Texas Court of Appeals Conditionally Grant Petition for Writ of Mandamus to Anderson
April 25, 2011 — April 25, 2011 Beverley BevenFlorez - Construction Defect Journal
The Texas Court of Appeals conditionally grant mandamus relief to Anderson Construction Company and Ronnie Anderson (collectively “Anderson”)… from the trial court in a construction defect lawsuit filed by Brent L. Mainwaring and Tatayana Mainwaring. See Tex. Prop. Code Ann. 27.001-.007 (West 2000 & Supp. 2010). Relators contend the trial court abused its discretion by compelling discovery while the case was abated by operation of law.
The Court of Appeals opinion describes what led up to the proceedings: “The Mainwarings’ original petition identified certain defects in their Anderson-constructed home. Those defects concerned the roof trusses and framing, air conditioning, mortar and masonry, exterior doors and windows, and weep holes. With respect to the five areas of defects identified in their original petition, the Mainwarings gave Anderson the statutorily required notice on January 13, 2010. After implementing agreed extensions, Anderson made an offer of settlement for the defects the Mainwarings identified in their notice. Almost eight months later, the Mainwarings filed an amended petition adding defects they had not included in their original petition and notice. The additional defects the Mainwarings included in their amended petition had not been addressed by Anderson’s offer of settlement.”
Following these events, Anderson claimed the Mainwarings did not respond in writing to their settlement offer. “Anderson filed a verified plea in abatement on December 2, 2010. In the trial court, Anderson claimed that the Mainwarings failed to respond in writing to Anderson’s settlement offer, as required by Section 27.004(b) of the RCLA. See Tex. Prop. Code Ann. 27.004(b)(1). The Mainwarings moved to compel discovery responses from Anderson. The Mainwarings alleged that they rejected Anderson’s settlement offer, and that if their response was insufficient, they contend that Anderson’s offer was rejected by operation of law on the twenty-fifth day after the Mainwarings received it. See Tex. Prop. Code Ann. 27.004(i). The Mainwarings’ motion to compel was not supported by affidavit. See Tex. Prop. Code Ann. 27.004(d)(2). On January 13, 2011, Anderson filed a verified supplemental plea in abatement. Anderson alleged that the Mainwarings failed to provide written notice concerning the newly alleged defects and complained the Mainwarings were attempting to circumvent the inspection and resolution procedure of the RCLA. Over Anderson’s objection that the lawsuit had been abated, the trial court granted the Mainwarings’ motion to compel discovery.”
After listening to both sides, the Court of Appeals offered this reasoning for their opinion: “The parties do not dispute that Anderson inspected the property before the Mainwarings alleged the existence of additional defects in their amended pleading, nor do the Mainwarings claim that Anderson has been given an opportunity to inspect the additional defects the Mainwarings identified in their amended pleadings. We conclude the trial court did not have the discretion to deny or lift the abatement until the Mainwarings established their compliance with the statute. In other words, the Mainwarings are required to provide Anderson a reasonable opportunity to inspect the additional defects identified by their amended pleading, which will allow Anderson the opportunity to cure or settle with respect to the newly identified defects.”
The Court of Appeals spoke directly on the issue of mandamus relief: “The Mainwarings contend that mandamus relief is not available because the trial court’s ruling does not prevent Anderson from making settlement offers during the discovery process. ‘An appellate remedy is “adequate” when any benefits to mandamus review are outweighed by the detriments.’ In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 136 (Tex. 2004). The failure to abate a case is typically not subject to mandamus. See In re Allstate Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co., 85 S.W.3d 193, 196 (Tex. 2002) (citing Abor v. Black, 695 S.W.2d 564, 567 (Tex. 1985)). In this case, however, the case was abated by operation of law. By ignoring the statutory abatement, the trial court interfered with the statutory procedure for developing and resolving construction defect claims. See In re Kimball Hill Homes Tex., Inc., 969 S.W.2d 522, 525 (Tex. App. Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, orig. proceeding) (An appeal provides an inadequate remedy for the trial court’s failure to observe automatic abatement pursuant to the RCLA.). The benefits of mandamus review are not outweighed by the detriments of mandamus review in this case.“
In conclusion, “The trial court had no discretion to compel discovery while the case was abated, and Anderson, who has been compelled to respond to discovery during a period the case was under an automatic abatement, has no adequate remedy on appeal. Accordingly, we conditionally grant the petition for writ of mandamus. The writ will issue only if the trial court fails to vacate its order of February 3, 2011, and fails to refrain from proceeding with the case until a motion to reinstate is filed that establishes compliance with the notice and inspection requirements of the Residential Construction Liability Act.”
