The Ever-Growing Thicket Of California Civil Code Section 2782
January 6, 2012 — Michael D. Worthing, Borton Petrini
California Civil Code section 2782 imposes limits on indemnity and defense provisions in construction contracts. Since the initial adoption of S.B. 8001 in 2002 (eff. January 1, 2003) section 27822 has been revised several times, and legislative history suggests that interest groups representing builders, developers and sub-contractors, as well as the insurance industry, have seen legislative action on these indemnity and defense issues as part of the overall response to the same economic pressures resulting from construction defect litigation that gave rise to S.B. 800. Amendments in 2005, 2007, 2008 and 2011 (each effective January 1 of the following year) have increasingly entangled the provisions of Section 2782 with various provisions of S.B. 800. The application of section 2782 to construction contracts, and in particular contracts between developer-builders and subcontractors, executed after January 1, 2006, will require a concurrent reading and understanding of S.B. 800, the application of which is itself still in flux.
The time a construction contract was executed will likely determine which version of section 2782, read in connection with provisions of S.B.800, is applicable. Because of the nature of construction defect litigation, the determination of relative rights and liabilities of developer-builders vis-à-vis subcontractors under construction contracts does not become the subject of litigation, and legal and judicial interpretation, until years after the contracts were entered and work performed. As of the date this article is submitted, there has been no case law interpreting or applying any of the post S.B. 800 amendments, in part, and perhaps primarily, because litigation arising from construction contracts executed after January 1, 2006, has not yet reached the appellate courts.
SECTION 2782 AT THE TIME S.B. 800 WAS ENACTED
Section 2782 was originally enacted in 1967 and amended several times to the version in effect when S.B. 800 became law, at which time the section was relatively simple and straightforward. It then consisted of two subdivisions, which have essentially remained unchanged until the most recent amendment during the 2011 legislative session.
Section 2782 (a) prohibited, and still prohibits, provisions in construction contracts that “purport to indemnify the promisee against liability for damages for death or bodily injury to persons, injury to property, or any other loss, damage or expense arising from the sole negligence or willful misconduct of the promise.” This provision essentially prohibits what had been referred to as so-called Type I or “specific” indemnity provisions. In such agreements, the indemnitor [the promisor, that is, the person or entity indemnifying] will indemnify the indemnitee [the promisee, that is, the person or entity being protected by the indemnity] for the indemnitee’s own negligence, whether active or passive, whether the indemnitee is solely negligent or concurrently negligent with the indemnitor. (See, MacDonald & Kruse, Inc. v. San Jose Steel Co. (1972) 29 Cal.App.3d 413, 419.)3 Section 2782 (a) has remained essentially intact since the enactment of S.B. 800. It still must be considered and applied to interpret a construction contract. Generally, it will apply to contracts not involving a public agency; the next part of section 2782 specifically governs such contracts.
The second subdivision prohibits provisions in any construction contract with a public agency which purport to impose on the contractor, or relieve the public agency from, liability for the active negligence of the public agency. Subdivision (b) has been revised by the 2011 amendment, discussed below. If a construction contract with the public agency is for residential construction, the standards of S.B. 800 likely apply.4
This was the extent of section 2782 on January 1, 2003, when S.B. 800 went into effect, and remained so until January 1, 2006. This version will govern interpretation and application of indemnity and defense provisions in construction contracts executed before January 1, 2006.5
2005 AMENDMENT
The first “post S.B. 800” change to Section 2782 was in enacted in 2005, effective January 1, 2006, and added two new sections. Subdivision (c) stated (in somewhat greater detail than paraphrased here) that for residential construction contracts, or amendments thereto, entered into after January 1, 2006, a subcontractor cannot be required to indemnify (including the cost to defend) a builder for construction defects that arise out of negligence or design defects of the builder or other independent contractors, or that do not arise out of the scope of the subcontractor=s scope of work. The term “residential construction” was defined by reference to S.B.800 generally, and the term “builder” was defined by reference to section 911 (a part of S.B. 800), for the first time expressly connecting provisions of section 2782 to S.B. 800. Contractual provisions not expressly prohibited were reserved to the agreement of the parties.
What subdivision (c) took away was partially given back by subdivision (d). It stated that “subdivision (c) does not prohibit a subcontractor and builder from mutually agreeing to the timing or immediacy of the defense and provisions for reimbursement of defense fees and costs, so long as that agreement, upon final resolution of the claims, does not waive or modify the provisions of subdivision (c).”6 In addition, it stated that this subdivision (c) did not affect the obligations of an insurance carrier under Presley Homes, Inc. v. American States Insurance Company (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 571, which holds that where an insurer has a duty to defend a developer pursuant to an additional insured endorsement obtained under a subcontractor’s policy, that duty generally applies to the entire action, even if the suit involves both covered and uncovered claims, or a single claim only partially covered by the policy. Finally, subdivision (d) stated that the amendment did not affect the builder’s or subcontractor’s obligations under S.B. 800. Both of these latter provisions, relating to the Presley Homes case, and obligations under S.B. 800, have been carried forward essentially intact in subsequent amendments of section 2782.
