SB800 Cases Approach the Courts
July 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
California’s Right to Repair Law turns ten this year and cases under the statute are finally coming to trial, as John V. O’Meara of Bremer Whyte Brown & O’Meara writes for the Martindale-Hubble Legal Library. Mr. O’Meara notes that SB800 eliminated “the traditional definitions of construction defect,” replacing them with “functionality standards.” He argues that these standards are not uniform: “some standards require damage and others do not.” He also wonders what terms like “significant cracks,” “intended water” and “materially comply” mean in a court.
Mr. O’Meara states that “defendants in construction defect cases have a right to know the standards that apply to a case, the definitions that will be presented to the jury, and the burden of proof that attaches.”
Read the full story…
Homeowner Has No Grounds to Avoid Mechanics Lien
September 1, 2011 — CDJ Staff
The California Court of Appeals has rejected a motion by a homeowner in a dispute with the contractor who built an extension to his home. In McCracken v. Pirvulete, Mr. McCracken filed a mechanics lien after Mr. Pirvulete failed to complete payment. The matter went to trial with a series of exhibits that showed “the contractual relationship was strained and the parties disagreed over performance and payment.” As a result of the trial, the court awarded Mr. McCracken, the contractor, $1,922.22.
Mr. Pirvulete appealed, contending that the court had not allowed his daughter to act as a translator, that the court had failed to give him sufficient time to present his case, that the mechanics lien should have been dismissed, and several other claims, all before a formal judgment was issued. After the court formalized its judgment and rejected the appeal, Mr. Pirvulete appealed again.
The appeals court found that Mr. Pirvulete did not provide an adequate record for review. The court dismissed Mr. Pirvulete’s claims. The court notes that Mr. Pirvulete claimed that a request for a discovery period was denied, however, he has provided neither the request nor the denial. The trial court has no record of either.
Nor was there a record of a request that Mr. Pirvulete’s daughter provide translation. The court notes, “so far as we can glean from the record provided, the Register of Actions states, ‘Trial to proceed without Romanian Interpreter for Defendant; Daughter present to interpret if needed.’” Additionally, the court found that “there has been no showing that his facility with the English language is or was impaired in any way or that there was any portion of any proceeding, which he did not understand.”
Further, the appeals court found there were no grounds for a new trial, despite Mr. Pirvulete’s filings. The court concluded, “The owner has failed to provide a record adequate for review of most, if not all, of the claims of error. Some issues are not cognizable because they relate to entirely separate proceedings, and not the trial below. To the limited extent that the claims are examinable, the owner has made no showing of error.” The court affirmed the judgment of the lower court against Mr. Pirvulete.
Read the court’s decision…
Destruction of Construction Defect Evidence Leads to Sanctions against Plaintiff
July 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Stating that the plaintiff’s actions have left the defendants in a situation where they “cannot properly defend the action,” a judge in the US District Court of New York has sanctioned the plaintiffs in Aktas v. JMC Dev. Co.
The plaintiffs hired JMC Development and Stephen Jung, an architect, to renovate their vacation home in Adirnodack, New York. As work progressed, “due to disagreements regarding the completion date and payments for the project, the relationship began to deteriorate.” The plaintiffs hired George Villar as an owner’s representative who “testified that he deemed the workmanship to be ‘poor.’”
Subsequently, the locks where changed on the home, preventing JMC from performing any additional work, after which drywall was removed, which Villar stated was so that “the engineer come and look at the framing.” Subsequently, Villar sent a letter to JMC stating that the work was “performed in an inadequate, negligent and un-professional manner.” Villar informed JMC that they were not to visit the property. Subsequently, the plaintiffs hired another firm. “Plaintiffs testified that the materials were ‘carted away’ and ‘thrown out.’”
The plaintiffs filed a suit against JMC and others. JMC filed a motion requesting that the plaintiffs be sanctioned for their spoliation of evidence. The court noted that “the plaintiffs recognized that litigation was imminent,” and that they “had a duty to preserve the evidence. As all of JMC’s work was destroyed, there is no evidence of whether or not the work was defective. The court concluded that it will “issue an adverse inference charge that permits the jury to infer that the missing evidence was favorable to the defendants.”
In conclusion, the court granted in part the spoliation sanctions. They granted JMC a summary judgment dismissing the plaintiffs’ claims of fraud.