Read the trial court’s decision…
Eighth Circuit Remands to Determine Applicability of Collapse Exclusion
January 6, 2012 — Tred Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
The Eighth Circuit determined a jury instruction regarding the applicability of the "all-risk" policy’s exclusion for "collapse" was inadequate. See KAAPA Ethanol, LLC v. Affiliated FM Ins. Co., 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 22158 (8th Cir. Nov. 3, 2011).
KAAPA had nine large, cylindrical, stainless steel tanks fabricated at its location. Soon after operations began in 2003, some of the tanks experienced unusual movement and began to shift. A geotechnical engineer found "silty clay" had been used for infill instead of compacted granular fill called for in engineering drawings. A year long plan to repair all nine tanks was implemented.
Affiliated’s "all-risk" policy excluded damage caused by faulty workmanship. It also excluded damage caused by settling or cracking. The settling exclusion went on to provide, "This exclusion will not apply to loss or damage resulting from collapse of: a building or structure; or material part of a building or structure." Affiliated denied coverage because of the faulty workmanship and settling exclusions.
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
Gut Feeling Does Not Disqualify Expert Opinion
July 6, 2011 — CDJ Staff
The New Jersey Supreme Court issued a ruling in June on the case of Nevins v. Toll in which they reversed an earlier decision and remanded the case to a lower court for retrial. At issue in the case was the testimony of the plaintiff’s expert, J. Anthony Dowling. In depositions, Mr. Dowling said that his estimates for repair were based on a “gut feeling.” Dowling said he had “very little” experience in cost estimates for single-family homes. The defendants sought to bar Dowling’s testimony which was granted by the judge. Without an expert, Ms. Nevin’s case was dismissed.
Describing Dowling’s report as “far from a model of how an expert’s opinion in a construction case should be presented,” the court noted that Dowling is not a professional expert witness. However, the court did note that Dowling is a professional cost estimator. Despite Mr. Dowling using his “gut feeling” to construct his estimate, the New Jersey Supreme Court felt that whether his estimate is convincing is “a question for the jury.”
Read the court’s opinion…
Contractor Removed from Site for Lack of Insurance
October 28, 2011 — CDJ Staff
The MetroWest Daily News reports that a demolition firm was told to leave the construction site at Natick High School since their failure to have workers compensation insurance makes them unable to work on the project. The contractor, Atlantic Dismantling and Site Construction, Inc. may have been working illegally since September.
The equipment that Atlantic had rented for the job was repossessed in August. Brait Builders Corp, the general contractor for the site had rented equipment so Atlantic could continue their work.
Their lack of insurance was discovered when a worker had a minor job-related injury. The state had issued a stop-work order for the firm and they could not legally bid on public projects. The school system did not receive any notice of this, and the school’s facilities director said of the general contractor, “chances are Brait never heard of anything either.”
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Green Buildings Could Lead to Liabilities
March 28, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Attempts to build “green,” reducing energy costs and increasing the use of sustainable building materials, may lead to more lawsuits, according to a report issued by the British Columbia Construction Association. The report warned those who were going to build green look into the implications. The report looked at the result of green building practices and requirements adopted in the United States.
The report warns that “the use of novel, less harmful building material or new construction techniques may give rise to liability due to: contractor inexperience with installation; lack of long-term evaluation of green materials; lack of understanding of how new building materials may impact existing traditional building systems; or warranties provided unintentionally about the durability or effectiveness of unproven materials or techniques.”
Manley McLachlan, president of the BCAA noted that they are aware of “legal action around the performance of the buildings,” noting that while fast-growing trees help toward LEED certification, their wood is more prone to mold. He also felt that low-VOC paints needed more testing to prove their durability as exterior finishes.
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Contractor Liable for Soils Settlement in Construction Defect Suit
February 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The California Court of Appeals ruled on January 9 in Burrow v. JTL Dev. Corp., a construction defect case in which houses suffered damage due to improperly compacted soil, upholding the decision of the lower court.
