History of Defects Leads to Punitive Damages for Bankrupt Developer
March 1, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The South Carolina Court of Appeals has ruled that evidence of construction defects at a developer’s other projects were admissible in a construction defect lawsuit. They issued their ruling on Magnolia North Property Owners’ Association v. Heritage Communities, Inc. on February 15, 2012.
Magnolia North is a condominium complex in South Carolina. The initial builder, Heritage Communities, had not completed construction when they filed for bankruptcy protection under Chapter 11. The remaining four buildings were completed by another contractor. The Property Owners’ Association subsequently sued Heritage Communities, Inc. (HCI) alleging defects. The POA also sued Heritage Magnolia North, and the general contractor, BuildStar.
The trial court ruled that all three entities were in fact one. On appeal, the defendants claimed that the trial court improperly amalgamated the defendants. The appeals court noted, however, that “all these corporations share officers, directors, office space, and a phone number with HCI.” Until Heritage Communities turned over control of the POA to the actual homeowners, all of the POA’s officers were officers of HCI. The appeals court concluded that “the trial court’s ruling that Appellants’ entities were amalgamated is supported by the law and the evidence.”
Heritage also claimed that the trial court should not have allowed the plaintiffs to produce evidence of construction defects at other Heritage properties. Heritage argued that the evidence was a violation of the South Carolina Rules of Evidence. The court cited a South Carolina Supreme Court case which made an exception for “facts showing the other acts were substantially similar to the event at issue.” The court noted that the defects introduced by the plaintiffs were “virtually identical across all developments.” This included identical use of the same products from project to project. Further, these were used to demonstrate that “HCI was aware of water issues in the other projects as early as 1998, before construction on Magnolia North had begun.”
The trial case ended with a directed verdict. Heritage charged that the jury should have determined whether the alleged defects existed. The appeals court noted that there was “overwhelming evidence” that Heritage failed “to meet the industry standard of care.” Heritage did not dispute the existence of the damages during the trial, they “merely contested the extent.”
Further, Heritage claimed in its appeal that the case should have been rejected due to the three-year statute of limitations. They note that the first meeting of the POA was on March 8, 2000, yet the suit was not filed until May 28, 2003, just over three years. The court noted that here the statute of limitation must be tolled, as Heritage controlled the POA until September 9, 2002. The owner-controlled POA filed suit “approximately eight months after assuming control.”
The court also applied equitable estoppel to the statute of limitations. During the time in which Heritage controlled the board, Heritage “assured the unit owners the construction defects would be repaired, and, as a result, the owners were justified in relying on those assurances.” Since “a reasonable owner could have believed that it would be counter-productive to file suit,” the court found that also prevented Heritage from invoking the statute of limitations. In the end, the appeals court concluded that the even apart from equitable tolling and equitable estoppel, the statute of limitations could not have started until the unit owners took control of the board in September, 2002.
Heritage also contested the jury’s awarding of damages, asserting that “the POA failed to establish its damages as to any of its claims.” Noting that damages are determined “with reasonable certainty or accuracy,” and that “proof with mathematical certainty of the amount of loss or damage is not required,” the appeals court found a “sufficiently reasonable basis of computation of damages to support the trial court’s submission of damages to the jury.” Heritage also claimed that the POA did not show that the damage existed at the time of the transfer of control. The court rejected this claim as well.
Finally, Heritage argued that punitive damages were improperly applied for two reasons: that “the award of punitive damages has no deterrent effect because Appellants went out of business prior to the commencement of the litigation” and that Heritages has “no ability to pay punitive damages.” The punitive damages were upheld, as the relevant earlier decision includes “defendant’s degree of culpability,” “defendants awareness or concealment,” “existence of similar past conduct,” and “likelihood of deterring the defendant or others from similar conduct.”
The appeals court rejected all of the claims made by Heritage, fully upholding the decision of the trial court.
Read the court’s decision…
Loose Bolts Led to Sagging Roof in Construction Defect Claim
February 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Though the sagging roof is neither leaking nor a safety hazard, the town of Waynesville, North Carolina is suing the builder of its new fire station, as reported in the Smoky Mountain News. The engineers who examined the roof found a substantial number of loose bolts in the roof trusses. Additionally, the trusses themselves have become bent.
Tom Galloway, Waynesville’s Town Manager said “it needs to be remedied and fixed.” He said that the builder, Construction Logic, “never indicated a willingness to fix the roof.” The town is seeking the cost of repair, which Galloway estimated could be $400,000, and an additional $30,000 in damages. The suit states that Construction Logic failed to follow the plan specifications for the roof.
