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    California Builders Right To Repair Current Law Summary:

    Current Law Summary: SB800 (codified as Civil Code §§895, et seq) is the most far-reaching, complex law regulating construction defect litigation, right to repair, warranty obligations and maintenance requirements transference in the country. In essence, to afford protection against frivolous lawsuits, builders shall do all the following:A homeowner is obligated to follow all reasonable maintenance obligations and schedules communicated in writing to the homeowner by the builder and product manufacturers, as well as commonly accepted maintenance practices. A failure by a homeowner to follow these obligations, schedules, and practices may subject the homeowner to the affirmative defenses.A builder, under the principles of comparative fault pertaining to affirmative defenses, may be excused, in whole or in part, from any obligation, damage, loss, or liability if the builder can demonstrate any of the following affirmative defenses in response to a claimed violation:


    Construction Expert Witness Contractors Licensing
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    Commercial and Residential Contractors License Required.


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    Building Industry Association Southern California - Desert Chapter
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    Palm Desert, CA 92211
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    Irvine, CA 92614
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    Building Industry Association Southern California - Baldy View Chapter
    Local # 0532
    8711 Monroe Ct Ste B
    Rancho Cucamonga, CA 91730
    http://www.biabuild.com

    Building Industry Association Southern California - LA/Ventura Chapter
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    Construction Expert Witness News and Information
    For Anaheim California

    Former New York Governor to Head Construction Monitoring Firm

    No-Show Contractor Can’t Hide from Construction Defect Claim

    Texas Construction Firm Files for Bankruptcy

    South Carolina Contractors Regain General Liability Coverage

    A Loud Boom, But No Serious Injuries in World Trade Center Accident

    Harmon Towers Duty to Defend Question Must Wait, Says Court

    2011 Worst Year Ever for Home Sales

    US Courts in Nevada Busy with Yellow Brass

    Construction Defect Lawsuits? There’s an App for That

    Williams v. Athletic Field: Hugely Important Lien Case Argued Before Supreme Court

    Construction Suit Ends with Just an Apology

    California Supreme Court Binds Homeowner Associations To Arbitration Provisions In CC&Rs

    Ensuing Loss Provision Does Not Salvage Coverage

    Manhattan Developer Breaks Ground on $520 Million Project

    Boston’s Tunnel Project Plagued by Water

    Court Will Not Compel Judge to Dismiss Construction Defect Case

    Federal District Court Predicts Florida Will Adopt Injury In Fact Trigger

    Illinois Court Determines Insurer Must Defend Property Damage Caused by Faulty Workmanship

    Nevada Bill Aims to Reduce Legal Fees For Construction Defect Practitioners

    Texas contractual liability exclusion

    Badly Constructed Masonry Walls Not an Occurrence in Arkansas Law

    Construction Law Alert: A Specialty License May Not Be Required If Work Covered By Another License

    Florida “get to” costs do not constitute damages because of “property damage”

    A Lien Might Just Save Your Small Construction Business

    Reference to "Man Made" Movement of Earth Corrects Ambiguity

    Ambitious Building Plans in Boston

    Water Drainage Case Lacks Standing

    California insured’s duty to cooperate and insurer’s right to select defense counsel

    Tenth Circuit Finds Insurer Must Defend Unintentional Faulty Workmanship

    Residential Construction Down in San Diego

    Construction Company Head Pleads Guilty to Insurance and Tax Fraud

    No Coverage for Property Damage That is Limited to Work Completed by Subcontractor

    Plans Go High Tech

    Ensuing Loss Provision Does Not Salvage Coverage

    Contractor Underpaid Workers, Pocketed the Difference

    Late Filing Contractor Barred from Involving Subcontractors in Construction Defect Claim

    Bill Seeks to Protect Legitimate Contractors

    The Colorado Court of Appeals Rules that a Statutory Notice of Claim Triggers an Insurer’s Duty to Defend.

    Battle of “Other Insurance” Clauses

    LEED Certified Courthouse Square Negotiating With Insurers, Mulling Over Demolition

    Is There a Conflict of Interest When a CD Defense Attorney Becomes Coverage Counsel Post-Litigation?

    Court finds subcontractor responsible for defending claim

    Construction Bright Spot in Indianapolis

    California Construction Bill Dies in Committee

    Insurers Reacting to Massachusetts Tornadoes

    State Audit Questions College Construction Spending in LA

    Granting Stay, Federal Court Reviews Construction Defect Coverage in Hawaii

    Homeowner Loses Suit against Architect and Contractor of Resold Home

    Mississippi exclusions j(5) and j(6) “that particular part”

    Construction Law Client Alert: Hirer Beware - When Exercising Control Over a Job Site’s Safety Conditions, You May be Held Directly Liable for an Independent Contractor’s Injury

    Builder to Appeal Razing of Harmon Tower

    No Third-Quarter Gain for Construction

    Insurer’s Motion for Summary Judgment Based on Earth Movement Exclusion Denied

    Alaska Supreme Court Dismisses Claims of Uncooperative Pro Se Litigant in Defect Case

    South Carolina “occurrence” and allocation

    New Construction Laws, New Forms in California

    Death of Construction Defect Lawyer Ruled a Suicide

    Windows and Lawsuits Fly at W Hotel

    Oregon agreement to procure insurance, anti-indemnity statute, and self-insured retention

    New OSHA Fall Rules to Start Early in Minnesota

    Nevada Construction Defect Lawyers Dead in Possible Suicides

    Colorado Senate Bill 12-181: 2012’s Version of a Prompt Pay Bill

    Certificate of Merit to Sue Architects or Engineers Bill Proposed

    Colorado Statutes of Limitations and Repose, A First Step in Construction Defect Litigation

    Supreme Court of New York Denies Motion in all but One Cause of Action in Kikirov v. 355 Realty Assoc., et al.

