Appeals Court Reverses Summary Judgment over Defective Archway Construction
February 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
A judge has ruled that a plaintiff can go forward with her suit that she was injured by a defective archway during a birthday party. A three-judge panel of the California Court of Appeals issued this ruling on January 23, 2012, in the case of Trujillo v. Cosio.
Ms. Trujillo attended a birthday party at the home of Maria Cosio and Joel Verduzco. A piñata was hung between a tree and a brick archway. Ms. Trujillo went to get candy that had fallen from the piñata, during which the archway fell on her hand. Subsequent examination of the archway showed that it had not been “properly anchored to the supporting pillars to protect the arch from falling.”
Ms. Cosio and Mr. Verduzco argued that they could not have been aware of the defective nature of the archway’s construction, as it had been built at the request of the prior property owner. The structure was constructed without building permits. Mark Burns, a civil engineer testifying for the plaintiff, said that “a reasonable property owner would have thoroughly tested the archway to ensure it was capable of withstanding such horizontal forces before allowing children to enter into the area.” Mr. Burns noted that twenty rope pulls would have been sufficient to demonstrate the structure’s instability.
The trial court rejected Mr. Burn’s statements, finding that the respondents did not have any knowledge of the defect and that a visual inspection should have sufficed. The court noted that this a triable issue, whether visual inspection suffices, or whether the property owners should have done as Mr. Burns suggested and yank a rope twenty times. The court noted that “although a jury may ultimately disagree with Burn’s opinion, it was supported by sufficient foundation and was not speculative.”
The opinion was written by Judge Flier, with Judges Rubin and Grimes concurring.
Read the court’s decison…
Unlicensed Contractors Nabbed in Sting Operation
September 9, 2011 — CDJ Staff
The California State License Board charged sixteen people in the Fresno area with accepting contracting jobs without licenses. The Statewide Investigative Fraud Team of the CSLB set up a sting operation at a home in Clovis, California seeking bids on tree service, painting, and general contracting services. Those who bid for jobs at more than $500 are required under California law to be licensed. Unlicensed contractors can only work on jobs with a cost to the homeowner of less than $500 and must inform the homeowner that they are not licensed.
In addition to citing contractors for not possessing appropriate licenses, the CSLB also cited contractors for failure to carry workers compensation insurance and illegal advertising. Further, California law limits down payments to the lesser of ten percent or $1,000. Two contractors were cited for requesting excessive down payments.
One contractor, an unlicensed tree service contractor, had been cited previously in a sting operation. He failed to show up for his court date.
Read the full story…
Conspirators Bilked Homeowners in Nevada Construction Defect Claims
March 28, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Courthouse News has a summary of the current lawsuit over a Nevada conspiracy to defraud homeowners by taking control of homeowner boards and then providing inadequate repairs. Homeowners in eight Las Vegas area communities are involved in the suit, which claims that the conspirators purchased units in the communities and then transferred fractional interests to others to allow them to run for HOA board elections. The suit claims that David Amesbury and his firm helped manipulate the elections.
Once homeowner boards were controlled by the conspirators, Nancy Quon, the construction defect attorney whose recent death appears to be by suicide, handled the litigation against homebuilders. She would settle out of court, engaging Silver Lining Construction to “do very minor and superficial repairs” to the homes. The remainder of the money was split by the conspirators. The suit also notes that the construction defect claims were “frivolous,” and?in addition to the negative publicity?caused the homes to lose at least 5% of their value.
Read the full story…
Contractor Sues License Board
June 30, 2011 — CDJ Staff
Judge Kendall J. Newman of the US District Court handed down a decision on June 24 on the case of Kent v California Department of Consumer Affairs. Mr. Kent, appearing as his own counsel, had brought the suit against the California Department of Consumer Affairs and the Contractors State Licensing Board after he was arrested in a sting operation and, as the plaintiff put it, “was absurdly arrested and uncooperatively detained for a time longer than necessary or allowed by law under the false pretense of contracting with out a license.” Mr. Kent’s alleged that Rick Lopez, one of the defendants, formed him to read allow from the California Business and Professions Code. He said he was later handcuffed and placed in an uncomfortable chair, “enduring physical pain and emotional agony.”
Although Kent was given a Notice to Appear, he alleged that a further defendant, Stuart Rind, “closed the plaintiff’s case marked citation A7773 without giving written notice to anyone.” As a result, the Placer County District Attorney’s Office had no record of his Notice to Appear.
Kent alleged that subsequently his firm was essentially shut down for two years and that he was prevented from “legally contracting or selling services for any other contractor or qualifying for any other licensed capacity governed by the CSLB.” After this, the CSLB suspended the license for his firm, DSI Construction. He was assessed a $1,500 fine, after which he claims he sent a letter to the CSLB demanding money damages. The judge noted that the letter was not included in the plaintiff’s Ninth Amended Complaint.
