No Coverage For Construction Defects When Complaint Alleges Contractual Damages
September 1, 2011 — Tred Eyerley, Insurance Law Hawaii
The underlying plaintiff’s allegations contended the contractor was in breach of contract for construction defects caused in building her home. Accordingly, the court found no coverage.See Nat’l Builders and Contractors Ins. Co. v. Slocum, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81694 (S.D. Miss. July 26, 2011).
Slocum Construction LLC sold a home it built to Laura Peterson. Subsequently, Peterson filed suit, alleging a breach of the contract and seeking rescission and cancellation of the contract. Peterson further alleged at least thirty-three specific defects in the construction of the house.
Slocum tendered to its insurer, National Builders and Contractors Insurance Company (NBCI). NBCI filed suit for a declaratory judgment.
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
Know the Minnesota Statute of Limitations for Construction Defect Claims
July 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Writing on the Benson Kerrane Storz Nelson web site, Alex Nelson gives an overview of the Minnesota laws covering statutes of limitation and repose. He notes that frequently when his firm declines to take a construction defect case its’ over a missed statute of limitation. He describes the time periods as both “short” and “ambigious.” The briefest limit is that a homeowner “has only 6 months within which to give written notice of the defect to the builder once the defect has manifested itself.” Any legal action must commence within two years of the same point.
The Minnesota statutes also have a six-year limitation, which starts for a single home at transfer of title to the first purchaser or when the purchaser takes possession, whichever happens first. For a condo, it is the last of “completion of the common element,” first unit sale or “Termination of Declarant control.” Fraud or misrepresentation also has a six-year limit, while negligence claims are limited to within the first two years “after the manifestation of the defect.”
The statues of repose also provide limits to filing construction defect lawsuits. Mr. Nelson points out that the longest are for negligence, fraud, and “major construction defects,” all of which have a ten-year limit. On the other hand, claims against general workmanship and materials must be made in the first year.
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Contractor’s Home Not Covered for Construction Defects
September 13, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The US District Court in Seattle has rejected most of the claims made by a Des Moines man over insurance coverage for water damage to his home. Judge John C. Coughenour granted summary judgment to Liberty Northwest in Ayar v. Liberty Northwest Insurance Corporation.
Sayad Ayar was the general contractor for the construction of his house. As a homeowner held a $1.5 million insurance policy from Liberty Northwest (LNW) that excluded “faulty, inadequate, or defective construction.”
In 2008, less than three years after his house was constructed, Mr. Ayar filed a claim after water leaked through his living room ceiling. LNW hired an engineering firm to investigate the damage. The engineering firm, CASE Forensics, concluded that the water intrusion was due to “the failure to install an adequate and continuous waterproof membrane, flashing, and drainage system within the balcony at the time of construction.” Ayar’s expert attributed the leakage to “damage done to the weather deck waterproofing during a storm event with high winds,” which would be covered under the policy. CASE Forensics reviewed these conclusions and rejected them. LNW denied coverage.
Further problems lead to further investigations, and in each case, LNW attributed the problems to construction defects. During this process, LNW “authorized Ayar to cut into the ceiling’s drywall in order to assist in determining the source of the water intrusion.” Mr. Ayar moved his family to a rental home. He requested that LNW cover the rental and other other costs.
LNW’s adjuster concluded that no coverage was available, but recommended paying Mr. Ayar $19,648.68 to reinstall drywall and repair the hole in the ceiling. The insurance company paid $2,000 to cover the cost of cutting into the ceiling. The also claimed the amount of drywall he removed was “excessive” and would not cover his relocation as “his home had been livable and because the loss was not covered.”
Ayar made four claims to the court in support of the argument that LNW misrepresented “pertinent facts or insurance policy provisions.” The court rejected three of these, noting that as all water damage was excluded, LNW’s citation of other sources of water intrusion was not a misrepresentation. “LNW did not rely on this provision as the reason for denying coverage.” Nor was LNW’s reference to “fungi, wet or dry rot” a misrepresentation. As for their reference to construction defects, it “was clearly appropriate given that the construction defect exclusion was the principal basis or denying the claim.” However, the court found that regarding the removal of drywall, “a triable issue of the facts exists.”
Ayar also claimed that LNW did not conduct a reasonable investigation, but the court found no evidence to support this conclusion. “This is not a case where the insurer failed to investigate or did so only half-heartedly.” Although the thoroughness of the investigation could not questioned, the court concluded that its timing could. Ayar claimed that LNW engaged in unreasonable delays. LNW counters that the delays were due to “Ayar’s own obstructive behavior and failure to cooperate with LNW’s investigation.”
The court dismissed all of Ayar’s claims, with the exception of whether LNW should have informed him that they would not pay for drywall repair unless there was damage, and whether LNW’s investigation failed to conclude its investigation within a thirty-day time line.
