Delaware “occurrence” and exclusions j(5) and j(6)
June 10, 2011 — CDCoverage.com
In Goodville Mut. Cas. Co. v. Baldo, No. 09-338 (D. Del. June 2, 2011), claimants condominium association and unit owners sued project developer Rehoboth and general contractor Capano seeking damages because of moisture penetration property damage to common elements and individual units resulting from construction defects. Rehoboth and Capano filed a third party complaint against insured property manager Baldo alleging that, if Rehoboth and Capano were liable to claimants, Baldo was also liable because of Baldo’s failure to properly manage, maintain, and repair the property
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Reprinted courtesy of CDCoverage.com
Washington Supreme Court Sides with Lien Claimants in Williams v. Athletic Field
September 30, 2011 — Douglas Reiser, Builders Counsel
The Washington Supreme Court issued their opinion today on Williams v. Athletic Field, perhaps the most talked about construction law case in the past few years. I have discussed this case exhaustively here on Builders Counsel. Today we have a resolution.
In an unanimous opinion issued today, the high court sided with lien filers who followed a sample form provided in RCW 60.04.091. Additionally, the court found that a lien company - and presumably other persons - could sign the lien for the lien claimant, as an agent, without invalidating the lien.
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Reprinted courtesy of Douglas Reiser of Reiser Legal LLC. Mr. Reiser can be contacted at info@reiserlegal.com
No-Show Contractor Can’t Hide from Construction Defect Claim
June 19, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The failure of R. J. Haas to produce documents or make himself available for deposition has worn out the patience of the US District Court in San Jose. Judge Howard Lloyd issued a ruling inProbuilders Specialty Ins. Co. v. Valley Corp. (N.D. Cal., 2012).
Probuilders issued an insurance policy covering Haas for their work on the construction of a single-family home for Ty and Karen Levine. The Levines sued Haas for “shoddy and incomplete work.” Probuilders contends that Haas “made material misrepresentations with respect to verifying that the subcontractors had insurance.” Since November 2011, Haas has been without legal counsel in this matter.
Despite Probuilder’s attempts, the court noted that “Hass any not provided any documents in response to the plaintiff’s three sets of requests for production of documents.” Haas also “has refused to make himself available for deposition.” Haas was first scheduled for deposition in September, 2011. Subsequently, Haas has rescheduled his deposition repeatedly, postponing it to January 4, then February 13, and then agreed to be deposed “before the then-scheduled March 15 mediation,” after which he said he would “be unavailable to be deposed before April.
The court noted that although Haas “hay have had legitimate reasons for wishing to continue his deposition, such as illness and his attempt to retain new counsel,” however, the court concluded that “Haas has had ample time to retain new counsel and prepare for deposition.
The court also found fault with Haas’s objections to certain terms in the Request for Admissions, among them “named,” “independent contractor,” and “work,” noting that Haas called these “vague and ambiguous.” The court called it “quibbling,” and noted that the federal courts disfavor this. Later in the decision, the court made it clear that Haas “is obligated under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to respond to discovery requests.” And concludes, “that he has apparently been seeking to retain new counsel for over five months does not give him license to ignore plaintiff’s discovery requests entirely.
The court granted Probuilders the option of filing a motion for sanctions. Mr. Haas did not attend or participate.
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Texas Court of Appeals Conditionally Grant Petition for Writ of Mandamus to Anderson
April 25, 2011 — April 25, 2011 Beverley BevenFlorez - Construction Defect Journal
The Texas Court of Appeals conditionally grant mandamus relief to Anderson Construction Company and Ronnie Anderson (collectively “Anderson”)… from the trial court in a construction defect lawsuit filed by Brent L. Mainwaring and Tatayana Mainwaring. See Tex. Prop. Code Ann. 27.001-.007 (West 2000 & Supp. 2010). Relators contend the trial court abused its discretion by compelling discovery while the case was abated by operation of law.
The Court of Appeals opinion describes what led up to the proceedings: “The Mainwarings’ original petition identified certain defects in their Anderson-constructed home. Those defects concerned the roof trusses and framing, air conditioning, mortar and masonry, exterior doors and windows, and weep holes. With respect to the five areas of defects identified in their original petition, the Mainwarings gave Anderson the statutorily required notice on January 13, 2010. After implementing agreed extensions, Anderson made an offer of settlement for the defects the Mainwarings identified in their notice. Almost eight months later, the Mainwarings filed an amended petition adding defects they had not included in their original petition and notice. The additional defects the Mainwarings included in their amended petition had not been addressed by Anderson’s offer of settlement.”