Read the court’s decision…
A Performance-Based Energy Code in Seattle: Will It Save Existing Buildings?
August 11, 2011 — Douglas Reiser, Builders Counsel
The City of Seattle has one of the most stringent energy codes in the nation. Based upon the Washington State Energy Code (which has been embroiled in litigation over its high standards), the code demands a lot from commercial developers. But, does it prevent developers from saving Seattle?s classic and old buildings? Perhaps.
The general compliance procedure requires buildings to be examined during the permitting process. This means that buildings are examined before they begin operating. The procedure is not malleable and is applicable to all buildings, old and new, big and small.
The downside of this procedure is that it eliminates awarding compliance to those buildings exhibiting a number of passive features, such as siting, thermal mass, and renewable energy production. This problem has prevented a number of interesting and architecturally pleasing existing building retrofits from getting off the ground. The cost of complying with the current system can be 20% more, and it might prevent builders from preserving a building?s historical integrity.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of Douglas Reiser of Reiser Legal LLC. Mr. Reiser can be contacted at info@reiserlegal.com
Southern California Lost $8 Billion in Construction Wages
August 17, 2011 — CDJ Staff
Los Angeles and Orange Counties are first on a list no area wants to be on. According to the Sacramento Bee, reporting on data from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, LA and Orange Counties saw an $8 billion drop in construction wages in 2010, as compared to 2006. In 2006, the region saw payrolls of $26.8 billion, but in 2010, that was reduced to $18.5 billion.
This was not the largest percentage change. Of the metropolitan areas with the largest declines in construction earnings, Las Vegas saw a $3.6 billion drop, however that represented half of their 2006 totals of $7.2 billion. Conversely, a $3.3 billion drop in the New York area represented only 10% of what had been $33.8 billion in payroll in 2006.
Read the full story…
Ohio Adopts Energy-Efficient Building Code
June 19, 2012 — CDJ Staff
In a compromise between environmental groups, who were looking for stricter standards, and homebuilders, who were trying to contain building costs, the state of Ohio has adopted buildings codes that will increase the energy efficiency of new homes. The estimated costs are about $1,100 with estimated annual savings of $230. According to Corey Roblee of the International Code Council, “It’s something needed in the state of Ohio.”
The Ohio Home Builders Association opposed a proposal to adopt the guidelines of the International Code Council. Builders will be able to either follow the ICC guidelines or they can use the Ohio guidelines to meet the same energy efficiency. Vincent Squillace, the executive vice president of the OHBA, said, “We came up with an equivalent code that’s more strict but is about $2,000 cheaper per home to implement than the original code.”
The new code will require that at least 75% of lighting must be high efficiency, increases the degree of insulation, and specifies more efficient windows, among other changes.
Read the full story…
Harsh New Time Limits on Construction Defect Claims
April 26, 2011 — April 26, 2011 by Scott F. Sullan, Esq., Mari K. Perczak, Esq., and Leslie A. Tuft, Esq. of
Sullan2, Sandgrund, Smith & Perczak, P.C. in the
HindemanSanchez blogA recent Colorado Supreme Court decision, Smith v. Executive Custom Homes, Inc., 230 P.3d 1186 (Colo. 2010), considerably shortens the time limit for bringing many construction defect lawsuits. Homeowners and homeowner associations risk losing the right to seek reimbursement from builders, developers and other construction professionals unless they carefully and quickly act upon discovery of evidence of any potential construction defect.
The Statute of Limitations for Construction Defect Claims
Colorado’s construction defect statute of limitations limits the time for homeowners and homeowners associations to bring lawsuits for construction defects against “construction professionals,” including developers, general contractors, builders, engineers, architects, other design professionals, inspectors and subcontractors. The statute requires homeowners and associations to file suit within two years “after the claim for relief arises.” A claim for relief “arises” when a homeowner or association discovers or reasonably should have discovered the physical manifestation of a construction defect.
The two-year time limitation applies to each construction defect separately, and will begin to run upon the appearance of a “manifestation” of a construction defect (which may include, for example, a condition as simple as a roof leak or drywall cracks), even if the homeowner or association does not know the cause of the apparent problem.