Read the court’s decision…
OSHA Cites Construction Firm for Safety Violations
August 16, 2012 — CDJ Staff
S.J. Louis Construction of Texas Ltd. has been cited by OHSH for one serious and one repeat safety violation, according to a report in Insurance Journal. OSHA officials saw S.J. Louis employees working in an unshored trench along a highway service road. The company had cited for this violation previously. Without shoring of trenches deeper than five feet there is a risk of serious injury or death.
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The Ever-Growing Thicket Of California Civil Code Section 2782
January 6, 2012 — Michael D. Worthing, Borton Petrini
California Civil Code section 2782 imposes limits on indemnity and defense provisions in construction contracts. Since the initial adoption of S.B. 8001 in 2002 (eff. January 1, 2003) section 27822 has been revised several times, and legislative history suggests that interest groups representing builders, developers and sub-contractors, as well as the insurance industry, have seen legislative action on these indemnity and defense issues as part of the overall response to the same economic pressures resulting from construction defect litigation that gave rise to S.B. 800. Amendments in 2005, 2007, 2008 and 2011 (each effective January 1 of the following year) have increasingly entangled the provisions of Section 2782 with various provisions of S.B. 800. The application of section 2782 to construction contracts, and in particular contracts between developer-builders and subcontractors, executed after January 1, 2006, will require a concurrent reading and understanding of S.B. 800, the application of which is itself still in flux.
The time a construction contract was executed will likely determine which version of section 2782, read in connection with provisions of S.B.800, is applicable. Because of the nature of construction defect litigation, the determination of relative rights and liabilities of developer-builders vis-à-vis subcontractors under construction contracts does not become the subject of litigation, and legal and judicial interpretation, until years after the contracts were entered and work performed. As of the date this article is submitted, there has been no case law interpreting or applying any of the post S.B. 800 amendments, in part, and perhaps primarily, because litigation arising from construction contracts executed after January 1, 2006, has not yet reached the appellate courts.
SECTION 2782 AT THE TIME S.B. 800 WAS ENACTED
Section 2782 was originally enacted in 1967 and amended several times to the version in effect when S.B. 800 became law, at which time the section was relatively simple and straightforward. It then consisted of two subdivisions, which have essentially remained unchanged until the most recent amendment during the 2011 legislative session.
Section 2782 (a) prohibited, and still prohibits, provisions in construction contracts that “purport to indemnify the promisee against liability for damages for death or bodily injury to persons, injury to property, or any other loss, damage or expense arising from the sole negligence or willful misconduct of the promise.” This provision essentially prohibits what had been referred to as so-called Type I or “specific” indemnity provisions. In such agreements, the indemnitor [the promisor, that is, the person or entity indemnifying] will indemnify the indemnitee [the promisee, that is, the person or entity being protected by the indemnity] for the indemnitee’s own negligence, whether active or passive, whether the indemnitee is solely negligent or concurrently negligent with the indemnitor. (See, MacDonald & Kruse, Inc. v. San Jose Steel Co. (1972) 29 Cal.App.3d 413, 419.)3 Section 2782 (a) has remained essentially intact since the enactment of S.B. 800. It still must be considered and applied to interpret a construction contract. Generally, it will apply to contracts not involving a public agency; the next part of section 2782 specifically governs such contracts.
The second subdivision prohibits provisions in any construction contract with a public agency which purport to impose on the contractor, or relieve the public agency from, liability for the active negligence of the public agency. Subdivision (b) has been revised by the 2011 amendment, discussed below. If a construction contract with the public agency is for residential construction, the standards of S.B. 800 likely apply.4
This was the extent of section 2782 on January 1, 2003, when S.B. 800 went into effect, and remained so until January 1, 2006. This version will govern interpretation and application of indemnity and defense provisions in construction contracts executed before January 1, 2006.5
2005 AMENDMENT
The first “post S.B. 800” change to Section 2782 was in enacted in 2005, effective January 1, 2006, and added two new sections. Subdivision (c) stated (in somewhat greater detail than paraphrased here) that for residential construction contracts, or amendments thereto, entered into after January 1, 2006, a subcontractor cannot be required to indemnify (including the cost to defend) a builder for construction defects that arise out of negligence or design defects of the builder or other independent contractors, or that do not arise out of the scope of the subcontractor=s scope of work. The term “residential construction” was defined by reference to S.B.800 generally, and the term “builder” was defined by reference to section 911 (a part of S.B. 800), for the first time expressly connecting provisions of section 2782 to S.B. 800. Contractual provisions not expressly prohibited were reserved to the agreement of the parties.
