District Court’s Ruling Affirmed in TCD v American Family Mutual Insurance Co.
May 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
In the case, TCD, Inc. v American Family Mutual Insurance Company, the district court’s summary judgment was in favor of the defendant. In response, the Plaintiff, TCD, appealed “on the ground that the insurance company had no duty to defend TCD under a commercial general liability (CGL) insurance policy.” The appeals court affirmed the decision.
The appeals ruling provides a brief history of the case: “This case arises out of a construction project in Frisco, Colorado. The developer, Frisco Gateway Center, LLC (Gateway), entered into a contract with TCD, the general contractor, to construct a building. TCD entered into a subcontract with Petra Roofing and Remodeling Company (Petra) to install the roof on the building. The subcontract required Petra to "indemnify, hold harmless, and defend" TCD against claims arising out of or resulting from the performance of Petra’s work on the project. The subcontract also required Petra to name TCD as an additional insured on its CGL policy in connection with Petra’s work under the subcontract.”
Furthermore, “TCD initiated this case against Petra and the insurance company, asserting claims for declaratory judgment, breach of insurance contract, breach of contract, and negligence. The district court entered a default judgment against Petra, and both the remaining parties moved for summary judgment. The court granted summary judgment on the entirety of the action, in favor of the insurance company, concluding that the counterclaims asserted by Gateway against TCD did not give rise to an obligation to defend or indemnify under the CGL policy.”
The appeals court rejected each contention made by TCD in turn. First, “TCD contend[ed] that Gateway’s counterclaims constitute[d] an allegation of ‘property damage,’ which is covered under the CGL policy.” The appeals court disagreed. Next, “TCD argue[d] that [the court] should broaden or extend the complaint rule, also called the ‘four corners’ rule, and allow it to offer evidence outside of the counterclaims to determine the insurance company’s duty to defend in this case.” The appeals court was not persuaded by TCD’s argument.
The judgment was affirmed. Judge Roman and Judge Miller concur.
Read the court’s decision…
Minnesota Starts Wide-Ranging Registration of Contractors
July 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Minnesota has replaced its Independent Contractor Exemption Certificate program with the Contractor Registration Pilot Project, according to an article in the Martindale-Hubble Legal Library by Michael B. Lapicola. Mr. Lapicola notes that “it will be a violation of the law to contract with or perform construction services for another person without first being registered with the Pilot Project, or to contract with or pay another person to perform construction services if the other person is not registered with the Pilot Project. There are, however, quite a few exceptions, including those who are currently registered with the earlier program. Additionally, independent contractors who do not register can avoid the fine (up to $2,000) by registering within thirty days of fines being levied. Individuals and firms that do not perform building construction or improvements are exempt from the hiring aspects of the statute.
Minnesota’s goal is to “assist state agencies to investigate employee misclassification in the building industry.” Employees of construction firms do not individually register. Rather, the intent of the of law is to stop those who would “require any individual through coercion, misrepresentation or fraudulent means to adopt independent contractor status” or to “knowingly misrepresent or misclassify an individual as an independent contractor.”
Read the full story…
Construction Firm Sues City and Engineers over Reservoir Project
October 28, 2011 — CDJ Staff
The city of Fremont, Ohio and Arcadis have been sued by Trucco Construction. Trucco had been hired by the city to build a reservoir designed by Arcadis, the News-Messenger reports. Peter Welin, attorney for Trucco, said that he found “startling evidence of the company’s negligence” when he deposed Arcadis engineers. “This project could never be built the way they bid it.”
Their suit alleges that Arcadis and the city were aware that the site was not conducive to construction and also that Arcadis failed to be a neutral party in discussions between Trucco and the city regarding compensation.
Sam Wamper, an attorney for Fremont, said he was going to file a motion which would include “quite an interesting story,” but declined to elaborate.
Read the full story...
Defect Claims as Occurrences? Check Your State Laws
July 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Although four states have defined construction defect claims as occurrences, contractors are still dealing with “coverage gaps for faulty work construction,” says Mike Tsikoudakis in a piece at Business Insurance. He quotes Julian Ehrlich, the senior VP of claims for Aon Risk Services that “one of the interesting and compelling aspects of the issue of coverage for defective construction is that jurisdictions differ, so policyholders don’t know what they’re going to get.” He further notes that “in context of construction defect, the term ‘occurrence’ is ambiguous.”
