Court Strikes Down Reasonable Construction Defect Settlement
December 20, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The Court of Appeals of Washington has struck down a construction defect settlement between a building owner and the companies she hired to repair the siding, among other repairs to bring the building up to code. Yuan Zhang hired Hawk Construction LLC to do repair work. Hawk, in turn, hired Ready Construction LLC for some aspects of the project. Hawk and Ready were both insured by Capital Specialty Insurance Corporation.
There were several problems with Ready’s work. After removing old siding, they did not protect the building, nor did they remove all of the damaged layers. Ready covered, but did not fix, a mildew problem under the old siding. When new siding was reattached, the nails used were too short to adequately attach it.
After paying for an inspection of the work, Zhang had Hawk and Ready begin the repairs again, but the work was abandoned without being completed. Zhang sued Hawk for breach of contract. Hawk then sued Ready, claiming that “Ready was liable to Hawk to the extent that Hawk was liable to Zhang.” Capitol retained defense for both contractors.
Zhang settled with Hawk, in an agreement that gave her “the right to collect and/or pursue all costs and attorney fees paid by Hawk or its insurance company defending against the Zhang’s claims and pursuing claims against Ready.” Subsequently, she also settled with Ready. Both companies ceased operations.
Zhang had the settlements reviewed by a court, which concluded that the settlements were reasonable. Capital was allowed to appeal, claiming that the settlement included costs that were Zhang’s responsibility. The appeals court did not examine the question of the reasonableness of the settlement, concluding that Capitol’s interests were relevant only to “questions of bad faith, collusion, and fraud.”
In the case of Zhang, the court concluded that the relationship between Zhang and her former contractors was collusive. The court noted that “bad faith or collusion may exist when the evidence indicates a joint effort to create, in a non-adversarial atmosphere, a resolution beneficial to both parties, yet highly prejudicial to the insurer as intervener.” The court noted that both companies had minimal assets which were, in any case, exempted from the agreement. Further, the court found that the agreements failed to determine “what amount of the repairs related to preexisting water damage.” Zhang’s calculation of costs also included her expenses for architectural and engineering services, which the court points out, “where always Zhang’s costs to bear.”
The court concluded that “the overall structure of the settlements is highly probative of collusion, fraud, or bad faith.” Zhang’s agreements with Hawk and Ready allowed her to collect compensation from Hawk and then collect Ready’s compensation to Hawk for their portion of the settlement, allowing Zhang to collect the monies twice. Further, she was allowed to pursue Capitol for Hawk’s attorney expenses, even though Hawk had none. “The right to recover Hawk’s fees merely set up a windfall recovery for Zhang.” The court described the agreements among Zhang, Hawk, and Ready as “precisely the type of manipulation [the law] is intended to preclude.”
Read the court’s decision…
Damron Agreement Questioned in Colorado Casualty Insurance v Safety Control Company, et al.
February 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Safety Control and EMC appealed the judgment in Colorado Casualty Insurance Company versus Safety Control Company, Inc., et al. (Ariz. App., 2012). The Superior Court in Maricopa County addressed “the validity and effect of a Damron agreement a contractor and its excess insurer entered into that assigned their rights to sue the primary insurer.” Judge Johnsen stated, “We hold the agreement is enforceable but remand for a determination of whether the stipulated judgment falls within the primary insurer’s policy.”
The Opinion provides some facts and procedural history regarding the claim. “The Arizona Department of Transportation (“ADOT”) hired DBA Construction Company (“DBA”) to perform a road-improvement project on the Loop 101 freeway. Safety Control Company, Inc. was one of DBA’s subcontractors. As required by the subcontract, Safety Control purchased from Employer’s Mutual Casualty Company (“EMC”) a certificate of insurance identifying DBA as an additional insured on a policy providing primary coverage for liability arising out of Safety Control’s work.”
A collision occurred on site, injuring Hugo Roman. Roman then sued ADT and DBA for damages. “Colorado Casualty tendered DBA’s defense to the subcontractors, including Safety Control. Safety Control and EMC rejected the tender. Roman eventually settled his claims against DBA and ADOT. DBA and ADOT stipulated with Roman for entry of judgment of $750,000; Roman received $75,000 from DBA (paid by Colorado Casualty) and $20,000 from ADOT, and agreed not to execute on the stipulated judgment. Finally, DBA, ADOT and Colorado Casualty assigned to Roman their rights against the subcontractors and other insurers.”