What subdivision (c) took away was partially given back by subdivision (d). It stated that “subdivision (c) does not prohibit a subcontractor and builder from mutually agreeing to the timing or immediacy of the defense and provisions for reimbursement of defense fees and costs, so long as that agreement, upon final resolution of the claims, does not waive or modify the provisions of subdivision (c).”6 In addition, it stated that this subdivision (c) did not affect the obligations of an insurance carrier under Presley Homes, Inc. v. American States Insurance Company (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 571, which holds that where an insurer has a duty to defend a developer pursuant to an additional insured endorsement obtained under a subcontractor’s policy, that duty generally applies to the entire action, even if the suit involves both covered and uncovered claims, or a single claim only partially covered by the policy. Finally, subdivision (d) stated that the amendment did not affect the builder’s or subcontractor’s obligations under S.B. 800. Both of these latter provisions, relating to the Presley Homes case, and obligations under S.B. 800, have been carried forward essentially intact in subsequent amendments of section 2782.
This version of section 2782 will be applicable to any contract between a builder as defined by section 911 (see fn. 4, above) and a subcontractor executed between January 1, 2006, and December 31, 2008. Thus, a general contractor, etc., who is not a builder is not subject to the provisions added by the 2005 amendment; this changed with the next amendment.
It is not clear whether this version would apply to a contract entered before January 1, 2006, but amended after that date. Subdivision (c) applies to “all construction contracts, and amendments thereto, entered into after January 1, 2006, for residential construction.” It would seem that the clearest and most logical construction would apply it only to contracts originally made after January 1, 2006, and thereafter amended, but there has been no judicial determination of this issue.
In addition, logically it would seem that this version of section 2782 should be applicable to construction contracts for residential construction between a builder and a subcontractor, entered between January 1, 2006, and December 31, 2008; however, legislative history relating to the 2008 amendment discussed below suggests a different result might occur.
2007 AMENDMENT
The second “post S.B. 800” amendment in 2007 (effective January 1, 2008), added subdivisions (e)(1) and (e)(2).
Subdivision (e)(1) added general contractors and subcontractors not affiliated with the builder and imposed essentially the same restrictions on provisions to indemnify, including the cost to defend, them as had been imposed on the “builder” by the 2005 amendment. The amendment refers to section 911 (b), again part of S.B. 800, to define general contractors, etc., not affiliated with the builder.
Subdivision (e)(1) essentially repeated the provisions of subdivision (d) permitting agreement to the timing and immediacy of the defense, the reference to the Presley Homes case, and the general contractor’s or subcontractor’s obligations under S.B. 800.
It appears this amendment was an attempt to harmonize the new restrictions on indemnity and defense provisions with S.B. 800. The 2005 amendment, whether by oversight or intent, covered only builders and not general contractors, although both classes are subject to the provisions of S.B. 800; the 2007 amendment added non-builder-affiliated general contractors.
Again, logically, it would seem that this version of section 2782 should be applicable to construction contracts for residential construction between a general contractor or contractor not affiliated with a builder and a subcontractor, entered between January 1 and December 31, 2008; however, legislative history relating to the 2008 amendment discussed below suggests a different result might occur. The same potential uncertainty regarding applicability to a contract entered before January 1, 2008, but amended after that date, exists for this provision as for the prior amendment, discussed above.
2008 AMENDMENT
The third “post S.B. 800” amendment in 2008 (effective January 1, 2009), reorganized the language relating to prohibited indemnity provisions, added a reference to insurance in that same prohibition, extensively rewrote the provisions governing agreements relating to the timing or immediacy of defense, added language preserving equitable indemnity claims, and added language defining “construction defect” by reference to the standards set forth in S.B. 800.
Subdivisions (a) and (b) remained unchanged.
Subdivision (c) now made a combined reference to builders (again by reference to section 911), as well as general contractors or contractors not affiliated with the builder (again by reference to section 911 (b)), rather than dealing with the two groups in separate but nearly identical subdivisions as previously. It otherwise restated the same limitations that were previously set forth separately in subdivisions (c) and (e), as well as the reference to the Presley Homes case, and the general contractor’s or subcontractor’s obligations under S.B. 800, but with one important addition. The word “insure” was added to the description of prohibited provisions, to-wit: “provisions? that purport to insure or indemnify, including the cost to defend, the builder, [etc.]? are unenforceable” to the extent they arise out of claims of the type previously described.
It is unclear what impact the addition of this single word “insure” will have; and, it will have to be read in light of the preservation of the language that it shall not affect the obligations of an insurance carrier under the holding of the Presley Homes case. Suppose a carrier had issued an additional insured endorsement under which it would otherwise be required to defend a builder or general contractor consistent with the Presley Homes rule: would this newly added single word (restricting the construction contract, to which the carrier is not a party) give the carrier a basis for denying coverage under the insurance contract? Or would the continued inclusion of the express language that it does not affect the obligations of an insurance carrier under Presley Homes control? That is surely an issue that will have to be worked out by the courts.