One problem, as noted by Jeffrey J. Vita, a partner at Saxe Doernberger & Vita, is that construction firms end up needing to simultaneously defend against defect claims and to also file suit to be certain their insurance firms will cover claims. Insurance for construction defect claims is described as “expensive and somewhat limited.” Mr. Vita expects more states to help this situation with new laws, clarifying what is an occurrence.
Read the full story…
Nevada Assembly Bill Proposes Changes to Construction Defect Litigation
April 14, 2011 — April 14, 2011 Beverley BevenFlorez - Construction Defect Journal
Assemblyman John Oceguera has written a bill that would redefine the term Construction Defect, set statutory limitations, and force the prevailing party to pay for attorney’s fees. Assembly Bill 401 has been referred to the Committee on Judiciary.
Currently, the law in Nevada states that “a defect in the design, construction, manufacture, repair or landscaping of a new residence, of an alteration of or addition to an existing residence, or of an appurtenance, which is done in violation of law, including in violation of local codes or ordinances, is a constructional defect.” However, AB401 “provides that there is a rebuttable presumption that workmanship which exceeds the standards set forth in the applicable law, including any applicable local codes or ordinances, is not a constructional defect.”
The Nevada courts may award attorney fees to the prevailing party today. However, AB401 mandates that attorney fees must be awarded, and the exact award is to be determined by the Court. “(1) The court shall award to the prevailing party reasonable attorney’s fees, which must be an element of costs and awarded as costs; and (2) the amount of any attorney’s fees awarded must be determined by and approved by the court.”
AB401 also sets a three year statutory limit “for an action for damages for certain deficiencies, injury or wrongful death caused by a defect in construction if the defect is a result of willful misconduct or was fraudulently concealed.”
This Nevada bill is in the early stages of development.
Read the full story...
Safe Harbors- not just for Sailors anymore (or, why advance planning can prevent claims of defective plans & specs) (law note)
August 17, 2011 — Melissa Brumback
Have you ever considered a “Safe Harbor Provision” for your Owner-Architect or Owner-Engineer contract? Maybe it is time that you do.
As you are (probably too well) aware, on every construction project there are changes. Some of these are due to the owner’s change of heart, value engineering concerns, contractor failures, and material substitutions. Some may be because of a design error, omission, or drawing conflict. It happens.
A “Safe Harbor Provision” is a provision that establishes an acceptable percentage of increased construction costs (that is, a percentage of the project’s contingency). The idea is that if the construction changes attributable to the designer is within this percentage, no claim will be made by the Owner for design defects.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of Melissa Brumback of Ragsdale Liggett PLLC. Ms. Brumback can be contacted at mbrumback@rl-law.com.
Courts Are Conflicted As To Whether "Good Faith" Settlement Determinations Can Be Reviewed Via Writ Petition Or Appeal
July 10, 2012 — Stephen A. Sunseri and Aarti Kewalramani, Gatzke Dillon & Ballance LLP
The Court of Appeal, Second District, Division Three, ruled in Oak Springs Villas Homeowners Association v. Advanced Truss Systems, Inc., et al., (June 14, 2012, B234568) __ Cal.App.4th __ [2012 WL 2149923], that a non-settling defendant cannot appeal a trial court's good faith settlement determination. Instead, a non-settling defendant may only file a petition for writ of mandate pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 877.6 to challenge a good faith determination. This decision comes on the heels of a 2011 ruling in Cahill v. San Diego Gas & Electric Co. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 939, which found that a writ petition is not the sole means of challenging a trial court's good faith settlement determination.
In Oak Springs Villas, supra, the condominium homeowners' association sued a developer, general contractor, and various subcontractors for alleged construction deficiencies and resultant property damage. The association eventually settled with the developer, but not with a truss manufacturer. The trial court approved the developer's motion for good faith settlement determination, and the truss manufacturer immediately appealed, instead of filing a writ petition. On appeal, the developer argued the good faith determination was not an appealable order. The truss manufacturer argued Cahill applied, as well as an older case, Justus v. Atchison (1977) 19 Cal.3d 564, which allowed for appeals when no remaining issues exist as to the appealing party.
The Court of Appeal ruled in the developer's favor and declined to follow Cahill, stating the truss manufacturer should have filed a writ petition, as expressly required under Section 877.6, subdivision (e). The Court also believed Justus was inapplicable because a non-settling party should not be allowed to have two review opportunities ?Äì one after an adverse good faith ruling, and then another after the ultimate conclusion of the case.