Read the full story…
New Safety Standards Issued by ASSE and ANSI
March 28, 2012 — Melissa Dewey Brumback, Construction Law North Carolina
The American National Standards Institute (ANSI) and the American Society of Safety Engineers (ASSE) have recently announced their approval of two new safety standards to enhance construction site safety.
The two new standards, which are set to take effect during June 2012, are the ANSI/ASSE A10.1-2011 Pre-Project and Pre-Task Safety and Health Planning for Construction and Demolition Operations, and the ANSI/ASSE A10.26-2011 Emergency Procedures for Construction and Demolition Sites.
The new A10.1-2011 standard was designed to assist construction owners, contractors, and designers by ensuring that safety and health planning were standard parts of their pre-construction planning. It is also intended to help owners of construction sites to establish a process for evaluating constructor candidates with regard to their safety and health performance planning.
The A10.26 standard applies to emergency situations, including fires, collapses, and hazardous spills. The standard deals with emergency rescue, evacuation, and transportation of injured workers, and also plans for coordinating with emergency medical facilities ahead of potential disasters.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of Melissa Dewey Brumback of Ragsdale Liggett PLLC. Ms. Brumback can be contacted at mbrumback@rl-law.com.
Water Drainage Case Lacks Standing
March 28, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The Texas Court of Appeals has ruled in the case La Tierra de Simmons Familia Ltd. V. Main Event Entertainment, LP. The trial court had found for Main Event. On appeal, the court threw out some of the grounds on which the trial court had reached its decision.
The case involved two commercial lots in northwest Austin, Texas. The uphill tract (Phase III of the Anderson Arbor development) diverts its runoff onto the lower tract (the “Ballard tract”). The owners of the Ballard tract claim that “the drainage system was designed or constructed in a manner that has damaged and continues to damage the Ballard tract.”
Both tracts have undergone changes of ownership since the construction of the drainage system in 2004. At the time the drainage system was constructed, the parcel was owned by Sears Roebuck and Co. Sears later sold the property. Main Event Entertainment is the current tenant. Likewise, the Ballard tract was previously owned by the Ballard Estate which sold the property to La Tierra on an “as is” basis in 2007.
After La Tierra bought the Ballard tract, La Tierra’s engineer “witnessed and videotaped what he described as ‘flooding’ on the Ballard tract caused by storm water discharge from the Anderson Arbor drainage system during a rainfall event.” La Tierra determined that an adequate drainage system would cost about $204,000. Development plans were put on hold.
La Tierra sued Main Event and various other parties associated with the uphill tract, seeking “actual damages for (1) decrease and loss in rental income due to delay in obtaining the development permit, (2) interest on carrying costs during that time period, (3) the cost to build a water conveyance system on the Ballard tract, (4) engineering fees incurred to redesign the water conveyance system, (5) unspecified out-of-pocket real estate expenses, and (6) property devaluation occasioned by the need to construct an expensive water conveyance system.” The trial court never reached these claims, ruling instead that La Tierra lacked standing, that its claims were barred under the statute of limitations, and that there was no evidence of damage.
La Tierra appealed, arguing that “(1) the summary-judgment evidence does not conclusively establish that property damage claims accrued or were discovered prior to September 11, 2007, which is within the limitations period and was after La Tierra purchased the property; (2) even if the property was damaged before La Tierra acquired ownership of the Ballard tract, standing exists based on the assignments of interest from the Ballard Estate heirs, and the discovery rule tolls limitations until the injury was discovered on September 11, 2007; (3) limitations does not bar La Tierra's request for injunctive relief; (4) La Tierra's water code claim against Main Event and M.E.E.P. is viable based on their control over the drainage system, which makes them necessary and indispensable parties for injunctive relief; (5) La Tierra presented more than a scintilla of evidence to raise a fact issue on damages, causation, and other essential elements of its causes of action; and (6) the trial court abused its discretion when it sustained the defendants' objections to La Tierra's summary-judgment evidence.”
The appeals court concluded that La Tierra’s second claim was irrelevant to standing, as La Tierra “obtained assignments from the Ballard Estate heirs ? nearly one year after the lawsuit was initially filed.” Nor did the court accept their first point. The water system had been operating unaltered since January, 2004, with monthly maintenance and inspection to maintain its designed operation. Further, a feasibility report La Tierra received stated that “over sixteen acres drain into those ponds, and thus onto this site.” The court noted that “the underlying facts giving rise to a cause of action were known before La Tierra acquired ownership of the Ballard tract.”
