Sometimes It’s Okay to Destroy Evidence
August 17, 2011 — CDJ Staff
The Minnesota Supreme Court has ruled in the case of Miller v. Lankow that Mr. Miller was within his rights to remediate his home, even though doing so destroyed the evidence of water intrusion.
Linda Lankow built a home in 1992. In 2001 or 2002, Lankow discovered a stucco problem at the garage which she attributed to moisture intrusion. She asked the original contractor to fix the wall. In 2003, Lankow attempted to sell her home, but the home inspection revealed fungal growth in the basement. Lankow made further repairs, including alterations to the landscaping.
In 2004, Lankow put her house on the market once again and entered into an agreement with David Miller. Miller declined to have an independent inspection, as the home had been repaired by professional contractors.
In 2005, Miller put the house on the market. A prospective buyer requested a moisture inspection. The inspection firm, Private Eye, Inc. found “significant moisture intrusion problems.”
Miller hired an attorney who sent letters to the contractors and to Lankow and her husband. Lankow’s husband, Jim Betz, an attorney, represented his wife and sent a letter to Miller’s attorney that Miller had declined an opportunity to inspect the home.
In 2007, Miller’s new attorney sent letters to all parties that Miller had decided to begin remediation work on the house. All stucco was removed. Miller then filed a lawsuit against the prior owners, the builders, and the realtors.
Two of the contractors and the prior owners moved for summary judgment on the grounds that Miller had spoliated evidence by removing the stucco. They requested that Miller’s expert reports be excluded. The district court found for the defendants and imposed sanctions on Miller.
The Minnesota Supreme court found that “a custodial party’s duty to preserve evidence is not boundless,” stating that “it may be particularly import to allow remediation in cases such as the one before us.” Their reasoning was that “remediation of the moisture intrusion problem in the home may be necessary, even essential, to address immediate health concerns.”
Given that Miller needed to remediate the problem in order to continue living there, and that he had given the other parties a “full and fair opportunity to inspect,” the court found that he was within his rights. The court reversed the judgment of the lower court and remanded it to them for review.
Read the court’s decision…
Construction Law Alert: A Specialty License May Not Be Required If Work Covered By Another License
March 7, 2011 — By
Steve Cvitanovic of
Haight Brown & Bonesteel, LLP.Contractors should always be sure that they understand the licensing in any Subcontract or Prime Contract before entering into any agreement. However, on March 3, 2011, in the case of Pacific Casson & Shoring, Inc. v. Bernards Bros., Inc. 2011 Cal.App.Lexis 236, the Court of Appeal determined that if a specialty license is subsumed within another license, the specialty license may not be required.
Bernards entered into a subcontract with Pacific to excavate, backfill, grade and provide geotechnical design parameters for a hospital. The Prime Contract required the bidder to maintain a Class C-12 specialty earthwork license. However, Pacific only held a Class A general engineering license which it turns out was suspended during the performance of the work. Pacific sued Bernards for nonpayment of $544,567, but the lawsuit was dismissed because the trial court found that Pacific (1) lacked a C-12 license, and (2) Pacific’s Class A license was suspended for failure to pay an unrelated judgment. Pacific was also ordered to disgorge $206,437 in prior payments.
The Court of Appeal reversed and remanded. The Court of Appeal agreed with Pacific and held that a C-12 specialty license was not required despite the Prime Contract. The Court of Appeal found that the C-12 specialty license would have been “superfluous” since it was fully encompassed within the Class A requirements. However, the Court of Appeal also remanded the case for further
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Reprinted courtesy of Steve Cvitanovic of Haight Brown & Bonesteel, LLP.
Time to Repair Nevada’s Construction Defect Laws?
February 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The Builders Magazine writes that during the previous session of the Nevada legislature, reforms sought by the building industry were stopped by the Speaker of the Nevada Assembly. The new session brings a new speaker and new hope for construction defect reform in Nevada.