Following these events, Anderson claimed the Mainwarings did not respond in writing to their settlement offer. “Anderson filed a verified plea in abatement on December 2, 2010. In the trial court, Anderson claimed that the Mainwarings failed to respond in writing to Anderson’s settlement offer, as required by Section 27.004(b) of the RCLA. See Tex. Prop. Code Ann. 27.004(b)(1). The Mainwarings moved to compel discovery responses from Anderson. The Mainwarings alleged that they rejected Anderson’s settlement offer, and that if their response was insufficient, they contend that Anderson’s offer was rejected by operation of law on the twenty-fifth day after the Mainwarings received it. See Tex. Prop. Code Ann. 27.004(i). The Mainwarings’ motion to compel was not supported by affidavit. See Tex. Prop. Code Ann. 27.004(d)(2). On January 13, 2011, Anderson filed a verified supplemental plea in abatement. Anderson alleged that the Mainwarings failed to provide written notice concerning the newly alleged defects and complained the Mainwarings were attempting to circumvent the inspection and resolution procedure of the RCLA. Over Anderson’s objection that the lawsuit had been abated, the trial court granted the Mainwarings’ motion to compel discovery.”
After listening to both sides, the Court of Appeals offered this reasoning for their opinion: “The parties do not dispute that Anderson inspected the property before the Mainwarings alleged the existence of additional defects in their amended pleading, nor do the Mainwarings claim that Anderson has been given an opportunity to inspect the additional defects the Mainwarings identified in their amended pleadings. We conclude the trial court did not have the discretion to deny or lift the abatement until the Mainwarings established their compliance with the statute. In other words, the Mainwarings are required to provide Anderson a reasonable opportunity to inspect the additional defects identified by their amended pleading, which will allow Anderson the opportunity to cure or settle with respect to the newly identified defects.”
The Court of Appeals spoke directly on the issue of mandamus relief: “The Mainwarings contend that mandamus relief is not available because the trial court’s ruling does not prevent Anderson from making settlement offers during the discovery process. ‘An appellate remedy is “adequate” when any benefits to mandamus review are outweighed by the detriments.’ In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 136 (Tex. 2004). The failure to abate a case is typically not subject to mandamus. See In re Allstate Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co., 85 S.W.3d 193, 196 (Tex. 2002) (citing Abor v. Black, 695 S.W.2d 564, 567 (Tex. 1985)). In this case, however, the case was abated by operation of law. By ignoring the statutory abatement, the trial court interfered with the statutory procedure for developing and resolving construction defect claims. See In re Kimball Hill Homes Tex., Inc., 969 S.W.2d 522, 525 (Tex. App. Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, orig. proceeding) (An appeal provides an inadequate remedy for the trial court’s failure to observe automatic abatement pursuant to the RCLA.). The benefits of mandamus review are not outweighed by the detriments of mandamus review in this case.“
In conclusion, “The trial court had no discretion to compel discovery while the case was abated, and Anderson, who has been compelled to respond to discovery during a period the case was under an automatic abatement, has no adequate remedy on appeal. Accordingly, we conditionally grant the petition for writ of mandamus. The writ will issue only if the trial court fails to vacate its order of February 3, 2011, and fails to refrain from proceeding with the case until a motion to reinstate is filed that establishes compliance with the notice and inspection requirements of the Residential Construction Liability Act.”
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California insured’s duty to cooperate and insurer’s right to select defense counsel
April 14, 2011 — April 14, 2011 - CDCoverage.com
In Travelers Property Casualty Co. v. Centex Homes, No. C 10-02757 (N.D. Cal. April 1, 2011), general contractor Centex was sued by homeowners for construction defects. Centex tendered its defense to Travelers as an additional insured under policies issued by Travelers to two Centex subcontractors. Travelers agreed to defend Centex under a reservation of rights and selected defense counsel to defend Centex. Centex refused to accept the defense, asserting that it was entitled to select defense counsel. Travelers filed suit against Centex seeking a declaratory judgment that Centex had breached the duty to cooperate condition in the Travelers’ policy.
