When Does a Claim Against an Insurance Carrier for Failing to Defend Accrue?
November 7, 2012 — David McLain, Colorado Construction Litigation
The following is an update on our December 20, 2010 article regarding United States Fire Insurance Company v. Pinkard Construction Company, Civil Action No. 09-CV-01854-MSK-MJW, and its underlying dispute, Legacy Apartments v. Pinkard Construction Company, Case No. 2003 CV 703, Boulder County Dist. Ct. That article can be found here.
The present action, St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Co., et al. v. The North River Insurance Co., et al., Civil Action No. 10-CV-02936-MSK-CBS, encompasses the coverage battle that ensued between Pinkard’s insurers, Travelers Indemnity Company of America (“Travelers”) and United States Fire Insurance Company (“USFI”), following the settlement of Legacy’s construction defect claims against Pinkard. A short history of the underlying facts is as follows:
In 1995, Pinkard constructed the Legacy Apartments housing complex in Longmont, Colorado. Following construction, Legacy notified Pinkard of water leaks associated with various elements of construction. Legacy ultimately filed suit against Pinkard in 2003, and would go on to clarify and amend its defect claims in 2004, 2006, and again in 2008. Following Pinkard’s notification of Legacy’s claims, USFI provided a defense to Pinkard, but Travelers refused to do so, on the purported basis that Legacy’s allegations did not implicate property damage under the terms of Travelers’ policy.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of David M. McLain, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC. Mr. McLain can be contacted at mclain@hhmrlaw.com
Court Requires Adherence to “Good Faith and Fair Dealing” in Construction Defect Coverage
September 30, 2011 — CDJ Staff
The California Court of Appeals has ruled in the case of Allied Framers, Inc. v. Golden Bear Insurance Company. Allied had been sued in a construction defect case and its primary insurer had become insolvent. Coverage for Allied’s defense was paid for by the California Insurance Guarantee Association through June 8, 2006. When warned that CIGA’s involvement was ending, Allied notified Golden Bear, which declined to provide coverage.
In the matters that followed, Golden Bear claimed that Allied had not exhausted its $1 million in primary insurance. Allied then showed that $1 million had already been paid out in the case. A few months thereafter, Golden Bear offered a $500,000 settlement on behalf of Allied which was rejected. Thereafter, Golden Bear hired new counsel to defend Allied. Golden Bear received, but allegedly did not pay, invoices Allied sent from their former counsel. Golden Bear finally settled the construction defect case for $2 million.
Allied’s original counsel sued Allied for payment. Golden Bear declined coverage. Allied then claimed that Golden Bear liable on several counts, arising from its failure to settle the construction defect action earlier than it did and its failure to pay Allied’s counsel. Golden Bear demurred, arguing that Allied had now exhausted is coverage with the $2 million settlement. The lower court sustained Golden Bear’s demurrer, dismissing Allied’s complaints.
The appeal court reviewed Allied’s seven complaints and sustained most of them. However, the court did reverse the trial court’s order in regard to Allied’s complaint that Golden Bear breached an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The appeals court was not convinced that Golden Bear properly evaluated the settlement demand in the underlying construction defect case. The court found three other ways in which Golden Bear’s actions might show bad faith, in refusing to pay defense fees “after promising [Allied] such costs would be paid in full,” “failing to advise Allied about ‘actual or potential negative consequences of agreeing to the proposed settlement,’” and that their choice of counsel “failed to protect [Allied’s] interests in the negotiation.”
Read the court’s decision…
Granting Stay, Federal Court Reviews Construction Defect Coverage in Hawaii
January 6, 2012 — Tred Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
The federal district court ultimately stayed a construction defect case, but offered comments on the current status of coverage disputes for such defects in Hawaii. See National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa. v. Simpson Mfg. Co., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128481(D. Haw. Nov. 7, 2011).
National Union filed a complaint for declaratory relief to establish it had no duty to defend or to indemnify Simpson Manufacturing Company in four actions pending in the Hawaii state courts. The state court actions concerned allegedly defective hurricane strap tie hold downs that were manufactured and sold by Simpson. The hurricane ties allegedly began to prematurely corrode and rust, causing cracking, spalling and other damage to homes.
