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    California Builders Right To Repair Current Law Summary:

    Current Law Summary: SB800 (codified as Civil Code §§895, et seq) is the most far-reaching, complex law regulating construction defect litigation, right to repair, warranty obligations and maintenance requirements transference in the country. In essence, to afford protection against frivolous lawsuits, builders shall do all the following:A homeowner is obligated to follow all reasonable maintenance obligations and schedules communicated in writing to the homeowner by the builder and product manufacturers, as well as commonly accepted maintenance practices. A failure by a homeowner to follow these obligations, schedules, and practices may subject the homeowner to the affirmative defenses.A builder, under the principles of comparative fault pertaining to affirmative defenses, may be excused, in whole or in part, from any obligation, damage, loss, or liability if the builder can demonstrate any of the following affirmative defenses in response to a claimed violation:


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    Construction Expert Witness News and Information
    For Anaheim California

    Construction Defect Notice in the Mailbox? Respond Appropriately

    Equipment Costs? It’s a Steal!

    Insurance Firm Under No Duty to Defend in Hawaii Construction Defect Case

    Judge Concludes Drywall Manufacturer Sold in Florida

    Home Repair Firms Sued for Fraud

    Bad Faith and a Partial Summary Judgment in Seattle Construction Defect Case

    Insurer Has Duty to Defend in Water Intrusion Case

    California Supreme Court Binds Homeowner Associations To Arbitration Provisions In CC&Rs

    Insurer Able to Refuse Coverage for Failed Retaining Wall

    A Downside of Associational Standing - HOA's Claims Against Subcontractors Barred by Statute of Limitations

    Pier Fire Started by Welders

    Court Rules on a Long List of Motions in Illinois National Insurance Co v Nordic PCL

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    Fifth Circuit Reverses Insurers’ Summary Judgment Award Based on "Your Work" Exclusion

    Safety Officials Investigating Death From Fall

    Another Guilty Plea in Las Vegas HOA Scandal

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    Contractor Removed from Site for Lack of Insurance

    Fifth Circuit Asks Texas Supreme Court to Clarify Construction Defect Decision

    South Carolina Contractors Regain General Liability Coverage

    A Lien Might Just Save Your Small Construction Business

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    Texas exclusions j(5) and j(6).

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    Badly Constructed Masonry Walls Not an Occurrence in Arkansas Law

    Bar to Raise on Green Standard

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    ANAHEIM CALIFORNIA CONSTRUCTION EXPERT WITNESS
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    The Anaheim, California Construction Expert Witness Group at BHA, leverages from the experience gained through more than 5,500 construction related expert witness designations encompassing a wide spectrum of construction related disputes. Drawing from this considerable body of experience, BHA provides construction related trial support and expert services to Anaheim's most recognized construction litigation practitioners, commercial general liability carriers, owners, construction practice groups, as well as a variety of state and local government agencies.

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    Construction Expert Witness News & Info
    Anaheim, California

    Harsh New Time Limits on Construction Defect Claims

    April 26, 2011 — April 26, 2011 by Scott F. Sullan, Esq., Mari K. Perczak, Esq., and Leslie A. Tuft, Esq. of Sullan2, Sandgrund, Smith & Perczak, P.C. in the HindemanSanchez blog

    A recent Colorado Supreme Court decision, Smith v. Executive Custom Homes, Inc., 230 P.3d 1186 (Colo. 2010), considerably shortens the time limit for bringing many construction defect lawsuits. Homeowners and homeowner associations risk losing the right to seek reimbursement from builders, developers and other construction professionals unless they carefully and quickly act upon discovery of evidence of any potential construction defect.

    The Statute of Limitations for Construction Defect Claims
    Colorado’s construction defect statute of limitations limits the time for homeowners and homeowners associations to bring lawsuits for construction defects against “construction professionals,” including developers, general contractors, builders, engineers, architects, other design professionals, inspectors and subcontractors. The statute requires homeowners and associations to file suit within two years “after the claim for relief arises.” A claim for relief “arises” when a homeowner or association discovers or reasonably should have discovered the physical manifestation of a construction defect.

    The two-year time limitation applies to each construction defect separately, and will begin to run upon the appearance of a “manifestation” of a construction defect (which may include, for example, a condition as simple as a roof leak or drywall cracks), even if the homeowner or association does not know the cause of the apparent problem.

    The Smith Opinion and its Effect on the Statute of Limitations
    In Smith v. Executive Custom Homes, Inc., the plaintiff homeowner, Mrs. Smith, slipped on ice that had accumulated on her sidewalk because of a leaking gutter and suffered injury. When she first noticed the leak, she reported it to her property manager, who reported it to the builder. The builder attempted to repair the gutter, unbeknownst to Mrs. Smith, and she did not notice further problems until approximately one year after she first observed the leak, when she fell and suffered serious injury. She sued the builder within two years of her injury, but nearly three years after she first learned of the leak.

    The Colorado Supreme Court dismissed Mrs. Smith’s claims as untimely and held that under the construction defect statute of limitations, the two-year period for suing for injuries due to construction defects begins when the homeowner first observes the physical manifestation of the defect, even if the resulting injury has not yet occurred. The court acknowledged that this ruling could result in “unfair results,” especially if a serious and unforeseeable injury occurs more than two years after the first time the homeowner noticed the problem, and as a result the victim is unable to seek redress from those responsible for the defect.

    Read the full story…

    Reprinted courtesy of Scott F. Sullan, Esq., Mari K. Perczak, Esq., and Leslie A. Tuft, Esq. of Sullan2, Sandgrund, Smith & Perczak, P.C., and they can be contacted through their web site.


    Instant Hotel Tower, But Is It Safe?

    March 28, 2012 — CDJ Staff

    Broad Sustainable Building has leapfrogged in China’s construction boom by building a thirty-story hotel in just fifteen days in the city of Changsha. According to an article in the Los Angeles Times, most of the building was prefabricated, but most prefabricated buildings require a longer time for assembly. Broad claimed that it cut no corners on safety. However, Zhang Li, a Beijing architect, told the Times that “incredible speed also means incredible risk.”