This version of section 2782 will be applicable to any contract between a builder as defined by section 911 (see fn. 4, above) and a subcontractor executed between January 1, 2006, and December 31, 2008. Thus, a general contractor, etc., who is not a builder is not subject to the provisions added by the 2005 amendment; this changed with the next amendment.
It is not clear whether this version would apply to a contract entered before January 1, 2006, but amended after that date. Subdivision (c) applies to “all construction contracts, and amendments thereto, entered into after January 1, 2006, for residential construction.” It would seem that the clearest and most logical construction would apply it only to contracts originally made after January 1, 2006, and thereafter amended, but there has been no judicial determination of this issue.
In addition, logically it would seem that this version of section 2782 should be applicable to construction contracts for residential construction between a builder and a subcontractor, entered between January 1, 2006, and December 31, 2008; however, legislative history relating to the 2008 amendment discussed below suggests a different result might occur.
2007 AMENDMENT
The second “post S.B. 800” amendment in 2007 (effective January 1, 2008), added subdivisions (e)(1) and (e)(2).
Subdivision (e)(1) added general contractors and subcontractors not affiliated with the builder and imposed essentially the same restrictions on provisions to indemnify, including the cost to defend, them as had been imposed on the “builder” by the 2005 amendment. The amendment refers to section 911 (b), again part of S.B. 800, to define general contractors, etc., not affiliated with the builder.
Subdivision (e)(1) essentially repeated the provisions of subdivision (d) permitting agreement to the timing and immediacy of the defense, the reference to the Presley Homes case, and the general contractor’s or subcontractor’s obligations under S.B. 800.
It appears this amendment was an attempt to harmonize the new restrictions on indemnity and defense provisions with S.B. 800. The 2005 amendment, whether by oversight or intent, covered only builders and not general contractors, although both classes are subject to the provisions of S.B. 800; the 2007 amendment added non-builder-affiliated general contractors.
Again, logically, it would seem that this version of section 2782 should be applicable to construction contracts for residential construction between a general contractor or contractor not affiliated with a builder and a subcontractor, entered between January 1 and December 31, 2008; however, legislative history relating to the 2008 amendment discussed below suggests a different result might occur. The same potential uncertainty regarding applicability to a contract entered before January 1, 2008, but amended after that date, exists for this provision as for the prior amendment, discussed above.
2008 AMENDMENT
The third “post S.B. 800” amendment in 2008 (effective January 1, 2009), reorganized the language relating to prohibited indemnity provisions, added a reference to insurance in that same prohibition, extensively rewrote the provisions governing agreements relating to the timing or immediacy of defense, added language preserving equitable indemnity claims, and added language defining “construction defect” by reference to the standards set forth in S.B. 800.
Subdivisions (a) and (b) remained unchanged.
Subdivision (c) now made a combined reference to builders (again by reference to section 911), as well as general contractors or contractors not affiliated with the builder (again by reference to section 911 (b)), rather than dealing with the two groups in separate but nearly identical subdivisions as previously. It otherwise restated the same limitations that were previously set forth separately in subdivisions (c) and (e), as well as the reference to the Presley Homes case, and the general contractor’s or subcontractor’s obligations under S.B. 800, but with one important addition. The word “insure” was added to the description of prohibited provisions, to-wit: “provisions? that purport to insure or indemnify, including the cost to defend, the builder, [etc.]? are unenforceable” to the extent they arise out of claims of the type previously described.
It is unclear what impact the addition of this single word “insure” will have; and, it will have to be read in light of the preservation of the language that it shall not affect the obligations of an insurance carrier under the holding of the Presley Homes case. Suppose a carrier had issued an additional insured endorsement under which it would otherwise be required to defend a builder or general contractor consistent with the Presley Homes rule: would this newly added single word (restricting the construction contract, to which the carrier is not a party) give the carrier a basis for denying coverage under the insurance contract? Or would the continued inclusion of the express language that it does not affect the obligations of an insurance carrier under Presley Homes control? That is surely an issue that will have to be worked out by the courts.
The new subdivision (d) addressed defense obligations. Again it permitted parties to agree to the timing and immediacy of the defense and provision for reimbursement of defense fees and costs, but imposed a very detailed scheme that appears to limit the extent of such agreement. A subcontractor owes no defense or indemnity obligation until the builder or general contractor provides a written tender of the claim, which has the same force and effect as notice of commencement of a legal proceeding. Upon that tender the subcontractor shall elect to follow one of two ways of performing: subdivision (d) (1) permits the subcontractor to defend with counsel of its choice and to control the defense, if the subcontractor gives written notice of this election within a reasonable time after receipt of the written tender and in no event later than 90 days following that receipt; subdivision (d) (2) provides an alternative by which the subcontractor pays a reasonable allocated share of the builder’s or general contractor’s defense fees and costs within 30 days of receipt of an invoice, subject to reallocation upon final resolution of the claim by settlement or judgment. Subdivision (e) sets forth remedies available to the builder or general contractor if a subcontractor fails to timely and adequately perform its obligations under either of the two alternatives in subdivision (d), including compensatory and consequential damages, reasonable attorneys’ fees in connection with the first alternative, and interest on defense and indemnity costs in connection with the second alternative. Subdivision (e) ends with provisions relating to reallocation of defense costs, and damages for failure to reallocate.
