Manhattan Developer Breaks Ground on $520 Million Project
November 18, 2011 — CDJ Staff
Rebuilding an area of Midtown West that has been condemned for decades, the Gotham Organization has broken ground on a 1,200-unit project that will include housing for a variety of household incomes and a school. One unit of the project will be affordable housing for families of annual incomes up to $40,000. Another will be for middle-income households. Additionally, there will be a 31-story tower with 550 luxury units.
The site CityBiz quotes Mayor Michael Bloomberg, as saying that the project “will grow our economy by creating 2,900 construction-related jobs.” The president of the Gotham Organization, David L. Picket notes that it will “create hundreds of new jobs, generate millions of dollars in revenue for the construction industry, contribute towards the building of a new primary, and provide homes to thousands of New Yorkers.”
Read the full story…
Exclusions Bar Coverage for Damage Caused by Chinese Drywall
July 5, 2011 —
Tred R. Eyerly,
Insurance Law HawaiiThe insured homeowners were unsuccessful in arguing around the policy's exclusions when seeking coverage for damage caused by Chinese drywall. Ross v. C. Adams. Constr. & Design, L.L.C., 2011 La. App. LEXIS 769 (La. Ct. App. June 14, 2011).
Before the insureds purchased and moved into their home, it was renovated. After moving in, the insures discovered foreign gypsum drywall, or Chinese drywall. The insureds submitted a claim to Louisiana Citizens Property Insurance Company. In an investigation, the insurer confirmed the presence of Chinese drywall and damage to the metal surfaces caused by corrosion. Louisiana Citizens refused coverage and the insureds sued. The trial court denied the insured's motion for summary judgment and granted summary judgment to Louisiana Citizens.
The court of appeal affirmed. Initially, the court determined the insureds sustained a direct physical loss. The inherent qualities of the Chinese drywall created a physical loss to the home and required that the drywall be removed and replaced.
Four exclusions, however, barred coverage. First, damages due to faulty or defective materials were excluded from coverage. The Chinese drywall emitted high levels of sulfuric gas which caused the damage to the insured's plumbing, electrical wiring and metal components.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
After Breaching its Duty to Defend, Insurer Must Indemnify
August 11, 2011 — Tred Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
In a brief decision analyzing Oregon law, the Ninth Circuit determined that once an insurer breaches its duty to defend, it must indemnify. See Desrosiers v. Hudson Speciality Ins. Co., 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 12591 (9th CIr. June 21, 2011).
The victim secured a judgment against the insured after he was beaten by another patron outside the insured's bar. Hudson Speciality Insurance refused to defend the insured, claiming the injury arose from an assault and battery, which excluded coverage.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
Construction Defect Case Not Over, Despite Summary Judgment
November 7, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The Supreme Court of Oregon has concluded in an en banc decision that a motion to reconsider a summary judgment is not a motion for a new trial. In coming to their conclusion the court overturned an earlier Oregon Supreme Court case, Carter v. U.S. National Bank. Although the decision does not bear on construction defects, the underlying case did. Due to the decision, these claims can now be evaluated in a trial.
The case, Association of Unit Owners of Timbercrest Condominiums v. Warren, came about after an apartment complex was converted into condominium units. The developers hired Big Al’s Construction for some of the remodeling work. The condominium association later sued the developer and the contractor over claims of construction defects. The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, which the court granted.
But that wasn’t the end of things. The plaintiff soon filed a “motion to reconsider,” noting that the summary judgment seemed to be in conflict with both law and other recent rulings, and additionally, the grounds for the decision were not in the order. The judge then notified the parties that the court had “pulled the trigger too quickly” and had seven questions for the parties to answer.
The court dismissed all claims against the defendants. The defendants filed their responses, objecting that that “‘there is no such thing’ as a motion for reconsideration.” Further, while “the rules do allow for post-judgment review of pre-judgment rulings through a motion for a new trial,” the plaintiffs had not filed for a new trial. But did they need one? They did file an appeal.