Pat Hickey, a member of the Assembly and a small business owner told The Builders Magazine that “we need to apply pressure on the legislators to fix the law.” He also recommended that people “go to Governor Sandoval and ask for his help.” Builders seeks legislation that will include right to repair and it should “define construction defect in such a way that it allows for a fair process.”
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New Web Site Tracks Settled Construction Defect Claims
June 19, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Peter Lissner, a former Nevada homebuilder, has created a new site to help track homes that have been involved in construction defect litigation. His site, housefaxreview.com, collections documentation about homes where claims of construction defects have been made. He told The Builders Magazine concerns about “the number of homes that have been served notices, received compensation, yet the homes weren’t repaired.” On the site, the creator is identified as “a family owned builder.” According to the site, “the builder had no claims until the neighborhood reached the statutory claims limit 10 years.”
Lissner also claims that in many cases, after settling construction defect lawsuits, the homeowners sell to subsequent buyers without disclosing the lawsuit or their failure to repair. “Who is going to let the new homeowner know about the issue?” he asks.
Documents on the site are priced according to their relevance. Lissner notes that those who provide documents to the site will receive free access.
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Plaintiff Not Entitled to Further Damages over Defective Decking
August 2, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Third Appellate District has rejected an appeal from the successful plaintiff of a construction defect case in Evilsizor v. Calaveras Lumber Company. John Evilsizor hired Scott Hunton to remove and replace the deck at the rear of his home. Subsequently, the deck, which had been constructed with a product called SmartDeck, a product of the subsequently bankrupt US Plastic Lumber, exhibited problems. Hunton made some repairs. Calaveras Lumber offered replacement decking if Evilsizor would pay the difference in price. Mr. Evilsizor hired another contractor to replace the decking and then sued for lost use and compensation for the amount he paid the second contractor. Replacing the deck a second time cost Mr. Evilsizor $113,065.44.
During the trial, the defendant conceded that the planking was defective. It has been recalled by the manufacturer. Additionally, the jury heard testimony from a construction and building codes consultant, Lonne Haughton, however the trial court found that Mr. Haughton did not have sufficient expertise in wood-plastic composite materials. Further, Haughton had been a California contractor for only three years, and though he claimed a college degree, this was “‘a distance learning diploma’ that required no in-class work.” The appeals court upheld the decision that Mr. Haughton was not qualified to testify as an expert about wood-plastic materials.
The court also upheld the trial court’s exclusion of two pieces of evidence. One was a list of SmartDeck sales. However, the witness asked about it was not able “to testify who prepared it or confirm that it had been prepared by a Cascade employee.” Further, “the fact defendant bought and sold SmartDeck was not disputed.” The other was an e-mail in which US Plastics said they had “some bad product in the field.” This e-mail went to Westmark & Associates, and the plaintiff did not establish that it was ever sent to the defendant.
Though the defense has suggested an award of $18,000 plus loss-of-use damages for one year and an additional $4,000 if the jury believed that leftover material from the front deck was used in the rear. As the plaintiff requested $100 per month of loss of use, this would have totaled $34,000. The jury awarded the cost of the decking, $6,275,82. The court cites earlier decision that the amount of the award is “a question of fact to be determined by the jury.”
In conclusion, Mr. Evilsizor was not only unable to receive a larger award, but the court ruled that he must pay the defendant’s cost on appeal.
Read the court's decision…
Local Government Waives Construction Fees to Spur Jobs
June 19, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Warren Township in New Jersey has waived building and electrical permit fees, up to $5,000, for businesses that create at least five new jobs. The fee reductions are available for construction in areas zones under various designations. Buildings that have received a zoning variance are not eligible. The Echoes-Sentinel notes that other towns in Somerset County, New Jersey have adopted similar ordinances.