However, the greater effect is that Cahill and Oak Springs Villas simultaneously stand in conflict and appear to be valid law. One case allows for an appeal of a good faith settlement determination, while the other requires strict adherence to the statute. The Supreme Court is likely to review the issue. In the meantime, parties challenging good faith rulings are advised to consult the statutory requirements under Section 877.6, subdivision (e).
Printed courtesy of Stephen A. Sunseri and Aarti Kewalramani, Gatzke Dillon & Ballance LLP. Mr. Sunseri can be contacted at ssunseri@gdandb.com and Ms. Kewalramani can be contacted at akewalramani@gdandb.com.
Nevada Supreme Court Reverses Decision against Grader in Drainage Case
June 30, 2011 — CDJ Staff
The Nevada Supreme Court has issued an opinion in the case of Rayburn Lawn & Landscape Designers v. Plaster Development Corporation, reversing the decision of the lower court and remanding the case for a new trial.
The case originated in a construction defect suit in which Plaster Development Corporation was sued by homeowners. Plaster filed a third-party complaint against its subcontractor, Reyburn. The testimony of Reyburn’s owner was considered to be admission of liability and so the court limited the scope of Reyburn’s closing argument and did not allow the jury to determine the extent of Reyburn’s liability. Reyburn appealed.
Plaster, in their case, cited California’s Crawford v. Weather Sheild MFG, Inc. The court held the application of these standards, but noted that the “an indemnitor’s duty to defend an indemnitee is limited to those claims directly attributed to the indemnitor’s scope of work and does not include defending against claims arising from the negligence of other subcontractors and the indemnittee’s own negligence.”
On the matter of law against Reyburn, the court concluded, “Given the conflicting evidence at trial as to whether Reyburn’s work was implicated in the defective retaining walls and sidewalls, and viewing the evidence and inferences in Reyburn’s favor, we conclude that a reasonable jury could have granted relief in favor of Reyburn.” The Nevada Supreme Court conduced that the district court should not have granted Plaster’s motion for judgement.
Further, the Nevada Supreme Court found that the district court should have apportioned the fees and costs to those claims directly attributed to Reyburn’s scope of work, “if any,” and should not have assigned all attorney costs and court fees to Reyburn.
Read the court’s decision…
Driver’s Death May Be Due to Construction Defect
August 16, 2012 — CDJ Staff
A man driving a rental truck collided with a parking ramp at the Mall of America in Bloomington, Minnesota, leading to his death when the ramp broke and crushed the cab of the truck. One expert said that the ramp should have been built to withstand the impact. Tim Galarnyk told Fox News that the building feature didn’t’ even bear weight, describing it as “a cosmetic facial panel.” Nevertheless, in a contest with a truck he said the ramp portion should “peel it like a tin can before it takes the concrete element down.”
The Mall of American is not commenting on the accident.
Read the full story…
California Supreme Court Binds Homeowner Associations To Arbitration Provisions In CC&Rs
September 13, 2012 — Stephen A. Sunseri and Aarti Kewalramani, Gatzke Dillon & Ballance LLP (http://www.gdandb.com).
The California Supreme Court ruled in Pinnacle Museum Tower Assn. v. Pinnacle Market Development (August 16, 2012, S186149) __ Cal.4th __ [2012 WL 3516134], that arbitration provisions within the covenants, conditions, and restrictions (“CC&Rs”) for condominium projects are enforceable against their homeowner associations. The ruling — two years in the making — was based on legislative history of laws governing common interest developments, and decades of decisional authority involving contracts and arbitration provisions.
In Pinnacle, a homeowners association sued a condominium builder for construction defects and resultant property damage to the common areas, and to the separate property interests held by the individual members. The builder moved to compel arbitration, based on a provision contained in the CC&Rs which required resolution of all construction disputes through binding arbitration. The association argued it could not be compelled to arbitrate these claims because it was not a party to the agreement to arbitrate, asserting “the Association did not bargain with [the builder] over the terms of the Project CC&R's or participate in their drafting.”