The new subdivision (d) addressed defense obligations. Again it permitted parties to agree to the timing and immediacy of the defense and provision for reimbursement of defense fees and costs, but imposed a very detailed scheme that appears to limit the extent of such agreement. A subcontractor owes no defense or indemnity obligation until the builder or general contractor provides a written tender of the claim, which has the same force and effect as notice of commencement of a legal proceeding. Upon that tender the subcontractor shall elect to follow one of two ways of performing: subdivision (d) (1) permits the subcontractor to defend with counsel of its choice and to control the defense, if the subcontractor gives written notice of this election within a reasonable time after receipt of the written tender and in no event later than 90 days following that receipt; subdivision (d) (2) provides an alternative by which the subcontractor pays a reasonable allocated share of the builder’s or general contractor’s defense fees and costs within 30 days of receipt of an invoice, subject to reallocation upon final resolution of the claim by settlement or judgment. Subdivision (e) sets forth remedies available to the builder or general contractor if a subcontractor fails to timely and adequately perform its obligations under either of the two alternatives in subdivision (d), including compensatory and consequential damages, reasonable attorneys’ fees in connection with the first alternative, and interest on defense and indemnity costs in connection with the second alternative. Subdivision (e) ends with provisions relating to reallocation of defense costs, and damages for failure to reallocate.
Application of these requirements in actual litigation is likely to be cumbersome and potentially fraught with conflicts. If retained pursuant to subdivision (d) (1) does the attorney represent the builder, the subcontractor, or both? To whom does the attorney owe his or her fiduciary duty? Can an appropriate informed written consent be formulated, for example, under Rule 3-310 of the California Rules of Professional Conduct, or Rule 1.7, ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct? Could an attorney retained by a subcontractor blame the subcontractor if that is in the developer’s best interests? If multiple subcontractors elect to defend directly, how would the defense be coordinated among the potentially multiple attorneys so retained? Would an attorney retained by one subcontractor be able, or inclined, to blame another subcontractor who also chose to defend directly, in other words, what would prevent inconsistent defense positions amongst the various counsel retained by subcontractors for the developer? There may be solutions to such practical and professional considerations but it seems an ethical thicket awaits any attorney involved in such circumstances.
Subdivision (e) and (f) preserve equitable indemnity claims for the builder, general contractor or subcontractor, the first in general, the second as against any supplier, design profession, or product manufacturer. Finally, the 2008 amendment added for the first time, in subdivision (h), language defining "construction defect" as used in section 2782 as a violation of standards set forth in S.B. 800.
The inclusion of these last three subsections would seem to work against simplification of litigation. A builder or general contractor is likely to allege a claim for equitable indemnity against any and all subcontractors in addition to claims for contractual indemnity and defense (however limited by the other provisions of section 2782). Nothing in the section suggests the subcontractor should, or even can, somehow take on the representation of the builder, etc., in connection with a claim of equitable indemnity back against the subcontractor.
And the limited definition of “construction defect” in subdivision (h) appears to raise an issue of the applicability of the limitations set forth in subdivision (c). Although there is a school of thought that section 941 limits residential construction defect claims only to breach of the performance standards under S.B. 800, it is still common for CD complaints to plead other legal theories, e.g., breach of contract, breach of warranty, negligence, etc., in addition to violation of S.B. 800 standards. With the addition of subdivision (h) it is arguable that the restrictions on indemnity and defense provisions spelled out in subdivisions (c) and (d), both of which relate to claims for residential construction defects, are applicable only to claims for violation of S.B. 800 standards, and not other residential construction defect claims. In other words, a developer might conceivably still be entitled to a broader scope of indemnity and concomitant defense for other types of claims, such as breach of contract, breach of warranty, negligence, etc., so long as the indemnity does not violate the limitation of subdivision (a) against Type I indemnity, which as noted above, has remained intact through these revisions.
Finally, it would seem that this version of section 2782 should be applicable to contracts executed between builders, general contractors, etc., on the one hand and subcontractors on the other hand on and after January 1, 2009. And, as noted above in connection with the 2005 and 2007 amendments, logic would suggest that those versions would ordinarily apply to contracts executed during the time periods mentioned above. But, the Legislative Counsel’s Digest for the 2008 amendment as it finally was enacted into law includes the following statements:
This bill would delete the provisions applicable to construction contracts entered into on or after January 1, 2008, that purport to indemnify the general contractor or contractor not affiliated with the builder. The bill would revise the provisions applicable to contracts entered into after January 1, 2006, to instead apply to contracts entered into after January 1, 2009, and to apply to agreements that purport to insure or indemnify the builder or the general contractor or contractor not affiliated with the builder, as described.
Although it seems a startling result, this legislative history suggests an argument can be made that the 2008 amendment retroactively nullified the effect of the 2005 and 2007 amendments, so that contracts executed from January 1, 2006, as to builders or January 1, 2008, for general contractors, etc., through December 31, 2008, are still governed by the provisions of section 2782 as it was on the books prior to the first post-S.B. 800 amendment in 2005.