    Homeowner Has No Grounds to Avoid Mechanics Lien

    Renovation Contractors: Be Careful How You Disclose Your Projects

    No Duty to Indemnify When Discovery Shows Faulty Workmanship Damages Insured’s Own Work

    Condo Owners Worried Despite Settlement

    Legislatures Shouldn’t Try to Do the Courts’ Job

    Judge Rejects Extrapolation, Harmon Tower to Remain Standing

    Insurance Company Prevails in “Chinese Drywall” Case

    Texas Law Bars Coverage under Homeowner’s Policy for Mold Damage

    CC&Rs Not the Place for Arbitration Agreement, Court Rules

    Construction Defects as Occurrences, Better Decided in Law than in Courts

    Colorado “property damage” caused by an “occurrence” and exclusions j(5) and j(6) “that particular part”

    Housing Prices Up through Most of Country

    Lien Law Unlikely To Change — Yet

    Allowing the Use of a General Verdict Form in a Construction Defect Case Could Subject Your Client to Prejudgment Interest

    Home Sales Still Low, But Enough to Spur Homebuilders

    Tennessee Court: Window Openings Too Small, Judgment Too Large

    Court Requires Adherence to “Good Faith and Fair Dealing” in Construction Defect Coverage

    Condominium Communities Must Complete Construction Defect Repairs, Says FHA

    Developer’s Fraudulent Statements Are His Responsibility Alone in Construction Defect Case

    Webinar on Insurance Disputes in Construction Defects

    Builder Cannot Receive Setoff in Construction Defect Case

    Texas exclusions j(5) and j(6).

    Construction Defect Lawsuit Stayed by SB800

    Pier Fire Started by Welders

    Remodels Replace Construction in Redding
    Corporate Profile

    ANAHEIM CALIFORNIA CONSTRUCTION EXPERT WITNESS
    DIRECTORY AND CAPABILITIES

    The Anaheim, California Construction Expert Witness Group is comprised from a number of credentialed construction professionals possessing extensive trial support experience relevant to construction defect and claims matters. Leveraging from this considerable body of experience, BHA provides construction related trial support and expert services to the nation's most recognized construction litigation practitioners, Fortune 500 builders, commercial general liability carriers, owners, construction practice groups, and a variety of state and local government agencies.

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    Construction Expert Witness News & Info
    Anaheim, California

    OSHA Cites Construction Firm for Safety Violations

    August 16, 2012 — CDJ Staff

    S.J. Louis Construction of Texas Ltd. has been cited by OHSH for one serious and one repeat safety violation, according to a report in Insurance Journal. OSHA officials saw S.J. Louis employees working in an unshored trench along a highway service road. The company had cited for this violation previously. Without shoring of trenches deeper than five feet there is a risk of serious injury or death.

    Read the full story…


    Window Manufacturer Weathers Recession by Diversifying

    October 28, 2011 — CDJ Staff

    American Openings, a Tuscon-based window manufacturer, has responded to the loss of its sales of windows for new home construction by moving into new markets. The Arizona Daily Star reports that American Openings used to see providing windows for new homes as half their business. Now, Tom Regina, the founder and president says “single family is just dead.”

    Their products are insulated windows, designed to comply with Energy Star standards. Without new homes being built, now the company is focusing on homeowners and building owners looking for more energy efficient windows. As the windows have two or three panes and special coatings, homeowners using them are eligible for tax credits.

    One of their newer products combines their energy-saving coatings with “break resistant” glass. The article notes that the windows repel “all but the most determined burglars.” However, the company is still awaiting special equipment to cut the glass.

    Read the full story...


    Colorado Court of Appeals Finds Damages to Non-Defective Property Arising From Defective Construction Covered Under Commercial General Liability Policy

    December 20, 2012 — Heidi Gassman, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell

    The recently decided case of Colorado Pool Systems, Inc. v. Scottsdale Insurance Company (Colo. Ct. App. 10CA2638, October 25, 2012), confirms that absent specific exclusions in the policy, a commercial general liability (“CGL”) policy covers damages to non-defective property arising from a builder’s own defective workmanship.

    Colorado Pool Systems, Inc. (“Colorado Pool”) was hired as a subcontractor to install a swimming pool at Founders Village Pool and Community Center (“Founders Village”) in Castle Rock, Colorado.  After the concrete shell of the pool was placed, some of the rebar frame was found to be too close to the surface.  Founders Village demanded that Colorado Pool remove and replace the pool, and Colorado Pool contacted its insurance carrier, Scottsdale Insurance Company (“Scottsdale”), with which Colorado Pool held a CGL policy.  After inspecting the pool, Scottsdale’s claims adjuster stated that the insurance policy would cover losses associated with removing and replacing the pool.

    Read the full story…

    Reprinted courtesy of Heidi Gassman, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC. Ms. Gassman can be contacted at gassman@hhmrlaw.com


    Insurance Policy Provides No Coverage For Slab Collapse in Vision One

    August 17, 2011 — Douglas Reiser, Builders Counsel

    This post will examine whether Division Two of the Washington Court of Appeals properly reversed and remanded several lower court decisions in the case of Vision One LLC v. Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance. In short, and from the perspective of an appellate attorney, the court of appeals got the decision right. Given the rules of contract interpretation and causation in tort claims, there was really no other way the court could have ruled. I understand that from a contractor’s perspective and insurance perspective, the decision seems odd. But from a purely legal standpoint, the decision is well-reasoned and well-supported. Let me explain.

    Background

    First, here are the facts in a nutshell. Vision One is a construction company that undertook to construct a condo complex in Tacoma. Vision then contracted with D&D Concrete to pour a concrete slab for a section of the foundation. To shore the concrete slab, D&D further contracted Berg Equipment to provide necessary equipment to stabilize the structure. Well, something down the line went wrong. The shoring failed and the slab collapsed, causing a great deal of damage.

    Read the full story…

    Read the court’s decision…

    Reprinted courtesy of Douglas Reiser of Reiser Legal LLC. Mr. Reiser can be contacted at info@reiserlegal.com


    A Lien Might Just Save Your Small Construction Business

    April 4, 2011 — Douglas Reiser in the Builders Counsel Blog

    Many owners incorrectly believe that payment to the general contractor gets the owner off the hook for payment to subcontractors and suppliers. This assumption sometimes fosters the irresponsible owner, who fails to ensure that everyone is getting paid. Fortunately for those contractors further down the contracting chain, this assumption is incorrect.

    Suppliers and subcontractors can file a lien to secure payment for their labor and materials. A filing party must offer proper notice (if applicable) and file an adequate and timely lien in the County where the work is performed. You can read our earlier posts on these topics by following this link.

    A lien notice and a lien put an owner on notice that your business has provided labor and/or materials for the improvement of the owner’s property (See RCW 60.04.031 for more info). If the owner fails to take care to ensure that your business is paid the law mandates that the owner may have to pay twice.

    Read the full story...

    Reprinted courtesy of Douglas Reiser of Reiser Legal LLC. Mr. Reiser can be contacted at info@reiserlegal.com


    Policing Those Subcontractors: It Might Take Extra Effort To Be An Additional Insured

    June 14, 2011 — Douglas Reiser, Builders Council Blog

    I just came across a case that I think truly paints the insurance dilemma for contractors. Thanks to this recent Illinois case, I don’t have to make up any factual scenarios—so kudos to Attorney Robert Boylan for posting it.

