ANAHEIM CALIFORNIA CONSTRUCTION EXPERT WITNESS
DIRECTORY AND CAPABILITIES

Irene May Benefit Construction Industry

Noting that while it wasn’t the $15 billion disaster some predicted, Hurricane Irene still caused quite a bit of damage on its path up the Eastern Seaboard. Martha White, reporting for MSNBC cites Kinetc Analysis Corp. with an estimate of $7 billion in damage. Carl Van Horn, a professor of public policy at Rutgers University expected an initial decline in construction jobs, due to projects delayed due to the storm’s arrival, but he said, “a few weeks later, employment picks up as people rebuild.”

Kinetic says that one unknown is how much of the damage is insured. They expect only $3 billion of damage will be covered by insurance. This would likely put a drag on consumer spending, as homeowners would have to dig into their own pockets to pay for repairs, according to Karl Smith, associate professor of economics and government at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.

Read the full story…

Joinder vs. Misjoinder in Colorado Construction Claims: Roche Constructors v. One Beacon

Often, those practicing in the construction defect field have faced questions concerning the joinder of a party. Recently, the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado weighed in on the requirements for joinder under the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure. See Roche Constructors, Inc. v. One Beacon America Ins. Co., 2012 WL 1060000 (D. Colo. 2012). Roche secured a construction contract to build a detention facility for the Lincoln County Sheriff’s Office in Lincoln County, Nebraska. In turn, Roche entered into a subcontract with Dobberstein Roofing Company, Inc. in October 2009 to install the roofing system and other related work at the detention facility. The subcontract agreement required Dobberstein to maintain adequate commercial general liability insurance and to add Roche as an additional insured under the policy. Roche maintained a builder’s risk policy issued by OneBeacon America Insurance Company and Dobberstein secured a certificate of liability insurance underwritten by Transportation Insurance Company (“TIC”). Id. at *1.

Roche alleged that Dobberstein constructed the roofing system in a negligent manner in violation of the subcontract. Roche claims it incurred additional costs to repair structural damage to the roofing system as a result of Dobberstein’s negligent work. In order to cover said damage, Roche tendered insurance claims to OneBeacon and TIC.

Read the full story…

Reprinted courtesy of David McLain, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC. Mr. McLain can be contacted at mclain@hhmrlaw.com

The Complete and Accepted Work Doctrine and Construction Defects

Matthew C. Bouchard of Lewis & Roberts PLLC, writes how North Carolina is “bucking the trend” on the “complete and accepted work doctrine.” As he notes, in most states “a contractor can be found liable for personal injuries suffered by third parties from accidents occurring after the contractor’s work is completed and accepted.” But one exception is North Carolina.

He gives the example of a case, Lamb v. D.S. Duggins Welding, Inc., in which a site superintendent was “injured by the alleged negligence of the project’s steel deck installer, a sub-subcontractor in the contractual chain” “after the sub-sub’s work had been completed and accepted.” The trial court held that the “completed and accepted work doctrine” ended the subcontractor’s liability. The case noted that “employees of the general contractor had modified the installation of the perimeter safety cable in question after the sub-sub had demobilized from the site.”

Mr. Bouchard notes that “once a project is accepted and turned over, the contractor typically loses control over maintenance of the new facility.” However, he notes that “where the contractor’s work constitutes negligence ?Ķ the doctrine may not apply.” Nor does it end breach of contract claims. It only covers third parties.

Read the full story…

Colorado Senate Bill 12-181: 2012’s Version of a Prompt Pay Bill

A potentially important legislative bill has been introduced in waning days of the 2012 legislative session, which would change many of the commercial practices that prevail in the construction industry. Senate Bill 12-181 applies to all building and construction contracts and would prohibit any contract provision that requires a contractor, subcontractor, or supplier to waive their lien in advance of payment. It also would ban any “choice of law” provisions that make a Colorado-based construction contract subject to enforcement only in another state, or under the laws of another state.

The bill also seeks to change many existing commercial practices between contractors, subcontractors, and suppliers. It is presently unclear whether the bill allows parties to contract around these payment procedure provisions, or whether these requirements are simply “gap filling” provisions that pertain if there are no written contract terms specified on these issues. The proposed statute would mandate payment to subcontractors and material suppliers due within seven days in the absence of a dispute about the work or materials being billed. After this seven day period, the bill would require the payment of interest at the rate of 1.5% monthly (18% annually). In any later suit for payment, the creditor would also be able to collect reasonable attorneys’ fees. Additionally, non-payment to a subcontractor or supplier who is later found to be entitled to prompt payment would excuse the subcontractor or supplier, and its surety bond provider, from any further performance under the contract.

