Court Rejects Anti-SLAPP Motion in Construction Defect Suit
September 1, 2011 — CJD Staff
The California Court of Appeals has upheld the denial of an anti-SLAPP motion in Claredon American Insurance Company v. Bishop, Barry, Howe, Haney & Ryder. This case was triggered by a water intrusion problem at a condominium complex, the Terraces at Emerystation, built and sold by Wareham Development Corporation. The insurer, Claredon, retained Risk Enterprise Management as the third party claims administrator. REM retained the law firm Bishop, Barry, Howe, Haney & Ryder. The construction defect case was settled in 2007 and the condo owners moved back by early 2008.
Due to issues with the claims settlement, Claredon filed against REM for “professional negligence, indemnity, apportionment and contribution,” with a cross-complaint that the cross-defendants negligently defended the developer, Wareham.
In response, the cross-defendants filed a motion to strike the cross-complaint under the anti-SLAPP statute. The trial court denied this motion and now this has been upheld by the appeals court.
The court noted that “The fundamental thrust of the cross-complaint is not protected litigation-related speech and petitioning activity undertaken on another’s behalf in a judicial proceeding.”
Read the court’s decision…
Homebuilding Still on the Rise
December 20, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The National Association of Home Builders reports that spending on private homes was up three percent in October 2012, bringing it to a four-year high. This was part of a trend in which fourteen of the last fifteen months have seen increases in spending on residential construction. Likewise, multifamily residences have seen thirteen months of increased spending, putting it 82% higher than its low, two years ago. ¬?In addition to new homes, remodeling is also up, reaching its highest point in five years.
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New Households Moving to Apartments
December 20, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The New York Times reports that multifamily construction?Äîapartment buildings?Äîis leading the recovery in construction. Construction of single-family homes is only a third of the way up from its fall from its earlier heights, while multifamily construction has recovered two-thirds of its peak. Young adults are moving out of their parents’ homes, but instead of buying homes, they’re renting apartments.
Houston is adding thousands of new units, leading to a fear of overbuilding. Rents have been rising, but as the supply of apartment units rises, higher rents may be unsustainable. However, during the recession, young adults did not move out of their parents’ homes, leading to about two million doubled-up households. David Crowe, the chief economist of the National Association of Home Builders, noted that “all of the net addition to households since 2004 has been in rentals.”
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Timing of Insured’s SIR Payment Has No Effect on Non-Participating Insurer’s Equitable Contribution to Co-Insurer
April 25, 2012 — Aarti Kewalramani, Gatzke Dillon & Balance LLP
In a case of first impression, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division One, examined whether a non-participating insurer can evade its defense and indemnity obligations because the insured only paid the policy’s self-insured retention ("SIR") as part of a settlement. In Axis Surplus Lines Insurance Company v. Glencoe Insurance LTD. (April 11, 2012, D058963) __ Cal.App.4th __ [2012 WL 11903203], the critical issue for the Court was whether an insurer, with full notice and continued investigation of a claim, can "hide behind the SIR requirement in its policy." The Court declined to "sanction such gamesmanship."
The dispute involved an equitable contribution claim between two insurers. Axis Surplus Insurance Company provided commercial general liability insurance to Pacifica Pointe L.P. During the same time period, Glencoe Insurance Ltd. provided an owner-controlled insurance policy (i.e., wrap policy) to Pacifica Pointe L.P. Both policies included provisions requiring co-carriers to split the defense and indemnity on equal shares. Pacifica was sued in a construction defect lawsuit, involving alleged resultant damages to condominiums it converted and sold. Pacifica tendered the claim to both Axis and Glencoe. While Axis agreed to defend Pacifica, subject to a reservation of rights, Glencoe declined to participate until Pacifica satisfied the $250,000 SIR on the policy. Glencoe continued to monitor the litigation from the sidelines.
Axis and Pacifica settled the underlying construction defect lawsuit for $1 million. Pacifica advised Glencoe of the settlement, and received Glencoe’s approval to contribute its $250,000 SIR towards the settlement. Axis contributed $750,000 towards the settlement. After the settlement, Axis sued Glencoe for declaratory relief and equitable contribution, to recover a portion of the defense and indemnity it paid. The trial court found in favor of Axis and allocated Glencoe 60% of the settlement payment. Glencoe appealed.