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Reprinted courtesy of CDCoverage.com
One World Trade Center Due to Be America’s Tallest and World’s Priciest
February 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
As One World Trade Center rises, so does the price tag. After construction delays and cost overruns, the cost of the building at the site of the September 11 attacks has risen to $3.8 billion. Part of the expense of the skyscraper is the heavily reinforced base of the building. The elevator shafts are also heavily reinforced, all part of guarding against future terrorist attacks.
In comparison, the world’s tallest tower, the Burj Khalifa in Dubai, cost only $1.5 billion, less than half the cost of One World Trade Center. As a result, the Port Authority does not see the building as being profitable in near future. In order to fund it, the agency is raising tolls on bridge and tunnel traffic.
Currently, about the half the unfinished building is leased. Construction is expected to conclude in 2013.
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Fifth Circuit Asks Texas Supreme Court to Clarify Construction Defect Decision
November 7, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The Fifth Circuit Court has withdrawn its decision in Ewing Construction Company v. Amerisure Insurance Company, pending clarification from the Texas Supreme Court of its decision in Gilbert Texas Construction, L.P. v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s London. The Fifth Circuit had applied the Gilbert case in determining that a contractual liability exclusion barred coverage for faulty workmanship. The Insurance Journal reports that this decision was both applauded and criticized, with a concern noted that “an insurer would now have its pick of either the ‘your work’ exclusion or the contractual liability exclusion without the exception for subcontracted work.”
The Fifth Circuit is now asking the Texas Supreme Court two questions to clarify Gilbert, which Brian S. Martin and Suzanne M. Patrick see as a sign that the Court has realized that it overly expanded the scope of the earlier ruling. A response is expected from the Texas Supreme Court by spring 2013.
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No Coverage for Construction Defects Under Alabama Law
June 19, 2012 — Tred Eyerely, Insurance Law Hawaii
The federal district court determined that under Alabama law, there was no coverage for breach of contract claims arising from alleged construction defects. Owners Ins. Co. v. Shep Jones Constr., Inc., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62085 (N.D. Ala. May 3, 2012).
The insured entered a contract with the homeowner to remodel her home. After construction was completed, the homeowner sued the insured, alleging damages arising form breach of contract, negligence and negligent supervision.
The insured had a policy with Owners Insurance Company. Owners Insurance defended under a reservation rights.
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
Vegas Hi-Rise Not Earthquake Safe
July 12, 2011 — CDJ Staff
If an earthquake hit Las Vegas, the Harmon Tower would not withstand it. A report from Weidlinger Associates told MGM Resorts that “in a code-level earthquake, using either the permitted or current code specified loads, it is likely that critical structural members in the tower will fail and become incapable of supporting gravity loads, leading to a partial or complete collapse of the tower.” The inspection came at the request of county officials, according to the article in Forbes.
According to Ronald Lynn, directory of the building division in the county’s development services division, “these deficiencies, in their current state, make the building uninhabitable.” The county is concerned about risks to adjacent buildings.
MGM Resorts is currently in litigation, separate from the stability issues, with Perini Corp., the builders of Harmon Tower.
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Gilroy Homeowners Sue over Leaky Homes
February 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Two years into a lawsuit against Shapell Homes, the builder of a subdivision called Eagle Ridge in Gilroy, California, homeowners have joined or left the lawsuit. About fifty homeowners are still in the suit, which contends that construction defects have lead to water intrusion in their homes. The lawyer for the homeowners contends that more than a hundred homes have construction defects.
One homeowner said that soon after he joined the suit, Sharpell sent workers to his home who repaired problems to his satisfaction. “They came in within two weeks and fixed everything,” said Frank Lowry. Another homeowner, Wilson Haddow, said that he was “quite happy” after Shapell repaired problems.
Others weren’t quite so happy. Greg Yancey said that problems had “been a nightmare” and that “it just doesn’t feel like home.” He said that his “house is possessed,” with problems that include walls that bow out and a balcony that drips rainwater to the front door. His home is currently worth far less than the $700,000 he paid in 2007.
