Negligent Misrepresentation in Sale of Building Altered without Permits
September 30, 2011 — CDJ Staff
The Supreme Court of New Hampshire has ruled in the case Wyle v. Lees. The Leeses owned a two-unit apartment building in North Conway, New Hampshire. They hired a contractor to add a third, larger apartment, including a two-car garage. The Leeses and their contractor submitted a building permit application. They were informed that site plan review was required. After receiving approval on the site plan, construction started. At no point did they obtain a building permit and the construction was never inspected. The Leeses subsequently added more space to the unit, reducing parking spaces below the minimum required. Again, they did not obtain a building permit.
In 2007, three years after all these changes were complete, the Leeses sold their building to Mr. Wyle. To the question “are you aware of any modifications or repairs made without the necessary permits?” they answered “no.” About six weeks after closing, Wyle “received a letter from the town code enforcement officer regarding the legality of the removal of a garage door from the new unit.” A subsequent inspection revealed “numerous building and life safety code violations.”
Mr. Wyle brought a claim against the Leeses for negligent misrepresentation. The defendants filed a motion “seeking to preclude economic loss damages.” At a two-day bench trial, Mr. Wyle won. The Leeses appealed.
The appeals court found that “the defendants negligently misrepresented that the premises were licensed for immediate occupancy and that the defendants had obtained all necessary permits,” and thus upheld the lower court’s finding of negligent misrepresentation. The appeals court also rejected the Leeses’ argument that damages must be apportioned on all parties, including “the plaintiff himself, the plaintiff’s building inspector, and the defendant’s contractor,” finding a lack of “adequate evidence.”
The Leeses further argued that they were unaware that modifications and repairs were accomplished without the required permits. The appeals court noted that “the trial court found that both the conditional approval and final approval for the site plan stated that a building permit and a certificate of occupancy were required prior to any use.” The court concluded that the Leeses “knew or should have known of the falsity of their representation.”
The appeals affirmed the findings of the trial court.
Read the court’s decision…
New Construction Laws, New Forms in California
July 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
New construction laws came into effect in California on July 1. Writing for the Martindale-Hubble Legal Library, Glenn Mau, J. Michael McGuire, and John Tonsing, all of Archer Norris, discuss these changes. They note that the most important part of the changes to California construction law is that “all mechanics liens, stop notices and bond claims recorded after July 1, 2012 must use the new standardized forms and follow the new definitions, notice prerequisites and statutory release form language.”
Read the full story…
Colorado statutory “property damage” caused by an “occurrence”
August 4, 2011 — CDCoverage.com
Colorado General Assembly House Bill 10-1394 was signed into law by the Governor on May 21, 2010, codified at Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-20-808 (2010)
13-20-808. Insurance policies issued to construction professionals
(1) (a) The general assembly finds and determines that:
(I) The interpretation of insurance policies issued to construction professionals is of vital importance to the economic and social welfare of the citizens of Colorado and in furthering the purposes of this part 8.
(II) Insurance policies issued to construction professionals have become increasingly complex, often containing multiple, lengthy endorsements and exclusions conflicting with the reasonable expectations of the insured.
(III) The correct interpretation of coverage for damages arising out of construction defects is in the best interest of insurers, construction professionals, and property owners.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of CDCoverage.com
Faulty Workmanship may be an Occurrence in Indiana CGL Policies
April 7, 2011 — April 7, 2011 Beverley BevenFlorez - Construction Defect Journal
The question of whether construction defects can be an occurrence in Commercial General Liabilities (CGL) policies continues to find mixed answers. The United States District Court in Indiana denied the Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment in the case of General Casualty Insurance v. Compton Construction Co., Inc. and Mary Ann Zubak stating that faulty workmanship can be an occurrence in CGL policies.