The Smith Opinion and its Effect on the Statute of Limitations
In Smith v. Executive Custom Homes, Inc., the plaintiff homeowner, Mrs. Smith, slipped on ice that had accumulated on her sidewalk because of a leaking gutter and suffered injury. When she first noticed the leak, she reported it to her property manager, who reported it to the builder. The builder attempted to repair the gutter, unbeknownst to Mrs. Smith, and she did not notice further problems until approximately one year after she first observed the leak, when she fell and suffered serious injury. She sued the builder within two years of her injury, but nearly three years after she first learned of the leak.
The Colorado Supreme Court dismissed Mrs. Smith’s claims as untimely and held that under the construction defect statute of limitations, the two-year period for suing for injuries due to construction defects begins when the homeowner first observes the physical manifestation of the defect, even if the resulting injury has not yet occurred. The court acknowledged that this ruling could result in “unfair results,” especially if a serious and unforeseeable injury occurs more than two years after the first time the homeowner noticed the problem, and as a result the victim is unable to seek redress from those responsible for the defect.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of Scott F. Sullan, Esq., Mari K. Perczak, Esq., and Leslie A. Tuft, Esq. of Sullan2, Sandgrund, Smith & Perczak, P.C., and they can be contacted through their web site.
Virginia Homebuilding Slumps After Last Year’s Gain
June 19, 2012 — CDJ Staff
As of May, only 61 residential construction permits have been issues in Roanoke County, Virginia, leaving officials doubtful that this year will meet last year’s mark of 179 permits. Residential construction was at its highest in the county in 2004. The worst year since then was 2009, when the county issued 143 permits. The county is in the western end of the state, near the border with West Virginia, and far from the D.C. metropolitan area.
Arnold Covey, the Director of Community Development for the county said that “it may be until 2014 before we really see a difference. The article by WDBJ7.com notes that a “key part” of the county budget comes from real estate.
Read the full story…
Amerisure Case to be Heard by Texas Supreme Court
August 16, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has withdrawn its decision in Ewing Construction Company Inc. v. Amerisure Insurance Company, according to Insurance Developments. The Fifth Circuit had concluded that “a contractor’s obligation to perform its contact in a workmanlike manner constituted an ‘assumption of liability.’” Two questions have now been certified to the Texas Supreme Court. The dissent in the case argued the majority had misread Texas Supreme Court precedent. The court will now have the opportunity to clarify this matter.
Read the full story…
Tennessee Court: Window Openings Too Small, Judgment Too Large
November 18, 2011 — CDJ Staff
The Tennessee Court of Appeals has issued a ruling in the case of Dayton v. Ackerman, upholding the decision of the lower court, even as they found that the award was incorrectly computed. The Daytons purchased a house that had been designed and built by the Ackermans, who operated a construction business. The court noted that the warranty with the house promised that “for a period of 60 days, the following items will be free of defects in materials or workmanship: doors (including hardware); windows; electric switches; receptacles; and fixtures; caulking around exterior openings; pluming fixtures; and cabinet work.”
Soon, the Daytons began to experience problems with the house. Many were addressed by the Ackermans, but the Daytons continued to have problems with the windows. Neither side could specify a firm date when the Ackermans were contacted by the Daytons about the window problems. The Ackermans maintained that more than two years passed before the Daytons complained about the windows. The lower court found the Daytons more credible in this.
Initially, the Daytons included the window manufacturer in their suit, but after preliminary investigations, the Daytons dropped Martin Doors from their suit. Martin Doors concluded that the windows were improperly installed, many of them “jammed into openings that were too small for them.”
After the Daytons dismissed Martin Doors, the Ackermans sought to file a third party complaint against them. This was denied by the court, as too much time had elapsed. The Ackermans also noted that not all of the window installations were defective, however, the courts found that the Daytons ought not to have mismatched windows.
Unfortunately for the Daytons, the window repair was done incorrectly and the windows were now too small for the openings. The firm that did the repair discounted the windows and Daytons concealed the problem with plantation shutters, totalling $400 less than the original lowest estimate. However, the appeals court noted that it was here that the trial court made their computation error. Correcting this, the appeals court assessed the Ackermans $12,016.20 instead of $13,016.20.
Finally, the Ackerman’s expert was excluded as he had changed his testimony between deposition and trial. The trial reviewed the expert’s testimony and had it been admissible, it would not have changed the ruling.
Read the court’s decision…
Preparing for Trial on a Cause of Action for Violation of Civil Code section 895, et seq.
