Bar to Raise on Green Standard
November 7, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Next June, members of the U.S. Green Building Council will be voting on changes to the LEED green building standard. “The bar is getting raised,” said Navad Malin of BuildingGreen, a consulting and publishing firm, in an article in USA Today. Under the proposed guidelines, builders would have to project energy and water use for five years as part of the certification process. However, if the occupants aren’t as green as the builders anticipated, the buildings will not lose their certification.
The new rules will include higher energy standards, award points for avoiding potentially hazardous materials, and even determine what kind of plumbing items can be used.
Read the full story…
Guilty Pleas Draw Renewed Interest In Nevada’s Construction Defect Laws
December 9, 2011 — CDJ Staff
A report this week by David McGrath Schwarz of the Las Vegas Sun suggests that Nevada’s construction defect laws will be a point of much contention in upcoming legislative sessions. The report cites renewed interest in the state’s construction defect laws due to ongoing federal investigations of construction defect attorney Nancy Quon and construction company owner Leon Benzer. Guilty pleas have been entered by at least ten individuals including an attorney, property managers, straw purchasers, and former HOA board members.
The article suggests that Nevada’s Chapter 40 laws are easily manipulated to the detriment of Nevada’s homebuilding industry. Construction industry lobbyists have tried unsuccessfully to change the laws in past legislative sessions.
The Sun’s article speculates that the building industry might be able to gain legislative concessions due to the volume of guilty pleas and what it refers to as examples of Chapter 40 abuses. ”With federal authorities collecting guilty pleas, the construction industry has prime examples of the system being abused, and how lucrative it can be for attorneys.”
Read the full story…
The Ever-Growing Thicket Of California Civil Code Section 2782
January 6, 2012 — Michael D. Worthing, Borton Petrini
California Civil Code section 2782 imposes limits on indemnity and defense provisions in construction contracts. Since the initial adoption of S.B. 8001 in 2002 (eff. January 1, 2003) section 27822 has been revised several times, and legislative history suggests that interest groups representing builders, developers and sub-contractors, as well as the insurance industry, have seen legislative action on these indemnity and defense issues as part of the overall response to the same economic pressures resulting from construction defect litigation that gave rise to S.B. 800. Amendments in 2005, 2007, 2008 and 2011 (each effective January 1 of the following year) have increasingly entangled the provisions of Section 2782 with various provisions of S.B. 800. The application of section 2782 to construction contracts, and in particular contracts between developer-builders and subcontractors, executed after January 1, 2006, will require a concurrent reading and understanding of S.B. 800, the application of which is itself still in flux.
The time a construction contract was executed will likely determine which version of section 2782, read in connection with provisions of S.B.800, is applicable. Because of the nature of construction defect litigation, the determination of relative rights and liabilities of developer-builders vis-à-vis subcontractors under construction contracts does not become the subject of litigation, and legal and judicial interpretation, until years after the contracts were entered and work performed. As of the date this article is submitted, there has been no case law interpreting or applying any of the post S.B. 800 amendments, in part, and perhaps primarily, because litigation arising from construction contracts executed after January 1, 2006, has not yet reached the appellate courts.
SECTION 2782 AT THE TIME S.B. 800 WAS ENACTED
Section 2782 was originally enacted in 1967 and amended several times to the version in effect when S.B. 800 became law, at which time the section was relatively simple and straightforward. It then consisted of two subdivisions, which have essentially remained unchanged until the most recent amendment during the 2011 legislative session.
Section 2782 (a) prohibited, and still prohibits, provisions in construction contracts that “purport to indemnify the promisee against liability for damages for death or bodily injury to persons, injury to property, or any other loss, damage or expense arising from the sole negligence or willful misconduct of the promise.” This provision essentially prohibits what had been referred to as so-called Type I or “specific” indemnity provisions. In such agreements, the indemnitor [the promisor, that is, the person or entity indemnifying] will indemnify the indemnitee [the promisee, that is, the person or entity being protected by the indemnity] for the indemnitee’s own negligence, whether active or passive, whether the indemnitee is solely negligent or concurrently negligent with the indemnitor. (See, MacDonald & Kruse, Inc. v. San Jose Steel Co. (1972) 29 Cal.App.3d 413, 419.)3 Section 2782 (a) has remained essentially intact since the enactment of S.B. 800. It still must be considered and applied to interpret a construction contract. Generally, it will apply to contracts not involving a public agency; the next part of section 2782 specifically governs such contracts.
