroko, who has held a contractor’s license since “approximately September 2006.” Ms. Nagano and HC Builders were also insured by Evanston Insurance. The house, started by PMX was finished by HC Builders.
The Hus authorized construction to begin in July 2003, but “construction did not commence until approximately October 2004 and, even after commencement, there were numerous delays resulting in months of inactivity on the Project.” The Hus had expressed to Mr. Nagano and PMX “that the construction period could not exceed twelve months after July 1, 2003.” As a result of the delays, “the Hus’ community association fined them because of the prolonged construction and the Hus’ construction lender assessed extension fees and fines for exceeding the term of the loan.”
The Hus noted that the project did not have a licensed contractor from March through September 2006. In the end, the Hus “allege that Defendants did not fulfill the obligations under the Construction Contract,” and that “the Project was ‘grossly delayed’ and the construction was ‘riddled with defects.’” Despite an Owner’s Notice of Completion filed in December 2007, the residence “had no electricity, no hot water, ... no installed appliances” and “parts of the flooring were either missing or incomplete.” And then it leaked.
The Naganos tendered the defense to Evanston. The Naganos “allege the defense is limited because Evanston: allowed default to be entered against the Naganos (the default was later set aside); delayed retaining experts; and limited the ability of the Naganos’ retained counsel to perform necessary actions to advance the case.” Evanston argues that it “does not have a duty to defend or indemnify Defendants against the Hus’ claims,” as the Hus’ claims are not covered under the policy. Further, the PMX policies have an exclusion for breach of contract.
The court concluded that all of the claims made by the Hus were based in contract and therefore were outside of the terms of the Naganos insurance coverage, as the courts have "construed Hawaii law as not providing for insurance coverage for contract related claims." Therefore, Evanston does not have a duty to defend the Naganos.
Read the court’s decision…
US Courts in Nevada Busy with Yellow Brass
August 2, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Judge Robert C. Jones, the chief judge of the United States District Court of Nevada, and Judge Peggy A. Leen, a magistrate judge with the same court, have issued orders in cases involving allegations of high-zinc yellow brass plumbing components. Judge Jones issued orders on Waterfall Homeowners Association v. Viega, Inc. and Greystone Nevada, LLC v. Anthem Highlands Community Association on July 9, 2012. Judge Leen issued orders on Southern Terrace Homeowners Association v. Viega, Inc. on July 10, and The Seasons Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Richmond American Homes of Nevada, Inc. on July 19.
Chief Judge Jones held an omnibus hearing on Waterfall v. Viega on June 12. During that hearing “Chief Judge Jones had already agreed that the claims against the product manufacturers should be be severed from the majority of the other claims and that discovery should proceed on different tracks.” Judge Leen ordered that the Southern Terrace claims be referred to Chief Judge Jones to determine if it should be consolidated with other yellow brass cases.
Chief Judge Jones’s decision in Greystone Nevada rests on issues of whether the affected homeowners had signed arbitration agreements. The judge found that the “Defendant’s claims that the seven homeowners they have identified are subsequent purchasers who need not arbitrate with Greystone is definitively refuted by the evidence.”
Judge Leen cites the Greystone decision in her ruling on Seasons Homeowners Association v. Richmond American Homes of Nevada. Richmond seeks to compel individual arbitration, stating that “the arbitration clause used singular rather than plural terms, and therefore, class arbitration was foreclosed.” Judge Leen determined that “under Nevada law, a homeowners association has statutory authority to represent homeowners associations in these types of actions. She did, however, accept Richmond’s argument that they could compel arbitration.
The Waterfall order involves an attempt by two homeowners associations to seek a class action against seventeen defendants, the first twelve of whom are described as “the Viega Defendants” and “the Uponor Defendants.” Chief Judge Jones notes that “many of these Defendants have been sued in identical class actions by the same law firms, but with different named defendants.” The homeowner association seek to “represent their own 998 members directly but also wish to represent up to 10,000 homeowner associations representing up to 250,000 similarly situated homeowner members throughout the Las Vega area via this class action.”
