Residential Construction Down in San Diego
September 13, 2012 — CDJ Staff
While new home construction is on the rise in some parts of the country, San Diego has seen a fall, comparing the first seven months of 2012 with the first seven months of 2011, dropping nine percent, according to an article in the San Diego Business Journal. The news isn’t all bad, since although July residential construction dropped sharply, nonresidential construction increased thirty-six percent.
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Homebuilders Go Green in Response to Homebuyer Demand
May 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
McGrawHill Construction reports that 17 percent of new homes and remodels in 2011 were done with green building practices. Their report estimates that by 2016, this will rise to 29 to 38 percent of the market for home construction and remodeling.
Consumers see the green buildings as more desirable, particularly where they are more energy efficient. Two thirds of builders noted their customers were interested in features that would lower the energy use of their homes. Consumers also feel that green building materials are more durable and see green homes as higher quality.
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“Details Matter” is the Foundation in a Texas Construction Defect Suit
March 1, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The Court of Appeals of Texas has ruled in the case of Barzoukas v. Foundation Design. Mr. Barzoukas contracted with Heights Development to build a house. He subsequently sued Heights Developments and “numerous other defendants who participated in the construction of his house.” Barzoukas eventually settled with all but two defendants, one who went bankrupt and Foundation Design, the defendant in this case. In the earlier phase, Barzoukas made claims of “negligence, negligent misrepresentation, fraud, fraudulent inducement, conspiracy, and exemplary damages in connection with the foundation.”
Foundation Design had been hired to install 15-foot piers to support the foundation. The engineer of record, Larry Smith, sent a letter to Heights Development noting that they had encountered hard clay stone when drilling. Smith changed the specifications to 12-foot piers. Initially, the City of Houston called a halt to work on the home when an inspector concluded that the piers were too shallow. Heights Development later convinced the city to allow work to continue. Subsequently, experts concluded that the piers were too shallow.
Foundation Design filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted this, “without specifying the basis for its ruling.” Barzoukas contends the court was in error. Foundation Design contends that “Barzoukas failed to proffer competent evidence establishing that their conduct proximately caused damages.” Further, they did not feel that Smith’s letter gave “rise to viable claims for fraud and fraudulent inducement.”
One problem the court had was a lack of evidence. The court noted that “the purported subcontract is entirely missing” in the pleadings. The court has no contract between Bazourkas and Heights Development, nor one between Heights Development and either Foundation Design or Smith. The court underscored the importance of this, writing, “details matter.” They found that “the details are largely missing here.” Without the contract, the court found it impossible to determine if “Smith or an entity related to him agreed to indemnify Heights Development for damages arising from Smith’s negligent performance.”
As the material facts are in dispute, the appeals court found that there were no grounds for a summary judgment in the case. “Pointing to the existence of a contract between Heights Development and Barzoukas, or to the existence of a subcontract, is the beginning of the analysis ? not the end.”
Foundation Design and Smith also claimed that Barzoukas’s expert did not proffer competent evidence and that the expert’s opinions were conclusory. The trial court did not rule on these claims and the appeals court has rejected them.
Finally, Barzoukas made a claim that the trial court should not have rejected his argument of fraud and fraudulent inducement. Here, however, the appeals court upheld the decision of the lower court. “Barzoukas did not present evidence supporting an inference that Smith or Foundation Design made a purposeful misrepresentation.
The court remanded the case to the trial court for reconsideration. One member of the panel, Judge Charles Seymore, upheld the entire decision of the trial court. He dissented with the majority, finding that the economic loss rule foreclosed the claim of negligence.
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Death of Construction Defect Lawyer Ruled a Suicide
June 19, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The Clark County Coroner’s Office has concluded that Nancy Quon, the construction defect attorney implicated in the wide-ranging HOA scandal, died by her own hand. The cause of death was a combination of anti-anxiety and insomnia medication mixed with alcohol. Quon survived an earlier incident in which she took GHB and her apartment was set on fire. Quon denied that it was a suicide attempt.
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Damron Agreement Questioned in Colorado Casualty Insurance v Safety Control Company, et al.
February 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Safety Control and EMC appealed the judgment in Colorado Casualty Insurance Company versus Safety Control Company, Inc., et al. (Ariz. App., 2012). The Superior Court in Maricopa County addressed “the validity and effect of a Damron agreement a contractor and its excess insurer entered into that assigned their rights to sue the primary insurer.” Judge Johnsen stated, “We hold the agreement is enforceable but remand for a determination of whether the stipulated judgment falls within the primary insurer’s policy.”