2011 AMENDMENT
Section 2782 has been amended yet again in the 2011 session of the California Legislature, effective January 1, 2012; however, the substantive changes affect certain contracts entered on or after January 1, 2013. All of the provisions contained in the 2008 amendment have been carried forward in the most recent amendment, although re-numbered: (c) became (d), etc., through (h) becoming (i). So, the law governing construction contracts entered into after January 1, 2009, for residential construction, as between a builder, or a general contractor, etc., not affiliated with a builder, and regarding insurance, indemnity or defense relating to claims for construction defects, remains the same as in the 2008 amendment.
As noted above the substantive changes to section 2782 all affect contracts entered into on or after January 1, 2013. Subdivision (b) has been amended such that any provision in a contract with a public agency that purports to impose on any contractor, etc., or relieve the public agency from, liability for the active negligence of the public agency will be void and unenforceable. A new subdivision (c) has been added that imposes a similar restriction on construction contracts with the owner of privately owned real property to be improved and as to which the owner is not acting as a contractor or supplier of materials or equipment to the work. This new restriction in subdivision (c) does not apply to a homeowner performing a home improvement project on his or her own single family dwelling.
The 2011 bill amending section 2782 also added a new section 2782.05, which will make void and unenforceable any provision in any construction contract (again, entered on or after January 1, 2013) that purports to insure or indemnify, including the cost to defend, a general contractor, construction manager, or other subcontractor, by a subcontractor for claims that arise out of the active negligence or willful misconduct of the general contractor, etc., or other independent contractors, etc., or to the extent the claims do not arise out of the scope of work of the subcontractor. However, the section also includes a long list of situations to which it does not apply, including all of those covered by section 2782 (residential construction subject to S.B. 800, public agency contracts subject to section 2782 (b), and direct contracts with private property owners subject to the new section 2782 (c)) as well as eight other categories. This apparently is intended to serve as a “catch-all” to extend a limitation on indemnity agreements to all construction contracts not previously swept into this widening legislative scheme, although the exact phrasing is slightly different.7
The new section 2782.05 then permits a mutual agreement to the timing or immediacy of a defense under a scheme essentially identical to that imposed in the 2008 amendment to section 2782: defend with counsel of choice, and maintain control of the defense; or, pay a reasonable allocated share of defense fees and costs. The same logistical and ethical difficulties presented by the 2008 scheme discussed above would likely be present in cases that fall under the new section 2782.05.
CONCLUSION
The California Legislature has been revising section 2782 since shortly after the adoption of S.B. 800. Each revision has been more complicated than the last, and each has tied certain provisions of section 2782 more closely to S.B. 800. In particular, with regard to construction defect claims relating to residential dwellings which are subject to S.B. 800, the Legislature has apparently attempted to exercise more and more control over the scope of allowable indemnity and dictated a very narrow scheme to govern how the defense obligation arising from a contractual indemnity is to be implemented. It seems likely that any attempt to manage the defense of a construction defect case under the options that allow a subcontractor to defend directly and control the defense will create a logistical problem and an ethical difficulty for any attorney attempting to defend a developer at the behest and direction of a subcontractor. Finally, as set forth in the current version of section 2782 relating to contractual indemnity and defense of S.B. 800 type cases (subdivisions (c) through (h) in the 2008 version, now subdivisions (d) through (i) in the 2011 amendment), the Legislature has apparently narrowed the application to only claims of violation of S.B. 800 standards. This may have, in essence, removed the restrictions on indemnity and defense provisions as they relate to other theories pleaded against developers in construction defense cases, e.g., breach of contract, breach of warranty, negligence, and the like. It is not at all clear that the Legislature has accomplished what it set out do accomplish. Rather, the law may have come full circle back to where it began, except for one legal theory, i.e. violation of S.B. 800 standards, currently being used in residential construction defect cases. For any other legal theory the limitation of section 2782 (a) may be solely controlling.
- California Civil Code section 43.99, and sections 895 to 945.5.
- All statutory references in this article are to the California Civil Code unless otherwise specified.
- Type I or specific indemnity does not exactly match the scope of proscribed indemnity as described in section 2782 (a) but it is the closest. More recent case law in California has eschewed a mechanical application of the MacDonald & Kruse typology in favor of examining the precise text of the actual contract (See, e.g., St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Frontier Pacific Ins. Co. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1234, 1246, n. 6) but some recent cases still use the Type I, II and II classifications. And, an understanding of that “historical” typology is useful as an aid to evaluating and understanding express indemnity in general.
