Eighth Circuit Remands to Determine Applicability of Collapse Exclusion
January 6, 2012 — Tred Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
The Eighth Circuit determined a jury instruction regarding the applicability of the "all-risk" policy’s exclusion for "collapse" was inadequate. See KAAPA Ethanol, LLC v. Affiliated FM Ins. Co., 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 22158 (8th Cir. Nov. 3, 2011).
KAAPA had nine large, cylindrical, stainless steel tanks fabricated at its location. Soon after operations began in 2003, some of the tanks experienced unusual movement and began to shift. A geotechnical engineer found "silty clay" had been used for infill instead of compacted granular fill called for in engineering drawings. A year long plan to repair all nine tanks was implemented.
Affiliated’s "all-risk" policy excluded damage caused by faulty workmanship. It also excluded damage caused by settling or cracking. The settling exclusion went on to provide, "This exclusion will not apply to loss or damage resulting from collapse of: a building or structure; or material part of a building or structure." Affiliated denied coverage because of the faulty workmanship and settling exclusions.
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
California Supreme Court to Examine Arbitration Provisions in Several Upcoming Cases
December 9, 2011 — CDJ Staff
Glen C. Hansen, writing on Abbott & Kinderman’s Land Use Law Blog looks at several cases pending before the California Supreme Court which ask if a developer can insist on arbitration of construction defect claims, based on provision in the CC&Rs. Currently, there is a split of opinions in the California appeals courts on the issue.
Four of the cases are in California’s Fourth Appellate District. In the earliest case, Villa Milano Homeowners Association v. Il Davorge, from 2000, the court concluded that the arbitration clause was sufficient to require that construction defect claims undergo arbitration. However, the Fourth Appellate District Court concluded in three later cases that the arbitration clauses did not allow the developer to compel arbitration. In two cases, argued in 2008 and 2010, the court concluded that to do otherwise would deprive the homeowners of their right to a jury trial. In the most recent case, Villa Vicenza Homeowners Association v. Nobel Court Development, the court decided that the CC&Rs did not create contractual rights for the developer.
The Second Appellate District Court came to a similar decision in Promenade at Playa Vista Homeowners Association v. Western Pacific Housing, Inc. In their decision, the court noted that CC&Rs could be enforced by homeowners and homeowners associations, but not developers.
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Statute of Limitations Upheld in Construction Defect Case
September 30, 2011 — CDJ Staff
The Missouri Court of Appeals has ruled in Ball v. Friese Construction Co., finding that Mr. Ball’s claims were barred by the statute of limitations.
Mr. Ball hired Friese Construction Company to build a single-family home. The sale was completed on March 29, 2001. That December, Mr. Ball complained of cracks in the basement floor. SCI Engineering, n engineering firm, hired by Friese, determined that the home’s footing had settled and recommended that Mr. Ball hire a structural engineer to determine if the footings were properly designed and sized. In September 2002, the structural engineer, Strain Engineering, determined that the cracks were due to slab movement, caused in part by water beneath the slab, recommending measures to move water away from the foundation. In 2005, Mr. Ball sent Friese correspondence “detailing issues he was having with the home, including problems with the basement slab, chimney structure, drywall tape, and doors.” All of these were attributed to the foundation problems. In 2006, Friese stated that the slab movement was due to Ball’s failure to maintain the storm water drains.
In 2009, Ball received a report from GeoTest “stating the house was resting on highly plastic clay soils.” He sued Friese in May, 2010. Friese was granted a summary judgment dismissing the suit, as the Missouri has a five-year statute of limitations. Ball appealed on the grounds that the extent of the damage could not be determined until after the third expert report. The appeals court rejected this claim, noting that a reasonable person would have concluded that after the conclusion of SCI and Strain Engineering that “injury and substantial damages may have occurred.”
The court concluded that as there were not “continuing wrongs causing new and distinct damages,” he should have filed his lawsuit after the first two expert reports, not waiting seven years for a third expert to opine.
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Avoid Gaps in Construction Defect Coverage
July 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The language may be standardized, but the way different states’ courts interpret it is not. That’s the problem discussed by William F. Knowles and Brendan Winslow-Nason in an article in Business Insurance. One of the major issue through the country is whether a construction defect claim and the resultant damage are an occurrence. Additionally, there are questions whether certain exclusions apply, such as “your work” or “your product” exclusions. They note that many courts “ agree that they are intended to exclude defective construction itself, while providing coverage for unintended consequences.” They further note that these are not the only insurance issues, “making it difficult for construction companies operating across state lines to ensure adequate coverage.”