Turf Construction entered into a deal with JTL to develop a parcel they acquired. A third firm, Griffin Homes, withdrew from the agreement “when a geotechnical and soils engineering firm reported significant problems with soil stability on 14 of the lots.” Turf Construction then took over compacting and grading the lots. Turf “had never compacted or graded a residential tract before.” Robert Taylor, the owner of Turf, “testified he knew there was a significant problem with unstable soils.”
After homes were built, the plaintiffs bought homes on the site. Shortly thereafter, the homes suffered damage from soil settlement “and the damage progressively worsened.” They separately filed complaints which the court consolidated.
During trial, the plaintiff’s expert said that there had been an inch and a half in both homes and three to five inches in the backyard and pool areas. “He also testified that there would be four to eight inches of future settlement in the next fifteen to twenty years.” The expert for Turf and JTL “testified that soil consolidation was complete and there would be no further settlement.”
Turf and JTL objected to projections made by the plaintiffs’ soil expert, William LaChappelle. Further, they called into question whether it was permissible for him to rely on work by a non-testifying expert, Mark Russell. The court upheld this noting that LaChappelle “said that they arrived at the opinion together, through a cycle of ‘back and forth’ and peer review, and that the opinion that the soil would settle four to eight inches in fifteen to twenty years was his own.”
Turf and JTL contended that the court relied on speculative damage. The appeals court disagreed, stating that the lower court based its award “on evidence of reasonably certain damage.”
Turf also that it was not strictly liable, since it did not own or sell the properties. The court wrote that they “disagree because Turf’s grading activities rendered it strictly liable as a manufacturer of the lots.” The court concluded that “Turf is strictly liable as a manufacturer of the lots.”
Judge Coffee upheld the decision of the lower court with Judges Yegan and Perren concurring.
Read the court’s decision…
After Katrina Came Homes that Could Withstand Isaac
October 23, 2012 — CDJ Staff
In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, Louisiana adopted its first uniform building code. Under the new standards, homes are better able to withstand the winds generated by hurricanes. The owner of one home said that during Hurricane Isaac, “there’s no shaking of the building itself, there’s no sign of a storm except for the rain.”
WWWLTV reports that the new standards require home to be able to withstand 130 mile per hour winds. They also must follow FEMA guidelines for elevation. Build Now, a non-profit organization, is seeking to build green homes that meet the new standards. Their executive director said “we’re building higher. We’re building stronger. We’re building greener.”
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Construction Defects as Occurrences, Better Decided in Law than in Courts
December 9, 2011 — CDJ Staff
Construction defect claims are now occurrences for insurance purposes in four states, Arkansas, Colorado, Hawaii, and South Carolina, yet there are still frustrations for commercial general liability policyholders. Business Insurance describes court decisions on whether construction defect claims are covered as “incongruous,” and this drives up coverage and litigation costs. Construction firms often find they are defending themselves on two fronts, both the construction defect claim and also whether their insurance covers it.
Frank Armstrong, the Senior Vice President and National Director of Construction Claims for Willis North America says that the problem starts with the word “occurrence,” as various state courts have different interpretations of the word. “Certain pieces of it don’t fit well, at lest according to some courts in the country, with coverage for construction defect risks.”
Another insurance executive, Julian Ehlich, the Senior Vice President of Claims for Aon Risk Solutions’ construction services group notes that “jurisdictions differ, so policyholders don’t know what they’re going to get.”
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In Colorado, Repair Vendors Can Bring First-Party Bad Faith Actions For Amounts Owed From an Insurer
December 20, 2012 — Brady Iandiorio, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell
With the aftermath of Sandy still being felt up and down the Eastern seaboard, the question of many victims turns to how they can rebuild their lives and homes. One of the first things many people do is call on their insurance carriers to help rebuild whatever damaged property they have. In a recent case here in Colorado, those rebuilding efforts got reaffirmed by a Court of Appeals case, Kyle W. Larson Enterprises, Inc., Roofing Experts, d/b/a The Roofing Experts v. Allstate Insurance Company, --- P.3d ----, 2012 WL 4459112 (Colo. App. September 27, 2012).