National Union contended the underlying allegations did not constitute "property damage" caused by an "occurrence," as defined in the policies.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
Boyfriend Pleads Guilty in Las Vegas Construction Defect Scam Suicide
November 7, 2012 — CDJ Staff
One of the odder twists of the Las Vegas construction defect scandal was the charge that Nancy Quon’s boyfriend helped her in an initial suicide attempt. Quon, implicated by not charged in the case of taking control of homeowner boards in order to profit from construction defect settlements. William Webb was alleged to have bought the drug GBH in order to allow Quon, his girlfriend, to commit suicide. Ms. Quon later overdosed on a combination of alcohol and prescription drugs.
In addition to pleading guilty to the drug charges, Webb also made a plea bargain with prosecutors in which he did not admit guilt in an insurance fraud charge, but acknowledged that prosecutors would likely be successful at obtaining a conviction. Webb will be sentenced February 7 and is expected to receive a sentence of six years imprisonment.
Read the full story…
South Carolina Legislature Defines "Occurrence" To Include Property Damage Arising From Faulty Workmanship
May 26, 2011 — Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
On May 17, 2011, South Carolina passed legislation to combat the restrictive interpretation of what constitutes an "occurrence" under CGL policies. S.C. Code Ann. sec. 38-61-70.
The legislation reversed a decision by the state's Supreme Court issued earlier this year. See Crossman Communities of North Carolina, Inc. v. Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co., 2011 W.L. 93716 (S.C. Jan. 7, 2011). Crossman had overruled an earlier decision by the South Carolina Supreme Court that holding that defective construction was an “occurrence.” Crossman, however, reversed course, holding that damages resulting from faulty workmanship were the “natural and probable cause” of the faulty work and, as such, did not qualify as an “occurrence.”
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
Exact Dates Not Needed for Construction Defect Insurance Claim
March 1, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The Texas Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court in Vines-Herrin Custom Homes v Great American Lloyds Insurance Company on December 21, 2011. Vines-Herrin Custom Homes built a single-family home in Plano, Texas in 1999. They obtained a commercial general liability policy from Great American, later purchasing coverage from Mid-Continent, which the decision describes as “a sister company of Great American.”
While the home was under construction, Emil G. Cerullo sought to purchase it. At the time, it was under contract to another buyer. Two months later, Vines-Herrin told Cerullo that the deal had “fell through.” Cerullo bought the house with modifications from the original plan. Upon moving in, Cerullo began having water intrusion and other problems. “Cerullo noticed water gathering on window sills and damage to the sheetrock and baseboard.” Additional problems followed, including cracks, leaks, “and in early 2002, the ceiling and roof began to sag.”
Cerullo sued Vines-Herrin, claiming negligent construction. Vines-Herrin filed a claim seeking defense and indemnification under the insurance policies. Coverage was denied and Vines-Herrin filed suit to require coverage and also bringing claims for “breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, breach of contract, and DTPA and insurance code violations.”
In May, 2006 Vines-Herrin stated that it had no more defense funds and went into arbitration with Cerullo. The underlying construction defect action was settled for about $2.5 million. As part of the settlement, “Cerullo became the rightful owner of all remaining claims, rights, and causes of action against” Vines-Herrin’s insurers. He then joined the coverage lawsuit.
The non-jury trial was held under the controlling law of the time which “imposed a duty to defend only if the property damage manifested or became apparent during the policy period.” The court concluded in Cerullo’s favor. During the post-judgment motions, the Texas Supreme Court rejected the manifestation rule. Under this ruling, the trial court set aside its judgment and found in favor of the insurance companies. The trial court noted that although “the Residence was covered by an uninterrupted period of insurance (which began before the Residence was constructed) and that the damages to the Residence manifested during the uninterrupted period of insurance coverage,” “Mr. Cerullo failed to allege the date when actual physical damage to the property occurred.”
The first claim by Cerullo and Vines-Herrin was that the “Final Judgment” occurred in October 2004, and that all proceedings thereafter were void. The court rejected this as the “final judgment” is not “final for the purposes of an appeal unless it actually disposes of every pending claim and party or unless it clearly and unequivocally states that it finally disposes of all claims and all parties.” Despite the use of the word “final,” the trial court’s decision did not do this.