Their recommendations to contractors are that they pay careful attention to where they’ve done business and “if the states have issued decisions or if there is legislation in place address the scope of coverage under additional insured endorsements.” Additionally, they suggest determining whether a contractor can negotiate a choice of law provision in their policy. The conclude that “construction companies can take proactive steps to protect themselves by identifying the applicable states’ laws, determining whether insurance is adequate under those laws, and then taking steps to resolve any gaps in their coverage.”
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South Carolina Legislature Defines "Occurrence" To Include Property Damage Arising From Faulty Workmanship
May 26, 2011 — Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
On May 17, 2011, South Carolina passed legislation to combat the restrictive interpretation of what constitutes an "occurrence" under CGL policies. S.C. Code Ann. sec. 38-61-70.
The legislation reversed a decision by the state's Supreme Court issued earlier this year. See Crossman Communities of North Carolina, Inc. v. Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co., 2011 W.L. 93716 (S.C. Jan. 7, 2011). Crossman had overruled an earlier decision by the South Carolina Supreme Court that holding that defective construction was an “occurrence.” Crossman, however, reversed course, holding that damages resulting from faulty workmanship were the “natural and probable cause” of the faulty work and, as such, did not qualify as an “occurrence.”
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
Claims Under Colorado Defect Action Reform Act Count as Suits
July 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The Colorado Court of Appeals has affirmed the judgment of the lower court in Melssen v. Auto-Owners Insurance. The Melssens built a custom home for the Holleys, during which time the Melssens retained a comprehensive general liability policy from Auto-Owners, which “obligated Auto-Owerns to defend the Melssens with respect to any ‘suit’ seeking damages for ‘property damage’ during the policy period.” Soon after the house was constructed, cracks developed in the drywall, then outside stucco and basement slab. The Holleys contended that “approximately $300,000 of damages to the Holleys’ property was caused by the Melssens’ engineering and construction defects” and filed a claim under the Colorado Defect Action Reform Act (CDARA). The Melssens “demanded Auto-Owners defend and indemnify the Melssens and forwared Auto-Owners the notice of claim.”
Although the Melssens notified Auto-Owners in June 2008, it was not until October 2008 that Auto-Owners denied coverage stating that the claims were sustained outside the policy period. The Melssens filed an action against Auto-Owners. At trial, the jury ruled in favor of the Melssens awarding them damages, to which the trial court added costs and attorney fees.
On appeal, Auto-Owners contended that the trial court erred in allowing the Melssens to argue that the CDARA notice of claim “was the functional equivalent of a complaint commencing a suit.” The appeals court found that “the CDARA notice of claim process constituted an alternative dispute resolution proceeding under the policy.” The court agreed that jury should not have been asked to determine if a CDARA action is a “suit,” but as the jury found for the Melssens, the concluding it “constituted harmless error.” Further, the court found that an action under the CDARA satisfied the definition of a “suit.”
The court found for the Melssens, affirming the lower court’s decision and remanding the case to the lower court for the awarding of appeals costs to the Melssens.
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Ensuing Loss Provision Found Ambiguous
April 25, 2012 — Tred Eyerly, Construction Law Hawaii
After the insurer denied coverage in a homeowner’s policy for construction defects under various exclusions, the court found the ensuing loss provision was ambiguous.Kesling v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38857 (D. Colo. March 22, 2012).
After purchasing a home from the sellers, the insureds noticed problems with the deck of the home. Massive cracking appeared, causing lifting and leaking on the deck and water running through the exterior foundation wall into the home. There was also damage to the roof and crawlspace.
The insureds had a homeowner’s policy with American Family, which covered accidental direct physical loss to property described in the policy unless the loss was excluded. They requested coverage for "conditions, defects and damages." American Family denied coverage because wear and tear, as well as damage to foundations, floors and roofs were excluded. The policy did provide coverage, however, for "any resulting loss to property described . . . above, not excluded or excepted in this policy.
When coverage was denied, the insureds sued American Family.
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
Water Damage Covered Under Efficient Proximate Cause Doctrine
August 2, 2012 — Tred Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
A U.S. District Court in Washington found coverage in what it described as a text book study of the efficient proximate cause rule. Hiller v. Allstate Pro. & Cas. Ins. Co., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84862 (E.D. Wash. June 19, 2012).
