Supreme Court of New York Denies Motion in all but One Cause of Action in Kikirov v. 355 Realty Assoc., et al.
April 28, 2011 — April 28, 2011 Beverley BevenFlorez - Construction Defect Journal
In the construction defect suit Kikirov v. 355 Realty Associates, LLC, et al., the Supreme Court of the State of New York granted a dismissal of the plaintiff’s fourth cause of action, but denied the defendants’ motion in all other respects. The plaintiff alleged breach of contract, among other claims. “355 Realty was the sponsor of 355 Kings Highway Condominium, a condominium project located at 355 Kings Highway, in Brooklyn, New York. The condominium units were allegedly marketed as ‘ultra luxury condos,’ and a ‘Manhattan style condominium building,’ which would be the ‘epitome of luxury and quality.’ The construction of the six-story 28 unit residential condominium building began in approximately November 2003. […] Plaintiff entered into a purchase agreement, dated December 21, 2005, with 355 Realty (which was executed on behalf of 355 Realty by Michael Marino, as its member) for the purchase of Unit 2G in the building.”
The plaintiff alleged that construction defects emerged soon after moving into the unit: “After taking occupancy of his condominium unit, plaintiff allegedly experienced serious leakage and moisture problems in his unit, which caused a dangerous mold condition to develop, in addition to causing actual damage to the structural elements of his unit. According to plaintiff, the walls, moldings, and wood floors of his unit are constantly wet and moist, and there is severe buckling of the wood floors. Plaintiff claims that these problems have caused his unit to be uninhabitable. Plaintiff alleges that he has been forced to remove all of his personal belongings from his unit and has been unable to occupy his unit.”
According to the plaintiff, Foremost attempted to repair the defects, but only made the situation worse: “Specifically, plaintiff asserts that Foremost’s contractors opened his walls to remove the stained drywall, but never corrected the cause of the leaks, destroyed the walls, and never properly taped and painted the sheet rock. Plaintiff alleges that Foremost repaired the openings in a defective manner. Plaintiff also claims that his floor was repaired at that time by a subcontractor hired by Foremost, but the basic structural problem was never resolved and the leaks continued, compromising the beams and causing the mold conditions, in addition to all of the physical damage present in the unit. On or about July 16, 2009, plaintiff allegedly sent a notice of the defects to 355 Realty and to the managing agent designated by the condominium board, by certified mail, return receipt requested. Plaintiff asserts that defendants have failed and refused to repair and remedy the defective condition, and that the damage is extensive and requires major structural repairs.”
The plaintiff filed suit on May 4, 2010, and the original complaint asserted eight causes of action. “By decision and order dated September 13, 2010, the court granted a motion by defendants to dismiss plaintiff’s second cause of action for breach of implied covenants of good faith and fair dealing, his third cause of action for breach of implied warranties, his fifth cause of action for negligence as against 355 Realty, Michael Marino, Anthony Piscione, Ahron Hersh, and Toby Hersh, his seventh cause of action for negligence as against Vision, Foremost, and MMJ, and his eighth cause of action for violations of General Business Law § 349 and § 350, and granted plaintiff leave to replead his first cause of action for breach of contract as against 355 Realty, Michael Marino, Anthony Piscione, Ahron Hersh, and Toby Hersh, his fourth cause of action for breach of statutory warranties, and his sixth cause of action for breach of contract as against Vision, Foremost, and MMJ.”
The plaintiff amended their complaint on October 18, 2010, and “has repleaded these three causes of action by asserting a first cause of action for breach of contract as against 355 Realty, Michael Marino, Anthony Piscione, Ahron Hersh, and Toby Hersh, a second cause of action for breach of statutory warranties, and a third cause of action for breach of contract as against Vision, Foremost, and MMJ. In addition, plaintiff, in his amended complaint, has added a fourth cause of action for fraud.”
The defendants, on the other hand, “argue that each of the four causes of action alleged by plaintiff in his amended complaint fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, and that plaintiff’s amended complaint must be dismissed pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7). Defendants also cite to CPLR 3211 (a) (1), and (5), asserting that dismissal is also required based upon documentary evidence and the Statute of Limitations contained in the limited warranty.”The defendants’ motion to dismiss the first cause of action, breach of contract against 355 Realty, was denied: “While defendants dispute that the alleged defects are actually structural in nature, plaintiff’s allegations as to their structural nature are sufficient, at this juncture, to withstand defendants’ motion to dismiss. Thus, dismissal of plaintiff’s first cause of action must be denied.”