Application of these requirements in actual litigation is likely to be cumbersome and potentially fraught with conflicts. If retained pursuant to subdivision (d) (1) does the attorney represent the builder, the subcontractor, or both? To whom does the attorney owe his or her fiduciary duty? Can an appropriate informed written consent be formulated, for example, under Rule 3-310 of the California Rules of Professional Conduct, or Rule 1.7, ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct? Could an attorney retained by a subcontractor blame the subcontractor if that is in the developer’s best interests? If multiple subcontractors elect to defend directly, how would the defense be coordinated among the potentially multiple attorneys so retained? Would an attorney retained by one subcontractor be able, or inclined, to blame another subcontractor who also chose to defend directly, in other words, what would prevent inconsistent defense positions amongst the various counsel retained by subcontractors for the developer? There may be solutions to such practical and professional considerations but it seems an ethical thicket awaits any attorney involved in such circumstances.
Subdivision (e) and (f) preserve equitable indemnity claims for the builder, general contractor or subcontractor, the first in general, the second as against any supplier, design profession, or product manufacturer. Finally, the 2008 amendment added for the first time, in subdivision (h), language defining "construction defect" as used in section 2782 as a violation of standards set forth in S.B. 800.
The inclusion of these last three subsections would seem to work against simplification of litigation. A builder or general contractor is likely to allege a claim for equitable indemnity against any and all subcontractors in addition to claims for contractual indemnity and defense (however limited by the other provisions of section 2782). Nothing in the section suggests the subcontractor should, or even can, somehow take on the representation of the builder, etc., in connection with a claim of equitable indemnity back against the subcontractor.
And the limited definition of “construction defect” in subdivision (h) appears to raise an issue of the applicability of the limitations set forth in subdivision (c). Although there is a school of thought that section 941 limits residential construction defect claims only to breach of the performance standards under S.B. 800, it is still common for CD complaints to plead other legal theories, e.g., breach of contract, breach of warranty, negligence, etc., in addition to violation of S.B. 800 standards. With the addition of subdivision (h) it is arguable that the restrictions on indemnity and defense provisions spelled out in subdivisions (c) and (d), both of which relate to claims for residential construction defects, are applicable only to claims for violation of S.B. 800 standards, and not other residential construction defect claims. In other words, a developer might conceivably still be entitled to a broader scope of indemnity and concomitant defense for other types of claims, such as breach of contract, breach of warranty, negligence, etc., so long as the indemnity does not violate the limitation of subdivision (a) against Type I indemnity, which as noted above, has remained intact through these revisions.
Finally, it would seem that this version of section 2782 should be applicable to contracts executed between builders, general contractors, etc., on the one hand and subcontractors on the other hand on and after January 1, 2009. And, as noted above in connection with the 2005 and 2007 amendments, logic would suggest that those versions would ordinarily apply to contracts executed during the time periods mentioned above. But, the Legislative Counsel’s Digest for the 2008 amendment as it finally was enacted into law includes the following statements:
This bill would delete the provisions applicable to construction contracts entered into on or after January 1, 2008, that purport to indemnify the general contractor or contractor not affiliated with the builder. The bill would revise the provisions applicable to contracts entered into after January 1, 2006, to instead apply to contracts entered into after January 1, 2009, and to apply to agreements that purport to insure or indemnify the builder or the general contractor or contractor not affiliated with the builder, as described.
Although it seems a startling result, this legislative history suggests an argument can be made that the 2008 amendment retroactively nullified the effect of the 2005 and 2007 amendments, so that contracts executed from January 1, 2006, as to builders or January 1, 2008, for general contractors, etc., through December 31, 2008, are still governed by the provisions of section 2782 as it was on the books prior to the first post-S.B. 800 amendment in 2005.
2011 AMENDMENT
Section 2782 has been amended yet again in the 2011 session of the California Legislature, effective January 1, 2012; however, the substantive changes affect certain contracts entered on or after January 1, 2013. All of the provisions contained in the 2008 amendment have been carried forward in the most recent amendment, although re-numbered: (c) became (d), etc., through (h) becoming (i). So, the law governing construction contracts entered into after January 1, 2009, for residential construction, as between a builder, or a general contractor, etc., not affiliated with a builder, and regarding insurance, indemnity or defense relating to claims for construction defects, remains the same as in the 2008 amendment.