The facts of the case are pretty straightforward and could describe many repair vendors in numerous situations. Roofing Experts contracted with four homeowners insured by Allstate to repair their damaged roofs. The contracts provided that repair costs would be paid from insurance proceeds. The contracts also allowed Roofing Experts full authority to communicate with Allstate regarding all aspects of the insurance claims. Before work began, Roofing Experts met with adjusters from Allstate to discuss the four homes and the amount of each claim. After receiving approval for the claims, Roofing Experts began the repairs. During construction, Roofing Experts discovered additional repairs were necessary to maintain certain manufacturer’s warranties and to conform to applicable building codes.
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Reprinted courtesy of Brady Iandorio, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC. Mr. Iandorio can be contacted at iandiorio@hhmrlaw.com
There is No Non-Delegable Duty on the Part of Residential Builders in Colorado
August 2, 2012 — Brady Iandiorio, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC
Recently, in the Arapahoe District Court, the Honorable Michael Spear, issued an order holding that builders do not owe a non-delegable duty to homeowners. In Marx and Corken v. Alpert Custom Homes, Inc., et al., Judge Spear’s order came in response to plaintiffs’ motion for determination of question of law seeking a finding that the defendants owed a non-delegable duty to the plaintiffs and thus, to strike defendants’ designation of nonparties at fault. After being fully briefed, Judge Spear, found that such a non-delegable duty does not exist.
The case arises from the construction of a single-family residence in Aurora, Colorado. Through the construction and interaction with Alpert Custom Homes, Inc. and Scott and Sally Alpert, the defendants, Paul Marx and Kay Corken, the plaintiffs claimed they suffered various damages and losses, and brought claims for breach of contract-warranty, breach of contract, violation of the Colorado Consumer Protection Act, breaches of the implied covenant of good faith, promissory estoppel, willful breach of contract, and quantum meruit. During litigation, the defendants filed a designation of nonparties at fault, which named several parties which were at fault for the alleged construction defects at issue in the case. The pertinent nonparties named were subcontractors of defendant Alpert Custom Homes, Inc. during the construction of the residence.
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Reprinted courtesy of Brady Iandiorio, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC. Mr. Iandiorio can be contacted at iandiorio@hhmrlaw.com
Unlicensed Contractors Nabbed in Sting Operation
September 9, 2011 — CDJ Staff
The California State License Board charged sixteen people in the Fresno area with accepting contracting jobs without licenses. The Statewide Investigative Fraud Team of the CSLB set up a sting operation at a home in Clovis, California seeking bids on tree service, painting, and general contracting services. Those who bid for jobs at more than $500 are required under California law to be licensed. Unlicensed contractors can only work on jobs with a cost to the homeowner of less than $500 and must inform the homeowner that they are not licensed.
In addition to citing contractors for not possessing appropriate licenses, the CSLB also cited contractors for failure to carry workers compensation insurance and illegal advertising. Further, California law limits down payments to the lesser of ten percent or $1,000. Two contractors were cited for requesting excessive down payments.
One contractor, an unlicensed tree service contractor, had been cited previously in a sting operation. He failed to show up for his court date.
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Seller Cannot Compel Arbitration for Its Role in Construction Defect Case<
March 1, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The buyer of a leaky home in Venice, California cannot be compelled to arbitration with the seller in a construction defect lawsuit, according to a decision in Lindemann v. Hume, which was heard in the California Court of Appeals. Lindemann was the trustee of the Schlei Trust which bought the home and then sued the seller and the builder for construction defects.
The initial owner was the Hancock Park Trust, a real estate trust for Nicholas Cage. Richard Hume was the trustee. In 2002, Cage agreed to buy the home which was being built by the Lee Group. Cage transferred the agreement to the Hancock Park Trust. Hancock had Richard Nazarin, a general contractor, conduct a pre-closing walk through. They also engaged an inspector. Before escrow closed, the Lee Group agreed to provide a ten-year warranty “to remedy and repair any and all damage resulting from water infiltration, intrusion, or flooding due to the fact that the door on the second and third floors of the residence at the Property were not originally installed at least one-half inch (1/2”) to one inch (1”) above the adjacent outside patio tile/floor on each of the second and third floors.”
Cage moved in and experienced water intrusion and flooding. The Lee Group was unable to fix the problems. Hume listed the home for sale. The Kamienowiczs went as far as escrow before backing out of the purchase over concerns about water, after the seller’s agent disclosed “a problem with the drainage system that is currently being addressed by the Lee Group.”