Judge Theresa L. Springmann cited Sheehan Construction Co., et al. v. Continental Casualty Co., et al. for her decision, ”The Indiana Supreme Court reversed summary judgment, which had been granted in favor of the insurer in Sheehan, holding that faulty workmanship can constitute an ‘accident’ under a CGL policy, which means any damage would have been caused by an ‘occurrence’ triggering the insurance policy’s coverage provisions. The Indiana Supreme Court also held that, under identically-worded policy exclusion terms that are at issue in this case, defective subcontractor work could provide the basis for a claim under a CGL policy.”
As we reported on April 1st, South Carolina’s legislature is currently working on bill S-431 that would change the wording of CGL policies in their state to include construction defects. Ray Farmer, Southwest region vice president of the American Insurance Association spoke out against the bill. “CGL policies were never meant to cover faulty workmanship by the contractor,” he said. “The bill’s supplementary and erroneous liability provisions will only serve to unnecessarily impact construction costs in South Carolina.”
Read the Opinion and order...
Read the court’s ruling...
Read the American Insurance Association statement...
Statute of Repose Dependant on When Subcontractors Finished
July 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Scott C. Sandberg of Snell and Wilmer writes a post on the JDSupra site about the Colorado Court of Appeals decision in Shaw Construction v. United Builder Services. Sanberg notes that when the general contractor was sued by an HOA, the contractor turned around and sued its subcontractors. The contractor made three claims. They claimed that “improvement” referred to the whole project, that “substantial completion” was reached when the architect certified completion, and that the statute of repose was tolled by the HOA’s service of a Construction Defect Action Reform Act notice.
The subcontractors claimed that “improvement” only referred to their specific work, which reached “substantial completion” when they finished, despite work to be done by other later, and the HOA’s notice to the contractor did not affect the subcontractors. The Colorado court agreed with the subcontractors.
Sandberg notes that some of the contractor’s were not addressed by the court, noting that “the court did not decide whether an improvement triggering the statute of repose can be determined on a trade-by-trade basis,” and that “the court did not decide whether substantial completion occurs when a certificate of occupancy is issued or when the architect certifies completion.”
Read the full story…
Ensuing Loss Provision Does Not Salvage Coverage
October 23, 2012 — Tred Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
The insureds' home was built in 1989. In 2006, extensive water damage was found to the house. The insureds notified their carrier, Chubb. The insureds had coverage for all risks unless stated otherwise in the policy or if an exclusion applied.
Chubb hired an adjustor who determined that defective construction had enabled water to enter the wall and beam systems. Chubb denied coverage under the faulty planning, construction or maintenance exclusion.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
Limiting Plaintiffs’ Claims to a Cause of Action for Violation of SB-800
November 18, 2011 — Samir R. Patel, Esq. and Todd E. Verbick, Esq., Lorber, Greenfield & Polito, LLP
There has been a fair share of publicity about the SB-800 amendments to the Civil Code (Civil Code section 896, et seq.) that codified construction defect litigation in 2002. Most of the publicity is geared toward the pre-litigation standards allowing a builder the right to repair before litigation is commenced by a homeowner. Less focus and attention has been given to the fact that violation of the SB-800 performance standards is being used by plaintiff’s counsel as an additional tool in the plaintiff’s pleading tool box against builders. Closer scrutiny to SB-800 reveals that those provisions should in fact act as a limitation to the pleading tools available to plaintiffs and an additional tool for builders in the defense of cases governed by SB-800.
The typical construction defect complaint contains the boiler plate versions of numerous causes of action. These causes of action include Strict Liability, Negligence, Negligence Per Se, Breach of Contract, Breach of Contract – Third-Party Beneficiary, Breach of Express Warranties, Breach of Implied Warranties, among others. The wide array of causes of action leave a defendant “pinned to the wall” because they require a complex defense on a multitude of contract and tort related causes of action. Furthermore, the statutes of limitations as to these claims widely differ depending upon if the particular defect is considered latent or patent. The truth of the matter remains, no matter what the circumstances, if a construction defect matter ultimately goes to trial, it is inevitable that plaintiffs will obtain a judgment on at least one of these causes of action.