It is presently unclear whether the bill allows parties to contract around these payment procedure provisions. However, it is clear that the bill provides some leeway for change orders, as long as there is (1) negotiation in good faith between the parties concerning the changed scope of work, and (2) a 50% payment of a subcontractor’s costs by the changing party within 30 days of the change order work being done. Additionally, the bill provides for retainage, but in an amount of no more than 5%.

The bill is presently set for hearing before the Colorado Senate Committee on Business, Labor, and Technology Committee on May 2, 2012 at 1:30 p.m.

Read the full story…

Reprinted courtesy of W. Berkeley Mann, Jr. of Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC. Mr. Mann can be contacted at mann@hhmrlaw.com.

Pier Fire Started by Welders

Welders working on Pier 29 in San Francisco were preparing the building for the America’s Cup sailing race. Instead, they accidentally caused $2.4 million in damages. Mindy Talmadge, a fire department spokesperson, attributed the fire to crews welding a latter to a wall. According to Talmadge, a spark entered a crack in the concrete wall and “the wood on the building underneath was really dry.” It took firefighters more than two hours to extinguish the blaze.

Read the full story…

Texas Construction Firm Files for Bankruptcy

A Texas construction firm, founded in 1937, filed for bankruptcy, bringing twenty-two projects to a sudden halt, and resulting in the loss of jobs for hundreds of employees. Ballenger Construction told its employees to go home, as it could not complete the jobs. In some cases, work will need to be done to ensure that the work sites do not cause public safety hazards.

Read the full story…

School District Settles Construction Lawsuit

The Franklin County, Pennsylvania Public Opinion reports that an area school is coming to an end with its construction lawsuit. The school district was sued by its contractors for a combined $1.4 million, which the school district withheld when the project was not completed on schedule. Lobar Inc. claimed that the district additionally owed interest and should pay attorney fees. The school claimed that only $1.15 million was due under the contract. Under the settlement, they will be paying $1.136 million.

Read the full story…

Construction Workers Unearth Bones

While digging for a new steam line at Eastern Michigan University, workers unearthed some old bones. Experts have yet to determine if the bones are human or animal, however Walter Kraft, the EMU vice president of communications, noted that a handle also unearthed might have come from a casket. Cindy Heflin, reporting in AnnArbor.com notes that until 1900 a Catholic cemetery was located in the area. Although the bodies were relocated, these may have been left behind.

Read the full story…

The Ever-Growing Thicket Of California Civil Code Section 2782

California Civil Code section 2782 imposes limits on indemnity and defense provisions in construction contracts. Since the initial adoption of S.B. 800¹ in 2002 (eff. January 1, 2003) section 2782² has been revised several times, and legislative history suggests that interest groups representing builders, developers and sub-contractors, as well as the insurance industry, have seen legislative action on these indemnity and defense issues as part of the overall response to the same economic pressures resulting from construction defect litigation that gave rise to S.B. 800. Amendments in 2005, 2007, 2008 and 2011 (each effective January 1 of the following year) have increasingly entangled the provisions of Section 2782 with various provisions of S.B. 800. The application of section 2782 to construction contracts, and in particular contracts between developer-builders and subcontractors, executed after January 1, 2006, will require a concurrent reading and understanding of S.B. 800, the application of which is itself still in flux.

The time a construction contract was executed will likely determine which version of section 2782, read in connection with provisions of S.B.800, is applicable. Because of the nature of construction defect litigation, the determination of relative rights and liabilities of developer-builders vis-à-vis subcontractors under construction contracts does not become the subject of litigation, and legal and judicial interpretation, until years after the contracts were entered and work performed. As of the date this article is submitted, there has been no case law interpreting or applying any of the post S.B. 800 amendments, in part, and perhaps primarily, because litigation arising from construction contracts executed after January 1, 2006, has not yet reached the appellate courts.

SECTION 2782 AT THE TIME S.B. 800 WAS ENACTED

Section 2782 was originally enacted in 1967 and amended several times to the version in effect when S.B. 800 became law, at which time the section was relatively simple and straightforward. It then consisted of two subdivisions, which have essentially remained unchanged until the most recent amendment during the 2011 legislative session.

Section 2782 (a) prohibited, and still prohibits, provisions in construction contracts that “purport to indemnify the promisee against liability for damages for death or bodily injury to persons, injury to property, or any other loss, damage or expense arising from the sole negligence or willful misconduct of the promise.” This provision essentially prohibits what had been referred to as so-called Type I or “specific” indemnity provisions. In such agreements, the indemnitor [the promisor, that is, the person or entity indemnifying] will indemnify the indemnitee [the promisee, that is, the person or entity being protected by the indemnity] for the indemnitee’s own negligence, whether active or passive, whether the indemnitee is solely negligent or concurrently negligent with the indemnitor. (See, MacDonald & Kruse, Inc. v. San Jose Steel Co. (1972) 29 Cal.App.3d 413, 419.)³ Section 2782 (a) has remained essentially intact since the enactment of S.B. 800. It still must be considered and applied to interpret a construction contract. Generally, it will apply to contracts not involving a public agency; the next part of section 2782 specifically governs such contracts.