On appeal, the Court scrutinized whether Glencoe, as the non-participating insurer, had a legal obligation to provide a defense and indemnity to the insured, despite the timing of the SIR’s satisfaction. The Court determined that in an equitable contribution action, the participating insurer has the burden of proving merely the potential for coverage under the non-participating insurer’s policy. On this showing, the burden of proof shifts to the non-participating insurer to prove the absence of actual coverage under its policy. The Court emphasized that the timing of the SIR’s payment was inconsequential to either insurer’s burden. Because Glencoe admitted coverage existed under its policy, the Court affirmed the trial court’s decision.
As a result, the result ultimately turned on whether the non-participating carrier had full notice of the claim and cannot use the timing of the satisfaction of the SIR to shield itself from an equitable contribution claim from the participating co-carrier.
Published courtesy of Aarti Kewalramani of Gatzke Dillon & Balance LLP. Ms. Kewalramani can be contacted at akewalramani@gdandb.com.
Statute of Repose Dependant on When Subcontractors Finished
July 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Scott C. Sandberg of Snell and Wilmer writes a post on the JDSupra site about the Colorado Court of Appeals decision in Shaw Construction v. United Builder Services. Sanberg notes that when the general contractor was sued by an HOA, the contractor turned around and sued its subcontractors. The contractor made three claims. They claimed that “improvement” referred to the whole project, that “substantial completion” was reached when the architect certified completion, and that the statute of repose was tolled by the HOA’s service of a Construction Defect Action Reform Act notice.
The subcontractors claimed that “improvement” only referred to their specific work, which reached “substantial completion” when they finished, despite work to be done by other later, and the HOA’s notice to the contractor did not affect the subcontractors. The Colorado court agreed with the subcontractors.
Sandberg notes that some of the contractor’s were not addressed by the court, noting that “the court did not decide whether an improvement triggering the statute of repose can be determined on a trade-by-trade basis,” and that “the court did not decide whether substantial completion occurs when a certificate of occupancy is issued or when the architect certifies completion.”
Read the full story…
General Contractor/Developer May Not Rely on the Homeowner Protection Act to Avoid a Waiver of Consequential Damages in an AIA Contract
August 4, 2011 — Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC
Recently, in Caribou Ridge Homes, LLC v. Zero Energy, LLC, et al., Case No. 10CV1094, Boulder County District Court Judge Ingrid S. Bakke entered a ruling and order on the Plaintiff’s Motion for Determination of Question of Law Pursuant to C.R.C.P. 56(h) on Issue of Damages. The Order found that the Plaintiff was not a homeowner intended to be protected by the Homeowner Protection Act (the “HPA”) and thus could not pursue its claims for consequential damages against Defendant.
By way of background, on June 18, 2008, Plaintiff Caribou Ridge Homes, LLC (“Caribou”) entered into a Standard Form Agreement Between Owner and Contractor AIA Document A114-2001 (the “Contract”) with Defendant Zero Energy, LLC (“Zero Energy”). Plaintiff hired Zero Energy to serve as a general contractor for the construction of a single-family home in the Caribou Ridge subdivision in Nederland, Colorado. A provision in the contract contained a mutual waiver of consequential damages (“Waiver”).
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC
Are Construction Defects Covered by Your General Liability Policy?
July 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Construction firms are finding that their insurers are denying construction defect claims and the courts are siding with the insurers, according to Kelly M. Gindele, writing in the Martindale-Hubble Legal Library. Ms. Gindele notes that when construction defect claims are not covered, firms can end up with “multi-million dollar claims” that it has to pay “out of its own pocket.” She notes that in Kentucky and Ohio, if “the insured’s work causes an unforeseen and unintended event to occur?Ķthere is not occurrence under the policy.” Further, if there is an occurrence, the court will “look for an exception to coverage.”
She also notes that contractors may not hold sufficient coverage, either by limiting the amounts or the time. She notes that while “insurers generally try to limit coverage for defect claims to one year,” that “construction defects may not be found in a year’s time.”