On its own, the Strict Liability cause of action can be a thorn in a defendant’s side. A builder is obviously placing a product into the stream of commerce and strict liability is a tough standard to defend against, particularly when it concerns intricate homes comprised of multiple components that originally sold for hundreds of thousands of dollars. A Negligence cause of action can also be difficult to defend because the duty of care for a builder is what a “reasonable” builder would have done under the circumstances. An interpretation of this duty of care can easily sway a jury that will almost always consist of sympathetic homeowners. A Negligence Per Se cause of action can also leave a defendant vulnerable to accusations that a builder violated the Uniform Building Code or a multitude of other obscure municipal construction-related code provisions during the construction of the home. Lastly, the Breach of Contract cause of action leaves a builder relying on dense and intricate purchase and sale agreements with dozens of addenda which leave the skeptical jurors turned off by what they view as one-side, boilerplate provisions. Ultimately, when a matter is about to go to trial, the complexity of these complaints can benefit a plaintiff and increase a plaintiff’s bargaining power against a defendant who is attempting to avoid a potentially large judgment.
Enter the SB-800 statutes. The SB-800 statutes apply to all homes sold after January 1, 2003. Civil Code section 938 specifically states that “[t]his title applies only to new residential units where the purchase agreements with the buyer was signed by the seller on or after January 1, 2003.” (Civil Code §, 938.) As time progresses, more residential construction defect cases will exclusively fall under the purview of SB-800. Slowly but surely more SB-800 governed litigation is being filed, and its exclusive application is looming on the horizon.
On its surface, this “right to repair” regime has left builders with a lot to be desired despite the fact that it is supposed to allow the builder the opportunity to cure any deficiencies in their product before litigation can be filed by potential plaintiffs. However, the application of the time line for repair has shown to be impractical for anything but the most minor problems involving only small numbers of residential units. Moreover, the fact that the fruits of the builder’s investigation into the claimed defects in the pre-litigation context can freely be used as evidence against it in litigation makes builders proceed with trepidation in responding with a repair. For these reasons, more SB-800 litigation can be expected to result due to the shortcomings of the pre-litigation procedures, and savvy defense counsel should anticipate the issues to be dealt with in presenting the defense of such cases at trial.
This fact should not necessarily be met with fear or disdain. Within the SB-800 statutes, the legislature made it clear that they were creating a new cause of action for construction defect claims, but it further made it clear that this cause of action is a plaintiff’s exclusive remedy. The legislature giveth, but at the same time, the legislature taketh away. Throughout numerous provisions within the SB-800 statutes, the Civil Code states that claims for construction defects as to residential construction are exclusively governed by the Civil Code, and that the Civil Code governs any and all litigation arising under breaches of these provisions. Civil Code section 896 specifically states:
In any action seeking recovery of damages arising out of, or related to deficiencies in, the residential construction … the claimant’s claims or causes of action shall be limited to violation of, the following standards, except as specifically set forth in this title. (Civil Code §, 896.)
Civil Code section 896 then provides approximately fifty-plus standards by which a construction defect claim is assessed under that provision. Civil Code section 896 covers everything from plumbing to windows, and from foundations to decks, and in several instances expressly dictates statutes of limitations as to specific areas of construction that severely truncate the 10-year latent damage limitations period. As for any construction deficiencies that are not enumerated within Civil Code section 896, Civil Code section 897 explicitly defines the intent of the standards and provides a method to assess deficiencies that are not addressed in Civil Code section 896. Civil Code section 897 states:
Intent of Standards
The standards set forth in this chapter are intended to address every function or component of a structure. To the extent that a function or component of a structure is not addressed by these standards, it shall be actionable if it causes damage. (Civil Code §, 897.)