The Supreme Court rejected the association's argument on the grounds that the builder-authored CC&Rs complied with the Davis-Stirling Act (“the Act”) (Civil Code §1350, et seq.) ? the law that governs all common interest developments in California. Under the Act, builders and sellers of common interest residential units are required to provide a copy of the CC&Rs to all purchasers, as well as copies of the Department of Real Estate's public report, which informs purchasers of their rights and remedies as members of the association, and encourages each prospective purchaser to review the terms carefully before entering into any agreement. Further, the Act states all CC&Rs are enforceable, unless unreasonable, and inure to the benefit of and bind all owners in the development. (Civ. Code, §1354, subd. (a).) The Court found each owner who purchased a condominium in the project either expressly consented to the terms and provisions of the CC&Rs or was deemed to have consented to the terms at the time of purchase.
The Court also did not find the arbitration provision to be unconscionable. The Court indicated the provision was drafted and recorded in accordance with the Act, which allowed each prospective purchaser to make an informed decision prior buying a condominium unit. The provision also limited arbitration to construction defect disputes. The Court did not find any evidence the provision “shocked the conscience” or was “oppressive” in any way.
Pinnacle settles a decades-long conflict over whether arbitration provisions in CC&Rs for condominium projects are enforceable against homeowner associations and their members. It remains unclear, however, whether Pinnacle’s rationale will be applied to cases involving homeowner associations for single-family residences (as opposed to condominiums), assuming those CC&Rs have similar arbitration requirements. Regardless, the result of Pinnacle is clear, if arbitration provisions contained in condominium CC&Rs meet the fairness and unconscionability tests set out by the Court, more condominium construction defect cases brought by homeowner associations will be resolved through the arbitration process.
Read the court’s decision…
Printed courtesy of Stephen A. Sunseri and Aarti Kewalramani, Gatzke Dillon & Ballance LLP. Mr. Sunseri can be contacted at ssunseri@gdandb.com and Ms. Kewalramani can be contacted at akewalramani@gdandb.com.
Supreme Court of New York Denies Motion in all but One Cause of Action in Kikirov v. 355 Realty Assoc., et al.
April 28, 2011 — April 28, 2011 Beverley BevenFlorez - Construction Defect Journal
In the construction defect suit Kikirov v. 355 Realty Associates, LLC, et al., the Supreme Court of the State of New York granted a dismissal of the plaintiff’s fourth cause of action, but denied the defendants’ motion in all other respects. The plaintiff alleged breach of contract, among other claims. “355 Realty was the sponsor of 355 Kings Highway Condominium, a condominium project located at 355 Kings Highway, in Brooklyn, New York. The condominium units were allegedly marketed as ‘ultra luxury condos,’ and a ‘Manhattan style condominium building,’ which would be the ‘epitome of luxury and quality.’ The construction of the six-story 28 unit residential condominium building began in approximately November 2003. […] Plaintiff entered into a purchase agreement, dated December 21, 2005, with 355 Realty (which was executed on behalf of 355 Realty by Michael Marino, as its member) for the purchase of Unit 2G in the building.”
The plaintiff alleged that construction defects emerged soon after moving into the unit: “After taking occupancy of his condominium unit, plaintiff allegedly experienced serious leakage and moisture problems in his unit, which caused a dangerous mold condition to develop, in addition to causing actual damage to the structural elements of his unit. According to plaintiff, the walls, moldings, and wood floors of his unit are constantly wet and moist, and there is severe buckling of the wood floors. Plaintiff claims that these problems have caused his unit to be uninhabitable. Plaintiff alleges that he has been forced to remove all of his personal belongings from his unit and has been unable to occupy his unit.”
According to the plaintiff, Foremost attempted to repair the defects, but only made the situation worse: “Specifically, plaintiff asserts that Foremost’s contractors opened his walls to remove the stained drywall, but never corrected the cause of the leaks, destroyed the walls, and never properly taped and painted the sheet rock. Plaintiff alleges that Foremost repaired the openings in a defective manner. Plaintiff also claims that his floor was repaired at that time by a subcontractor hired by Foremost, but the basic structural problem was never resolved and the leaks continued, compromising the beams and causing the mold conditions, in addition to all of the physical damage present in the unit. On or about July 16, 2009, plaintiff allegedly sent a notice of the defects to 355 Realty and to the managing agent designated by the condominium board, by certified mail, return receipt requested. Plaintiff asserts that defendants have failed and refused to repair and remedy the defective condition, and that the damage is extensive and requires major structural repairs.”