Ms. Ginele recommends that contractors “hire an insurance company with extensive experience in this field” and “independent legal counsel with insurance knowledge,” to avoid finding themselves “with limited or even no coverage when it needs it most.”
Read the full story…
No Choice between Homeowner Protection and Bankrupt Developers?
February 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Donna DiMaggio Berger, writing in the Sun Sentinel argues those may be the only current choices in Florida. A recent court case, Lakeview Reserve HOA v. Maronda Homes has caused a swift response from the legislators. Ms. Berger notes that the construction defect bill, HB 1013, “would take away a homeowner’s rights to pursue a developer for defects to the driveways, roads, sidewalks, utilities, drainage areas and other so-called ‘off-site’ improvements.” The alternative? She notes that applying the Maronda decision would “bankrupt developers who don’t build defect-free roads and sidewalks.”
Read the full story…
Good Signs for Housing Market in 2013
December 20, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Dan Green, a loan officer at Waterstone Mortgage, is optimistic about the construction market in 2013. He notes that the rise in building permit, housing starts, and housing completions are all good signs. Mortgage rates are still low, making these new homes attractive to buyers.
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Lien Law Unlikely To Change — Yet
May 26, 2011 — Melissa Brumback, Construction Law in North Carolina
For those of you following the proposed revisions to the NC lien law that is currently at the NC House Judiciary Subcommittee B, a quick update: the proposed bill (HB 489) is unlikely to be voted on this legislative session due to its unpopularity with several constituency groups, including both the AIA-North Carolinaand the NC Home Builders Association.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of Melissa Brumback of Ragsdale Liggett PLLC. Ms. Brumback can be contacted at mbrumback@rl-law.com.
Damron Agreement Questioned in Colorado Casualty Insurance v Safety Control Company, et al.
February 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Safety Control and EMC appealed the judgment in Colorado Casualty Insurance Company versus Safety Control Company, Inc., et al. (Ariz. App., 2012). The Superior Court in Maricopa County addressed “the validity and effect of a Damron agreement a contractor and its excess insurer entered into that assigned their rights to sue the primary insurer.” Judge Johnsen stated, “We hold the agreement is enforceable but remand for a determination of whether the stipulated judgment falls within the primary insurer’s policy.”
The Opinion provides some facts and procedural history regarding the claim. “The Arizona Department of Transportation (“ADOT”) hired DBA Construction Company (“DBA”) to perform a road-improvement project on the Loop 101 freeway. Safety Control Company, Inc. was one of DBA’s subcontractors. As required by the subcontract, Safety Control purchased from Employer’s Mutual Casualty Company (“EMC”) a certificate of insurance identifying DBA as an additional insured on a policy providing primary coverage for liability arising out of Safety Control’s work.”
A collision occurred on site, injuring Hugo Roman. Roman then sued ADT and DBA for damages. “Colorado Casualty tendered DBA’s defense to the subcontractors, including Safety Control. Safety Control and EMC rejected the tender. Roman eventually settled his claims against DBA and ADOT. DBA and ADOT stipulated with Roman for entry of judgment of $750,000; Roman received $75,000 from DBA (paid by Colorado Casualty) and $20,000 from ADOT, and agreed not to execute on the stipulated judgment. Finally, DBA, ADOT and Colorado Casualty assigned to Roman their rights against the subcontractors and other insurers.”
Colorado Casualty attempted to recover what “it had paid to defend DBA and ADOT and settle with Roman. However, Roman intervened, and argued that “Colorado Casualty had assigned its subrogation rights to him as part of the settlement agreement.” The suit was not dismissed, but the Superior Court allowed Roman to intervene. “Roman then filed a counterclaim against Colorado Casualty and a cross-claim against the subcontractors.”