    In reading over my RSS feeds this weekend, I noticed a great writeup on long-time blogger Josh Glazov’s Construction Law Today. Attorney Robert Boylan’s post describes a recent Illinois case where a general contractor was denied its additional insured status on a second-tier subcontractor’s insurance. The reason for the denial: the general contractor failed to procure an agreement in writing with the second-tier subcontractor, requiring it to be listed as an additional insured.

    Read the full story…

    Reprinted courtesy of Douglas Reiser of Reiser Legal LLC. Mr. Reiser can be contacted at info@reiserlegal.com


    An Upward Trend in Commercial Construction?

    March 28, 2012 — Melissa Dewey Brumback, Construction Law North Carolina

    Year-end economic indicators demonstrate that private commercial construction may be increasing in 2012, primarily as demand grows for new projects built in the United States.

    According to an article in Businessweek, the Architecture Billings Index held at 52 in December, indicating a modest expansion in the market. The American Institute of Architects said that the commercial and industrial component of the number climbed to 54.1 in December, the highest in 10 months.

    The monthly survey of U.S.-based architecture firms is one of the main indicators of nonresidential construction, and these numbers suggest that modest improvement may be on the horizon.

    The information is confirmed by data from the Census Bureau that shows that spending on lodging, office, commercial and manufacturing buildings grew 8.2 percent in November to $9.2 billion from a year ago. These types of commercial and industrial projects are historically canaries in the mine and are usually the first part of the industry to improve as the economy expands.

    Read the full story…

    Reprinted courtesy of Melissa Dewey Brumback of Ragsdale Liggett PLLC. Ms. Brumback can be contacted at mbrumback@rl-law.com.


    Fire Reveals Defects, Appeals Court Affirms Judgment against Builder

    July 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff

    The Arizona Court of Appeals has ruled in the case of Simms v. Nance Construction. After a fire damaged his home, Jerry Simms discovered some construction defects in the work of the builder, Nance Construction. Nance Construction completed the home in 2000 and it was damaged by fire in 2001. In the course of Simms’ suit against his neighbor, “defense experts opined both that Dusty Creek had negligently repaired the damage to Simms’ residence and that many defects found in the houses were the result of defects in the original construction.” Nance offered to make roof repairs. Simms responded with a list of “numerous construction defects,” stating this was “not a comprehensive and final list of items.” Nance offered to repair some while disputing others. Simms entered a lawsuit against Nance and other parties.

    Nance first sought a summary judgment, “asserting that Simms had failed to adequately disclose the repairs for which he sought to hold Nance responsible.” The court denied this. It also would not allow Nance to introduce evidence that Simms had been denied a license by the Arizona Department of Gaming over “questionable business practices, illegal activities, and financial transactions with a person purportedly involved in organized crime.”

    During the suit, Simms contracted with Advanced Repair Technologies “for repairs that included a complete remodel of the roof and the exterior stucco system.” Nance later claimed that the cost of ART’s repair was unreasonable, claiming that it should have cost about $600,000 instead of the $1.5 million for which Simms contracted. The jury found against Nance, with a judgment of $870,200 of which half was due to the roofing subcontractor.

    After the verdict, Nash moved for a new trial, stating that the jury should have heard expert testimony on whether the contract price was reasonable. Nance also “argued that the trial court had erred in refusing to allow Nance to impeach Simms’ credibility with his purported prior acts of dishonesty.” These motions were denied and Nance appealed.

    The appeals court upheld the trial court on all counts. The court found that, despite the contention made by Nance, the jury had sufficient information to determine if the cost of the repairs were reasonable. The court also found that Simms had given Nance an opportunity to propose repairs. The law, however, “does not require the Plaintiff to accept an offer for repairs,” adding that “the record makes clear that the parties were far apart in their belief of the nature of repairs necessary.” Nor did the court find that Nance should have been allowed to introduce evidence to impeach Simms’ credibility.

    Although judgment of the lower court was affirmed, the court took the discretion to decline to award attorneys’ fees to Simms, although he was awarded costs.

    Read the court’s decision…


    Construction Defects in Home a Breach of Contract

    September 9, 2011 — CDJ Staff

    The Supreme Court of North Dakota has ruled in Leno v. K & L Homes, affirming the verdict of the lower court. K & L Homes argued that district court had erred in several ways, including by refusing to instruct the jury on comparative fault, denying a request for inspection, and not allowing a defendant to testify on his observations during jury viewing.

    The Lenos purchased a home constructed by K & L Homes, after which they alleged they found cracks, unevenness, and shifting, which they attributed to improper construction. They claimed negligence on the part of K & L Homes. K & L Homes responded that the Lenos were responsible for damage to the home. The Lenos dropped their negligence claim, arguing breach of contract and implied warranties.

    Before the trial, after the discovery period had passed, K & L Homes requested to inspect the home. This was rejected by the court. Kelly Moldenhauer, the owner of K & L Homes sought to testify about his observations during the jury’s viewing of the house. The court denied this too. The jury found that K & L was in breach of contract and awarded damages to the Lenos.

    The North Dakota Supreme Court noted that K & L Homes gave “warranties that the home had been built according to local building codes and laws, and that the house was fit for its particular purpose as a residence.” The court found that a defective home breached this warranty. Further, the home violated an implied warranty of fitness.

    The district court had denied K & L’s request to inspect the home, as the discovery period had ended and it would not give the Lenos time to do further discovery of their own. At the time of the request, there was only twenty-two days before the trial. The Supreme Court ruled that this was not an abuse of discretion of the part of the district court.

    The Lenos had requested that Moldenhauer’s testimony not be permitted, as it would “have the same effect as if the court had granted K & L Homes’ pretrial request for inspection.” K & L Homes agreed to this in court, replying, “okay.”

    The decision affirms the judgment of the district court and the damages awarded to the Lenos by the jury.

    Read the court’s decision…


    Alabama “occurrence” and subcontractor work exception to the “your completed work” exclusion

    November 18, 2011 — CDCoverage.com

    In Town & Country Property, LLC v. Amerisure Ins. Co., No. 1100009 (Ala. Oct. 21, 2010), property owner Town & Country contracted with insured general contractor Jones-Williams for the construction of a car dealership. All of the construction work was performed by Jones-Williams subcontractors. After completion, Town & Country sued Jones-Williams for defective construction. Jones-Williams’ CGL insurer Amerisure defended. The case was tried and a judgment was entered against Jones-Williams in favor of Town & Country. After Amerisure denied any obligation to pay the judgment, Town & Country sued Amerisure in a statutory direct action.