The court concluded that the drainage issue is a permanent injury, but that it “accrued before La Tierra acquired an ownership interest in the property.” As La Tierra has standing, the appeals court ruled that it was improper for the trial court to rule on the issues. The appeals court dismissed the questions of whether the case was barred under the statute of limitation and also the question of whether or not La Tierra had damages.
As the issue of standing would not allow La Tierra to bring the suit, the appeals court found for the defendants, dismissing the case for this single reason, and otherwise affirming the ruling of the lower court.
Read the court’s decision…
2011 Worst Year Ever for Home Sales
September 9, 2011 — CDJ Staff
So few new single-family homes have sold in 2011 that expectations are that this will be the worst year for new homes sales since the Commerce Department started tracking this in 1963. The Harford Courant notes that previously builders created a new supply to which was added homes under foreclosure.
Ed Leamer, economist and director of UCLA’s Anderson Forecast, says that recovery would be driven by two sectors, manufacturing and construction. “It doesn’t look like there is going to be a big recovery in manufacturing,” he says. “It is going to have to come in housing.”
The soft housing market, however, is leading to a loss of construction jobs, as reported by the Associated General Contractors of America. As a result, stock prices for the twelve largest publicly-traded home builders have declined 22.7 percent in a market that has declined 4.2 percent overall.
Read the full story…
Nevada Bill Aims to Reduce Legal Fees For Construction Defect Practitioners
March 21, 2011 — March 21, 2011 Construction Defect Journal Staff
Assemblyman Ira Hansen and twelve additional members of Nevada’s Assembly are sponsoring Assembly Bill 285. AB 285 Revises provisions governing an award of attorney’s fees in causes of action for constructional defects. Existing law generally provides that a claimant may recover reasonable attorney’s fees as part of the claimant’s damages in a cause of action for constructional defects. (NRS 40.655)
This bill removes this provision and instead authorizes a court to award reasonable attorney’s fees to a prevailing party involved in such a cause of action if an independent basis for the award exists pursuant to existing law which authorizes a court to award attorney’s fees in certain circumstances, or Rule 68 of the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides for the payment of reasonable attorney’s fees by an offeree who rejects an offer and subsequently fails to obtain a more favorable judgment.
In an AP report published in Business Week it is suggested that the target objective of legislators centers on what it refers to as Nevada’s "Rampant construction defect lawsuits".
According to Business Week "The suits bring in hundreds of millions of dollars for lawyers and have put construction companies out of business. Hansen says fewer construction firms mean higher prices for Nevada consumers."
Click Here To Read Full Text and Revisions of Assembly Bill 285
Court Will Not Compel Judge to Dismiss Construction Defect Case
August 2, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The Fourteenth Court of Appeals of Texas has denied a petition for a writ of mandamus. The parties involved, Bonner Ball, Thomas Zenner, and Rallin Welch, are lmited partners of Black Diamond Builders, LLP. Black Diamond is the recipient of a lawsuit from Grier and Camille Patton, for whom Black Diamond built a home. The Pattons are alleging construction defects.
The Black Diamond partners argue that Judge Jeff Shadwick, presiding judge of the 55th District Court of Harris County, Texas should have granted their motion to dismiss. They sought to have the Fourteenth Court of Appeals compel that action.
The Black Diamond Partners claims that “the homowners failed to satisfy statutory prerequisites before filing suit, and dismissal of the suit was automatic under the applicable statues in effect at the time the Pattons noticed alleged defects in their home.”
The court noted that “a trial court will be held to have abused its discretion only if the party requesting mandamus relief establishes that the trial court could have reached but one decision.” The court did not concur with this and denied the petition for a writ of mandamus.
Read the court's decision…
Hovnanian Sees Second-Quarter Profit, Points to Recovery
June 19, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Hovnanian Enterprises has shown a profit in the second quarter, which the company attributes to recovery in the homebuilding industry. Apart from a sales promotion in 2007, the company sold more homes per community in April than it has in any other month since 2006. Ara K. Hovnanian said that “the sales improvements we have experienced are fairly wide-based in terms of geography, price points and buyer profiles.”
The quarter’s profit was $1.8 million. In the year prior, Hovnanian faced losses of $72.7 million. The Wall Street Journal’s Marketwatch reported that Hovnanian’s stock price recently went up 19%.
Read the full story…
Delays in Filing Lead to Dismissal in Moisture Intrusion Lawsuit
September 9, 2011 — CDJ Staff
The Alabama Court of Civil Appeals has upheld a summary judgment in the case of Franklin v. Mitchell. Walter Mitchell, doing business as Southern Classic Construction built a new home for the Franklins. The Franklins moved into the home in October 2001. In April 2006 they discovered sagging floors in both the bathroom and kitchen. They contacted Mitchell who suggested the flooring might be defective. The Franklins spent eight months attempting to contact the flooring manufacturer.