The Hillers purchased a newly constructed home in December 2006. They also purchased an all-risk homeowner's policy from Allstate.
In July 2010, the Hillers discovered that the carpet in the basement of the residence was saturated with water. Allstate was immediately notified. Hiller began an investigation to attempt to determine the source of the water. He poured water into a downspout drain at the northwest corner of the residence. This caused water to leak into the northwest corner of the home's basement.
An area was excavated around the northwest downspout drain. The end of the drain pipe was partially blocked by rocks and had been wrapped with fabric landscaping material. Further, a “T” pipe installed at the foot of the drain was directing water toward the house's concrete foundation. Hiller notified Allstate that the problems with the drain was due to construction defects and the system was designed to fail.
Allstate denied the claim. Based upon Hiller's information, coverage was excluded under the policy's surface water, subsurface water, inherent vice, and latent defect exclusions.
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
Construction Defects Are Occurrences, Says South Carolina High Court
December 20, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The South Carolina Supreme Court has left the legislature’s new, expanded definition of “occurrence” in place, declining to declare it unconstitutional. South Carolina included faulty workmanship as an occurrence in response to a Supreme Court decision, which the court later reversed. One of the parties in that earlier decision, Harleysville Insurance, challenged the new law, claiming that the legislature didn’t have the power to pass a law to overturn a court ruling. The court did not concur.
However, the court did determine that the law was not retroactive and covered only claims filed after the law became effective in May 2011. The Chief Justice of South Carolina noted that “insurance coverage for construction liability lacks clarity, particularly with respect to whether construction defects constitute ‘occurrences’ under construction general insurance policies.”
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Contract Not So Clear in South Carolina Construction Defect Case
November 7, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The South Carolina Court of Appeals has reversed a partial summary judgment issued by one of the lower courts in the case of The Retreat at Edisto Co-Owners Association v. The Retreat at Edisto. The underlying issues of the case deal with a construction defect complaint.
The lower court had concluded “Developer’s ‘First Amendment’ to the Master Deed required the Developer to satisfy the provision in the paragraph labeled ‘Master Deed Amendment or Phase II’ as a condition precedent to its election to proceed with the development of Phase II.”
The appeals court found that “the language of the First Amendment to the Master Deed is susceptible to more than one interpretation.” The court additionally concluded that the “Developer presented the requisite scintilla of evidence on the question of its intent in order to establish a genuine issue of material fact. As the material facts were in dispute, the appeals court reversed the summary judgment and remanded the case to the circuit court for further proceedings.
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In Re Golba: The Knaubs v. Golba and Rollison, Debtors
June 19, 2012 — Brady Iandiorio
Now comes another cautionary tale for builders and developers, especially those using single purpose business entities to handle individual construction projects. The United States Bankruptcy Court in Denver, Colorado, through the Honorable Michael Romero, provided an order regarding plaintiffs’ problems with a home they purchased from an entity controlled or represented by defendants. Plaintiffs, Kelvin and Holly Knaub (the “Knaubs”) filed adversary proceedings against debtor Robert Golba in his bankruptcy proceeding and against debtor Greg Rollison in his separate bankruptcy proceeding. The adversary proceedings were partially consolidated to proceed in parallel but not substantively.
The Knaubs purchased a home from Gemm Homes (“Gemm”) in May 2003. Problems stemming from the foundation caused the Knaubs to seek an explanation and ultimately a solution from Gemm and then from Avalon Homes (“Avalon”), which the Knaubs claim is just a continuation of Gemm. Through their complaint, the Knaubs seek relief for 1) damages caused by fraudulent representations and false pretenses under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A), based on Golba’s misrepresentation that Gemm and Rollison were not involved in Avalon; 2) damages caused by actual fraud under § 523(a)(2)(A), based on Golba’s and Rollison’s alleged conspiracy fraudulently to convey the assets of Gemm to the Avalon entities; and 3) damages caused by breach of fiduciary duty under § 523(a)(4), alleging Gemm was an insolvent company which owed a fiduciary duty to its creditors, and alleging Golba participated in transferring Gemm’s assets to Avalon for no consideration. In the Golba action, the third claim for relief was dismissed.
