Preparing For the Worst with Smart Books & Records
November 7, 2012 — Douglas Reiser, Builders Counsel
Contractors are often too caught up in keeping the wheel of business churning to recognize deficiencies in how their records are managed. Working hard and working often tend to leave little time for consideration of your documents. But all too often I see the unthinkable, a contractor gets into trouble and has to call on its surety for help. At that point, you might finally get your first dose of reality about your records ?Äì and it can cost you.
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Reprinted courtesy of Douglas Reiser of Reiser Legal LLC. Mr. Reiser can be contacted at info@reiserlegal.com
Safer Schools Rendered Unsafe Due to Construction Defects
February 10, 2012 — CJD Staff
Built on a program for safer school buildings, schools in Neenan County, Colorado have been shown to have mild-to-moderate structural problems, rendering some of them unsafe. The Denver Post reports that a third-party review of schools built by the Neenan Company has shown structural issues in all fifteen school buildings.
One school, Meeker Elementary, has been closed as it could collapse under high winds or during an earthquake. Sargent Junior-Senior High School is in use, but there are plans to evacuate the buildings if winds exceed 25 mile per hour. Two schools have roofs that are unable to bear expected loads of snow during the winter.
The Neenan Company says that the school buildings are not up to their standards and is working with the school districts to repair the buildings. Repairs are expected to be complete by August.
Read the full story…
Nevada Senate Rejects Construction Defect Bill
June 7, 2011 — CDJ Staff
The Las Vegas Sun reports that Assembly Bill 401, the construction defect bill, lost in a vote of 9 to 12. The measure extended the time for construction defect suits to be filed, awarded legal costs only to successful plaintiffs, and set a definition of construction defects. Two Democrats joined the Republicans in the Senate in defeating the bill.
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Damage During Roof Repairs Account for Three Occurrences
August 2, 2012 — Tred Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
Southgate Gardens Condominium had buildings damaged by Hurricane Wilma in 2005. See Mid-Continent Cas. Co. v. Basedeo, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 11864 (11th Cir. June 12, 2012). First State Development Corporation was hired by Southgate to do repairs.
On November 1, 2005, First State completed tarping on the buildings. Thereafter, on November 11, 2005, First State contracted with Southgate to remove and replace the roofs of the Southgate Buildings.
The tarps placed by First State were inadequate and allowed water to enter the unit of Wayne Basdeo and cause damage. Further, when it attached the tarps, First State caused holes to be made in the roofs of buildings, leading to additional damage. First State also left open the mansards (a type of roof which has two slopes on all all sides, but with the lower slope steeper that the upper one). Finally, the peeled-back condition of the roofing allowed rain to enter.
Basdeo filed a claim with Mid-Continent.
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
Defective Shingle Claims Valid Despite Bankruptcy
June 19, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The Third Circuit Court has allowed claims to go forward against Owens Corning for making allegedly defective shingles. The shingles split, leading to leaking roofs. The building products manufacturer filed for bankruptcy in 2000, which “extinguished” claims against it. The company was facing millions in liabilities over asbestos lawsuits.
The lawsuit was filed in 2009. The courts initially found the lawsuit timely, but the Third Circuit Court later applied determined the exposure stated before the bankruptcy. On appeal, the court has reversed this and is again allowing the suit to proceed.
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When is a Construction Project truly “Complete”? That depends. (law note)
August 2, 2012 — Melissa Dewey Brumback, Construction Law North Carolina
Long-time readers of the blog may remember my earlier post on substantial completion. However, in looking over my blog stats to see what search terms lead people here, it looks like this is hot topic. The blog searches came in two general categories:
1. Those searching strictly for a definition of substantial completion. Some examples:
- What does “substantial completion” mean?
- when does a building achieve substantial completion
- contracts “substantial completion”
- substantial completion undefined
- when is a project substantially complete
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Reprinted courtesy of Melissa Dewey Brumback of Ragsdale Liggett PLLC. Ms. Brumback can be contacted at mbrumback@rl-law.com.