Next, the court reviewed the second cause of action, which was breach of statutory warranties: “Defendants’ motion also seeks dismissal of plaintiff’s second cause of action for breach of statutory warranties, which alleges that, under applicable law, including General Business Law § 777-a, et seq., the sponsor warranted to purchasers of units that the units would be constructed in a skillful, careful, and workmanlike manner, consistent with proper design, engineering, and construction standards and practices, and free of material latent, design, and structural defects. Defendants argue that General Business Law § 777-a, known as the housing merchant implied warranty, is inapplicable to this case because it is limited to the construction of a ‘new home,’ defined in General Business Law § 777 (5) as ‘any single family house or for-sale unit in a multi-unit residential structure of five stories or less.’ As noted above, the building in which plaintiff’s condominium unit is located is a six-story building.”
The motion to dismiss the second cause of action is denied. The court provided this reasoning: “the full text of the offering plan has not been provided, the court is unable to examine the entire written agreement so as to determine the purpose of the inclusion of the text of General Business Law § 777.”
In the third cause of action, the plaintiff alleges “a breach of contract claim as against Vision, Foremost, and MMJ based upon their contract with 355 Realty, pursuant to which they agreed to be the general contractors/construction managers for the condominium, to undertake oversight responsibility for the design and construction of the condominium, to prepare and/or review drawings, plans, and specifications for the condominium, and to otherwise manage and oversee the project. Plaintiff alleges that Vision, Foremost, and MMJ breached their contractual obligations in that the condominium units were improperly and inadequately designed and constructed, and completed in an incompetent and unworkmanlike manner, with material design and construction defects.”
The motion to dismiss the third cause of action was denied as well: “Plaintiff alleges, in his amended complaint, that Vision, Foremost, and MMJ have acknowledged notice of the defects and have not denied that they are responsible for providing a warranty to plaintiff. Plaintiff also refers to this warranty, in his amended complaint, by noting that paragraph 16 of the purchase agreement stated that the ‘[s]eller shall not be liable to . . . the [p]urchaser for any matter as to which an assignable warranty . . . has been assigned . . . to [p]urchaser and in such case the sole recourse of such . . . [p]urchaser . . . shall be against the warrantor . . . except that in the event a contractor or subcontractor is financially unable or refuses to perform its warranty . . . [s]eller shall not be excused from its obligations enumerated in the [offering p]lan under Rights and Obligations of Sponsor.’ Consequently, the court finds that dismissal of plaintiff’s third cause of action as against Foremost and MMJ must also be denied.”
In the fourth cause of action, the plaintiff alleges “that defendants made false statements and representations orally, in advertisements, and in the purchase agreement, that the condominium was properly and adequately designed and constructed and completed in a competent and workmanlike manner, in accordance with the condominium plans and specifications and proper design, engineering, and construction standards and practices consistent with applicable standards for a first class, luxury condominium in Brooklyn.”
The court dismissed the fourth cause of action stating, “it must be dismissed because it is duplicative of his first cause of action for breach of contract.” Therefore, “defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s amended complaint is granted to the extent that it seeks dismissal of plaintiff’s fourth cause of action, and it is denied in all other respects.”
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Partial Settlement in DeKalb Construction Management Case
July 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The DeKalb County School District has made a partial settlement in a lawsuit over their claims of mismanagement of construction projects. The Atlanta Journal-Constitution reports that the school board settled with E. R. Mitchell & Co., the smaller of two firms that they have sued. As part of the settlement, Mitchell will be testifying against their former partner. Claims from the other side of the lawsuit are that the school board improperly fired the Heery/Mitchell partnership. The superintendant who fired the company, Crawford Lewis, and his chief operations office, Pat Reid, have since been charged with criminal conspiracy to defraud the construction program. A lawyer for Heery said that “we believe that when presented to a jury, Heery will be vindicated.”