As noted above the substantive changes to section 2782 all affect contracts entered into on or after January 1, 2013. Subdivision (b) has been amended such that any provision in a contract with a public agency that purports to impose on any contractor, etc., or relieve the public agency from, liability for the active negligence of the public agency will be void and unenforceable. A new subdivision (c) has been added that imposes a similar restriction on construction contracts with the owner of privately owned real property to be improved and as to which the owner is not acting as a contractor or supplier of materials or equipment to the work. This new restriction in subdivision (c) does not apply to a homeowner performing a home improvement project on his or her own single family dwelling.
The 2011 bill amending section 2782 also added a new section 2782.05, which will make void and unenforceable any provision in any construction contract (again, entered on or after January 1, 2013) that purports to insure or indemnify, including the cost to defend, a general contractor, construction manager, or other subcontractor, by a subcontractor for claims that arise out of the active negligence or willful misconduct of the general contractor, etc., or other independent contractors, etc., or to the extent the claims do not arise out of the scope of work of the subcontractor. However, the section also includes a long list of situations to which it does not apply, including all of those covered by section 2782 (residential construction subject to S.B. 800, public agency contracts subject to section 2782 (b), and direct contracts with private property owners subject to the new section 2782 (c)) as well as eight other categories. This apparently is intended to serve as a “catch-all” to extend a limitation on indemnity agreements to all construction contracts not previously swept into this widening legislative scheme, although the exact phrasing is slightly different.7
The new section 2782.05 then permits a mutual agreement to the timing or immediacy of a defense under a scheme essentially identical to that imposed in the 2008 amendment to section 2782: defend with counsel of choice, and maintain control of the defense; or, pay a reasonable allocated share of defense fees and costs. The same logistical and ethical difficulties presented by the 2008 scheme discussed above would likely be present in cases that fall under the new section 2782.05.
CONCLUSION
The California Legislature has been revising section 2782 since shortly after the adoption of S.B. 800. Each revision has been more complicated than the last, and each has tied certain provisions of section 2782 more closely to S.B. 800. In particular, with regard to construction defect claims relating to residential dwellings which are subject to S.B. 800, the Legislature has apparently attempted to exercise more and more control over the scope of allowable indemnity and dictated a very narrow scheme to govern how the defense obligation arising from a contractual indemnity is to be implemented. It seems likely that any attempt to manage the defense of a construction defect case under the options that allow a subcontractor to defend directly and control the defense will create a logistical problem and an ethical difficulty for any attorney attempting to defend a developer at the behest and direction of a subcontractor. Finally, as set forth in the current version of section 2782 relating to contractual indemnity and defense of S.B. 800 type cases (subdivisions (c) through (h) in the 2008 version, now subdivisions (d) through (i) in the 2011 amendment), the Legislature has apparently narrowed the application to only claims of violation of S.B. 800 standards. This may have, in essence, removed the restrictions on indemnity and defense provisions as they relate to other theories pleaded against developers in construction defense cases, e.g., breach of contract, breach of warranty, negligence, and the like. It is not at all clear that the Legislature has accomplished what it set out do accomplish. Rather, the law may have come full circle back to where it began, except for one legal theory, i.e. violation of S.B. 800 standards, currently being used in residential construction defect cases. For any other legal theory the limitation of section 2782 (a) may be solely controlling.
- California Civil Code section 43.99, and sections 895 to 945.5.
- All statutory references in this article are to the California Civil Code unless otherwise specified.
- Type I or specific indemnity does not exactly match the scope of proscribed indemnity as described in section 2782 (a) but it is the closest. More recent case law in California has eschewed a mechanical application of the MacDonald & Kruse typology in favor of examining the precise text of the actual contract (See, e.g., St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Frontier Pacific Ins. Co. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1234, 1246, n. 6) but some recent cases still use the Type I, II and II classifications. And, an understanding of that “historical” typology is useful as an aid to evaluating and understanding express indemnity in general.
- The provisions of S.B. 800 other than the prelitigation procedures of sections 910 through 938 apply to general contractors, subcontractors, etc., pursuant to section 936. The prelitigation procedures generally involve a “builder,” which is specifically defined in section 911 (a) by reference to entities or individuals in the business of selling residential units to the public or of building, developing, or constructing residential units for public purchase. Pursuant to section 911 (b) the term builder does not include general contractors, etc., not affiliated with the builder. Thus, a general contractor who constructs residential housing pursuant to a contract with a public agency is still subject to claims for violation of the standards set forth in sections 896 and 897, resulting from its negligent act or omission or breach of contract, pursuant to section 936.
- As noted above, there has been no case law yet interpreting any of the “post S.B. 800” changes to Section 2782. One of the most important legal decisions relating to express indemnity and defense obligations and rights between developer-builders and sub-contractors was published after two of the amendments but based upon contracts executed and the language of section 2782 prior to January 1, 2006. (See, Crawford v. Weather Shield Mfg., Inc. (2008) 44 Cal.4th 541, 547, 566-67, fn. 14).