Judge Kendall recommended that the plaintiff’s Complaints be dismissed, although he did allow that sixth, and perhaps the eighth and ninth, could be amended with a tenth amended complaint.
Read the court’s decision…
Micropiles for bad soil: a Tarheel victory
March 14, 2011 — Original article by by Melissa Brumback on March 14, 2011
Despite foundation challenges, construction is almost complete on the expansion at University of North Carolina’s Kenan stadium. The project started with a deep foundation system from design-build contractor GeoStructures. Known as the Carolina Student-Athlete Center for Excellence, the addition was built on a parcel with a knotty mix of fill soils, subsurface boulders and varying depths to rock. To achieve uniform foundation support, GeoStructures designed a Micropile system (also known as a Mini pile system) which could be drilled into the variable ground conditions.
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of Melissa Brumback of Ragsdale Liggett PLLC. Ms. Brumback can be contacted at mbrumback@rl law.com.
Counterpoint: Washington Supreme Court to Rule on Resulting Losses in Insurance Disputes
September 1, 2011 — Douglas Reiser, Builders Counsel
This is the fourth installment of posts on Vision One v. Philadelphia Indemnity, a Washington Supreme Court case touching on Washington construction and insurance law. After Williams v. Athletic Field got so much coverage, I wished that I had provided a forum for argument on Builders Counsel. While we await that opinion from the Supreme Court, I decided to let a few good writers have at Vision One here on the blog. Last week, attorney Chris Carr weighed in. Today, insurance expert David Thayer returns to give his final impression. David provided an initial peak at the case earlier this year. Thanks to both Chris and David for contributing to the debate.
In August 2011 the Washington Supreme Court will rule on a pair of joined cases that involve critical insurance coverage issues. The outcome of the ruling will impact a large swath of policyholders in Washington State including builders, developers, and homeowners to name a few.
The cases are Vision One vs. Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance and Sprague vs. Safeco. The Vision one case comes from Division Two of the Appellate Court which overturned a lower court decision in favor the plaintiff, Vision One. Division Two decided that the collapse of a concrete pour during the course of construction did not constitute a resulting loss due to faulty workmanship. They further went on to redefine efficient proximate cause in a way that is harmful to policyholders by broadening rather than narrowing the meaning of exclusionary language in Philadelphia’s Builders Risk Policy.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of Douglas Reiser of Reiser Legal LLC. Mr. Reiser can be contacted at info@reiserlegal.com
California Posts Nation’s Largest Gain in Construction Jobs
March 28, 2012 — CDJ Staff
California added about 8,900 construction jobs in January, 2012, as compared to December, 2011, leading the nation in the number of added construction jobs. Thirty-four other states also saw added construction jobs. A year prior, only twenty-eight states added construction jobs. The Associated General Contractors of America analyzed the monthly report from the Labor Department. Ken Simonson, the chief economist for the Associated General Contractors of America noted that “the gains this January partly reflect very mild weather this winter and exceptionally cold and snowy conditions a year before.”
Read the full story…
Insurers Reacting to Massachusetts Tornadoes
August 11, 2011 — CDJ Staff
The Patriot-Ledger reports that insurers could pay out as much as $200 million to cover homes damaged or destroyed in the tornadoes that hit central and southern Massachusetts in June, 2011. Joseph Murphy, Commissioner of the State Division of Insurance didn?t foresee problems with insurers covering these claims. “At this point, there doesn’t seem to be any one company overexposed in that area,” he told the Patriot-Ledger.
Insurance executives did not think the tornadoes would cause them to raise rates. Steve Chevalier, CEO of NLC Companies, said, “it’s a major event for those impacted by it, but it’s not close to a financial hit to us.”
One insurer noted that the winter weather generated more claims; however the cumulative value of those claims was $15 million.
Read the full story…
Pier Fire Started by Welders
August 2, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Welders working on Pier 29 in San Francisco were preparing the building for the America’s Cup sailing race. Instead, they accidentally caused $2.4 million in damages. Mindy Talmadge, a fire department spokesperson, attributed the fire to crews welding a latter to a wall. According to Talmadge, a spark entered a crack in the concrete wall and “the wood on the building underneath was really dry.” It took firefighters more than two hours to extinguish the blaze.
Read the full story…
The Ever-Growing Thicket Of California Civil Code Section 2782
January 6, 2012 — Michael D. Worthing, Borton Petrini
California Civil Code section 2782 imposes limits on indemnity and defense provisions in construction contracts. Since the initial adoption of S.B. 8001 in 2002 (eff. January 1, 2003) section 27822 has been revised several times, and legislative history suggests that interest groups representing builders, developers and sub-contractors, as well as the insurance industry, have seen legislative action on these indemnity and defense issues as part of the overall response to the same economic pressures resulting from construction defect litigation that gave rise to S.B. 800. Amendments in 2005, 2007, 2008 and 2011 (each effective January 1 of the following year) have increasingly entangled the provisions of Section 2782 with various provisions of S.B. 800. The application of section 2782 to construction contracts, and in particular contracts between developer-builders and subcontractors, executed after January 1, 2006, will require a concurrent reading and understanding of S.B. 800, the application of which is itself still in flux.