The second issue was the application of the Texas Supreme Court case Don’s Building Supply Inc. v. OneBeacon Insurance. In this case, framing rot due to defective stucco was not discovered until after the end of the policy period. The Supreme Court noted that “the key date is when injury happens, not when someone happens on it.”
The appeals court found that the trial court misapplied the Don’s Building Supply decision. Rather than an exact date, “so long as that damage occurred within the policy period, coverage was provided.” The appeals court noted that “Cerullo alleged the house was constructed in 1999 and he purchased it in May 2000.” “By April of 2001, Cerullo noticed that the windowsills in the study were showing signs of leakage and water damage.” As the court put it, “the petitions then alleged a litany of defects.”
The court noted that coverage by Great American was in effect from November 9, 1999 to November 9, 2000. In May of 2000, the house suffered “substantial flooding from a rainstorm that caused damage.” This was during the policy period. “As a matter of law, actual damages must occur no later than when they manifest.”
The court concluded that as damage manifested during the period of coverage, so must have the damage. The court ruled that “contrary to the trial court’s determination otherwise, the evidence showed Great American’s duty to indemnify was triggered, and expert testimony establishing the exact date of injury was not required to trigger the duty.”
Read the court’s decision…
Although Property Damage Arises From An Occurrence, Coverage Barred By Business Risk Exclusions
July 8, 2011 — Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
The homeowners hired the insured to raise the structure of their home twenty-four inches above the flood zone. Lafayette Ins. Co. v. Peerboom, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58985 (S.D. Miss. June 2, 2011). When the insured’s crew returned from lunch one day, they found the house had fallen from hydraulic jacks being used to raise the structure a few inches at a time. There was substantial damage to the entire structure.
The homeowners sued, asserting several claims, including negligence and breach of contract. The complaint alleged the homeowners entered a contract with the insured to raise their structure while maintaining its integrity. However, the insured failed to use proper equipment, which caused the house to fall and be completely destroyed.
The insured tendered the claim to its insurer, Lafayette Insurance Company. Lafayette defended under a reservation of rights and filed suit for a declaratory judgment. Lafayette’s subsequent motion for summary judgment contended there was no “occurrence” alleged in the underlying complaint and, even if there was, the business risk exclusions barred coverage.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
Homebuilders Go Green in Response to Homebuyer Demand
May 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
McGrawHill Construction reports that 17 percent of new homes and remodels in 2011 were done with green building practices. Their report estimates that by 2016, this will rise to 29 to 38 percent of the market for home construction and remodeling.
Consumers see the green buildings as more desirable, particularly where they are more energy efficient. Two thirds of builders noted their customers were interested in features that would lower the energy use of their homes. Consumers also feel that green building materials are more durable and see green homes as higher quality.
Read the full story…
Construction Defects Are Occurrences, Says Georgia Supreme Court
July 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Michael Bradford writes about the implications of a March decision of the Georgia Supreme Court in which the court found that “negligent construction resulting in damage to surrounding property constitutes an occurrence under a commercial general liability policy. The contractor in the case, American Empire Surplus Lines Insurance Co. Inc. vs. Hathaway Development Co. Inc, argued that a damage caused by a plumbing subcontractor’s work was covered. American Empire was the insurer for the plumbing subcontractor.
Bradford notes that this follows similar decisions in other courts. The George court ruled that “an occurrence can arise where faulty workmanship causes unforeseen or unexpected damage to other property.”
Read the full story…
Pipes May Be Defective, But Owners Lack Standing
September 13, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The United States District Court in Minnesota has determined that Steven and Cecilia Thundander cannot make a class-action claim against Uponor, Inc. over the plumbing in their home, as they do not have Article III standing. In this situation, the alleged defect is that Uponor made fraudulent claims that the pipes met National Sanitation Foundation (NSF) standards for use in potable water systems. Uponor submitted samples of other pipes, and their substitution was discovered when the NSF made an inspection of the manufacturing facility. The court noted that “the Thunanders contend that Uponor failed to inform homeowners, plumbers and consumers that it had been selling pipe that failed to meet NSF toxicity requirements at the time of sale and installation.”
The Court noted that the Thunanders have not tested their piping to determine if they “demonstrate toxicity or lack of compliance with the NSF 61 standards,” noting also that the Complaint seeks to require Uponor to instruct the plaintiffs on “how to test the piping and water to determine the level of risk.” Lacking testing, the Court could not find that the Thundanders have defective pipes. The Court found that the “Plaintiffs have failed to adequately plead an injury in fact sufficient to confer standing as to their product liability claims.”
