Analysis of the “owned property exclusion” under Panico v. State Farm
March 8, 2011 — March 8, 2011, Colorado Construction Litigation
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit recently concluded that the “owned property exclusion” applied to bar coverage for claims of property damage. See Panico v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 2011 WL 322830 (10th Cir. 2011). In Panico, the plaintiffs sold property in Aspen, Colorado to the Taylors, who sued the Panicos upon discovering the property was not as represented. After refusing to defend, the Panicos sued State Farm for breach of contract. The district court concluded that the Taylors’ claims were not covered under the Panicos insurance policies and granted summary judgment in State Farm’s favor. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed.
Mr. Panico built the house on the property as well as several additions to the house. As the Taylors lived in Florida, they primarily relied on their real estate agent and an inspector to ensure the property was acceptable. According to their complaint, the Taylors discovered that the house was “virtually uninhabitable due to serious design and construction defects, mold, rodents, and drainage problems.” Id. at *1. In their complaint, the Taylors asserted three claims for relief against the Panicos based upon misrepresentation and fraudulent concealment about the condition of the property.
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of Heather M. Anderson of Higgins, Hopkins, McClain & Roswell, LLP. Ms Anderson can be contacted at anderson@hhmrlaw.com
Minnesota Starts Wide-Ranging Registration of Contractors
July 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Minnesota has replaced its Independent Contractor Exemption Certificate program with the Contractor Registration Pilot Project, according to an article in the Martindale-Hubble Legal Library by Michael B. Lapicola. Mr. Lapicola notes that “it will be a violation of the law to contract with or perform construction services for another person without first being registered with the Pilot Project, or to contract with or pay another person to perform construction services if the other person is not registered with the Pilot Project. There are, however, quite a few exceptions, including those who are currently registered with the earlier program. Additionally, independent contractors who do not register can avoid the fine (up to $2,000) by registering within thirty days of fines being levied. Individuals and firms that do not perform building construction or improvements are exempt from the hiring aspects of the statute.
Minnesota’s goal is to “assist state agencies to investigate employee misclassification in the building industry.” Employees of construction firms do not individually register. Rather, the intent of the of law is to stop those who would “require any individual through coercion, misrepresentation or fraudulent means to adopt independent contractor status” or to “knowingly misrepresent or misclassify an individual as an independent contractor.”
Read the full story…
OSHA Extends Delay of Residential Construction Fall Protection Requirements
September 13, 2012 — CDJ Staff
OSHA has announced a fourth delay in full implementation of requiring fall protection in residential construction. The requirements, which would obligate those in residential construction to use the same degree of fall protection as is used in commercial construction, were originally set to go into effect in September 2011. As part of the phasing in of the new requirements, penalties were reduced, originally until March 2012. This has now been extended until December 15, 2012.
Read the full story…
California Supreme Court Finds Associations Bound by Member Arbitration Clauses
September 13, 2012 — CDJ Staff
In a decision with great implications for construction defect suits in California, the California Supreme Court has ruled in Pinnacle Museum Tower Association v. Pinnacle Market Development that arbitration clauses binding on the members of the association are also binding on the association itself. They concluded this, even though “the association did not exist as an entity independent of the developer when the declaration was drafted and recorded.” The opinion, written by Justice Baxter, was joined by four additional justices, with two separate concurrences and a dissenting opinion by Justice Kennard.
The Pinnacle homeowners sought to bring suit over construction defect claims. In response, the developer filed a motion to compel arbitration. The association argued that the arbitration clause signed by its individual members was not binding on it. The Appeals Court invalidated the arbitration agreement “finding it marked by slight substantive unconscionability and high degree of procedural unconscionability. The Appeals Court determined that “for all intents and purposes, Pinnacle was the only party to the ‘agreement,’ and there was no independent homeowners association when Pinnacle recorded the CC&R’s.” However, the California Supreme Court said that this was “not persuasive in light of the statutory and contract principles in play.”
The opinion notes that “the Project CC&R’s provides that Pinnacle and, by accepting a deed to any portion of the Project property, the Association and each individual condominium owner agree to submit any construction dispute to binding arbitration in accordance with the FAA.” The Court noted that “settled principles of condominium law establish that an owners association, like its constituent members, must act in conformity with the terms of a recorded declaration,” which, as the Court notes, includes the CC&Rs.