The time a construction contract was executed will likely determine which version of section 2782, read in connection with provisions of S.B.800, is applicable. Because of the nature of construction defect litigation, the determination of relative rights and liabilities of developer-builders vis-à-vis subcontractors under construction contracts does not become the subject of litigation, and legal and judicial interpretation, until years after the contracts were entered and work performed. As of the date this article is submitted, there has been no case law interpreting or applying any of the post S.B. 800 amendments, in part, and perhaps primarily, because litigation arising from construction contracts executed after January 1, 2006, has not yet reached the appellate courts.
SECTION 2782 AT THE TIME S.B. 800 WAS ENACTED
Section 2782 was originally enacted in 1967 and amended several times to the version in effect when S.B. 800 became law, at which time the section was relatively simple and straightforward. It then consisted of two subdivisions, which have essentially remained unchanged until the most recent amendment during the 2011 legislative session.
Section 2782 (a) prohibited, and still prohibits, provisions in construction contracts that “purport to indemnify the promisee against liability for damages for death or bodily injury to persons, injury to property, or any other loss, damage or expense arising from the sole negligence or willful misconduct of the promise.” This provision essentially prohibits what had been referred to as so-called Type I or “specific” indemnity provisions. In such agreements, the indemnitor [the promisor, that is, the person or entity indemnifying] will indemnify the indemnitee [the promisee, that is, the person or entity being protected by the indemnity] for the indemnitee’s own negligence, whether active or passive, whether the indemnitee is solely negligent or concurrently negligent with the indemnitor. (See, MacDonald & Kruse, Inc. v. San Jose Steel Co. (1972) 29 Cal.App.3d 413, 419.)3 Section 2782 (a) has remained essentially intact since the enactment of S.B. 800. It still must be considered and applied to interpret a construction contract. Generally, it will apply to contracts not involving a public agency; the next part of section 2782 specifically governs such contracts.
The second subdivision prohibits provisions in any construction contract with a public agency which purport to impose on the contractor, or relieve the public agency from, liability for the active negligence of the public agency. Subdivision (b) has been revised by the 2011 amendment, discussed below. If a construction contract with the public agency is for residential construction, the standards of S.B. 800 likely apply.4
This was the extent of section 2782 on January 1, 2003, when S.B. 800 went into effect, and remained so until January 1, 2006. This version will govern interpretation and application of indemnity and defense provisions in construction contracts executed before January 1, 2006.5
2005 AMENDMENT
The first “post S.B. 800” change to Section 2782 was in enacted in 2005, effective January 1, 2006, and added two new sections. Subdivision (c) stated (in somewhat greater detail than paraphrased here) that for residential construction contracts, or amendments thereto, entered into after January 1, 2006, a subcontractor cannot be required to indemnify (including the cost to defend) a builder for construction defects that arise out of negligence or design defects of the builder or other independent contractors, or that do not arise out of the scope of the subcontractor=s scope of work. The term “residential construction” was defined by reference to S.B.800 generally, and the term “builder” was defined by reference to section 911 (a part of S.B. 800), for the first time expressly connecting provisions of section 2782 to S.B. 800. Contractual provisions not expressly prohibited were reserved to the agreement of the parties.
What subdivision (c) took away was partially given back by subdivision (d). It stated that “subdivision (c) does not prohibit a subcontractor and builder from mutually agreeing to the timing or immediacy of the defense and provisions for reimbursement of defense fees and costs, so long as that agreement, upon final resolution of the claims, does not waive or modify the provisions of subdivision (c).”6 In addition, it stated that this subdivision (c) did not affect the obligations of an insurance carrier under Presley Homes, Inc. v. American States Insurance Company (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 571, which holds that where an insurer has a duty to defend a developer pursuant to an additional insured endorsement obtained under a subcontractor’s policy, that duty generally applies to the entire action, even if the suit involves both covered and uncovered claims, or a single claim only partially covered by the policy. Finally, subdivision (d) stated that the amendment did not affect the builder’s or subcontractor’s obligations under S.B. 800. Both of these latter provisions, relating to the Presley Homes case, and obligations under S.B. 800, have been carried forward essentially intact in subsequent amendments of section 2782.
This version of section 2782 will be applicable to any contract between a builder as defined by section 911 (see fn. 4, above) and a subcontractor executed between January 1, 2006, and December 31, 2008. Thus, a general contractor, etc., who is not a builder is not subject to the provisions added by the 2005 amendment; this changed with the next amendment.