    At the completion date, the interior was still partially finished. Some rooms were furnished, while others weren’t quite so ready. The hotel will be used to house clients who are visiting Broad and some of its employees.

    Broad called their process “the most profound innovation in human history” and predicted that soon a third of new buildings worldwide would be constructed this way. The company anticipates using the same process to build taller buildings, with hopes of eventually constructing a 150-story building.

    China is currently undergoing a building boom which Zhang attributed to a desire to catch up to the developed world. As a result of this boom, he noted that building inspections are often skipped in China to speed up building.

    Read the full story…


    Can Negligent Contractors Shift Blame in South Carolina?

    July 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff

    Clay Olson looks back to a 1991 Carolina case, Nelson v. Concrete Supply Company. The court concluded in that case that “a plaintiff in South Carolina may recover only if his/her negligence does not exceed that of the defendant’s and amount of plaintiff’s recovery shall be reduced in proportion to amount of his or her negligence; if there is more than one defendant, plaintiff’s negligence shall be compared to combined negligence of all defendants.” In 2005, he reports, as part of tort reform in South Carolina, the legislature further addressed this.

    He then suggests a possible outcome of this is that negligent contractors may be able to shift some of the blame (and cost of the settlement) to other defendants who may not be to blame. He offers a scenario in which a contractor is sued for construction defects and a jury has to allocate responsibility for indivisible damage. “A jury need only find the two subcontractors to have each contributed 15% of the indivisible damage.” He adds in another 15% for claims against the architect. Minor blame is given to the manufacturers, and suddenly the negligent contractor is paying less than 50% of the total settlement.

    He notes that the previous system in place also had its problems, but notes that this one may not be “fair and equitable.”

    Read the full story…


    Safe Harbors- not just for Sailors anymore (or, why advance planning can prevent claims of defective plans & specs) (law note)

    August 17, 2011 — Melissa Brumback

    Have you ever considered a “Safe Harbor Provision” for your Owner-Architect or Owner-Engineer contract? Maybe it is time that you do.

    As you are (probably too well) aware, on every construction project there are changes. Some of these are due to the owner’s change of heart, value engineering concerns, contractor failures, and material substitutions. Some may be because of a design error, omission, or drawing conflict. It happens.

    A “Safe Harbor Provision” is a provision that establishes an acceptable percentage of increased construction costs (that is, a percentage of the project’s contingency). The idea is that if the construction changes attributable to the designer is within this percentage, no claim will be made by the Owner for design defects.

    Read the full story…

    Reprinted courtesy of Melissa Brumback of Ragsdale Liggett PLLC. Ms. Brumback can be contacted at mbrumback@rl-law.com.


    The Ever-Growing Thicket Of California Civil Code Section 2782

    January 6, 2012 — Michael D. Worthing, Borton Petrini

    California Civil Code section 2782 imposes limits on indemnity and defense provisions in construction contracts. Since the initial adoption of S.B. 8001 in 2002 (eff. January 1, 2003) section 27822 has been revised several times, and legislative history suggests that interest groups representing builders, developers and sub-contractors, as well as the insurance industry, have seen legislative action on these indemnity and defense issues as part of the overall response to the same economic pressures resulting from construction defect litigation that gave rise to S.B. 800. Amendments in 2005, 2007, 2008 and 2011 (each effective January 1 of the following year) have increasingly entangled the provisions of Section 2782 with various provisions of S.B. 800. The application of section 2782 to construction contracts, and in particular contracts between developer-builders and subcontractors, executed after January 1, 2006, will require a concurrent reading and understanding of S.B. 800, the application of which is itself still in flux.

    The time a construction contract was executed will likely determine which version of section 2782, read in connection with provisions of S.B.800, is applicable. Because of the nature of construction defect litigation, the determination of relative rights and liabilities of developer-builders vis-à-vis subcontractors under construction contracts does not become the subject of litigation, and legal and judicial interpretation, until years after the contracts were entered and work performed. As of the date this article is submitted, there has been no case law interpreting or applying any of the post S.B. 800 amendments, in part, and perhaps primarily, because litigation arising from construction contracts executed after January 1, 2006, has not yet reached the appellate courts.

    SECTION 2782 AT THE TIME S.B. 800 WAS ENACTED

    Section 2782 was originally enacted in 1967 and amended several times to the version in effect when S.B. 800 became law, at which time the section was relatively simple and straightforward. It then consisted of two subdivisions, which have essentially remained unchanged until the most recent amendment during the 2011 legislative session.

    Section 2782 (a) prohibited, and still prohibits, provisions in construction contracts that “purport to indemnify the promisee against liability for damages for death or bodily injury to persons, injury to property, or any other loss, damage or expense arising from the sole negligence or willful misconduct of the promise.” This provision essentially prohibits what had been referred to as so-called Type I or “specific” indemnity provisions. In such agreements, the indemnitor [the promisor, that is, the person or entity indemnifying] will indemnify the indemnitee [the promisee, that is, the person or entity being protected by the indemnity] for the indemnitee’s own negligence, whether active or passive, whether the indemnitee is solely negligent or concurrently negligent with the indemnitor. (See, MacDonald & Kruse, Inc. v. San Jose Steel Co. (1972) 29 Cal.App.3d 413, 419.)3 Section 2782 (a) has remained essentially intact since the enactment of S.B. 800. It still must be considered and applied to interpret a construction contract. Generally, it will apply to contracts not involving a public agency; the next part of section 2782 specifically governs such contracts.