Limiting Plaintiffs’ Claims to a Cause of Action for Violation of SB-800
November 18, 2011 — Samir R. Patel, Esq. and Todd E. Verbick, Esq., Lorber, Greenfield & Polito, LLP
There has been a fair share of publicity about the SB-800 amendments to the Civil Code (Civil Code section 896, et seq.) that codified construction defect litigation in 2002. Most of the publicity is geared toward the pre-litigation standards allowing a builder the right to repair before litigation is commenced by a homeowner. Less focus and attention has been given to the fact that violation of the SB-800 performance standards is being used by plaintiff’s counsel as an additional tool in the plaintiff’s pleading tool box against builders. Closer scrutiny to SB-800 reveals that those provisions should in fact act as a limitation to the pleading tools available to plaintiffs and an additional tool for builders in the defense of cases governed by SB-800.
The typical construction defect complaint contains the boiler plate versions of numerous causes of action. These causes of action include Strict Liability, Negligence, Negligence Per Se, Breach of Contract, Breach of Contract – Third-Party Beneficiary, Breach of Express Warranties, Breach of Implied Warranties, among others. The wide array of causes of action leave a defendant “pinned to the wall” because they require a complex defense on a multitude of contract and tort related causes of action. Furthermore, the statutes of limitations as to these claims widely differ depending upon if the particular defect is considered latent or patent. The truth of the matter remains, no matter what the circumstances, if a construction defect matter ultimately goes to trial, it is inevitable that plaintiffs will obtain a judgment on at least one of these causes of action.
On its own, the Strict Liability cause of action can be a thorn in a defendant’s side. A builder is obviously placing a product into the stream of commerce and strict liability is a tough standard to defend against, particularly when it concerns intricate homes comprised of multiple components that originally sold for hundreds of thousands of dollars. A Negligence cause of action can also be difficult to defend because the duty of care for a builder is what a “reasonable” builder would have done under the circumstances. An interpretation of this duty of care can easily sway a jury that will almost always consist of sympathetic homeowners. A Negligence Per Se cause of action can also leave a defendant vulnerable to accusations that a builder violated the Uniform Building Code or a multitude of other obscure municipal construction-related code provisions during the construction of the home. Lastly, the Breach of Contract cause of action leaves a builder relying on dense and intricate purchase and sale agreements with dozens of addenda which leave the skeptical jurors turned off by what they view as one-side, boilerplate provisions. Ultimately, when a matter is about to go to trial, the complexity of these complaints can benefit a plaintiff and increase a plaintiff’s bargaining power against a defendant who is attempting to avoid a potentially large judgment.
Enter the SB-800 statutes. The SB-800 statutes apply to all homes sold after January 1, 2003. Civil Code section 938 specifically states that “[t]his title applies only to new residential units where the purchase agreements with the buyer was signed by the seller on or after January 1, 2003.” (Civil Code §, 938.) As time progresses, more residential construction defect cases will exclusively fall under the purview of SB-800. Slowly but surely more SB-800 governed litigation is being filed, and its exclusive application is looming on the horizon.
On its surface, this “right to repair” regime has left builders with a lot to be desired despite the fact that it is supposed to allow the builder the opportunity to cure any deficiencies in their product before litigation can be filed by potential plaintiffs. However, the application of the time line for repair has shown to be impractical for anything but the most minor problems involving only small numbers of residential units. Moreover, the fact that the fruits of the builder’s investigation into the claimed defects in the pre-litigation context can freely be used as evidence against it in litigation makes builders proceed with trepidation in responding with a repair. For these reasons, more SB-800 litigation can be expected to result due to the shortcomings of the pre-litigation procedures, and savvy defense counsel should anticipate the issues to be dealt with in presenting the defense of such cases at trial.