- Subcontractor dissatisfaction with the perceived inadequacy of protection afforded by this provision apparently became the impetus for a 2008 amendment to section 2782, discussed below, at least based upon the numerous (form) letters submitted to legislators in connection therewith.
- Section 2782 (a), where we started, and which has continued without change, prohibits indemnity for claims arising out of the sole negligence or willful misconduct of the promisee; sole negligence can be either active or passive. The various versions relating to residential construction prohibit indemnity for the negligence of the builder, etc., suggesting there is no express contractual indemnity for the negligence of the subcontractor if the builder, etc., is at all negligent. This is tempered a bit by the preservation of the right to equitable indemnity, which will now be found in section 2782 (g) and (h).
Courtesy of Michael D. Worthing of Borton Petrini, LLP. Mr. Worthing can be contacted at mworthing@bortonpetrini.com.
Florida Property Bill Passes Economic Affairs Committee with Amendments
April 14, 2011 — April 14, 2011 Beverley BevenFlorez - Construction Defect Journal
The Florida Property Bill (HBB 803) was passed by the Economic Affairs Committee by a vote of 11-7, according to Property Casualty 360, after adopting nine new amendments. The additions to the bill included limiting notice of claims to a set number of years, extending the statute of limitation on property claims from five years to six years, among others.
HB 803 and SB 408, the Senate companion bill, focus primarily on residential property insurance. They make changes to the Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund, while also promoting increased notification of policy changes to policyholders. Sections of the bills provide minor fixes such as renaming Citizens Property Insurance Corporation to Taxpayer-Funded Property Insurance Corporation. However, other sections of the bills contain more significant policy changes such as sinkhole coverage and hurricane claims.
The bills’ intent, according to the SunSentinel.com, is to reduce fraudulent claims and to bring new insurers into the insurance market. However, SunSentinel.com also reports that the bills may drastically increase property insurance premiums.
Read the full Property Casualty 360 article...
Read the full Sun Sentinel article...
Consulting Firm Indicted and Charged with Falsifying Concrete Reports
August 17, 2011 — CDJ Staff
The New York Times reports that a company paid to inspect concrete at major public works projects in New York has been charged with falsifying results. They had been hired by the city three years ago after their predecessor was found to have falsified results.
According to the Times, investigators found nothing legitimate in nearly three thousand reports. The owner and five employees of American Standard Testing and Consulting Laboratories have been indicted on twenty-nine counts, including charges under New York’s racketeering law. Prison terms could be up to twenty-five years.
Prior to the city’s contract with American Standard, the city employed a firm called Testwell. Testwell was found in 2008 to have falsified its test results.
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Gut Feeling Does Not Disqualify Expert Opinion
July 6, 2011 — CDJ Staff
The New Jersey Supreme Court issued a ruling in June on the case of Nevins v. Toll in which they reversed an earlier decision and remanded the case to a lower court for retrial. At issue in the case was the testimony of the plaintiff’s expert, J. Anthony Dowling. In depositions, Mr. Dowling said that his estimates for repair were based on a “gut feeling.” Dowling said he had “very little” experience in cost estimates for single-family homes. The defendants sought to bar Dowling’s testimony which was granted by the judge. Without an expert, Ms. Nevin’s case was dismissed.
Describing Dowling’s report as “far from a model of how an expert’s opinion in a construction case should be presented,” the court noted that Dowling is not a professional expert witness. However, the court did note that Dowling is a professional cost estimator. Despite Mr. Dowling using his “gut feeling” to construct his estimate, the New Jersey Supreme Court felt that whether his estimate is convincing is “a question for the jury.”
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Limitations of Liability in Subcontractors’ Contracts May Not Be Enforceable in Colorado to Limit Claims by Construction Professionals.
October 23, 2012 — Heidi J. Gassman, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell
The Colorado Homeowner Protection Act of 2007 (“HPA”), codified at C.R.S. § 13-20-806(7), specifically voids express waivers of, or limitations on, a residential property owner’s ability to enforce any rights, remedies, and damages provided by law in a construction defect case. Practically speaking, this means that limitation of liability provisions in contracts between construction professionals and residential homeowners are void and will not be enforced in Colorado. The HPA can extend even further, however, to subcontractors on residential projects, as seen in a recent District Court ruling.
The HPA was tested in Thacker v. Gallery Homes, et al., v. Terracon Consultants, Inc., et al., Larimer County District Court Case No. 2007CV1195. Gallery Homes hired Terracon to provide geotechnical and structural engineering services at the Colony Ridge subdivision in Loveland, Colorado. Terracon performed work for Gallery Homes under three separate contracts, each of which included a provision limiting Terracon’s total liability to Gallery Homes.
