Michigan Supreme Court Concludes No Statute of Repose on Breach of Contract
July 19, 2011 — CDJ Staff
Judge Marilyn Kelly of the Michigan Supreme Court has remanded the case of Miller-Davis Co. v. Ahrens Constr. Inc. (Mich., 2011) to the Court of Appeals, after determining that the court had improperly applied the statute of repose. She reversed their judgment, pending a new trial.
Ahrens Construction was a subcontractor, hired by Miller-Davis to build and install a natatorium room at a YMCA camp in Kalamazoo, Michigan. After its installation, the YMCA discovered a severe condensation problem, causing moisture to “rain” from the roof. The architect, testifying for Miller-Davis, alleged that the problems were due to improper installation by Ahrens. Ahrens claimed that the condensation problem was due to a design error.
When the roof was removed and reconstructed, the moisture problem ended. Ahrens argued that the alleged defects were caused by the removal. Further, in trial Ahrens raised the issue of the statute of repose. The court found in favor of Miller-Davis and did not address the statute of repose.
The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, determining that the statute of repose had barred the suit. This rendered the other issues moot.
The Michigan Supreme concluded that the issue at hand was “a suit for breach of contract,” and that the Michigan statute of repose is limited to tort actions. They remanded the case to the Court of Appeals to address the issues that had been mooted by the application of the statute of repose.
Read the court’s decision…
Background Owner of Property Cannot Be Compelled to Arbitrate Construction Defects
November 7, 2012 — CDJ Staff
In Truppi v. Pasco Engineering, John Quattro sued Property Management Contractors, Inc. over construction defects in William Truppi’s home. All parties are named in the suit. The California Court of Appeals ruled that Property Management Contractors, Inc. (PMCI) could not compel Mr. Quattro to arbitration.
The background of the case involves two houses built in Encinitas, California by PCMI: one for Mr. Truppi at 560 Neptune, and one for Mr. Quattro at 566 Neptune. Both contracts contained an arbitration provision. Mr. Quattro signed the contract for his residence and Mr. Truppi signed the other. Mr. Quattro then sued PCMI and its principal, William Gregory. Mr. Quattro claimed to be the true contracting party for the 560 Neptune residence and a third party beneficiary of the contract Mr. Truppi signed, and stated that PCMI was aware of this.
PCMI in a demurrer stated that Quattro “had only a ‘prospective beneficial interest in the property upon its eventual sale or lease.’” Mr. Quattro amended his complaint to account for the issues raised by PCMI. The court rejected PCMI’s demurrer to the amended complaint.
Finally, PCMI and Gregory asserted that Quattro was “not the real party in interest” and could not sue. PCMI continues to assert that Quattro lacks standing, but their attorney sent Quattro an e-mail stating, “While my client disputes that you are a party, and that you lack standing to assert the claim, to the extent you do so I believe you are obligated to proceed by way of arbitration.”
The court did not cover the issue of Quattro’s standing in the case, only if he could be compelled to arbitration. The court affirmed the lower court’s finding that Quattro could not be compelled to arbitrate the construction defect claim as neither he nor Gregory signed the contract in an individual capacity. Further, the court noted that PCMI and Gregory “denied the existence of an agreement between themselves and Quattro on the 560 contract,” and cannot compel arbitration on a non-existent agreement. And while non-signatories can, in some situations be compelled to arbitrate, the court found that “these cases are inapplicable because here they seek to have the alleged third party beneficiary (Quattro) compelled by a nonsignatory (Gregory).” The arbitration clause in question “expressly limited its application to persons or entities that signed the 560 contract.”
As Mr. Quattro was not a signatory to that agreement, the court found that he could not be held to its arbitration provision.
Read the court’s decision…
Home Builder Doesn’t See Long Impact from Hurricane
November 7, 2012 — CDJ Staff
No one needs to tell Toll Brothers about the impact of Hurricane Sandy. The Wall Street Journal reports that the home building company lost power as a result of the storm. Martin Connor, the company’s CFO, told the Journal that he did not expect the hurricane to have a big effect on sales. Luckily for the company, many of its large projects are either sufficiently completed to provide shelter or too early in the process to be affected by the storm. “This type of weather event has limited impact on the market. It may move settlements later, and may defer people a weekend or two until they go out shopping. But it doesn’t have a long impact.”