This fact should not necessarily be met with fear or disdain. Within the SB-800 statutes, the legislature made it clear that they were creating a new cause of action for construction defect claims, but it further made it clear that this cause of action is a plaintiff’s exclusive remedy. The legislature giveth, but at the same time, the legislature taketh away. Throughout numerous provisions within the SB-800 statutes, the Civil Code states that claims for construction defects as to residential construction are exclusively governed by the Civil Code, and that the Civil Code governs any and all litigation arising under breaches of these provisions. Civil Code section 896 specifically states:
In any action seeking recovery of damages arising out of, or related to deficiencies in, the residential construction … the claimant’s claims or causes of action shall be limited to violation of, the following standards, except as specifically set forth in this title. (Civil Code §, 896.)
Civil Code section 896 then provides approximately fifty-plus standards by which a construction defect claim is assessed under that provision. Civil Code section 896 covers everything from plumbing to windows, and from foundations to decks, and in several instances expressly dictates statutes of limitations as to specific areas of construction that severely truncate the 10-year latent damage limitations period. As for any construction deficiencies that are not enumerated within Civil Code section 896, Civil Code section 897 explicitly defines the intent of the standards and provides a method to assess deficiencies that are not addressed in Civil Code section 896. Civil Code section 897 states:
Intent of Standards
The standards set forth in this chapter are intended to address every function or component of a structure. To the extent that a function or component of a structure is not addressed by these standards, it shall be actionable if it causes damage. (Civil Code §, 897.)
Therefore, Civil Code section 897 acts as a catch-all by which defects that are not covered within Civil Code section 896 can be evaluated on a damage standard mirroring the Aas case (damages must be present and actual). The result of sections 896 and 897 being read in combination is a comprehensive, all-inclusive set of performance standards by which any defect raised by Plaintiffs can be evaluated and resolved under a single SB-800 based cause of action.
Civil Code section 943 makes clear that a cause of action for violation of SB-800 performance standards is a plaintiff’s sole remedy for a residential construction defect action. Specifically, Civil Code section 943 states:
Except as provided in this title, no other cause of action for a claim covered by this title or for damages recoverable under 944 is allowed. In addition to the rights under this title, this title does not apply to any action by a claimant to enforce a contract or express contractual provision, or any action for fraud, personal injury, or violation of a statute. (Civil Code §, 943.)
Civil Code section 944 provides the method for computing damages within a construction defect action, as follows:
If a claim for damages is made under this title, the homeowner is only entitled to damages for the reasonable value of repairing any violation of the standards set forth in this title, [and] the reasonable cost of repairing any damages caused by the repair efforts… . (Civil Code §, 944.)
A cursory review of these statutes yields the conclusion that the legislature was attempting to create an exclusive cause of action that trumps all other causes of action where SB-800 applies. The remedy available to plaintiffs is limited to that allowed by the Civil Code. As noted above, “[n]o other cause of action for a claim covered by this title…is allowed.” (Civil Code §, 943.) Therefore, Civil Code sections 896, 897, 943, and 944 specifically prohibit the contract-based and tort-based causes of action typically pled by plaintiffs.
Plaintiff’s counsel has seized upon the language of section 943 to advance the argument that SB-800 still allows a plaintiff to advance typical contract and tort based causes of action. On the surface, this argument may seem compelling, but a minimum of scrutiny of the express language of section 943 dispels this notion. Section 943 says that it provides rights “[i]n addition” to those under the SB-800 Civil Code provisions. Clearly, the language in section 943 is intended to expressly underscore the fact that a plaintiff is not precluded from seeking relief in addition to that allowed under SB-800 for damages not arising from a breach of the SB-800 standards or for damages in addition to those recoverable under Section 944. This language does not provide an unfettered license to bring a Strict Liability, Negligence or other cause of action against a builder where SB-800 applies.