The Court also concluded that it could not determine if the Plaintiff’s warranty actions could not be applied, as they “have failed to allege a plausible defect.” Even in the presence of a defect, the Court noted that more than eight years had passed before the filing of the suit, when the warranties under both Indiana and Minnesota law have a four-year statute of limitations. The Court also rejected the Thunanders tort claims, once again because “Plaintiffs have not tested their pipes,” noting that “a tort requires the existence of an injury.”
In conclusion, Judge Nelson rejected the entirety of the complaint, granting the motions to dismiss by the defendants. However, despite the problems with the Thunanders’ claims, she found that they were not “patently frivolous or groundless.” Therefore, she denied attorney fees requested by one of the defendants.
Read the court’s decision…
Don MacGregor To Speak at 2011 West Coast Casualty Construction Defect Seminar
January 1, 2011 — February 08, 2011 CDJ Staff
“Challenges for Experts in Construction Defect Claims and Litigation” will be held Thursday May 13, 2011 between 1:30 and 3:00 PM at this year’s West Coast Casualty Construction Defect Seminar. Among the various topics covered will be of Right to Repair/Opportunity to Repair statutes, improper testing methodologies, new challenges where a case involves a Wrap Policy, OCIPS, CCIPS, and other owner controlled insurance programs, as well as the need for realistic testing protocols for the party the expert is retained to represent.
During the presentation Mr. MacGregor will be working in connection with a group of construction and design experts each of which have extensive experience with construction defect and claims related litigation. This particular session is expected to attract a standing-room only crowd, drawing in excess of 1700 attendees.
The West Coast Casualty Construction Defect Seminar is the largest seminar of its type. This year’s event is scheduled for will take place on May 12 and 13, 2011, at The Disneyland Hotel and Resort. For more information regarding the years event please visit http://www.westcoastcasualty.com/dyncat.cfm?catid=3322
http://www.westcoastcasualty.com/dyncat.cfm?catid=3322
Association May Not Make Claim Against Builder in Vermont Construction Defect Case
October 23, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The Vermont Supreme Court issued a ruling on September 28 on Long Trail House Condominium Association. The case was heard by a panel of two Supreme Court justices, Marilyn Skoglund and Brian Burgess, and three justices specially assigned for the case, Kupersmith, Davenport, and Johnson. The decision came down with a 3-2 split; Judges Kupersmith and Johnson joining in a dissent.
In the underlying case, Stratton Corporation entered into an agreement with Engelberth Construction in which Engelberth would supply “recommendations on construction feasibility, consultation as to the selection of materials and equipment, assistance with zoning requirements and permits, and cooperation with the ‘design team’ to provide valuable engineering services.” Engelberth was not responsible to determine that the drawings and specifications were in accordance with the law and building codes, nor were they responsible “for the design team’s designs, errors, or omissions.”
Subsequent to the agreement was a construction project which culminated in the incorporation of the Long Trail House Condominium Association. The condominium owners initiated a lawsuit over alleged defects. Stratton, Intrawest, and the association settled claims for $7,025,00 with Stratton and Intrawest both pursuing claims against Engelberth. This case is still unsettled.
The association progressed on remediation, which cost about $1,500,00 more than was provided by the settlement, and so the association also sued Engelberth. In this case, the court granted a summary judgment to Engelberth, concluding that negligence claim was barred both “by the economic loss rule and that the absence of contractual privity was fatal to the warranty claims.”
The court upheld both determinations of the lower court. The court noted that “the economic loss rule ‘prohibits recovery in tort for purely economic losses’” and that “in tort law, duties are imposed by law to protect the public from harm.” A negligence claim could only be supported with evidence of “some accompanying physical harm, which does not include economic loss.”
The association made the claim that the economic loss rule applies only when there is a contractual relationship between the two parties. The court rejected this argument, citing a reference that “economic interests are protected, if at all, by contract principles, rather than tort principles.”
Nor did the court find it persuasive that a “professional services” exception to the economic loss doctrine applied, noting that the court has rejected this notion in two prior cases. The noted that the association’s losses were purely economic, and their inability to settle those claims with Engelberth did not mean that they had not means of settling them, as they were able to settle these very claims with Stratton and Intrawest.