The second subdivision prohibits provisions in any construction contract with a public agency which purport to impose on the contractor, or relieve the public agency from, liability for the active negligence of the public agency. Subdivision (b) has been revised by the 2011 amendment, discussed below. If a construction contract with the public agency is for residential construction, the standards of S.B. 800 likely apply.⁴

This was the extent of section 2782 on January 1, 2003, when S.B. 800 went into effect, and remained so until January 1, 2006. This version will govern interpretation and application of indemnity and defense provisions in construction contracts executed before January 1, 2006.⁵

2005 AMENDMENT

The first “post S.B. 800” change to Section 2782 was in enacted in 2005, effective January 1, 2006, and added two new sections. Subdivision (c) stated (in somewhat greater detail than paraphrased here) that for residential construction contracts, or amendments thereto, entered into after January 1, 2006, a subcontractor cannot be required to indemnify (including the cost to defend) a builder for construction defects that arise out of negligence or design defects of the builder or other independent contractors, or that do not arise out of the scope of the subcontractor=s scope of work. The term “residential construction” was defined by reference to S.B.800 generally, and the term “builder” was defined by reference to section 911 (a part of S.B. 800), for the first time expressly connecting provisions of section 2782 to S.B. 800. Contractual provisions not expressly prohibited were reserved to the agreement of the parties.

What subdivision (c) took away was partially given back by subdivision (d). It stated that “subdivision (c) does not prohibit a subcontractor and builder from mutually agreeing to the timing or immediacy of the defense and provisions for reimbursement of defense fees and costs, so long as that agreement, upon final resolution of the claims, does not waive or modify the provisions of subdivision (c).”⁶ In addition, it stated that this subdivision (c) did not affect the obligations of an insurance carrier under Presley Homes, Inc. v. American States Insurance Company (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 571, which holds that where an insurer has a duty to defend a developer pursuant to an additional insured endorsement obtained under a subcontractor’s policy, that duty generally applies to the entire action, even if the suit involves both covered and uncovered claims, or a single claim only partially covered by the policy. Finally, subdivision (d) stated that the amendment did not affect the builder’s or subcontractor’s obligations under S.B. 800. Both of these latter provisions, relating to the Presley Homes case, and obligations under S.B. 800, have been carried forward essentially intact in subsequent amendments of section 2782.

This version of section 2782 will be applicable to any contract between a builder as defined by section 911 (see fn. 4, above) and a subcontractor executed between January 1, 2006, and December 31, 2008. Thus, a general contractor, etc., who is not a builder is not subject to the provisions added by the 2005 amendment; this changed with the next amendment.

It is not clear whether this version would apply to a contract entered before January 1, 2006, but amended after that date. Subdivision (c) applies to “all construction contracts, and amendments thereto, entered into after January 1, 2006, for residential construction.” It would seem that the clearest and most logical construction would apply it only to contracts originally made after January 1, 2006, and thereafter amended, but there has been no judicial determination of this issue.

In addition, logically it would seem that this version of section 2782 should be applicable to construction contracts for residential construction between a builder and a subcontractor, entered between January 1, 2006, and December 31, 2008; however, legislative history relating to the 2008 amendment discussed below suggests a different result might occur.

2007 AMENDMENT

The second “post S.B. 800” amendment in 2007 (effective January 1, 2008), added subdivisions (e)(1) and (e)(2).

Subdivision (e)(1) added general contractors and subcontractors not affiliated with the builder and imposed essentially the same restrictions on provisions to indemnify, including the cost to defend, them as had been imposed on the “builder” by the 2005 amendment. The amendment refers to section 911 (b), again part of S.B. 800, to define general contractors, etc., not affiliated with the builder.

Subdivision (e)(1) essentially repeated the provisions of subdivision (d) permitting agreement to the timing and immediacy of the defense, the reference to the Presley Homes case, and the general contractor’s or subcontractor’s obligations under S.B. 800.

It appears this amendment was an attempt to harmonize the new restrictions on indemnity and defense provisions with S.B. 800. The 2005 amendment, whether by oversight or intent, covered only builders and not general contractors, although both classes are subject to the provisions of S.B. 800; the 2007 amendment added non-builder-affiliated general contractors.