The second subdivision prohibits provisions in any construction contract with a public agency which purport to impose on the contractor, or relieve the public agency from, liability for the active negligence of the public agency. Subdivision (b) has been revised by the 2011 amendment, discussed below. If a construction contract with the public agency is for residential construction, the standards of S.B. 800 likely apply.4
This was the extent of section 2782 on January 1, 2003, when S.B. 800 went into effect, and remained so until January 1, 2006. This version will govern interpretation and application of indemnity and defense provisions in construction contracts executed before January 1, 2006.5
2005 AMENDMENT
The first “post S.B. 800” change to Section 2782 was in enacted in 2005, effective January 1, 2006, and added two new sections. Subdivision (c) stated (in somewhat greater detail than paraphrased here) that for residential construction contracts, or amendments thereto, entered into after January 1, 2006, a subcontractor cannot be required to indemnify (including the cost to defend) a builder for construction defects that arise out of negligence or design defects of the builder or other independent contractors, or that do not arise out of the scope of the subcontractor=s scope of work. The term “residential construction” was defined by reference to S.B.800 generally, and the term “builder” was defined by reference to section 911 (a part of S.B. 800), for the first time expressly connecting provisions of section 2782 to S.B. 800. Contractual provisions not expressly prohibited were reserved to the agreement of the parties.
What subdivision (c) took away was partially given back by subdivision (d). It stated that “subdivision (c) does not prohibit a subcontractor and builder from mutually agreeing to the timing or immediacy of the defense and provisions for reimbursement of defense fees and costs, so long as that agreement, upon final resolution of the claims, does not waive or modify the provisions of subdivision (c).”6 In addition, it stated that this subdivision (c) did not affect the obligations of an insurance carrier under Presley Homes, Inc. v. American States Insurance Company (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 571, which holds that where an insurer has a duty to defend a developer pursuant to an additional insured endorsement obtained under a subcontractor’s policy, that duty generally applies to the entire action, even if the suit involves both covered and uncovered claims, or a single claim only partially covered by the policy. Finally, subdivision (d) stated that the amendment did not affect the builder’s or subcontractor’s obligations under S.B. 800. Both of these latter provisions, relating to the Presley Homes case, and obligations under S.B. 800, have been carried forward essentially intact in subsequent amendments of section 2782.
This version of section 2782 will be applicable to any contract between a builder as defined by section 911 (see fn. 4, above) and a subcontractor executed between January 1, 2006, and December 31, 2008. Thus, a general contractor, etc., who is not a builder is not subject to the provisions added by the 2005 amendment; this changed with the next amendment.
It is not clear whether this version would apply to a contract entered before January 1, 2006, but amended after that date. Subdivision (c) applies to “all construction contracts, and amendments thereto, entered into after January 1, 2006, for residential construction.” It would seem that the clearest and most logical construction would apply it only to contracts originally made after January 1, 2006, and thereafter amended, but there has been no judicial determination of this issue.
In addition, logically it would seem that this version of section 2782 should be applicable to construction contracts for residential construction between a builder and a subcontractor, entered between January 1, 2006, and December 31, 2008; however, legislative history relating to the 2008 amendment discussed below suggests a different result might occur.
2007 AMENDMENT
The second “post S.B. 800” amendment in 2007 (effective January 1, 2008), added subdivisions (e)(1) and (e)(2).
Subdivision (e)(1) added general contractors and subcontractors not affiliated with the builder and imposed essentially the same restrictions on provisions to indemnify, including the cost to defend, them as had been imposed on the “builder” by the 2005 amendment. The amendment refers to section 911 (b), again part of S.B. 800, to define general contractors, etc., not affiliated with the builder.
Subdivision (e)(1) essentially repeated the provisions of subdivision (d) permitting agreement to the timing and immediacy of the defense, the reference to the Presley Homes case, and the general contractor’s or subcontractor’s obligations under S.B. 800.
It appears this amendment was an attempt to harmonize the new restrictions on indemnity and defense provisions with S.B. 800. The 2005 amendment, whether by oversight or intent, covered only builders and not general contractors, although both classes are subject to the provisions of S.B. 800; the 2007 amendment added non-builder-affiliated general contractors.
Again, logically, it would seem that this version of section 2782 should be applicable to construction contracts for residential construction between a general contractor or contractor not affiliated with a builder and a subcontractor, entered between January 1 and December 31, 2008; however, legislative history relating to the 2008 amendment discussed below suggests a different result might occur. The same potential uncertainty regarding applicability to a contract entered before January 1, 2008, but amended after that date, exists for this provision as for the prior amendment, discussed above.