The association also raised claims of an implied warranty, resting on the construction contract between Engelberth and Stratton. This was also rejected by the court, noting that Vermont “case law plainly contemplates the existence of contractual privity before a breach of implied warranty claim can be raised.” The court noted that there was neither a contract nor a sale between Engelberth and the association, and thus there were no grounds for an implied warranty. The court concluded that “the Association’s warranty remedy lies against the entity that sold it the condominium units and implicitly warranted through the sale that the units were built in a good and workmanlike manner and that they were suitable for habitation.”
Read the court’s decision …
Federal Court Denies Summary Judgment in Leaky Condo Conversion
August 4, 2011 — CDJ Staff
In the US District Court for Illinois, Judge William Hibber has rejected the request for summary judgment sought by the developers of a condominium building in the case of Nautilus Ins. Co. v. 1735 W. Diversey, LLC (the insureds). The insureds renovated a building at 1735 W. Diversey, Chicago, converting it into condominiums. After the project was completed and all units sold, and a condominium association form, one of the owners found that unit suffered leaks during rainstorms. The condo board hired a firm, CRI, to investigate the cause of the leakage. CRI found “water infiltration through the exterior brick masonry walls, build-up of efflorescence on the interior surfaces of the masonry, and periodic spalling of portions of the brick masonry.”
The redevelopment firm had purchased coverage from Nautilus. “Shortly after the Board filed its first complaint, the Insureds tendered the mater to Nautilus and requested that it indemnify and defend them from the Board's underlying claims. Nautilus, however, rejected the Insureds’ tender and denied coverage under both insurance policies.” Nautilus stated that the water leakage did not constitute an occurrence under the policies. The court cited these policies in which an occurrence is defined as “an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful conditions.” The Illinois courts have determined that construction defects are not accidents.
The court concluded that the insured did not bring forth claims within the coverage of the policies and denied the motion for summary judgment.
Read the court’s decision…
Hawaii State Senate Requires CGL Carriers to Submit Premium Information To State Legislature
March 20, 2011 — March 20, 2011 Construction Defect Journal Staff
In light of the decision in Hawaii’s Intermediate Court of Appeals in Group Builders, Inc.,v. Admiral Insurance Company, 231 P.3d 67(2010), Hawaii’s state senate is requesting that "every domestic and foreign insurance company that has ever issued commercial general liability policies in the State is requested to submit information to the Legislature on the total premiums received for their commercial general liability policies during the past ten years"
Read Full Text of Hawaii State Senate Resolution
Limiting Plaintiffs’ Claims to a Cause of Action for Violation of SB-800
November 18, 2011 — Samir R. Patel, Esq. and Todd E. Verbick, Esq., Lorber, Greenfield & Polito, LLP
There has been a fair share of publicity about the SB-800 amendments to the Civil Code (Civil Code section 896, et seq.) that codified construction defect litigation in 2002. Most of the publicity is geared toward the pre-litigation standards allowing a builder the right to repair before litigation is commenced by a homeowner. Less focus and attention has been given to the fact that violation of the SB-800 performance standards is being used by plaintiff’s counsel as an additional tool in the plaintiff’s pleading tool box against builders. Closer scrutiny to SB-800 reveals that those provisions should in fact act as a limitation to the pleading tools available to plaintiffs and an additional tool for builders in the defense of cases governed by SB-800.
The typical construction defect complaint contains the boiler plate versions of numerous causes of action. These causes of action include Strict Liability, Negligence, Negligence Per Se, Breach of Contract, Breach of Contract – Third-Party Beneficiary, Breach of Express Warranties, Breach of Implied Warranties, among others. The wide array of causes of action leave a defendant “pinned to the wall” because they require a complex defense on a multitude of contract and tort related causes of action. Furthermore, the statutes of limitations as to these claims widely differ depending upon if the particular defect is considered latent or patent. The truth of the matter remains, no matter what the circumstances, if a construction defect matter ultimately goes to trial, it is inevitable that plaintiffs will obtain a judgment on at least one of these causes of action.