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Court Requires Adherence to “Good Faith and Fair Dealing” in Construction Defect Coverage
September 30, 2011 — CDJ Staff
The California Court of Appeals has ruled in the case of Allied Framers, Inc. v. Golden Bear Insurance Company. Allied had been sued in a construction defect case and its primary insurer had become insolvent. Coverage for Allied’s defense was paid for by the California Insurance Guarantee Association through June 8, 2006. When warned that CIGA’s involvement was ending, Allied notified Golden Bear, which declined to provide coverage.
In the matters that followed, Golden Bear claimed that Allied had not exhausted its $1 million in primary insurance. Allied then showed that $1 million had already been paid out in the case. A few months thereafter, Golden Bear offered a $500,000 settlement on behalf of Allied which was rejected. Thereafter, Golden Bear hired new counsel to defend Allied. Golden Bear received, but allegedly did not pay, invoices Allied sent from their former counsel. Golden Bear finally settled the construction defect case for $2 million.
Allied’s original counsel sued Allied for payment. Golden Bear declined coverage. Allied then claimed that Golden Bear liable on several counts, arising from its failure to settle the construction defect action earlier than it did and its failure to pay Allied’s counsel. Golden Bear demurred, arguing that Allied had now exhausted is coverage with the $2 million settlement. The lower court sustained Golden Bear’s demurrer, dismissing Allied’s complaints.
The appeal court reviewed Allied’s seven complaints and sustained most of them. However, the court did reverse the trial court’s order in regard to Allied’s complaint that Golden Bear breached an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The appeals court was not convinced that Golden Bear properly evaluated the settlement demand in the underlying construction defect case. The court found three other ways in which Golden Bear’s actions might show bad faith, in refusing to pay defense fees “after promising [Allied] such costs would be paid in full,” “failing to advise Allied about ‘actual or potential negative consequences of agreeing to the proposed settlement,’” and that their choice of counsel “failed to protect [Allied’s] interests in the negotiation.”
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Montrose Language Interpreted: How Many Policies Are Implicated By A Construction Defect That Later Causes a Flood?
March 17, 2011 — By Shaun McParland Baldwin, March 17, 2011
The Court of Appeals of Indiana recently addressed the “Montrose” language added to the CGL ISO form in 2001 in the context of a construction defect claim where a fractured storm drain caused significant flooding a year after the drain was damaged. The insuring agreement requires that “bodily injury” or “property damage” be caused by an “occurrence” and that the “bodily injury” or “property damage” occur during the policy period. The Montrose language adds that the insurance applies only if, prior to the policy period, no insured knew that the “bodily injury” or “property damage” had occurred in whole or in part. Significantly, it also states that any “bodily injury“ or “property damage” which occurs during the policy period and was not, prior to the policy period known to have occurred, includes a continuation, change or resumption of that “bodily injury” or “property damage” after the end of the policy period.
In Grange Mutual Cas. Co. v. West Bend Mut. Ins. Co., No. 29D04-0706-PL-1112 (Ct. App. IN March 15, 2011), http://www.ai.org/judiciary/opinions/pdf/03151109ehf.pdf, Sullivan was the General Contractor for a school construction project. Its subcontractor, McCurdy, installed the storm drain pipes. One of the storm pipes was fractured in 2005 while McCurdy was doing its installation work. More than a year later, the school experienced significant water damage due to flooding. It was later discovered that the flooding was due to the fractured storm drain. Sullivan’s insurer paid $146,403 for the water damage. That insurer brought a subrogation claim against McCurdy and its two insurers: West Bend and Grange. West Bend had issued CGL coverage to McCurdy while the construction was ongoing , including the date in which the storm pipe was fractured. Grange issued CGL coverage to McCurdy at the time of the flooding. Those two carriers jointly settled the subrogation claim and then litigated which insurer actually owed coverage for the loss. Significantly, the loss that was paid included only damages from the flooding, not any damages for the cost of repairing the pipe.