    The second subdivision prohibits provisions in any construction contract with a public agency which purport to impose on the contractor, or relieve the public agency from, liability for the active negligence of the public agency. Subdivision (b) has been revised by the 2011 amendment, discussed below. If a construction contract with the public agency is for residential construction, the standards of S.B. 800 likely apply.4

    This was the extent of section 2782 on January 1, 2003, when S.B. 800 went into effect, and remained so until January 1, 2006. This version will govern interpretation and application of indemnity and defense provisions in construction contracts executed before January 1, 2006.5

    2005 AMENDMENT

    The first “post S.B. 800” change to Section 2782 was in enacted in 2005, effective January 1, 2006, and added two new sections. Subdivision (c) stated (in somewhat greater detail than paraphrased here) that for residential construction contracts, or amendments thereto, entered into after January 1, 2006, a subcontractor cannot be required to indemnify (including the cost to defend) a builder for construction defects that arise out of negligence or design defects of the builder or other independent contractors, or that do not arise out of the scope of the subcontractor=s scope of work. The term “residential construction” was defined by reference to S.B.800 generally, and the term “builder” was defined by reference to section 911 (a part of S.B. 800), for the first time expressly connecting provisions of section 2782 to S.B. 800. Contractual provisions not expressly prohibited were reserved to the agreement of the parties.

    What subdivision (c) took away was partially given back by subdivision (d). It stated that “subdivision (c) does not prohibit a subcontractor and builder from mutually agreeing to the timing or immediacy of the defense and provisions for reimbursement of defense fees and costs, so long as that agreement, upon final resolution of the claims, does not waive or modify the provisions of subdivision (c).”6 In addition, it stated that this subdivision (c) did not affect the obligations of an insurance carrier under Presley Homes, Inc. v. American States Insurance Company (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 571, which holds that where an insurer has a duty to defend a developer pursuant to an additional insured endorsement obtained under a subcontractor’s policy, that duty generally applies to the entire action, even if the suit involves both covered and uncovered claims, or a single claim only partially covered by the policy. Finally, subdivision (d) stated that the amendment did not affect the builder’s or subcontractor’s obligations under S.B. 800. Both of these latter provisions, relating to the Presley Homes case, and obligations under S.B. 800, have been carried forward essentially intact in subsequent amendments of section 2782.

    This version of section 2782 will be applicable to any contract between a builder as defined by section 911 (see fn. 4, above) and a subcontractor executed between January 1, 2006, and December 31, 2008. Thus, a general contractor, etc., who is not a builder is not subject to the provisions added by the 2005 amendment; this changed with the next amendment.

    It is not clear whether this version would apply to a contract entered before January 1, 2006, but amended after that date. Subdivision (c) applies to “all construction contracts, and amendments thereto, entered into after January 1, 2006, for residential construction.” It would seem that the clearest and most logical construction would apply it only to contracts originally made after January 1, 2006, and thereafter amended, but there has been no judicial determination of this issue.

    In addition, logically it would seem that this version of section 2782 should be applicable to construction contracts for residential construction between a builder and a subcontractor, entered between January 1, 2006, and December 31, 2008; however, legislative history relating to the 2008 amendment discussed below suggests a different result might occur.

    2007 AMENDMENT

    The second “post S.B. 800” amendment in 2007 (effective January 1, 2008), added subdivisions (e)(1) and (e)(2).

    Subdivision (e)(1) added general contractors and subcontractors not affiliated with the builder and imposed essentially the same restrictions on provisions to indemnify, including the cost to defend, them as had been imposed on the “builder” by the 2005 amendment. The amendment refers to section 911 (b), again part of S.B. 800, to define general contractors, etc., not affiliated with the builder.

    Subdivision (e)(1) essentially repeated the provisions of subdivision (d) permitting agreement to the timing and immediacy of the defense, the reference to the Presley Homes case, and the general contractor’s or subcontractor’s obligations under S.B. 800.

    It appears this amendment was an attempt to harmonize the new restrictions on indemnity and defense provisions with S.B. 800. The 2005 amendment, whether by oversight or intent, covered only builders and not general contractors, although both classes are subject to the provisions of S.B. 800; the 2007 amendment added non-builder-affiliated general contractors.

    Again, logically, it would seem that this version of section 2782 should be applicable to construction contracts for residential construction between a general contractor or contractor not affiliated with a builder and a subcontractor, entered between January 1 and December 31, 2008; however, legislative history relating to the 2008 amendment discussed below suggests a different result might occur. The same potential uncertainty regarding applicability to a contract entered before January 1, 2008, but amended after that date, exists for this provision as for the prior amendment, discussed above.

    2008 AMENDMENT

    The third “post S.B. 800” amendment in 2008 (effective January 1, 2009), reorganized the language relating to prohibited indemnity provisions, added a reference to insurance in that same prohibition, extensively rewrote the provisions governing agreements relating to the timing or immediacy of defense, added language preserving equitable indemnity claims, and added language defining “construction defect” by reference to the standards set forth in S.B. 800.

    Subdivisions (a) and (b) remained unchanged.

    Subdivision (c) now made a combined reference to builders (again by reference to section 911), as well as general contractors or contractors not affiliated with the builder (again by reference to section 911 (b)), rather than dealing with the two groups in separate but nearly identical subdivisions as previously. It otherwise restated the same limitations that were previously set forth separately in subdivisions (c) and (e), as well as the reference to the Presley Homes case, and the general contractor’s or subcontractor’s obligations under S.B. 800, but with one important addition. The word “insure” was added to the description of prohibited provisions, to-wit: “provisions? that purport to insure or indemnify, including the cost to defend, the builder, [etc.]? are unenforceable” to the extent they arise out of claims of the type previously described.

    It is unclear what impact the addition of this single word “insure” will have; and, it will have to be read in light of the preservation of the language that it shall not affect the obligations of an insurance carrier under the holding of the Presley Homes case. Suppose a carrier had issued an additional insured endorsement under which it would otherwise be required to defend a builder or general contractor consistent with the Presley Homes rule: would this newly added single word (restricting the construction contract, to which the carrier is not a party) give the carrier a basis for denying coverage under the insurance contract? Or would the continued inclusion of the express language that it does not affect the obligations of an insurance carrier under Presley Homes control? That is surely an issue that will have to be worked out by the courts.