The plaintiff filed suit on May 4, 2010, and the original complaint asserted eight causes of action. “By decision and order dated September 13, 2010, the court granted a motion by defendants to dismiss plaintiff’s second cause of action for breach of implied covenants of good faith and fair dealing, his third cause of action for breach of implied warranties, his fifth cause of action for negligence as against 355 Realty, Michael Marino, Anthony Piscione, Ahron Hersh, and Toby Hersh, his seventh cause of action for negligence as against Vision, Foremost, and MMJ, and his eighth cause of action for violations of General Business Law § 349 and § 350, and granted plaintiff leave to replead his first cause of action for breach of contract as against 355 Realty, Michael Marino, Anthony Piscione, Ahron Hersh, and Toby Hersh, his fourth cause of action for breach of statutory warranties, and his sixth cause of action for breach of contract as against Vision, Foremost, and MMJ.”
The plaintiff amended their complaint on October 18, 2010, and “has repleaded these three causes of action by asserting a first cause of action for breach of contract as against 355 Realty, Michael Marino, Anthony Piscione, Ahron Hersh, and Toby Hersh, a second cause of action for breach of statutory warranties, and a third cause of action for breach of contract as against Vision, Foremost, and MMJ. In addition, plaintiff, in his amended complaint, has added a fourth cause of action for fraud.”
The defendants, on the other hand, “argue that each of the four causes of action alleged by plaintiff in his amended complaint fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, and that plaintiff’s amended complaint must be dismissed pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7). Defendants also cite to CPLR 3211 (a) (1), and (5), asserting that dismissal is also required based upon documentary evidence and the Statute of Limitations contained in the limited warranty.”The defendants’ motion to dismiss the first cause of action, breach of contract against 355 Realty, was denied: “While defendants dispute that the alleged defects are actually structural in nature, plaintiff’s allegations as to their structural nature are sufficient, at this juncture, to withstand defendants’ motion to dismiss. Thus, dismissal of plaintiff’s first cause of action must be denied.”
Next, the court reviewed the second cause of action, which was breach of statutory warranties: “Defendants’ motion also seeks dismissal of plaintiff’s second cause of action for breach of statutory warranties, which alleges that, under applicable law, including General Business Law § 777-a, et seq., the sponsor warranted to purchasers of units that the units would be constructed in a skillful, careful, and workmanlike manner, consistent with proper design, engineering, and construction standards and practices, and free of material latent, design, and structural defects. Defendants argue that General Business Law § 777-a, known as the housing merchant implied warranty, is inapplicable to this case because it is limited to the construction of a ‘new home,’ defined in General Business Law § 777 (5) as ‘any single family house or for-sale unit in a multi-unit residential structure of five stories or less.’ As noted above, the building in which plaintiff’s condominium unit is located is a six-story building.”
The motion to dismiss the second cause of action is denied. The court provided this reasoning: “the full text of the offering plan has not been provided, the court is unable to examine the entire written agreement so as to determine the purpose of the inclusion of the text of General Business Law § 777.”
In the third cause of action, the plaintiff alleges “a breach of contract claim as against Vision, Foremost, and MMJ based upon their contract with 355 Realty, pursuant to which they agreed to be the general contractors/construction managers for the condominium, to undertake oversight responsibility for the design and construction of the condominium, to prepare and/or review drawings, plans, and specifications for the condominium, and to otherwise manage and oversee the project. Plaintiff alleges that Vision, Foremost, and MMJ breached their contractual obligations in that the condominium units were improperly and inadequately designed and constructed, and completed in an incompetent and unworkmanlike manner, with material design and construction defects.”
The motion to dismiss the third cause of action was denied as well: “Plaintiff alleges, in his amended complaint, that Vision, Foremost, and MMJ have acknowledged notice of the defects and have not denied that they are responsible for providing a warranty to plaintiff. Plaintiff also refers to this warranty, in his amended complaint, by noting that paragraph 16 of the purchase agreement stated that the ‘[s]eller shall not be liable to . . . the [p]urchaser for any matter as to which an assignable warranty . . . has been assigned . . . to [p]urchaser and in such case the sole recourse of such . . . [p]urchaser . . . shall be against the warrantor . . . except that in the event a contractor or subcontractor is financially unable or refuses to perform its warranty . . . [s]eller shall not be excused from its obligations enumerated in the [offering p]lan under Rights and Obligations of Sponsor.’ Consequently, the court finds that dismissal of plaintiff’s third cause of action as against Foremost and MMJ must also be denied.”