All claims were settled against all of the defendants except Safety Control and EMC. “The superior court ruled on summary judgment that EMC breached a duty to defend DBA and that as a result, ‘DBA was entitled to settle with Roman without EMC’s consent as long as the settlement was not collusive or fraudulent.’ After more briefing, the court held the stipulated judgment was neither collusive nor procured by fraud and that EMC therefore was liable to Roman on the stipulated judgment and for his attorney’s fees. The court also held Safety Control breached its subcontract with DBA by failing to procure completed-operations insurance coverage and would be liable for damages to the extent that EMC did not satisfy what remained (after the other settlements) of the stipulated judgment and awards of attorney’s fees.” Safety Control and EMC appealed the judgment.
Four reasons were given for the decision of the ruling. First, “the disagreement between Roman and Colorado Casualty does not preclude them from pursuing their claims against EMC and Safety Control.” Second, “the settlement agreement is not otherwise invalid.” Third, “issues of fact remain about whether the judgment falls within the EMC policy.” Finally, “Safety Control breached the subcontract by failing to procure ‘Completed Operations’ coverage for DBA.”
In conclusion, the Superior Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded . “Although, as stated above, we have affirmed several rulings of the superior court, we reverse the judgment against EMC and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion to determine whether the stipulated judgment was a liability that arose out of Safety Control’s operations. In addition, we affirm the superior court’s declaratory judgment against Safety Control but remand so that the court may clarify the circumstances under which Safety Control may be liable for damages and may conduct whatever further proceedings it deems appropriate to ascertain the amount of those damages. We decline all parties’ requests for attorney’s fees pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-341.01 without prejudice to a request for fees incurred in this appeal to be filed by the prevailing party on remand before the superior court.”
Read the court’s decision…
DA’s Office Checking Workers Comp Compliance
February 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The San Bernardino office of the California District Attorney is partnering with the California Contractor’s State License Board to check if subcontractors are holding the required workers compensation insurance. The High Desert Daily Press reports that the process of checking at sites has been going on for several months.
Investigators visit sites and ask supervisors to provide a list of subcontractors which the state then checks for compliance. One worker was quoted that insurance inspections were so rare that he had never seen one before, despite 20 years in construction.
On one day, investigators in two teams visited fourteen construction sites and reviewed the insurance status of twenty-two firms. Three were found out of compliance and stop work orders were issued.
Read the full story…
Ensuing Losses From Faulty Workmanship Must be Covered
May 10, 2012 — Tred Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
Coverage for damages resulting from faulty workmanship in the construction of an apartment complex was at issue in The Bartram, LLC v. Landmark Am. Ins. Co., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44535 (N.D. Fla. March 30, 2012).
The owner of the apartments, Bartram, had primary coverage and three layers of excess coverage. Each contract excluded loss from faulty workmanship. The policies provided, however, "if loss or damage by a Covered Cause of Loss results, we will pay for that resulting loss or damage."
Bartram contended water intrusion occurred because of faulty workmanship, which caused damage to the buildings’ exterior and interior finishes, wood sheathing, framing, balcony systems, drywall ceilings and stucco walls. This damage was separate from the work needed to simply fix the faulty workmanship. Therefore, Bartram argued, the ensuing losses that resulted from the water intrusion was covered.
The insurer argued the ensuing loss exception was not applicable if the ensuing loss was directly related to the original excluded loss.
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
Construction Defect Case Not Over, Despite Summary Judgment
November 7, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The Supreme Court of Oregon has concluded in an en banc decision that a motion to reconsider a summary judgment is not a motion for a new trial. In coming to their conclusion the court overturned an earlier Oregon Supreme Court case, Carter v. U.S. National Bank. Although the decision does not bear on construction defects, the underlying case did. Due to the decision, these claims can now be evaluated in a trial.
The case, Association of Unit Owners of Timbercrest Condominiums v. Warren, came about after an apartment complex was converted into condominium units. The developers hired Big Al’s Construction for some of the remodeling work. The condominium association later sued the developer and the contractor over claims of construction defects. The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, which the court granted.
But that wasn’t the end of things. The plaintiff soon filed a “motion to reconsider,” noting that the summary judgment seemed to be in conflict with both law and other recent rulings, and additionally, the grounds for the decision were not in the order. The judge then notified the parties that the court had “pulled the trigger too quickly” and had seven questions for the parties to answer.