Colorado Casualty attempted to recover what “it had paid to defend DBA and ADOT and settle with Roman. However, Roman intervened, and argued that “Colorado Casualty had assigned its subrogation rights to him as part of the settlement agreement.” The suit was not dismissed, but the Superior Court allowed Roman to intervene. “Roman then filed a counterclaim against Colorado Casualty and a cross-claim against the subcontractors.”
All claims were settled against all of the defendants except Safety Control and EMC. “The superior court ruled on summary judgment that EMC breached a duty to defend DBA and that as a result, ‘DBA was entitled to settle with Roman without EMC’s consent as long as the settlement was not collusive or fraudulent.’ After more briefing, the court held the stipulated judgment was neither collusive nor procured by fraud and that EMC therefore was liable to Roman on the stipulated judgment and for his attorney’s fees. The court also held Safety Control breached its subcontract with DBA by failing to procure completed-operations insurance coverage and would be liable for damages to the extent that EMC did not satisfy what remained (after the other settlements) of the stipulated judgment and awards of attorney’s fees.” Safety Control and EMC appealed the judgment.
Four reasons were given for the decision of the ruling. First, “the disagreement between Roman and Colorado Casualty does not preclude them from pursuing their claims against EMC and Safety Control.” Second, “the settlement agreement is not otherwise invalid.” Third, “issues of fact remain about whether the judgment falls within the EMC policy.” Finally, “Safety Control breached the subcontract by failing to procure ‘Completed Operations’ coverage for DBA.”
In conclusion, the Superior Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded . “Although, as stated above, we have affirmed several rulings of the superior court, we reverse the judgment against EMC and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion to determine whether the stipulated judgment was a liability that arose out of Safety Control’s operations. In addition, we affirm the superior court’s declaratory judgment against Safety Control but remand so that the court may clarify the circumstances under which Safety Control may be liable for damages and may conduct whatever further proceedings it deems appropriate to ascertain the amount of those damages. We decline all parties’ requests for attorney’s fees pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-341.01 without prejudice to a request for fees incurred in this appeal to be filed by the prevailing party on remand before the superior court.”
Read the court’s decision…
Safe Harbors- not just for Sailors anymore (or, why advance planning can prevent claims of defective plans & specs) (law note)
August 17, 2011 — Melissa Brumback
Have you ever considered a “Safe Harbor Provision” for your Owner-Architect or Owner-Engineer contract? Maybe it is time that you do.
As you are (probably too well) aware, on every construction project there are changes. Some of these are due to the owner’s change of heart, value engineering concerns, contractor failures, and material substitutions. Some may be because of a design error, omission, or drawing conflict. It happens.
A “Safe Harbor Provision” is a provision that establishes an acceptable percentage of increased construction costs (that is, a percentage of the project’s contingency). The idea is that if the construction changes attributable to the designer is within this percentage, no claim will be made by the Owner for design defects.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of Melissa Brumback of Ragsdale Liggett PLLC. Ms. Brumback can be contacted at mbrumback@rl-law.com.
Ceiling Collapse Attributed to Construction Defect
May 19, 2011 — May 16, 2011 - CDJ Staff
WSMV, Nashville reports that the ceiling collapse in a Franklin, Tennessee Kohl’s was attributed to a construction defect by fire officials. The officials noted that the ceiling was renovated at the time. No injuries were reported.
The report notes that “inspectors were supposed to look at the renovations next week, but fire officials said that will have to be delayed until another time.”
Read the full story…
Alabama “occurrence” and subcontractor work exception to the “your completed work” exclusion
November 18, 2011 — CDCoverage.com
In Town & Country Property, LLC v. Amerisure Ins. Co., No. 1100009 (Ala. Oct. 21, 2010), property owner Town & Country contracted with insured general contractor Jones-Williams for the construction of a car dealership. All of the construction work was performed by Jones-Williams subcontractors. After completion, Town & Country sued Jones-Williams for defective construction. Jones-Williams’ CGL insurer Amerisure defended. The case was tried and a judgment was entered against Jones-Williams in favor of Town & Country. After Amerisure denied any obligation to pay the judgment, Town & Country sued Amerisure in a statutory direct action.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of CDCoverage.com.