The judge has denied the Viega Defendants’ attempt to deny class certification, noting that the plaintiffs “argue that they intend to argue for class certification under Rule 23(b)(3). He also denied the motions by the two groups of the Viega Defendants. The U.S. Viega Defendants sought to be dismissed from the case for a variety of reasons. The judge noted of the claim that the plaintiffs had no injury of fact and are not alleging actual damage is contradicted by the allegations of actual damage made by the plaintiffs. ”They have alleged that the parts are defective and have already begun to corrode in at least a few sample circumstances, even if they have not yet failed.” To the argument that there re not particular claims made against defendants, the judge notes, “it is clear from the Complaint which Defendants are alleged to have manufactured and sold which brands of allegedly defective products, and which Defendants are alleged to have installed them.”
The German Viega firms also sought to be dismissed from the suit, noting that “they have no property, employees, accounts, advertisements, etc. in Nevada and have not sold any products in Nevada.” However, the judge notes that “at least Waterfall, and perhaps Red Bluff, was still under construction when Viega, Inc. became the sole shareholder of Vanguard Industries, Inc.”
Finally, both of Chief Judge Jones’s rulings cite a related case in the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota involving a class action settlement for those with F1807 systems. He notes in both these cases that “Plaintiffs disclaimed any claims based upon F1807 components.”
Read the courts' decisions…
Waterfall Homeowners Association v. Viega, Inc.
Greystone Nevada, LLC v. Anthem Highlands Community Association
Southern Terrace Homeowners Association v. Viega, Inc.
The Seasons Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Richmond American Homes of Nevada, Inc.
Florida County Suspends Impact Fees to Spur Development
November 18, 2011 — CDJ Staff
Hernando County, just north of Tampa on Florida’s west coast, has suspended impact fees for a year, hoping to spur development. Hernando Today reports that the move drew applause from the audience at the county commissioners meeting. Many of those in attendance were builders or members of the Greater Hernando Chamber of Commerce.
Not all were convinced. Frankie Burnett, the mayor of Brooksville, told the commissioners that his city council were not convinced that this would spur development. “Development should pay its fair share, even in slow economic times.” Burnett’s letter to the board warned that “if lowering impact fees succeeded in stimulating more residential overbuilding, it would only further depress the current real estate market.”
Read the full story…
Architectural Firm Disputes Claim of Fault
May 27, 2011 — CDJ Staff
Lake-Flato Architects has disputed the arbitration panel’s conclusion that problems with the home of Tom Hanks and Rita Wilson were due to design flaws. The firm settled with the couple for $900,000, however the Idaho Mountain Express reports that David Lake said, “the settlement in the case in no way represents that Lake Flato was responsible for faulty design.” The Express reported that “the arbitrators found that problems at the home were attributable to design errors that did not take into account the cold winter climate of the Sun Valley area.”
Read the full story…
Safer Schools Rendered Unsafe Due to Construction Defects
February 10, 2012 — CJD Staff
Built on a program for safer school buildings, schools in Neenan County, Colorado have been shown to have mild-to-moderate structural problems, rendering some of them unsafe. The Denver Post reports that a third-party review of schools built by the Neenan Company has shown structural issues in all fifteen school buildings.
One school, Meeker Elementary, has been closed as it could collapse under high winds or during an earthquake. Sargent Junior-Senior High School is in use, but there are plans to evacuate the buildings if winds exceed 25 mile per hour. Two schools have roofs that are unable to bear expected loads of snow during the winter.
The Neenan Company says that the school buildings are not up to their standards and is working with the school districts to repair the buildings. Repairs are expected to be complete by August.
Read the full story…
Construction Law Client Alert: California Is One Step Closer to Prohibiting Type I Indemnity Agreements In Private Commercial Projects
June 15, 2011 — Haight Brown & Bonesteel, LLP
On June 1, 2011 by majority vote, the California Senate passed Senate Bill 474, which would amend Civil Code section 2782, and add Civil Code section 2782.05. The passage of this new law is a critical development for real estate developers, general contractors and subcontractors because it will affect how these projects are insured and how disputes are resolved.