On its own, the Strict Liability cause of action can be a thorn in a defendant’s side. A builder is obviously placing a product into the stream of commerce and strict liability is a tough standard to defend against, particularly when it concerns intricate homes comprised of multiple components that originally sold for hundreds of thousands of dollars. A Negligence cause of action can also be difficult to defend because the duty of care for a builder is what a “reasonable” builder would have done under the circumstances. An interpretation of this duty of care can easily sway a jury that will almost always consist of sympathetic homeowners. A Negligence Per Se cause of action can also leave a defendant vulnerable to accusations that a builder violated the Uniform Building Code or a multitude of other obscure municipal construction-related code provisions during the construction of the home. Lastly, the Breach of Contract cause of action leaves a builder relying on dense and intricate purchase and sale agreements with dozens of addenda which leave the skeptical jurors turned off by what they view as one-side, boilerplate provisions. Ultimately, when a matter is about to go to trial, the complexity of these complaints can benefit a plaintiff and increase a plaintiff’s bargaining power against a defendant who is attempting to avoid a potentially large judgment.
Enter the SB-800 statutes. The SB-800 statutes apply to all homes sold after January 1, 2003. Civil Code section 938 specifically states that “[t]his title applies only to new residential units where the purchase agreements with the buyer was signed by the seller on or after January 1, 2003.” (Civil Code §, 938.) As time progresses, more residential construction defect cases will exclusively fall under the purview of SB-800. Slowly but surely more SB-800 governed litigation is being filed, and its exclusive application is looming on the horizon.
On its surface, this “right to repair” regime has left builders with a lot to be desired despite the fact that it is supposed to allow the builder the opportunity to cure any deficiencies in their product before litigation can be filed by potential plaintiffs. However, the application of the time line for repair has shown to be impractical for anything but the most minor problems involving only small numbers of residential units. Moreover, the fact that the fruits of the builder’s investigation into the claimed defects in the pre-litigation context can freely be used as evidence against it in litigation makes builders proceed with trepidation in responding with a repair. For these reasons, more SB-800 litigation can be expected to result due to the shortcomings of the pre-litigation procedures, and savvy defense counsel should anticipate the issues to be dealt with in presenting the defense of such cases at trial.
This fact should not necessarily be met with fear or disdain. Within the SB-800 statutes, the legislature made it clear that they were creating a new cause of action for construction defect claims, but it further made it clear that this cause of action is a plaintiff’s exclusive remedy. The legislature giveth, but at the same time, the legislature taketh away. Throughout numerous provisions within the SB-800 statutes, the Civil Code states that claims for construction defects as to residential construction are exclusively governed by the Civil Code, and that the Civil Code governs any and all litigation arising under breaches of these provisions. Civil Code section 896 specifically states:
In any action seeking recovery of damages arising out of, or related to deficiencies in, the residential construction … the claimant’s claims or causes of action shall be limited to violation of, the following standards, except as specifically set forth in this title. (Civil Code §, 896.)
Civil Code section 896 then provides approximately fifty-plus standards by which a construction defect claim is assessed under that provision. Civil Code section 896 covers everything from plumbing to windows, and from foundations to decks, and in several instances expressly dictates statutes of limitations as to specific areas of construction that severely truncate the 10-year latent damage limitations period. As for any construction deficiencies that are not enumerated within Civil Code section 896, Civil Code section 897 explicitly defines the intent of the standards and provides a method to assess deficiencies that are not addressed in Civil Code section 896. Civil Code section 897 states:
Intent of Standards
The standards set forth in this chapter are intended to address every function or component of a structure. To the extent that a function or component of a structure is not addressed by these standards, it shall be actionable if it causes damage. (Civil Code §, 897.)
Therefore, Civil Code section 897 acts as a catch-all by which defects that are not covered within Civil Code section 896 can be evaluated on a damage standard mirroring the Aas case (damages must be present and actual). The result of sections 896 and 897 being read in combination is a comprehensive, all-inclusive set of performance standards by which any defect raised by Plaintiffs can be evaluated and resolved under a single SB-800 based cause of action.
Civil Code section 943 makes clear that a cause of action for violation of SB-800 performance standards is a plaintiff’s sole remedy for a residential construction defect action. Specifically, Civil Code section 943 states:
Except as provided in this title, no other cause of action for a claim covered by this title or for damages recoverable under 944 is allowed. In addition to the rights under this title, this title does not apply to any action by a claimant to enforce a contract or express contractual provision, or any action for fraud, personal injury, or violation of a statute. (Civil Code §, 943.)