May 10, 2012 — Samir R. Patel, Esq., Lorber, Greenfield, & Polito, LLP
In 2002, the California Legislature enacted the Right to Repair Act (hereinafter “SB-800”), as codified in Title VII of the Civil Code. As set forth in Civil Code section 895, et seq., SB-800 established a set of standards for residential construction, and provides a statutory protocol to address alleged violations of those standards. SB-800 applies to all new single family homes sold after January 1, 2003, and it created its own cause of action governed completely by its own terms, in that in order to state a cause of action under SB-800, a plaintiff may only allege a violation of the Act. (Civ. Code, § 938.) Under Civil Code sections 896, 897, 943, and 944, the Legislature made it clear that it intended to create a single cause of action for construction defects in homes that fall under the purview of SB-800. By passing SB-800, the Legislature eliminated multiple and often redundant or conflicting causes of action, burdens of proof, statutes of limitations, and types of damages that were common in construction defect actions prior to the enactment of the same.
Civil Code section 895, et seq. has significantly changed the landscape of construction defect lawsuits. Yet, for years, the only attention given to the statutes focused solely on the codified pre-litigation process that requires plaintiffs and builders to meet and confer regarding defects and attempt a process to repair the alleged defects before litigation is pursued. A major impediment to the implementation of the pre-litigation procedures has often been that the statutes specifically state that the information obtained during the pre-litigation process is admissible at trial. Hence, through use of the pre-litigation process, plaintiffs’ counsel can engage in a builder funded fishing expedition and later use the information obtained to advance their litigation goals. As such, many builders have chosen to opt out of codified pre-litigation process altogether, an option which the builder can elect within their Purchase and Sale Agreements.
Recently, counsel for builders throughout California have turned their attention to the “exclusive remedy” aspect of SB-800 by seeking, often successfully, to limit plaintiffs to a single cause of action for violation of SB-800. Civil Code section 943 makes clear that a cause of action for violation of SB-800 performance standards is a plaintiff’s sole remedy for a residential construction defect action. Civil Code section 943 states:
Except as provided in this title, no other cause of action for a claim covered by this title or for damages recoverable under 944 is allowed. (Civ. Code, § 943.) Â
The question remains: what is the benefit of requiring plaintiffs to trim down their complaint and eliminate their tried and true common law causes of action, and requiring them to pursue only a single cause of action for violation of SB800?
The construction standards enumerated within SB-800 include fifty-plus functionality standards. On their face, any benefit to pursuing a construction defect action under a single cause of action for violation of SB-800 initially appears trivial at best, in light of the fact that a jury may be very confused with the complexity of the functionality standards set forth within the Civil Code. Nevertheless, Title VII of the Civil Code actually contains numerous provisions that builders can utilize to their benefit throughout the process of construction defect litigation, including during preparation for trial.
First and foremost, counsel for builders can assert numerous affirmative defenses that will be beneficial if the matter proceeds to trial. These affirmative defenses, as codified in Civil Code section 945.5, include mitigation, in whole or in part, for damages caused by: an unforeseen act of nature; a homeowner’s failure to allow reasonable and timely access for inspections and repair under the pre-litigation procedures; the homeowner’s failure to follow the builder’s recommendations and commonly accepted homeowner maintenance obligations; ordinary wear and tear; misuse; abuse; or neglect. Builders should include these affirmative defenses within their responsive pleadings and as trial approaches, prepare appropriate motions in limine and request special jury instructions regarding the same. As frustrated builders and their attorneys are well aware, many construction defect suits result from a homeowner’s failure to properly maintain their property in a manner that is consistent with normal maintenance procedures and guidelines. Furthermore, within the ten year statute of limitations for most defects, ordinary wear and tear is often attributable to numerous deficiencies alleged by plaintiffs. The affirmative defense for a homeowner’s failure to allow inspections and repairs is also vital, as plaintiffs’ counsel may encourage a homeowner to forego the repair and seek monetary damages, allowing plaintiffs’ counsel to ultimately obtain their share of attorney’s fees. Therefore, the SB-800 statutes provide the builder with recourse and distinctive mitigation defenses that were previously and confusingly mixed into tort and contract related defenses. These affirmative defenses can also be utilized by counsel during the cross-examination of plaintiff homeowners and expert witnesses. Defense counsel should fully grasp these defenses and utilize them as defense themes throughout litigation.