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Reprinted courtesy of Shaun McParland Baldwin of Tressler LLP. Ms Baldwin can be contacted at sbaldwin@tresslerllp.com
North Carolina Exclusion j(6) “That Particular Part”
February 10, 2012 — CDCoverage.com
In Alliance Mutual Insurance Co. v. Dove, 714 S.E.2d 782 (N.C. Ct. App. 2011), claimant Murphy-Brown hired insured Dove to repair a broken elevator belt in a grain elevator in Murphy-Brown’s feed mill. The elevator was inside a metal duct and, to access the broken belt, Dove had to cut out a section of the duct. After replacing the belt, Dove welded the metal section back to the duct. Immediately after Dove completed the welding, dust inside the duct ignited, causing an explosion in the elevator, resulting in property damage to the elevator and other property. Murphy-Brown sued Dove for negligence seeking damages for the repair and replacement of the elevator, repair and replacement of the other property, increased grain handling costs during the repairs, and loss of use.
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Reprinted courtesy of CDCoverage.com
Construction Law Alert: A Specialty License May Not Be Required If Work Covered By Another License
March 7, 2011 — By
Steve Cvitanovic of
Haight Brown & Bonesteel, LLP.Contractors should always be sure that they understand the licensing in any Subcontract or Prime Contract before entering into any agreement. However, on March 3, 2011, in the case of Pacific Casson & Shoring, Inc. v. Bernards Bros., Inc. 2011 Cal.App.Lexis 236, the Court of Appeal determined that if a specialty license is subsumed within another license, the specialty license may not be required.
Bernards entered into a subcontract with Pacific to excavate, backfill, grade and provide geotechnical design parameters for a hospital. The Prime Contract required the bidder to maintain a Class C-12 specialty earthwork license. However, Pacific only held a Class A general engineering license which it turns out was suspended during the performance of the work. Pacific sued Bernards for nonpayment of $544,567, but the lawsuit was dismissed because the trial court found that Pacific (1) lacked a C-12 license, and (2) Pacific’s Class A license was suspended for failure to pay an unrelated judgment. Pacific was also ordered to disgorge $206,437 in prior payments.
The Court of Appeal reversed and remanded. The Court of Appeal agreed with Pacific and held that a C-12 specialty license was not required despite the Prime Contract. The Court of Appeal found that the C-12 specialty license would have been “superfluous” since it was fully encompassed within the Class A requirements. However, the Court of Appeal also remanded the case for further
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Reprinted courtesy of Steve Cvitanovic of Haight Brown & Bonesteel, LLP.
Home Sales Still Low, But Enough to Spur Homebuilders
August 16, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Although new home sales are still fifty percent below the average over the last forty years, the housing rebound has sent stock of homebuilders up 53 percent this year, during the same period, the S&P 500 rose only 12 percent. The San Francisco Chronicle reports that from 2005 through 2011, homebuilder stocks trailed the S&P 500.
The growth isn’t limited to homebuilders alone. Building suppliers are also seeing a growth in sales, with profits for companies that make gypsum wallboard, cabinetry, plumbing products, and other items used in home building.
Homebuilders have also been able to raise prices. Standard Pacific Corp of Irvine, California has raised prices and cut incentives. Nevertheless, the buyers still come. PulteGroup and D.R. Horton are also raising prices.
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Court Orders House to be Demolished or Relocated
April 26, 2011 — April 26, 2011 Beverley BevenFlorez - Construction Defect Journal
Decision Affirmed in Central Arkansas Foundation Homes, LLC v. Rebecca Choate
The Arkansas Court of Appeals affirmed the decision by the trial court in Central Arkansas Foundation Homes, LLC v. Rebecca Choate. In the trial case, Central Arkansas Foundation Homes (CAFH) sought payment for a home built for Choate, while Choate alleged that the builders committed multiple construction defects including using the wrong foundation materials and positioning the house in the wrong direction.
After the house was built, CAFH contacted Choate regarding payment, however, Choate alleged that the finished product did not match the contract. “ After CAFH completed construction, it obtained permanent home financing for Choate and tried to contact her to close the transaction. Choate did not respond until October 2005, when she sent CAFH a list of alleged construction defects, including that the house was facing in the wrong direction; that it was not built on a slab; and that the fireplace, garbage disposal, driveway, and storage area were missing. CAFH replied to Choate in writing, telling her that she had until January 6, 2006, to close on the house or CAFH would sell it. The correspondence enclosed worksheets showing that the amount Choate would owe at closing exceeded $94,000, which included interest that had accrued on the as-yet unpaid construction loan.”