    The new subdivision (d) addressed defense obligations. Again it permitted parties to agree to the timing and immediacy of the defense and provision for reimbursement of defense fees and costs, but imposed a very detailed scheme that appears to limit the extent of such agreement. A subcontractor owes no defense or indemnity obligation until the builder or general contractor provides a written tender of the claim, which has the same force and effect as notice of commencement of a legal proceeding. Upon that tender the subcontractor shall elect to follow one of two ways of performing: subdivision (d) (1) permits the subcontractor to defend with counsel of its choice and to control the defense, if the subcontractor gives written notice of this election within a reasonable time after receipt of the written tender and in no event later than 90 days following that receipt; subdivision (d) (2) provides an alternative by which the subcontractor pays a reasonable allocated share of the builder’s or general contractor’s defense fees and costs within 30 days of receipt of an invoice, subject to reallocation upon final resolution of the claim by settlement or judgment. Subdivision (e) sets forth remedies available to the builder or general contractor if a subcontractor fails to timely and adequately perform its obligations under either of the two alternatives in subdivision (d), including compensatory and consequential damages, reasonable attorneys’ fees in connection with the first alternative, and interest on defense and indemnity costs in connection with the second alternative. Subdivision (e) ends with provisions relating to reallocation of defense costs, and damages for failure to reallocate.

    Application of these requirements in actual litigation is likely to be cumbersome and potentially fraught with conflicts. If retained pursuant to subdivision (d) (1) does the attorney represent the builder, the subcontractor, or both? To whom does the attorney owe his or her fiduciary duty? Can an appropriate informed written consent be formulated, for example, under Rule 3-310 of the California Rules of Professional Conduct, or Rule 1.7, ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct? Could an attorney retained by a subcontractor blame the subcontractor if that is in the developer’s best interests? If multiple subcontractors elect to defend directly, how would the defense be coordinated among the potentially multiple attorneys so retained? Would an attorney retained by one subcontractor be able, or inclined, to blame another subcontractor who also chose to defend directly, in other words, what would prevent inconsistent defense positions amongst the various counsel retained by subcontractors for the developer? There may be solutions to such practical and professional considerations but it seems an ethical thicket awaits any attorney involved in such circumstances.

    Subdivision (e) and (f) preserve equitable indemnity claims for the builder, general contractor or subcontractor, the first in general, the second as against any supplier, design profession, or product manufacturer. Finally, the 2008 amendment added for the first time, in subdivision (h), language defining "construction defect" as used in section 2782 as a violation of standards set forth in S.B. 800.

    The inclusion of these last three subsections would seem to work against simplification of litigation. A builder or general contractor is likely to allege a claim for equitable indemnity against any and all subcontractors in addition to claims for contractual indemnity and defense (however limited by the other provisions of section 2782). Nothing in the section suggests the subcontractor should, or even can, somehow take on the representation of the builder, etc., in connection with a claim of equitable indemnity back against the subcontractor.

    And the limited definition of “construction defect” in subdivision (h) appears to raise an issue of the applicability of the limitations set forth in subdivision (c). Although there is a school of thought that section 941 limits residential construction defect claims only to breach of the performance standards under S.B. 800, it is still common for CD complaints to plead other legal theories, e.g., breach of contract, breach of warranty, negligence, etc., in addition to violation of S.B. 800 standards. With the addition of subdivision (h) it is arguable that the restrictions on indemnity and defense provisions spelled out in subdivisions (c) and (d), both of which relate to claims for residential construction defects, are applicable only to claims for violation of S.B. 800 standards, and not other residential construction defect claims. In other words, a developer might conceivably still be entitled to a broader scope of indemnity and concomitant defense for other types of claims, such as breach of contract, breach of warranty, negligence, etc., so long as the indemnity does not violate the limitation of subdivision (a) against Type I indemnity, which as noted above, has remained intact through these revisions.

    Finally, it would seem that this version of section 2782 should be applicable to contracts executed between builders, general contractors, etc., on the one hand and subcontractors on the other hand on and after January 1, 2009. And, as noted above in connection with the 2005 and 2007 amendments, logic would suggest that those versions would ordinarily apply to contracts executed during the time periods mentioned above. But, the Legislative Counsel’s Digest for the 2008 amendment as it finally was enacted into law includes the following statements:

    This bill would delete the provisions applicable to construction contracts entered into on or after January 1, 2008, that purport to indemnify the general contractor or contractor not affiliated with the builder. The bill would revise the provisions applicable to contracts entered into after January 1, 2006, to instead apply to contracts entered into after January 1, 2009, and to apply to agreements that purport to insure or indemnify the builder or the general contractor or contractor not affiliated with the builder, as described.

    Although it seems a startling result, this legislative history suggests an argument can be made that the 2008 amendment retroactively nullified the effect of the 2005 and 2007 amendments, so that contracts executed from January 1, 2006, as to builders or January 1, 2008, for general contractors, etc., through December 31, 2008, are still governed by the provisions of section 2782 as it was on the books prior to the first post-S.B. 800 amendment in 2005.

    2011 AMENDMENT

    Section 2782 has been amended yet again in the 2011 session of the California Legislature, effective January 1, 2012; however, the substantive changes affect certain contracts entered on or after January 1, 2013. All of the provisions contained in the 2008 amendment have been carried forward in the most recent amendment, although re-numbered: (c) became (d), etc., through (h) becoming (i). So, the law governing construction contracts entered into after January 1, 2009, for residential construction, as between a builder, or a general contractor, etc., not affiliated with a builder, and regarding insurance, indemnity or defense relating to claims for construction defects, remains the same as in the 2008 amendment.