In March 2007, the Franklins had the home inspected. The sagging was determined to be due to a loss of strength in the decking because of condensation from the air conditioning system. Air returns were not properly sealed and drawing moisture into the structure. There was mold on the decking and floor joints.
When Mitchell was contacted by the Franklins, he told them his one-year warranty had expired but had the HVAC subcontractor, Southern Mechanical Heating & Air (owned by Mitchell’s father, Jim Mitchell), look at the situation. SMHA replaced and braced subfloors. Later, they entered the crawl space to tape ducts, seal the air return, and insulate the air vent housing. The Franklins were not satisfied with the repairs, as not all the ducts were taped, nor were the air vent housings insulated.
Franklin complained to Walter Mitchell who again cited his one-year warranty. Jim Mitchell said he would not report complaints to his insurer, stating that the repairs were unnecessary, that the work had been done correctly in the first place, and it was only done at the request of Walter Mitchell.
In February 2009, the Franklins sued Walker Mitchell. Mitchell denied the claims, citing in part the statute of limitations. Mitchell also filed complaints against three subcontractors, including his father’s firm. Mitchell received a summary judgment as the case started after Alabama’s six-year statute of limitations.
The appeals court rejected the Franklin’s argument that the claim of damage did not start until they were aware it was due to a construction defect. The court noted that as Walter Mitchell was licensed as a “residential home builder, the statute the Franklins cite did not apply, as it concerns architects, engineers, and licensed general contactors.”
Nor did they feel that Mitchells’ claim that his warranty had expired were sufficient to override the statute of limitations, quoting an earlier case, “Vague assurances do not amount to an affirmative inducement to delay filing suit.” Their claim of subsequent negligent repairs was rejected because Mitchell did not direct the specific actions taken by his father’s firm.
Read the court’s decision…
Contractor Burns Down Home, Insurer Refuses Coverage
May 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
InsuranceStep reports that a Connecticut insurance company has rejected a claim over a fire in a remodeling project that killed five people. Utica First Insurance states that the coverage was invalid as the insured, Tiberias Construction, had misrepresented information about the company and the work performed in applying for insurance. During a remodel, the contractor allegedly placed fireplace ashes near trash. The trash ignited, leading to the house fire.
Read the full story…
Louisiana Politicians Struggle on Construction Bills, Hospital Redevelopment
June 16, 2011 — CDJ Staff
Louisiana politicians are still working on a compromise in the state’s construction budget, as reported in the Times-Picayune. Rob Marrianneax, the chair of the Senate Revenue and Fiscal Affairs Committee, removed a $45 million request from Governor Bobby Jindal and added $4 million for projects that Jindal vetoed last year.
Two senators have formed competing plans to fund redevelopment construction for New Orleans’s Methodist Hospital. Mitch Landrieu, the mayor of New Orleans, hoped for $30 million dollars in state bonds. Senator Cynthia Willard-Lewis proposed an amendment that would supply $1.6 million, while Senator J.P. Morrell has an amendment that would supply $4 million.
Read the full story…
Appeals Court Upholds Decision by Referee in Trial Court for Antagan v Shea Homes
May 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
In the case Antangan v. Shea Homes Ltd. Partnership (Cal. App., 2012), Plaintiffs appealed “an order vacating a judgment and entering a modified judgment in their construction defect action against defendants Shea Homes, Inc. and Shea Homes Limited Partnership,” while the Defendant, Shea Homes Limited Partnership (Shea Homes) appealed “an order of the judicial referee denying its motion to strike and tax costs.”
On the Antagon issue, the appeals court concluded that “the trial court did not err by vacating and modifying its judgment so that the cost of referee’s fees would be equally divided by the parties and consistent with a prior stipulation they filed in court.”
On the Shea Homes issue, the appeals court concluded: “1) the judicial referee did not err by ruling that plaintiffs’ offers to compromise (§ 998) were validly served on Shea Homes’ counsel, 2) the offers substantially complied with statutory requirements, 3) the offers were not required to be apportioned, and 4) the referee’s award of $5,000 as costs for a person assisting plaintiffs’ counsel was not an abuse of discretion.” The appeals court affirmed the judgment.