- The provisions of S.B. 800 other than the prelitigation procedures of sections 910 through 938 apply to general contractors, subcontractors, etc., pursuant to section 936. The prelitigation procedures generally involve a “builder,” which is specifically defined in section 911 (a) by reference to entities or individuals in the business of selling residential units to the public or of building, developing, or constructing residential units for public purchase. Pursuant to section 911 (b) the term builder does not include general contractors, etc., not affiliated with the builder. Thus, a general contractor who constructs residential housing pursuant to a contract with a public agency is still subject to claims for violation of the standards set forth in sections 896 and 897, resulting from its negligent act or omission or breach of contract, pursuant to section 936.
- As noted above, there has been no case law yet interpreting any of the “post S.B. 800” changes to Section 2782. One of the most important legal decisions relating to express indemnity and defense obligations and rights between developer-builders and sub-contractors was published after two of the amendments but based upon contracts executed and the language of section 2782 prior to January 1, 2006. (See, Crawford v. Weather Shield Mfg., Inc. (2008) 44 Cal.4th 541, 547, 566-67, fn. 14).
- Subcontractor dissatisfaction with the perceived inadequacy of protection afforded by this provision apparently became the impetus for a 2008 amendment to section 2782, discussed below, at least based upon the numerous (form) letters submitted to legislators in connection therewith.
- Section 2782 (a), where we started, and which has continued without change, prohibits indemnity for claims arising out of the sole negligence or willful misconduct of the promisee; sole negligence can be either active or passive. The various versions relating to residential construction prohibit indemnity for the negligence of the builder, etc., suggesting there is no express contractual indemnity for the negligence of the subcontractor if the builder, etc., is at all negligent. This is tempered a bit by the preservation of the right to equitable indemnity, which will now be found in section 2782 (g) and (h).
Courtesy of Michael D. Worthing of Borton Petrini, LLP. Mr. Worthing can be contacted at mworthing@bortonpetrini.com.
Insurance Firm Under No Duty to Defend in Hawaii Construction Defect Case
September 13, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The US District Court for Hawaii has granted a motion for summary judgment in Evanston Insurance v. Nagano. The case is related to a construction defect claim, Hu v. Nagano, and the issue at hand is whether Evanston Insurance is obligated to defend the Naganos in the underlying case.
The Hus hired Eric Nagano and his firm PMX to construct a house. Mr. Nagano’s firm was insured by Evanston, however, he lost his contractor’s license in “approximately March 2006.” Mr. Nagano sought the Hus’ authorization to allow HC Builders to take over the contract. HC Builders is headed by Mr. Nagano’s wife, Hiroko, who has held a contractor’s license since “approximately September 2006.” Ms. Nagano and HC Builders were also insured by Evanston Insurance. The house, started by PMX was finished by HC Builders.
The Hus authorized construction to begin in July 2003, but “construction did not commence until approximately October 2004 and, even after commencement, there were numerous delays resulting in months of inactivity on the Project.” The Hus had expressed to Mr. Nagano and PMX “that the construction period could not exceed twelve months after July 1, 2003.” As a result of the delays, “the Hus’ community association fined them because of the prolonged construction and the Hus’ construction lender assessed extension fees and fines for exceeding the term of the loan.”
The Hus noted that the project did not have a licensed contractor from March through September 2006. In the end, the Hus “allege that Defendants did not fulfill the obligations under the Construction Contract,” and that “the Project was ‘grossly delayed’ and the construction was ‘riddled with defects.’” Despite an Owner’s Notice of Completion filed in December 2007, the residence “had no electricity, no hot water, ... no installed appliances” and “parts of the flooring were either missing or incomplete.” And then it leaked.
The Naganos tendered the defense to Evanston. The Naganos “allege the defense is limited because Evanston: allowed default to be entered against the Naganos (the default was later set aside); delayed retaining experts; and limited the ability of the Naganos’ retained counsel to perform necessary actions to advance the case.” Evanston argues that it “does not have a duty to defend or indemnify Defendants against the Hus’ claims,” as the Hus’ claims are not covered under the policy. Further, the PMX policies have an exclusion for breach of contract.
The court concluded that all of the claims made by the Hus were based in contract and therefore were outside of the terms of the Naganos insurance coverage, as the courts have "construed Hawaii law as not providing for insurance coverage for contract related claims." Therefore, Evanston does not have a duty to defend the Naganos.
Read the court’s decision…
Housing Prices Up through Most of Country
December 20, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Home prices in October were up more than six percent compared with prices in October 2011. The LA Times noted that some of the strongest gains were in California and Arizona. The Phoenix metropolitan area saw a 24.5% rise in home prices. In California, Riverside and Los Angeles were just above the national average, at 7.3% and 6.4%, contributing to the state’s overall nine percent increase.
The news wasn’t good throughout the entire country, as five states did not see any price increases. Mark Fleming, the chief economist at CoreLogic, a research firm in Irvine, California said that “the housing recovery that started earlier in 2012 continues to gain momentum.