2008 AMENDMENT
The third “post S.B. 800” amendment in 2008 (effective January 1, 2009), reorganized the language relating to prohibited indemnity provisions, added a reference to insurance in that same prohibition, extensively rewrote the provisions governing agreements relating to the timing or immediacy of defense, added language preserving equitable indemnity claims, and added language defining “construction defect” by reference to the standards set forth in S.B. 800.
Subdivisions (a) and (b) remained unchanged.
Subdivision (c) now made a combined reference to builders (again by reference to section 911), as well as general contractors or contractors not affiliated with the builder (again by reference to section 911 (b)), rather than dealing with the two groups in separate but nearly identical subdivisions as previously. It otherwise restated the same limitations that were previously set forth separately in subdivisions (c) and (e), as well as the reference to the Presley Homes case, and the general contractor’s or subcontractor’s obligations under S.B. 800, but with one important addition. The word “insure” was added to the description of prohibited provisions, to-wit: “provisions? that purport to insure or indemnify, including the cost to defend, the builder, [etc.]? are unenforceable” to the extent they arise out of claims of the type previously described.
It is unclear what impact the addition of this single word “insure” will have; and, it will have to be read in light of the preservation of the language that it shall not affect the obligations of an insurance carrier under the holding of the Presley Homes case. Suppose a carrier had issued an additional insured endorsement under which it would otherwise be required to defend a builder or general contractor consistent with the Presley Homes rule: would this newly added single word (restricting the construction contract, to which the carrier is not a party) give the carrier a basis for denying coverage under the insurance contract? Or would the continued inclusion of the express language that it does not affect the obligations of an insurance carrier under Presley Homes control? That is surely an issue that will have to be worked out by the courts.
The new subdivision (d) addressed defense obligations. Again it permitted parties to agree to the timing and immediacy of the defense and provision for reimbursement of defense fees and costs, but imposed a very detailed scheme that appears to limit the extent of such agreement. A subcontractor owes no defense or indemnity obligation until the builder or general contractor provides a written tender of the claim, which has the same force and effect as notice of commencement of a legal proceeding. Upon that tender the subcontractor shall elect to follow one of two ways of performing: subdivision (d) (1) permits the subcontractor to defend with counsel of its choice and to control the defense, if the subcontractor gives written notice of this election within a reasonable time after receipt of the written tender and in no event later than 90 days following that receipt; subdivision (d) (2) provides an alternative by which the subcontractor pays a reasonable allocated share of the builder’s or general contractor’s defense fees and costs within 30 days of receipt of an invoice, subject to reallocation upon final resolution of the claim by settlement or judgment. Subdivision (e) sets forth remedies available to the builder or general contractor if a subcontractor fails to timely and adequately perform its obligations under either of the two alternatives in subdivision (d), including compensatory and consequential damages, reasonable attorneys’ fees in connection with the first alternative, and interest on defense and indemnity costs in connection with the second alternative. Subdivision (e) ends with provisions relating to reallocation of defense costs, and damages for failure to reallocate.
Application of these requirements in actual litigation is likely to be cumbersome and potentially fraught with conflicts. If retained pursuant to subdivision (d) (1) does the attorney represent the builder, the subcontractor, or both? To whom does the attorney owe his or her fiduciary duty? Can an appropriate informed written consent be formulated, for example, under Rule 3-310 of the California Rules of Professional Conduct, or Rule 1.7, ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct? Could an attorney retained by a subcontractor blame the subcontractor if that is in the developer’s best interests? If multiple subcontractors elect to defend directly, how would the defense be coordinated among the potentially multiple attorneys so retained? Would an attorney retained by one subcontractor be able, or inclined, to blame another subcontractor who also chose to defend directly, in other words, what would prevent inconsistent defense positions amongst the various counsel retained by subcontractors for the developer? There may be solutions to such practical and professional considerations but it seems an ethical thicket awaits any attorney involved in such circumstances.
Subdivision (e) and (f) preserve equitable indemnity claims for the builder, general contractor or subcontractor, the first in general, the second as against any supplier, design profession, or product manufacturer. Finally, the 2008 amendment added for the first time, in subdivision (h), language defining "construction defect" as used in section 2782 as a violation of standards set forth in S.B. 800.
The inclusion of these last three subsections would seem to work against simplification of litigation. A builder or general contractor is likely to allege a claim for equitable indemnity against any and all subcontractors in addition to claims for contractual indemnity and defense (however limited by the other provisions of section 2782). Nothing in the section suggests the subcontractor should, or even can, somehow take on the representation of the builder, etc., in connection with a claim of equitable indemnity back against the subcontractor.