After the project was completed, two homeowners filed suit against Gallery Homes for alleged construction defects involving movement of their basement floor systems and foundations and damage to porches, patios, garages, and driveways. Gallery Homes sued Terracon as a third-party defendant, and Terracon sought to enforce its limitation of liability provisions via a partial summary judgment motion.
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Reprinted courtesy of Heidi J. Gassman, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC. Ms. Gassman can be contacted at gassman@hhmrlaw.com
California Supreme Court Finds Associations Bound by Member Arbitration Clauses
September 13, 2012 — CDJ Staff
In a decision with great implications for construction defect suits in California, the California Supreme Court has ruled in Pinnacle Museum Tower Association v. Pinnacle Market Development that arbitration clauses binding on the members of the association are also binding on the association itself. They concluded this, even though “the association did not exist as an entity independent of the developer when the declaration was drafted and recorded.” The opinion, written by Justice Baxter, was joined by four additional justices, with two separate concurrences and a dissenting opinion by Justice Kennard.
The Pinnacle homeowners sought to bring suit over construction defect claims. In response, the developer filed a motion to compel arbitration. The association argued that the arbitration clause signed by its individual members was not binding on it. The Appeals Court invalidated the arbitration agreement “finding it marked by slight substantive unconscionability and high degree of procedural unconscionability. The Appeals Court determined that “for all intents and purposes, Pinnacle was the only party to the ‘agreement,’ and there was no independent homeowners association when Pinnacle recorded the CC&R’s.” However, the California Supreme Court said that this was “not persuasive in light of the statutory and contract principles in play.”
The opinion notes that “the Project CC&R’s provides that Pinnacle and, by accepting a deed to any portion of the Project property, the Association and each individual condominium owner agree to submit any construction dispute to binding arbitration in accordance with the FAA.” The Court noted that “settled principles of condominium law establish that an owners association, like its constituent members, must act in conformity with the terms of a recorded declaration,” which, as the Court notes, includes the CC&Rs.
After finding that the terms were binding on the Association, the Court then questioned whether the terms were “unenforceable as unconscionable,” noting that “the party resisting arbitration bears the burden of proving unconscionability.” But the Court found that “the arbitration provisions of article XVIII are not substantively unconscionable.” Additionally, they found “no support for the Association’s claims of unfairness and absence of mutuality.”
Read the court’s decision…
New Apartment Tower on the Rise in Seattle
September 13, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The Seattle Times reports that groundbreaking is planned for a forty-story tower in Seattle. The building process will take at least five years, during which time, according to the paper, there will be nearly eight thousand new apartments in Seattle. The planned tower will add another 386 units to that.
The developer, Holland Partner Group, has four other apartments buildings planned or in construction currently, which will account for more than a thousand of the units being added to the city’s apartment stock.
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Texas covered versus uncovered allocation and “legally obligated to pay.”
April 27, 2011 — April 27, 2011, by CDCoverage.com
In Markel American Ins. Co. v. Lennar Corp., No. 14-10-00008-CV (Tex. Ct. App. April 19, 2011), insured homebuilder Lennar filed suit against its insurer Markel seeking recovery of costs incurred by Lennar to repair water damage to homes resulting from defective EIFS siding. Following a jury trial, judgment was entered in favor of Lennar and against Markel. On appeal, the intermediate appellate court reversed. Applying Texas law, the court first held that Lennar failed to satisfy its burden of allocating damages between covered and uncovered. In a prior decision, the court had held that, while the costs incurred by Lennar for the repair of the resulting water damage
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Reprinted courtesy of CDCoverage.com
New Safety Standards Issued by ASSE and ANSI
March 28, 2012 — Melissa Dewey Brumback, Construction Law North Carolina
The American National Standards Institute (ANSI) and the American Society of Safety Engineers (ASSE) have recently announced their approval of two new safety standards to enhance construction site safety.
The two new standards, which are set to take effect during June 2012, are the ANSI/ASSE A10.1-2011 Pre-Project and Pre-Task Safety and Health Planning for Construction and Demolition Operations, and the ANSI/ASSE A10.26-2011 Emergency Procedures for Construction and Demolition Sites.
The new A10.1-2011 standard was designed to assist construction owners, contractors, and designers by ensuring that safety and health planning were standard parts of their pre-construction planning. It is also intended to help owners of construction sites to establish a process for evaluating constructor candidates with regard to their safety and health performance planning.
The A10.26 standard applies to emergency situations, including fires, collapses, and hazardous spills. The standard deals with emergency rescue, evacuation, and transportation of injured workers, and also plans for coordinating with emergency medical facilities ahead of potential disasters.
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Reprinted courtesy of Melissa Dewey Brumback of Ragsdale Liggett PLLC. Ms. Brumback can be contacted at mbrumback@rl-law.com.
Granting Stay, Federal Court Reviews Construction Defect Coverage in Hawaii
January 6, 2012 — Tred Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
The federal district court ultimately stayed a construction defect case, but offered comments on the current status of coverage disputes for such defects in Hawaii. See National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa. v. Simpson Mfg. Co., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128481(D. Haw. Nov. 7, 2011).