Here is a brief history of the trial case: “Plaintiffs Chito Antangan, Jimmy Alcova and other homeowners brought an action against defendants Shea Homes, Inc. and Shea Homes Limited Partnership for damages alleging that the properties they purchased from these ‘developer defendants’ were defective. Plaintiffs claimed numerous construction defects required them ‘to incur expenses’ for ‘restoration and repairs’ and the value of their homes had been diminished.”
In response, Shea Homes filed a motion for an order to appoint a judicial referee. The motion was granted and it was ruled that “a referee would ‘try all issues’ and ‘report a statement of decision to this court.’”
On May 10, 2010 the judicial referee (Thompson) “awarded plaintiffs damages and various costs, and ruled that ‘Shea Homes shall bear all of the Referee’s fees.’” The latter ruling would become a matter for contention later on.
In July of 2010, the plaintiffs “sought, among other things, $54,409.90 for expert fees, and $14,812.50 for the services of Melissa Fox for ‘exhibit preparation & trial presentation.’ Shea Homes filed a motion to strike and/or tax costs claiming: 1) Fox was a paralegal, 2) plaintiffs were not entitled to attorney’s fees, and 3) the fees for Fox’s services were an indirect and improper method to obtain attorney’s fees. The referee disagreed and awarded $5,000 for Fox’s services. The referee also ruled that plaintiffs had properly served valid offers to compromise (§ 998) on Shea Homes’ counsel in 2009. He said those offers to defendants in the case at that time did not have to be apportioned.”
“Antangan contends the trial court erred when it vacated and modified its original judgment, which ordered Shea Homes to pay all the referee’s fees. We disagree.”
Antagon contended that the trial court erred when it vacated and modified its original judgment regarding Shea Homes paying the referee’s fees. The appeals court disagreed: “A trial court has inherent authority to vacate or correct a judgment that is void on its face, incorrect, or entered by mistake. (§ 473; Rochin v. Pat Johnson Manufacturing Co. (1998),67 Cal.App.4th 1228; Olivera
Read the court’s decision…
Irene May Benefit Construction Industry
September 1, 2011 — CDJ Staff
Noting that while it wasn’t the $15 billion disaster some predicted, Hurricane Irene still caused quite a bit of damage on its path up the Eastern Seaboard. Martha White, reporting for MSNBC cites Kinetc Analysis Corp. with an estimate of $7 billion in damage. Carl Van Horn, a professor of public policy at Rutgers University expected an initial decline in construction jobs, due to projects delayed due to the storm’s arrival, but he said, “a few weeks later, employment picks up as people rebuild.”
Kinetic says that one unknown is how much of the damage is insured. They expect only $3 billion of damage will be covered by insurance. This would likely put a drag on consumer spending, as homeowners would have to dig into their own pockets to pay for repairs, according to Karl Smith, associate professor of economics and government at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
Read the full story…
Defense for Additional Insured Not Barred By Sole Negligence Provision
August 11, 2011 — Tred Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
A general contractor was entitled to a defense as an additional insured when the underlying complaint did not allege it was solely negligent. A-1 Roofing Co. v. Navigators Ins. Co., 2011 Ill. App. LEXIS 656 (Ill. Ct. App. June 24, 2011).
A-1 was the general contractor for a roof resurfacing job at a high school. Jack Frost Iron Works Inc. (“Frost”) was one of A-1’s subcontractors. Frost had a CGL policy with Navigators Insurance Company under which A-1 was an additional insured.
An employee of Frost’s subcontractor Midwest Sheet Metal Inc. was killed at the job site when a boom-lift he was operating flipped over. The boom-lift had been leased by another Frost subcontractor, Bakes Steel Erectors, Inc. (BSE). The deceased's estate filed suit against A-1, BSE and two other defendants.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
Analysis of the “owned property exclusion” under Panico v. State Farm
March 8, 2011 — March 8, 2011, Colorado Construction Litigation
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit recently concluded that the “owned property exclusion” applied to bar coverage for claims of property damage. See Panico v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 2011 WL 322830 (10th Cir. 2011). In Panico, the plaintiffs sold property in Aspen, Colorado to the Taylors, who sued the Panicos upon discovering the property was not as represented. After refusing to defend, the Panicos sued State Farm for breach of contract. The district court concluded that the Taylors’ claims were not covered under the Panicos insurance policies and granted summary judgment in State Farm’s favor. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed.
Mr. Panico built the house on the property as well as several additions to the house. As the Taylors lived in Florida, they primarily relied on their real estate agent and an inspector to ensure the property was acceptable. According to their complaint, the Taylors discovered that the house was “virtually uninhabitable due to serious design and construction defects, mold, rodents, and drainage problems.” Id. at *1. In their complaint, the Taylors asserted three claims for relief against the Panicos based upon misrepresentation and fraudulent concealment about the condition of the property.