Again, logically, it would seem that this version of section 2782 should be applicable to construction contracts for residential construction between a general contractor or contractor not affiliated with a builder and a subcontractor, entered between January 1 and December 31, 2008; however, legislative history relating to the 2008 amendment discussed below suggests a different result might occur. The same potential uncertainty regarding applicability to a contract entered before January 1, 2008, but amended after that date, exists for this provision as for the prior amendment, discussed above.

2008 AMENDMENT

The third “post S.B. 800” amendment in 2008 (effective January 1, 2009), reorganized the language relating to prohibited indemnity provisions, added a reference to insurance in that same prohibition, extensively rewrote the provisions governing agreements relating to the timing or immediacy of defense, added language preserving equitable indemnity claims, and added language defining “construction defect” by reference to the standards set forth in S.B. 800.

Subdivisions (a) and (b) remained unchanged.

Subdivision (c) now made a combined reference to builders (again by reference to section 911), as well as general contractors or contractors not affiliated with the builder (again by reference to section 911 (b)), rather than dealing with the two groups in separate but nearly identical subdivisions as previously. It otherwise restated the same limitations that were previously set forth separately in subdivisions (c) and (e), as well as the reference to the Presley Homes case, and the general contractor’s or subcontractor’s obligations under S.B. 800, but with one important addition. The word “insure” was added to the description of prohibited provisions, to-wit: “provisions? that purport to insure or indemnify, including the cost to defend, the builder, [etc.]? are unenforceable” to the extent they arise out of claims of the type previously described.

It is unclear what impact the addition of this single word “insure” will have; and, it will have to be read in light of the preservation of the language that it shall not affect the obligations of an insurance carrier under the holding of the Presley Homes case. Suppose a carrier had issued an additional insured endorsement under which it would otherwise be required to defend a builder or general contractor consistent with the Presley Homes rule: would this newly added single word (restricting the construction contract, to which the carrier is not a party) give the carrier a basis for denying coverage under the insurance contract? Or would the continued inclusion of the express language that it does not affect the obligations of an insurance carrier under Presley Homes control? That is surely an issue that will have to be worked out by the courts.

The new subdivision (d) addressed defense obligations. Again it permitted parties to agree to the timing and immediacy of the defense and provision for reimbursement of defense fees and costs, but imposed a very detailed scheme that appears to limit the extent of such agreement. A subcontractor owes no defense or indemnity obligation until the builder or general contractor provides a written tender of the claim, which has the same force and effect as notice of commencement of a legal proceeding. Upon that tender the subcontractor shall elect to follow one of two ways of performing: subdivision (d) (1) permits the subcontractor to defend with counsel of its choice and to control the defense, if the subcontractor gives written notice of this election within a reasonable time after receipt of the written tender and in no event later than 90 days following that receipt; subdivision (d) (2) provides an alternative by which the subcontractor pays a reasonable allocated share of the builder’s or general contractor’s defense fees and costs within 30 days of receipt of an invoice, subject to reallocation upon final resolution of the claim by settlement or judgment. Subdivision (e) sets forth remedies available to the builder or general contractor if a subcontractor fails to timely and adequately perform its obligations under either of the two alternatives in subdivision (d), including compensatory and consequential damages, reasonable attorneys’ fees in connection with the first alternative, and interest on defense and indemnity costs in connection with the second alternative. Subdivision (e) ends with provisions relating to reallocation of defense costs, and damages for failure to reallocate.

Application of these requirements in actual litigation is likely to be cumbersome and potentially fraught with conflicts. If retained pursuant to subdivision (d) (1) does the attorney represent the builder, the subcontractor, or both? To whom does the attorney owe his or her fiduciary duty? Can an appropriate informed written consent be formulated, for example, under Rule 3-310 of the California Rules of Professional Conduct, or Rule 1.7, ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct? Could an attorney retained by a subcontractor blame the subcontractor if that is in the developer’s best interests? If multiple subcontractors elect to defend directly, how would the defense be coordinated among the potentially multiple attorneys so retained? Would an attorney retained by one subcontractor be able, or inclined, to blame another subcontractor who also chose to defend directly, in other words, what would prevent inconsistent defense positions amongst the various counsel retained by subcontractors for the developer? There may be solutions to such practical and professional considerations but it seems an ethical thicket awaits any attorney involved in such circumstances.

Subdivision (e) and (f) preserve equitable indemnity claims for the builder, general contractor or subcontractor, the first in general, the second as against any supplier, design profession, or product manufacturer. Finally, the 2008 amendment added for the first time, in subdivision (h), language defining "construction defect" as used in section 2782 as a violation of standards set forth in S.B. 800.

The inclusion of these last three subsections would seem to work against simplification of litigation. A builder or general contractor is likely to allege a claim for equitable indemnity against any and all subcontractors in addition to claims for contractual indemnity and defense (however limited by the other provisions of section 2782). Nothing in the section suggests the subcontractor should, or even can, somehow take on the representation of the builder, etc., in connection with a claim of equitable indemnity back against the subcontractor.