Civil Code section 2782 was amended in 2007 to prohibit Type I indemnity agreements for residential projects only. Since 2007, various trade associations and labor unions have lobbied to expand those very same restrictions to other projects. These new provisions apply to contracts, entered into after January 1, 2013, that are not for residential projects, and that are not executed by a public entity. The revisions provide that any provision in a contract purporting to indemnify, hold harmless, and defend another for their negligence or other fault is against public policy and void. These provisions cannot be waived.
A provision in a contract requiring additional insured coverage is also void and unenforceable to the extent it would be prohibited under the new law. Moreover, the new law does not apply to wrap-up insurance policies or programs, or a cause of action for breach of contract or warranty that exists independently of the indemnity obligation.
The practical impact of this new law is that greater participation in wrap-up insurance programs will likely result. While many wrap-up programs suffer from problems such as insufficient limits, and disputes about funding the self-insured retention, the incentive for the developer or general contractor to utilize wrap-up insurance will be greater than ever before because they will no longer be able to spread the risk of the litigation to the trades and the trade carriers.
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Reprinted courtesy of Steve Cvitanovic of Haight Brown & Bonesteel, LLP.
The Montrose Language Interpreted: How Many Policies Are Implicated By A Construction Defect That Later Causes a Flood?
March 17, 2011 — By Shaun McParland Baldwin, March 17, 2011
The Court of Appeals of Indiana recently addressed the “Montrose” language added to the CGL ISO form in 2001 in the context of a construction defect claim where a fractured storm drain caused significant flooding a year after the drain was damaged. The insuring agreement requires that “bodily injury or “property damage” be caused by an occurrence and that the “bodily injury or “property damage” occur during the policy period. The Montrose language adds that the insurance applies only if, prior to the policy period, no insured knew that the “bodily injury or “property damage” had occurred in whole or in part. Significantly, it also states that any “bodily injury” or “property damage” which occurs during the policy period and was not, prior to the policy period known to have occurred, includes a continuation, change or resumption of that “bodily injury” or “property damage” after the end of the policy period.
In Grange Mutual Cas. Co. v. West Bend Mut. Ins. Co., No. 29D04-0706-PL-1112 (Ct. App. IN March 15, 2011), http://www.ai.org/judiciary/opinions/pdf/03151109ehf.pdf, Sullivan was the General Contractor for a school construction project. Its subcontractor, McCurdy, installed the storm drain pipes. One of the storm pipes was fractured in 2005 while McCurdy was doing its installation work. More than a year later, the school experienced significant water damage due to flooding. It was later discovered that the flooding was due to the fractured storm drain. Sullivanrsquo;s insurer paid $146,403 for the water damage. That insurer brought a subrogation claim against McCurdy and its two insurers: West Bend and Grange. West Bend had issued CGL coverage to McCurdy while the construction was ongoing, including the date in which the storm pipe was fractured. Grange issued CGL coverage to McCurdy at the time of the flooding. Those two carriers jointly settled the subrogation claim and then litigated which insurer actually owed coverage for the loss. Significantly, the loss that was paid included only damages from the flooding, not any damages for the cost of repairing the pipe.
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Reprinted courtesy of Shaun McParland Baldwin of Tressler LLP. Ms Baldwin can be contacted at sbaldwin@tresslerllp.com
Insurer Has Duty to Disclose Insured's Interest In Obtaining Written Explanation of Arbitration Award
October 23, 2012 — Tred Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
The issue faced by the Minnesota Supreme Court was whether the insurer had a duty to disclose the insured's interest in obtaining a written explanation of an arbitration award that identified the claims of recovery and the portions of the award attributable to each. Remodeling Dimensions, Inc. v. Integrity Mut. Ins. Co., 2012 LEXIS Minn. 404 (Minn. Sup. Ct., Aug. 22, 2012).
Remodeling Dimensions, Inc. ("RDI") built an addition for the homeowners and installed windows in the original part of the house. After construction began, the homeowners also asked RDI to fix the master bedroom window in the original part of the house.
After completion of the project, the house sustained storm damage.
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com