The judge in the case admitted that there was no such thing as a motion to reconsider, and felt bad about prematurely signing the judgment. The case was sent to the Court of Appeals to determine if the motion to reconsider was a request for a new trial. The Court of Appeals concurred.
In reviewing the decision, the Oregon Supreme Court concluded that there were a maximum of three questions to address. Was the motion for reconsideration a motion for a new trial? If so, was the later notice of appeal premature? And if so, was the plaintiff required to file a new appeal? The court determined that the answer to the first question was no.
Prior decisions pointed to the conclusion “that a motion for reconsideration of a summary judgment amounts to a motion for a new trial,” but here the court concluded that “our prior cases erred,” and turned to the summary judgment rule for clarification. The court noted that “the rule contemplates that summary judgment and trial are separate and distinct events.” With this conclusion, the Oregon Supreme Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings.
Read the court’s decision…
After Katrina Came Homes that Could Withstand Isaac
October 23, 2012 — CDJ Staff
In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, Louisiana adopted its first uniform building code. Under the new standards, homes are better able to withstand the winds generated by hurricanes. The owner of one home said that during Hurricane Isaac, “there’s no shaking of the building itself, there’s no sign of a storm except for the rain.”
WWWLTV reports that the new standards require home to be able to withstand 130 mile per hour winds. They also must follow FEMA guidelines for elevation. Build Now, a non-profit organization, is seeking to build green homes that meet the new standards. Their executive director said “we’re building higher. We’re building stronger. We’re building greener.”
Read the full story…
South Carolina Legislature Redefining Occurrences to Include Construction Defects in CGL Policies
April 1, 2011 — April 1, 2011 Beverley BevenFlorez - Construction Defect Journal
The question of what circumstances must be in place for construction defects to be covered in a general commercial liability (CGL) policies is being raised by the courts and the legislature in South Carolina. The Insurance Journal reports that the American Insurance Association as well as the Property and Casualty Insurers Association of America are speaking out on the issue.
The problem seems to be centered on what defines an “occurrence.” CGL policies were not meant to cover faulty workmanship, according to the filing by the South Carolina Supreme Court. In January of this year, the South Carolina Supreme Court reversed the ruling in Crossmann Communities v Harleysville Mutual declaring that “Respondents cannot show the damage here was the result of an occurrence. Rather, the damage was a direct result and the natural and expected consequence of faulty workmanship; faulty workmanship did not cause an occurrence resulting in damage.” They focused their attention on the word “accident,” stating that there is a fortuity element that is not diminished.
The South Carolina legislature reacted by producing a bill that would add new language directly negating the ruling by the Supreme Court. The South Carolina bill S-431 would change the definition of an occurrence in regards to construction defects as follows: “For a liability insurance policy issued to a construction professional, an ‘occurrence’ means, at a minimum: (1) an accident; or (2) continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful condition or substance. No additional requirement of a fortuitous event is needed to constitute an ‘occurrence.’”
S-431 is currently residing in the House Committee on Labor, Commerce and Industry.
Read the full story...
Summary Judgment in Construction Defect Case Cannot Be Overturned While Facts Are Still in Contention in Related Cases
September 9, 2011 — CDJ Staff
The Alabama Court of Civil Appeals has dismissed an appeal of a summary judgment in the case Bella Investments, Inc. v. Multi Family Services, Inc. MFS was hired by Bella to be the general contractor for a hotel in Gardendale, Alabama. MFS hired various subcontractors, including the architect for the project. After completion of the hotel in April, 2006, Bella made requests for MFS to repair cracked floor tiles.
In August, 2008, Bella sued MFS, the architect, and various fictitiously named defendants. Subsequently, Bella amended its complaint, naming some of the fictitiously named defendants.
MFS in turn claimed that Bella’s claims were void under the statute of limitations and that Bella was in beach of contact by failing to pay MFS the full amount owed. MFS moved for summary judgment under the statute of limitations, which was granted by the court.
Bella requested that the court “alter, amend, or vacate its summary judgment order.” When this was denied, Bella appealed to the Alabama Supreme Court, which transferred the appeal to the Court of Civil Appeals. The Court of Appeals refused to vacate the summary judgment as claims that form part of the case against MFS are also part of Bella’s claims against the other defendants. For this reason, the court upheld the summary judgment.