The house was subsequently bought by the Schlei Trust. The purchase agreement included an arbitration clause which included an agreement that “any dispute or claim in Law or equity arising between them out of this Agreement or any resulting transaction, which is not settled through mediation, shall be decided by neutral, binding arbitration.” The warranty the Lee Group had given to Hancock was transferred to the Schlei trust and Mr. Schlei moved into the home in May 2003.
Lindemann enquired as to whether the work done would prevent future flooding. Nazarin sent Schlei a letter that said that measures had been taken “to prevent that situation from recurring.” In February, 2004, there was flooding and water intrusion. Lindemann filed a lawsuit against the Lee Group and then added the Hancock Park defendants.
The Hancock Park defendants invoked the arbitration clause, arguing that Lindemann’s claims “were only tangentially related to her construction defect causes of action against the Lee Group.” On June 9, 2010, the trial court rejected this claim, ruling that there was a possibility of conflicting rulings on common issues of law. “With respect to both the developer defendants and the seller defendants, the threshold issue is whether there was a problem with the construction of the property in the first instance. If there was no problem with the construction of the property, then there was nothing to fail to disclose.” Later in the ruling, the trial court noted that “the jury could find there was no construction defect on the property, while the arbitration finds there was a construction defect, the sellers knew about it, and the sellers failed to disclose it.” The appeals court noted that while Hancock Park had disclosed the drainage problems to the Kamienowiczs, no such disclosure was made to Sclei.
The appeals court described Hancock Park’s argument that there is no risk of inconsistent rulings as “without merit.” The appeals court said that the issue “is not whether inconsistent rulings are inevitable but whether they are possible if arbitration is ordered.” Further, the court noted that “the Hancock Park defendants and the Lee Group have filed cross-complaints for indemnification against each other, further increasing the risk of inconsistent rulings.”
The court found for Lindemann, awarding her costs.
Read the court’s decision…
Toxic Drywall Not Covered Under Homeowner’s Policy
March 28, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The Duphuys of Baton Rouge Louisiana found themselves needing to argue both sides of an issue, according to the judge in Duphuy v. USAA Casualty Insurance Company. The Duphuys alleged that the drywall in their home “emits odorous gases that cause damage to air-condition and refrigerator coils, copper tubing, electrical wiring, computer wiring, and other household items.” Additionally, they reported damage to “their home’s insulation, trimwork, floors, cabinets, carpets, and other items” which they maintained were “covered under the ‘ensuing loss’ portion of their policy.”
Their insurer declined coverage, stating that the damages were not a “direct, physical loss,” and even if they were “four different exclusions independently exclude coverage, even if such loss occurred.” The policy excludes defective building materials, latent defects, pollutants, and corrosion damage. The court noted that “ambiguities in policy exclusions are construed to afford coverage to the insured.”
The court did determine that the Duphuys were not in “a situation where the plaintiffs caused the risk for which they now seek coverage.” The judge cited an earlier case, In re Chinese Drywall, “a case with substantially similar facts and construing the same policy” and in that case, “property damage” was determined to “include the loss of use of tangible property.” The court’s conclusion was that the Duphuys “suffered a direct, physical loss triggering coverage under their policy.”
Unfortunately for the Duphuys, at this point the judge noted that while they had a “direct, physical loss,” the exclusions put them “in the tough predicament of claiming the drywall is neither defective nor its off-gassing corrosive or a pollutant, but nonetheless damage-causing.”
In the earlier Chinese Drywall case, the judge found that “faulty and defective materials” “constitutes a physical thing tainted by imperfection or impairment.” The case “found the drywall served its intended purpose as a room divider and insulator but nonetheless qualified under the exclusion, analogizing the drywall to building components containing asbestos that courts have previously determined fit under the same exclusion.” In the current case, the judge concluded that the drywall was “outside the realm of coverage under the policy.”
The court also found that it had to apply the corrosion exclusion, noting that the plaintiffs tried to evade this by stating, “simplistically and somewhat disingenuously, that the damage is not caused by corrosion but by the drywall itself.” The plaintiffs are, however, parties to another Chinese drywall case, Payton v. Knauf Gips KG, in which “they directly alleged that ‘sulfides and other noxious gases, such as those emitted from [Chinese] drywall, cause corrosion and damage to personal property.’” As the court pointed out, the Duphuys could not claim in one case that the corrosion was caused by gases emitted by the drywall and in another claim it was the drywall itself. “They hope their more ambiguous allegations will be resolved in their favor and unlock the doors to discovery.”