As a plaintiff is limited to a single cause of action for violation of SB-800, if defense counsel has failed to properly eliminate excessive tort and contract causes of action prior to trial, a motion for summary adjudication, or at the very least, a motion for judgment on the pleadings should be brought to limit the introduction of evidence outside of a single cause of action for violation of SB-800. Practical judges are always looking for ways to streamline and expedite trials, and they are currently ruling that SB-800 is the exclusive remedy available to plaintiffs. In fact, plaintiffs’ firms in SB-800 matters are now voluntarily limiting their complaints to this one cause of action.
Special jury instructions can also be crafted to limit a jury’s computation of damages pursuant to Civil Codesection 944, which provides the method for computing damages within a construction defect action, as follows:
If a claim for damages is made under this title, the homeowner is only entitled to damages for the reasonable value of repairing any violation of the standards set forth in this title, the reasonable cost of repairing any damages caused by the repair efforts, the reasonable cost of repairing and rectifying any damages resulting from the failure of the home to meet the standards, the reasonable cost of removing and replacing any improper repair by the builder, reasonable relocation and storage expenses, lost business income if the home was used as a principal place of a business licensed to be operated from the home, reasonable investigative costs for each established violation, and all other costs or fees recoverable by contract or statute. (Civ. Code, § 944.) [Emphasis added.]
Civil Code section 944 specifically prohibits recovery for damages outside the scope of its explicit language as it states “the homeowner is only entitled to ... damages for the reasonable value of repairing any violation of the standards set forth in this title....” [Emphasis added.] The statute ultimately provides a “reasonableness” standard for the computation of damages that did not exist when computing damages on traditional common law tort and contract claims. Therefore, defense counsel should prepare special jury instructions to limit evidence of damages introduced at trial to the reasonable value of repairing any violation of the standards, and to exclude any evidence of damages beyond the reasonableness standard. Defense counsel should seize the opportunity to utilize the theme of “reasonableness” when attacking plaintiffs’ allegations and plaintiffs’ proposed repair methodology throughout the discovery process and at trial.
Defense counsel may also prepare a motion in limine or special jury instruction regarding the limitation of evidence regarding defects that did not cause resultant damage. Civil Code section 897 states:
Intent of Standards
The standards set forth in this chapter are intended to address every function or component of a structure. To the extent that a function or component of a structure is not addressed by these standards, it shall be actionable if it causes damage. (Civ. Code, § 897.) [Emphasis added.]
Defense counsel can argue that the introduction of any evidence supporting a claim for construction-related deficiencies that are not enumerated within Civil Code section 896, or for deficiencies where no damage has occurred is prohibited and must be excluded at trial. This requirement of resultant damages is familiar as the general rule was previously established in Aas v. Superior Court (2000) 24 Cal.4th 627, in which the California Supreme Court held that there is no tort recovery for construction defects that have not actually caused property damage. The legislature effectively codified this rule within Civil Code section 897.
A motion in limine can also be crafted to limit expert testimony to the standards enumerated in Civil Code section 896, and to deficiencies that caused damage pursuant to Civil Code 897. The motion in limine can be based upon Civil Code section 943 and the fact that claims for defects in homes which were sold after January 1, 2003 may only be pursued under a single cause of action for violation of SB-800. As such, expert testimony should be controlled by the standards set forth in Civil Code section 896. Furthermore, throughout a construction defect matter, defense counsel should ensure that their experts are well versed with the standards and that they can provide testimony that utilizes the same. Defense counsel’s knowledge of the standards will also be helpful during the cross-examination of plaintiffs’ expert witnesses.