Initially, the court found in favor of CAFH. “On April 18, 2007, Choate’s attorney withdrew from representing her. Soon thereafter, CAFH’s attorney asked the court to set a final hearing on the case. The attorney purportedly sent Choate a letter by regular mail on May 15, 2007, advising her that the case was set for trial on July 9, 2007. Choate, however, did not appear. CAFH did appear, and its general manager, John Oldner, testified to events leading up to the case and the amount of damages claimed. According to Oldner, the interest on the construction loan had accrued to the point that CAFH now sought $104,965.88 from Choate. The court found in favor of CAFH and entered judgment for that amount, plus attorney fees, on July 18, 2007. The court ruled that CAFH could sell the house and either remit any excess to Choate or look to Choate for the deficiency if the sales price did not cover the judgment.”
However, Choate successfully argued that she did not receive notice of the trial. A new trial was ordered, and the outcome was quite different. “On June 6, 2008, the circuit court entered judgment for Choate, ruling that the house was not in substantial compliance with the parties’ contract and that the contract should be rescinded. The court found that the house suffered from numerous construction defects, that the contract contemplated a slab rather than a concrete-pier foundation, and that CAFH ignored Choate’s complaints that the house was facing the wrong way. The judgment directed CAFH to hold Choate harmless on the construction loan, to deed Choate’s two acres back to her, and to remove the house from Choate’s property.”
The Court of Appeals “found that Choate would be unjustly enriched by retaining the benefit of the septic systems and utility lines that CAFH installed on her land. The court therefore awarded $5340 to CAFH as a quantum-meruit recovery for the value of that work. CAFH contends that the award is not sufficient, but we see no clear error.” In the end, the Court of Appeals provided this reason for declining to reverse the trial court’s decision: “The court in this case apparently concluded that the house constructed by CAFH was so fundamentally at odds with Choate’s contractual expectations that she was not unjustly enriched and should simply be, as nearly as possible, returned to the status quo ante. Accordingly, the court ordered the house removed from her property and permitted CAFH to either relocate the house or salvage the house’s materials and unused appliances. We decline to reverse the court’s weighing of the equities in this manner.”
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Dust Infiltration Due to Construction Defect Excluded from Policy
September 9, 2011 — CDJ Staff
A summary judgment was affirmed in the case of Brown v. Farmers Group, by the California Court of Appeals. The Browns bought a new home in Oakley, California. At the time, they signed disclosure statement “acknowledging that the area around their home experienced gusty winds and would be in development for years to come, which might result in dust and airborne mold.”
The Browns found an unusual amount of dust in their home, which became worse when they ran their heating and air conditioning system. Shelia Brown was later diagnosed with chronic valley fever, which was attributed to airborne mold. The Browns contacted Farmers which investigated the house. Although the adjustor from Farmers said the Browns would be covered, Farmers denied the claim.
After the Browns moved out of the house, an inspector found that the HVAC line in the attic was disconnected, sending dust into the home. The Browns brought action against Mid-Century Insurance, which managed the policy, and Farmers. The identified the HVAC defect, window problems, and valley fever as causes, suing for breach of contact, breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and the intentional infliction of emotional distress.
The court rejected all these claims. The policy with Farmers excluded losses due to defective construction. This ruled out the faulty HVAC system and any problems there might have been from the windows. The policy also specifically excluded losses from contamination, fungi, pathogens, and noxious substances. The court further found that the adjustor’s opinion was irrelevant to the question of what the policy actually covered. Finally, the court found no evidence of intentional infliction of emotional stress.
On review, the appeals court upheld the trial court’s conclusions and affirmed the summary judgment.
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No Choice between Homeowner Protection and Bankrupt Developers?
February 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Donna DiMaggio Berger, writing in the Sun Sentinel argues those may be the only current choices in Florida. A recent court case, Lakeview Reserve HOA v. Maronda Homes has caused a swift response from the legislators. Ms. Berger notes that the construction defect bill, HB 1013, “would take away a homeowner’s rights to pursue a developer for defects to the driveways, roads, sidewalks, utilities, drainage areas and other so-called ‘off-site’ improvements.” The alternative? She notes that applying the Maronda decision would “bankrupt developers who don’t build defect-free roads and sidewalks.”