In fact, this language only keeps the door open for plaintiffs to pursue such causes of action not arising from a breach of the SB-800 standards should there be such supporting allegations. For example, if a plaintiff alleges that a builder breached an “express contractual provision” related to the timing of the completion of the home and close of escrow, and the contract specifies damages in this regard, a plaintiff may have a viable separate cause of action for Breach of Contract for recovery of those damages precisely because that is not an issue expressly dealt with in SB-800 in the performance standards under sections 896 and 897, or in the damage recovery terms under 944. As it stands, the vast majority of complaints are seeking redress for violation of the same primary right; that is, defects specifically outlined in Section 896 and 897 or which result in damages as stated in Section 944.
So, how does a builder defend against a complaint that contains multiple causes of action regarding construction defects for a home sold after January 1, 2003? There are numerous ways to approach this. First and foremost, these superfluous and improper causes of action can be attacked by demurrer seeking dismissal of all causes of action other than the cause of action alleging violation of SB-800. If the the time period within which to file a demurrer has passed already, a motion for judgment on the pleadings can be utilized to attack the improper causes of action in the same way as a demurrer can be used for this purpose.
The limitation to a demurrer or motion for judgment on the pleadings is that the judge is restricted to viewing only the four corners of the pleading when making a ruling. It is typical for plaintiffs’ counsel to cleverly (or one might even say, disingenuously) leave the complaint purposely vague to avoid a successful defense attack on the pleadings by not including the original date the residence was sold. In that instance, a motion for summary adjudication can be used to attack a plaintiff’s complaint. By simply providing evidence that the homes were originally sold after January 1, 2003, the improper causes of action should be subject to dismissal by summary adjudication. If the plaintiff is a subsequent purchaser, the builder still has recourse to enforce the pleading limitations under SB-800. Civil Code section 945 states that “[t]he provisions, standards, rights, and obligations set forth in this title are binding upon all original purchasers and their successors-in-interest.” (Civil Code §, 945.)
Attacking a plaintiff’s complaint to eliminate multiple causes of action can have numerous benefits. The practical result is that a plaintiff will only have one viable cause of action. The advantage is that the SB-800 performance standards include the defined performance standards and shortened statutes of limitations periods with regard to specific issues. Furthermore, as to defects which are not specifically provided for in Civil Code section 896, Civil Code section 897 requires a proof of actual damages. Therefore, a plaintiff must provide evidence of current damages and not simply conditions that may potentially cause damage in the future.
The Appellate Courts have yet to directly address and interpret these SB-800 provisions. The time for that is undoubtedly drawing near. For now, however, plaintiffs will have to find ways to accurately plead construction defect claims within the confines of one cause of action for breach of the performance standards enumerated within the Civil Code.
Printed courtesy of Lorber, Greenfield & Polito, LLP. Mr. Patel can be contacted at spatel@lorberlaw.com and Mr. Verbick at tverbick@lorberlaw.com.
FHA Lists Bridges and Overpasses that May Have Defective Grout
September 13, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The Federal Highway Administration has released a list of bridges and overpasses that may be prone to corrosion problems due to grout that was in chlorides when it was supposed to be completely free of them. Currently, the FHA is working with state departments of transportation to determine if the defective grout was indeed used on additional bridges and overpasses. The initial FHA list of structures determined to have been built with the defective grout lists thirty-four sites, of which four are in Ohio, the largest number for any state.
California contains only one such site, the intersection of the 55 and 405 freeways, one of the few items on the list not designated as a bridge.
Read the full story…
General Contractors Must Plan to Limit Liability for Subcontractor Injury
May 18, 2011 — May 18, 2011 - Douglas Reiser in the Builders Counsel Blog
It takes more than a hard hat, but safety checks, a good policy and a smart contract might save you some problems.If you are a general contractor, you will want to pay close attention to this article. A new Washington appellate decision showcases a general contractor’s liability to subcontractors who are injured on the job, when security barriers fail. But can a general limit this liability? Will its contract help?
In Wrought Corporation, Inc., Appellant V. Mario Interiano (quick note: this opinion is unpublished, but we are here to talk about an issue that was not determined on appeal – WISHA compliance), a subcontractor was injured when a security barrier failed and he fell into an elevator shaft.