It is not clear whether this version would apply to a contract entered before January 1, 2006, but amended after that date. Subdivision (c) applies to “all construction contracts, and amendments thereto, entered into after January 1, 2006, for residential construction.” It would seem that the clearest and most logical construction would apply it only to contracts originally made after January 1, 2006, and thereafter amended, but there has been no judicial determination of this issue.
In addition, logically it would seem that this version of section 2782 should be applicable to construction contracts for residential construction between a builder and a subcontractor, entered between January 1, 2006, and December 31, 2008; however, legislative history relating to the 2008 amendment discussed below suggests a different result might occur.
2007 AMENDMENT
The second “post S.B. 800” amendment in 2007 (effective January 1, 2008), added subdivisions (e)(1) and (e)(2).
Subdivision (e)(1) added general contractors and subcontractors not affiliated with the builder and imposed essentially the same restrictions on provisions to indemnify, including the cost to defend, them as had been imposed on the “builder” by the 2005 amendment. The amendment refers to section 911 (b), again part of S.B. 800, to define general contractors, etc., not affiliated with the builder.
Subdivision (e)(1) essentially repeated the provisions of subdivision (d) permitting agreement to the timing and immediacy of the defense, the reference to the Presley Homes case, and the general contractor’s or subcontractor’s obligations under S.B. 800.
It appears this amendment was an attempt to harmonize the new restrictions on indemnity and defense provisions with S.B. 800. The 2005 amendment, whether by oversight or intent, covered only builders and not general contractors, although both classes are subject to the provisions of S.B. 800; the 2007 amendment added non-builder-affiliated general contractors.
Again, logically, it would seem that this version of section 2782 should be applicable to construction contracts for residential construction between a general contractor or contractor not affiliated with a builder and a subcontractor, entered between January 1 and December 31, 2008; however, legislative history relating to the 2008 amendment discussed below suggests a different result might occur. The same potential uncertainty regarding applicability to a contract entered before January 1, 2008, but amended after that date, exists for this provision as for the prior amendment, discussed above.
2008 AMENDMENT
The third “post S.B. 800” amendment in 2008 (effective January 1, 2009), reorganized the language relating to prohibited indemnity provisions, added a reference to insurance in that same prohibition, extensively rewrote the provisions governing agreements relating to the timing or immediacy of defense, added language preserving equitable indemnity claims, and added language defining “construction defect” by reference to the standards set forth in S.B. 800.
Subdivisions (a) and (b) remained unchanged.
Subdivision (c) now made a combined reference to builders (again by reference to section 911), as well as general contractors or contractors not affiliated with the builder (again by reference to section 911 (b)), rather than dealing with the two groups in separate but nearly identical subdivisions as previously. It otherwise restated the same limitations that were previously set forth separately in subdivisions (c) and (e), as well as the reference to the Presley Homes case, and the general contractor’s or subcontractor’s obligations under S.B. 800, but with one important addition. The word “insure” was added to the description of prohibited provisions, to-wit: “provisions? that purport to insure or indemnify, including the cost to defend, the builder, [etc.]? are unenforceable” to the extent they arise out of claims of the type previously described.
It is unclear what impact the addition of this single word “insure” will have; and, it will have to be read in light of the preservation of the language that it shall not affect the obligations of an insurance carrier under the holding of the Presley Homes case. Suppose a carrier had issued an additional insured endorsement under which it would otherwise be required to defend a builder or general contractor consistent with the Presley Homes rule: would this newly added single word (restricting the construction contract, to which the carrier is not a party) give the carrier a basis for denying coverage under the insurance contract? Or would the continued inclusion of the express language that it does not affect the obligations of an insurance carrier under Presley Homes control? That is surely an issue that will have to be worked out by the courts.
The new subdivision (d) addressed defense obligations. Again it permitted parties to agree to the timing and immediacy of the defense and provision for reimbursement of defense fees and costs, but imposed a very detailed scheme that appears to limit the extent of such agreement. A subcontractor owes no defense or indemnity obligation until the builder or general contractor provides a written tender of the claim, which has the same force and effect as notice of commencement of a legal proceeding. Upon that tender the subcontractor shall elect to follow one of two ways of performing: subdivision (d) (1) permits the subcontractor to defend with counsel of its choice and to control the defense, if the subcontractor gives written notice of this election within a reasonable time after receipt of the written tender and in no event later than 90 days following that receipt; subdivision (d) (2) provides an alternative by which the subcontractor pays a reasonable allocated share of the builder’s or general contractor’s defense fees and costs within 30 days of receipt of an invoice, subject to reallocation upon final resolution of the claim by settlement or judgment. Subdivision (e) sets forth remedies available to the builder or general contractor if a subcontractor fails to timely and adequately perform its obligations under either of the two alternatives in subdivision (d), including compensatory and consequential damages, reasonable attorneys’ fees in connection with the first alternative, and interest on defense and indemnity costs in connection with the second alternative. Subdivision (e) ends with provisions relating to reallocation of defense costs, and damages for failure to reallocate.