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of Heather M. Anderson of Higgins, Hopkins, McClain & Roswell, LLP. Ms Anderson can be contacted at anderson@hhmrlaw.com
Limiting Plaintiffs’ Claims to a Cause of Action for Violation of SB-800
November 18, 2011 — Samir R. Patel, Esq. and Todd E. Verbick, Esq., Lorber, Greenfield & Polito, LLP
There has been a fair share of publicity about the SB-800 amendments to the Civil Code (Civil Code section 896, et seq.) that codified construction defect litigation in 2002. Most of the publicity is geared toward the pre-litigation standards allowing a builder the right to repair before litigation is commenced by a homeowner. Less focus and attention has been given to the fact that violation of the SB-800 performance standards is being used by plaintiff’s counsel as an additional tool in the plaintiff’s pleading tool box against builders. Closer scrutiny to SB-800 reveals that those provisions should in fact act as a limitation to the pleading tools available to plaintiffs and an additional tool for builders in the defense of cases governed by SB-800.
The typical construction defect complaint contains the boiler plate versions of numerous causes of action. These causes of action include Strict Liability, Negligence, Negligence Per Se, Breach of Contract, Breach of Contract – Third-Party Beneficiary, Breach of Express Warranties, Breach of Implied Warranties, among others. The wide array of causes of action leave a defendant “pinned to the wall” because they require a complex defense on a multitude of contract and tort related causes of action. Furthermore, the statutes of limitations as to these claims widely differ depending upon if the particular defect is considered latent or patent. The truth of the matter remains, no matter what the circumstances, if a construction defect matter ultimately goes to trial, it is inevitable that plaintiffs will obtain a judgment on at least one of these causes of action.
On its own, the Strict Liability cause of action can be a thorn in a defendant’s side. A builder is obviously placing a product into the stream of commerce and strict liability is a tough standard to defend against, particularly when it concerns intricate homes comprised of multiple components that originally sold for hundreds of thousands of dollars. A Negligence cause of action can also be difficult to defend because the duty of care for a builder is what a “reasonable” builder would have done under the circumstances. An interpretation of this duty of care can easily sway a jury that will almost always consist of sympathetic homeowners. A Negligence Per Se cause of action can also leave a defendant vulnerable to accusations that a builder violated the Uniform Building Code or a multitude of other obscure municipal construction-related code provisions during the construction of the home. Lastly, the Breach of Contract cause of action leaves a builder relying on dense and intricate purchase and sale agreements with dozens of addenda which leave the skeptical jurors turned off by what they view as one-side, boilerplate provisions. Ultimately, when a matter is about to go to trial, the complexity of these complaints can benefit a plaintiff and increase a plaintiff’s bargaining power against a defendant who is attempting to avoid a potentially large judgment.
Enter the SB-800 statutes. The SB-800 statutes apply to all homes sold after January 1, 2003. Civil Code section 938 specifically states that “[t]his title applies only to new residential units where the purchase agreements with the buyer was signed by the seller on or after January 1, 2003.” (Civil Code §, 938.) As time progresses, more residential construction defect cases will exclusively fall under the purview of SB-800. Slowly but surely more SB-800 governed litigation is being filed, and its exclusive application is looming on the horizon.
On its surface, this “right to repair” regime has left builders with a lot to be desired despite the fact that it is supposed to allow the builder the opportunity to cure any deficiencies in their product before litigation can be filed by potential plaintiffs. However, the application of the time line for repair has shown to be impractical for anything but the most minor problems involving only small numbers of residential units. Moreover, the fact that the fruits of the builder’s investigation into the claimed defects in the pre-litigation context can freely be used as evidence against it in litigation makes builders proceed with trepidation in responding with a repair. For these reasons, more SB-800 litigation can be expected to result due to the shortcomings of the pre-litigation procedures, and savvy defense counsel should anticipate the issues to be dealt with in presenting the defense of such cases at trial.
This fact should not necessarily be met with fear or disdain. Within the SB-800 statutes, the legislature made it clear that they were creating a new cause of action for construction defect claims, but it further made it clear that this cause of action is a plaintiff’s exclusive remedy. The legislature giveth, but at the same time, the legislature taketh away. Throughout numerous provisions within the SB-800 statutes, the Civil Code states that claims for construction defects as to residential construction are exclusively governed by the Civil Code, and that the Civil Code governs any and all litigation arising under breaches of these provisions. Civil Code section 896 specifically states:
In any action seeking recovery of damages arising out of, or related to deficiencies in, the residential construction … the claimant’s claims or causes of action shall be limited to violation of, the following standards, except as specifically set forth in this title. (Civil Code §, 896.)