And the limited definition of “construction defect” in subdivision (h) appears to raise an issue of the applicability of the limitations set forth in subdivision (c). Although there is a school of thought that section 941 limits residential construction defect claims only to breach of the performance standards under S.B. 800, it is still common for CD complaints to plead other legal theories, e.g., breach of contract, breach of warranty, negligence, etc., in addition to violation of S.B. 800 standards. With the addition of subdivision (h) it is arguable that the restrictions on indemnity and defense provisions spelled out in subdivisions (c) and (d), both of which relate to claims for residential construction defects, are applicable only to claims for violation of S.B. 800 standards, and not other residential construction defect claims. In other words, a developer might conceivably still be entitled to a broader scope of indemnity and concomitant defense for other types of claims, such as breach of contract, breach of warranty, negligence, etc., so long as the indemnity does not violate the limitation of subdivision (a) against Type I indemnity, which as noted above, has remained intact through these revisions.
Finally, it would seem that this version of section 2782 should be applicable to contracts executed between builders, general contractors, etc., on the one hand and subcontractors on the other hand on and after January 1, 2009. And, as noted above in connection with the 2005 and 2007 amendments, logic would suggest that those versions would ordinarily apply to contracts executed during the time periods mentioned above. But, the Legislative Counsel’s Digest for the 2008 amendment as it finally was enacted into law includes the following statements:
This bill would delete the provisions applicable to construction contracts entered into on or after January 1, 2008, that purport to indemnify the general contractor or contractor not affiliated with the builder. The bill would revise the provisions applicable to contracts entered into after January 1, 2006, to instead apply to contracts entered into after January 1, 2009, and to apply to agreements that purport to insure or indemnify the builder or the general contractor or contractor not affiliated with the builder, as described.
Although it seems a startling result, this legislative history suggests an argument can be made that the 2008 amendment retroactively nullified the effect of the 2005 and 2007 amendments, so that contracts executed from January 1, 2006, as to builders or January 1, 2008, for general contractors, etc., through December 31, 2008, are still governed by the provisions of section 2782 as it was on the books prior to the first post-S.B. 800 amendment in 2005.
2011 AMENDMENT
Section 2782 has been amended yet again in the 2011 session of the California Legislature, effective January 1, 2012; however, the substantive changes affect certain contracts entered on or after January 1, 2013. All of the provisions contained in the 2008 amendment have been carried forward in the most recent amendment, although re-numbered: (c) became (d), etc., through (h) becoming (i). So, the law governing construction contracts entered into after January 1, 2009, for residential construction, as between a builder, or a general contractor, etc., not affiliated with a builder, and regarding insurance, indemnity or defense relating to claims for construction defects, remains the same as in the 2008 amendment.
As noted above the substantive changes to section 2782 all affect contracts entered into on or after January 1, 2013. Subdivision (b) has been amended such that any provision in a contract with a public agency that purports to impose on any contractor, etc., or relieve the public agency from, liability for the active negligence of the public agency will be void and unenforceable. A new subdivision (c) has been added that imposes a similar restriction on construction contracts with the owner of privately owned real property to be improved and as to which the owner is not acting as a contractor or supplier of materials or equipment to the work. This new restriction in subdivision (c) does not apply to a homeowner performing a home improvement project on his or her own single family dwelling.
The 2011 bill amending section 2782 also added a new section 2782.05, which will make void and unenforceable any provision in any construction contract (again, entered on or after January 1, 2013) that purports to insure or indemnify, including the cost to defend, a general contractor, construction manager, or other subcontractor, by a subcontractor for claims that arise out of the active negligence or willful misconduct of the general contractor, etc., or other independent contractors, etc., or to the extent the claims do not arise out of the scope of work of the subcontractor. However, the section also includes a long list of situations to which it does not apply, including all of those covered by section 2782 (residential construction subject to S.B. 800, public agency contracts subject to section 2782 (b), and direct contracts with private property owners subject to the new section 2782 (c)) as well as eight other categories. This apparently is intended to serve as a “catch-all” to extend a limitation on indemnity agreements to all construction contracts not previously swept into this widening legislative scheme, although the exact phrasing is slightly different.7
The new section 2782.05 then permits a mutual agreement to the timing or immediacy of a defense under a scheme essentially identical to that imposed in the 2008 amendment to section 2782: defend with counsel of choice, and maintain control of the defense; or, pay a reasonable allocated share of defense fees and costs. The same logistical and ethical difficulties presented by the 2008 scheme discussed above would likely be present in cases that fall under the new section 2782.05.