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Coverage Exists Under Ensuing Loss Provision
July 10, 2012 — Tred Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
Finding coverage under the ensuing loss provision, the Washington Supreme Court overruled a Court of Appeals decision we previously reported here. Vision One, LLC v. Philadelphia Indem. Ins. Co., 276 P.3d 300 (Wash. 2012).
Vision developed a condominium project. Before concrete was poured, a subcontractor supplied the shoring to temporarily support the poured concrete slabs. After the shoring installation was completed, concrete was poured on the first floor. When the pouring was finished, the shoring gave way. The framing, rebar and newly poured concrete came crashing down onto the the lower level parking area, where the wet concrete eventually hardened. It took several weeks to clean up the debris and repair the damage.
Vision had a builders’ risk policy with Philadelphia. The policy excluded losses caused by or resulting from deficient design or faulty workmanship. Collapse, however, was not listed as an excluded event. Further, the exclusion for faulty workmanship contained a resulting loss clause providing that "if loss or damage by a Covered Cause of Loss results, [Philadelphia] will pay for the loss or damage caused by that Covered Cause of Loss."
Philadelphia denied coverage under the faulty workmanship exclusion.
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
The Montrose Language Interpreted: How Many Policies Are Implicated By A Construction Defect That Later Causes a Flood?
March 17, 2011 — By Shaun McParland Baldwin, March 17, 2011
The Court of Appeals of Indiana recently addressed the “Montrose” language added to the CGL ISO form in 2001 in the context of a construction defect claim where a fractured storm drain caused significant flooding a year after the drain was damaged. The insuring agreement requires that “bodily injury or “property damage” be caused by an occurrence and that the “bodily injury or “property damage” occur during the policy period. The Montrose language adds that the insurance applies only if, prior to the policy period, no insured knew that the “bodily injury or “property damage” had occurred in whole or in part. Significantly, it also states that any “bodily injury” or “property damage” which occurs during the policy period and was not, prior to the policy period known to have occurred, includes a continuation, change or resumption of that “bodily injury” or “property damage” after the end of the policy period.
In Grange Mutual Cas. Co. v. West Bend Mut. Ins. Co., No. 29D04-0706-PL-1112 (Ct. App. IN March 15, 2011), http://www.ai.org/judiciary/opinions/pdf/03151109ehf.pdf, Sullivan was the General Contractor for a school construction project. Its subcontractor, McCurdy, installed the storm drain pipes. One of the storm pipes was fractured in 2005 while McCurdy was doing its installation work. More than a year later, the school experienced significant water damage due to flooding. It was later discovered that the flooding was due to the fractured storm drain. Sullivanrsquo;s insurer paid $146,403 for the water damage. That insurer brought a subrogation claim against McCurdy and its two insurers: West Bend and Grange. West Bend had issued CGL coverage to McCurdy while the construction was ongoing, including the date in which the storm pipe was fractured. Grange issued CGL coverage to McCurdy at the time of the flooding. Those two carriers jointly settled the subrogation claim and then litigated which insurer actually owed coverage for the loss. Significantly, the loss that was paid included only damages from the flooding, not any damages for the cost of repairing the pipe.
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Reprinted courtesy of Shaun McParland Baldwin of Tressler LLP. Ms Baldwin can be contacted at sbaldwin@tresslerllp.com
No Coverage Under Ensuing Loss Provision
September 9, 2011 — Tred Eyerley, Construction Law Hawaii
The cost of removing and replacing cracked flanges to prevent future leakage was not covered as an ensuing loss under a builder’s risk policy in RK Mechanical, Inc. v. Travelers Prop. Casualty Co. of Am., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83958 (D. Colo. Aug. 1, 2011).
The insured, RK Mechanical Inc., was a subcontractor hired to install plumbing for a residential construction project. RK was an additional insured on the general contractor’s policy with Travelers. RK installed approximately 170 CPVC flanges on the project. Subsequently, two of the flanges cracked, allowing water to overflow and causing water damage to the project. Travelers was notified of the flange failure and resulting water damage.
RK subsequently removed and replaced the two cracked flanges and began water remediation. Travelers paid for the cost of the water damage due to the cracked flanges.
RK then examined all of the flanges installed in the project and discovered many were cracked and/or showed signs of potential failure. RK removed and replaced the cracked flanges. RK tendered a claim and demand for indemnity to Travelers for these repair costs. Travelers denied the claim. RK then sued for breach of contract and declaratory relief. The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment.