Civil Code section 896 then provides approximately fifty-plus standards by which a construction defect claim is assessed under that provision. Civil Code section 896 covers everything from plumbing to windows, and from foundations to decks, and in several instances expressly dictates statutes of limitations as to specific areas of construction that severely truncate the 10-year latent damage limitations period. As for any construction deficiencies that are not enumerated within Civil Code section 896, Civil Code section 897 explicitly defines the intent of the standards and provides a method to assess deficiencies that are not addressed in Civil Code section 896. Civil Code section 897 states:
Intent of Standards
The standards set forth in this chapter are intended to address every function or component of a structure. To the extent that a function or component of a structure is not addressed by these standards, it shall be actionable if it causes damage. (Civil Code §, 897.)
Therefore, Civil Code section 897 acts as a catch-all by which defects that are not covered within Civil Code section 896 can be evaluated on a damage standard mirroring the Aas case (damages must be present and actual). The result of sections 896 and 897 being read in combination is a comprehensive, all-inclusive set of performance standards by which any defect raised by Plaintiffs can be evaluated and resolved under a single SB-800 based cause of action.
Civil Code section 943 makes clear that a cause of action for violation of SB-800 performance standards is a plaintiff’s sole remedy for a residential construction defect action. Specifically, Civil Code section 943 states:
Except as provided in this title, no other cause of action for a claim covered by this title or for damages recoverable under 944 is allowed. In addition to the rights under this title, this title does not apply to any action by a claimant to enforce a contract or express contractual provision, or any action for fraud, personal injury, or violation of a statute. (Civil Code §, 943.)
Civil Code section 944 provides the method for computing damages within a construction defect action, as follows:
If a claim for damages is made under this title, the homeowner is only entitled to damages for the reasonable value of repairing any violation of the standards set forth in this title, [and] the reasonable cost of repairing any damages caused by the repair efforts… . (Civil Code §, 944.)
A cursory review of these statutes yields the conclusion that the legislature was attempting to create an exclusive cause of action that trumps all other causes of action where SB-800 applies. The remedy available to plaintiffs is limited to that allowed by the Civil Code. As noted above, “[n]o other cause of action for a claim covered by this title…is allowed.” (Civil Code §, 943.) Therefore, Civil Code sections 896, 897, 943, and 944 specifically prohibit the contract-based and tort-based causes of action typically pled by plaintiffs.
Plaintiff’s counsel has seized upon the language of section 943 to advance the argument that SB-800 still allows a plaintiff to advance typical contract and tort based causes of action. On the surface, this argument may seem compelling, but a minimum of scrutiny of the express language of section 943 dispels this notion. Section 943 says that it provides rights “[i]n addition” to those under the SB-800 Civil Code provisions. Clearly, the language in section 943 is intended to expressly underscore the fact that a plaintiff is not precluded from seeking relief in addition to that allowed under SB-800 for damages not arising from a breach of the SB-800 standards or for damages in addition to those recoverable under Section 944. This language does not provide an unfettered license to bring a Strict Liability, Negligence or other cause of action against a builder where SB-800 applies.
In fact, this language only keeps the door open for plaintiffs to pursue such causes of action not arising from a breach of the SB-800 standards should there be such supporting allegations. For example, if a plaintiff alleges that a builder breached an “express contractual provision” related to the timing of the completion of the home and close of escrow, and the contract specifies damages in this regard, a plaintiff may have a viable separate cause of action for Breach of Contract for recovery of those damages precisely because that is not an issue expressly dealt with in SB-800 in the performance standards under sections 896 and 897, or in the damage recovery terms under 944. As it stands, the vast majority of complaints are seeking redress for violation of the same primary right; that is, defects specifically outlined in Section 896 and 897 or which result in damages as stated in Section 944.
So, how does a builder defend against a complaint that contains multiple causes of action regarding construction defects for a home sold after January 1, 2003? There are numerous ways to approach this. First and foremost, these superfluous and improper causes of action can be attacked by demurrer seeking dismissal of all causes of action other than the cause of action alleging violation of SB-800. If the the time period within which to file a demurrer has passed already, a motion for judgment on the pleadings can be utilized to attack the improper causes of action in the same way as a demurrer can be used for this purpose.