    As noted above the substantive changes to section 2782 all affect contracts entered into on or after January 1, 2013. Subdivision (b) has been amended such that any provision in a contract with a public agency that purports to impose on any contractor, etc., or relieve the public agency from, liability for the active negligence of the public agency will be void and unenforceable. A new subdivision (c) has been added that imposes a similar restriction on construction contracts with the owner of privately owned real property to be improved and as to which the owner is not acting as a contractor or supplier of materials or equipment to the work. This new restriction in subdivision (c) does not apply to a homeowner performing a home improvement project on his or her own single family dwelling.

    The 2011 bill amending section 2782 also added a new section 2782.05, which will make void and unenforceable any provision in any construction contract (again, entered on or after January 1, 2013) that purports to insure or indemnify, including the cost to defend, a general contractor, construction manager, or other subcontractor, by a subcontractor for claims that arise out of the active negligence or willful misconduct of the general contractor, etc., or other independent contractors, etc., or to the extent the claims do not arise out of the scope of work of the subcontractor. However, the section also includes a long list of situations to which it does not apply, including all of those covered by section 2782 (residential construction subject to S.B. 800, public agency contracts subject to section 2782 (b), and direct contracts with private property owners subject to the new section 2782 (c)) as well as eight other categories. This apparently is intended to serve as a “catch-all” to extend a limitation on indemnity agreements to all construction contracts not previously swept into this widening legislative scheme, although the exact phrasing is slightly different.7

    The new section 2782.05 then permits a mutual agreement to the timing or immediacy of a defense under a scheme essentially identical to that imposed in the 2008 amendment to section 2782: defend with counsel of choice, and maintain control of the defense; or, pay a reasonable allocated share of defense fees and costs. The same logistical and ethical difficulties presented by the 2008 scheme discussed above would likely be present in cases that fall under the new section 2782.05.

    CONCLUSION

    The California Legislature has been revising section 2782 since shortly after the adoption of S.B. 800. Each revision has been more complicated than the last, and each has tied certain provisions of section 2782 more closely to S.B. 800. In particular, with regard to construction defect claims relating to residential dwellings which are subject to S.B. 800, the Legislature has apparently attempted to exercise more and more control over the scope of allowable indemnity and dictated a very narrow scheme to govern how the defense obligation arising from a contractual indemnity is to be implemented. It seems likely that any attempt to manage the defense of a construction defect case under the options that allow a subcontractor to defend directly and control the defense will create a logistical problem and an ethical difficulty for any attorney attempting to defend a developer at the behest and direction of a subcontractor. Finally, as set forth in the current version of section 2782 relating to contractual indemnity and defense of S.B. 800 type cases (subdivisions (c) through (h) in the 2008 version, now subdivisions (d) through (i) in the 2011 amendment), the Legislature has apparently narrowed the application to only claims of violation of S.B. 800 standards. This may have, in essence, removed the restrictions on indemnity and defense provisions as they relate to other theories pleaded against developers in construction defense cases, e.g., breach of contract, breach of warranty, negligence, and the like. It is not at all clear that the Legislature has accomplished what it set out do accomplish. Rather, the law may have come full circle back to where it began, except for one legal theory, i.e. violation of S.B. 800 standards, currently being used in residential construction defect cases. For any other legal theory the limitation of section 2782 (a) may be solely controlling.

    1. California Civil Code section 43.99, and sections 895 to 945.5.
    2. All statutory references in this article are to the California Civil Code unless otherwise specified.
    3. Type I or specific indemnity does not exactly match the scope of proscribed indemnity as described in section 2782 (a) but it is the closest. More recent case law in California has eschewed a mechanical application of the MacDonald & Kruse typology in favor of examining the precise text of the actual contract (See, e.g., St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Frontier Pacific Ins. Co. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1234, 1246, n. 6) but some recent cases still use the Type I, II and II classifications. And, an understanding of that “historical” typology is useful as an aid to evaluating and understanding express indemnity in general.
    4. The provisions of S.B. 800 other than the prelitigation procedures of sections 910 through 938 apply to general contractors, subcontractors, etc., pursuant to section 936. The prelitigation procedures generally involve a “builder,” which is specifically defined in section 911 (a) by reference to entities or individuals in the business of selling residential units to the public or of building, developing, or constructing residential units for public purchase. Pursuant to section 911 (b) the term builder does not include general contractors, etc., not affiliated with the builder. Thus, a general contractor who constructs residential housing pursuant to a contract with a public agency is still subject to claims for violation of the standards set forth in sections 896 and 897, resulting from its negligent act or omission or breach of contract, pursuant to section 936.
    5. As noted above, there has been no case law yet interpreting any of the “post S.B. 800” changes to Section 2782. One of the most important legal decisions relating to express indemnity and defense obligations and rights between developer-builders and sub-contractors was published after two of the amendments but based upon contracts executed and the language of section 2782 prior to January 1, 2006. (See, Crawford v. Weather Shield Mfg., Inc. (2008) 44 Cal.4th 541, 547, 566-67, fn. 14).
    6. Subcontractor dissatisfaction with the perceived inadequacy of protection afforded by this provision apparently became the impetus for a 2008 amendment to section 2782, discussed below, at least based upon the numerous (form) letters submitted to legislators in connection therewith.
    7. Section 2782 (a), where we started, and which has continued without change, prohibits indemnity for claims arising out of the sole negligence or willful misconduct of the promisee; sole negligence can be either active or passive. The various versions relating to residential construction prohibit indemnity for the negligence of the builder, etc., suggesting there is no express contractual indemnity for the negligence of the subcontractor if the builder, etc., is at all negligent. This is tempered a bit by the preservation of the right to equitable indemnity, which will now be found in section 2782 (g) and (h).

    Courtesy of Michael D. Worthing of Borton Petrini, LLP. Mr. Worthing can be contacted at mworthing@bortonpetrini.com.