Read the full story…
Renovation Contractors: Be Careful How You Disclose Your Projects
December 9, 2011 — Derek J. Lindenschmidt, Colorado Construction Litigation
In Palu and Beyer v. Toney, 2011 WL 2560249 (Bankr. D. Colo.), the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado determined that a Colorado District Court order granting summary judgment in favor of plaintiff home buyers was binding on the Bankruptcy Court in the defendant contractor’s bankruptcy proceeding based on issue preclusion.
Pertinent to this column is the subject matter of the summary judgment motion: Colorado’s Seller’s Property Disclosure (Form LC-18-5-04). In the underlying state court action, the plaintiff home buyers filed a motion for summary judgment contending that the defendant contractor represented to them, through the Seller’s Property Disclosure, that there were no present or past conditions involving moisture or water problems, roof problems or leaks, skylight problems, or gutter downspout problems.
In granting plaintiffs’ motion, the state court determined that the defendant contractor made these representations on her Seller’s Property Disclosure despite witnessing water leaking from the skylight onto the floor and being aware of repairs to the roof, skylight, and interior drywall prior to the sale of the property.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of Derek J. Lindenschmidt of Higgins, Hopkins, McClain & Roswell, LLP. Mr. Lindenschmidt can be contacted at lindenschmidt@hhmrlaw.com
Williams v. Athletic Field: Hugely Important Lien Case Argued Before Supreme Court
June 17, 2011 — Douglas Reiser, Builders Counsel
Well, it finally made it. The most important Washington lien case of recent memory was argued in front of the Washington Supreme Court on Tuesday, June 14, 2011. So, what should we all expect?
As I was reading through my RSS feeds this afternoon ? I was stopped dead in my tracks. Williams v . Athletic Field, the Division II case that has been a frequent topic here on Builders Counsel, has finally been argued before the Supreme Court. All of you who have been anxiously awaiting this day, you can check out the Supreme Court submissions by following this link.
The Williams case has been the center of attention for construction lawyers and construction organizations over the past year. Some have called for complete lien law reform, others have tried to patch a hole in the law. Now, we can expect a ruling from the highest court in the state. That ruling will have a major impact on whether the Legislature feels compelled to change lien law.
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Reprinted courtesy of Douglas Reiser of Reiser Legal LLC. Mr. Reiser can be contacted at info@reiserlegal.com
Construction Job Opening Rise in October
December 20, 2012 — CDJ Staff
There was a significant increase in the number of open construction jobs during October, according to a report for the National Association of Home Builders. Working from preliminary data provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the NAHB said that the number of open positions reached “levels and rates last seen in 2007.” As the data is still preliminary, the NAHB noted that the conclusions should be taken with caution.
While there was a spike in job openings, the hiring of people to fill these positions hasn’t caught up with it, and there was a small decline in hires. But to return to the good news, there was also a drop in layoffs in that same period.
Through October, about 8,000 people have been hired in the construction sector. The NAHB notes that this does not correspond with the recent increases with home construction. They suggest that “it may be the case that startups in the home building and remodeling sectors are being missed by the establishment survey.” Another possibility they raise is that already-employed construction workers are simply working more hours.
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Defective Grout May Cause Trouble for Bridges
August 16, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Grout, which was used to protect the steel support cables of the Woodrow Wilson Bridge, may lead to problems instead. The Baltimore Sun reports that the Federal Highway Administration is looking at three dozen bridges in twenty-one states that were built with defective grout. The grout contains high levels of chlorides, which can lead to corrosion. The collapse of pedestrian walkway in Concord, North Carolina was attributed to chloride contamination in the grout.
The grout, SikaGrout 300PT, was advertised as "non-corrosive, does not contain chlorides," but later testing showed that it contained levels that exceeded limits by 400 percent. Throughout the country, about 16 million pounds of this were used. Sika Corp. suspended production of the grout in 2010. If repairs need to be made, it is unclear who will pay.
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Contractor’s Coverage For Additional Insured Established by Unilateral Contract
November 18, 2011 — Tred Eyerley, Insurance Law Hawaii
The contractor was covered as an additional insured under the subcontractor’s policy even though the parties had never actually signed an agreement to add the contractor to the policy. Evanston Ins. Co. v. Westchester Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 20081 (9th Cir. Oct. 3, 2011).
The policies held by Bellevue Master, the general contractor, required it to be an additional insured under any subcontractor’s liability policy. Northwest Tower Crane Services was a subcontractor. Bellevue Master LLC, faxed a message that Northwest could continue to be a subcontractor on the project if it complied with Bellevue Master’s insurance requirements. Northwest contacted its insurance broker and requested an insurance certificate be issued to Bellevue Master so that it would be an additional insured under Northwest’s policy.