Read the court’s decision…
Lockton Expands Construction and Design Team
July 19, 2011 — CDJ Staff
Lockton Companies, LLC, the largest privately held independent insurance broker, has announced that it is expanding its construction and design team with the hiring of Karen Erger and Tom Miller.
Ms. Erger will provide professional liability practice management, loss prevention, contract and complex claims management consulting services to Lockton's architectural, engineering and construction clients in her role as Vice President, Director of Practice Management. Her background includes construction litigation at a leading construction law firm, professional liability claims defense and claims consulting for major professional liability underwriters.
Miller joins Lockton as a Senior Vice President within the Design and Construction Unit. His role will be dedicated to serving the needs of engineering, architecture and construction firms performing services around the globe. He has spent more than 15 years concentrating on professional liability for design professionals and contractors in multiple roles. He previously managed the professional liability underwriting of one of the largest construction insurers and has developed numerous manuscript insurance products as well as focused on strategic planning to enhance business unit opportunities.
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Washington Court Limits Lien Rights of Construction Managers
August 17, 2011 — Douglas Reiser, Builders Counsel
A newly filed, yet unpublished, court opinion opines that a construction manager cannot file a construction lien in Washington state. So, how far reaching is this opinion?
In the case of Blue Diamond Group Inc. v. KB Seattle 1, Inc., et al, a New York construction manager filed a lien against the Westfield Southcenter Mall in Tukwila, Washington. The lien was filed after the owner of a coffee stand failed to pay Blue Diamond for consulting services used in the construction of a kiosk.
Blue Diamond served as the owner’s agent, assisting with managing subcontractors, vendors and other tasks. The manager’s tasks also included paying invoices, managing deliveries, setting schedules and other site managerial tasks. Blue Diamond was not registered as a contractor under Washington’s RCW 18.27.
Read the full story…
Read the court’s decision…
Reprinted courtesy of Douglas Reiser of Reiser Legal LLC. Mr. Reiser can be contacted at info@reiserlegal.com
Loose Bolts Led to Sagging Roof in Construction Defect Claim
February 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Though the sagging roof is neither leaking nor a safety hazard, the town of Waynesville, North Carolina is suing the builder of its new fire station, as reported in the Smoky Mountain News. The engineers who examined the roof found a substantial number of loose bolts in the roof trusses. Additionally, the trusses themselves have become bent.
Tom Galloway, Waynesville’s Town Manager said “it needs to be remedied and fixed.” He said that the builder, Construction Logic, “never indicated a willingness to fix the roof.” The town is seeking the cost of repair, which Galloway estimated could be $400,000, and an additional $30,000 in damages. The suit states that Construction Logic failed to follow the plan specifications for the roof.
Read the full story…
Environment Decision May Expand Construction Defect Claims
August 16, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Could a California Supreme Court decision on environmental claims have an effect on construction defect cases? Jonathan B. Sokol, a lawyer at Greenberg Glusker argues just that in a post on his firm’s blog. He notes that the California Supreme Court has held that “the ‘all sums” method of allocation applies in California” and that “an insurer cannot limit its liability to just the amount of loss that occurred in its particular policy period.” While his focus is on environmental cases, he says that “the decision could also potentially expand the scope of coverage for construction defect claims and other claims involving continuous and progressive property damage and bodily injury.
Read the full story…
Pennsylvania Court Extends Construction Defect Protections to Subsequent Buyers
December 20, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The Pennsylvania courts have long held that there is an implied warranty of habitability for the initial purchaser of a home. Now, as some defects may not immediately show up, the court has extended that implied warranty to second and subsequent purchasers. As Marc D. Brookman, David I. Haas, and Christopher Bender of Duane Morris note, “this judicially created doctrine shifts the risk of a latent defect in the construction of a new home from the purchaser to the builder-vendor.”