    Builder Cannot Receive Setoff in Construction Defect Case

    July 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff

    The California Court of Appeals has dismissed an appeal in a San Diego construction defect case. In Smith v. Walters Group, Christopher and Maud Smith sued The Walters Group, a real estate developer, and Galen C. Pavelko, Inc, the builder of their home. Walters had bought five lots and hired Pavelko to build houses on them, selling one of these homes to the Smiths. “After moving in, the Smiths noticed a strong and obnoxious odor permeating the house.” The Smiths sued but were ordered to arbitrate instead, pursuant to a clause in the purchase contract. The Smiths were awarded $1.5 million at arbitration.

    Walters requested that the arbitration remain open to determine if Walters was entitled to a setoff for settlements from defendants not involved in the arbitration. During this time, Pavelko made a settlement with the Smiths, which the court found was in good faith. At the same time, the arbitrator “reached the opposite conclusion.” The arbitrator concluded that “only settlements made ‘in good faith before verdict or judgment’ qualified for setoff.”

    Walters moved that the trial court “‘correct’ the award,” but the trial court declined to do so and confirmed the award. In the appeal, Walters raised the issue of “whether Pavelko’s settlement occurred ‘before verdict or judgment.’” The appeals court dismissed the appeal, noting that “Walters would not be entitled to a $500,000 setoff if we reversed the trial court’s order determining the Smith-Pavelko settlement was made in good faith because Pavelko’s $500,000 payment was expressly conditioned on such an order.” They add that “were we to reverse the trial court’s order, Pavelko would have no obligation to pay the Smiths the $500,000.” This would then “deprive Walters of the corresponding statutory right to a setoff.”

    Read the court’s decision…


    US Courts in Nevada Busy with Yellow Brass

    August 2, 2012 — CDJ Staff

    Judge Robert C. Jones, the chief judge of the United States District Court of Nevada, and Judge Peggy A. Leen, a magistrate judge with the same court, have issued orders in cases involving allegations of high-zinc yellow brass plumbing components. Judge Jones issued orders on Waterfall Homeowners Association v. Viega, Inc. and Greystone Nevada, LLC v. Anthem Highlands Community Association on July 9, 2012. Judge Leen issued orders on Southern Terrace Homeowners Association v. Viega, Inc. on July 10, and The Seasons Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Richmond American Homes of Nevada, Inc. on July 19.

    Chief Judge Jones held an omnibus hearing on Waterfall v. Viega on June 12. During that hearing “Chief Judge Jones had already agreed that the claims against the product manufacturers should be be severed from the majority of the other claims and that discovery should proceed on different tracks.” Judge Leen ordered that the Southern Terrace claims be referred to Chief Judge Jones to determine if it should be consolidated with other yellow brass cases.

    Chief Judge Jones’s decision in Greystone Nevada rests on issues of whether the affected homeowners had signed arbitration agreements. The judge found that the “Defendant’s claims that the seven homeowners they have identified are subsequent purchasers who need not arbitrate with Greystone is definitively refuted by the evidence.”

    Judge Leen cites the Greystone decision in her ruling on Seasons Homeowners Association v. Richmond American Homes of Nevada. Richmond seeks to compel individual arbitration, stating that “the arbitration clause used singular rather than plural terms, and therefore, class arbitration was foreclosed.” Judge Leen determined that “under Nevada law, a homeowners association has statutory authority to represent homeowners associations in these types of actions. She did, however, accept Richmond’s argument that they could compel arbitration.

    The Waterfall order involves an attempt by two homeowners associations to seek a class action against seventeen defendants, the first twelve of whom are described as “the Viega Defendants” and “the Uponor Defendants.” Chief Judge Jones notes that “many of these Defendants have been sued in identical class actions by the same law firms, but with different named defendants.” The homeowner association seek to “represent their own 998 members directly but also wish to represent up to 10,000 homeowner associations representing up to 250,000 similarly situated homeowner members throughout the Las Vega area via this class action.”

    The judge has denied the Viega Defendants’ attempt to deny class certification, noting that the plaintiffs “argue that they intend to argue for class certification under Rule 23(b)(3). He also denied the motions by the two groups of the Viega Defendants. The U.S. Viega Defendants sought to be dismissed from the case for a variety of reasons. The judge noted of the claim that the plaintiffs had no injury of fact and are not alleging actual damage is contradicted by the allegations of actual damage made by the plaintiffs. ”They have alleged that the parts are defective and have already begun to corrode in at least a few sample circumstances, even if they have not yet failed.” To the argument that there re not particular claims made against defendants, the judge notes, “it is clear from the Complaint which Defendants are alleged to have manufactured and sold which brands of allegedly defective products, and which Defendants are alleged to have installed them.”

    The German Viega firms also sought to be dismissed from the suit, noting that “they have no property, employees, accounts, advertisements, etc. in Nevada and have not sold any products in Nevada.” However, the judge notes that “at least Waterfall, and perhaps Red Bluff, was still under construction when Viega, Inc. became the sole shareholder of Vanguard Industries, Inc.”

    Finally, both of Chief Judge Jones’s rulings cite a related case in the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota involving a class action settlement for those with F1807 systems. He notes in both these cases that “Plaintiffs disclaimed any claims based upon F1807 components.”

    Read the courts' decisions…

    Waterfall Homeowners Association v. Viega, Inc.

    Greystone Nevada, LLC v. Anthem Highlands Community Association

    Southern Terrace Homeowners Association v. Viega, Inc.

    The Seasons Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Richmond American Homes of Nevada, Inc.


    Homebuilders Go Green in Response to Homebuyer Demand

    May 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff

    McGrawHill Construction reports that 17 percent of new homes and remodels in 2011 were done with green building practices. Their report estimates that by 2016, this will rise to 29 to 38 percent of the market for home construction and remodeling.

    Consumers see the green buildings as more desirable, particularly where they are more energy efficient. Two thirds of builders noted their customers were interested in features that would lower the energy use of their homes. Consumers also feel that green building materials are more durable and see green homes as higher quality.