The court quickly noted that “the remaining damage allegations are too vague and conclusory to construe” and permitted “exploration of the latent defect and pollution exclusions.”
The judge concluded that the plaintiffs did not provide sufficient facts to establish coverage under the ensuing loss provision, stating that the “plaintiffs must allege, at the very least, how the drywall causes damage to the trimwork, carpet, etc., not simply that it does so.” Given the court’s determinations in the case, the plaintiffs’ motion was dismissed.
Read the court’s decision…
Guilty Pleas Draw Renewed Interest In Nevada’s Construction Defect Laws
December 9, 2011 — CDJ Staff
A report this week by David McGrath Schwarz of the Las Vegas Sun suggests that Nevada’s construction defect laws will be a point of much contention in upcoming legislative sessions. The report cites renewed interest in the state’s construction defect laws due to ongoing federal investigations of construction defect attorney Nancy Quon and construction company owner Leon Benzer. Guilty pleas have been entered by at least ten individuals including an attorney, property managers, straw purchasers, and former HOA board members.
The article suggests that Nevada’s Chapter 40 laws are easily manipulated to the detriment of Nevada’s homebuilding industry. Construction industry lobbyists have tried unsuccessfully to change the laws in past legislative sessions.
The Sun’s article speculates that the building industry might be able to gain legislative concessions due to the volume of guilty pleas and what it refers to as examples of Chapter 40 abuses. ”With federal authorities collecting guilty pleas, the construction industry has prime examples of the system being abused, and how lucrative it can be for attorneys.”
Read the full story…
Claims Under Colorado Defect Action Reform Act Count as Suits
July 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The Colorado Court of Appeals has affirmed the judgment of the lower court in Melssen v. Auto-Owners Insurance. The Melssens built a custom home for the Holleys, during which time the Melssens retained a comprehensive general liability policy from Auto-Owners, which “obligated Auto-Owerns to defend the Melssens with respect to any ‘suit’ seeking damages for ‘property damage’ during the policy period.” Soon after the house was constructed, cracks developed in the drywall, then outside stucco and basement slab. The Holleys contended that “approximately $300,000 of damages to the Holleys’ property was caused by the Melssens’ engineering and construction defects” and filed a claim under the Colorado Defect Action Reform Act (CDARA). The Melssens “demanded Auto-Owners defend and indemnify the Melssens and forwared Auto-Owners the notice of claim.”
Although the Melssens notified Auto-Owners in June 2008, it was not until October 2008 that Auto-Owners denied coverage stating that the claims were sustained outside the policy period. The Melssens filed an action against Auto-Owners. At trial, the jury ruled in favor of the Melssens awarding them damages, to which the trial court added costs and attorney fees.
On appeal, Auto-Owners contended that the trial court erred in allowing the Melssens to argue that the CDARA notice of claim “was the functional equivalent of a complaint commencing a suit.” The appeals court found that “the CDARA notice of claim process constituted an alternative dispute resolution proceeding under the policy.” The court agreed that jury should not have been asked to determine if a CDARA action is a “suit,” but as the jury found for the Melssens, the concluding it “constituted harmless error.” Further, the court found that an action under the CDARA satisfied the definition of a “suit.”
The court found for the Melssens, affirming the lower court’s decision and remanding the case to the lower court for the awarding of appeals costs to the Melssens.
Read the court’s decision…
Background Owner of Property Cannot Be Compelled to Arbitrate Construction Defects
November 7, 2012 — CDJ Staff
In Truppi v. Pasco Engineering, John Quattro sued Property Management Contractors, Inc. over construction defects in William Truppi’s home. All parties are named in the suit. The California Court of Appeals ruled that Property Management Contractors, Inc. (PMCI) could not compel Mr. Quattro to arbitration.
The background of the case involves two houses built in Encinitas, California by PCMI: one for Mr. Truppi at 560 Neptune, and one for Mr. Quattro at 566 Neptune. Both contracts contained an arbitration provision. Mr. Quattro signed the contract for his residence and Mr. Truppi signed the other. Mr. Quattro then sued PCMI and its principal, William Gregory. Mr. Quattro claimed to be the true contracting party for the 560 Neptune residence and a third party beneficiary of the contract Mr. Truppi signed, and stated that PCMI was aware of this.