CONCLUSION
The California Legislature has been revising section 2782 since shortly after the adoption of S.B. 800. Each revision has been more complicated than the last, and each has tied certain provisions of section 2782 more closely to S.B. 800. In particular, with regard to construction defect claims relating to residential dwellings which are subject to S.B. 800, the Legislature has apparently attempted to exercise more and more control over the scope of allowable indemnity and dictated a very narrow scheme to govern how the defense obligation arising from a contractual indemnity is to be implemented. It seems likely that any attempt to manage the defense of a construction defect case under the options that allow a subcontractor to defend directly and control the defense will create a logistical problem and an ethical difficulty for any attorney attempting to defend a developer at the behest and direction of a subcontractor. Finally, as set forth in the current version of section 2782 relating to contractual indemnity and defense of S.B. 800 type cases (subdivisions (c) through (h) in the 2008 version, now subdivisions (d) through (i) in the 2011 amendment), the Legislature has apparently narrowed the application to only claims of violation of S.B. 800 standards. This may have, in essence, removed the restrictions on indemnity and defense provisions as they relate to other theories pleaded against developers in construction defense cases, e.g., breach of contract, breach of warranty, negligence, and the like. It is not at all clear that the Legislature has accomplished what it set out do accomplish. Rather, the law may have come full circle back to where it began, except for one legal theory, i.e. violation of S.B. 800 standards, currently being used in residential construction defect cases. For any other legal theory the limitation of section 2782 (a) may be solely controlling.
- California Civil Code section 43.99, and sections 895 to 945.5.
- All statutory references in this article are to the California Civil Code unless otherwise specified.
- Type I or specific indemnity does not exactly match the scope of proscribed indemnity as described in section 2782 (a) but it is the closest. More recent case law in California has eschewed a mechanical application of the MacDonald & Kruse typology in favor of examining the precise text of the actual contract (See, e.g., St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Frontier Pacific Ins. Co. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1234, 1246, n. 6) but some recent cases still use the Type I, II and II classifications. And, an understanding of that “historical” typology is useful as an aid to evaluating and understanding express indemnity in general.
- The provisions of S.B. 800 other than the prelitigation procedures of sections 910 through 938 apply to general contractors, subcontractors, etc., pursuant to section 936. The prelitigation procedures generally involve a “builder,” which is specifically defined in section 911 (a) by reference to entities or individuals in the business of selling residential units to the public or of building, developing, or constructing residential units for public purchase. Pursuant to section 911 (b) the term builder does not include general contractors, etc., not affiliated with the builder. Thus, a general contractor who constructs residential housing pursuant to a contract with a public agency is still subject to claims for violation of the standards set forth in sections 896 and 897, resulting from its negligent act or omission or breach of contract, pursuant to section 936.
- As noted above, there has been no case law yet interpreting any of the “post S.B. 800” changes to Section 2782. One of the most important legal decisions relating to express indemnity and defense obligations and rights between developer-builders and sub-contractors was published after two of the amendments but based upon contracts executed and the language of section 2782 prior to January 1, 2006. (See, Crawford v. Weather Shield Mfg., Inc. (2008) 44 Cal.4th 541, 547, 566-67, fn. 14).
- Subcontractor dissatisfaction with the perceived inadequacy of protection afforded by this provision apparently became the impetus for a 2008 amendment to section 2782, discussed below, at least based upon the numerous (form) letters submitted to legislators in connection therewith.
- Section 2782 (a), where we started, and which has continued without change, prohibits indemnity for claims arising out of the sole negligence or willful misconduct of the promisee; sole negligence can be either active or passive. The various versions relating to residential construction prohibit indemnity for the negligence of the builder, etc., suggesting there is no express contractual indemnity for the negligence of the subcontractor if the builder, etc., is at all negligent. This is tempered a bit by the preservation of the right to equitable indemnity, which will now be found in section 2782 (g) and (h).
Courtesy of Michael D. Worthing of Borton Petrini, LLP. Mr. Worthing can be contacted at mworthing@bortonpetrini.com.
Homeowners Sue Over Sinkholes, Use Cash for Other Things
January 6, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Quoting one homeowner as saying that his house “can fall in the ground for all I care, I made my money,” the Tampa Bay Times looks at the issue of sinkhole claims in Florida. Homeowners “have paid off mortgages, put in pools, replaced roofs, or otherwise used money from sinkhole claims to do something besides fix sinkhole damage.
It’s been tough for insurance companies. Citizens Property Insurance took in $32 million in premiums for sinkhole coverage in 2010, but paid out $245 million in sinkhole claims. The Tampa Bay Times notes that some of those claims come from settling problems caused by their repairs, including one settlement of $350,000 for repairs to a house worth $39,000.