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South Carolina Legislature Redefining Occurrences to Include Construction Defects in CGL Policies
April 1, 2011 — April 1, 2011 Beverley BevenFlorez - Construction Defect Journal
The question of what circumstances must be in place for construction defects to be covered in a general commercial liability (CGL) policies is being raised by the courts and the legislature in South Carolina. The Insurance Journal reports that the American Insurance Association as well as the Property and Casualty Insurers Association of America are speaking out on the issue.
The problem seems to be centered on what defines an “occurrence.” CGL policies were not meant to cover faulty workmanship, according to the filing by the South Carolina Supreme Court. In January of this year, the South Carolina Supreme Court reversed the ruling in Crossmann Communities v Harleysville Mutual declaring that “Respondents cannot show the damage here was the result of an occurrence. Rather, the damage was a direct result and the natural and expected consequence of faulty workmanship; faulty workmanship did not cause an occurrence resulting in damage.” They focused their attention on the word “accident,” stating that there is a fortuity element that is not diminished.
The South Carolina legislature reacted by producing a bill that would add new language directly negating the ruling by the Supreme Court. The South Carolina bill S-431 would change the definition of an occurrence in regards to construction defects as follows: “For a liability insurance policy issued to a construction professional, an ‘occurrence’ means, at a minimum: (1) an accident; or (2) continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful condition or substance. No additional requirement of a fortuitous event is needed to constitute an ‘occurrence.’”
S-431 is currently residing in the House Committee on Labor, Commerce and Industry.
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General Contractors Must Plan to Limit Liability for Subcontractor Injury
May 18, 2011 — May 18, 2011 - Douglas Reiser in the Builders Counsel Blog
It takes more than a hard hat, but safety checks, a good policy and a smart contract might save you some problems.If you are a general contractor, you will want to pay close attention to this article. A new Washington appellate decision showcases a general contractor’s liability to subcontractors who are injured on the job, when security barriers fail. But can a general limit this liability? Will its contract help?
In Wrought Corporation, Inc., Appellant V. Mario Interiano (quick note: this opinion is unpublished, but we are here to talk about an issue that was not determined on appeal – WISHA compliance), a subcontractor was injured when a security barrier failed and he fell into an elevator shaft.
A jury awarded a $1.56 million verdict against the general contractor, and the court of appeals affirmed on the basis that the general contractor has a non-delegable duty to ensure compliance with the Washington Industrial Safety and Health Act of 1973, codified under RCW 49.17 (WISHA).
Read the full story… Reprinted courtesy of Douglas Reiser of Reiser Legal LLC. Mr. Reiser can be contacted at info@reiserlegal.com
Preparing for Trial on a Cause of Action for Violation of Civil Code section 895, et seq.
May 10, 2012 — Samir R. Patel, Esq., Lorber, Greenfield, & Polito, LLP
In 2002, the California Legislature enacted the Right to Repair Act (hereinafter “SB-800”), as codified in Title VII of the Civil Code. As set forth in Civil Code section 895, et seq., SB-800 established a set of standards for residential construction, and provides a statutory protocol to address alleged violations of those standards. SB-800 applies to all new single family homes sold after January 1, 2003, and it created its own cause of action governed completely by its own terms, in that in order to state a cause of action under SB-800, a plaintiff may only allege a violation of the Act. (Civ. Code, § 938.) Under Civil Code sections 896, 897, 943, and 944, the Legislature made it clear that it intended to create a single cause of action for construction defects in homes that fall under the purview of SB-800. By passing SB-800, the Legislature eliminated multiple and often redundant or conflicting causes of action, burdens of proof, statutes of limitations, and types of damages that were common in construction defect actions prior to the enactment of the same.