If, despite the efforts of defense counsel, the complaint still has numerous causes of action, or if only some homes fall under the purview of SB-800 while others do not, defense counsel can utilize a motion to bifurcate trial. The motion’s basis is that a cause of action for violation of SB-800 will require the introduction of evidence regarding the violations of the fifty-plus standards, and the tort and contract-based claims would also require the introduction of a wide range of evidence to prove each cause of action. For example, in order to prove the tort causes of action, plaintiffs must prove elements such as: duty, breach, proximate and actual causation, and that the builder placed the homes into the stream of commerce. (See Richards v. Stanley (1954) 43 Cal.2d 60, 63; Kriegler v. Eichler Homes, Inc. (1969) 269 Cal.App.2d 224, 227.) On the contract causes of action, plaintiffs must prove the existence of a valid written contract for the sale of the home, including proof regarding the existence of basic contractual elements such as offer, acceptance, and consideration. (Civ. Code, § 1624 subd. (a); Roth v. Malson (1997) 67 Cal.App.4th 552, 557.) Defense counsel can argue that exposing the jury to elements that may or may not be applicable to all of the homes in the action will complicate and confuse the jury. Thus, concurrently exposing the jury to the SB-800 claims and the non-SB-800 claims will necessitate undue consumption of time, and create the substantial danger of undue prejudice of confusing the issues or misleading the jury.
One of the most important and relevant features of the SB-800 statutes is that they include shortened statutes of limitation as to certain enumerated defects. The codified statutes of limitations apply from the date of “close of escrow,” and are much more definitive than statutes of limitations regarding tort and contract claims. Therefore, they can be utilized within a motion for summary adjudication in cases where only one or a few defects are alleged. For example, under Civil Code section 896, et seq., there is a five year limitation on paint (Civ. Code, § 896, subd. (g)(1)); a four year limitation on plumbing fixtures (Civ. Code, § 896, subd. (e)); a three year limitation on landscaping (Civ. Code § 896, subd. (g)(12)); and a one year limitation on irrigation systems and drainage (Civ. Code, § 896, subd. (g)(7)). The non-SB-800 claims are subject to a four year statute of limitation for patent defects and a ten year statute of limitation for latent defects. (See Code of Civ. Proc., §§ 337.1, 337.15.) The contrast between the statute of limitations for the SB-800 claims and non-SB-800 claims can complicate a matter at trial, further establishing the necessity to limit plaintiffs to a single cause of action for violation of SB-800. Hence, defense counsel should also utilize a motion to bifurcate the statute of limitations issues from the issue of liability if a question of fact exists. If successful on the motion to bifurcate, plaintiff’s counsel will be barred from the introducing evidence at trial regarding a defect where the statute of limitations has run.
Defense counsel should also seek to simplify the construction standards for the jury. Ultimately, by drafting jury instructions and a special verdict form that is easy to navigate, counsel can promote an easy interpretation of the standards enumerated within the Civil Code. The best route for drafting a special verdict form is to draft it as a check-list, similar to a traditional real estate walk-through check-list. By incorporating the shortened statutes of limitations into the special verdict form, defense counsel can effectively frame the case for the jury. The special verdict form should also allow the jury to easily eliminate any claim for damages that is mitigated, in whole or in part, through the codified affirmative defenses. Defense counsel should also consider drafting a trial brief that effectively and simplistically provides the trial court judge with an understanding of the specific defects before the court, and simultaneously notes which Civil Code standards are implicated and the scope of the same. If the trial judge is not well versed in construction defect litigation, defense counsel should be all the more careful in breaking down the parameters and limitations codified within SB-800 for the court.
The strategies outlined within this article are only a few tactics that can be utilized to defend a construction defect suit. Depending on the defect allegations within any particular case, defense counsel should become intimately familiar with Title VII of the Civil Code and use all aspects of the same to their advantage. If not, plaintiffs’ counsel will have the advantage during “court-house step” settlement discussions and at trial.
Printed courtesy of Samir R. Patel, Esq. of Lorber, Greenfield, & Polito, LLP. Mr. Patel can be contacted at spatel@lorberlaw.com.
Allowing The Use Of a General Verdict Form in a Construction Defect Case Could Subject Your Client to Prejudgment Interest
August 16, 2012 — Heather Anderson, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC
A recent opinion from the Colorado Court of Appeals is a cautionary tale concerning the calculation of pre-judgment interest. See Hendricks v. Allied Waste Transportation, Inc., 2012 WL 1881004 (Colo. App. 2012). The Hendricks sued Allied after one of its drivers backed into the corner of their home with an Allied garbage truck. At trial, a jury awarded the Hendricks $160,100 in damages. Although the jury was instructed on the cost of repairs, diminution in value, and non-economic damages, the parties agreed to a general verdict form that did not ask the jury to specify the types of damages awarded. Id. at *1. The Hendricks sought to amend the judgment to include prejudgment interest and costs, which the trial court granted.