The Opinion provides some facts and procedural history regarding the claim. “The Arizona Department of Transportation (“ADOT”) hired DBA Construction Company (“DBA”) to perform a road-improvement project on the Loop 101 freeway. Safety Control Company, Inc. was one of DBA’s subcontractors. As required by the subcontract, Safety Control purchased from Employer’s Mutual Casualty Company (“EMC”) a certificate of insurance identifying DBA as an additional insured on a policy providing primary coverage for liability arising out of Safety Control’s work.”
A collision occurred on site, injuring Hugo Roman. Roman then sued ADT and DBA for damages. “Colorado Casualty tendered DBA’s defense to the subcontractors, including Safety Control. Safety Control and EMC rejected the tender. Roman eventually settled his claims against DBA and ADOT. DBA and ADOT stipulated with Roman for entry of judgment of $750,000; Roman received $75,000 from DBA (paid by Colorado Casualty) and $20,000 from ADOT, and agreed not to execute on the stipulated judgment. Finally, DBA, ADOT and Colorado Casualty assigned to Roman their rights against the subcontractors and other insurers.”
Colorado Casualty attempted to recover what “it had paid to defend DBA and ADOT and settle with Roman. However, Roman intervened, and argued that “Colorado Casualty had assigned its subrogation rights to him as part of the settlement agreement.” The suit was not dismissed, but the Superior Court allowed Roman to intervene. “Roman then filed a counterclaim against Colorado Casualty and a cross-claim against the subcontractors.”
All claims were settled against all of the defendants except Safety Control and EMC. “The superior court ruled on summary judgment that EMC breached a duty to defend DBA and that as a result, ‘DBA was entitled to settle with Roman without EMC’s consent as long as the settlement was not collusive or fraudulent.’ After more briefing, the court held the stipulated judgment was neither collusive nor procured by fraud and that EMC therefore was liable to Roman on the stipulated judgment and for his attorney’s fees. The court also held Safety Control breached its subcontract with DBA by failing to procure completed-operations insurance coverage and would be liable for damages to the extent that EMC did not satisfy what remained (after the other settlements) of the stipulated judgment and awards of attorney’s fees.” Safety Control and EMC appealed the judgment.
Four reasons were given for the decision of the ruling. First, “the disagreement between Roman and Colorado Casualty does not preclude them from pursuing their claims against EMC and Safety Control.” Second, “the settlement agreement is not otherwise invalid.” Third, “issues of fact remain about whether the judgment falls within the EMC policy.” Finally, “Safety Control breached the subcontract by failing to procure ‘Completed Operations’ coverage for DBA.”
In conclusion, the Superior Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded . “Although, as stated above, we have affirmed several rulings of the superior court, we reverse the judgment against EMC and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion to determine whether the stipulated judgment was a liability that arose out of Safety Control’s operations. In addition, we affirm the superior court’s declaratory judgment against Safety Control but remand so that the court may clarify the circumstances under which Safety Control may be liable for damages and may conduct whatever further proceedings it deems appropriate to ascertain the amount of those damages. We decline all parties’ requests for attorney’s fees pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-341.01 without prejudice to a request for fees incurred in this appeal to be filed by the prevailing party on remand before the superior court.”
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Arbitration Clause Not Binding on Association in Construction Defect Claim
June 19, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Determining that a community’s CC&Rs do not form an agreement to arbitrate, the California Court of Appeals has reversed the decision of the Superior Court inVerano Condo. Homeowners the Ass’n v. La Cima Dev., LLC (Cal. App., 2012). La Cima purchased an apartment complex in December 2004, which they converted into condominiums. In the process, La Cima created the CC&Rs, under which the Verano Condominium Homeowners Association came into being. One section of the CC&Rs included arbitration clauses. Additionally, the purchase agreements for individual condominium units also contained arbitration clauses. Subsequently, the owners became aware of construction defect both in units and in the common areas. The Association sued La Cima both in its own interest and on behalf of its members. La Cima moved to compel arbitration, which was denied by the trial court. La Cima appealed.
The court concluded that “CC&Rs are insufficient to form an agreement to arbitrate between La Cima and the Association.” The court noted that “no evidence exists to show the Association consented to the terms of the CC&Rs, either explicitly or implicitly.”