Civil Code section 944 provides the method for computing damages within a construction defect action, as follows:
If a claim for damages is made under this title, the homeowner is only entitled to damages for the reasonable value of repairing any violation of the standards set forth in this title, [and] the reasonable cost of repairing any damages caused by the repair efforts… . (Civil Code §, 944.)
A cursory review of these statutes yields the conclusion that the legislature was attempting to create an exclusive cause of action that trumps all other causes of action where SB-800 applies. The remedy available to plaintiffs is limited to that allowed by the Civil Code. As noted above, “[n]o other cause of action for a claim covered by this title…is allowed.” (Civil Code §, 943.) Therefore, Civil Code sections 896, 897, 943, and 944 specifically prohibit the contract-based and tort-based causes of action typically pled by plaintiffs.
Plaintiff’s counsel has seized upon the language of section 943 to advance the argument that SB-800 still allows a plaintiff to advance typical contract and tort based causes of action. On the surface, this argument may seem compelling, but a minimum of scrutiny of the express language of section 943 dispels this notion. Section 943 says that it provides rights “[i]n addition” to those under the SB-800 Civil Code provisions. Clearly, the language in section 943 is intended to expressly underscore the fact that a plaintiff is not precluded from seeking relief in addition to that allowed under SB-800 for damages not arising from a breach of the SB-800 standards or for damages in addition to those recoverable under Section 944. This language does not provide an unfettered license to bring a Strict Liability, Negligence or other cause of action against a builder where SB-800 applies.
In fact, this language only keeps the door open for plaintiffs to pursue such causes of action not arising from a breach of the SB-800 standards should there be such supporting allegations. For example, if a plaintiff alleges that a builder breached an “express contractual provision” related to the timing of the completion of the home and close of escrow, and the contract specifies damages in this regard, a plaintiff may have a viable separate cause of action for Breach of Contract for recovery of those damages precisely because that is not an issue expressly dealt with in SB-800 in the performance standards under sections 896 and 897, or in the damage recovery terms under 944. As it stands, the vast majority of complaints are seeking redress for violation of the same primary right; that is, defects specifically outlined in Section 896 and 897 or which result in damages as stated in Section 944.
So, how does a builder defend against a complaint that contains multiple causes of action regarding construction defects for a home sold after January 1, 2003? There are numerous ways to approach this. First and foremost, these superfluous and improper causes of action can be attacked by demurrer seeking dismissal of all causes of action other than the cause of action alleging violation of SB-800. If the the time period within which to file a demurrer has passed already, a motion for judgment on the pleadings can be utilized to attack the improper causes of action in the same way as a demurrer can be used for this purpose.
The limitation to a demurrer or motion for judgment on the pleadings is that the judge is restricted to viewing only the four corners of the pleading when making a ruling. It is typical for plaintiffs’ counsel to cleverly (or one might even say, disingenuously) leave the complaint purposely vague to avoid a successful defense attack on the pleadings by not including the original date the residence was sold. In that instance, a motion for summary adjudication can be used to attack a plaintiff’s complaint. By simply providing evidence that the homes were originally sold after January 1, 2003, the improper causes of action should be subject to dismissal by summary adjudication. If the plaintiff is a subsequent purchaser, the builder still has recourse to enforce the pleading limitations under SB-800. Civil Code section 945 states that “[t]he provisions, standards, rights, and obligations set forth in this title are binding upon all original purchasers and their successors-in-interest.” (Civil Code §, 945.)
Attacking a plaintiff’s complaint to eliminate multiple causes of action can have numerous benefits. The practical result is that a plaintiff will only have one viable cause of action. The advantage is that the SB-800 performance standards include the defined performance standards and shortened statutes of limitations periods with regard to specific issues. Furthermore, as to defects which are not specifically provided for in Civil Code section 896, Civil Code section 897 requires a proof of actual damages. Therefore, a plaintiff must provide evidence of current damages and not simply conditions that may potentially cause damage in the future.
The Appellate Courts have yet to directly address and interpret these SB-800 provisions. The time for that is undoubtedly drawing near. For now, however, plaintiffs will have to find ways to accurately plead construction defect claims within the confines of one cause of action for breach of the performance standards enumerated within the Civil Code.