A jury awarded a $1.56 million verdict against the general contractor, and the court of appeals affirmed on the basis that the general contractor has a non-delegable duty to ensure compliance with the Washington Industrial Safety and Health Act of 1973, codified under RCW 49.17 (WISHA).
Read the full story… Reprinted courtesy of Douglas Reiser of Reiser Legal LLC. Mr. Reiser can be contacted at info@reiserlegal.com
Mobile Home Owners Not a Class in Drainage Lawsuit
March 1, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Comparing it to a “complex construction defect action,” the California Court of Appeals for Orange County has rejected the claims of a group of mobile home owners that they should be certified as a class in their lawsuit against Huntington Shorecliffs Mobilehome Park. The Appeals court sustained the judgment of the lower court. The court issued a decision in the case of Criswell v. MMR Family LLC on January 17, 2012.
The claims made by the group were that the owners and operators of the mobile home park had known of an “on-going and potentially worsening shallow groundwater condition on the property” and had “exacerbated the problem by changing ‘the configuration and drainage related to the hillside that abuts’ the park.” The homeowners claimed that the class should consist of “any past or current homeowner during the same time frame” who had experienced “the accumulation of mold, fungus, and/or other toxins,” “property damage to his/her mobilehome and/or other property resulting from drainage problems, water seepage, water accumulation, moisture build-up, mold, fungus, and/or other toxins,” emotional distress related to drainage problems or mold, and finally health problems “resulting from exposure to drainage problems, water seepage, water accumulation, moisture build-up, mold, fungus, and/or other toxins, in or around one’s home, lot, or common areas of the park.”
The lower court concluded that while the limits of the class were identifiable, they failed to constitute a class in other ways. First, the people affected were small enough in number that they could be brought together. They “are not so numerous that it would be impracticable to bring them all before the Court.”
The court noted that while many of the homeowners would have issues in common, they did not find “a well-defined community of interest among the class members.” The Appeals Court wrote that “the individual issues affecting each mobile home and homeowner will predominate over the common issue of the presence of standing or pooling water in and around the park.” The court noted that each home would be affected differently by water and “the ‘accumulation of mold, fungus, and/or other toxins.’”
While the court conceded that there would be common issues, such as the “defendants’ alleged concealment of excess moisture conditions and their allegedly negligent roadwork and landscaping,” they noted that “these common issues would be swamped by the swarm of individual determinations of property damage, emotional distress, and personal injury.” The Appeals Court cited an earlier case that ruled against certification “if a class action ‘will splinter into individual trials.’” The court affirmed the judgment of the lower court that they could not proceed as a class.
Read the court’s decision…
Denver Court Rules that Condo Owners Must Follow Arbitration Agreement
November 7, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Prior to initiating a construction defect lawsuit, the Glass House Residential Association voted to invalidate the arbitration agreement that had been written into its declaration and bylaws by the developer and general contractor. After the association started their construction defect claims, the developer and general contractor argued that the case must go to arbitration, as the arbitration clause contained a provision that it could not be altered without the agreement of the developer and general contractor.
The Denver District Court has ruled against that association, determining that the res triction was not in violation of Colorado condominium law. And, as a post from Polsinelli Shughart PC on JDSupra notes, the Colorado Common Interest Ownership Act encourages the use of arbitration procedures to settle disputes. The CCIOA does prohibit “certain restrictions on the homeowners association’s ability to amend the condominium declarations,” however, preserving an arbitration agreement is not one of them.
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Wisconsin “property damage” caused by an “occurrence.”
April 4, 2011 — April 4, 2011 in CDCoverage.com
In American Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. American Girl, Inc., 673 N.W.2d 65 (Wis. 2004), the insured general contractor was hired by the owner to design and build a warehouse on the owner s property. The general contractor hired a soil engineer to do a soil analysis and make site preparation recommendations. The soil engineer determined that the soil conditions were poor and recommended a compression process which the general contractor followed. After the warehouse was completed and the owner took possession, excessive soil settlement caused the foundation to sink which in turn caused structural damage to the warehouse. The warehouse had to be torn down.