    Read the full story…

    Reprinted courtesy of CDCoverage.com.


    The Ever-Growing Thicket Of California Civil Code Section 2782

    January 6, 2012 — Michael D. Worthing, Borton Petrini

    California Civil Code section 2782 imposes limits on indemnity and defense provisions in construction contracts. Since the initial adoption of S.B. 8001 in 2002 (eff. January 1, 2003) section 27822 has been revised several times, and legislative history suggests that interest groups representing builders, developers and sub-contractors, as well as the insurance industry, have seen legislative action on these indemnity and defense issues as part of the overall response to the same economic pressures resulting from construction defect litigation that gave rise to S.B. 800. Amendments in 2005, 2007, 2008 and 2011 (each effective January 1 of the following year) have increasingly entangled the provisions of Section 2782 with various provisions of S.B. 800. The application of section 2782 to construction contracts, and in particular contracts between developer-builders and subcontractors, executed after January 1, 2006, will require a concurrent reading and understanding of S.B. 800, the application of which is itself still in flux.

    The time a construction contract was executed will likely determine which version of section 2782, read in connection with provisions of S.B.800, is applicable. Because of the nature of construction defect litigation, the determination of relative rights and liabilities of developer-builders vis-à-vis subcontractors under construction contracts does not become the subject of litigation, and legal and judicial interpretation, until years after the contracts were entered and work performed. As of the date this article is submitted, there has been no case law interpreting or applying any of the post S.B. 800 amendments, in part, and perhaps primarily, because litigation arising from construction contracts executed after January 1, 2006, has not yet reached the appellate courts.

    SECTION 2782 AT THE TIME S.B. 800 WAS ENACTED

    Section 2782 was originally enacted in 1967 and amended several times to the version in effect when S.B. 800 became law, at which time the section was relatively simple and straightforward. It then consisted of two subdivisions, which have essentially remained unchanged until the most recent amendment during the 2011 legislative session.

    Section 2782 (a) prohibited, and still prohibits, provisions in construction contracts that “purport to indemnify the promisee against liability for damages for death or bodily injury to persons, injury to property, or any other loss, damage or expense arising from the sole negligence or willful misconduct of the promise.” This provision essentially prohibits what had been referred to as so-called Type I or “specific” indemnity provisions. In such agreements, the indemnitor [the promisor, that is, the person or entity indemnifying] will indemnify the indemnitee [the promisee, that is, the person or entity being protected by the indemnity] for the indemnitee’s own negligence, whether active or passive, whether the indemnitee is solely negligent or concurrently negligent with the indemnitor. (See, MacDonald & Kruse, Inc. v. San Jose Steel Co. (1972) 29 Cal.App.3d 413, 419.)3 Section 2782 (a) has remained essentially intact since the enactment of S.B. 800. It still must be considered and applied to interpret a construction contract. Generally, it will apply to contracts not involving a public agency; the next part of section 2782 specifically governs such contracts.

    The second subdivision prohibits provisions in any construction contract with a public agency which purport to impose on the contractor, or relieve the public agency from, liability for the active negligence of the public agency. Subdivision (b) has been revised by the 2011 amendment, discussed below. If a construction contract with the public agency is for residential construction, the standards of S.B. 800 likely apply.4

    This was the extent of section 2782 on January 1, 2003, when S.B. 800 went into effect, and remained so until January 1, 2006. This version will govern interpretation and application of indemnity and defense provisions in construction contracts executed before January 1, 2006.5

    2005 AMENDMENT

    The first “post S.B. 800” change to Section 2782 was in enacted in 2005, effective January 1, 2006, and added two new sections. Subdivision (c) stated (in somewhat greater detail than paraphrased here) that for residential construction contracts, or amendments thereto, entered into after January 1, 2006, a subcontractor cannot be required to indemnify (including the cost to defend) a builder for construction defects that arise out of negligence or design defects of the builder or other independent contractors, or that do not arise out of the scope of the subcontractor=s scope of work. The term “residential construction” was defined by reference to S.B.800 generally, and the term “builder” was defined by reference to section 911 (a part of S.B. 800), for the first time expressly connecting provisions of section 2782 to S.B. 800. Contractual provisions not expressly prohibited were reserved to the agreement of the parties.

    What subdivision (c) took away was partially given back by subdivision (d). It stated that “subdivision (c) does not prohibit a subcontractor and builder from mutually agreeing to the timing or immediacy of the defense and provisions for reimbursement of defense fees and costs, so long as that agreement, upon final resolution of the claims, does not waive or modify the provisions of subdivision (c).”6 In addition, it stated that this subdivision (c) did not affect the obligations of an insurance carrier under Presley Homes, Inc. v. American States Insurance Company (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 571, which holds that where an insurer has a duty to defend a developer pursuant to an additional insured endorsement obtained under a subcontractor’s policy, that duty generally applies to the entire action, even if the suit involves both covered and uncovered claims, or a single claim only partially covered by the policy. Finally, subdivision (d) stated that the amendment did not affect the builder’s or subcontractor’s obligations under S.B. 800. Both of these latter provisions, relating to the Presley Homes case, and obligations under S.B. 800, have been carried forward essentially intact in subsequent amendments of section 2782.

    This version of section 2782 will be applicable to any contract between a builder as defined by section 911 (see fn. 4, above) and a subcontractor executed between January 1, 2006, and December 31, 2008. Thus, a general contractor, etc., who is not a builder is not subject to the provisions added by the 2005 amendment; this changed with the next amendment.

    It is not clear whether this version would apply to a contract entered before January 1, 2006, but amended after that date. Subdivision (c) applies to “all construction contracts, and amendments thereto, entered into after January 1, 2006, for residential construction.” It would seem that the clearest and most logical construction would apply it only to contracts originally made after January 1, 2006, and thereafter amended, but there has been no judicial determination of this issue.

    In addition, logically it would seem that this version of section 2782 should be applicable to construction contracts for residential construction between a builder and a subcontractor, entered between January 1, 2006, and December 31, 2008; however, legislative history relating to the 2008 amendment discussed below suggests a different result might occur.

    2007 AMENDMENT

    The second “post S.B. 800” amendment in 2007 (effective January 1, 2008), added subdivisions (e)(1) and (e)(2).

    Subdivision (e)(1) added general contractors and subcontractors not affiliated with the builder and imposed essentially the same restrictions on provisions to indemnify, including the cost to defend, them as had been imposed on the “builder” by the 2005 amendment. The amendment refers to section 911 (b), again part of S.B. 800, to define general contractors, etc., not affiliated with the builder.