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Bad Faith and a Partial Summary Judgment in Seattle Construction Defect Case
February 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The US District Court of Washington has issued a ruling in the case of Ledcor Industries v. Virginia Surety Company, Inc. Ledcor was the builder of a mixed-use real estate project in Seattle called the Adelaide Project. Ledcor purchased an insurance policy from Virginia Surety covering the project. After the completion of the project, Ledcor received complaints of construction defects from the homeowners, which they forwarded to Virginia Surety.
Virginia Surety denied coverage on several grounds. Absent any lawsuit, Virginia claimed that there was “not yet any duty to defend or indemnify.” Further, as the policy commenced ten days after work on the project was substantially completed, Virginia cited a provision in the policy that excluded coverage for damage that occurred before the policy began. As problems included water intrusion, Virginia noted an exclusion for fungal damage. Finally, Virginia noted that it was not clear whether damage was due to Ledcor’s own actions.
The homeowners sued over the construction defects. Ledcor settled these suits before trial. In this, they were defended by, and settlements were paid by American Home, another of Ledcor’s insurers. Ledcor claims that Virginia Surety acted in bad faith by denying coverage and by its failure to investigate the ongoing nature of the work at the project.
The judge determined that Virginia Surety acted in bad faith when it invoked the fungus exclusion. Virginia noted that fungal damage “‘would have been’ referenced in the list of construction defects,” however, the HOAs claimed only “water stains” and “water damage,” and made no mention of mold or fungus. The court found that Virginia Surety “was not entitled to deny coverage simply because it may have suspected that mold or fungus damage existed.” The court noted that further proceedings would be needed to determine what portion of the settlement Virginia is obligated to pay.
The court found that there were matters of fact to be determined on the further issues in the case. The judge wrote that although Virginia acted in bad faith in invoking the fungus exclusion, it still had to be determined if they were in breach of contract by failing to defend Ledcor. Ledcor still needs to show that the damages claimed by the HOA were due to work actually covered by Virginia Surety.
Ledcor made an additional claim that Virginia Surety violated Washington’s laws concerning the insurance industry. Here, the court noted that the improper exclusion for fungus issues “constitutes a per se unfair trade practice.” Six other claims were made under this law. The court found that Virginia Surety did not misrepresent “pertinent facts or insurance policy provisions.” It also issued its denial letter promptly, satisfying the fifth provision. However, Virginia Surety did violate the second provision, in that it failed “to acknowledge and act reasonably promptly upon communications with respect to claims.” Two other issues could not be determined.
Judge Martinez’s decision granted a summary judgment to Ledcor on the issue of bad faith. An additional summary judgment was granted that Virginia Surety violated Washington’s Insurance Fair Conduct Act. Judge Martinez did not grant summary judgment on any of the other issues Ledcor raised.
Read the court’s decision…
Water Drainage Case Lacks Standing
March 28, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The Texas Court of Appeals has ruled in the case La Tierra de Simmons Familia Ltd. V. Main Event Entertainment, LP. The trial court had found for Main Event. On appeal, the court threw out some of the grounds on which the trial court had reached its decision.
The case involved two commercial lots in northwest Austin, Texas. The uphill tract (Phase III of the Anderson Arbor development) diverts its runoff onto the lower tract (the “Ballard tract”). The owners of the Ballard tract claim that “the drainage system was designed or constructed in a manner that has damaged and continues to damage the Ballard tract.”
Both tracts have undergone changes of ownership since the construction of the drainage system in 2004. At the time the drainage system was constructed, the parcel was owned by Sears Roebuck and Co. Sears later sold the property. Main Event Entertainment is the current tenant. Likewise, the Ballard tract was previously owned by the Ballard Estate which sold the property to La Tierra on an “as is” basis in 2007.