The court dismissed all claims against the defendants. The defendants filed their responses, objecting that that “‘there is no such thing’ as a motion for reconsideration.” Further, while “the rules do allow for post-judgment review of pre-judgment rulings through a motion for a new trial,” the plaintiffs had not filed for a new trial. But did they need one? They did file an appeal.
The judge in the case admitted that there was no such thing as a motion to reconsider, and felt bad about prematurely signing the judgment. The case was sent to the Court of Appeals to determine if the motion to reconsider was a request for a new trial. The Court of Appeals concurred.
In reviewing the decision, the Oregon Supreme Court concluded that there were a maximum of three questions to address. Was the motion for reconsideration a motion for a new trial? If so, was the later notice of appeal premature? And if so, was the plaintiff required to file a new appeal? The court determined that the answer to the first question was no.
Prior decisions pointed to the conclusion “that a motion for reconsideration of a summary judgment amounts to a motion for a new trial,” but here the court concluded that “our prior cases erred,” and turned to the summary judgment rule for clarification. The court noted that “the rule contemplates that summary judgment and trial are separate and distinct events.” With this conclusion, the Oregon Supreme Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings.
Read the court’s decision…
Virginia Chinese Drywall and pollution exclusion
May 27, 2011 — CDCoverage.com
In Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. The Overlook, LLC, No. 4:10cv69 (E.D. Va. May 13, 2011), homeowner Edmonds sued insured developer/general contractor Overlook seeking damages resulting from defective Chinese drywall installed in Edmonds’ home. Overlook’s CGL insurer Nationwide defended Overlook under a reservation of rights and filed a declaratory judgment action. The federal district trial court granted Nationwide’s motion for summary judgment.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of CDCoverage.com
Webinar on Insurance Disputes in Construction Defects
July 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Seth Lamden, of the firm Neal Gerber Eisenberg will be presenting a webinar on “Insurance Coverage Disputes in Construction Defects” on July 17, 2012 at 1 p.m. EDT. Mr. Lamden’s presentation will focus on “handling both the construction and insurance components of construction defect claims.” He will be discussing recent case law and new insurance products. The presentation will present information on evaluating various types of insurance policies, explaining common issues, contract requirement, and the economic loss doctrine. Mr. Lamden will advise attendees on how to avoid getting into a construction defect case. He will conclude his presentation with a brief question-and-answer session.
Read the full story…
Can We Compel Insurers To Cover Construction Defect in General Liability Policies?
December 9, 2011 — Douglas Reiser, Builders Counsel
Recently, I read an article on Engineering News-Record that outlines a remarkable movement by as many as four states, to mandate coverage of construction defects in contractor general liability insurance policies. Say what? Is this a reality? What will become of affordable insurance?
Commercial General Liability insurance, or CGL, is your basic liability insurance. Every contractor doing business in the State of Washington, and most likely those abroad, has this insurance. Contractors buy this insurance to protect them from unforeseen liabilities arising from their negligence - and right now it’s reasonably affordable.
Why is it so affordable in such a risk-heavy industry? Because CGL policies significantly limit the scope of their coverage. Coverage is generally afforded for damages resulting from negligence (The roofer put a hammer through the drywall contractor’s wall) or which resulted from your defective construction (the roof leaked and flooded the rest of the house). But, that coverage does not include replacement of your faulty construction (the contents of the home might be protected by your leaky roof - the leaky roof itself is not).
The debate over coverage typically stems from the definition of “occurrence,” a term used to describe the event from which coverage arises, “resulting loss,” a term used to describe the type of loss covered.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of Douglas Reiser of Reiser Legal LLC. Mr. Reiser can be contacted at info@reiserlegal.com
Court Rules on a Long List of Motions in Illinois National Insurance Co v Nordic PCL
May 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The case Illinois National Insurance Co. v Nordic PCL, et al. “involves a dispute about whether insurance benefits are available to a general contractor who built structures that allegedly have construction defects. Plaintiffs Illinois National Insurance Company (‘Illinois National’) and National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, PA (‘National Union’) (collectively, the ‘Insurers’), commenced this action for declaratory relief against Defendant Nordic PCL Construction, Inc., f/k/a Nordic Construction, Ltd. ("Nordic"), on August 23, 2011.”