Civil Code section 895, et seq. has significantly changed the landscape of construction defect lawsuits. Yet, for years, the only attention given to the statutes focused solely on the codified pre-litigation process that requires plaintiffs and builders to meet and confer regarding defects and attempt a process to repair the alleged defects before litigation is pursued. A major impediment to the implementation of the pre-litigation procedures has often been that the statutes specifically state that the information obtained during the pre-litigation process is admissible at trial. Hence, through use of the pre-litigation process, plaintiffs’ counsel can engage in a builder funded fishing expedition and later use the information obtained to advance their litigation goals. As such, many builders have chosen to opt out of codified pre-litigation process altogether, an option which the builder can elect within their Purchase and Sale Agreements.
Recently, counsel for builders throughout California have turned their attention to the “exclusive remedy” aspect of SB-800 by seeking, often successfully, to limit plaintiffs to a single cause of action for violation of SB-800. Civil Code section 943 makes clear that a cause of action for violation of SB-800 performance standards is a plaintiff’s sole remedy for a residential construction defect action. Civil Code section 943 states:
Except as provided in this title, no other cause of action for a claim covered by this title or for damages recoverable under 944 is allowed. (Civ. Code, § 943.) Â
The question remains: what is the benefit of requiring plaintiffs to trim down their complaint and eliminate their tried and true common law causes of action, and requiring them to pursue only a single cause of action for violation of SB800?
The construction standards enumerated within SB-800 include fifty-plus functionality standards. On their face, any benefit to pursuing a construction defect action under a single cause of action for violation of SB-800 initially appears trivial at best, in light of the fact that a jury may be very confused with the complexity of the functionality standards set forth within the Civil Code. Nevertheless, Title VII of the Civil Code actually contains numerous provisions that builders can utilize to their benefit throughout the process of construction defect litigation, including during preparation for trial.
First and foremost, counsel for builders can assert numerous affirmative defenses that will be beneficial if the matter proceeds to trial. These affirmative defenses, as codified in Civil Code section 945.5, include mitigation, in whole or in part, for damages caused by: an unforeseen act of nature; a homeowner’s failure to allow reasonable and timely access for inspections and repair under the pre-litigation procedures; the homeowner’s failure to follow the builder’s recommendations and commonly accepted homeowner maintenance obligations; ordinary wear and tear; misuse; abuse; or neglect. Builders should include these affirmative defenses within their responsive pleadings and as trial approaches, prepare appropriate motions in limine and request special jury instructions regarding the same. As frustrated builders and their attorneys are well aware, many construction defect suits result from a homeowner’s failure to properly maintain their property in a manner that is consistent with normal maintenance procedures and guidelines. Furthermore, within the ten year statute of limitations for most defects, ordinary wear and tear is often attributable to numerous deficiencies alleged by plaintiffs. The affirmative defense for a homeowner’s failure to allow inspections and repairs is also vital, as plaintiffs’ counsel may encourage a homeowner to forego the repair and seek monetary damages, allowing plaintiffs’ counsel to ultimately obtain their share of attorney’s fees. Therefore, the SB-800 statutes provide the builder with recourse and distinctive mitigation defenses that were previously and confusingly mixed into tort and contract related defenses. These affirmative defenses can also be utilized by counsel during the cross-examination of plaintiff homeowners and expert witnesses. Defense counsel should fully grasp these defenses and utilize them as defense themes throughout litigation.
As a plaintiff is limited to a single cause of action for violation of SB-800, if defense counsel has failed to properly eliminate excessive tort and contract causes of action prior to trial, a motion for summary adjudication, or at the very least, a motion for judgment on the pleadings should be brought to limit the introduction of evidence outside of a single cause of action for violation of SB-800. Practical judges are always looking for ways to streamline and expedite trials, and they are currently ruling that SB-800 is the exclusive remedy available to plaintiffs. In fact, plaintiffs’ firms in SB-800 matters are now voluntarily limiting their complaints to this one cause of action.