After La Tierra bought the Ballard tract, La Tierra’s engineer “witnessed and videotaped what he described as ‘flooding’ on the Ballard tract caused by storm water discharge from the Anderson Arbor drainage system during a rainfall event.” La Tierra determined that an adequate drainage system would cost about $204,000. Development plans were put on hold.
La Tierra sued Main Event and various other parties associated with the uphill tract, seeking “actual damages for (1) decrease and loss in rental income due to delay in obtaining the development permit, (2) interest on carrying costs during that time period, (3) the cost to build a water conveyance system on the Ballard tract, (4) engineering fees incurred to redesign the water conveyance system, (5) unspecified out-of-pocket real estate expenses, and (6) property devaluation occasioned by the need to construct an expensive water conveyance system.” The trial court never reached these claims, ruling instead that La Tierra lacked standing, that its claims were barred under the statute of limitations, and that there was no evidence of damage.
La Tierra appealed, arguing that “(1) the summary-judgment evidence does not conclusively establish that property damage claims accrued or were discovered prior to September 11, 2007, which is within the limitations period and was after La Tierra purchased the property; (2) even if the property was damaged before La Tierra acquired ownership of the Ballard tract, standing exists based on the assignments of interest from the Ballard Estate heirs, and the discovery rule tolls limitations until the injury was discovered on September 11, 2007; (3) limitations does not bar La Tierra's request for injunctive relief; (4) La Tierra's water code claim against Main Event and M.E.E.P. is viable based on their control over the drainage system, which makes them necessary and indispensable parties for injunctive relief; (5) La Tierra presented more than a scintilla of evidence to raise a fact issue on damages, causation, and other essential elements of its causes of action; and (6) the trial court abused its discretion when it sustained the defendants' objections to La Tierra's summary-judgment evidence.”
The appeals court concluded that La Tierra’s second claim was irrelevant to standing, as La Tierra “obtained assignments from the Ballard Estate heirs ? nearly one year after the lawsuit was initially filed.” Nor did the court accept their first point. The water system had been operating unaltered since January, 2004, with monthly maintenance and inspection to maintain its designed operation. Further, a feasibility report La Tierra received stated that “over sixteen acres drain into those ponds, and thus onto this site.” The court noted that “the underlying facts giving rise to a cause of action were known before La Tierra acquired ownership of the Ballard tract.”
The court concluded that the drainage issue is a permanent injury, but that it “accrued before La Tierra acquired an ownership interest in the property.” As La Tierra has standing, the appeals court ruled that it was improper for the trial court to rule on the issues. The appeals court dismissed the questions of whether the case was barred under the statute of limitation and also the question of whether or not La Tierra had damages.
As the issue of standing would not allow La Tierra to bring the suit, the appeals court found for the defendants, dismissing the case for this single reason, and otherwise affirming the ruling of the lower court.
Read the court’s decision…
David McLain to Speak at the CDLA 2012 Annual Conference
June 19, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The Colorado Dense Lawyers Association will be holding their 2012 Annual Conference from July 26 through the 28, in Crested Butte, Colorado. The CDLA provides benefits to its member defense trial lawyers, including educational and information resources.
David McLain of Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC will be joining in a discussion with William J. McConnell, PE of Vertex Engineering on Saturday, July 28. Their topic will be common building code violations alleged in construction defect cases and how to respond to these allegations.
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Underpowered AC Not a Construction Defect
November 7, 2012 — CDJ Staff
After buying a home in Louisiana, Mike Gines determined that the home’s air conditioning unit was insufficient to maintain an appropriate temperature. He contacted the home builder, D.R. Horton, Inc., which worked with the air conditioning installer, Reliant Heating & Air Conditioning, in order to repair the system. When the problems persisted, Gines filed a class action petition against Horton and Reliant in state court. Horton and Reliant moved the case to the federal courts, whereupon Gines asserted the defendants were in violation of the Louisiana New Home Warranty Act (NHWA). Horton stated that the claim under the NHWA was invalid, because Gines had not alleged actual physical damage to his home.