Printed courtesy of Lorber, Greenfield & Polito, LLP. Mr. Patel can be contacted at spatel@lorberlaw.com and Mr. Verbick at tverbick@lorberlaw.com.
South Carolina Legislature Redefining Occurrences to Include Construction Defects in CGL Policies
April 1, 2011 — April 1, 2011 Beverley BevenFlorez - Construction Defect Journal
The question of what circumstances must be in place for construction defects to be covered in a general commercial liability (CGL) policies is being raised by the courts and the legislature in South Carolina. The Insurance Journal reports that the American Insurance Association as well as the Property and Casualty Insurers Association of America are speaking out on the issue.
The problem seems to be centered on what defines an “occurrence.” CGL policies were not meant to cover faulty workmanship, according to the filing by the South Carolina Supreme Court. In January of this year, the South Carolina Supreme Court reversed the ruling in Crossmann Communities v Harleysville Mutual declaring that “Respondents cannot show the damage here was the result of an occurrence. Rather, the damage was a direct result and the natural and expected consequence of faulty workmanship; faulty workmanship did not cause an occurrence resulting in damage.” They focused their attention on the word “accident,” stating that there is a fortuity element that is not diminished.
The South Carolina legislature reacted by producing a bill that would add new language directly negating the ruling by the Supreme Court. The South Carolina bill S-431 would change the definition of an occurrence in regards to construction defects as follows: “For a liability insurance policy issued to a construction professional, an ‘occurrence’ means, at a minimum: (1) an accident; or (2) continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful condition or substance. No additional requirement of a fortuitous event is needed to constitute an ‘occurrence.’”
S-431 is currently residing in the House Committee on Labor, Commerce and Industry.
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Ohio subcontractor work exception to the “your work” exclusion
August 11, 2011 — CDCoverage.com
In Mosser Construction, Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., No. 09-4449 (6th Cir. July 14, 2011)(unpublished), claimant project owner Port Clinton contracted with insured general contractor Mosser for the construction of a building. Following completion, Port Clinton sued Mosser for breach of contract seeking damages because of physical injury to the project occurring after completion resulting from defective backfill material that settled improperly.
Mosser’s CGL insurer Travelers denied a defense and Mosser filed suit against Travelers seeking a declaratory judgment. Mosser and Travelers filed cross-motions for summary judgment on the issue of whether the supplier of the backfill material?Gerken?qualified as a subcontractor for purposes of the subcontractor work exception to the “your work” exclusion—exclusion l.—for property damage to or arising out of Mosser’s completed work.  Mosser had purchased the backfill material from Gerken pursuant to a purchase order specifying that Gerken was to supply Mosser with an industry standard grade of backfill for use in the Port Clinton project.
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Reprinted courtesy of CDCoverage.com
Steps to Defending against Construction Defect Lawsuits
July 21, 2011 — CDJ Staff
Writing in Claims Journal, Bryan Rendzio notes that the decline in construction has not been matched by a decline in construction defect lawsuits over condominiums. He reviews the ways in which lawyers representing developers can help protect their clients. He identifies four important considerations in defending developers from claims of construction defects.
He advocates a careful review of the contract. “Under a breach of contract claim, the insured’s duties to the party who brought the claim against the insured flow from the contract. Commonly, construction contracts limit the scope of recoverable damages, such as by waiving consequential damages.’
The next step, according to Rendzio is to check of a settlement agreement is already in place, noting that these are “a familiar occurrence in the construction industry, regardless of any lawsuits having been filed.”
He considers the statute of repose “the single-most decisive weapon an insured possesses in its arsenal during a condo defect lawsuit.” He notes that no lawsuits can be brought for construction defects after the end specified by the statute of repose, and if a lawsuit is brought beforehand, no additional parties can be named once the statute has taken effect.
Finally, he warns adjusters to be suspicious when a condo association requests contractual indemnification. He notes that the pitfall in this is that developers and the subsequent condominium association often have similar names, given the theoretical example of a condo project built by “Fake Lakes LLC” and later run by the “Fake Lakes Condominium Association.” Writing in regards to Florida law, he notes that condominium associations do not have successor interest in contracts developers made with contractors.
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