The limitation to a demurrer or motion for judgment on the pleadings is that the judge is restricted to viewing only the four corners of the pleading when making a ruling. It is typical for plaintiffs’ counsel to cleverly (or one might even say, disingenuously) leave the complaint purposely vague to avoid a successful defense attack on the pleadings by not including the original date the residence was sold. In that instance, a motion for summary adjudication can be used to attack a plaintiff’s complaint. By simply providing evidence that the homes were originally sold after January 1, 2003, the improper causes of action should be subject to dismissal by summary adjudication. If the plaintiff is a subsequent purchaser, the builder still has recourse to enforce the pleading limitations under SB-800. Civil Code section 945 states that “[t]he provisions, standards, rights, and obligations set forth in this title are binding upon all original purchasers and their successors-in-interest.” (Civil Code §, 945.)
Attacking a plaintiff’s complaint to eliminate multiple causes of action can have numerous benefits. The practical result is that a plaintiff will only have one viable cause of action. The advantage is that the SB-800 performance standards include the defined performance standards and shortened statutes of limitations periods with regard to specific issues. Furthermore, as to defects which are not specifically provided for in Civil Code section 896, Civil Code section 897 requires a proof of actual damages. Therefore, a plaintiff must provide evidence of current damages and not simply conditions that may potentially cause damage in the future.
The Appellate Courts have yet to directly address and interpret these SB-800 provisions. The time for that is undoubtedly drawing near. For now, however, plaintiffs will have to find ways to accurately plead construction defect claims within the confines of one cause of action for breach of the performance standards enumerated within the Civil Code.
Printed courtesy of Lorber, Greenfield & Polito, LLP. Mr. Patel can be contacted at spatel@lorberlaw.com and Mr. Verbick at tverbick@lorberlaw.com.
Judge Kobayashi Determines No Coverage for Construction Defect Claim
October 23, 2012 — Tred Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
Judge Kobayashi of the U.S. District Court, District of Hawaii, largely followed earlier precedent established by Judge Mollway in finding no coverage for construction defect claims. See Evanston v. Nagano, 2012 WL 3800320 (D. Hawaii Aug. 31, 2012).
Evanston issued several liability policies to the insured contractor from 2002 and 2011. The insured entered a contract to build a residence in Honolulu. The homeowners were not happy with their home after the work was completed. They filed suit, alleging that the project was delayed and the construction was "riddled with defects." The complaint included claims for breach of contract and breach of warranties. Negligence was not alleged. Evanston defended, but under a reservation of rights.
Evanston filed suit for a declaratory judgment and moved for summary judgment.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
Construction Defects Not Occurrences under Ohio Law
November 7, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Concluding the “claims of defective construction or workmanship brought by a property owners are not claims for ‘property damage’ caused by an ‘occurrence’ under a commercial general liability policy,” the Supreme Court of Ohio has ruled in Westfield Insurance Co. v. Custom Agri Systems, Inc. In the underlying case, Custom Agri Systems, Inc. built a grain bin as a subcontractor to Younglove Construction, LLC. Younglove had been contracted by PSD Development, which withheld payment, claiming it had suffered damages due to defects in Custom Agri System’s work. Younglove filed a complaint against Custom Agri, which filed complaints against its subcontractors. Custom Agri also requested that its insurer, Westfield Insurance Company, defend and indemnify it. Westfield claimed that it had no such duty. The Ohio Supreme Court concurred.
The decision notes that “Custom was being sued under two general theories: defective construction and consequential damages resulting from the defective construction.” Westfield argued that none of the claims were “for ‘property damage’ caused by an ‘occurrence” and therefore none of the claims were covered under the CGL policy.” Further, Westfield argued that “even if the claims were for property damage caused by an occurrence, they were removed from coverage by an exclusion in the policy.”
The case was filed in the US District Court which issued a summary judgment for Westfield. The plaintiff appealed and Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals certified the questions to the Supreme Court of Ohio.
The court noted that “all of the claims against which Westfield is being asked to defect and indemnify Custom relate to Custom’s work itself.” And so, the court concluded that they “must decide whether Custom’s alleged defective construction of and workmanship on the steel grain bin constitute property damage caused by an ‘occurrence.’” However, the court noted that under the terms of the insurance contract, an occurrence is defined as “an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful conditions,” and the court noted that the “natural and commonly accepted meaning” of “accident” is something “unexpected, as well as unintended.”
The Ohio Supreme Court also looked at court decisions in other places, and found that in many similar cases, courts have concluded that construction defects are not occurrences.
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Pfeifer argues that “if the defective construction is accidental, it constitutes an ‘occurrence’ under a CGL policy.” Justice Pfeifer characterized the majority’s definition of “accidental” as “broad, covering unexpected, unintentional happenings.”
Read the court’s decision…