The district court granted Horton’s motion to dismiss. Gines sought a reversal from the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals and sought to have two questions of state law addressed by the Louisiana Supreme Court.
The district court ruled that the NHWA was the “sole remedy under Louisiana law for a purchaser of a new home with construction defects. Gines argued that court erred in this, but also conceded that this was the conclusion of the Louisiana Supreme Court.
Further, Gines argued that a provision in the NHWA that allows the inclusion of construction defects that do not cause damage was satisfied by paragraph 6 of the contract. The court noted that Gines did not attach a copy of the contract to either the original or amended complaint, and so the court does not need to address these claims. However, the court cautioned that if a copy had been included, they still would have rejected the claim, as “the cited language does not indicate a waiver of the physical damage requirement.” They also note that “paragraph 13 of the contract shows that Gines was aware to the absence of any such waiver in the contract.”
The court concludes that “the moral of this story is that in order to avoid the harsh result that has obtained here, the buyer of a newly constructed home in Louisiana should seek to obtain in the contract of sale an express waiver of the actual damage requirement of the NHWA.” The appeals court affirmed the decision of the circuit court and denied the application to certify questions to the Louisiana Supreme Court.
Read the court’s decision…
Lawsuit over Construction Defects Not a Federal Case
August 16, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The United State District Court in California has dismissed the claims of a contractor against the United States government, on the grounds that it was not within the subject matter jurisdiction of the court. The origins of the case are in a related construction defect claim. The current plaintiff, Performance Contracting, Inc., did the lath and plaster work for a building for the Department of Veterans Affairs. After the building was completed, the Veterans Affairs complained to the general contractor, Wynema, Inc., of water intrusion problems.
Wyema and Performance conducted testing and the water intrusion was found to be due to “a variety of design defects and omissions, including: 1) omission of proper window flashing; 2) inadequate waterproof membrane around the windows; 3) inadequate T-molding around the windows; 4) lack of a window sill pan for the windows; 5) lack of any backing in the window framing; 6) lack of any backing for the stucco expansion joints and seams; and 7) failure to require that a performance mock-up of the window assembly and adjacent areas be built and water tested.” Wyema filed a construction defect action against Performance and other subcontractors.
In the current case, Performance claims that Veteran Affairs was negligent, that it “breached its duty to Plaintiff when it provided deficient plants and specifications” and “failed to properly oversee construction and inspect Project work.” The court determined that it could not hear this case, noting that “Federal Courts are presumptively without jurisdiction over civil actions.”
Performance raised its claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act. The judge was not persuaded by this claim, noting that the FTCA does not apply to purported breach of the General Contract. The FTCA waives the government’s sovereign immunity in cases of “injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of an employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.”
Performance was unable to pursue its claims in the Court of Federal Claims as there was no contract between Performance and the government. However, the court noted that Performance’s inability to file suit in the Court of Federal Claims does not open up a path to the District Court. “Litigants are not guaranteed a forum in which to sue the United States.” The court further noted that “if this Court were to accept Plaintiff’s logic, non-parties to contracts, but not parties, would be free to pursue contract claims in the fora of their choosing.”
Read the court’s decision…
Good Signs for Housing Market in 2013
December 20, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Dan Green, a loan officer at Waterstone Mortgage, is optimistic about the construction market in 2013. He notes that the rise in building permit, housing starts, and housing completions are all good signs. Mortgage rates are still low, making these new homes attractive to buyers.
Read the full story…
SB800 Cases Approach the Courts
July 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
California’s Right to Repair Law turns ten this year and cases under the statute are finally coming to trial, as John V. O’Meara of Bremer Whyte Brown & O’Meara writes for the Martindale-Hubble Legal Library. Mr. O’Meara notes that SB800 eliminated “the traditional definitions of construction defect,” replacing them with “functionality standards.” He argues that these standards are not uniform: “some standards require damage and others do not.” He also wonders what terms like “significant cracks,” “intended water” and “materially comply” mean in a court.