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded that a contractual relationship is not needed for an implied warranty of habitability. The court’s concern was inequalities would result when a home was sold while other homes were protected by being within the statute of repose.
Read the full story…
Lower Court “Eminently Reasonable” but Wrong in Construction Defect Case
July 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Noting that “circuit court’s orders are eminently reasonable, logical and just” the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia has granted a writ to halt enforcement of these orders and to compel arbitration instead in the case of State v. Tucker. The initial case concerned claims that an HVAC system had been improperly designed, constructed, manufactured, or maintained, leading to serious problems. Glenmark Holding, the owner of the Suncrest Executive Plaza brought a lawsuit against seven defendants. Three of the defendants, Morgan Keller, Inc, York International Corporation, and Johnson Controls, Inc. argued that Glenmark was obligated to enter into arbitration.
Glenmark and the other defendants argued that the motions for arbitration should be denied “so all the claims and cross-claims of the parties could be litigated in one forum, in one proceeding.” The circuit court noted that arbitration is preferred over litigation because of its supposed “expeditious, economic resolution of issues,” but that in this case, “the petitioners would expend additional, not fewer resources responding to the parties’ claims and cross-claims.” As “compulsory arbitration would be insufficient and inequitable” the court denied the request, finding the arbitration clauses “unconscionable and, therefore, unenforceable.”
Morgan Keller, York, and Johson argued that “the interpretation of arbitration clauses is governed exclusively by the Federal Arbitration Act.” The appeals court found that “the circuit court was within its authority to consider Glenmark’s claim that the arbitration clauses were unenforceable.” However, the appeals court rejected the circuit court’s conclusion about the “piecemeal” resolution of the conflict, as it contradicts a Supreme Court ruling. The Supreme Court stated in 1983 that the FAA “requires piecemeal resolution when necessary to give effect to an arbitration agreement.” In a 1985 decision, the Court held that a court could “not substitute [its] own views of economy and efficiency.”
Nor could the court find the arbitration clause to be unconscionable or unenforceable. The court noted that the contract was a standard AIA form, and was amended by the parties involved, whom the court characterized as “commercially sophisticated.” The court found that the agreement limited the rights of all parties and was not one-sided.
As the arbitration clause was neither unconscionable nor unenforceable, and Supreme Court rulings preclude a court from substituting its own procedures, even when these are “eminently reasonable, logical and just,” the appeals court halted the order of the circuit court, sending the matter to arbitration.
Read the court’s decision…
Gut Feeling Does Not Disqualify Expert Opinion
July 6, 2011 — CDJ Staff
The New Jersey Supreme Court issued a ruling in June on the case of Nevins v. Toll in which they reversed an earlier decision and remanded the case to a lower court for retrial. At issue in the case was the testimony of the plaintiff’s expert, J. Anthony Dowling. In depositions, Mr. Dowling said that his estimates for repair were based on a “gut feeling.” Dowling said he had “very little” experience in cost estimates for single-family homes. The defendants sought to bar Dowling’s testimony which was granted by the judge. Without an expert, Ms. Nevin’s case was dismissed.
Describing Dowling’s report as “far from a model of how an expert’s opinion in a construction case should be presented,” the court noted that Dowling is not a professional expert witness. However, the court did note that Dowling is a professional cost estimator. Despite Mr. Dowling using his “gut feeling” to construct his estimate, the New Jersey Supreme Court felt that whether his estimate is convincing is “a question for the jury.”
Read the court’s opinion…
Yellow Brass Fittings Play a Crucial Role in Baker v Castle & Cooke Homes
May 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Baker v Castle & Cooke Homes Hawaii, et al. is a “class action filed by homeowners who allege that their homes have a construction defect. They allege that their plumbing systems include brass fittings susceptible to corrosion and likely to cause leaks. They bring this action against the developer of their homes and the manufacturers of the brass fittings.”
Zurn, the manufacturer of the allegedly defective brass fittings, sought a dismissal, or if that could not be achieved, then “a more definite statement, of five of the six claims.” Zurn moved for summary judgment on the sixth claim, or alternately sought “summary judgment on one of the five claims it” sought to dismiss.” The court granted in part the motion, and denied the motion for summary judgment.