The facts of the case are important and somewhat convoluted. In an effort to make the cases clear, the evidence, allegations, and facts will be laid out in detail below. The Knaubs’ house was purchased from Gemm and soon after both Gemm and Rollison had an engineering company perform an analysis which discovered the foundation was not laid on stable ground.
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Reprinted courtesy of Brady Iandiorio, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC. Mr. Iandiorio can be contacted at iandiorio@hhmrlaw.com
Georgia Supreme Court Rules Construction Defects Can Constitute an Occurrence in CGL Policies
April 5, 2011 — April 5, 2011 Beverley BevenFlorez - Construction Defect Journal
Recently, the Supreme Court of Georgia reversed the decision in American Empire Surplus Lines Insurance Company v Hathaway Development Company, Inc. stating that because Whisnant’s faulty workmanship caused damage to the surrounding properties, the construction defects constituted “occurrences” under the Commercial General Liability (CGL) policy. Unlike the South Carolina Supreme court ruling in the case of Crossman Communities v Harleysville Mutual, the Georgia Supreme Court stated that an accident can happen intentionally if the effect is not the intended result.
Interestingly, the only dissenting judge, J. Melton, disagreed with his colleagues on the basis that “although the term ‘accident’ is not specifically defined in the policy, it is axiomatic that an ‘accident’ cannot result from ‘intentional’ behavior.” It is clear that what constitutes an occurrence in CGL policies is still being hotly debated.
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Homebuilding Still on the Rise
December 20, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The National Association of Home Builders reports that spending on private homes was up three percent in October 2012, bringing it to a four-year high. This was part of a trend in which fourteen of the last fifteen months have seen increases in spending on residential construction. Likewise, multifamily residences have seen thirteen months of increased spending, putting it 82% higher than its low, two years ago. ¬?In addition to new homes, remodeling is also up, reaching its highest point in five years.
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Insurance Firm Defends against $22 Million Claim
June 15, 2011 — CDJ Staff
The Houston law firm of Eggleston & Briscoe successfully defended their client, Colony Insurance Company, which was being sued for $22 million over roof hail damage. The Summer Hill Village Community Association did not convince a jury that the insurance company had violated state law or breached its contract when it denied coverage for the roofs. The homeowners association contended that the roof damage was due to a hail storm in 2007. The jury agreed with experts who contended the damage was already present at that time.
Mr. Eggleston noted that “when your client is sued for a claim of $22 million, it is very satisfying to hear a jury agree that they in fact acted honorably and owed nothing.”
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No Third-Quarter Gain for Construction
November 18, 2011 — CDJ Staff
The Associated Builders and Contractors released their analysis of construction work under contract and found that there was no increase in construction backlog from the second quarter of 2011. There was still improvement, however, over 2010, as the third quarter backlog is 16.3 percent higher than that of a year ago.
The current backlog is 8.1 months, which according to Anirban Basu, the chief economist of the ABC, “is consistent with flat construction spending.” He noted that less than 8 months indicated a decline.
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District Court Awards Summary Judgment to Insurance Firm in Framing Case
August 4, 2011 — CDJ Staff
In the case of Continental Western Insurance Company v. Shay Construction Inc., Judge Walker Miller has granted a summary judgment against Shay Construction and their co-defendant, Milender White Construction Company.
Shay was the framing subcontractor for Milender White on what the court described as “a major construction project in Grand County, Colorado.” Two of Shay’s subcontractors, Wood Source Inc. and Chase Lumber Company furnished materials, labor, and equipment to Shay. They subsequently sued for nonpayment and sought to enforce mechanic’s liens, naming both Shay and Milender as defendants. Milender White alleged that Shay had “breached its obligation under its subcontracts with Milender White.”
Shay’s insurance provider, Continental Western, stated that its coverage did not include “the dispute between Shay, its subcontractors, particularly the cross claims asserted by Milender White.” Shay then sued Continental Western, alleging breach of contract and statutory bad faith.
The court, however, has found with Continental Western and has granted them a summary judgment. They found “no genuine issue as to any material fact.” The judge did not side with Continental Western on their interpretation of the phrase “those sums that the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as damages.” The court found that the Colorado courts have not limited this to tort actions only. However, as Milender’s cross claim included claims of faulty workmanship on the part of Shay, Judge Miller found for Continental.