    Read the full story…


    Houses Can Still Make Cents: Illinois’ Implied Warranty of Habitability

    March 1, 2011 — Original Story by Marisa L. Saber Cozen O’Connor Subrogation & Recovery Law Blog

    In a report published earlier this week Marisa L. Saber writes about the implied warranty of habitability in the context of construction defect litigation. The piece speaks of the difficulties in alleging tort theories against builders and vendors in light of Illinois’ expansion of the economic loss doctrine, and how the implied warranty of habitability may provide another avenue for recovery.

    Read Full Story...


    Unlicensed Contractors Nabbed in Sting Operation

    September 9, 2011 — CDJ Staff

    The California State License Board charged sixteen people in the Fresno area with accepting contracting jobs without licenses. The Statewide Investigative Fraud Team of the CSLB set up a sting operation at a home in Clovis, California seeking bids on tree service, painting, and general contracting services. Those who bid for jobs at more than $500 are required under California law to be licensed. Unlicensed contractors can only work on jobs with a cost to the homeowner of less than $500 and must inform the homeowner that they are not licensed.

    In addition to citing contractors for not possessing appropriate licenses, the CSLB also cited contractors for failure to carry workers compensation insurance and illegal advertising. Further, California law limits down payments to the lesser of ten percent or $1,000. Two contractors were cited for requesting excessive down payments.

    One contractor, an unlicensed tree service contractor, had been cited previously in a sting operation. He failed to show up for his court date.

    Read the full story…


    Crane Dangles and So Do Insurance Questions

    November 7, 2012 — CDJ Staff

    Hurricane Sandy sent a construction crane dangling from the top of One57, a condo construction project in New York City. In response to the risk, the nearby Parker Meridian and other nearby buildings were evacuated until the crane could be stabilized. Businessweek reports that One57 involves “a tangle of companies,” including the developer, Extell Development and the contractor, Lend Lease Construction. Pinnacle Industries was responsible for providing and operating the crane.

    The insurance claims are yet to be made, but they will likely include the costs of evacuating nearby buildings and to cover any damage to the building itself. David DeLaRue, a vice president in construction practice at Willis Group Holdings said there would be two questions: “Did our insured do anything to cause that loss? Does this policy cover it?”

    Read the full story…


    Consumer Protection Act Whacks Seattle Roofing Contractor

    July 21, 2011 — Douglas Reiser, Builders Council

    It’s been over 1 year since we last visited the CertainTeed Corp. v. Seattle Roof Brokers lawsuit. After my original post, the contractor, James Garcia, appeared at Builders Counsel in a comment to defend himself. It appears that 1 year later, the court decided to side with CertainTeed and award them significant attorneys’ fees. Ready for the whole story? Its a pricey one.

    Back in July 2010, good friend Mike Atkins (Seattle Trademark Attorney) authored a post about a Seattle roofing contractor who had been sued for false advertising on his website. The lawsuit was raised by CertainTeed, a roofing material producer, whose products were the target of a Seattle contractor’s ire. Seattle Roof Brokers, owned by James Garcia, published content on its website, remarking that CertainTeed products have a history of “premature failure” and that they “will fail?.resale inspection after 15-20 years.”

    CertainTeed filed its action to obtain an injunction and damages under the Consumer Protection Act.

    Read the full story…

    Reprinted courtesy of Douglas Reiser of Reiser Legal LLC. Mr. Reiser can be contacted at info@reiserlegal.com


    Insurer’s Discovery Requests Ruled to be Overbroad in Construction Defect Suit

    October 28, 2011 — CDJ Staff

    The US District Court has ruled in the case of D.R. Horton Los Angeles Holding Co. Inc. v. American Safety Indemnity, Co. D.R. Horton was involved in a real estate development project. Its subcontractor, Ebensteiner Co., was insured by ASIC and named D.R. Horton as an additional insured and third-party beneficiary. D.R. Horton, in response to legal complaints and cross-complaints, filed for coverage from ASIC under the Ebensteiner policy. This was refused by ASIC. ASIC claimed that “there is no potential coverage for Ebensteiner as a Named Insurer and/or D.R. Horton as an Additional Insured.” They stated that “the requirements for coverage are not satisfied.”

    The case same to trial with the deadline for discovery set at March 1, 2011. ASIC stated they were seeking the developer’s “job file” for the Canyon Gate project. D.R. Horton claimed that ASIC’s discovery request was overbroad and that it would be “unduly burdensome for it to produce all documents responsive to the overbroad requests.”

    D.R. Horton did agree to produce several categories of documents, which included:

    “(1) final building inspection sign-offs for the homes that are the subject of the underlying litigation;(2) an updated homeowner matrix for the underlying actions; (3) the concrete subcontractor files; (4) the daily field logs for D.R. Horton’s on-site employee during Ebensteiner’s work; (5) documents relating to concrete work, including documents for concrete suppliers; (6) documents relating to compacting testing; (7) documents relating to grading; and (8) D.R. Horton’s request for proposal for grading”

    The court found that the requests from ASIC were overbroad, noting that the language of the ASIC Request for Production of Documents (RFP) 3-5 would include “subcontractor files for plumbing, electric, flooring, etc. - none of these being at issue in the case.” The court denied the ASIC’s motion to compel further documents.

    The court also found fault with ASIC’s RFPs 6 and 7. Here, D.R. Horton claimed the language was written so broadly it would require the production of sales information and, again, subcontractors not relevant to the case.

    Further, the court found that RFPs 8, 10, 11, and 13 were also overbroad. RFP 8 covered all subcontractors. D.R. Horton replied that they had earlier complied with the documents covered in RFPs 10 and 11. The court concurred. RFP 13 was denied as it went beyond the scope of admissible evidence, even including attorney-client communication.

    The court denied all of ASIC’s attempts to compel further discovery.

    Read the court’s decision…


    Remodels Replace Construction in Redding

    September 9, 2011 — CDJ Staff

    The Record Searchlight reports that while new construction is down in Redding, California, residential and commercial remodel permits are up 17 percent. By August 2010, there had been 63 housing and commercial business starts in Redding, while this year has seen only 15.