In the fourth cause of action, the plaintiff alleges “that defendants made false statements and representations orally, in advertisements, and in the purchase agreement, that the condominium was properly and adequately designed and constructed and completed in a competent and workmanlike manner, in accordance with the condominium plans and specifications and proper design, engineering, and construction standards and practices consistent with applicable standards for a first class, luxury condominium in Brooklyn.”
The court dismissed the fourth cause of action stating, “it must be dismissed because it is duplicative of his first cause of action for breach of contract.” Therefore, “defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s amended complaint is granted to the extent that it seeks dismissal of plaintiff’s fourth cause of action, and it is denied in all other respects.”
Read the court’s decision…
Condo Owners Worried Despite Settlement
September 13, 2012 — CDJ Staff
KB Homes may have settled a construction defect claim with Willowbrook Condominium Association, but some of the owners are still concerned about the repair process. The Sarasota, Florida Herald Tribune reports that one homeowner’s living room “ends with a white tarp.” He told the paper, “We feel like we’re not even owners of our own home.” A neighbor wondered “what happens when people get displaced while their homes are gutted?”
As part of the agreement, the condominium association will be selecting a contractor to repair the problems, while the cost will be paid by KB Homes. Nevertheless, at least one owner fears for their ability to resell his home, noting that even after repairs have been made, “do you think someone’s going to come in here and buy?”
Read the full story…
Late Filing Contractor Barred from Involving Subcontractors in Construction Defect Claim
March 1, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The Colorado Court of Appeals looked at that state’s Construction Defect Action Reform Act in determining if a general contractor could add subcontractors as third-party defendants to a construction defect lawsuit. Shaw Construction, LLC was the general contraction of the Roslyn Court condominium complex, and was sued by the homeowners’ association in a construction defect case. United Builder Services was the drywall subcontractor on the project. MB Roofing had installed roofs, gutters, and downspouts. The certificate of occupancy for the last building was issued on March 10, 2004. The project architect certified completion of all known remaining architectural items in June, 2004.
The HOA filed a claim against the developers of the property on January, 21, 2009. A week later, the HOA amended its complaint to add Shaw, the general contractor. Shaw did not file its answer and third-party complaint until March 29, 2010, sending its notice of claim under the CDARA on March 30.
The subcontractors claimed that the six-year statute of limitations had ended twenty days prior. Shaw claimed that the statute of limitations ran until six years after the architect’s certification, or that the HOA’s suit had tolled all claims.
The trial court granted summary judgment to the subcontractors, determining that “substantial completion occurs ‘when an improvement to real property achieves a degree of completion at which the owner can conveniently utilize the improvement of the purpose it was intended.’”
The appeals court noted that “Shaw correctly points out that the CDARA does not define ‘substantial completion.’” The court argued that Shaw’s interpretation went against the history and intent of the measure. “Historically, a construction professional who received a complaint responded by ‘cross-nam[ing] or add[ing] everybody and anybody who had a part to play in the construction chain.’” The court concluded that the intent of the act was to prevent unnamed subcontractors from being tolled.
The court further rejected Shaw’s reliance on the date of the architect’s certification as the time of “substantial completion,” instead agreeing with the trial court that “the architect’s letter on which Shaw relies certified total completion.”
The appeals court upheld the trial court’s determination that the statute of limitation began to run no later than March 10, 2004 and that Shaw’s complaint of March 29, 2010 was therefore barred. The summary judgment was upheld.
Read the court’s decision…
Homeowner Has No Grounds to Avoid Mechanics Lien
September 1, 2011 — CDJ Staff
The California Court of Appeals has rejected a motion by a homeowner in a dispute with the contractor who built an extension to his home. In McCracken v. Pirvulete, Mr. McCracken filed a mechanics lien after Mr. Pirvulete failed to complete payment. The matter went to trial with a series of exhibits that showed “the contractual relationship was strained and the parties disagreed over performance and payment.” As a result of the trial, the court awarded Mr. McCracken, the contractor, $1,922.22.
Mr. Pirvulete appealed, contending that the court had not allowed his daughter to act as a translator, that the court had failed to give him sufficient time to present his case, that the mechanics lien should have been dismissed, and several other claims, all before a formal judgment was issued. After the court formalized its judgment and rejected the appeal, Mr. Pirvulete appealed again.
The appeals court found that Mr. Pirvulete did not provide an adequate record for review. The court dismissed Mr. Pirvulete’s claims. The court notes that Mr. Pirvulete claimed that a request for a discovery period was denied, however, he has provided neither the request nor the denial. The trial court has no record of either.