The court agreed with La Cima that the arbitration agreement applied to those owners who had purchased their units directly from La Cima. Moreover, as the conversion to condominiums involved interstate commerce, in part because a Delaware company was selling condominiums located in California, the court held that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) applied, and as such “even a state constitutional standard, such as the the jury waiver provision requirements of the California Constitution, cannot be used to circumvent the FAA in the face of an otherwise valid arbitration agreement.”
However, the court also held that there was “no agreement in the CC&Rs between La Cima and owners who did not purchase units directly from La Cima,” adding that “no meeting of the minds between La Cima and these later purchasers and their successors occurred.” The court did not believe that “the Legislature intended that CC&Rs would be used to provide continuing and irrevocable contractual development or role as a representative of the owners of the development.”
The purpose of the CC&Rs, according to the court are to “protect owners from one another and permit enforcement of its terms by the Association.” The court stated that “La Cima relinquished its interests in the land by selling its property and may not assert any rights under the CC&Rs following the transfer of its ownership interest.
In its conclusion, the court determined that claims must be organized in three classes. The claims the association made against La Cima for defects in the common area “are not subject to any valid agreement to arbitrate.” The second category are those owners who did not purchase their units directly from La Cima. Here, also, the court found that the units “are similarly not subject to a valid arbitration agreement.”
The third category, however, was “owners who purchased units directly from La Cima.” The court held that these arbitration agreements were valid, and if the claims were to be taken up by the association, the association could only submit these claims to arbitration. The lower court was instructed to separate these claims, as here La Cima’s motion could be granted.
Read the court’s decision…
Washington Court of Appeals Upholds Standard of Repose in Fruit Warehouse Case
August 4, 2011 — CDJ Staff
On July 28, the Washington Court of Appeals ruled in Clasen Fruit & Cold Storage v. Frederick & Michael Construction Co., Inc. that more than six years had passed since a contractor had concluded work and so granted a summary dismissal of the suit.
Frederick & Michael Construction Co., Inc. (F&M) was contracted to construct several buildings for Clasen Fruit and Cold Storage. These were completed in March, 1999. The buildings suffered wind damage to the roofs in 2001, 2003, 2005, and 2006. In the first two incidents, F&M repaired the roofs with Clasen paying for repairs.
In 2005, Clasen hired Continuous Gutter to make repairs. The final incident was the collapse of the roof of one building. This was attributed to “excessive moisture in the roof’s vapor barriers.” At this point, Clasen demanded that F&M pay for repair and replacement costs. In 2008, Clasen sued F&M for damages for breach of contract and negligent design and construction of the roof.
The decision then covered the meanings, in Washington law, of “termination of services” and “substantial completion.” The panel concluded that construction was “substantially completed in 1997” and “relevant services” by 2001. “But Clasen did not sue until 2008, some seven years after termination of any roof related services.”
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Orange County Home Builder Dead at 93
April 25, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Randall E. Presley was a homebuilder in Southern California for more than thirty years, acting as head of Presley Development Company from 1956 until selling the firm to Lyon Homes in 1987. The two companies merged in 1991 as the Presley Cos. Mr. Presley saw the need in the 1950s to provide people in Southern California with low- to medium-priced quality homes.
His firm built more than 160 communities and was among the ten largest homebuilding firms in the country, expanding beyond California. Mr. Presley was 93 when he succumbed to pneumonia. He is survived by a wife, three children, seven grandchildren, and 11 great-grandchildren.
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Arizona Contractor Designs Water-Repellant Cabinets
September 9, 2011 — CDJ Staff
Dubbing his product “Baltic Duck,” a Mesa, Arizona building contractor is offering household cabinets made with specially treated water-repellent plywood instead of the usual particle board. Pete Celano calls his product Baltic Duck because the plywood is made in the Baltic region of Eastern Europe. To further protect the cabinets from moisture, a silicone-based sealant is applied to the corners and edges.
Celano’s cabinets use standard decorative fronts. The design of the cabinets allows spilled liquids to drain away without encountering the decorative wood.
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Insurance Company Must Show that Lead Came from Building Materials
August 17, 2011 — CDJ Staff
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals for Louisiana has reversed the summary judgment of a lower court in the case of Widder v. Louisiana Citizens Property Insurance Company. Judge Roland L. Belsome wrote the opinion for the panel of three judges. Ms. Widder discovered that her home and its content were contaminated by lead. She applied to her insurer, Louisiana Citizens Property Insurance, which denied her claim.
In response to Ms. Widder’s suit, LCPIC applied for a summary judgment on the grounds that there was no physical loss and that the policy did not cover defective material, latents defects, and pollution damage.