Special jury instructions can also be crafted to limit a jury’s computation of damages pursuant to Civil Codesection 944, which provides the method for computing damages within a construction defect action, as follows:
If a claim for damages is made under this title, the homeowner is only entitled to damages for the reasonable value of repairing any violation of the standards set forth in this title, the reasonable cost of repairing any damages caused by the repair efforts, the reasonable cost of repairing and rectifying any damages resulting from the failure of the home to meet the standards, the reasonable cost of removing and replacing any improper repair by the builder, reasonable relocation and storage expenses, lost business income if the home was used as a principal place of a business licensed to be operated from the home, reasonable investigative costs for each established violation, and all other costs or fees recoverable by contract or statute. (Civ. Code, § 944.) [Emphasis added.]
Civil Code section 944 specifically prohibits recovery for damages outside the scope of its explicit language as it states “the homeowner is only entitled to ... damages for the reasonable value of repairing any violation of the standards set forth in this title....” [Emphasis added.] The statute ultimately provides a “reasonableness” standard for the computation of damages that did not exist when computing damages on traditional common law tort and contract claims. Therefore, defense counsel should prepare special jury instructions to limit evidence of damages introduced at trial to the reasonable value of repairing any violation of the standards, and to exclude any evidence of damages beyond the reasonableness standard. Defense counsel should seize the opportunity to utilize the theme of “reasonableness” when attacking plaintiffs’ allegations and plaintiffs’ proposed repair methodology throughout the discovery process and at trial.
Defense counsel may also prepare a motion in limine or special jury instruction regarding the limitation of evidence regarding defects that did not cause resultant damage. Civil Code section 897 states:
Intent of Standards
The standards set forth in this chapter are intended to address every function or component of a structure. To the extent that a function or component of a structure is not addressed by these standards, it shall be actionable if it causes damage. (Civ. Code, § 897.) [Emphasis added.]
Defense counsel can argue that the introduction of any evidence supporting a claim for construction-related deficiencies that are not enumerated within Civil Code section 896, or for deficiencies where no damage has occurred is prohibited and must be excluded at trial. This requirement of resultant damages is familiar as the general rule was previously established in Aas v. Superior Court (2000) 24 Cal.4th 627, in which the California Supreme Court held that there is no tort recovery for construction defects that have not actually caused property damage. The legislature effectively codified this rule within Civil Code section 897.
A motion in limine can also be crafted to limit expert testimony to the standards enumerated in Civil Code section 896, and to deficiencies that caused damage pursuant to Civil Code 897. The motion in limine can be based upon Civil Code section 943 and the fact that claims for defects in homes which were sold after January 1, 2003 may only be pursued under a single cause of action for violation of SB-800. As such, expert testimony should be controlled by the standards set forth in Civil Code section 896. Furthermore, throughout a construction defect matter, defense counsel should ensure that their experts are well versed with the standards and that they can provide testimony that utilizes the same. Defense counsel’s knowledge of the standards will also be helpful during the cross-examination of plaintiffs’ expert witnesses.
If, despite the efforts of defense counsel, the complaint still has numerous causes of action, or if only some homes fall under the purview of SB-800 while others do not, defense counsel can utilize a motion to bifurcate trial. The motion’s basis is that a cause of action for violation of SB-800 will require the introduction of evidence regarding the violations of the fifty-plus standards, and the tort and contract-based claims would also require the introduction of a wide range of evidence to prove each cause of action. For example, in order to prove the tort causes of action, plaintiffs must prove elements such as: duty, breach, proximate and actual causation, and that the builder placed the homes into the stream of commerce. (See Richards v. Stanley (1954) 43 Cal.2d 60, 63; Kriegler v. Eichler Homes, Inc. (1969) 269 Cal.App.2d 224, 227.) On the contract causes of action, plaintiffs must prove the existence of a valid written contract for the sale of the home, including proof regarding the existence of basic contractual elements such as offer, acceptance, and consideration. (Civ. Code, § 1624 subd. (a); Roth v. Malson (1997) 67 Cal.App.4th 552, 557.) Defense counsel can argue that exposing the jury to elements that may or may not be applicable to all of the homes in the action will complicate and confuse the jury. Thus, concurrently exposing the jury to the SB-800 claims and the non-SB-800 claims will necessitate undue consumption of time, and create the substantial danger of undue prejudice of confusing the issues or misleading the jury.