Therefore, Civil Code section 897 acts as a catch-all by which defects that are not covered within Civil Code section 896 can be evaluated on a damage standard mirroring the Aas case (damages must be present and actual). The result of sections 896 and 897 being read in combination is a comprehensive, all-inclusive set of performance standards by which any defect raised by Plaintiffs can be evaluated and resolved under a single SB-800 based cause of action.
Civil Code section 943 makes clear that a cause of action for violation of SB-800 performance standards is a plaintiff’s sole remedy for a residential construction defect action. Specifically, Civil Code section 943 states:
Except as provided in this title, no other cause of action for a claim covered by this title or for damages recoverable under 944 is allowed. In addition to the rights under this title, this title does not apply to any action by a claimant to enforce a contract or express contractual provision, or any action for fraud, personal injury, or violation of a statute. (Civil Code §, 943.)
Civil Code section 944 provides the method for computing damages within a construction defect action, as follows:
If a claim for damages is made under this title, the homeowner is only entitled to damages for the reasonable value of repairing any violation of the standards set forth in this title, [and] the reasonable cost of repairing any damages caused by the repair efforts… . (Civil Code §, 944.)
A cursory review of these statutes yields the conclusion that the legislature was attempting to create an exclusive cause of action that trumps all other causes of action where SB-800 applies. The remedy available to plaintiffs is limited to that allowed by the Civil Code. As noted above, “[n]o other cause of action for a claim covered by this title…is allowed.” (Civil Code §, 943.) Therefore, Civil Code sections 896, 897, 943, and 944 specifically prohibit the contract-based and tort-based causes of action typically pled by plaintiffs.
Plaintiff’s counsel has seized upon the language of section 943 to advance the argument that SB-800 still allows a plaintiff to advance typical contract and tort based causes of action. On the surface, this argument may seem compelling, but a minimum of scrutiny of the express language of section 943 dispels this notion. Section 943 says that it provides rights “[i]n addition” to those under the SB-800 Civil Code provisions. Clearly, the language in section 943 is intended to expressly underscore the fact that a plaintiff is not precluded from seeking relief in addition to that allowed under SB-800 for damages not arising from a breach of the SB-800 standards or for damages in addition to those recoverable under Section 944. This language does not provide an unfettered license to bring a Strict Liability, Negligence or other cause of action against a builder where SB-800 applies.
In fact, this language only keeps the door open for plaintiffs to pursue such causes of action not arising from a breach of the SB-800 standards should there be such supporting allegations. For example, if a plaintiff alleges that a builder breached an “express contractual provision” related to the timing of the completion of the home and close of escrow, and the contract specifies damages in this regard, a plaintiff may have a viable separate cause of action for Breach of Contract for recovery of those damages precisely because that is not an issue expressly dealt with in SB-800 in the performance standards under sections 896 and 897, or in the damage recovery terms under 944. As it stands, the vast majority of complaints are seeking redress for violation of the same primary right; that is, defects specifically outlined in Section 896 and 897 or which result in damages as stated in Section 944.
So, how does a builder defend against a complaint that contains multiple causes of action regarding construction defects for a home sold after January 1, 2003? There are numerous ways to approach this. First and foremost, these superfluous and improper causes of action can be attacked by demurrer seeking dismissal of all causes of action other than the cause of action alleging violation of SB-800. If the the time period within which to file a demurrer has passed already, a motion for judgment on the pleadings can be utilized to attack the improper causes of action in the same way as a demurrer can be used for this purpose.
The limitation to a demurrer or motion for judgment on the pleadings is that the judge is restricted to viewing only the four corners of the pleading when making a ruling. It is typical for plaintiffs’ counsel to cleverly (or one might even say, disingenuously) leave the complaint purposely vague to avoid a successful defense attack on the pleadings by not including the original date the residence was sold. In that instance, a motion for summary adjudication can be used to attack a plaintiff’s complaint. By simply providing evidence that the homes were originally sold after January 1, 2003, the improper causes of action should be subject to dismissal by summary adjudication. If the plaintiff is a subsequent purchaser, the builder still has recourse to enforce the pleading limitations under SB-800. Civil Code section 945 states that “[t]he provisions, standards, rights, and obligations set forth in this title are binding upon all original purchasers and their successors-in-interest.” (Civil Code §, 945.)