Application of these requirements in actual litigation is likely to be cumbersome and potentially fraught with conflicts. If retained pursuant to subdivision (d) (1) does the attorney represent the builder, the subcontractor, or both? To whom does the attorney owe his or her fiduciary duty? Can an appropriate informed written consent be formulated, for example, under Rule 3-310 of the California Rules of Professional Conduct, or Rule 1.7, ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct? Could an attorney retained by a subcontractor blame the subcontractor if that is in the developer’s best interests? If multiple subcontractors elect to defend directly, how would the defense be coordinated among the potentially multiple attorneys so retained? Would an attorney retained by one subcontractor be able, or inclined, to blame another subcontractor who also chose to defend directly, in other words, what would prevent inconsistent defense positions amongst the various counsel retained by subcontractors for the developer? There may be solutions to such practical and professional considerations but it seems an ethical thicket awaits any attorney involved in such circumstances.
Subdivision (e) and (f) preserve equitable indemnity claims for the builder, general contractor or subcontractor, the first in general, the second as against any supplier, design profession, or product manufacturer. Finally, the 2008 amendment added for the first time, in subdivision (h), language defining "construction defect" as used in section 2782 as a violation of standards set forth in S.B. 800.
The inclusion of these last three subsections would seem to work against simplification of litigation. A builder or general contractor is likely to allege a claim for equitable indemnity against any and all subcontractors in addition to claims for contractual indemnity and defense (however limited by the other provisions of section 2782). Nothing in the section suggests the subcontractor should, or even can, somehow take on the representation of the builder, etc., in connection with a claim of equitable indemnity back against the subcontractor.
And the limited definition of “construction defect” in subdivision (h) appears to raise an issue of the applicability of the limitations set forth in subdivision (c). Although there is a school of thought that section 941 limits residential construction defect claims only to breach of the performance standards under S.B. 800, it is still common for CD complaints to plead other legal theories, e.g., breach of contract, breach of warranty, negligence, etc., in addition to violation of S.B. 800 standards. With the addition of subdivision (h) it is arguable that the restrictions on indemnity and defense provisions spelled out in subdivisions (c) and (d), both of which relate to claims for residential construction defects, are applicable only to claims for violation of S.B. 800 standards, and not other residential construction defect claims. In other words, a developer might conceivably still be entitled to a broader scope of indemnity and concomitant defense for other types of claims, such as breach of contract, breach of warranty, negligence, etc., so long as the indemnity does not violate the limitation of subdivision (a) against Type I indemnity, which as noted above, has remained intact through these revisions.
Finally, it would seem that this version of section 2782 should be applicable to contracts executed between builders, general contractors, etc., on the one hand and subcontractors on the other hand on and after January 1, 2009. And, as noted above in connection with the 2005 and 2007 amendments, logic would suggest that those versions would ordinarily apply to contracts executed during the time periods mentioned above. But, the Legislative Counsel’s Digest for the 2008 amendment as it finally was enacted into law includes the following statements:
This bill would delete the provisions applicable to construction contracts entered into on or after January 1, 2008, that purport to indemnify the general contractor or contractor not affiliated with the builder. The bill would revise the provisions applicable to contracts entered into after January 1, 2006, to instead apply to contracts entered into after January 1, 2009, and to apply to agreements that purport to insure or indemnify the builder or the general contractor or contractor not affiliated with the builder, as described.
Although it seems a startling result, this legislative history suggests an argument can be made that the 2008 amendment retroactively nullified the effect of the 2005 and 2007 amendments, so that contracts executed from January 1, 2006, as to builders or January 1, 2008, for general contractors, etc., through December 31, 2008, are still governed by the provisions of section 2782 as it was on the books prior to the first post-S.B. 800 amendment in 2005.
2011 AMENDMENT
Section 2782 has been amended yet again in the 2011 session of the California Legislature, effective January 1, 2012; however, the substantive changes affect certain contracts entered on or after January 1, 2013. All of the provisions contained in the 2008 amendment have been carried forward in the most recent amendment, although re-numbered: (c) became (d), etc., through (h) becoming (i). So, the law governing construction contracts entered into after January 1, 2009, for residential construction, as between a builder, or a general contractor, etc., not affiliated with a builder, and regarding insurance, indemnity or defense relating to claims for construction defects, remains the same as in the 2008 amendment.
As noted above the substantive changes to section 2782 all affect contracts entered into on or after January 1, 2013. Subdivision (b) has been amended such that any provision in a contract with a public agency that purports to impose on any contractor, etc., or relieve the public agency from, liability for the active negligence of the public agency will be void and unenforceable. A new subdivision (c) has been added that imposes a similar restriction on construction contracts with the owner of privately owned real property to be improved and as to which the owner is not acting as a contractor or supplier of materials or equipment to the work. This new restriction in subdivision (c) does not apply to a homeowner performing a home improvement project on his or her own single family dwelling.