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There is No Non-Delegable Duty on the Part of Residential Builders in Colorado
August 2, 2012 — Brady Iandiorio, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC
Recently, in the Arapahoe District Court, the Honorable Michael Spear, issued an order holding that builders do not owe a non-delegable duty to homeowners. In Marx and Corken v. Alpert Custom Homes, Inc., et al., Judge Spear’s order came in response to plaintiffs’ motion for determination of question of law seeking a finding that the defendants owed a non-delegable duty to the plaintiffs and thus, to strike defendants’ designation of nonparties at fault. After being fully briefed, Judge Spear, found that such a non-delegable duty does not exist.
The case arises from the construction of a single-family residence in Aurora, Colorado. Through the construction and interaction with Alpert Custom Homes, Inc. and Scott and Sally Alpert, the defendants, Paul Marx and Kay Corken, the plaintiffs claimed they suffered various damages and losses, and brought claims for breach of contract-warranty, breach of contract, violation of the Colorado Consumer Protection Act, breaches of the implied covenant of good faith, promissory estoppel, willful breach of contract, and quantum meruit. During litigation, the defendants filed a designation of nonparties at fault, which named several parties which were at fault for the alleged construction defects at issue in the case. The pertinent nonparties named were subcontractors of defendant Alpert Custom Homes, Inc. during the construction of the residence.
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Reprinted courtesy of Brady Iandiorio, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC. Mr. Iandiorio can be contacted at iandiorio@hhmrlaw.com
Renovation Contractors: Be Careful How You Disclose Your Projects
December 9, 2011 — Derek J. Lindenschmidt, Colorado Construction Litigation
In Palu and Beyer v. Toney, 2011 WL 2560249 (Bankr. D. Colo.), the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado determined that a Colorado District Court order granting summary judgment in favor of plaintiff home buyers was binding on the Bankruptcy Court in the defendant contractor’s bankruptcy proceeding based on issue preclusion.
Pertinent to this column is the subject matter of the summary judgment motion: Colorado’s Seller’s Property Disclosure (Form LC-18-5-04). In the underlying state court action, the plaintiff home buyers filed a motion for summary judgment contending that the defendant contractor represented to them, through the Seller’s Property Disclosure, that there were no present or past conditions involving moisture or water problems, roof problems or leaks, skylight problems, or gutter downspout problems.
In granting plaintiffs’ motion, the state court determined that the defendant contractor made these representations on her Seller’s Property Disclosure despite witnessing water leaking from the skylight onto the floor and being aware of repairs to the roof, skylight, and interior drywall prior to the sale of the property.
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Reprinted courtesy of Derek J. Lindenschmidt of Higgins, Hopkins, McClain & Roswell, LLP. Mr. Lindenschmidt can be contacted at lindenschmidt@hhmrlaw.com
No Coverage for Property Damage That is Limited to Work Completed by Subcontractor
April 25, 2012 — Tred Eyerly, Construction Law Hawaii
The issue before the 11th Circuit was whether, under Florida law, a general contractor had coverage for a property damage claim limited to the defective work performed by a subcontractor, and not affecting any other portion of the project. The court found no coverage in Amerisure Mut. Ins. Co. v. Auchter Co., 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 5412 (11th Cir. March 15, 2012).
Amelia Island Company contracted with Auchter Company, a general contractor, for construction of an inn and conference room. Auchter subcontracted with Register Contracting Company to install the Inn’s roof. Pursuant to the Florida Building Code, installation of the roof required that it be able to withstand 110 m.p.h. winds.
Register completed installing the roof tiles in January 1998. Beginning in 2002, the tiles began dislodging from the roof. During the 2004 hurricane season, three hurricanes caused more tiles to come off the roof. Some of these tiles hit other tiles, cracking them.
In 2006, the parties went to arbitration over the costs of repairs for the roof.
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
Parking Garage Collapse May Be Due to Construction Defect
November 7, 2012 — CDJ Staff
A parking garage under construction at the Doral campus of Miami Dade College collapsed on October 9. Experts state that the collapse may have been due to errors in the construction process, either in the fabrication of the pre-cast components or in their assembly. The Bradenton Herald quotes Mark Santos, a structural engineer, who “would look at erection procedures ?Äì that’s probably the one question to ask first.”