Attacking a plaintiff’s complaint to eliminate multiple causes of action can have numerous benefits. The practical result is that a plaintiff will only have one viable cause of action. The advantage is that the SB-800 performance standards include the defined performance standards and shortened statutes of limitations periods with regard to specific issues. Furthermore, as to defects which are not specifically provided for in Civil Code section 896, Civil Code section 897 requires a proof of actual damages. Therefore, a plaintiff must provide evidence of current damages and not simply conditions that may potentially cause damage in the future.
The Appellate Courts have yet to directly address and interpret these SB-800 provisions. The time for that is undoubtedly drawing near. For now, however, plaintiffs will have to find ways to accurately plead construction defect claims within the confines of one cause of action for breach of the performance standards enumerated within the Civil Code.
Printed courtesy of Lorber, Greenfield & Polito, LLP. Mr. Patel can be contacted at spatel@lorberlaw.com and Mr. Verbick at tverbick@lorberlaw.com.
Hovnanian Increases Construction Defect Reserves for 2012
January 6, 2012 — CDJ Staff
In their fourth quarter earnings call, executives of Hovnanian Enterprises made some projections for investors, covering the company’s plans for 2012. During the call, Ara K. Hovnanian, the firm’s CEO, discussed their reserves to meet construction defect claims. The firm does an annual actuarial study of their construction defect reserves.
Mr. Hovnanian noted that there have been no changes for the past several years, but this year they are increasing their reserves by about $6.3 million. Additionally, the firm has added $2.5 million to their legal reserves. Mr. Hovnanian stated “we do not anticipate that changes of this magnitude will be recurring as we look forward to 2012.”
Read the full story…
Vegas Hi-Rise Not Earthquake Safe
July 12, 2011 — CDJ Staff
If an earthquake hit Las Vegas, the Harmon Tower would not withstand it. A report from Weidlinger Associates told MGM Resorts that “in a code-level earthquake, using either the permitted or current code specified loads, it is likely that critical structural members in the tower will fail and become incapable of supporting gravity loads, leading to a partial or complete collapse of the tower.” The inspection came at the request of county officials, according to the article in Forbes.
According to Ronald Lynn, directory of the building division in the county’s development services division, “these deficiencies, in their current state, make the building uninhabitable.” The county is concerned about risks to adjacent buildings.
MGM Resorts is currently in litigation, separate from the stability issues, with Perini Corp., the builders of Harmon Tower.
Read the full story…
Don MacGregor To Speak at 2011 West Coast Casualty Construction Defect Seminar
January 1, 2011 — February 08, 2011 CDJ Staff
“Challenges for Experts in Construction Defect Claims and Litigation” will be held Thursday May 13, 2011 between 1:30 and 3:00 PM at this year’s West Coast Casualty Construction Defect Seminar. Among the various topics covered will be of Right to Repair/Opportunity to Repair statutes, improper testing methodologies, new challenges where a case involves a Wrap Policy, OCIPS, CCIPS, and other owner controlled insurance programs, as well as the need for realistic testing protocols for the party the expert is retained to represent.
During the presentation Mr. MacGregor will be working in connection with a group of construction and design experts each of which have extensive experience with construction defect and claims related litigation. This particular session is expected to attract a standing-room only crowd, drawing in excess of 1700 attendees.