And the limited definition of “construction defect” in subdivision (h) appears to raise an issue of the applicability of the limitations set forth in subdivision (c). Although there is a school of thought that section 941 limits residential construction defect claims only to breach of the performance standards under S.B. 800, it is still common for CD complaints to plead other legal theories, e.g., breach of contract, breach of warranty, negligence, etc., in addition to violation of S.B. 800 standards. With the addition of subdivision (h) it is arguable that the restrictions on indemnity and defense provisions spelled out in subdivisions (c) and (d), both of which relate to claims for residential construction defects, are applicable only to claims for violation of S.B. 800 standards, and not other residential construction defect claims. In other words, a developer might conceivably still be entitled to a broader scope of indemnity and concomitant defense for other types of claims, such as breach of contract, breach of warranty, negligence, etc., so long as the indemnity does not violate the limitation of subdivision (a) against Type I indemnity, which as noted above, has remained intact through these revisions.

Finally, it would seem that this version of section 2782 should be applicable to contracts executed between builders, general contractors, etc., on the one hand and subcontractors on the other hand on and after January 1, 2009. And, as noted above in connection with the 2005 and 2007 amendments, logic would suggest that those versions would ordinarily apply to contracts executed during the time periods mentioned above. But, the Legislative Counsel’s Digest for the 2008 amendment as it finally was enacted into law includes the following statements:

This bill would delete the provisions applicable to construction contracts entered into on or after January 1, 2008, that purport to indemnify the general contractor or contractor not affiliated with the builder. The bill would revise the provisions applicable to contracts entered into after January 1, 2006, to instead apply to contracts entered into after January 1, 2009, and to apply to agreements that purport to insure or indemnify the builder or the general contractor or contractor not affiliated with the builder, as described.

Although it seems a startling result, this legislative history suggests an argument can be made that the 2008 amendment retroactively nullified the effect of the 2005 and 2007 amendments, so that contracts executed from January 1, 2006, as to builders or January 1, 2008, for general contractors, etc., through December 31, 2008, are still governed by the provisions of section 2782 as it was on the books prior to the first post-S.B. 800 amendment in 2005.

2011 AMENDMENT

Section 2782 has been amended yet again in the 2011 session of the California Legislature, effective January 1, 2012; however, the substantive changes affect certain contracts entered on or after January 1, 2013. All of the provisions contained in the 2008 amendment have been carried forward in the most recent amendment, although re-numbered: (c) became (d), etc., through (h) becoming (i). So, the law governing construction contracts entered into after January 1, 2009, for residential construction, as between a builder, or a general contractor, etc., not affiliated with a builder, and regarding insurance, indemnity or defense relating to claims for construction defects, remains the same as in the 2008 amendment.

As noted above the substantive changes to section 2782 all affect contracts entered into on or after January 1, 2013. Subdivision (b) has been amended such that any provision in a contract with a public agency that purports to impose on any contractor, etc., or relieve the public agency from, liability for the active negligence of the public agency will be void and unenforceable. A new subdivision (c) has been added that imposes a similar restriction on construction contracts with the owner of privately owned real property to be improved and as to which the owner is not acting as a contractor or supplier of materials or equipment to the work. This new restriction in subdivision (c) does not apply to a homeowner performing a home improvement project on his or her own single family dwelling.

The 2011 bill amending section 2782 also added a new section 2782.05, which will make void and unenforceable any provision in any construction contract (again, entered on or after January 1, 2013) that purports to insure or indemnify, including the cost to defend, a general contractor, construction manager, or other subcontractor, by a subcontractor for claims that arise out of the active negligence or willful misconduct of the general contractor, etc., or other independent contractors, etc., or to the extent the claims do not arise out of the scope of work of the subcontractor. However, the section also includes a long list of situations to which it does not apply, including all of those covered by section 2782 (residential construction subject to S.B. 800, public agency contracts subject to section 2782 (b), and direct contracts with private property owners subject to the new section 2782 (c)) as well as eight other categories. This apparently is intended to serve as a “catch-all” to extend a limitation on indemnity agreements to all construction contracts not previously swept into this widening legislative scheme, although the exact phrasing is slightly different.⁷

The new section 2782.05 then permits a mutual agreement to the timing or immediacy of a defense under a scheme essentially identical to that imposed in the 2008 amendment to section 2782: defend with counsel of choice, and maintain control of the defense; or, pay a reasonable allocated share of defense fees and costs. The same logistical and ethical difficulties presented by the 2008 scheme discussed above would likely be present in cases that fall under the new section 2782.05.