The developer, Castle & Cooke, sought dismissal of the First Amended Complaint stating “that Plaintiffs have not complied with Hawaii’s Contractor Repair Act, chapter 672E of Hawaii Revised Statutes, which requires, among other things, a plaintiff to give a contractor the results of any testing done before filing an action against that contractor.” The court couldn’t determine “certain facts essential to ruling” on Castle & Cooke’s motion, and therefore denied the motion, but ordered Plaintiffs to submit requested material by the stated deadline.
The Baker v Castle & Cooke case began with the Plaintiffs claim that the use of yellow brass fittings can lead to construction defects. They allege that “yellow brass is particularly susceptible to dezincification, a corrosion process in which zinc leaches into potable water that comes into contact with the brass. According to Plaintiffs, as the brass corrodes, it becomes porous and mechanically weak. Plaintiffs further allege that the PEX systems in the putative class members’ homes have begun to, or are about to, leak water into the walls, ceilings, and floors of their homes. Plaintiffs allege that the leakage will cause water damage and mold growth, exposing the occupants to toxins.”
In response to the plaintiffs’ claims, Zurn argued “because their yellow brass fittings have not failed to date, Plaintiffs fail to allege, and have no evidence showing, that they have suffered any actual injury.” Plaintiffs replied, “even if the fittings have not failed as of today, failure in the future is inevitable.”
However, the court stated, “whether Plaintiffs have suffered any injury, or whether Plaintiffs are attempting to proceed based solely on future injury, implicates Plaintiffs’ standing to bring this action, as well as whether this case is ripe for adjudication.” The court has requested the parties to submit “supplemental briefing on whether this case should be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1). In supplemental briefs, Zurn argues that dismissal is appropriate because Plaintiffs lack standing, and Castle & Cooke argues that dismissal is appropriate because Plaintiffs’ claims are not ripe.”
The court continues to discuss the problem of standing: “To establish standing, a plaintiff must demonstrate three things. First, the plaintiff must suffer an "injury-in-fact," which means that there must be a concrete and particularized "invasion of a legally protected interest" and the invasion is actual or imminent. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). Second, the injury must be fairly traceable to the challenged action. Third, a favorable decision must be likely to redress the injury. Id. It is the first element (injury-in-fact) that is in issue here.”
The court found that the plaintiffs do have standing: “Even if the court could not rely on the allegations that the pipes will soon leak, the court would conclude that, for standing purposes, Plaintiffs have a sufficient injury-in-fact in the form of their alleged economic loss.” In a hearing, Plaintiffs argued that their homes had decreased in value.
The court also denied Castle & Cooke’s motion to dismiss based on a lack of ripeness, stating “the same reasons Plaintiffs satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement for standing purposes, they satisfy the constitutional ripeness requirement.”
Plaintiffs asserted six counts against Zurn. Zurn, in response, made a motion to dismiss counts VIII, IX, X, XII, and XIII. The court granted Zurn’s motion for Counts VIII, IX, and X only: “Counts VIII (product liability), IX (negligence), and X (strict liability) sound in tort. Zurn argues that, because Plaintiffs allege no injury other than to the PEX systems and the yellow brass fittings themselves, the economic loss rule bars their tort claims. The court agrees.”
The court disagreed with Zurn’s motion regarding Count XII: “Count XII asserts that Zurn has breached the implied warranty of merchantability. Zurn argues that Count XII is barred by the applicable statute of limitations and that Plaintiffs do not sufficiently allege an injury. The court disagrees.”
Zurn’s motion regarding Count XIII was also denied: “Count XIII asserts that Zurn violated section 480-2 of Hawaii Revised Statutes.” Furthermore, “Plaintiffs allege that Zurn ‘engaged in unfair and deceptive acts or practices when [it] designed, manufactured and sold Yellow Brass Fittings.’ Zurn argues that Plaintiffs fail to state a claim under section 480-2(a) because their claims are barred by the statute of limitations and they do not adequately allege reliance or a cognizable injury. The court disagrees.”