The West Coast Casualty Construction Defect Seminar is the largest seminar of its type. This year’s event is scheduled for will take place on May 12 and 13, 2011, at The Disneyland Hotel and Resort. For more information regarding the years event please visit http://www.westcoastcasualty.com/dyncat.cfm?catid=3322
http://www.westcoastcasualty.com/dyncat.cfm?catid=3322
Pipes May Be Defective, But Owners Lack Standing
September 13, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The United States District Court in Minnesota has determined that Steven and Cecilia Thundander cannot make a class-action claim against Uponor, Inc. over the plumbing in their home, as they do not have Article III standing. In this situation, the alleged defect is that Uponor made fraudulent claims that the pipes met National Sanitation Foundation (NSF) standards for use in potable water systems. Uponor submitted samples of other pipes, and their substitution was discovered when the NSF made an inspection of the manufacturing facility. The court noted that “the Thunanders contend that Uponor failed to inform homeowners, plumbers and consumers that it had been selling pipe that failed to meet NSF toxicity requirements at the time of sale and installation.”
The Court noted that the Thunanders have not tested their piping to determine if they “demonstrate toxicity or lack of compliance with the NSF 61 standards,” noting also that the Complaint seeks to require Uponor to instruct the plaintiffs on “how to test the piping and water to determine the level of risk.” Lacking testing, the Court could not find that the Thundanders have defective pipes. The Court found that the “Plaintiffs have failed to adequately plead an injury in fact sufficient to confer standing as to their product liability claims.”
The Court also concluded that it could not determine if the Plaintiff’s warranty actions could not be applied, as they “have failed to allege a plausible defect.” Even in the presence of a defect, the Court noted that more than eight years had passed before the filing of the suit, when the warranties under both Indiana and Minnesota law have a four-year statute of limitations. The Court also rejected the Thunanders tort claims, once again because “Plaintiffs have not tested their pipes,” noting that “a tort requires the existence of an injury.”
In conclusion, Judge Nelson rejected the entirety of the complaint, granting the motions to dismiss by the defendants. However, despite the problems with the Thunanders’ claims, she found that they were not “patently frivolous or groundless.” Therefore, she denied attorney fees requested by one of the defendants.
Read the court’s decision…
Who Is To Blame For Defective — And Still LEED Certified — Courthouse Square?
September 1, 2011 — Douglas Reiser, Builders Counsel
Remember Courthouse Square? I sure do. We have talked about the closed and evacuated LEED certified building a couple of times here on Builders Counsel. Well, it’s back in the news. This time building professionals are pointing fingers — but there is some talk about a fix. Still, its LEED certification remains.
If you read my past articles about Courthouse Square, you can get caught up on this mess. The short of it is that Salem, Oregon had the five-story government building and bus mall completed in 2000 for $34 Million. It was awarded LEED certification during the USGBC’s infancy. Last year, it became public that the building had significantly defective concrete and design. The Salem-Keizer Transit District worked with the City of Salem to shut the building down, and it has not been occupied since.
Last fall, Courthouse Square failed thorough forensic testing leading to a lengthy bout with a number of insurers. The contractors and designers had been hauled into court, but the Transit District was able to settle with the architect and contractors. The only remaining party involved in the lawsuit appears to be the engineering firm, Century West Engineering. Most expert reports have pinned the responsibility for the poor design and materials on Century West’s shoulders.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of Douglas Reiser of Reiser Legal LLC. Mr. Reiser can be contacted at info@reiserlegal.com
Ensuing Losses From Faulty Workmanship Must be Covered
May 10, 2012 — Tred Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
Coverage for damages resulting from faulty workmanship in the construction of an apartment complex was at issue in The Bartram, LLC v. Landmark Am. Ins. Co., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44535 (N.D. Fla. March 30, 2012).
The owner of the apartments, Bartram, had primary coverage and three layers of excess coverage. Each contract excluded loss from faulty workmanship. The policies provided, however, "if loss or damage by a Covered Cause of Loss results, we will pay for that resulting loss or damage."
Bartram contended water intrusion occurred because of faulty workmanship, which caused damage to the buildings’ exterior and interior finishes, wood sheathing, framing, balcony systems, drywall ceilings and stucco walls. This damage was separate from the work needed to simply fix the faulty workmanship. Therefore, Bartram argued, the ensuing losses that resulted from the water intrusion was covered.