One couple, after receiving $217,000 from Citizens, sold the house to a company that bought unrepaired sinkhole homes for $190,000. The home has been sold since and remains unrepaired.
Sometimes the preferred solution by the insurance company isn’t the cheapest either. One couple was informed that Citizens was going to spend $150,000 to have the hole filled with grout. After they settled with the insurance company, they fixed the problem by installing steel piers, at a cost of about $45,000.
Read the full story…
Another Guilty Plea In Nevada Construction Defect Fraud Case
April 25, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The eleventh defendant has entered a guilty plea in the ongoing federal investigation of construction defect fraud in the Las Vegas area. Mahin Quintero plead guilty to producing a false authentication feature, a misdemeanor. Ms. Quintero’s part in the scheme was to falsely authenticate signatures on loan documents for straw buyers. Ms. Quintero stated in court that she had been ordered to destroy her notary book three years ago. According to her plea bargain, the straw buyers did not appear in front of her when she notarized their signatures. As part of the scheme, the straw buyers would take control of homeowners associates, sending construction defect complaints and repairs to favored firms.
Read the full story…
Ohio “property damage” caused by an “occurrence.”
May 18, 2011 — May 18, 2011 - CDCoverage.com
In JTO, Inc. v. State Automobile Mut. Ins. Co., No. 2010-L-062 (Ohio Ct. App. March 25, 2011), general contractor JTO was sued by hotel project owner Marriott for breach of contract and warranties seeking damages for the repair of construction defects resulting in moisture penetration property damage to interior components. JTO filed a third party complaint against subcontractor Farizel and also tendered its defense as an additional insured under Farizel’s State Auto CGL policy.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of CDCoverage.com
Census Bureau, HUD Show Declines in Residential Construction
May 17, 2011 – CDJ Staff
The U.S. Census Bureau and the Department of Housing and Urban Development released their summary of residential construction for April 2011 on May 17.
Building permits for privately owned housing units were down 4% from last month and 12% from last year. Similarly, privately-owned housing starts were down 10% from March and 23% below the previous year.
For further details, read the Census Bureau/HUD report
Ensuing Loss Provision Does Not Salvage Coverage
October 23, 2012 — Tred Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
The insureds' home was built in 1989. In 2006, extensive water damage was found to the house. The insureds notified their carrier, Chubb. The insureds had coverage for all risks unless stated otherwise in the policy or if an exclusion applied.
Chubb hired an adjustor who determined that defective construction had enabled water to enter the wall and beam systems. Chubb denied coverage under the faulty planning, construction or maintenance exclusion.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
Delays in Filing Lead to Dismissal in Moisture Intrusion Lawsuit
September 9, 2011 — CDJ Staff
The Alabama Court of Civil Appeals has upheld a summary judgment in the case of Franklin v. Mitchell. Walter Mitchell, doing business as Southern Classic Construction built a new home for the Franklins. The Franklins moved into the home in October 2001. In April 2006 they discovered sagging floors in both the bathroom and kitchen. They contacted Mitchell who suggested the flooring might be defective. The Franklins spent eight months attempting to contact the flooring manufacturer.
In March 2007, the Franklins had the home inspected. The sagging was determined to be due to a loss of strength in the decking because of condensation from the air conditioning system. Air returns were not properly sealed and drawing moisture into the structure. There was mold on the decking and floor joints.
When Mitchell was contacted by the Franklins, he told them his one-year warranty had expired but had the HVAC subcontractor, Southern Mechanical Heating & Air (owned by Mitchell’s father, Jim Mitchell), look at the situation. SMHA replaced and braced subfloors. Later, they entered the crawl space to tape ducts, seal the air return, and insulate the air vent housing. The Franklins were not satisfied with the repairs, as not all the ducts were taped, nor were the air vent housings insulated.
Franklin complained to Walter Mitchell who again cited his one-year warranty. Jim Mitchell said he would not report complaints to his insurer, stating that the repairs were unnecessary, that the work had been done correctly in the first place, and it was only done at the request of Walter Mitchell.
In February 2009, the Franklins sued Walker Mitchell. Mitchell denied the claims, citing in part the statute of limitations. Mitchell also filed complaints against three subcontractors, including his father’s firm. Mitchell received a summary judgment as the case started after Alabama’s six-year statute of limitations.