Mr. O’Meara states that “defendants in construction defect cases have a right to know the standards that apply to a case, the definitions that will be presented to the jury, and the burden of proof that attaches.”
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Insurer Has Duty to Defend in Water Intrusion Case
July 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has upheld a summary judgment against an insurance company in a construction defect suit. Lagestee-Mulder, Incorporated (LMI) was hired by Crown Centre to construct a multi-story office building in Franfort, Illinois. LMI hired Frontrunner Glass & Metal to supply and install windows and doors. Frontrunner purchased an insurance policy from Consolidated which named LMI as an additional insured. The project experienced water intrusion and other construction defects and Crown sued LMI. Consolidated denied coverage. LMI sued Consolidated and the US District Court granted a summary judgment against Consolidated.
The appeals court reviewed the grounds for summary judgment and determined that under Illinois law, Consolidated had a duty to defend. The court cited an earlier opinion that “if the underlying compliant alleges facts within or potentially within policy coverage, an insurer is obligated to defend its insured even if the allegations are groundless, false, or fraudulent.”
Read the court’s decision…
Local Government Waives Construction Fees to Spur Jobs
June 19, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Warren Township in New Jersey has waived building and electrical permit fees, up to $5,000, for businesses that create at least five new jobs. The fee reductions are available for construction in areas zones under various designations. Buildings that have received a zoning variance are not eligible. The Echoes-Sentinel notes that other towns in Somerset County, New Jersey have adopted similar ordinances.
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South Carolina Law Clarifies Statue of Repose
July 11, 2011 — CDJ Staff
A new law in South Carolina, H 3375, fixes a loophole in that state’s statute of repose. State law puts a cap of eight years on construction defects, but the 2008 law that set that limit had a loophole that would allow for construction defect claims to start thirteen years after construction. The law also provides a cap on punitive damages.
The measure was backed by the Carolinas Association of General Contractors. Their spokesperson said that the legislation “increases our state’s ability to be economically competitive and helps protect our members from frivolous lawsuits.”
Read the full story…
Read South Carolina H 3375…
Broker Not Liable for Failure to Reveal Insurer's Insolvency After Policy Issued
March 28, 2012 — Tred Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
Faced with an issue of first impression in California, the Court of Appeals held that a broker was not liable for failing to reveal the insurer's insolvency occurring after issuance of the policy. Pacific Rim Mechanical Contractors, Inc. v. Aon Risk Ins. Serv. West, Inc., 2012 Cal. App. LEXIS 232 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 28, 2012).
The developer for a construction project in downtown San Diego retained Aon as its broker to secure coverage. Aon procured a general liability policy for the project with Legion Indemnity Company. Legion was solvent when it issued the policy.
The developer hired Pacific Rim (“PacRim”) as one of several subcontractors on the project. The parties entered into a contract in which the developer agreed to provide PacRim with liability insurance through an Owner Controlled Insurance Program (“OCIP”). Aon was not a party to the contract and PacRim was never its client. PacRim, however, enrolled in the OCIP by contacting Aon and providing all necessary paperwork.
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
Fifth Circuit Reverses Insurers’ Summary Judgment Award Based on "Your Work" Exclusion
November 18, 2011 — Tred Eyerley, Insurance Law Hawaii
Application of the facts to the "your work" exclusion was the key to resolving coverage issued in Am. Home Assurance Co. v. Cat Tech L.L.C., 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 21076 (5th Cir. Oct. 5, 2011).
Ergon Refining, Inc. hired Cat Tech L.L.C. to service a hydrotreating reactor. In January 2005, Cat Tech replaced certain parts in the reactor. After Cat Tech finished the job and left, Ergon noticed a high pressure drop in the reactor, forcing it to be shut down. Cat Tech returned in February 2005, removed, repaired and replaced the damaged parts, and loaded new parts. After completion, a second large pressure drop occurred during the reactor’s start-up process. The reactor was shut down until October 2005, when Ergon hired a different contractor to perform the repair work. Additional damage to the reactor was found.