Allied appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by awarding the Hendricks prejudgment interest from the date their property was damaged. Id. at *7. The Colorado Court of Appeals found no error, and affirmed.
Read the full story…5
Reprinted courtesy of Heather Anderson, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC. Ms. Anderson can be contacted at anderson@hhmrlaw.com
Georgia Law: “An Occurrence Can Arise Where Faulty Workmanship Causes Unforeseen or Unexpected Damage to Other Property”
March 5, 2011 — By
CDCoverage.com, March 5, 2011
In American Empire Surplus Lines Ins. Co. v. Hathaway Development Co., Inc., No. S10G0521 (Ga. March 7, 2011), insured plumbing subcontractor Whisnant was sued by general contractor Hathaway seeking damages for costs incurred by Hathaway in repairing damage to property other than Whisnant’s plumbing work resulting from Whisnant’s negligently performed plumbing work on three separate projects. On one project, Whisnant installed a pipe smaller
Read the full story...Reprinted courtesy of CDCoverage.com
Damron Agreement Questioned in Colorado Casualty Insurance v Safety Control Company, et al.
February 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Safety Control and EMC appealed the judgment in Colorado Casualty Insurance Company versus Safety Control Company, Inc., et al. (Ariz. App., 2012). The Superior Court in Maricopa County addressed “the validity and effect of a Damron agreement a contractor and its excess insurer entered into that assigned their rights to sue the primary insurer.” Judge Johnsen stated, “We hold the agreement is enforceable but remand for a determination of whether the stipulated judgment falls within the primary insurer’s policy.”
The Opinion provides some facts and procedural history regarding the claim. “The Arizona Department of Transportation (“ADOT”) hired DBA Construction Company (“DBA”) to perform a road-improvement project on the Loop 101 freeway. Safety Control Company, Inc. was one of DBA’s subcontractors. As required by the subcontract, Safety Control purchased from Employer’s Mutual Casualty Company (“EMC”) a certificate of insurance identifying DBA as an additional insured on a policy providing primary coverage for liability arising out of Safety Control’s work.”
A collision occurred on site, injuring Hugo Roman. Roman then sued ADT and DBA for damages. “Colorado Casualty tendered DBA’s defense to the subcontractors, including Safety Control. Safety Control and EMC rejected the tender. Roman eventually settled his claims against DBA and ADOT. DBA and ADOT stipulated with Roman for entry of judgment of $750,000; Roman received $75,000 from DBA (paid by Colorado Casualty) and $20,000 from ADOT, and agreed not to execute on the stipulated judgment. Finally, DBA, ADOT and Colorado Casualty assigned to Roman their rights against the subcontractors and other insurers.”
Colorado Casualty attempted to recover what “it had paid to defend DBA and ADOT and settle with Roman. However, Roman intervened, and argued that “Colorado Casualty had assigned its subrogation rights to him as part of the settlement agreement.” The suit was not dismissed, but the Superior Court allowed Roman to intervene. “Roman then filed a counterclaim against Colorado Casualty and a cross-claim against the subcontractors.”
All claims were settled against all of the defendants except Safety Control and EMC. “The superior court ruled on summary judgment that EMC breached a duty to defend DBA and that as a result, ‘DBA was entitled to settle with Roman without EMC’s consent as long as the settlement was not collusive or fraudulent.’ After more briefing, the court held the stipulated judgment was neither collusive nor procured by fraud and that EMC therefore was liable to Roman on the stipulated judgment and for his attorney’s fees. The court also held Safety Control breached its subcontract with DBA by failing to procure completed-operations insurance coverage and would be liable for damages to the extent that EMC did not satisfy what remained (after the other settlements) of the stipulated judgment and awards of attorney’s fees.” Safety Control and EMC appealed the judgment.
Four reasons were given for the decision of the ruling. First, “the disagreement between Roman and Colorado Casualty does not preclude them from pursuing their claims against EMC and Safety Control.” Second, “the settlement agreement is not otherwise invalid.” Third, “issues of fact remain about whether the judgment falls within the EMC policy.” Finally, “Safety Control breached the subcontract by failing to procure ‘Completed Operations’ coverage for DBA.”