After finding that the terms were binding on the Association, the Court then questioned whether the terms were “unenforceable as unconscionable,” noting that “the party resisting arbitration bears the burden of proving unconscionability.” But the Court found that “the arbitration provisions of article XVIII are not substantively unconscionable.” Additionally, they found “no support for the Association’s claims of unfairness and absence of mutuality.”
Read the court’s decision…
Brown Paint Doesn’t Cover Up Construction Defects
April 25, 2012 — CDJ Staff
In a decision that describes the case as illustrating “the perils that real estate brokers and their agents assume when acting as a dual listing agent to both the buyers and sellers of the same house,” the California Court of Appeals has issued a decision in William L. Lyon & Associates v. The Superior Court of Placer County. Lyon & Associates sought summary judgment to dismiss the claims of the Henleys who bought a home in a transaction where a Lyon agent represented both sides.
The prior owners of the home, the Costas, had used a Lyon agent in purchasing their home. When they later sought to sell it, that agent “became aware of some of the house’s defects and problems.” In response, the Costas sought the help of another agent, Connie Gidal, also of Lyons & Associates. Photos taken in the presence of Ms. Gidal show defects of the paint and stucco. The Costas also took the step of painting the house dark brown. During the sale process, “rain caused many of the painted-over defects to reappear.” The Costas “purchased more dark brown paint and covered up the newly visible damage prior to inspection by the Henleys.”
With the damage concealed, the Henleys bought the home in May 2006. The agreement with Lyons & Associates noted that “a dual agent is obligated to disclose known facts materially affecting the value or desirability of the property to both parties.” Escrow closed on May 9, 2006. The contract with the broker included a two-year limit on the time to bring legal action.
The Henleys moved in during June 2006, and “began to discover construction defects that had been concealed by the Costas.” In addition to the painted-over stucco problems, the Henleys found that the Costas had “installed quartzite stone overlays on the backyard steps in a manner that caused water intrusion on the house’s stucco walls.”
In May 2009, the Henleys sued the Costas, Ron McKim Construction, Lyons & Associates, and Ms. Gidal. Their complaint alleged that Lyons & Associates had committed breach of contact, negligence, fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and negligent nondisclosure in connection with the construction defects. The Costas named Lyons in a cross complaint. Lyons moved for summary judgments on the grounds that the two-year statute of limitations had expired before the complaint and cross-complaint were filed. Both the Henleys and the Costas opposed this claim. The court denied the motion and Lyons appealed.
The appeals court upheld the denial, noting that the both California Supreme Court decision and later action by the legislature compels real estate brokers and salespersons “to conduct a reasonably competent and diligent visual inspection of the property offered for sale.” The court noted that under California law, brokers have responsibilities to both sellers and buyers. The section of law cited by Lyons applies to seller’s agents. The court rejected the contention by Lyons that they were “cooperating brokers.” The Henleys were “not constrained by the two-year statute of limitations.”
Lyons contended that even if California’s statute did not apply, there was a contractual limit of two years. The court also rejected this, agreeing with the Henleys that “the two-year limitation period must be extended by the discovery rule.”
The court noted that “Lyon & Associates may not reap the benefit of a shortened contractual limitation period when its own alleged malfeasance contributed to the delay in the discovery of the buyer’s injury.” The court found that the Henleys could proceed with their breach of contract claim, because, “when a breach of contract is committed in secret, such as the intentional nondisclosure of a real estate broker regarding a previously visible construction defect, the contractual limitations period is properly held subject to the discovery rule.” The court felt that the interpretation favored by the California Association of Realtors would “halve the applicable statute of limitations period.”
In addition to rejecting Lyon request for summary judgment on the claims made by the Henleys, the court also rejected the request of summary judgment on the claims made by the Costas, concluding that neither claim is time-barred. Costs were awarded to both the Henleys and Costas.
Read the court’s decision…
Insurer Able to Refuse Coverage for Failed Retaining Wall
October 28, 2011 — CDJ Staff
The Eleventh District of the US Court of Appeals has ruled in the case of Nix v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Company. In this case, the Nixes filed a claim after a portion of the retaining wall in their home collapsed and their basement flooded. State Farm denied the claim “on the ground that the policy excluded coverage for collapses caused by defects in construction and for damage caused by groundwater.”
The court reviewed the Nixes’ policy and found that State Farm’s statement did specifically exclude both of these items. In reviewing the lower court’s ruling, the appeals court noted that State Farm’s expert witness, Mark Voll, determined that the retaining wall “lacked reinforcing steel, as required by a local building code, and could not withstand the pressure created by groundwater that had accumulated during a heavy rainfall.” Additionally, a french drain had been covered with clay soil and so had failed to disperse the groundwater.