During the failure, floors separated from the south wall of the structure. The contractor responsible for the garage, Ajax Building Corp, said there was “no indication of any potential cause.”
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Pennsylvania Court Extends Construction Defect Protections to Subsequent Buyers
December 20, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The Pennsylvania courts have long held that there is an implied warranty of habitability for the initial purchaser of a home. Now, as some defects may not immediately show up, the court has extended that implied warranty to second and subsequent purchasers. As Marc D. Brookman, David I. Haas, and Christopher Bender of Duane Morris note, “this judicially created doctrine shifts the risk of a latent defect in the construction of a new home from the purchaser to the builder-vendor.”
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded that a contractual relationship is not needed for an implied warranty of habitability. The court’s concern was inequalities would result when a home was sold while other homes were protected by being within the statute of repose.
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Pier Fire Started by Welders
August 2, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Welders working on Pier 29 in San Francisco were preparing the building for the America’s Cup sailing race. Instead, they accidentally caused $2.4 million in damages. Mindy Talmadge, a fire department spokesperson, attributed the fire to crews welding a latter to a wall. According to Talmadge, a spark entered a crack in the concrete wall and “the wood on the building underneath was really dry.” It took firefighters more than two hours to extinguish the blaze.
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Nevada Supreme Court Reverses Decision against Grader in Drainage Case
June 30, 2011 — CDJ Staff
The Nevada Supreme Court has issued an opinion in the case of Rayburn Lawn & Landscape Designers v. Plaster Development Corporation, reversing the decision of the lower court and remanding the case for a new trial.
The case originated in a construction defect suit in which Plaster Development Corporation was sued by homeowners. Plaster filed a third-party complaint against its subcontractor, Reyburn. The testimony of Reyburn’s owner was considered to be admission of liability and so the court limited the scope of Reyburn’s closing argument and did not allow the jury to determine the extent of Reyburn’s liability. Reyburn appealed.
Plaster, in their case, cited California’s Crawford v. Weather Sheild MFG, Inc. The court held the application of these standards, but noted that the “an indemnitor’s duty to defend an indemnitee is limited to those claims directly attributed to the indemnitor’s scope of work and does not include defending against claims arising from the negligence of other subcontractors and the indemnittee’s own negligence.”
On the matter of law against Reyburn, the court concluded, “Given the conflicting evidence at trial as to whether Reyburn’s work was implicated in the defective retaining walls and sidewalls, and viewing the evidence and inferences in Reyburn’s favor, we conclude that a reasonable jury could have granted relief in favor of Reyburn.” The Nevada Supreme Court conduced that the district court should not have granted Plaster’s motion for judgement.
Further, the Nevada Supreme Court found that the district court should have apportioned the fees and costs to those claims directly attributed to Reyburn’s scope of work, “if any,” and should not have assigned all attorney costs and court fees to Reyburn.
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Insurance Company Must Show that Lead Came from Building Materials
August 17, 2011 — CDJ Staff
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals for Louisiana has reversed the summary judgment of a lower court in the case of Widder v. Louisiana Citizens Property Insurance Company. Judge Roland L. Belsome wrote the opinion for the panel of three judges. Ms. Widder discovered that her home and its content were contaminated by lead. She applied to her insurer, Louisiana Citizens Property Insurance, which denied her claim.
In response to Ms. Widder’s suit, LCPIC applied for a summary judgment on the grounds that there was no physical loss and that the policy did not cover defective material, latents defects, and pollution damage.
The appeals court found that the lead contamination of Widder’s home did meet the standards of a direct physical loss, citing a recent Chinese Drywall case. There, it was found, “when a home has been rendered unusable or uninhabitable, physical damage is not necessary.”
The lower court addressed only one of LCPIC’s exclusions, addressing only the exclusion on basis of “faulty, inadequate or defective material.” The appeals court noted that the evidence offered at trial does not show that the building materials were the source of the lead. This provided the appeals court with a matter of fact to remand to the lower court.
Read the court’s decision…