The 2011 bill amending section 2782 also added a new section 2782.05, which will make void and unenforceable any provision in any construction contract (again, entered on or after January 1, 2013) that purports to insure or indemnify, including the cost to defend, a general contractor, construction manager, or other subcontractor, by a subcontractor for claims that arise out of the active negligence or willful misconduct of the general contractor, etc., or other independent contractors, etc., or to the extent the claims do not arise out of the scope of work of the subcontractor. However, the section also includes a long list of situations to which it does not apply, including all of those covered by section 2782 (residential construction subject to S.B. 800, public agency contracts subject to section 2782 (b), and direct contracts with private property owners subject to the new section 2782 (c)) as well as eight other categories. This apparently is intended to serve as a “catch-all” to extend a limitation on indemnity agreements to all construction contracts not previously swept into this widening legislative scheme, although the exact phrasing is slightly different.7
The new section 2782.05 then permits a mutual agreement to the timing or immediacy of a defense under a scheme essentially identical to that imposed in the 2008 amendment to section 2782: defend with counsel of choice, and maintain control of the defense; or, pay a reasonable allocated share of defense fees and costs. The same logistical and ethical difficulties presented by the 2008 scheme discussed above would likely be present in cases that fall under the new section 2782.05.
CONCLUSION
The California Legislature has been revising section 2782 since shortly after the adoption of S.B. 800. Each revision has been more complicated than the last, and each has tied certain provisions of section 2782 more closely to S.B. 800. In particular, with regard to construction defect claims relating to residential dwellings which are subject to S.B. 800, the Legislature has apparently attempted to exercise more and more control over the scope of allowable indemnity and dictated a very narrow scheme to govern how the defense obligation arising from a contractual indemnity is to be implemented. It seems likely that any attempt to manage the defense of a construction defect case under the options that allow a subcontractor to defend directly and control the defense will create a logistical problem and an ethical difficulty for any attorney attempting to defend a developer at the behest and direction of a subcontractor. Finally, as set forth in the current version of section 2782 relating to contractual indemnity and defense of S.B. 800 type cases (subdivisions (c) through (h) in the 2008 version, now subdivisions (d) through (i) in the 2011 amendment), the Legislature has apparently narrowed the application to only claims of violation of S.B. 800 standards. This may have, in essence, removed the restrictions on indemnity and defense provisions as they relate to other theories pleaded against developers in construction defense cases, e.g., breach of contract, breach of warranty, negligence, and the like. It is not at all clear that the Legislature has accomplished what it set out do accomplish. Rather, the law may have come full circle back to where it began, except for one legal theory, i.e. violation of S.B. 800 standards, currently being used in residential construction defect cases. For any other legal theory the limitation of section 2782 (a) may be solely controlling.
- California Civil Code section 43.99, and sections 895 to 945.5.
- All statutory references in this article are to the California Civil Code unless otherwise specified.
- Type I or specific indemnity does not exactly match the scope of proscribed indemnity as described in section 2782 (a) but it is the closest. More recent case law in California has eschewed a mechanical application of the MacDonald & Kruse typology in favor of examining the precise text of the actual contract (See, e.g., St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Frontier Pacific Ins. Co. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1234, 1246, n. 6) but some recent cases still use the Type I, II and II classifications. And, an understanding of that “historical” typology is useful as an aid to evaluating and understanding express indemnity in general.
- The provisions of S.B. 800 other than the prelitigation procedures of sections 910 through 938 apply to general contractors, subcontractors, etc., pursuant to section 936. The prelitigation procedures generally involve a “builder,” which is specifically defined in section 911 (a) by reference to entities or individuals in the business of selling residential units to the public or of building, developing, or constructing residential units for public purchase. Pursuant to section 911 (b) the term builder does not include general contractors, etc., not affiliated with the builder. Thus, a general contractor who constructs residential housing pursuant to a contract with a public agency is still subject to claims for violation of the standards set forth in sections 896 and 897, resulting from its negligent act or omission or breach of contract, pursuant to section 936.
- As noted above, there has been no case law yet interpreting any of the “post S.B. 800” changes to Section 2782. One of the most important legal decisions relating to express indemnity and defense obligations and rights between developer-builders and sub-contractors was published after two of the amendments but based upon contracts executed and the language of section 2782 prior to January 1, 2006. (See, Crawford v. Weather Shield Mfg., Inc. (2008) 44 Cal.4th 541, 547, 566-67, fn. 14).
- Subcontractor dissatisfaction with the perceived inadequacy of protection afforded by this provision apparently became the impetus for a 2008 amendment to section 2782, discussed below, at least based upon the numerous (form) letters submitted to legislators in connection therewith.