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
Safe Harbors- not just for Sailors anymore (or, why advance planning can prevent claims of defective plans & specs) (law note)
August 17, 2011 — Melissa Brumback
Have you ever considered a “Safe Harbor Provision” for your Owner-Architect or Owner-Engineer contract? Maybe it is time that you do.
As you are (probably too well) aware, on every construction project there are changes. Some of these are due to the owner’s change of heart, value engineering concerns, contractor failures, and material substitutions. Some may be because of a design error, omission, or drawing conflict. It happens.
A “Safe Harbor Provision” is a provision that establishes an acceptable percentage of increased construction costs (that is, a percentage of the project’s contingency). The idea is that if the construction changes attributable to the designer is within this percentage, no claim will be made by the Owner for design defects.
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Reprinted courtesy of Melissa Brumback of Ragsdale Liggett PLLC. Ms. Brumback can be contacted at mbrumback@rl-law.com.
Pennsylvania Court Extends Construction Defect Protections to Subsequent Buyers
December 20, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The Pennsylvania courts have long held that there is an implied warranty of habitability for the initial purchaser of a home. Now, as some defects may not immediately show up, the court has extended that implied warranty to second and subsequent purchasers. As Marc D. Brookman, David I. Haas, and Christopher Bender of Duane Morris note, “this judicially created doctrine shifts the risk of a latent defect in the construction of a new home from the purchaser to the builder-vendor.”
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded that a contractual relationship is not needed for an implied warranty of habitability. The court’s concern was inequalities would result when a home was sold while other homes were protected by being within the statute of repose.
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Nevada Assembly Bill Proposes Changes to Construction Defect Litigation
April 14, 2011 — April 14, 2011 Beverley BevenFlorez - Construction Defect Journal
Assemblyman John Oceguera has written a bill that would redefine the term Construction Defect, set statutory limitations, and force the prevailing party to pay for attorney’s fees. Assembly Bill 401 has been referred to the Committee on Judiciary.
Currently, the law in Nevada states that “a defect in the design, construction, manufacture, repair or landscaping of a new residence, of an alteration of or addition to an existing residence, or of an appurtenance, which is done in violation of law, including in violation of local codes or ordinances, is a constructional defect.” However, AB401 “provides that there is a rebuttable presumption that workmanship which exceeds the standards set forth in the applicable law, including any applicable local codes or ordinances, is not a constructional defect.”
The Nevada courts may award attorney fees to the prevailing party today. However, AB401 mandates that attorney fees must be awarded, and the exact award is to be determined by the Court. “(1) The court shall award to the prevailing party reasonable attorney’s fees, which must be an element of costs and awarded as costs; and (2) the amount of any attorney’s fees awarded must be determined by and approved by the court.”
AB401 also sets a three year statutory limit “for an action for damages for certain deficiencies, injury or wrongful death caused by a defect in construction if the defect is a result of willful misconduct or was fraudulently concealed.”
This Nevada bill is in the early stages of development.
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Ohio Casualty’s and Beazer’s Motions were Granted in Part, and Denied in Part
May 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The case Trinity Homes LLC and Beazer Homes Investments LLC has reached the summary judgment stage. The remaining plaintiffs are Trinity Homes LLC (Trinity) and Beazer Homes Investments LLC (Beazer), and the only defendant remaining is Ohio Casualty Insurance Company (Ohio Casualty). “Ohio Casualty has filed a motion for summary judgment (Dkt. #409) on all claims against it, and Trinity and Beazer have filed a cross-motion seeking partial summary judgment (Dkt. #431) in their favor.” Ohio Casualty’s Motion for Summary Judgment was granted in part and denied in part, and Beazer’s motion was granted in part and denied in part.
The court’s ruling presented a bit of background on the companies involved in the litigation: “Trinity is an Indiana limited liability company with its principal place of business in Indiana and is one of several construction related companies owned by Beazer, which is a limited liability company incorporated under the laws of Delaware having its principal place of business in Atlanta, Georgia. Beazer’s predecessor, Beazer Homes Investment Corporation, acquired the stock of Crossman Communities, Inc. in 2002. Crossman and its subsidiary owned all interests in Trinity. Beazer and Trinity are in the business of residential real estate development and construction.”