CONCLUSION

The California Legislature has been revising section 2782 since shortly after the adoption of S.B. 800. Each revision has been more complicated than the last, and each has tied certain provisions of section 2782 more closely to S.B. 800. In particular, with regard to construction defect claims relating to residential dwellings which are subject to S.B. 800, the Legislature has apparently attempted to exercise more and more control over the scope of allowable indemnity and dictated a very narrow scheme to govern how the defense obligation arising from a contractual indemnity is to be implemented. It seems likely that any attempt to manage the defense of a construction defect case under the options that allow a subcontractor to defend directly and control the defense will create a logistical problem and an ethical difficulty for any attorney attempting to defend a developer at the behest and direction of a subcontractor. Finally, as set forth in the current version of section 2782 relating to contractual indemnity and defense of S.B. 800 type cases (subdivisions (c) through (h) in the 2008 version, now subdivisions (d) through (i) in the 2011 amendment), the Legislature has apparently narrowed the application to only claims of violation of S.B. 800 standards. This may have, in essence, removed the restrictions on indemnity and defense provisions as they relate to other theories pleaded against developers in construction defense cases, e.g., breach of contract, breach of warranty, negligence, and the like. It is not at all clear that the Legislature has accomplished what it set out do accomplish. Rather, the law may have come full circle back to where it began, except for one legal theory, i.e. violation of S.B. 800 standards, currently being used in residential construction defect cases. For any other legal theory the limitation of section 2782 (a) may be solely controlling.

1. California Civil Code section 43.99, and sections 895 to 945.5.
2. All statutory references in this article are to the California Civil Code unless otherwise specified.
3. Type I or specific indemnity does not exactly match the scope of proscribed indemnity as described in section 2782 (a) but it is the closest. More recent case law in California has eschewed a mechanical application of the MacDonald & Kruse typology in favor of examining the precise text of the actual contract (See, e.g., St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Frontier Pacific Ins. Co. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1234, 1246, n. 6) but some recent cases still use the Type I, II and II classifications. And, an understanding of that “historical” typology is useful as an aid to evaluating and understanding express indemnity in general.
4. The provisions of S.B. 800 other than the prelitigation procedures of sections 910 through 938 apply to general contractors, subcontractors, etc., pursuant to section 936. The prelitigation procedures generally involve a “builder,” which is specifically defined in section 911 (a) by reference to entities or individuals in the business of selling residential units to the public or of building, developing, or constructing residential units for public purchase. Pursuant to section 911 (b) the term builder does not include general contractors, etc., not affiliated with the builder. Thus, a general contractor who constructs residential housing pursuant to a contract with a public agency is still subject to claims for violation of the standards set forth in sections 896 and 897, resulting from its negligent act or omission or breach of contract, pursuant to section 936.
5. As noted above, there has been no case law yet interpreting any of the “post S.B. 800” changes to Section 2782. One of the most important legal decisions relating to express indemnity and defense obligations and rights between developer-builders and sub-contractors was published after two of the amendments but based upon contracts executed and the language of section 2782 prior to January 1, 2006. (See, Crawford v. Weather Shield Mfg., Inc. (2008) 44 Cal.4th 541, 547, 566-67, fn. 14).
6. Subcontractor dissatisfaction with the perceived inadequacy of protection afforded by this provision apparently became the impetus for a 2008 amendment to section 2782, discussed below, at least based upon the numerous (form) letters submitted to legislators in connection therewith.
7. Section 2782 (a), where we started, and which has continued without change, prohibits indemnity for claims arising out of the sole negligence or willful misconduct of the promisee; sole negligence can be either active or passive. The various versions relating to residential construction prohibit indemnity for the negligence of the builder, etc., suggesting there is no express contractual indemnity for the negligence of the subcontractor if the builder, etc., is at all negligent. This is tempered a bit by the preservation of the right to equitable indemnity, which will now be found in section 2782 (g) and (h).

Courtesy of Michael D. Worthing of Borton Petrini, LLP. Mr. Worthing can be contacted at mworthing@bortonpetrini.com.

Homebuilding Still on the Rise

The National Association of Home Builders reports that spending on private homes was up three percent in October 2012, bringing it to a four-year high. This was part of a trend in which fourteen of the last fifteen months have seen increases in spending on residential construction. Likewise, multifamily residences have seen thirteen months of increased spending, putting it 82% higher than its low, two years ago. ¬?In addition to new homes, remodeling is also up, reaching its highest point in five years.

Read the full story…

Crane Dangles and So Do Insurance Questions

Hurricane Sandy sent a construction crane dangling from the top of One57, a condo construction project in New York City. In response to the risk, the nearby Parker Meridian and other nearby buildings were evacuated until the crane could be stabilized. Businessweek reports that One57 involves “a tangle of companies,” including the developer, Extell Development and the contractor, Lend Lease Construction. Pinnacle Industries was responsible for providing and operating the crane.