    One such remodel, that of Parkview Market, will cost about $201,000. Safeway is planning on two $80,000 remodels of its grocery stores in Redding. In all, the 150 building permits for remodels are worth a total of $2.8 million.

    Read the full story…


    Continuous Trigger of Coverage Adopted for Loss Under First Party Policy

    August 2, 2012 — Tred Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii

    The Seventh Circuit predicted that the Wisconsin Supreme Court would adopt the continuous injury trigger for first party property loss that extends over several policy periods. Miller v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 12940 (7th Cir. June 25, 2012).

    A home inspection report performed before the Millers purchased their home showed a soft spot on the roof. The stucco's finish color was also uneven and stained. Further, some water damage was found in the study and skylights above the kitchen sink. But the report advised that the exterior walls, chimney, grass roof, flashings, floor joists/beams and columns, garage walls and floor appeared serviceable. A roof specialist determined the soft spot was not significant and could be repaired for $1,500.

    The Millers purchased a homeowner's policy from Safeco on June 30, 2005. The policy went into effect the next day when the Millers closed on the property. But the Millers did not see the policy's terms until Safeco mailed them a copy of the policy at the end of July.

    Before receiving the policy, the Millers discovered severe inner wall water leaks and significant water infiltration on three of the home's exterior walls.

    Read the full story…

    Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com


    Judge Rejects Extrapolation, Harmon Tower to Remain Standing

    November 7, 2012 — CDJ Staff

    CityCenter has filed an emergency motion asking the Nevada Supreme Court to intervene in Judge Elizabeth Gonzalez’ order that the building’s defects cannot be extrapolated from those tested. CityCenter’s structural engineering expert “evaluated 397 of the Harmon’s critical structural elements and found all but one defective,” according to the article on Vegas.Inc. Judge Gonzalez would not permit this to be extrapolated to the untested 1,072, as the locations tested were not random.

    Judge Gonzalez also ruled that if CityCenter does additional testing, they may not appeal her order that ruled the extrapolation inadmissible. CityCenter argued to the Nevada Supreme Court that “the notion that CityCenter should be forced to incur additional millions of dollars in testing costs and sanctions ?Äì on the condition that it waive its right to appeal this ruling ?Äì just to be permitted to present its own damages evidence, shocks the conscience.”

    Gonzalez gave the okay to CityCenter to demolish the building, but its demolition would make any further testing impossible. Under Gonzalez’ ruling, the untested structural elements cannot b assumed to be defective.

    Read the full story…


    Lower Court “Eminently Reasonable” but Wrong in Construction Defect Case

    July 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff

    Noting that “circuit court’s orders are eminently reasonable, logical and just” the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia has granted a writ to halt enforcement of these orders and to compel arbitration instead in the case of State v. Tucker. The initial case concerned claims that an HVAC system had been improperly designed, constructed, manufactured, or maintained, leading to serious problems. Glenmark Holding, the owner of the Suncrest Executive Plaza brought a lawsuit against seven defendants. Three of the defendants, Morgan Keller, Inc, York International Corporation, and Johnson Controls, Inc. argued that Glenmark was obligated to enter into arbitration.

    Glenmark and the other defendants argued that the motions for arbitration should be denied “so all the claims and cross-claims of the parties could be litigated in one forum, in one proceeding.” The circuit court noted that arbitration is preferred over litigation because of its supposed “expeditious, economic resolution of issues,” but that in this case, “the petitioners would expend additional, not fewer resources responding to the parties’ claims and cross-claims.” As “compulsory arbitration would be insufficient and inequitable” the court denied the request, finding the arbitration clauses “unconscionable and, therefore, unenforceable.”

    Morgan Keller, York, and Johson argued that “the interpretation of arbitration clauses is governed exclusively by the Federal Arbitration Act.” The appeals court found that “the circuit court was within its authority to consider Glenmark’s claim that the arbitration clauses were unenforceable.” However, the appeals court rejected the circuit court’s conclusion about the “piecemeal” resolution of the conflict, as it contradicts a Supreme Court ruling. The Supreme Court stated in 1983 that the FAA “requires piecemeal resolution when necessary to give effect to an arbitration agreement.” In a 1985 decision, the Court held that a court could “not substitute [its] own views of economy and efficiency.”

    Nor could the court find the arbitration clause to be unconscionable or unenforceable. The court noted that the contract was a standard AIA form, and was amended by the parties involved, whom the court characterized as “commercially sophisticated.” The court found that the agreement limited the rights of all parties and was not one-sided.

    As the arbitration clause was neither unconscionable nor unenforceable, and Supreme Court rulings preclude a court from substituting its own procedures, even when these are “eminently reasonable, logical and just,” the appeals court halted the order of the circuit court, sending the matter to arbitration.

    Read the court’s decision…


    No Coverage for Property Damage That is Limited to Work Completed by Subcontractor

    April 25, 2012 — Tred Eyerly, Construction Law Hawaii

    The issue before the 11th Circuit was whether, under Florida law, a general contractor had coverage for a property damage claim limited to the defective work performed by a subcontractor, and not affecting any other portion of the project. The court found no coverage in Amerisure Mut. Ins. Co. v. Auchter Co., 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 5412 (11th Cir. March 15, 2012).

    Amelia Island Company contracted with Auchter Company, a general contractor, for construction of an inn and conference room. Auchter subcontracted with Register Contracting Company to install the Inn’s roof. Pursuant to the Florida Building Code, installation of the roof required that it be able to withstand 110 m.p.h. winds.

    Register completed installing the roof tiles in January 1998. Beginning in 2002, the tiles began dislodging from the roof. During the 2004 hurricane season, three hurricanes caused more tiles to come off the roof. Some of these tiles hit other tiles, cracking them.

    In 2006, the parties went to arbitration over the costs of repairs for the roof.

    Read the full story…

    Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com