    Subdivision (e)(1) essentially repeated the provisions of subdivision (d) permitting agreement to the timing and immediacy of the defense, the reference to the Presley Homes case, and the general contractor’s or subcontractor’s obligations under S.B. 800.

    It appears this amendment was an attempt to harmonize the new restrictions on indemnity and defense provisions with S.B. 800. The 2005 amendment, whether by oversight or intent, covered only builders and not general contractors, although both classes are subject to the provisions of S.B. 800; the 2007 amendment added non-builder-affiliated general contractors.

    Again, logically, it would seem that this version of section 2782 should be applicable to construction contracts for residential construction between a general contractor or contractor not affiliated with a builder and a subcontractor, entered between January 1 and December 31, 2008; however, legislative history relating to the 2008 amendment discussed below suggests a different result might occur. The same potential uncertainty regarding applicability to a contract entered before January 1, 2008, but amended after that date, exists for this provision as for the prior amendment, discussed above.

    2008 AMENDMENT

    The third “post S.B. 800” amendment in 2008 (effective January 1, 2009), reorganized the language relating to prohibited indemnity provisions, added a reference to insurance in that same prohibition, extensively rewrote the provisions governing agreements relating to the timing or immediacy of defense, added language preserving equitable indemnity claims, and added language defining “construction defect” by reference to the standards set forth in S.B. 800.

    Subdivisions (a) and (b) remained unchanged.

    Subdivision (c) now made a combined reference to builders (again by reference to section 911), as well as general contractors or contractors not affiliated with the builder (again by reference to section 911 (b)), rather than dealing with the two groups in separate but nearly identical subdivisions as previously. It otherwise restated the same limitations that were previously set forth separately in subdivisions (c) and (e), as well as the reference to the Presley Homes case, and the general contractor’s or subcontractor’s obligations under S.B. 800, but with one important addition. The word “insure” was added to the description of prohibited provisions, to-wit: “provisions? that purport to insure or indemnify, including the cost to defend, the builder, [etc.]? are unenforceable” to the extent they arise out of claims of the type previously described.

    It is unclear what impact the addition of this single word “insure” will have; and, it will have to be read in light of the preservation of the language that it shall not affect the obligations of an insurance carrier under the holding of the Presley Homes case. Suppose a carrier had issued an additional insured endorsement under which it would otherwise be required to defend a builder or general contractor consistent with the Presley Homes rule: would this newly added single word (restricting the construction contract, to which the carrier is not a party) give the carrier a basis for denying coverage under the insurance contract? Or would the continued inclusion of the express language that it does not affect the obligations of an insurance carrier under Presley Homes control? That is surely an issue that will have to be worked out by the courts.

    The new subdivision (d) addressed defense obligations. Again it permitted parties to agree to the timing and immediacy of the defense and provision for reimbursement of defense fees and costs, but imposed a very detailed scheme that appears to limit the extent of such agreement. A subcontractor owes no defense or indemnity obligation until the builder or general contractor provides a written tender of the claim, which has the same force and effect as notice of commencement of a legal proceeding. Upon that tender the subcontractor shall elect to follow one of two ways of performing: subdivision (d) (1) permits the subcontractor to defend with counsel of its choice and to control the defense, if the subcontractor gives written notice of this election within a reasonable time after receipt of the written tender and in no event later than 90 days following that receipt; subdivision (d) (2) provides an alternative by which the subcontractor pays a reasonable allocated share of the builder’s or general contractor’s defense fees and costs within 30 days of receipt of an invoice, subject to reallocation upon final resolution of the claim by settlement or judgment. Subdivision (e) sets forth remedies available to the builder or general contractor if a subcontractor fails to timely and adequately perform its obligations under either of the two alternatives in subdivision (d), including compensatory and consequential damages, reasonable attorneys’ fees in connection with the first alternative, and interest on defense and indemnity costs in connection with the second alternative. Subdivision (e) ends with provisions relating to reallocation of defense costs, and damages for failure to reallocate.

    Application of these requirements in actual litigation is likely to be cumbersome and potentially fraught with conflicts. If retained pursuant to subdivision (d) (1) does the attorney represent the builder, the subcontractor, or both? To whom does the attorney owe his or her fiduciary duty? Can an appropriate informed written consent be formulated, for example, under Rule 3-310 of the California Rules of Professional Conduct, or Rule 1.7, ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct? Could an attorney retained by a subcontractor blame the subcontractor if that is in the developer’s best interests? If multiple subcontractors elect to defend directly, how would the defense be coordinated among the potentially multiple attorneys so retained? Would an attorney retained by one subcontractor be able, or inclined, to blame another subcontractor who also chose to defend directly, in other words, what would prevent inconsistent defense positions amongst the various counsel retained by subcontractors for the developer? There may be solutions to such practical and professional considerations but it seems an ethical thicket awaits any attorney involved in such circumstances.

    Subdivision (e) and (f) preserve equitable indemnity claims for the builder, general contractor or subcontractor, the first in general, the second as against any supplier, design profession, or product manufacturer. Finally, the 2008 amendment added for the first time, in subdivision (h), language defining "construction defect" as used in section 2782 as a violation of standards set forth in S.B. 800.

    The inclusion of these last three subsections would seem to work against simplification of litigation. A builder or general contractor is likely to allege a claim for equitable indemnity against any and all subcontractors in addition to claims for contractual indemnity and defense (however limited by the other provisions of section 2782). Nothing in the section suggests the subcontractor should, or even can, somehow take on the representation of the builder, etc., in connection with a claim of equitable indemnity back against the subcontractor.

    And the limited definition of “construction defect” in subdivision (h) appears to raise an issue of the applicability of the limitations set forth in subdivision (c). Although there is a school of thought that section 941 limits residential construction defect claims only to breach of the performance standards under S.B. 800, it is still common for CD complaints to plead other legal theories, e.g., breach of contract, breach of warranty, negligence, etc., in addition to violation of S.B. 800 standards. With the addition of subdivision (h) it is arguable that the restrictions on indemnity and defense provisions spelled out in subdivisions (c) and (d), both of which relate to claims for residential construction defects, are applicable only to claims for violation of S.B. 800 standards, and not other residential construction defect claims. In other words, a developer might conceivably still be entitled to a broader scope of indemnity and concomitant defense for other types of claims, such as breach of contract, breach of warranty, negligence, etc., so long as the indemnity does not violate the limitation of subdivision (a) against Type I indemnity, which as noted above, has remained intact through these revisions.