The insurance claims are yet to be made, but they will likely include the costs of evacuating nearby buildings and to cover any damage to the building itself. David DeLaRue, a vice president in construction practice at Willis Group Holdings said there would be two questions: “Did our insured do anything to cause that loss? Does this policy cover it?”

Read the full story…

Oregon agreement to procure insurance, anti-indemnity statute, and self-insured retention

In Continental Casualty Ins. Co. v. Zurich American Ins. Co., No. 09-35484 (9th Cir. Oct. 28, 2010), general contractor TCR was sued by an employee of subcontractor Safeway for bodily injuries suffered while working on the project. In the subcontract, Safeway agreed to procure primary insurance providing coverage for TCR for liability arising out of Safeway’s negligence. Safeway’s CGL policy included a self-insured retention that had to be satisfied before the insurer had a duty to defend. TCR filed suit against Safeway alleging that

Reprinted courtesy of CDCoverage.com

Construction Defect Destroys Home, Forty Years Later

Fire investigators in Monroe, North Carolina have blamed a nail as the source of a fire that lead to a home being declared a total loss. The nail, part of the original construction, nicked a wire within a wall, causing a short, which started a fire. The home was built in the late 1960s.

WBTV reported that the homeowner was awakened by a power outage. He went outside and saw flames coming from a vent in the roof. He was unable to contain the fire with a garden hose. Neighbors called firemen who were able to stop the blaze.

Read the full story…

Contractual Liability Exclusion Bars Coverage

The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals considered whether coverage existed for a defectively built tennis court in light of a contractual liability exclusion. Ewing Construction Company, Inc. v. Amerisure Ins. Co., 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 12154 (5th Cir. June 15, 2012).

Ewing Construction Company entered a contract with the School District to construct tennis courts at a school. After completion, the School District complained that the courts were cracking and flaking, rendering them unfit for playing tennis. The School District filed suit, seeking damages for defective construction. It alleged that Ewing breached its contract and performed negligently.

Ewing tendered the underlying lawsuit to Amerisure. Amerisure denied coverage and Ewing filed suit.

Read the full story…

Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com

California Construction Bill Dies in Committee

AB 20, which its sponsor, Linda Halderman (R-Fresno), stated would discourage class action lawsuits against builders and protect jobs in the construction industry, has died in committee. Although the Business Journal reported in June that Haldeman was promoting the bill during a talk in her district and the bill is still on her web site, the California Assembly reports that the bill failed in committee on March 15, 2011. It is possible that the bill could be reconsidered, but the Assembly Committee on Judiciary sees the bill as responding to issues quieted by SB 800 which gives builders the right to repair alleged defects before any suit can be filed.

Read the full story…

Mortar Insufficient to Insure Summary Judgment in Construction Defect Case

The US District Court of Nevada issued a summary judgment in the case of R&O Construction Company V. Rox Pro International Group, Ltd. on December 19, 2011. The case involved the installation of stone veneer at a Home Depot location (Home Depot was not involved in the case). R&O’s subcontractor, New Creation Masonry, purchased the stone veneer from Arizona Stone. Judge Larry Hicks noted that “the stone veneer failed and R&O was forced to make substantial structural repairs to the Home Depot store.”

Rox Pro asked the court for a summary judgment, which the court granted only in part. The court looked at two issues in the case, whether the installation instructions constituted a breach of implied warranty of merchantability, and whether there was a breach of an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose.

Judge Hicks found that there was a breach of implied warranty of merchantability. The instructions drafted by Real Stone and distributed by Arizona Stone were not sufficient for affixing the supplied stones, according to R&O’s expert, a claim the plaintiffs dispute. “Because there is an issue of material fact concerning the installation guidelines, the court shall deny Arizona Stone’s motion for a summary judgment on this issue.”

On the other hand, the judge did not find that the instructions had any bearing as to whether R&O bought the stone, since the stone was selected by the shopping center developer. This issue was, in the view of the judge, appropriately dismissed.

Read the court’s decision…

Insurer Not Liable for Construction Defect Revealed by Woodpecker

The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has ruled that an insurance provision that excluded construction defects must stand in Friedberg v. Chubb, granting a summary judgment to the insurance firm.

The Friedbergs discovered extensive water damage to their home after a woodpecker drilled a hole in a vertical support. They sought insurance coverage under their Chubb “Masterpiece” policy. The decision quotes the policy as covering “all risk of physical loss” “unless stated otherwise or an exclusion applies.” These exclusions included “gradual or sudden loss,” “structural movement,” and “faulty planning, construction or maintenance,” but the policy covered “ensuing covered loss unless another exclusion applies.”