Nor was there a record of a request that Mr. Pirvulete’s daughter provide translation. The court notes, “so far as we can glean from the record provided, the Register of Actions states, ‘Trial to proceed without Romanian Interpreter for Defendant; Daughter present to interpret if needed.’” Additionally, the court found that “there has been no showing that his facility with the English language is or was impaired in any way or that there was any portion of any proceeding, which he did not understand.”
Further, the appeals court found there were no grounds for a new trial, despite Mr. Pirvulete’s filings. The court concluded, “The owner has failed to provide a record adequate for review of most, if not all, of the claims of error. Some issues are not cognizable because they relate to entirely separate proceedings, and not the trial below. To the limited extent that the claims are examinable, the owner has made no showing of error.” The court affirmed the judgment of the lower court against Mr. Pirvulete.
Read the court’s decision…
Increased Expenditure on Injuries for New York City School Construction
August 16, 2012 — CDJ Staff
You can buy a lot of bandages for $270 million, but even though the expenses are related to the New York City schools, the money is being budgeted by the School Construction Agency as what they expect to pay for injuries and liability expenses related to school construction. The New York Post notes that this is nearly ten times what the city spent in 2000 on workers' compensation and liability claims. Michael Elmdendorf of the General Contractors Association likened injury compensation to a broken slot machine, telling the Post, "when you pull that lever, you win." A spokesperson from the Department of Education, Margie Feinberg, attributed the rise to higher medical care costs.
Read the full story…
Insurer Must Cover Construction Defects Claims under Actual Injury Rule
March 1, 2012 — Tred Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
The Texas Court of Appeals held that the insured need not prove the exact dates physical damage occurred in order to trigger defense and indemnity coverage. Vines-Herrin Custom Homes, LLC v. Great Am. Lloyds Ins. Co., 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 10027 (Tex. Ct. App. Dec. 21, 2011).
In 1999, the insured built a home. He was insured under a CGL policy issued by Great American from November 9, 1998 to November 9, 2000. Thereafter, the insured held a CGL policy issued by Mid-Continent from November 9, 2000 to September 18, 2002.
After construction was completed, the insured sold the house to the buyer in May 2000. After moving in, the buyer found numerous construction defects in the home, including water entering cracks in the home, and sinking and sagging of parts of the house. The buyer sued the insured, who sought coverage under the two policies. When the insurers refused to defend the underlying suit, the insured sued for a declaratory judgment.
The underlying case went to arbitration and an award of $2.4 million was granted to the buyer. The insured assigned to the buyer his claims against the insurers.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
Another Las Vegas Tower at the Center of Construction Defect Claims
November 7, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Accusations are coming from both sides over construction defects at a Las Vegas tower, only this time, it’s not the Harmon Towers, it’s Hilton Grand Vacations, which is part of the Planet Hollywood Resort. The project was originally dubbed PH Towers Westgate, and it was developed by Westgate Resorts, which is suing the contractor, Tutor-Saliba for $10 million over late completion and construction defects.
Among the defects Westgate is claiming are cracked floor tiles in the valet lobby and cracks and delamination of the pool deck. Tutor-Saliba argues that the failure of the valet lobby floor is due to Westgate specifying only 1/16th inch-wide grouting, instead of the specified ¬º inch, and Westgate’s refusal to allow expansion joints on the pool deck has lead to problems there. Westgate’s attorney, Robert Schumacher, attributes the problems to “shoddy construction practices.”
According to the article in the Las Vegas Review Journal, plans were only 60 percent complete when construction began, leading to “thousands of change orders.” Despite not meeting an August completion deadline, Tutor-Saliba is claiming it is owed a $1.5 million bonus nevertheless.
Read the full story…
Legislatures Shouldn’t Try to Do the Courts’ Job
March 1, 2012 — CDJ Staff
David Thamann, writing in Property Casualty 360, argues that current actions by legislatures on insurance coverage amount to “legislative interference or overreach.” He notes that under current Colorado law, “a court shall presume that the work of a construction professional that results in property damage — including damage to the work itself or other work — is an accident unless the property damage is intended and expected by the insured.” He argues that here legislators are stepping into the role of the courts. “Insureds and insurers are not always going to be pleased with a court ruling, but that is the system we have.”
Read the full story…