- Section 2782 (a), where we started, and which has continued without change, prohibits indemnity for claims arising out of the sole negligence or willful misconduct of the promisee; sole negligence can be either active or passive. The various versions relating to residential construction prohibit indemnity for the negligence of the builder, etc., suggesting there is no express contractual indemnity for the negligence of the subcontractor if the builder, etc., is at all negligent. This is tempered a bit by the preservation of the right to equitable indemnity, which will now be found in section 2782 (g) and (h).
Courtesy of Michael D. Worthing of Borton Petrini, LLP. Mr. Worthing can be contacted at mworthing@bortonpetrini.com.
Demand for Urban Living Leads to Austin Building Boom
August 16, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The New York Times reports that Austin is undergoing a building boom as a high-tech firms, including Facebook and Google, have moved into the downtown area. With them, comes a need for more apartment buildings and more retail space. Mike Kennedy, the president and chief executive of an Austin real estate firm, told the Times “the office space was here, the housing came, and retail is arriving last to the scene.” Currently, two large projects that will add about 500 apartment units is underway, including a 222-unit, 18-story building, and another that will contain 277 units. Apartment occupancy in Austin is at ninety-seven percent.
Developers also have hotels and more office space planned. The area has about 6,000 hotel rooms with an additional 2,000 planned, but events in Austin can bring in more people than the city’s 30,000 hotel rooms can accommodate. Office space is eighty-eight percent occupied, and a lack of office space could cause firms to look elsewhere.
Read the full story…
The Montrose Language Interpreted: How Many Policies Are Implicated By A Construction Defect That Later Causes a Flood?
March 17, 2011 — By Shaun McParland Baldwin, March 17, 2011
The Court of Appeals of Indiana recently addressed the “Montrose” language added to the CGL ISO form in 2001 in the context of a construction defect claim where a fractured storm drain caused significant flooding a year after the drain was damaged. The insuring agreement requires that “bodily injury or “property damage” be caused by an occurrence and that the “bodily injury or “property damage” occur during the policy period. The Montrose language adds that the insurance applies only if, prior to the policy period, no insured knew that the “bodily injury or “property damage” had occurred in whole or in part. Significantly, it also states that any “bodily injury” or “property damage” which occurs during the policy period and was not, prior to the policy period known to have occurred, includes a continuation, change or resumption of that “bodily injury” or “property damage” after the end of the policy period.
In Grange Mutual Cas. Co. v. West Bend Mut. Ins. Co., No. 29D04-0706-PL-1112 (Ct. App. IN March 15, 2011), http://www.ai.org/judiciary/opinions/pdf/03151109ehf.pdf, Sullivan was the General Contractor for a school construction project. Its subcontractor, McCurdy, installed the storm drain pipes. One of the storm pipes was fractured in 2005 while McCurdy was doing its installation work. More than a year later, the school experienced significant water damage due to flooding. It was later discovered that the flooding was due to the fractured storm drain. Sullivanrsquo;s insurer paid $146,403 for the water damage. That insurer brought a subrogation claim against McCurdy and its two insurers: West Bend and Grange. West Bend had issued CGL coverage to McCurdy while the construction was ongoing, including the date in which the storm pipe was fractured. Grange issued CGL coverage to McCurdy at the time of the flooding. Those two carriers jointly settled the subrogation claim and then litigated which insurer actually owed coverage for the loss. Significantly, the loss that was paid included only damages from the flooding, not any damages for the cost of repairing the pipe.
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Reprinted courtesy of Shaun McParland Baldwin of Tressler LLP. Ms Baldwin can be contacted at sbaldwin@tresslerllp.com
Federal District Court Predicts Florida Will Adopt Injury In Fact Trigger
October 23, 2012 — Tred Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
The U. S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida was confronted with determining whether Florida would follow the manifestation or injury in fact trigger in Axis Surplus Ins. Co. v. Contravest Constr. Co., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104502 (D. Fla. June 5, 2012).
The homeowner's association sued the insureds for alleged negligent construction and development of individual dwelling units and common areas of their condominium. Due to this negligence, severe damage was caused by water intrusion. The Association's members only became aware of the defects through the retention of construction experts.
The insured had CGL coverage with Axis, with policies issued from 2003 to 2007. Coverage was denied for the periods 2003-2004 and 2004-2005. Axis provided a defense under the policies issued for 2005-2006 and 2006-2007, but under a reservation of rights. Axis sought a declaration that it had no duty to defend or indemnify because the damage manifested before its policy periods.
For coverage to exist, "property damage" must have "occurred" during Axis' policy period.