    Finally, it would seem that this version of section 2782 should be applicable to contracts executed between builders, general contractors, etc., on the one hand and subcontractors on the other hand on and after January 1, 2009. And, as noted above in connection with the 2005 and 2007 amendments, logic would suggest that those versions would ordinarily apply to contracts executed during the time periods mentioned above. But, the Legislative Counsel’s Digest for the 2008 amendment as it finally was enacted into law includes the following statements:

    This bill would delete the provisions applicable to construction contracts entered into on or after January 1, 2008, that purport to indemnify the general contractor or contractor not affiliated with the builder. The bill would revise the provisions applicable to contracts entered into after January 1, 2006, to instead apply to contracts entered into after January 1, 2009, and to apply to agreements that purport to insure or indemnify the builder or the general contractor or contractor not affiliated with the builder, as described.

    Although it seems a startling result, this legislative history suggests an argument can be made that the 2008 amendment retroactively nullified the effect of the 2005 and 2007 amendments, so that contracts executed from January 1, 2006, as to builders or January 1, 2008, for general contractors, etc., through December 31, 2008, are still governed by the provisions of section 2782 as it was on the books prior to the first post-S.B. 800 amendment in 2005.

    2011 AMENDMENT

    Section 2782 has been amended yet again in the 2011 session of the California Legislature, effective January 1, 2012; however, the substantive changes affect certain contracts entered on or after January 1, 2013. All of the provisions contained in the 2008 amendment have been carried forward in the most recent amendment, although re-numbered: (c) became (d), etc., through (h) becoming (i). So, the law governing construction contracts entered into after January 1, 2009, for residential construction, as between a builder, or a general contractor, etc., not affiliated with a builder, and regarding insurance, indemnity or defense relating to claims for construction defects, remains the same as in the 2008 amendment.

    As noted above the substantive changes to section 2782 all affect contracts entered into on or after January 1, 2013. Subdivision (b) has been amended such that any provision in a contract with a public agency that purports to impose on any contractor, etc., or relieve the public agency from, liability for the active negligence of the public agency will be void and unenforceable. A new subdivision (c) has been added that imposes a similar restriction on construction contracts with the owner of privately owned real property to be improved and as to which the owner is not acting as a contractor or supplier of materials or equipment to the work. This new restriction in subdivision (c) does not apply to a homeowner performing a home improvement project on his or her own single family dwelling.

    The 2011 bill amending section 2782 also added a new section 2782.05, which will make void and unenforceable any provision in any construction contract (again, entered on or after January 1, 2013) that purports to insure or indemnify, including the cost to defend, a general contractor, construction manager, or other subcontractor, by a subcontractor for claims that arise out of the active negligence or willful misconduct of the general contractor, etc., or other independent contractors, etc., or to the extent the claims do not arise out of the scope of work of the subcontractor. However, the section also includes a long list of situations to which it does not apply, including all of those covered by section 2782 (residential construction subject to S.B. 800, public agency contracts subject to section 2782 (b), and direct contracts with private property owners subject to the new section 2782 (c)) as well as eight other categories. This apparently is intended to serve as a “catch-all” to extend a limitation on indemnity agreements to all construction contracts not previously swept into this widening legislative scheme, although the exact phrasing is slightly different.7

    The new section 2782.05 then permits a mutual agreement to the timing or immediacy of a defense under a scheme essentially identical to that imposed in the 2008 amendment to section 2782: defend with counsel of choice, and maintain control of the defense; or, pay a reasonable allocated share of defense fees and costs. The same logistical and ethical difficulties presented by the 2008 scheme discussed above would likely be present in cases that fall under the new section 2782.05.

    CONCLUSION

    The California Legislature has been revising section 2782 since shortly after the adoption of S.B. 800. Each revision has been more complicated than the last, and each has tied certain provisions of section 2782 more closely to S.B. 800. In particular, with regard to construction defect claims relating to residential dwellings which are subject to S.B. 800, the Legislature has apparently attempted to exercise more and more control over the scope of allowable indemnity and dictated a very narrow scheme to govern how the defense obligation arising from a contractual indemnity is to be implemented. It seems likely that any attempt to manage the defense of a construction defect case under the options that allow a subcontractor to defend directly and control the defense will create a logistical problem and an ethical difficulty for any attorney attempting to defend a developer at the behest and direction of a subcontractor. Finally, as set forth in the current version of section 2782 relating to contractual indemnity and defense of S.B. 800 type cases (subdivisions (c) through (h) in the 2008 version, now subdivisions (d) through (i) in the 2011 amendment), the Legislature has apparently narrowed the application to only claims of violation of S.B. 800 standards. This may have, in essence, removed the restrictions on indemnity and defense provisions as they relate to other theories pleaded against developers in construction defense cases, e.g., breach of contract, breach of warranty, negligence, and the like. It is not at all clear that the Legislature has accomplished what it set out do accomplish. Rather, the law may have come full circle back to where it began, except for one legal theory, i.e. violation of S.B. 800 standards, currently being used in residential construction defect cases. For any other legal theory the limitation of section 2782 (a) may be solely controlling.

    1. California Civil Code section 43.99, and sections 895 to 945.5.
    2. All statutory references in this article are to the California Civil Code unless otherwise specified.
    3. Type I or specific indemnity does not exactly match the scope of proscribed indemnity as described in section 2782 (a) but it is the closest. More recent case law in California has eschewed a mechanical application of the MacDonald & Kruse typology in favor of examining the precise text of the actual contract (See, e.g., St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Frontier Pacific Ins. Co. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1234, 1246, n. 6) but some recent cases still use the Type I, II and II classifications. And, an understanding of that “historical” typology is useful as an aid to evaluating and understanding express indemnity in general.
    4. The provisions of S.B. 800 other than the prelitigation procedures of sections 910 through 938 apply to general contractors, subcontractors, etc., pursuant to section 936. The prelitigation procedures generally involve a “builder,” which is specifically defined in section 911 (a) by reference to entities or individuals in the business of selling residential units to the public or of building, developing, or constructing residential units for public purchase. Pursuant to section 911 (b) the term builder does not include general contractors, etc., not affiliated with the builder. Thus, a general contractor who constructs residential housing pursuant to a contract with a public agency is still subject to claims for violation of the standards set forth in sections 896 and 897, resulting from its negligent act or omission or breach of contract, pursuant to section 936.
    5. As noted above, there has been no case law yet interpreting any of the “post S.B. 800” changes to Section 2782. One of the most important legal decisions relating to express indemnity and defense obligations and rights between developer-builders and sub-contractors was published after two of the amendments but based upon contracts executed and the language of section 2782 prior to January 1, 2006. (See, Crawford v. Weather Shield Mfg., Inc. (2008) 44 Cal.4th 541, 547, 566-67, fn. 14).
    6. Subcontractor dissatisfaction with the perceived inadequacy of protection afforded by this provision apparently became the impetus for a 2008 amendment to section 2782, discussed below, at least based upon the numerous (form) letters submitted to legislators in connection therewith.
    7. Section 2782 (a), where we started, and which has continued without change, prohibits indemnity for claims arising out of the sole negligence or willful misconduct of the promisee; sole negligence can be either active or passive. The various versions relating to residential construction prohibit indemnity for the negligence of the builder, etc., suggesting there is no express contractual indemnity for the negligence of the subcontractor if the builder, etc., is at all negligent. This is tempered a bit by the preservation of the right to equitable indemnity, which will now be found in section 2782 (g) and (h).