The insurer argued the ensuing loss exception was not applicable if the ensuing loss was directly related to the original excluded loss.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
Washington Court of Appeals Upholds Standard of Repose in Fruit Warehouse Case
August 4, 2011 — CDJ Staff
On July 28, the Washington Court of Appeals ruled in Clasen Fruit & Cold Storage v. Frederick & Michael Construction Co., Inc. that more than six years had passed since a contractor had concluded work and so granted a summary dismissal of the suit.
Frederick & Michael Construction Co., Inc. (F&M) was contracted to construct several buildings for Clasen Fruit and Cold Storage. These were completed in March, 1999. The buildings suffered wind damage to the roofs in 2001, 2003, 2005, and 2006. In the first two incidents, F&M repaired the roofs with Clasen paying for repairs.
In 2005, Clasen hired Continuous Gutter to make repairs. The final incident was the collapse of the roof of one building. This was attributed to “excessive moisture in the roof’s vapor barriers.” At this point, Clasen demanded that F&M pay for repair and replacement costs. In 2008, Clasen sued F&M for damages for breach of contract and negligent design and construction of the roof.
The decision then covered the meanings, in Washington law, of “termination of services” and “substantial completion.” The panel concluded that construction was “substantially completed in 1997” and “relevant services” by 2001. “But Clasen did not sue until 2008, some seven years after termination of any roof related services.”
Read the court’s decision…
Developer’s Fraudulent Statements Are His Responsibility Alone in Construction Defect Case
February 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The Texas Court of Appeals ruled on December 21 in the case of Helm v Kingston, a construction defect case. After purchasing what was described as “an extremely well-built” two-bedroom townhouse, Mr. Kingston made complaints of construction defects. Greenway Development did not repair the defects to Kingston’s satisfaction, and he filed notice of suit. In his suit, he claimed that GDI and its president, John Helm, had committed fraud and negligent misrepresentation. Kingston claimed that Helm “fraudulently induced Kingston to believe that the townhouse evidenced the highest quality of workmanship when in fact the quality of workmanship was atrocious.” Helms brought a counterclaim that Kingston’s suit was frivolous.
About four years after Kingston purchased the townhome, the suit proceeded to trial. The trial court determined that Helm was not “liable in his individual capacity,” but this was reversed at appeal.
A second trial was held ten years later on the question of whether Kingston’s unit was a townhome or an apartment. A jury found that Helm “engaged in a false, misleading or deceptive act or practice that Kingston relied on to his detriment.” Kingston was awarded $75,862.29 and an additional $95,000 in attorney fees by the jury. Helms made an unsuccessful appeal to the Appeals Court, after which Kingston was awarded an additional $10,000. Helms then made an unsuccessful appeal to the Texas Supreme Court, which lead to an additional $3,000 for Kingston. There was also a verdict of $48,770.09 in pre-judgment interest and “five percent post-judgment interest accruing from the date of the judgment until the time the judgment is paid. Helm appealed.
In his appeal, Helm raised seven issues, which the court reorganized into five Kingston raised one issue on cross-appeal.
Helms’ first claim was that Kingston “failed to satisfy the requirement of” Texas’s Residential Construction Liability Act and that by not filing under the RCLA, Kingston’s fraud and misrepresentation claims were preempted. Further Helms claimed that the RCLA limited Kingston’s damages. The court rejected this, as the RCLA deals with complaints made to a contractor and not only did Helm fail to “conclusively establish” his “status as a ‘contractor’ under the statutory definition,” Helm testified that he was “not a contactor” at the pre-trial hearing.
Helms’s second claim was that Kingston’s later claim of a misconstructed firewall should be barred, claiming that Kingston “‘had knowledge of a defect in the firewall’ as early as 1997 but did not assert them until 2007.” The court rejected this because Kingston’s claim was that “Helm ‘fraudulently induced Kingston to believe that the townhouse evidenced the highest quality of workmanship when in fact the quality of the workmanship was atrocious.’”