Furthermore, “Ohio Casualty’s home office is in Ohio, where it is incorporated. It sells insurance policies to commercial entities such as Plaintiffs. It purchased a book of business from Great American Insurance Company, a subsidiary of which had sold commercial general liability policies (‘CGL’) and umbrella liability policies to Trinity, covering the period of time between May 1, 1994 through May 1, 1999. For ease of reference, we will refer to these policies as the Ohio Casualty policies. Trinity sold and acted as a general contractor for the construction of new homes in Central Indiana throughout the period of time in which the Ohio Casualty policies were in place.”
The court disagreed with almost every argument put forth by Ohio Casualty. However, they did concede “that Ohio Casualty is obligated to indemnify Trinity only for damages arising during its policy periods for pro rata liability as opposed to several and indivisible, by reason of its having limited its indemnity obligation to ‘those sums’ that Trinity becomes liable to pay for property damage which ‘occurs during the policy period.’”
Finally, the court ruled that “Ohio Casualty Company’s Motion For Summary Judgment (Dkt. #409) is GRANTED IN PART, that is, to the extent that Beazer is not an insured under the Ohio Casualty insurance policies, but the motion is DENIED in all other respects.”
The court further ruled that “Trinity and Beazer’s Motion For Partial Summary Judgment (Dkt. #431) is GRANTED IN PART, that is: (1) Trinity is an insured under the Ohio Casualty CGL and umbrella policies in effect for the time period from May 1, 1994 to May 1, 1999; (2) the claims at issue in the Underlying Lawsuits are "property damage" claims resulting from an "occurrence" and are therefore within the policy coverage provided under the Ohio Casualty Policy; and (3) none of the exclusions in the Ohio Casualty Policy bars coverage. Trinity and Beazer’s Motion is DENIED in all other respects. Moreover, material questions of fact remain with respect to whether payments made to the 54 homeowners, who were part of the putative class in the underlying Colon class action but were not included in the certified settlement class, were voluntary payments and as such do not qualify for indemnification. Material questions of fact also preclude a summary ruling on the issue of whether Ohio Casualty is estopped from raising their voluntary nature as a defense to indemnity.”
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HOA Has No Claim to Extend Statute of Limitations in Construction Defect Case
October 28, 2011 — CDJ Staff
The California Court of Appeals ruled on September 20, 2011 in the case of Arundel Homeowners Association v. Arundel Green Partners, a construction defect case involving a condominium conversion in San Francisco. Eight years after the Notice of Completion was filed, the homeowners association filed a lawsuit alleging a number of construction defects, including “defective cabinets, waterproofing membranes, wall-cladding, plumbing, electrical wiring, roofing (including slope, drainage and flashings), fire-rated ceilings, and chimney flues.” Three years of settlement negotiations followed.
Negotiations ended in the eleventh year with the homeowners association filing a lawsuit. Arundel Green argued that the suit should be thrown out as California’s ten-year statute of limitations had passed. The court granted judgment to Arundel Green.
The homeowners then filed for a new trial and to amend its complaint, arguing that the statute of limitations should not apply due to the doctrine of equitable estoppel as Arundel Green’s actions had lead them to believe the issues could be solved without a lawsuit. “The HOA claimed that it was not until after the statute of limitations ran that the HOA realized Arundel Green would not keep its promises; and after this realization, the HOA promptly brought its lawsuit.” The trial court denied the homeowners association’s motions, which the homeowners association appealed.
In reviewing the case, the Appeals Court compared Arundel to an earlier California Supreme Court case, Lantzy. (The homeowners also cited Lantzy as the basis of their appeal.) In Lantzy, the California Supreme Court set up a four-part test as to whether estoppel could be applied. The court applied these tests and found, as was the case in Lantzy, that there were no grounds for estoppel.
In Arundel, the court noted that “there are simply no allegations that Arundel Green made any affirmative statement or promise that would lull the HOA into a reasonable belief that its claims would be resolved without filing a lawsuit.” The court also cited Lesko v. Superior Court which included a recommendation that the plaintiffs “send a stipulation?Ķextending time.” This did not happen and the court upheld the dismissal.
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