The appeals court rejected the Franklin’s argument that the claim of damage did not start until they were aware it was due to a construction defect. The court noted that as Walter Mitchell was licensed as a “residential home builder, the statute the Franklins cite did not apply, as it concerns architects, engineers, and licensed general contactors.”
Nor did they feel that Mitchells’ claim that his warranty had expired were sufficient to override the statute of limitations, quoting an earlier case, “Vague assurances do not amount to an affirmative inducement to delay filing suit.” Their claim of subsequent negligent repairs was rejected because Mitchell did not direct the specific actions taken by his father’s firm.
Read the court’s decision…
Condo Owners Allege Construction Defects
July 6, 2011 — CDJ Staff
Last November, mold problems were discovered at the Siena Condominiums in Montclair, New Jersey, which had been described by their developers as “an enclave of luxury in an urban village setting.” The owners have filed a lawsuit against Pinnacle Companies, Kohl Parnters, and Herod Development, seeking “compensatory damages, interest, reasonable attorney’s fee and costs, and for such other, further, and different relief as the Court may deem just and proper.”
According to the article on Baristanet.com, an engineering report commissioned by the condominium association revealed many problems, including improperly installed windows and siding. The developers commissioned two engineering reports themselves and found evidence of water pounding on the roof. Despite these reports and repeated promises, no repairs have been made.
Read the full story…
Liability policy covers negligent construction: GA high court
October 31, 2010 — Original article by
Michael Bradford in Business Insurance
ATLANTA—Negligent construction that results in damage to surrounding property constitutes an occurrence under a commercial general liability policy, the Georgia Supreme Court has ruled.
In a 6-1 opinion Monday in
American Empire Surplus Lines Insurance Co. Inc. vs. Hathaway Development Co. Inc., the Georgia high court upheld a lower court ruling that the general contractor’s claim for damage caused by a subcontractor’s faulty plumbing work was covered.
The ruling on construction defects is the latest in number of such cases across the United States
Read Full Story...
Reprinted courtesy of Michael Bradford of Business Insurance.
Construction Law Client Alert: Hirer Beware - When Exercising Control Over a Job Site’s Safety Conditions, You May be Held Directly Liable for an Independent Contractor’s Injury
April 6, 2011 — April 6, 2011 - By Mark VonderHaar and Yvette Davis in the Haight Brown & Bonesteel Blog
On February 24, 2011, the California Court of Appeal held in Jeffrey Tverberg, et al v. Fillner Construction, Inc. that the imposition of direct liability on a hirer turns on whether the hirer exercised retained control of worksite safety in such a manner that affirmatively contributed to the independent contractor’s injury. Twice, Tverberg, an independent contractor hired by a general contractor's subcontractor, asked the general contractor to make the job site safe by covering up open holes created by another unrelated subcontractor while Tverberg was working at the site. After Tverberg was injured at the site by falling in a hole, he sued both the general contractor and the subcontractor which had hired him.
The Court of Appeal reasoned that when the general contractor instructed another subcontractor to create a condition that was potentially dangerous (i.e., creating open and uncovered bollard holes), and simultaneously required Tverberg to perform unrelated work near the open holes, the general contractor s conduct may have constituted a negligent exercise of its retained control which affirmatively contributed to Tverberg’s injury. The Court also reasoned that the general contractor affirmatively assumed responsibility for the safety of the workers near the holes by only requiring stakes and safety ribbon, and negligently discharged that responsibility which resulted in injury.
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of Mark VonderHaar and Yvette Davis of Haight Brown & Bonesteel. Mr. VonderHaar can be contacted at mvonderhaar@hbblaw.com and Ms. Davis at ydavis@hbblaw.com.
Application of Efficient Proximate Cause Doctrine Supports Coverage
January 6, 2012 — Tred Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
Relying on the efficient proximate cause doctrine, the court determined coverage potentially existed for damage caused by water. Union Sav. Bank v. Allstate Indem. Co., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134398 (S.D. Ind. Nov. 21, 2011).
The Tods purchased property that was mortgaged by Union Savings. The Tods obtained a Landlords Policy for the property from Allstate. When the Tods were in default on their loan, Union Savings notified them that foreclosure proceedings would commence. Union Savings sent an appraiser to the property who discovered water in the basement. Water and electricity to the building were off. Union Savings notified Allstate and later filed a formal claim under the mortgagee clause in the Landlords Policy. This clause stated, "A covered loss will be payable to the mortgagees named on the policy declaration. . . ."