The appeals court found that the lead contamination of Widder’s home did meet the standards of a direct physical loss, citing a recent Chinese Drywall case. There, it was found, “when a home has been rendered unusable or uninhabitable, physical damage is not necessary.”
The lower court addressed only one of LCPIC’s exclusions, addressing only the exclusion on basis of “faulty, inadequate or defective material.” The appeals court noted that the evidence offered at trial does not show that the building materials were the source of the lead. This provided the appeals court with a matter of fact to remand to the lower court.
Read the court’s decision…
Town Files Construction Lawsuit over Dust
August 16, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Washington Township in Ohio has filed a lawsuit against Underground Utilities for their handling of construction fill on a road project. The City of Mansfield had hired the firm to improve road safety. The lawsuit is over the company’s actions in processing soil for fill, which they are doing on three vacant lots that are zoned for residential use. Washington Township Trustee Jack Butler told the Mansfield Journal that “what brought the lawsuit to a head was the fact that the contractor did not control the dust.” Subsequent receiving notices of zoning violations, the company began to move its operation to another site.
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Driver’s Death May Be Due to Construction Defect
August 16, 2012 — CDJ Staff
A man driving a rental truck collided with a parking ramp at the Mall of America in Bloomington, Minnesota, leading to his death when the ramp broke and crushed the cab of the truck. One expert said that the ramp should have been built to withstand the impact. Tim Galarnyk told Fox News that the building feature didn’t’ even bear weight, describing it as “a cosmetic facial panel.” Nevertheless, in a contest with a truck he said the ramp portion should “peel it like a tin can before it takes the concrete element down.”
The Mall of American is not commenting on the accident.
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No Choice between Homeowner Protection and Bankrupt Developers?
February 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Donna DiMaggio Berger, writing in the Sun Sentinel argues those may be the only current choices in Florida. A recent court case, Lakeview Reserve HOA v. Maronda Homes has caused a swift response from the legislators. Ms. Berger notes that the construction defect bill, HB 1013, “would take away a homeowner’s rights to pursue a developer for defects to the driveways, roads, sidewalks, utilities, drainage areas and other so-called ‘off-site’ improvements.” The alternative? She notes that applying the Maronda decision would “bankrupt developers who don’t build defect-free roads and sidewalks.”
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When Does a Claim Against an Insurance Carrier for Failing to Defend Accrue?
November 7, 2012 — David McLain, Colorado Construction Litigation
The following is an update on our December 20, 2010 article regarding United States Fire Insurance Company v. Pinkard Construction Company, Civil Action No. 09-CV-01854-MSK-MJW, and its underlying dispute, Legacy Apartments v. Pinkard Construction Company, Case No. 2003 CV 703, Boulder County Dist. Ct. That article can be found here.
The present action, St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Co., et al. v. The North River Insurance Co., et al., Civil Action No. 10-CV-02936-MSK-CBS, encompasses the coverage battle that ensued between Pinkard’s insurers, Travelers Indemnity Company of America (“Travelers”) and United States Fire Insurance Company (“USFI”), following the settlement of Legacy’s construction defect claims against Pinkard. A short history of the underlying facts is as follows:
In 1995, Pinkard constructed the Legacy Apartments housing complex in Longmont, Colorado. Following construction, Legacy notified Pinkard of water leaks associated with various elements of construction. Legacy ultimately filed suit against Pinkard in 2003, and would go on to clarify and amend its defect claims in 2004, 2006, and again in 2008. Following Pinkard’s notification of Legacy’s claims, USFI provided a defense to Pinkard, but Travelers refused to do so, on the purported basis that Legacy’s allegations did not implicate property damage under the terms of Travelers’ policy.
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Reprinted courtesy of David M. McLain, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC. Mr. McLain can be contacted at mclain@hhmrlaw.com
Repair of Part May Necessitate Replacement of Whole
February 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Judge Gleuda E. Edmonds, a magistrate judge in the United States District Court of Arizona issued a ruling in Guadiana v. State Farm on January 25, 2012. Judge Edmonds recommended a partial summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff.
Ms. Guandiana’s home had water damage due to pluming leaks in September 2004. She was informed that polybutylene pluming in her house could not be repaired in parts “it must be completely replaced.” She had had the plumbing replaced. State Farm denied her claim, arguing that “the tear-out provision did not cover the cost of accessing and replacing those pipes that were not leaking.”