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Reprinted courtesy of CDCoverage.com
Seller Cannot Compel Arbitration for Its Role in Construction Defect Case<
March 1, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The buyer of a leaky home in Venice, California cannot be compelled to arbitration with the seller in a construction defect lawsuit, according to a decision in Lindemann v. Hume, which was heard in the California Court of Appeals. Lindemann was the trustee of the Schlei Trust which bought the home and then sued the seller and the builder for construction defects.
The initial owner was the Hancock Park Trust, a real estate trust for Nicholas Cage. Richard Hume was the trustee. In 2002, Cage agreed to buy the home which was being built by the Lee Group. Cage transferred the agreement to the Hancock Park Trust. Hancock had Richard Nazarin, a general contractor, conduct a pre-closing walk through. They also engaged an inspector. Before escrow closed, the Lee Group agreed to provide a ten-year warranty “to remedy and repair any and all damage resulting from water infiltration, intrusion, or flooding due to the fact that the door on the second and third floors of the residence at the Property were not originally installed at least one-half inch (1/2”) to one inch (1”) above the adjacent outside patio tile/floor on each of the second and third floors.”
Cage moved in and experienced water intrusion and flooding. The Lee Group was unable to fix the problems. Hume listed the home for sale. The Kamienowiczs went as far as escrow before backing out of the purchase over concerns about water, after the seller’s agent disclosed “a problem with the drainage system that is currently being addressed by the Lee Group.”
The house was subsequently bought by the Schlei Trust. The purchase agreement included an arbitration clause which included an agreement that “any dispute or claim in Law or equity arising between them out of this Agreement or any resulting transaction, which is not settled through mediation, shall be decided by neutral, binding arbitration.” The warranty the Lee Group had given to Hancock was transferred to the Schlei trust and Mr. Schlei moved into the home in May 2003.
Lindemann enquired as to whether the work done would prevent future flooding. Nazarin sent Schlei a letter that said that measures had been taken “to prevent that situation from recurring.” In February, 2004, there was flooding and water intrusion. Lindemann filed a lawsuit against the Lee Group and then added the Hancock Park defendants.
The Hancock Park defendants invoked the arbitration clause, arguing that Lindemann’s claims “were only tangentially related to her construction defect causes of action against the Lee Group.” On June 9, 2010, the trial court rejected this claim, ruling that there was a possibility of conflicting rulings on common issues of law. “With respect to both the developer defendants and the seller defendants, the threshold issue is whether there was a problem with the construction of the property in the first instance. If there was no problem with the construction of the property, then there was nothing to fail to disclose.” Later in the ruling, the trial court noted that “the jury could find there was no construction defect on the property, while the arbitration finds there was a construction defect, the sellers knew about it, and the sellers failed to disclose it.” The appeals court noted that while Hancock Park had disclosed the drainage problems to the Kamienowiczs, no such disclosure was made to Sclei.
The appeals court described Hancock Park’s argument that there is no risk of inconsistent rulings as “without merit.” The appeals court said that the issue “is not whether inconsistent rulings are inevitable but whether they are possible if arbitration is ordered.” Further, the court noted that “the Hancock Park defendants and the Lee Group have filed cross-complaints for indemnification against each other, further increasing the risk of inconsistent rulings.”
The court found for Lindemann, awarding her costs.
Read the court’s decision…
Brown Paint Doesn’t Cover Up Construction Defects
April 25, 2012 — CDJ Staff
In a decision that describes the case as illustrating “the perils that real estate brokers and their agents assume when acting as a dual listing agent to both the buyers and sellers of the same house,” the California Court of Appeals has issued a decision in William L. Lyon & Associates v. The Superior Court of Placer County. Lyon & Associates sought summary judgment to dismiss the claims of the Henleys who bought a home in a transaction where a Lyon agent represented both sides.