In conclusion, the Superior Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded . “Although, as stated above, we have affirmed several rulings of the superior court, we reverse the judgment against EMC and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion to determine whether the stipulated judgment was a liability that arose out of Safety Control’s operations. In addition, we affirm the superior court’s declaratory judgment against Safety Control but remand so that the court may clarify the circumstances under which Safety Control may be liable for damages and may conduct whatever further proceedings it deems appropriate to ascertain the amount of those damages. We decline all parties’ requests for attorney’s fees pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-341.01 without prejudice to a request for fees incurred in this appeal to be filed by the prevailing party on remand before the superior court.”
Read the court’s decision…
Policing Those Subcontractors: It Might Take Extra Effort To Be An Additional Insured
June 14, 2011 — Douglas Reiser, Builders Council Blog
I just came across a case that I think truly paints the insurance dilemma for contractors. Thanks to this recent Illinois case, I don’t have to make up any factual scenarios—so kudos to Attorney Robert Boylan for posting it.
In reading over my RSS feeds this weekend, I noticed a great writeup on long-time blogger Josh Glazov’s Construction Law Today. Attorney Robert Boylan’s post describes a recent Illinois case where a general contractor was denied its additional insured status on a second-tier subcontractor’s insurance. The reason for the denial: the general contractor failed to procure an agreement in writing with the second-tier subcontractor, requiring it to be listed as an additional insured.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of Douglas Reiser of Reiser Legal LLC. Mr. Reiser can be contacted at info@reiserlegal.com
Ghost Employees Steal Jobs from Legit Construction Firms
September 13, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Firms that skirt labor laws for construction workers can undercut firms that are obeying those laws. In a piece in Raleigh, North Carolina’s News & Observer, Doug Burton, a commercial masonry contractor summed it up: “my competitors are cheating.” The article describes the low-bidding firms “called their workers independent contractors ? or treated them like ghosts, paid under the table and never acknowledged.” The cost to the state is “unpaid medical bills for injured workers, uncollected business and personal taxes, and payments not made to a depleted state unemployment reserve.”
One firm examined in the article, Martin’s Bricklaying, employs mostly immigrant Mexican laborers, many of whom are in the country illegally. One employee told the News & Observer, “we don’t complain.”
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Mortar Insufficient to Insure Summary Judgment in Construction Defect Case
January 6, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The US District Court of Nevada issued a summary judgment in the case of R&O Construction Company V. Rox Pro International Group, Ltd. on December 19, 2011. The case involved the installation of stone veneer at a Home Depot location (Home Depot was not involved in the case). R&O’s subcontractor, New Creation Masonry, purchased the stone veneer from Arizona Stone. Judge Larry Hicks noted that “the stone veneer failed and R&O was forced to make substantial structural repairs to the Home Depot store.”
Rox Pro asked the court for a summary judgment, which the court granted only in part. The court looked at two issues in the case, whether the installation instructions constituted a breach of implied warranty of merchantability, and whether there was a breach of an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose.
Judge Hicks found that there was a breach of implied warranty of merchantability. The instructions drafted by Real Stone and distributed by Arizona Stone were not sufficient for affixing the supplied stones, according to R&O’s expert, a claim the plaintiffs dispute. “Because there is an issue of material fact concerning the installation guidelines, the court shall deny Arizona Stone’s motion for a summary judgment on this issue.”
On the other hand, the judge did not find that the instructions had any bearing as to whether R&O bought the stone, since the stone was selected by the shopping center developer. This issue was, in the view of the judge, appropriately dismissed.
Read the court’s decision…
Fifth Circuit Asks Texas Supreme Court to Clarify Construction Defect Decision
November 7, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The Fifth Circuit Court has withdrawn its decision in Ewing Construction Company v. Amerisure Insurance Company, pending clarification from the Texas Supreme Court of its decision in Gilbert Texas Construction, L.P. v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s London. The Fifth Circuit had applied the Gilbert case in determining that a contractual liability exclusion barred coverage for faulty workmanship. The Insurance Journal reports that this decision was both applauded and criticized, with a concern noted that “an insurer would now have its pick of either the ‘your work’ exclusion or the contractual liability exclusion without the exception for subcontracted work.”
The Fifth Circuit is now asking the Texas Supreme Court two questions to clarify Gilbert, which Brian S. Martin and Suzanne M. Patrick see as a sign that the Court has realized that it overly expanded the scope of the earlier ruling. A response is expected from the Texas Supreme Court by spring 2013.
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