In September 2007, State Farm filed a motion to dismiss. The court rejected this motion, stating that “If Guadiana can establish as a matter of fact that the system that caused the covered loss included all the pipes in her house and it was necessary to replace all the pipes to repair that system, State Farm is obligated to pay the tear-out costs necessary to replace all the pipes, even those not leaking.”
In March 2009, State Farm filed for summary judgment, which the court granted. State Farm argued that “the tear-out provision only applied to ‘repair’ and not ‘replace’ the system that caused the covered leak.” As for the rest of the piping, State Farm argued that “the policy does not cover defective materials.”
In December 2011, Ms. Guadiana filed for summary judgment, asking the court to determine that “the policy ‘covers tear-out costs necessary to adequately repair the plumbing system, even if an adequate repair requires replacing all or part of the system.”
In her ruling, Judge Edmonds noted that Ms. Guadiana’s claim is that “the water damage is a covered loss and she is entitled to tear-out costs necessary to repair the pluming system that caused that covered loss.” She rejected State Farm’s claim that it was not obligated to replace presumably defective pipes. Further, she rejected State Farm’s argument that they were only responsible for the leaking portion, noting “Guadiana intends to prove at trial that this is an unusual case where repair of her plumbing system requires replacement of all the PB plumbing.”
Judge Edmonds concluded by directing the District Court to interpret the tear out issue as “the tear-out provision in State Farm’s policy requires State Farm to pay all tear-out costs necessary to repair the plumbing system (that caused the covered loss) even if repair of the system requires accessing more than the leaking portion of the system.”
Read the court’s decision…
Local Government Waives Construction Fees to Spur Jobs
June 19, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Warren Township in New Jersey has waived building and electrical permit fees, up to $5,000, for businesses that create at least five new jobs. The fee reductions are available for construction in areas zones under various designations. Buildings that have received a zoning variance are not eligible. The Echoes-Sentinel notes that other towns in Somerset County, New Jersey have adopted similar ordinances.
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Yellow Brass Fittings Play a Crucial Role in Baker v Castle & Cooke Homes
May 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Baker v Castle & Cooke Homes Hawaii, et al. is a “class action filed by homeowners who allege that their homes have a construction defect. They allege that their plumbing systems include brass fittings susceptible to corrosion and likely to cause leaks. They bring this action against the developer of their homes and the manufacturers of the brass fittings.”
Zurn, the manufacturer of the allegedly defective brass fittings, sought a dismissal, or if that could not be achieved, then “a more definite statement, of five of the six claims.” Zurn moved for summary judgment on the sixth claim, or alternately sought “summary judgment on one of the five claims it” sought to dismiss.” The court granted in part the motion, and denied the motion for summary judgment.
The developer, Castle & Cooke, sought dismissal of the First Amended Complaint stating “that Plaintiffs have not complied with Hawaii’s Contractor Repair Act, chapter 672E of Hawaii Revised Statutes, which requires, among other things, a plaintiff to give a contractor the results of any testing done before filing an action against that contractor.” The court couldn’t determine “certain facts essential to ruling” on Castle & Cooke’s motion, and therefore denied the motion, but ordered Plaintiffs to submit requested material by the stated deadline.
The Baker v Castle & Cooke case began with the Plaintiffs claim that the use of yellow brass fittings can lead to construction defects. They allege that “yellow brass is particularly susceptible to dezincification, a corrosion process in which zinc leaches into potable water that comes into contact with the brass. According to Plaintiffs, as the brass corrodes, it becomes porous and mechanically weak. Plaintiffs further allege that the PEX systems in the putative class members’ homes have begun to, or are about to, leak water into the walls, ceilings, and floors of their homes. Plaintiffs allege that the leakage will cause water damage and mold growth, exposing the occupants to toxins.”
In response to the plaintiffs’ claims, Zurn argued “because their yellow brass fittings have not failed to date, Plaintiffs fail to allege, and have no evidence showing, that they have suffered any actual injury.” Plaintiffs replied, “even if the fittings have not failed as of today, failure in the future is inevitable.”
However, the court stated, “whether Plaintiffs have suffered any injury, or whether Plaintiffs are attempting to proceed based solely on future injury, implicates Plaintiffs’ standing to bring this action, as well as whether this case is ripe for adjudication.” The court has requested the parties to submit “supplemental briefing on whether this case should be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1). In supplemental briefs, Zurn argues that dismissal is appropriate because Plaintiffs lack standing, and Castle & Cooke argues that dismissal is appropriate because Plaintiffs’ claims are not ripe.”