National Union filed a complaint for declaratory relief to establish it had no duty to defend or to indemnify Simpson Manufacturing Company in four actions pending in the Hawaii state courts. The state court actions concerned allegedly defective hurricane strap tie hold downs that were manufactured and sold by Simpson. The hurricane ties allegedly began to prematurely corrode and rust, causing cracking, spalling and other damage to homes.
National Union contended the underlying allegations did not constitute "property damage" caused by an "occurrence," as defined in the policies.
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
New Households Moving to Apartments
December 20, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The New York Times reports that multifamily construction?Äîapartment buildings?Äîis leading the recovery in construction. Construction of single-family homes is only a third of the way up from its fall from its earlier heights, while multifamily construction has recovered two-thirds of its peak. Young adults are moving out of their parents’ homes, but instead of buying homes, they’re renting apartments.
Houston is adding thousands of new units, leading to a fear of overbuilding. Rents have been rising, but as the supply of apartment units rises, higher rents may be unsustainable. However, during the recession, young adults did not move out of their parents’ homes, leading to about two million doubled-up households. David Crowe, the chief economist of the National Association of Home Builders, noted that “all of the net addition to households since 2004 has been in rentals.”
Read the full story…
2011 West Coast Casualty Construction Defect Seminar – Recap
June 1, 2011 — CDJ Staff
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| Event exhibitors and sponsors contribute to an informative and engaging environment |
This year’s meeting was the best yet for the industry-leading construction defect and claims event.
This year’s seminar concluded on May 13, 2011 with the Construction Defect Community Charitable Foundation Golf Tournament, held at Strawberry Farms Golf Course.
The Disneyland Hotel in Anaheim, California was the place where more than 1,500 attendees convened for two days of professional development activities and seminars that included CLE workshops and panel discussions of special interest to legal and insurance professionals concerned with construction defect and claims litigation. Key events included “Challenges for Experts in Construction Defect Claims and Litigation,” “Keeping Up with Construction Defect Coverage,” and “Tips for Avoiding the ‘Perfect Storm’ in Handling of Wrap Claims.”
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| Supporting the golf tournament at the 15th hole |
This year’s Ollie award was given to George D. Calkins II, Esq. The West Coast Casualty Jerrold S. Oliver Award of Excellence was named in honor of the late Judge Jerrold S. Oliver, and recognizes an individual who is outstanding or has contributed to the betterment of the construction community.
In addition to being the most comprehensive professional development seminar in the area of construction defects, this year’s seminar was equally valuable as a networking opportunity for members of the industry. People participated in professional development events during the day and then continued networking in the evening at numerous social events. The Lawn Party as well as the legendary Wood, Smith, Henning & Berman events were very well attended. Additional valuable networking events were hosted by a number of industry professionals at the House of Blues, and Tortilla Joe’s.
As of this writing the 2011, West Coast Casualty's Construction Defect Seminar has applied for or has already received the following continuing education accreditation in the following areas;
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For more information about next year’s event, visit West Coast Casualty.
A Downside of Associational Standing - HOA's Claims Against Subcontractors Barred by Statute of Limitations
March 28, 2012 — Bret Cogdill, Colorado Construction Litigation
In multi-family construction defect litigation in Colorado, homeowners associations rely on associational standing to pursue claims affecting more than two units and to bring claims covering an entire development. This practice broadens an association’s case beyond what individual, aggrieved owners would otherwise bring on their own against a developer or builder-vendor. However, reliance on associational standing to combine homeowners’ defect claims into a single lawsuit has its drawbacks to homeowners.
A recent order in the case Villa Mirage Condominium Owners’ Association, Inc., v. Stetson 162, LLC, et al., in El Paso County District Court, presents an example. There, the HOA unsuccessfully sought a determination from the court that its claims against subcontractors were not barred by the statute of limitations. To do so, the HOAs attempted to apply the Colorado Common Interest Ownership Act (“CCIOA”), which governs the creation and operation of HOAs, and a statute intended to apply to persons under a legal disability.
Under CCIOA, during the period of “declarant control” the developer may appoint members to the association’s executive board until sufficient homeowners have moved into the development and taken seats on the board.
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Reprinted courtesy of Bret Cogdill of Higgins, Hopkins, McClain & Roswell, LLC. Mr. Cogdill can be contacted at cogdill@hhmrlaw.com.
Insurance Company Prevails in “Chinese Drywall” Case
June 17, 2011 — CDJ Staff
The Louisiana Court of Appeals rejected an appeal to reverse a summary judgment granted to Louisiana Citizens Property Insurance Company. Terrence and Rhonda Ross contracted for a remodel of their home in which Chinese-made drywall was used. When the drywall emitted harmful gasses, the Rosses filed a claim under their insurance policy. This claim was rejected under four exclusions: for faulty materials, latent defect, loss by corrosion, and loss by pollution. After the claim was denied, the Rosses sued Louisiana Citizens.