The Nixes argued that the flooding was due to a main line water pipe, but their opinions were those of Terry Nix and the contractor who made temporary repairs to the wall. “Those opinions were not admissible as lay testimony. Neither Nix nor the contractor witnessed the wall collapse or had personal knowledge about the construction of the Nixes’ home.”
The lower court granted a summary judgment to State Farm which has been upheld by the appeals court.
Read the court’s decision…
When is a Construction Project truly “Complete”? That depends. (law note)
August 2, 2012 — Melissa Dewey Brumback, Construction Law North Carolina
Long-time readers of the blog may remember my earlier post on substantial completion. However, in looking over my blog stats to see what search terms lead people here, it looks like this is hot topic. The blog searches came in two general categories:
1. Those searching strictly for a definition of substantial completion. Some examples:
- What does “substantial completion” mean?
- when does a building achieve substantial completion
- contracts “substantial completion”
- substantial completion undefined
- when is a project substantially complete
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of Melissa Dewey Brumback of Ragsdale Liggett PLLC. Ms. Brumback can be contacted at mbrumback@rl-law.com.
Developer’s Fraudulent Statements Are His Responsibility Alone in Construction Defect Case
February 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The Texas Court of Appeals ruled on December 21 in the case of Helm v Kingston, a construction defect case. After purchasing what was described as “an extremely well-built” two-bedroom townhouse, Mr. Kingston made complaints of construction defects. Greenway Development did not repair the defects to Kingston’s satisfaction, and he filed notice of suit. In his suit, he claimed that GDI and its president, John Helm, had committed fraud and negligent misrepresentation. Kingston claimed that Helm “fraudulently induced Kingston to believe that the townhouse evidenced the highest quality of workmanship when in fact the quality of workmanship was atrocious.” Helms brought a counterclaim that Kingston’s suit was frivolous.
About four years after Kingston purchased the townhome, the suit proceeded to trial. The trial court determined that Helm was not “liable in his individual capacity,” but this was reversed at appeal.
A second trial was held ten years later on the question of whether Kingston’s unit was a townhome or an apartment. A jury found that Helm “engaged in a false, misleading or deceptive act or practice that Kingston relied on to his detriment.” Kingston was awarded $75,862.29 and an additional $95,000 in attorney fees by the jury. Helms made an unsuccessful appeal to the Appeals Court, after which Kingston was awarded an additional $10,000. Helms then made an unsuccessful appeal to the Texas Supreme Court, which lead to an additional $3,000 for Kingston. There was also a verdict of $48,770.09 in pre-judgment interest and “five percent post-judgment interest accruing from the date of the judgment until the time the judgment is paid. Helm appealed.
In his appeal, Helm raised seven issues, which the court reorganized into five Kingston raised one issue on cross-appeal.
Helms’ first claim was that Kingston “failed to satisfy the requirement of” Texas’s Residential Construction Liability Act and that by not filing under the RCLA, Kingston’s fraud and misrepresentation claims were preempted. Further Helms claimed that the RCLA limited Kingston’s damages. The court rejected this, as the RCLA deals with complaints made to a contractor and not only did Helm fail to “conclusively establish” his “status as a ‘contractor’ under the statutory definition,” Helm testified that he was “not a contactor” at the pre-trial hearing.
Helms’s second claim was that Kingston’s later claim of a misconstructed firewall should be barred, claiming that Kingston “‘had knowledge of a defect in the firewall’ as early as 1997 but did not assert them until 2007.” The court rejected this because Kingston’s claim was that “Helm ‘fraudulently induced Kingston to believe that the townhouse evidenced the highest quality of workmanship when in fact the quality of the workmanship was atrocious.’”
Helms also challenged whether his statements that the residence was of “good quality” constituted fraud and misrepresentation under Texas’s Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act. The court concluded that Helm was in a position to make knowledgeable statements and further that “residential housing units are not artistic works for which quality is inherently a matter of subjective judgment.” Helm also claimed that Kingston could have avoided certain repair expenses through the “exercise of reasonable care.” Helms argued that the repairs could have been made for $6,400. The court disagreed, as these claims were cited only to invoke the DTPA, and that later petitions established additional defects.