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
Alabama “occurrence” and subcontractor work exception to the “your completed work” exclusion
November 18, 2011 — CDCoverage.com
In Town & Country Property, LLC v. Amerisure Ins. Co., No. 1100009 (Ala. Oct. 21, 2010), property owner Town & Country contracted with insured general contractor Jones-Williams for the construction of a car dealership. All of the construction work was performed by Jones-Williams subcontractors. After completion, Town & Country sued Jones-Williams for defective construction. Jones-Williams’ CGL insurer Amerisure defended. The case was tried and a judgment was entered against Jones-Williams in favor of Town & Country. After Amerisure denied any obligation to pay the judgment, Town & Country sued Amerisure in a statutory direct action.
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Reprinted courtesy of CDCoverage.com.
Another Las Vegas Tower at the Center of Construction Defect Claims
November 7, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Accusations are coming from both sides over construction defects at a Las Vegas tower, only this time, it’s not the Harmon Towers, it’s Hilton Grand Vacations, which is part of the Planet Hollywood Resort. The project was originally dubbed PH Towers Westgate, and it was developed by Westgate Resorts, which is suing the contractor, Tutor-Saliba for $10 million over late completion and construction defects.
Among the defects Westgate is claiming are cracked floor tiles in the valet lobby and cracks and delamination of the pool deck. Tutor-Saliba argues that the failure of the valet lobby floor is due to Westgate specifying only 1/16th inch-wide grouting, instead of the specified ¬º inch, and Westgate’s refusal to allow expansion joints on the pool deck has lead to problems there. Westgate’s attorney, Robert Schumacher, attributes the problems to “shoddy construction practices.”
According to the article in the Las Vegas Review Journal, plans were only 60 percent complete when construction began, leading to “thousands of change orders.” Despite not meeting an August completion deadline, Tutor-Saliba is claiming it is owed a $1.5 million bonus nevertheless.
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Harmon Towers Case to Last into 2014
December 20, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Don’t expect a fast resolution to the Harmon Tower case in Las Vegas. The latest schedule sets trial for the construction defect claims in January 2014. Previously, these claims were going to be heard during the trial set to start in June 2013. Now the June trial will be over payment issues only.
Don’t expect the building to come down soon either. While CityCenter claims the building could come down in an earthquake, Judge Elizabeth Gonzalez had determined that as the structural testing was not random; its results cannot be extrapolated through the entire structure. As a result, CityCenter has elected to do more testing, holding off on demolishing the building. They are appealing Gonzalez’s order to the Nevada Supreme Court.
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Texas “your work” exclusion
January 6, 2012 — CDCoverage.com
In American Home Assurance Co. v. Cat Tech, L.L.C., No. 10-20499 (5th Cir. Oct. 5, 2011), claimant Ergon hired insured Cat Tech to perform service on a reactor at Ergon’s refinery. During a start-up of the reactor after Cat Tech had completed its work, the reactor suffered damage. Cat Tech performed additional service and repairs. However, again upon start-up of the reactor, it suffered additional damage. Ergon hired another contractor to repair the reactor. Ergon initiated arbitration proceedings against Cat Tech. Cat Tech’s CGL insurer American Home defended Cat Tech against the Ergon arbitration under a reservation of rights.
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Reprinted courtesy of CDCoverage.com
Construction Defects: 2010 in Review
July 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Candace Matson, Harold Hammersmith, and Helen Lauderdale, all of Sheppard Mullin, recently looked at design and construction defect litigation in 2010. They look at three California construction law cases. In one prominent case, the developer’s claims were barred under California law. However, the court did allow a claim for breach of the duty to defend.
In a second case, the California Supreme Court ruled that a duty to defend is separate from a duty to indemnify. A developer sought to include its engineering subcontractor in a suit. The subcontractor unsuccessfully argued that it had no duty to defend as the homeowners had not sued it.
The third case involved a lawyer who had represented a homeowner accused a libel against a construction firm and then later represented one of the subcontractors the firm had employed. The California Court of appeals concluded that there was no conflict of interest and so the contractor could not disqualify the subcontractor’s lawyer.
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Lien Claimant’s Right to Execute against Bond Upheld in Court of Appeals
February 10, 2012 — Douglas Rieser, Builders Counsel
Stonewood v. Infinity Homes is a simple construction dispute over a matter of about $9,000.00. But sometimes these tiny little disputes turn into expensive legal battles over mere procedural quivering. In Stonewood, a small subcontractor won a big victory yesterday when the Divison 1 Court of Appeals upheld its judgment against a lien release bond posted by an owner.
Infinity Homes contracted with Stonewood Design to lay tile in one of its customer’s homes. Stonewood did the work, but Infinity withheld roughly $9,000.00 of the contract sums for what it alleged were trade damages left on the tile. The two parties were unable to come to an agreement over payment and Stonewood proceeded with a lien under RCW 60.04. It then filed an action to enforce the lien against the homeowner, Infinity and its bonding company.
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Reprinted courtesy of Douglas Reiser of Reiser Legal LLC. Mr. Reiser can be contacted at info@reiserlegal.com