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Allowing The Use Of a General Verdict Form in a Construction Defect Case Could Subject Your Client to Prejudgment Interest
August 16, 2012 — Heather Anderson, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC
A recent opinion from the Colorado Court of Appeals is a cautionary tale concerning the calculation of pre-judgment interest. See Hendricks v. Allied Waste Transportation, Inc., 2012 WL 1881004 (Colo. App. 2012). The Hendricks sued Allied after one of its drivers backed into the corner of their home with an Allied garbage truck. At trial, a jury awarded the Hendricks $160,100 in damages. Although the jury was instructed on the cost of repairs, diminution in value, and non-economic damages, the parties agreed to a general verdict form that did not ask the jury to specify the types of damages awarded. Id. at *1. The Hendricks sought to amend the judgment to include prejudgment interest and costs, which the trial court granted.
Allied appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by awarding the Hendricks prejudgment interest from the date their property was damaged. Id. at *7. The Colorado Court of Appeals found no error, and affirmed.
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Reprinted courtesy of Heather Anderson, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC. Ms. Anderson can be contacted at anderson@hhmrlaw.com
Supreme Court of New York Denies Motion in all but One Cause of Action in Kikirov v. 355 Realty Assoc., et al.
April 28, 2011 — April 28, 2011 Beverley BevenFlorez - Construction Defect Journal
In the construction defect suit Kikirov v. 355 Realty Associates, LLC, et al., the Supreme Court of the State of New York granted a dismissal of the plaintiff’s fourth cause of action, but denied the defendants’ motion in all other respects. The plaintiff alleged breach of contract, among other claims. “355 Realty was the sponsor of 355 Kings Highway Condominium, a condominium project located at 355 Kings Highway, in Brooklyn, New York. The condominium units were allegedly marketed as ‘ultra luxury condos,’ and a ‘Manhattan style condominium building,’ which would be the ‘epitome of luxury and quality.’ The construction of the six-story 28 unit residential condominium building began in approximately November 2003. […] Plaintiff entered into a purchase agreement, dated December 21, 2005, with 355 Realty (which was executed on behalf of 355 Realty by Michael Marino, as its member) for the purchase of Unit 2G in the building.”
The plaintiff alleged that construction defects emerged soon after moving into the unit: “After taking occupancy of his condominium unit, plaintiff allegedly experienced serious leakage and moisture problems in his unit, which caused a dangerous mold condition to develop, in addition to causing actual damage to the structural elements of his unit. According to plaintiff, the walls, moldings, and wood floors of his unit are constantly wet and moist, and there is severe buckling of the wood floors. Plaintiff claims that these problems have caused his unit to be uninhabitable. Plaintiff alleges that he has been forced to remove all of his personal belongings from his unit and has been unable to occupy his unit.”
According to the plaintiff, Foremost attempted to repair the defects, but only made the situation worse: “Specifically, plaintiff asserts that Foremost’s contractors opened his walls to remove the stained drywall, but never corrected the cause of the leaks, destroyed the walls, and never properly taped and painted the sheet rock. Plaintiff alleges that Foremost repaired the openings in a defective manner. Plaintiff also claims that his floor was repaired at that time by a subcontractor hired by Foremost, but the basic structural problem was never resolved and the leaks continued, compromising the beams and causing the mold conditions, in addition to all of the physical damage present in the unit. On or about July 16, 2009, plaintiff allegedly sent a notice of the defects to 355 Realty and to the managing agent designated by the condominium board, by certified mail, return receipt requested. Plaintiff asserts that defendants have failed and refused to repair and remedy the defective condition, and that the damage is extensive and requires major structural repairs.”
The plaintiff filed suit on May 4, 2010, and the original complaint asserted eight causes of action. “By decision and order dated September 13, 2010, the court granted a motion by defendants to dismiss plaintiff’s second cause of action for breach of implied covenants of good faith and fair dealing, his third cause of action for breach of implied warranties, his fifth cause of action for negligence as against 355 Realty, Michael Marino, Anthony Piscione, Ahron Hersh, and Toby Hersh, his seventh cause of action for negligence as against Vision, Foremost, and MMJ, and his eighth cause of action for violations of General Business Law § 349 and § 350, and granted plaintiff leave to replead his first cause of action for breach of contract as against 355 Realty, Michael Marino, Anthony Piscione, Ahron Hersh, and Toby Hersh, his fourth cause of action for breach of statutory warranties, and his sixth cause of action for breach of contract as against Vision, Foremost, and MMJ.”