Helms’s next claim was that he was not allowed to designate responsible third parties. The court rejected this because there GDI represented matters concerning the residence only through Helm’s statements. The court noted that “Helm is correct that?third parties may be liable for fraud if they ‘participated in the fraudulent transactions and reaped the benefits,’” but they note that “Helm never specifically alleged that GDI or CREIC participated in Helm’s alleged fraudulent transactions.
The final issue in the decision was about court costs, and here the court denied claims on both sides. Helm argued that the award of legal fees were excessive, as they exceeded the actual damages. The court noted that they “may not substitute our judgment for that of the jury,” and also that “the ratio between the actual damages awarded and the attorney’s fees is not a factor that determines the reasonableness of the fees.” But the court also rejected Kingston’s claim for post-judgment interest on $10,312.30 that Helm had deposited in the trial court’s registry. The court noted that the monies were to be paid out upon final judgment, but the mandate did not include any reference to interest.
Read the court’s decision…
Construction Law Client Alert: California Is One Step Closer to Prohibiting Type I Indemnity Agreements In Private Commercial Projects
June 15, 2011 — Haight Brown & Bonesteel, LLP
On June 1, 2011 by majority vote, the California Senate passed Senate Bill 474, which would amend Civil Code section 2782, and add Civil Code section 2782.05. The passage of this new law is a critical development for real estate developers, general contractors and subcontractors because it will affect how these projects are insured and how disputes are resolved.
Civil Code section 2782 was amended in 2007 to prohibit Type I indemnity agreements for residential projects only. Since 2007, various trade associations and labor unions have lobbied to expand those very same restrictions to other projects. These new provisions apply to contracts, entered into after January 1, 2013, that are not for residential projects, and that are not executed by a public entity. The revisions provide that any provision in a contract purporting to indemnify, hold harmless, and defend another for their negligence or other fault is against public policy and void. These provisions cannot be waived.
A provision in a contract requiring additional insured coverage is also void and unenforceable to the extent it would be prohibited under the new law. Moreover, the new law does not apply to wrap-up insurance policies or programs, or a cause of action for breach of contract or warranty that exists independently of the indemnity obligation.
The practical impact of this new law is that greater participation in wrap-up insurance programs will likely result. While many wrap-up programs suffer from problems such as insufficient limits, and disputes about funding the self-insured retention, the incentive for the developer or general contractor to utilize wrap-up insurance will be greater than ever before because they will no longer be able to spread the risk of the litigation to the trades and the trade carriers.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of Steve Cvitanovic of Haight Brown & Bonesteel, LLP.
South Carolina Legislature Defines "Occurrence" To Include Property Damage Arising From Faulty Workmanship
May 26, 2011 — Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
On May 17, 2011, South Carolina passed legislation to combat the restrictive interpretation of what constitutes an "occurrence" under CGL policies. S.C. Code Ann. sec. 38-61-70.
The legislation reversed a decision by the state's Supreme Court issued earlier this year. See Crossman Communities of North Carolina, Inc. v. Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co., 2011 W.L. 93716 (S.C. Jan. 7, 2011). Crossman had overruled an earlier decision by the South Carolina Supreme Court that holding that defective construction was an “occurrence.” Crossman, however, reversed course, holding that damages resulting from faulty workmanship were the “natural and probable cause” of the faulty work and, as such, did not qualify as an “occurrence.”
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
Congress Addresses Homebuilding Credit Crunch
May 20, 2011 — CDJ Staff
The National Association of Home Builders (NAHB) reports that Representatives Gary Miller (CA), Brad Miller (NC) and twenty-nine cosponsors have put forth a bill with bipartisan support to “address the severe credit crunch for acquisition, development, and construction (AD&C) financing.” They report in addition to more than 1.4 million construction workers who have been “idled since 2006,” the housing slump has cost 3 million jobs and $145 million in wages.
NAHB reports that they worked closely with lawmakers on the bill. The association had members meet with legislators both in D.C. and in their home districts. They state that HR 1755 would help homebuilders “find the credit they need to move forward with new or existing projects.”
The bill would allow lenders to use the value upon completion when assessing loan collateral and ban the use of foreclosed or distressed sale properties in assessing values of projects. The would bill would also lessen restrictions by banking regulators, which the lead sponsors said “have hindered federal and state chartered banks and thrifts’ ability to make and maintain loans to qualified small home builders that have viable projects.”
The NAHB is urging members of Congress to cosponsor the bill and is urging the Senate to introduce a companion bill.
Read the full story…
Read HR 1755