PCMI in a demurrer stated that Quattro “had only a ‘prospective beneficial interest in the property upon its eventual sale or lease.’” Mr. Quattro amended his complaint to account for the issues raised by PCMI. The court rejected PCMI’s demurrer to the amended complaint.
Finally, PCMI and Gregory asserted that Quattro was “not the real party in interest” and could not sue. PCMI continues to assert that Quattro lacks standing, but their attorney sent Quattro an e-mail stating, “While my client disputes that you are a party, and that you lack standing to assert the claim, to the extent you do so I believe you are obligated to proceed by way of arbitration.”
The court did not cover the issue of Quattro’s standing in the case, only if he could be compelled to arbitration. The court affirmed the lower court’s finding that Quattro could not be compelled to arbitrate the construction defect claim as neither he nor Gregory signed the contract in an individual capacity. Further, the court noted that PCMI and Gregory “denied the existence of an agreement between themselves and Quattro on the 560 contract,” and cannot compel arbitration on a non-existent agreement. And while non-signatories can, in some situations be compelled to arbitrate, the court found that “these cases are inapplicable because here they seek to have the alleged third party beneficiary (Quattro) compelled by a nonsignatory (Gregory).” The arbitration clause in question “expressly limited its application to persons or entities that signed the 560 contract.”
As Mr. Quattro was not a signatory to that agreement, the court found that he could not be held to its arbitration provision.
Read the court’s decision…
Construction Law Client Alert: California Is One Step Closer to Prohibiting Type I Indemnity Agreements In Private Commercial Projects
June 15, 2011 — Haight Brown & Bonesteel, LLP
On June 1, 2011 by majority vote, the California Senate passed Senate Bill 474, which would amend Civil Code section 2782, and add Civil Code section 2782.05. The passage of this new law is a critical development for real estate developers, general contractors and subcontractors because it will affect how these projects are insured and how disputes are resolved.
Civil Code section 2782 was amended in 2007 to prohibit Type I indemnity agreements for residential projects only. Since 2007, various trade associations and labor unions have lobbied to expand those very same restrictions to other projects. These new provisions apply to contracts, entered into after January 1, 2013, that are not for residential projects, and that are not executed by a public entity. The revisions provide that any provision in a contract purporting to indemnify, hold harmless, and defend another for their negligence or other fault is against public policy and void. These provisions cannot be waived.
A provision in a contract requiring additional insured coverage is also void and unenforceable to the extent it would be prohibited under the new law. Moreover, the new law does not apply to wrap-up insurance policies or programs, or a cause of action for breach of contract or warranty that exists independently of the indemnity obligation.
The practical impact of this new law is that greater participation in wrap-up insurance programs will likely result. While many wrap-up programs suffer from problems such as insufficient limits, and disputes about funding the self-insured retention, the incentive for the developer or general contractor to utilize wrap-up insurance will be greater than ever before because they will no longer be able to spread the risk of the litigation to the trades and the trade carriers.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of Steve Cvitanovic of Haight Brown & Bonesteel, LLP.
Florida: No Implied Warranties for Neighborhood Improvements
July 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
A new law in Florida ends suits from homeowners associations from suing over damages from off-site improvements on the basis of implied warranties. Rob Samouch, writing for the Naples Daily News quotes House Biill 1013: “There is no cause of action in law or equity available to a purchaser of a home or to a homeowners’ association based upon the doctrine or theory of implied warranty of fitness and merchantability or habitability for damages to off-site improvements." The off-site improvements are defined as: "The street, road, driveway, sidewalk, drainage, utilities, or any other improvement or structure that is not located on or under the lot on which a new home is constructed.”
Mr. Samouch notes that “there are no statutory warrant rights in homeowner associations of fitness and merchantability or habitability like there is for condominium associations.” He predicts that the Florida legislature will have to address this issue “once new homeowners start screaming and yelling to them about their shoddy infrastructure for which they have no legal remedy.”
The bill took effect on July 1, 2012 and applies to “all cases accruing before, pending on, or filed after July 1, 2012.”
Read the full story…