The plaintiff amended their complaint on October 18, 2010, and “has repleaded these three causes of action by asserting a first cause of action for breach of contract as against 355 Realty, Michael Marino, Anthony Piscione, Ahron Hersh, and Toby Hersh, a second cause of action for breach of statutory warranties, and a third cause of action for breach of contract as against Vision, Foremost, and MMJ. In addition, plaintiff, in his amended complaint, has added a fourth cause of action for fraud.”
The defendants, on the other hand, “argue that each of the four causes of action alleged by plaintiff in his amended complaint fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, and that plaintiff’s amended complaint must be dismissed pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7). Defendants also cite to CPLR 3211 (a) (1), and (5), asserting that dismissal is also required based upon documentary evidence and the Statute of Limitations contained in the limited warranty.”The defendants’ motion to dismiss the first cause of action, breach of contract against 355 Realty, was denied: “While defendants dispute that the alleged defects are actually structural in nature, plaintiff’s allegations as to their structural nature are sufficient, at this juncture, to withstand defendants’ motion to dismiss. Thus, dismissal of plaintiff’s first cause of action must be denied.”
Next, the court reviewed the second cause of action, which was breach of statutory warranties: “Defendants’ motion also seeks dismissal of plaintiff’s second cause of action for breach of statutory warranties, which alleges that, under applicable law, including General Business Law § 777-a, et seq., the sponsor warranted to purchasers of units that the units would be constructed in a skillful, careful, and workmanlike manner, consistent with proper design, engineering, and construction standards and practices, and free of material latent, design, and structural defects. Defendants argue that General Business Law § 777-a, known as the housing merchant implied warranty, is inapplicable to this case because it is limited to the construction of a ‘new home,’ defined in General Business Law § 777 (5) as ‘any single family house or for-sale unit in a multi-unit residential structure of five stories or less.’ As noted above, the building in which plaintiff’s condominium unit is located is a six-story building.”
The motion to dismiss the second cause of action is denied. The court provided this reasoning: “the full text of the offering plan has not been provided, the court is unable to examine the entire written agreement so as to determine the purpose of the inclusion of the text of General Business Law § 777.”
In the third cause of action, the plaintiff alleges “a breach of contract claim as against Vision, Foremost, and MMJ based upon their contract with 355 Realty, pursuant to which they agreed to be the general contractors/construction managers for the condominium, to undertake oversight responsibility for the design and construction of the condominium, to prepare and/or review drawings, plans, and specifications for the condominium, and to otherwise manage and oversee the project. Plaintiff alleges that Vision, Foremost, and MMJ breached their contractual obligations in that the condominium units were improperly and inadequately designed and constructed, and completed in an incompetent and unworkmanlike manner, with material design and construction defects.”
The motion to dismiss the third cause of action was denied as well: “Plaintiff alleges, in his amended complaint, that Vision, Foremost, and MMJ have acknowledged notice of the defects and have not denied that they are responsible for providing a warranty to plaintiff. Plaintiff also refers to this warranty, in his amended complaint, by noting that paragraph 16 of the purchase agreement stated that the ‘[s]eller shall not be liable to . . . the [p]urchaser for any matter as to which an assignable warranty . . . has been assigned . . . to [p]urchaser and in such case the sole recourse of such . . . [p]urchaser . . . shall be against the warrantor . . . except that in the event a contractor or subcontractor is financially unable or refuses to perform its warranty . . . [s]eller shall not be excused from its obligations enumerated in the [offering p]lan under Rights and Obligations of Sponsor.’ Consequently, the court finds that dismissal of plaintiff’s third cause of action as against Foremost and MMJ must also be denied.”
In the fourth cause of action, the plaintiff alleges “that defendants made false statements and representations orally, in advertisements, and in the purchase agreement, that the condominium was properly and adequately designed and constructed and completed in a competent and workmanlike manner, in accordance with the condominium plans and specifications and proper design, engineering, and construction standards and practices consistent with applicable standards for a first class, luxury condominium in Brooklyn.”
The court dismissed the fourth cause of action stating, “it must be dismissed because it is duplicative of his first cause of action for breach of contract.” Therefore, “defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s amended complaint is granted to the extent that it seeks dismissal of plaintiff’s fourth cause of action, and it is denied in all other respects.”
Read the court’s decision…