The court denied the motion for summary judgment with respect to Counts XI and XII.
Castle & Cooke sought to dismiss “Plaintiffs’ claims against it under section 672E-2 of Hawaii Revised Statutes, which provides for dismissal when claimants fail to comply with chapter 672E.” There was some discussion regarding the test results. Apparently, the plaintiffs had failed to provide a written notice of claim at least 90 days before filing the action. However, it is unclear if the Plaintiffs have since complied with the requirements of the chapter. “The court has received no supplemental information from either party about whether any test results from another case have been turned over or whether those materials are subject to a confidentiality agreement. The record at this point does not establish noncompliance with the requirement in chapter 672E to provide such information. The court therefore denies the motion to dismiss.”
In summary, “Zurn’s motion to dismiss is granted as to Count VIII, Count IX, and Count X. Zurn’s motion to dismiss is denied with respect to Plaintiffs’ other claims. Zurn’s request for a more definite statement and its summary judgment motion are denied. Plaintiffs are given leave to file an amended Complaint no later than May 21, 2012.” Furthermore, “the court denies Castle & Cooke’s motion, but directs Plaintiffs to file, within two weeks, either a certificate of compliance with section 672E-3(c), or an explanation as to why they have not complied. Castle & Cooke may submit a response within two weeks of Plaintiffs’ submission. Each party’s submission is limited to 1000 words.”
Read the court’s decision…
Texas Windstorm Insurance Agency Under Scrutiny
April 5, 2011 — April 5, 2011 Beverley BevenFlorez - Construction Defect Journal
Representative Larry Taylor has introduced a bill in the Texas Legislature (HB 2818) that would further regulate the Texas Windstorm Insurance Agency (TWIA). According to Taylor, “In order to be adequately prepared for future hurricane seasons, it is imperative that TWIA be operating at maximum efficiency, that the Reserve Trust Fund be solvent and that the agency have adequate management measures in place to protect consumers and ensure that claims are paid in a timely manner. House Bill 2818 is an important step in the right direction toward restoring public confidence in TWIA.”
HB 2818 includes measures that would create an expert panel that would advise the commissioner on how to evaluate loss from the storm, and a greater transparency of TWIA Board meetings and actions.
In addition, the Texas Department of Insurance (TDI) has placed TWIA on Administrative Oversight. According to TDI, “While under Administrative Oversight, the Department may require its prior review and approval of executive decisions, certain expenditures, and other transactions. The insurer is required to fully cooperate with the Department and provide complete and timely disclosure of all information responsive to Department requests.”
Read the full story (Rep. Taylor’s Press Release)...
Read the full story (Texas Department of Insurance’s Press Release)...
South Carolina Law Clarifies Statue of Repose
July 11, 2011 — CDJ Staff
A new law in South Carolina, H 3375, fixes a loophole in that state’s statute of repose. State law puts a cap of eight years on construction defects, but the 2008 law that set that limit had a loophole that would allow for construction defect claims to start thirteen years after construction. The law also provides a cap on punitive damages.
The measure was backed by the Carolinas Association of General Contractors. Their spokesperson said that the legislation “increases our state’s ability to be economically competitive and helps protect our members from frivolous lawsuits.”
Read the full story…
Read South Carolina H 3375…
Recent Case Brings Clarity and Questions to Statute of Repose Application
August 16, 2012 — Douglas Reiser, Builders Counsel
I have often chatted about the Washington Statute of Repose on this blog. The Statute of Repose prevents construction claims, for the most part, from being raised 6 years from the date of substantial completion or termination. Well, a recent Court of Appeals case dove deep into the specific determinative factors that tell us when to start the clock. It certainly raises questions about how long we really have to file suit.
The Statute of Repose has been a frequent topic here, so I will simply direct you to my prior post for further information on how this law works. A recent post was published about a lawsuit that might raise some questions about when and how the clock begins to roll, and claim periods begin to diminish.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of Douglas Reiser of Reiser Legal LLC. Mr. Reiser can be contacted at info@reiserlegal.com