The prior owners of the home, the Costas, had used a Lyon agent in purchasing their home. When they later sought to sell it, that agent “became aware of some of the house’s defects and problems.” In response, the Costas sought the help of another agent, Connie Gidal, also of Lyons & Associates. Photos taken in the presence of Ms. Gidal show defects of the paint and stucco. The Costas also took the step of painting the house dark brown. During the sale process, “rain caused many of the painted-over defects to reappear.” The Costas “purchased more dark brown paint and covered up the newly visible damage prior to inspection by the Henleys.”
With the damage concealed, the Henleys bought the home in May 2006. The agreement with Lyons & Associates noted that “a dual agent is obligated to disclose known facts materially affecting the value or desirability of the property to both parties.” Escrow closed on May 9, 2006. The contract with the broker included a two-year limit on the time to bring legal action.
The Henleys moved in during June 2006, and “began to discover construction defects that had been concealed by the Costas.” In addition to the painted-over stucco problems, the Henleys found that the Costas had “installed quartzite stone overlays on the backyard steps in a manner that caused water intrusion on the house’s stucco walls.”
In May 2009, the Henleys sued the Costas, Ron McKim Construction, Lyons & Associates, and Ms. Gidal. Their complaint alleged that Lyons & Associates had committed breach of contact, negligence, fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and negligent nondisclosure in connection with the construction defects. The Costas named Lyons in a cross complaint. Lyons moved for summary judgments on the grounds that the two-year statute of limitations had expired before the complaint and cross-complaint were filed. Both the Henleys and the Costas opposed this claim. The court denied the motion and Lyons appealed.
The appeals court upheld the denial, noting that the both California Supreme Court decision and later action by the legislature compels real estate brokers and salespersons “to conduct a reasonably competent and diligent visual inspection of the property offered for sale.” The court noted that under California law, brokers have responsibilities to both sellers and buyers. The section of law cited by Lyons applies to seller’s agents. The court rejected the contention by Lyons that they were “cooperating brokers.” The Henleys were “not constrained by the two-year statute of limitations.”
Lyons contended that even if California’s statute did not apply, there was a contractual limit of two years. The court also rejected this, agreeing with the Henleys that “the two-year limitation period must be extended by the discovery rule.”
The court noted that “Lyon & Associates may not reap the benefit of a shortened contractual limitation period when its own alleged malfeasance contributed to the delay in the discovery of the buyer’s injury.” The court found that the Henleys could proceed with their breach of contract claim, because, “when a breach of contract is committed in secret, such as the intentional nondisclosure of a real estate broker regarding a previously visible construction defect, the contractual limitations period is properly held subject to the discovery rule.” The court felt that the interpretation favored by the California Association of Realtors would “halve the applicable statute of limitations period.”
In addition to rejecting Lyon request for summary judgment on the claims made by the Henleys, the court also rejected the request of summary judgment on the claims made by the Costas, concluding that neither claim is time-barred. Costs were awarded to both the Henleys and Costas.
Read the court’s decision…
Foundation Arbitration Doesn’t Preclude Suing Over Cracks
March 28, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The Louisiana Court of Appeals has reversed the decision of a lower court, allowing a construction defect case to go through. In Greer v. Town Construction Company, the Greers hired Town Construction to build a home in Baton Rouge. The business relationship went sour, with disputes over “costs, change orders, workmanship, and timeliness issues.”
Town Construction filed an arbitration claim for the unpaid contract balance. In the counterclaim, the Greers made claims of mold and mildew problems, and wall cracks that they attributed to a “structural defect in the foundation.” In arbitration, Town Construction was awarded the full contract balance plus extra costs and interest, while the Greers were awarded for their structural claims.