In April 2010, the lower court granted a summary judgment, followed by a May, 2010 order dismissing the Rosses’ claims against Louisiana Citizens. The Rosses appealed this decision. In the court’s review, they agreed with Louisiana Citizens and the lower court on all counts. Although the Rosses maintained that the drywall was not defective (as it still functioned as drywall), the court ruled that its emission of sulfuric gases was a defect. Further, as it was in place for two years before this became evident, it was also a latent defect. Damage to the Rosses’ home consisted of corrosion damage caused by the pollutants in the drywall.
The Rosses made an additional claim that since their policy covered smoke damage, this should be covered, as the harm was done by sulfuric gases. The court noted that the contract specifies “fumes or vapors from a boiler, furnace, or related equipment,” none of which apply in this case.
Read the court’s decision
Fifth Circuit Reverses Insurers’ Summary Judgment Award Based on "Your Work" Exclusion
November 18, 2011 — Tred Eyerley, Insurance Law Hawaii
Application of the facts to the "your work" exclusion was the key to resolving coverage issued in Am. Home Assurance Co. v. Cat Tech L.L.C., 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 21076 (5th Cir. Oct. 5, 2011).
Ergon Refining, Inc. hired Cat Tech L.L.C. to service a hydrotreating reactor. In January 2005, Cat Tech replaced certain parts in the reactor. After Cat Tech finished the job and left, Ergon noticed a high pressure drop in the reactor, forcing it to be shut down. Cat Tech returned in February 2005, removed, repaired and replaced the damaged parts, and loaded new parts. After completion, a second large pressure drop occurred during the reactor’s start-up process. The reactor was shut down until October 2005, when Ergon hired a different contractor to perform the repair work. Additional damage to the reactor was found.
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
Construction Jobs Expected to Rise in Post-Hurricane Rebuilding
November 7, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Businessweek reports that construction jobs and materials will see increased demand as property owners in New York and New Jersey rebuild after hurricane Sandy. Tom Jeffery, of Irvine, California-based CoreLogic, a real estate information service, noted that “a high percent of damaged properties are going to be repaired.” Experts estimate property damage to total anywhere from $7 billion to $40 billion.
It is also estimated that about 739,000 properties in the area are underwater in the way that has nothing to do with flooding, with negative equity of 25 percent or more. Many of these homeowners are likely to walk away from their mortgages.
Ken Simonson, chief economist of the Associated General Contractors of America, expects “localized spikes in construction employment throughout November and the winter.” Martin Connor, the chief financial officer of Toll Brothers, expects to see more a rise in labor costs than in materials.
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General Contractors Must Plan to Limit Liability for Subcontractor Injury
May 18, 2011 — May 18, 2011 - Douglas Reiser in the Builders Counsel Blog
It takes more than a hard hat, but safety checks, a good policy and a smart contract might save you some problems.If you are a general contractor, you will want to pay close attention to this article. A new Washington appellate decision showcases a general contractor’s liability to subcontractors who are injured on the job, when security barriers fail. But can a general limit this liability? Will its contract help?
In Wrought Corporation, Inc., Appellant V. Mario Interiano (quick note: this opinion is unpublished, but we are here to talk about an issue that was not determined on appeal – WISHA compliance), a subcontractor was injured when a security barrier failed and he fell into an elevator shaft.
A jury awarded a $1.56 million verdict against the general contractor, and the court of appeals affirmed on the basis that the general contractor has a non-delegable duty to ensure compliance with the Washington Industrial Safety and Health Act of 1973, codified under RCW 49.17 (WISHA).
Read the full story… Reprinted courtesy of Douglas Reiser of Reiser Legal LLC. Mr. Reiser can be contacted at info@reiserlegal.com
Can Negligent Contractors Shift Blame in South Carolina?
July 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Clay Olson looks back to a 1991 Carolina case, Nelson v. Concrete Supply Company. The court concluded in that case that “a plaintiff in South Carolina may recover only if his/her negligence does not exceed that of the defendant’s and amount of plaintiff’s recovery shall be reduced in proportion to amount of his or her negligence; if there is more than one defendant, plaintiff’s negligence shall be compared to combined negligence of all defendants.” In 2005, he reports, as part of tort reform in South Carolina, the legislature further addressed this.
He then suggests a possible outcome of this is that negligent contractors may be able to shift some of the blame (and cost of the settlement) to other defendants who may not be to blame. He offers a scenario in which a contractor is sued for construction defects and a jury has to allocate responsibility for indivisible damage. “A jury need only find the two subcontractors to have each contributed 15% of the indivisible damage.” He adds in another 15% for claims against the architect. Minor blame is given to the manufacturers, and suddenly the negligent contractor is paying less than 50% of the total settlement.
He notes that the previous system in place also had its problems, but notes that this one may not be “fair and equitable.”
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