    Courtesy of Michael D. Worthing of Borton Petrini, LLP. Mr. Worthing can be contacted at mworthing@bortonpetrini.com.


    Official Tried to Influence Judge against Shortchanged Subcontractor

    February 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff

    A contractor testified in the trial of former Cuyahoga County Commissioner Jimmy Dimora. According to Fox 8 in Cleveland, Ohio, Sean Newman, the president of Letter Perfect testified that his company was a subcontractor on the reconstruction of the locker rooms at the Cleveland Browns Stadium. Newman said his company was paid only $400,000 of their $650,000 bid. When Letter Perfect sued the contractor, D.A.S. Construction, Dimora called the judge to influence her to rule in favor of D.A.S.

    The judge in the earlier case, Bridgett McCafferty, has been found guilty of lying to the FBI during their investigation and is serving a 14-month prison sentence.

    Read the full story…


    Seller Cannot Compel Arbitration for Its Role in Construction Defect Case<

    March 1, 2012 — CDJ Staff

    The buyer of a leaky home in Venice, California cannot be compelled to arbitration with the seller in a construction defect lawsuit, according to a decision in Lindemann v. Hume, which was heard in the California Court of Appeals. Lindemann was the trustee of the Schlei Trust which bought the home and then sued the seller and the builder for construction defects.

    The initial owner was the Hancock Park Trust, a real estate trust for Nicholas Cage. Richard Hume was the trustee. In 2002, Cage agreed to buy the home which was being built by the Lee Group. Cage transferred the agreement to the Hancock Park Trust. Hancock had Richard Nazarin, a general contractor, conduct a pre-closing walk through. They also engaged an inspector. Before escrow closed, the Lee Group agreed to provide a ten-year warranty “to remedy and repair any and all damage resulting from water infiltration, intrusion, or flooding due to the fact that the door on the second and third floors of the residence at the Property were not originally installed at least one-half inch (1/2”) to one inch (1”) above the adjacent outside patio tile/floor on each of the second and third floors.”

    Cage moved in and experienced water intrusion and flooding. The Lee Group was unable to fix the problems. Hume listed the home for sale. The Kamienowiczs went as far as escrow before backing out of the purchase over concerns about water, after the seller’s agent disclosed “a problem with the drainage system that is currently being addressed by the Lee Group.”

    The house was subsequently bought by the Schlei Trust. The purchase agreement included an arbitration clause which included an agreement that “any dispute or claim in Law or equity arising between them out of this Agreement or any resulting transaction, which is not settled through mediation, shall be decided by neutral, binding arbitration.” The warranty the Lee Group had given to Hancock was transferred to the Schlei trust and Mr. Schlei moved into the home in May 2003.

    Lindemann enquired as to whether the work done would prevent future flooding. Nazarin sent Schlei a letter that said that measures had been taken “to prevent that situation from recurring.” In February, 2004, there was flooding and water intrusion. Lindemann filed a lawsuit against the Lee Group and then added the Hancock Park defendants.

    The Hancock Park defendants invoked the arbitration clause, arguing that Lindemann’s claims “were only tangentially related to her construction defect causes of action against the Lee Group.” On June 9, 2010, the trial court rejected this claim, ruling that there was a possibility of conflicting rulings on common issues of law. “With respect to both the developer defendants and the seller defendants, the threshold issue is whether there was a problem with the construction of the property in the first instance. If there was no problem with the construction of the property, then there was nothing to fail to disclose.” Later in the ruling, the trial court noted that “the jury could find there was no construction defect on the property, while the arbitration finds there was a construction defect, the sellers knew about it, and the sellers failed to disclose it.” The appeals court noted that while Hancock Park had disclosed the drainage problems to the Kamienowiczs, no such disclosure was made to Sclei.

    The appeals court described Hancock Park’s argument that there is no risk of inconsistent rulings as “without merit.” The appeals court said that the issue “is not whether inconsistent rulings are inevitable but whether they are possible if arbitration is ordered.” Further, the court noted that “the Hancock Park defendants and the Lee Group have filed cross-complaints for indemnification against each other, further increasing the risk of inconsistent rulings.”

    The court found for Lindemann, awarding her costs.

    Read the court’s decision…


    Lower Court “Eminently Reasonable” but Wrong in Construction Defect Case

    July 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff

    Noting that “circuit court’s orders are eminently reasonable, logical and just” the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia has granted a writ to halt enforcement of these orders and to compel arbitration instead in the case of State v. Tucker. The initial case concerned claims that an HVAC system had been improperly designed, constructed, manufactured, or maintained, leading to serious problems. Glenmark Holding, the owner of the Suncrest Executive Plaza brought a lawsuit against seven defendants. Three of the defendants, Morgan Keller, Inc, York International Corporation, and Johnson Controls, Inc. argued that Glenmark was obligated to enter into arbitration.

    Glenmark and the other defendants argued that the motions for arbitration should be denied “so all the claims and cross-claims of the parties could be litigated in one forum, in one proceeding.” The circuit court noted that arbitration is preferred over litigation because of its supposed “expeditious, economic resolution of issues,” but that in this case, “the petitioners would expend additional, not fewer resources responding to the parties’ claims and cross-claims.” As “compulsory arbitration would be insufficient and inequitable” the court denied the request, finding the arbitration clauses “unconscionable and, therefore, unenforceable.”