The court was asked to rule on a long list of motions: “Counterclaim Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice in Support of Their (1) Motion to Dismiss the Counterclaim and (2) Motion to Strike Portions of the Counterclaim, ECF No. 16 (‘Request for Judicial Notice’); Counterclaim Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Counterclaim Filed October 24, 2011, ECF No. 14 (‘Motion to Dismiss Counterclaim’); Counterclaim Defendants’ Motion to Strike Portions of the Counterclaim Filed October 24, 2011, ECF No. 15 (‘Motion to Strike’); Third-Party Defendant Marsh USA, Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Stay Proceedings in Favor of Pending State Action, ECF No. 33 (‘Marsh’s Motion To Dismiss Or Stay’); Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff Nordic PCL Construction, Inc., f/k/a Nordic Construction Ltd.’s Substantive Joinder to Third-Party Defendant Marsh USA Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Stay Proceedings in Favor of Pending State Action, ECF No. 36 (‘Nordic’s Joinder’); and Third-Party Defendant Marsh USA, Inc.’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings on Counts V and VI of Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff Nordic PCL Construction, Inc.’s Third-Party Complaint, ECF No. 29 (‘Marsh’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings’).”
In result, the court reached the following decisions: “The court GRANTS IN RELEVANT PART the Insurers’ Request for Judicial Notice to the extent it covers matters relevant to these motions; GRANTS IN PART the Insurers’ Motion to Dismiss Counterclaim, but gives Nordic leave to amend the Counterclaim in certain respects; DENIES the Insurers’ Motion to Strike; DENIES Marsh’s Motion To Dismiss Or Stay and Nordic’s Joinder; and GRANTS Marsh’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.”
The court provides a bit of background on the case: “This action arises out of alleged construction defects involving two projects on which Nordic acted as the general contractor. Nordic is a defendant in a pending state court action with respect to one of the projects and says it spent more than $400,000 on repairs with respect to the other project. Nordic tendered the defense of the pending state court action to the Insurers and sought reimbursement of the cost of repairs already performed. The Insurers responded by filing this action to determine their rights under the insurance policies issued to Nordic.”
Furthermore, the court presented a brief procedural history: “The Insurers commenced this declaratory action in this court on August 23, 2011. The Complaint asserts two claims, one seeking a declaration that the Insurers have no duty to provide a defense or indemnification regarding the Safeway Action, the other seeking such a declaration regarding the Moanalua Claims. Along with its Answer, Nordic filed a Counterclaim against the Insurers. The Counterclaim asserts breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, misrepresentations and omissions of material fact, and bad faith, and seeks declaratory relief against the Insurers.”
The procedural history continues: “Nordic also filed a Third-Party Complaint against Marsh, the broker that had procured the Policies from the Insurers for Nordic. Nordic alleges that it reasonably believed that the Policies would provide completed operations insurance coverage for the types of construction defects alleged in the Safeway Action and Moanalua Claims. The Third-Party Complaint asserts breach of contract, negligence, promissory estoppel, breach of fiduciary duties, implied indemnity, and contribution and equitable subrogation.”
In conclusion, “The court GRANTS IN RELEVANT PART the Insurers’ Request for Judicial Notice. With regard to the Insurers’ Motion to Dismiss Counterclaim, the court GRANTS the motion as to Count I (breach of contract), Count II (duty of good faith and fair dealing), Count III (fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation), the portion of Count IV (bad faith) premised on fraud, and Count IV (declaratory relief). The court DENIES the motion as to Count IV (bad faith) that is not premised on fraud. Except with respect to the "occurrence" issue, which the court disposes of here on the merits, and Count V, which concerns only a form of relief, Nordic is given leave to amend its Counterclaim within three weeks of the date of this order. The court DENIES the Insurers’ Motion to Strike, DENIES Marsh’s Motion to Dismiss or Stay and Nordic’s Joinder, and GRANTS Marsh’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings with respect to Counts V and VI of the Third-Party Complaint.”
Read the court’s decision…