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
Ensuing Loss Provision Does Not Salvage Coverage
December 9, 2011 — Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
Water intrusion caused by a construction defect was not covered under the all risk policy’s ensuing loss provision. See Friedberg v. Chubb & Son, Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123582 (D. Minn. Oct. 25, 2011).
Extensive water damage was discovered in the insureds’ home when a small hole in the exterior wall was being repaired. Chubb’s adjuster and an expert found water intrusion causing rot, mold, and damage to the home’s wood framing and insulation. Chubb denied coverage because water intruded through the roof and wall, resulting in gradual deterioration. The insureds filed suit.
The policy excluded coverage for construction defects, but insured "ensuing covered loss unless another exclusion applies."
The court agreed there was a prima facie case for coverage because the home suffered a physical loss.
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
The Montrose Language Interpreted: How Many Policies Are Implicated By A Construction Defect That Later Causes a Flood?
March 17, 2011 — By Shaun McParland Baldwin, March 17, 2011
The Court of Appeals of Indiana recently addressed the “Montrose” language added to the CGL ISO form in 2001 in the context of a construction defect claim where a fractured storm drain caused significant flooding a year after the drain was damaged. The insuring agreement requires that “bodily injury or “property damage” be caused by an occurrence and that the “bodily injury or “property damage” occur during the policy period. The Montrose language adds that the insurance applies only if, prior to the policy period, no insured knew that the “bodily injury or “property damage” had occurred in whole or in part. Significantly, it also states that any “bodily injury” or “property damage” which occurs during the policy period and was not, prior to the policy period known to have occurred, includes a continuation, change or resumption of that “bodily injury” or “property damage” after the end of the policy period.
In Grange Mutual Cas. Co. v. West Bend Mut. Ins. Co., No. 29D04-0706-PL-1112 (Ct. App. IN March 15, 2011), http://www.ai.org/judiciary/opinions/pdf/03151109ehf.pdf, Sullivan was the General Contractor for a school construction project. Its subcontractor, McCurdy, installed the storm drain pipes. One of the storm pipes was fractured in 2005 while McCurdy was doing its installation work. More than a year later, the school experienced significant water damage due to flooding. It was later discovered that the flooding was due to the fractured storm drain. Sullivanrsquo;s insurer paid $146,403 for the water damage. That insurer brought a subrogation claim against McCurdy and its two insurers: West Bend and Grange. West Bend had issued CGL coverage to McCurdy while the construction was ongoing, including the date in which the storm pipe was fractured. Grange issued CGL coverage to McCurdy at the time of the flooding. Those two carriers jointly settled the subrogation claim and then litigated which insurer actually owed coverage for the loss. Significantly, the loss that was paid included only damages from the flooding, not any damages for the cost of repairing the pipe.
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Reprinted courtesy of Shaun McParland Baldwin of Tressler LLP. Ms Baldwin can be contacted at sbaldwin@tresslerllp.com
One Colorado Court Allows Negligence Claim by General Contractor Against Subcontractor
December 20, 2012 — Heather Anderson , Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell
Judge Paul King of the Douglas County District Court recently confirmed that subcontractors in residential construction owe an independent duty, separate and apart from any contractual duties, to act without negligence in the construction of a home in Colorado. See Order, dated September 7, 2010, Sunoo v. Hickory Homes, Inc. et al., Case No. 2007CV1866; see alsoCosmopolitan Homes, Inc. v. Weller, 663 P.2d 1041 (Colo. 1983); A.C. Excavating v. Yacht Club II Homeowners Ass’n, Inc., 114 P.3d 862 (Colo. 2005). He also verified that the holding in the B.R.W. Inc. v. Dufficy & Sons, Inc., 99 P.3d 66 (Colo. 2004)[1] case does not prohibit general contractors, such as Hickory Homes, from enforcing a subcontractor’s independent duty to act without negligence in the construction of a home.
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Reprinted courtesy of Heather Anderson, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC. Ms. Anderson can be contacted at anderson@hhmrlaw.com