Allstate denied coverage, citing exclusions for water damage.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
Save a Legal Fee: Prevent Costly Lawsuits With Claim Limitation Clauses
April 25, 2012 — Douglas Reiser, Builders Cousel
Ever had that lingering problem with a contracting partner that went away for awhile and then came back to bite you ? years later? In Washington, construction contract claims can be raised for up to six years after substantial completion. Six years!? Why would I want to wait that long to find out if I have a problem? You don’t have to.
Over the past few years, I have discussed the notion of “contractual claim periods” on The Builders Counsel. For today’s Save a Legal Fee column, I cannot think of a better topic. These provisions are specifically intended to save you from unnecessary legal fees that might arise if a problem goes unnoticed for too long.
Contractual claim periods are simply a way to reduce the amount of time that a contracting party has to raise a claim against its contracting partner. For example, a subcontractor might require that a general contractor raise any claim that it might have ? for defective or incomplete work, injury, damages, etc ? within a particular amount of time or forever lose the ability to raise the claim in a legal proceeding.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of Douglas Reiser of Reiser Legal LLC. Mr. Reiser can be contacted at info@reiserlegal.com
School District Marks End of Construction Project by Hiring Lawyers
June 19, 2012 — CDJ Staff
A school district in northeastern Pennsylvania has retained legal services as they approach the end of a construction project. The Mid Valley School Board cited concerns about the project’s budget, but Randy Parry, Superintendent of Mid Valley schools referenced “possible litigation at the end of the project.” Mr. Parry told the Scranton Times Tribune that construction delays could be a reason for litigation.
In addition to approving an additional $20,000 for legal representation, the board also approved $21,579 for additional project costs.
Read the full story…
Ambitious Building Plans in Boston
November 18, 2011 — CDJ Staff
Although most are unlikely to change the Boston skyline, there are several large projects on the drawing boards. The site BostInnovation covered ten of them in a recent post. Downtown Boston will be the site of several of these large projects, including three towers to be added to the Christian Science Plaza, a 404-unit residential tower in the Theater District, and perhaps the largest of these projects, a 47-story tower to be built over Copley Plaza, which will tower over the adjacent buildings. None of the planned buildings will challenge the Hancock Tower’s 60 stories.
Read the full story…
Texas covered versus uncovered allocation and “legally obligated to pay.”
April 27, 2011 — April 27, 2011, by CDCoverage.com
In Markel American Ins. Co. v. Lennar Corp., No. 14-10-00008-CV (Tex. Ct. App. April 19, 2011), insured homebuilder Lennar filed suit against its insurer Markel seeking recovery of costs incurred by Lennar to repair water damage to homes resulting from defective EIFS siding. Following a jury trial, judgment was entered in favor of Lennar and against Markel. On appeal, the intermediate appellate court reversed. Applying Texas law, the court first held that Lennar failed to satisfy its burden of allocating damages between covered and uncovered. In a prior decision, the court had held that, while the costs incurred by Lennar for the repair of the resulting water damage
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of CDCoverage.com
Florida trigger
May 18, 2011 — May 18, 2011 - CDCoverage.com
In Johnson-Graham-Malone, Inc. v. Austwood Enterprises, Inc., No. 16-2009-CA-005750-XXXX-MA (Fla. 4th Cir. Ct. Duval County, April 29, 2011), insured JGM was the general contractor for an apartment project completed in 1998. In 2007, the project owner sued JGM seeking damages for defective construction resulting in moisture penetration property damage. JGM tendered its defense to Amerisure. Amerisure denied a defense. JGM defended and settled the underlying suit and then filed suit against Amerisure seeking recovery of defense and settlement costs. The trial court granted JGM’s motion for partial summary judgment. The court first addressed Amerisure’s duty to defend. Applying Florida law, the court held that, although the underlying complaint alleged that the property damage was not discovered until after expiration of the Amerisure policies
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of CDCoverage.com
Homeowners Not Compelled to Arbitration in Construction Defect Lawsuit
January 6, 2012 — CDJ Staff
A California appeals court has ruled that developers cannot enforce CC&Rs in a case where a developer cited an arbitration clause it had inserted into the CC&R. The homeowners are alleging construction defect and wished to sue the developer who claimed a right to this under the CC&Rs.
The Marina del Rey Argonaut reports that particular appeal dealt only with whether the developer could compel arbitration. The underlying construction defect issues will subsequently have to be determined at trial.
The attorney for the homeowners’ association, Dan Clifford, noted that “arbitration has to be agreed to by both parties.” The covenant was drafted by the developer and in addition to requiring arbitration, it had a clause that it could not be amended without the consent of the developers. The court ruled that CC&Rs “can be enforced only by the homeowners association, the owner of a condominium or both.”
Read the full story…