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
A Lien Might Just Save Your Small Construction Business
April 4, 2011 — Douglas Reiser in the Builders Counsel Blog
Many owners incorrectly believe that payment to the general contractor gets the owner off the hook for payment to subcontractors and suppliers. This assumption sometimes fosters the irresponsible owner, who fails to ensure that everyone is getting paid. Fortunately for those contractors further down the contracting chain, this assumption is incorrect.
Suppliers and subcontractors can file a lien to secure payment for their labor and materials. A filing party must offer proper notice (if applicable) and file an adequate and timely lien in the County where the work is performed. You can read our earlier posts on these topics by following this link.
A lien notice and a lien put an owner on notice that your business has provided labor and/or materials for the improvement of the owner’s property (See RCW 60.04.031 for more info). If the owner fails to take care to ensure that your business is paid the law mandates that the owner may have to pay twice.
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Reprinted courtesy of Douglas Reiser of Reiser Legal LLC. Mr. Reiser can be contacted at info@reiserlegal.com
After $15 Million Settlement, Association Gets $7.7 Million From Additional Subcontractor
November 7, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The stucco subcontractor for a condominium complex did not join in with the other defendants in a settlement of more than $15 million, preferring to take the case to a jury trial. That jury has found the stucco installer liable for $7.7 million to make repairs. Mark Wiechnik of Herrick Feinstein LLP wrote about the case on the Lexology web site. Mr. Wiechnik notes that the jury was shown “samples of rotted wood taken from the property as well as numerous pictures of damage resulting from the various defects.”
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New Jersey Court Rules on Statue of Repose Case
May 26, 2011 — CDJ Staff
A three-judge panel issued a per curium ruling on May 23 in Fairview Heights Condo. v. Investors (N.J. Super., 2011), a case which the members of a condominium board argued: “that the judge erred by: 1) dismissing plaintiff’s claims against RLI based upon the statute of repose; 2) dismissing the breach of fiduciary duty claims against the Luppinos based upon a lack of expert opinion; 3) barring the testimony of Gonzalez; and 4) barring the May 23, 1989 job site report.” The court rejected all claims from the condominium board.
The court found that the building must be unsafe for the statute of repose to apply. They noted, “the judge made no findings on whether the water seepage, or the property damage caused by such seepage, in any way rendered the building, or any of the units, unsafe.” Further, “without a specific finding on the question of whether the defects had rendered the building ‘unsafe,’ defendants were not entitled to the benefit of the ten-year statute of repose.“
On the second point, the court also upheld the lower court’s findings regarding the management company:
“The report submitted by Berman establishes that the EIFS product was defective in its design and would therefore have failed from the outset. The defects in that product were, according to Berman, not prone to repair or other mitigation. Therefore, even if defendants did not appropriately inspect or repair the EIFS, their failure to do so would have had no impact on the long-term performance of the EIFS exterior cladding. As plaintiff failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact on these questions, the judge properly granted summary judgment to the Luppinos on plaintiff’s breach of fiduciary duty claim.”
On the final two points, the judges noted “plaintiff maintains that the judge committed reversible error when he excluded the Gonzalez certification and the 1989 job site report prepared by Raymond Brzuchalski.” They saw “no abuse of discretion related to the exclusion of the Gonzalez certification, and reject plaintiff’s arguments to the contrary.” Of the job site report, they found, “no abuse of discretion in the judge's finding that the Brzuchalski 1989 job site report did not satisfy the requirements of N.J.R.E.803(c)(6).”
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The King of Construction Defect Scams
June 19, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Echoing Businessweek, the Las Vegas Sun agrees that the Nevada HOA scandal is the “king of all Vegas real estate scams,” and says that the Nevada legislatures should take action. The Sun notes that the case involves only 12 out of 2,356 HOAs in Southern Nevada.
To date, 25 people have plead guilty in the case. At the center were an attorney and contractor who allegedly referred work to each other. To enable this, they assembled a wider conspiracy of people who enriched by the process. In the words of the Sun, those involved “upended the concept of a ‘common interest’ community.”
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More Charges in Las Vegas HOA Construction Defect Scam
May 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
VegasInc.com reports that U.S. District Judge James Mahan has unsealed fourteen more criminal cases in the ongoing Las Vegas HOA corruption probe. One of the fourteen is Lisa Kim, whose Platinum Community Services managed communities in which Nancy Quon and Leon Benzer were involved.
Two attorneys were also named. Brian Jones had previously been named in civil litigation as working to rig HOA elections in favor of the straw buyers. Jeanne Winkler had done legal work for one of the communities and for the developer before her disbarment.
Eight of the names released were of alleged straw buyers. These individuals are said to have bought fractional shares of homes so they could stand for election on the HOA boards. One of the individuals named, Arnold Meyers, had sued the Jasmine Homeowners Association, claiming that their HOA elections were tainted. Myers claimed that homeowners received postcards stating that he did not own his condo. His suit was dropped after two homeowners claimed that their names had been forged on Meyer’s affidavits.
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