Three years later, the Greers found additional cracks and filed a suit against Town Construction. Town Construction argued that the Greer’s lawsuit should be dismissed, as the claims had already been through the arbitration process. The district court agreed with Town Construction and dismissed the suit.
The appeals court noted that the Greers would have no ground for a suit if the arbitration was a “valid and final judgment,” and went on to note that there was no evidence in the trial record that the arbitration met this qualification. The court noted that although it was clear that both parties had agreed to the decisions of the arbiter, under Louisiana law, arbitration is not final until it has been “rendered by a court with jurisdiction over subject mater and over parties.”
The court remanded the case to the lower court, noting that “the district court is obligated to first determine whether a valid arbitration award is in existence and had been confirmed before considering the merits of the exception. The court noted that their decision “should not be read to express any opinion as to the merits of the claims or as to the propriety of damages sought in the Greer’s lawsuit.”
Read the court’s decision…
Ohio subcontractor work exception to the “your work” exclusion
August 11, 2011 — CDCoverage.com
In Mosser Construction, Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., No. 09-4449 (6th Cir. July 14, 2011)(unpublished), claimant project owner Port Clinton contracted with insured general contractor Mosser for the construction of a building. Following completion, Port Clinton sued Mosser for breach of contract seeking damages because of physical injury to the project occurring after completion resulting from defective backfill material that settled improperly.
Mosser’s CGL insurer Travelers denied a defense and Mosser filed suit against Travelers seeking a declaratory judgment. Mosser and Travelers filed cross-motions for summary judgment on the issue of whether the supplier of the backfill material?Gerken?qualified as a subcontractor for purposes of the subcontractor work exception to the “your work” exclusion—exclusion l.—for property damage to or arising out of Mosser’s completed work.  Mosser had purchased the backfill material from Gerken pursuant to a purchase order specifying that Gerken was to supply Mosser with an industry standard grade of backfill for use in the Port Clinton project.
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Reprinted courtesy of CDCoverage.com
Can Negligent Contractors Shift Blame in South Carolina?
July 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Clay Olson looks back to a 1991 Carolina case, Nelson v. Concrete Supply Company. The court concluded in that case that “a plaintiff in South Carolina may recover only if his/her negligence does not exceed that of the defendant’s and amount of plaintiff’s recovery shall be reduced in proportion to amount of his or her negligence; if there is more than one defendant, plaintiff’s negligence shall be compared to combined negligence of all defendants.” In 2005, he reports, as part of tort reform in South Carolina, the legislature further addressed this.
He then suggests a possible outcome of this is that negligent contractors may be able to shift some of the blame (and cost of the settlement) to other defendants who may not be to blame. He offers a scenario in which a contractor is sued for construction defects and a jury has to allocate responsibility for indivisible damage. “A jury need only find the two subcontractors to have each contributed 15% of the indivisible damage.” He adds in another 15% for claims against the architect. Minor blame is given to the manufacturers, and suddenly the negligent contractor is paying less than 50% of the total settlement.
He notes that the previous system in place also had its problems, but notes that this one may not be “fair and equitable.”
Read the full story…
Federal Judge Dismisses Insurance Coverage Lawsuit In Construction Defect Case
December 9, 2011 — CDJ Staff
A federal judge dismissed a coverage lawsuit brought by Mid Continent Casualty Company against its insured, Greater Midwest Builders Ltd.
Plaintiff brought this declaratory judgment action in response to a suit filed in Johnson County District Court, seeking a judicial determination that it had no coverage obligation for claims asserted against its insured. This case was stayed until the state court action entered judgment against the insured. The prevailing parties then commenced a garnishment action against the plaintiff, and another insurance company, in state court in Missouri. The court was asked whether it should lift the stay and proceed with the case, or decline jurisdiction in favor of resolution in the Missouri state court.
The court granted the motion to dismiss holding that proceeding with the case would lead to protracted, piecemeal litigation, while deferring to the Missouri state court would decide all the claims involved in the dispute.
Read the court’s decision…