    Morgan Keller, York, and Johson argued that “the interpretation of arbitration clauses is governed exclusively by the Federal Arbitration Act.” The appeals court found that “the circuit court was within its authority to consider Glenmark’s claim that the arbitration clauses were unenforceable.” However, the appeals court rejected the circuit court’s conclusion about the “piecemeal” resolution of the conflict, as it contradicts a Supreme Court ruling. The Supreme Court stated in 1983 that the FAA “requires piecemeal resolution when necessary to give effect to an arbitration agreement.” In a 1985 decision, the Court held that a court could “not substitute [its] own views of economy and efficiency.”

    Nor could the court find the arbitration clause to be unconscionable or unenforceable. The court noted that the contract was a standard AIA form, and was amended by the parties involved, whom the court characterized as “commercially sophisticated.” The court found that the agreement limited the rights of all parties and was not one-sided.

    As the arbitration clause was neither unconscionable nor unenforceable, and Supreme Court rulings preclude a court from substituting its own procedures, even when these are “eminently reasonable, logical and just,” the appeals court halted the order of the circuit court, sending the matter to arbitration.

    Read the court’s decision…


    Virginia Chinese Drywall “property damage” caused by an “occurrence” and number of “occurrences”

    August 4, 2011 — CDCoverage.com

    In Dragas Management Corp. v. Hanover Insurance Co., No. 2:10cv547 (E.D. Va. July 21, 2011), claimant residential home general contractor and developer DMC filed for arbitration against insured drywall supply and install subcontractor Porter-Blaine seeking damages for (1) the replacement of defective Chinese drywall, and (2) the repair of resulting property to other components of the DMC homes and homeowners’ personal property in seventy-four homes. Porter-Blaine’s CGL insurer Citizens and excess insurer Hanover defended Porter-Blaine in the DMC arbitration.

    Read the full story…

    Reprinted courtesy of CDCoverage.com


    Insurer Able to Refuse Coverage for Failed Retaining Wall

    October 28, 2011 — CDJ Staff

    The Eleventh District of the US Court of Appeals has ruled in the case of Nix v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Company. In this case, the Nixes filed a claim after a portion of the retaining wall in their home collapsed and their basement flooded. State Farm denied the claim “on the ground that the policy excluded coverage for collapses caused by defects in construction and for damage caused by groundwater.”

    The court reviewed the Nixes’ policy and found that State Farm’s statement did specifically exclude both of these items. In reviewing the lower court’s ruling, the appeals court noted that State Farm’s expert witness, Mark Voll, determined that the retaining wall “lacked reinforcing steel, as required by a local building code, and could not withstand the pressure created by groundwater that had accumulated during a heavy rainfall.” Additionally, a french drain had been covered with clay soil and so had failed to disperse the groundwater.

    The Nixes argued that the flooding was due to a main line water pipe, but their opinions were those of Terry Nix and the contractor who made temporary repairs to the wall. “Those opinions were not admissible as lay testimony. Neither Nix nor the contractor witnessed the wall collapse or had personal knowledge about the construction of the Nixes’ home.”

    The lower court granted a summary judgment to State Farm which has been upheld by the appeals court.

    Read the court’s decision…


    Arbitration Clause Not Binding on Association in Construction Defect Claim

    June 19, 2012 — CDJ Staff

    Determining that a community’s CC&Rs do not form an agreement to arbitrate, the California Court of Appeals has reversed the decision of the Superior Court inVerano Condo. Homeowners the Ass’n v. La Cima Dev., LLC (Cal. App., 2012). La Cima purchased an apartment complex in December 2004, which they converted into condominiums. In the process, La Cima created the CC&Rs, under which the Verano Condominium Homeowners Association came into being. One section of the CC&Rs included arbitration clauses. Additionally, the purchase agreements for individual condominium units also contained arbitration clauses. Subsequently, the owners became aware of construction defect both in units and in the common areas. The Association sued La Cima both in its own interest and on behalf of its members. La Cima moved to compel arbitration, which was denied by the trial court. La Cima appealed.

    The court concluded that “CC&Rs are insufficient to form an agreement to arbitrate between La Cima and the Association.” The court noted that “no evidence exists to show the Association consented to the terms of the CC&Rs, either explicitly or implicitly.”

    The court agreed with La Cima that the arbitration agreement applied to those owners who had purchased their units directly from La Cima. Moreover, as the conversion to condominiums involved interstate commerce, in part because a Delaware company was selling condominiums located in California, the court held that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) applied, and as such “even a state constitutional standard, such as the the jury waiver provision requirements of the California Constitution, cannot be used to circumvent the FAA in the face of an otherwise valid arbitration agreement.”

    However, the court also held that there was “no agreement in the CC&Rs between La Cima and owners who did not purchase units directly from La Cima,” adding that “no meeting of the minds between La Cima and these later purchasers and their successors occurred.” The court did not believe that “the Legislature intended that CC&Rs would be used to provide continuing and irrevocable contractual development or role as a representative of the owners of the development.”

    The purpose of the CC&Rs, according to the court are to “protect owners from one another and permit enforcement of its terms by the Association.” The court stated that “La Cima relinquished its interests in the land by selling its property and may not assert any rights under the CC&Rs following the transfer of its ownership interest.

    In its conclusion, the court determined that claims must be organized in three classes. The claims the association made against La Cima for defects in the common area “are not subject to any valid agreement to arbitrate.” The second category are those owners who did not purchase their units directly from La Cima. Here, also, the court found that the units “are similarly not subject to a valid arbitration agreement.”

    The third category, however, was “owners who purchased units directly from La Cima.” The court held that these arbitration agreements were valid, and if the claims were to be taken up by the association, the association could only submit these claims to arbitration. The lower court was instructed to separate these claims, as here La Cima’s motion could be granted.

    Read the court’s decision…


    Gut Feeling Does Not Disqualify Expert Opinion

    July 6, 2011 — CDJ Staff

    The New Jersey Supreme Court issued a ruling in June on the case of Nevins v. Toll in which they reversed an earlier decision and remanded the case to a lower court for retrial. At issue in the case was the testimony of the plaintiff’s expert, J. Anthony Dowling. In depositions, Mr. Dowling said that his estimates for repair were based on a “gut feeling.” Dowling said he had “very little” experience in cost estimates for single-family homes. The defendants sought to bar Dowling’s testimony which was granted by the judge. Without an expert, Ms. Nevin’s case was dismissed.

    Describing Dowling’s report as “far from a model of how an expert’s opinion in a construction case should be presented,” the court noted that Dowling is not a professional expert witness. However, the court did note that Dowling is a professional cost estimator. Despite Mr. Dowling using his “gut feeling” to construct his estimate, the New Jersey Supreme Court felt that whether his estimate is convincing is “a question for the jury.”

    Read the court’s opinion…