One of the most important and relevant features of the SB-800 statutes is that they include shortened statutes of limitation as to certain enumerated defects. The codified statutes of limitations apply from the date of “close of escrow,” and are much more definitive than statutes of limitations regarding tort and contract claims. Therefore, they can be utilized within a motion for summary adjudication in cases where only one or a few defects are alleged. For example, under Civil Code section 896, et seq., there is a five year limitation on paint (Civ. Code, § 896, subd. (g)(1)); a four year limitation on plumbing fixtures (Civ. Code, § 896, subd. (e)); a three year limitation on landscaping (Civ. Code § 896, subd. (g)(12)); and a one year limitation on irrigation systems and drainage (Civ. Code, § 896, subd. (g)(7)). The non-SB-800 claims are subject to a four year statute of limitation for patent defects and a ten year statute of limitation for latent defects. (See Code of Civ. Proc., §§ 337.1, 337.15.) The contrast between the statute of limitations for the SB-800 claims and non-SB-800 claims can complicate a matter at trial, further establishing the necessity to limit plaintiffs to a single cause of action for violation of SB-800. Hence, defense counsel should also utilize a motion to bifurcate the statute of limitations issues from the issue of liability if a question of fact exists. If successful on the motion to bifurcate, plaintiff’s counsel will be barred from the introducing evidence at trial regarding a defect where the statute of limitations has run.
Defense counsel should also seek to simplify the construction standards for the jury. Ultimately, by drafting jury instructions and a special verdict form that is easy to navigate, counsel can promote an easy interpretation of the standards enumerated within the Civil Code. The best route for drafting a special verdict form is to draft it as a check-list, similar to a traditional real estate walk-through check-list. By incorporating the shortened statutes of limitations into the special verdict form, defense counsel can effectively frame the case for the jury. The special verdict form should also allow the jury to easily eliminate any claim for damages that is mitigated, in whole or in part, through the codified affirmative defenses. Defense counsel should also consider drafting a trial brief that effectively and simplistically provides the trial court judge with an understanding of the specific defects before the court, and simultaneously notes which Civil Code standards are implicated and the scope of the same. If the trial judge is not well versed in construction defect litigation, defense counsel should be all the more careful in breaking down the parameters and limitations codified within SB-800 for the court.
The strategies outlined within this article are only a few tactics that can be utilized to defend a construction defect suit. Depending on the defect allegations within any particular case, defense counsel should become intimately familiar with Title VII of the Civil Code and use all aspects of the same to their advantage. If not, plaintiffs’ counsel will have the advantage during “court-house step” settlement discussions and at trial.
Printed courtesy of Samir R. Patel, Esq. of Lorber, Greenfield, & Polito, LLP. Mr. Patel can be contacted at spatel@lorberlaw.com.
Florida Chinese drywall, pollution exclusion, “your work” exclusion, and “sistership” exclusion.
May 26, 2011 — CDCoverage.com
In Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. American Building Materials, Inc., No. 8:10-CV-313-T-24-AEP (M.D. Fla. May 17, 2011), insured drywall supplier ABM was sued by general contractor KB Homes seeking damages because property damage to houses built by KB Homes using defective Chinese drywall supplied by ABM. ABM’s CGL insurer Auto-Owners defended ABM under a reservation of rights and filed suit against ABM and KB Homes seeking a judicial declaration of no to duty to defend or indemnify ABM against the KB Homes lawsuit. On cross motions for summary, the federal district trial court directed entry of judgment in favor of ABM and KB Homes and against Auto-Owners, holding that Auto-Owners had a duty to defend and indemnify ABM against the KB Homes lawsuit.
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Reprinted courtesy of CDCoverage.com