Chubb’s expert determined that the Friedbergs’ home had defective construction, and “attributed the damage to the beams and walls below the beam to a failure to install control joints.” After Chubb denied coverage, the Friedbergs sued, although the court ruled that “even under the Friedbergs’ theory, the water damage was a loss caused by faulty construction and therefore excluded under the policy.”

On appeal, the Friedbergs argued that “the loss resulted from the combination of both faulty construction and the presence of water” and that Minnesota’s “concurrent causation” doctrine must apply, which according to the decision, “when a loss results from both a covered peril and an excluded peril, coverage exists unless the excluded peril is the ‘overriding cause’ of the loss.” The court rejected this reasoning, noting that “once the house was plagued with faulty construction, it was a foreseeable and natural consequence that water would enter.”

The Friedbergs also contended that “the damage caused by the intrusion of water into their home is an ‘ensuing covered loss’ for which they are due coverage.” The court also rejected this claim, noting that Minnesota law excludes defective construction from the ensuing loss provision. The court said that “the Friedbergs’ reading of their ensuing-loss clause, by contrast, would dramatically limit their policy’s faulty-construction exclusion, because almost ‘any loss cause by’ faulty construction could also be characterized as an ensuing loss under an all-risk policy.”

Read the court’ decision…

Badly Constructed Masonry Walls Not an Occurrence in Arkansas Law

The US District Court for Maryland has granted a summary judgment in the case Konover Construction Corp. v. ATC Associates to Massachusetts Bay Insurance Company and denied a request for dismissal from ACT. Konover (KBE) was contracted by Wal-Mart to build a Wal-Mart store and a Sam’s Club in Port Covington, Maryland. Superus, Inc. was hired by KBE to build the masonry walls. Superus purchased a policy from Massachusetts Bay Insurance which named KBE as an additional insured. Wal-Mart hired ATC Associates to independently test and inspect the concrete structural steel, and masonry.

After the building was in use, a large crack appeared which was attributed a latent construction defect. Other cracks were discovered. Upon investigation, it was discovered that there were “voids or foam in the concrete block surrounding the reinforcing steel that should have been filled with grout,” and in some cases, “reinforcing steel was missing or not installed in accordance with the specifications.” KBE paid for the repair and remediation and Wal-Mart assigned all rights and interests against ATC to KBE.

KBE filed suit against ATC. ATC called for dismissal on the grounds that Wal-Mart had no claims as the problems had been remediated. Wal-Mart then provided KBE with additional agreements to give them enforceable rights against ATC and Superus. KBE filed a fourteen claims against ATC, Superus, and Massachusetts Bay. In the current case, Massachusetts Bay sought summary judgment and ATC sought dismissal of all claims against it.

Massachusetts Bay claims that they need not indemnify Superus, as “there is no evidence adequate to establish that Superus’ defective work caused any collateral and/or resulting damage that was not subject to an Impaired Property exclusion, and that, in any event, no damage occurred during the policy period.”

As Wal-Mart is headquarted in Arkansas, certain contracts were under Arkansas law. Under the Arkansas courts, “defective workmanship, standing alone and resulting in damages only to the work product itself, is not an ‘occurrence.’” The court determined that collateral or resultant damage would be covered. The court found that “it is clear under Arkansas law, and the parties appear to agree, that Massachusetts Bay is not obligated to indemnify KBE for any repairs to the masonry walls themselves, including any cracks or gaps in the walls.” The court also found that “there is no evidence adequate to prove that any allegedly resultant property damage was caused by Superus’ faulty construction of the walls.” The court also noted that “if the building code violation and structural integrity problem were ‘property damage,’ insurance coverage would be barred by the Impaired Property Exclusion.” Based on these findings, the court concluded that Massachusetts Bay is entitled to summary judgment.

While the court dismissed the case against Massachusetts Bay, the court declined ATC’s motion to dismiss. The court noted that ACT’s alleged negligence in conducting inspections “created only a risk of economic loss for KBE.” Although hired by Wal-Mart, ATC “transmitted its daily testing and inspection reports of the Wal-Mart and Sam’s Club projects directly to KBE.” The court found that “KBE has made a plausible claim.”

ATC also claimed that KBE contributed to the negligence due to the negligence of its subcontractor. The court concluded that it was plausible that “ATC will not be able to carry its burden of proving KBE was contributorily negligent.” The court was less sanguine about KBE’s fraud claim, but though it “may not now appear likely to have merit, it is above the ‘plausibility’ line.”

In conclusion, KBE may not continue its case against Massachusetts Bay. However, the judge allowed the other proceedings to continue.

Read the court’s decision…