Helms also challenged whether his statements that the residence was of “good quality” constituted fraud and misrepresentation under Texas’s Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act. The court concluded that Helm was in a position to make knowledgeable statements and further that “residential housing units are not artistic works for which quality is inherently a matter of subjective judgment.” Helm also claimed that Kingston could have avoided certain repair expenses through the “exercise of reasonable care.” Helms argued that the repairs could have been made for $6,400. The court disagreed, as these claims were cited only to invoke the DTPA, and that later petitions established additional defects.
Helms’s next claim was that he was not allowed to designate responsible third parties. The court rejected this because there GDI represented matters concerning the residence only through Helm’s statements. The court noted that “Helm is correct that?third parties may be liable for fraud if they ‘participated in the fraudulent transactions and reaped the benefits,’” but they note that “Helm never specifically alleged that GDI or CREIC participated in Helm’s alleged fraudulent transactions.
The final issue in the decision was about court costs, and here the court denied claims on both sides. Helm argued that the award of legal fees were excessive, as they exceeded the actual damages. The court noted that they “may not substitute our judgment for that of the jury,” and also that “the ratio between the actual damages awarded and the attorney’s fees is not a factor that determines the reasonableness of the fees.” But the court also rejected Kingston’s claim for post-judgment interest on $10,312.30 that Helm had deposited in the trial court’s registry. The court noted that the monies were to be paid out upon final judgment, but the mandate did not include any reference to interest.
Read the court’s decision…
Fifth Circuit Asks Texas Supreme Court to Clarify Construction Defect Decision
November 7, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The Fifth Circuit Court has withdrawn its decision in Ewing Construction Company v. Amerisure Insurance Company, pending clarification from the Texas Supreme Court of its decision in Gilbert Texas Construction, L.P. v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s London. The Fifth Circuit had applied the Gilbert case in determining that a contractual liability exclusion barred coverage for faulty workmanship. The Insurance Journal reports that this decision was both applauded and criticized, with a concern noted that “an insurer would now have its pick of either the ‘your work’ exclusion or the contractual liability exclusion without the exception for subcontracted work.”
The Fifth Circuit is now asking the Texas Supreme Court two questions to clarify Gilbert, which Brian S. Martin and Suzanne M. Patrick see as a sign that the Court has realized that it overly expanded the scope of the earlier ruling. A response is expected from the Texas Supreme Court by spring 2013.
Read the full story…
AFL-CIO Joins in $10 Billion Infrastructure Plan
June 30, 2011 — CDJ Staff
The AFL-CIO has announced plans to generate up to $10 billion in funding for infrastructure development, training construction workers, and making buildings more energy efficient, pledging $20 million to retrofit buildings. Bloomberg News reports that union officials made the announcement in Chicago at the Clinton Global Initiative, releasing a statement from Richard Trumka, president of the union, “we, at the AFL-CIO, believe that together, with our partners in business and government, we can profitably invest significant resources to make America more competitive and energy efficient.” A foot injury prevented Mr. Trumka from attending the event.
The statement also quoted Mark Ayers, president of the Building and Construction Trades Department of the AFL-CIO, “the time is now to become intensely focused on the creation of jobs.”
Read the full story…
Appropriation Bill Cuts Military Construction Spending
June 15, 2011 — CDJ Staff
The Hill reports that HR 2055, the Military Construction, Veterans Affairs (VA) and Related Agencies bill, has passed with only five votes in opposition. The bill cuts the budget for military construction spending by $2.6 billion due to anticipated base closures.
The bill includes $186 million for family housing construction by the Army, $100 million for family housing construction by the Navy and Marines, and $84 million for family construction by the Air Force, with an additional $50 million allocated for the DOD outside the military branches. By the act, these funds will remain available until September 30, 2016.
Read the full story…
Read HR 2055