The court continues to discuss the problem of standing: “To establish standing, a plaintiff must demonstrate three things. First, the plaintiff must suffer an "injury-in-fact," which means that there must be a concrete and particularized "invasion of a legally protected interest" and the invasion is actual or imminent. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). Second, the injury must be fairly traceable to the challenged action. Third, a favorable decision must be likely to redress the injury. Id. It is the first element (injury-in-fact) that is in issue here.”
The court found that the plaintiffs do have standing: “Even if the court could not rely on the allegations that the pipes will soon leak, the court would conclude that, for standing purposes, Plaintiffs have a sufficient injury-in-fact in the form of their alleged economic loss.” In a hearing, Plaintiffs argued that their homes had decreased in value.
The court also denied Castle & Cooke’s motion to dismiss based on a lack of ripeness, stating “the same reasons Plaintiffs satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement for standing purposes, they satisfy the constitutional ripeness requirement.”
Plaintiffs asserted six counts against Zurn. Zurn, in response, made a motion to dismiss counts VIII, IX, X, XII, and XIII. The court granted Zurn’s motion for Counts VIII, IX, and X only: “Counts VIII (product liability), IX (negligence), and X (strict liability) sound in tort. Zurn argues that, because Plaintiffs allege no injury other than to the PEX systems and the yellow brass fittings themselves, the economic loss rule bars their tort claims. The court agrees.”
The court disagreed with Zurn’s motion regarding Count XII: “Count XII asserts that Zurn has breached the implied warranty of merchantability. Zurn argues that Count XII is barred by the applicable statute of limitations and that Plaintiffs do not sufficiently allege an injury. The court disagrees.”
Zurn’s motion regarding Count XIII was also denied: “Count XIII asserts that Zurn violated section 480-2 of Hawaii Revised Statutes.” Furthermore, “Plaintiffs allege that Zurn ‘engaged in unfair and deceptive acts or practices when [it] designed, manufactured and sold Yellow Brass Fittings.’ Zurn argues that Plaintiffs fail to state a claim under section 480-2(a) because their claims are barred by the statute of limitations and they do not adequately allege reliance or a cognizable injury. The court disagrees.”
The court denied the motion for summary judgment with respect to Counts XI and XII.
Castle & Cooke sought to dismiss “Plaintiffs’ claims against it under section 672E-2 of Hawaii Revised Statutes, which provides for dismissal when claimants fail to comply with chapter 672E.” There was some discussion regarding the test results. Apparently, the plaintiffs had failed to provide a written notice of claim at least 90 days before filing the action. However, it is unclear if the Plaintiffs have since complied with the requirements of the chapter. “The court has received no supplemental information from either party about whether any test results from another case have been turned over or whether those materials are subject to a confidentiality agreement. The record at this point does not establish noncompliance with the requirement in chapter 672E to provide such information. The court therefore denies the motion to dismiss.”
In summary, “Zurn’s motion to dismiss is granted as to Count VIII, Count IX, and Count X. Zurn’s motion to dismiss is denied with respect to Plaintiffs’ other claims. Zurn’s request for a more definite statement and its summary judgment motion are denied. Plaintiffs are given leave to file an amended Complaint no later than May 21, 2012.” Furthermore, “the court denies Castle & Cooke’s motion, but directs Plaintiffs to file, within two weeks, either a certificate of compliance with section 672E-3(c), or an explanation as to why they have not complied. Castle & Cooke may submit a response within two weeks of Plaintiffs’ submission. Each party’s submission is limited to 1000 words.”
Read the court’s decision…
Bound by Group Builders, Federal District Court Finds No Occurrence
August 11, 2011 — Tred Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
The homeowners sued their contractor, alleging the contractor had defectively constructed and failed to complete their home.  State Farm Fire and Casualty Co. v. Vogelgesang, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72618 (D. Haw. July 6, 2011). The homeowners' complaint pled, among other things, damage caused by breach of contract and negligence. State Farm agreed to defend under a reservation of rights.
State Farm filed suit in federal court for declaratory relief. Judge Mollway granted State Farm's motion for summary judgment. Relying on the Hawaii Intermediate Court of Appeal's decision in Group Builders, Inc. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 123 Haw. 142, 231 P.3d 67 (Haw. Ct. App. 2010), Judge Mollway determined that the claims asserted in the underlying litigation arose from the contractor's alleged breach of contract.  Group Builders held that breach of contract claims based on allegations of shoddy performance were not covered under CGL policies.
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com