Defense for Additional Insured Not Barred By Sole Negligence Provision
August 11, 2011 — Tred Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
A general contractor was entitled to a defense as an additional insured when the underlying complaint did not allege it was solely negligent. A-1 Roofing Co. v. Navigators Ins. Co., 2011 Ill. App. LEXIS 656 (Ill. Ct. App. June 24, 2011).
A-1 was the general contractor for a roof resurfacing job at a high school. Jack Frost Iron Works Inc. (“Frost”) was one of A-1’s subcontractors. Frost had a CGL policy with Navigators Insurance Company under which A-1 was an additional insured.
An employee of Frost’s subcontractor Midwest Sheet Metal Inc. was killed at the job site when a boom-lift he was operating flipped over. The boom-lift had been leased by another Frost subcontractor, Bakes Steel Erectors, Inc. (BSE). The deceased's estate filed suit against A-1, BSE and two other defendants.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
Tenth Circuit Finds Insurer Must Defend Unintentional Faulty Workmanship
December 9, 2011 — Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
Applying Colorado law, the Tenth Circuit found a duty to defend construction defect claims where the faulty workmanship was unintentional. Greystone Const. Inc. v. National Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 22053 (10th Cir. Nov. 1, 2011). A prior post [here] discussed the Tenth Circuit’s certified question to the Colorado Supreme Court in this matter, a request that was rejected by the Colorado court.
In two underlying cases, Greystone was sued by the homeowner for damage caused to the foundation by soil expansion. In both cases, the actual construction was performed by subcontractors. Further, in neither case was the damage intended or anticipated. Nevertheless, National Union refused to defend, contending property damage resulting from faulty construction was not an occurrence.
Relying on a Colorado Court of Appeals case, General Security Indemn. Co. of Arizona v. Mountain States Mut. Cas. Co., 205 P.3d 529 (Colo. App. 2009), the district court granted summary judgment to National Union.
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit first considered whether Colorado legislation enacted to overturn General Security could be applied retroactively. The statute, section 13-20-808, provided courts "shall presume that the work of a construction professional that results in property damage, including damage to the work itself or other work, is an accident unless the property damage is intended and expected by the insured."
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
Pipes May Be Defective, But Owners Lack Standing
September 13, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The United States District Court in Minnesota has determined that Steven and Cecilia Thundander cannot make a class-action claim against Uponor, Inc. over the plumbing in their home, as they do not have Article III standing. In this situation, the alleged defect is that Uponor made fraudulent claims that the pipes met National Sanitation Foundation (NSF) standards for use in potable water systems. Uponor submitted samples of other pipes, and their substitution was discovered when the NSF made an inspection of the manufacturing facility. The court noted that “the Thunanders contend that Uponor failed to inform homeowners, plumbers and consumers that it had been selling pipe that failed to meet NSF toxicity requirements at the time of sale and installation.”
The Court noted that the Thunanders have not tested their piping to determine if they “demonstrate toxicity or lack of compliance with the NSF 61 standards,” noting also that the Complaint seeks to require Uponor to instruct the plaintiffs on “how to test the piping and water to determine the level of risk.” Lacking testing, the Court could not find that the Thundanders have defective pipes. The Court found that the “Plaintiffs have failed to adequately plead an injury in fact sufficient to confer standing as to their product liability claims.”
The Court also concluded that it could not determine if the Plaintiff’s warranty actions could not be applied, as they “have failed to allege a plausible defect.” Even in the presence of a defect, the Court noted that more than eight years had passed before the filing of the suit, when the warranties under both Indiana and Minnesota law have a four-year statute of limitations. The Court also rejected the Thunanders tort claims, once again because “Plaintiffs have not tested their pipes,” noting that “a tort requires the existence of an injury.”
In conclusion, Judge Nelson rejected the entirety of the complaint, granting the motions to dismiss by the defendants. However, despite the problems with the Thunanders’ claims, she found that they were not “patently frivolous or groundless.” Therefore, she denied attorney fees requested by one of the defendants.
Read the court’s decision…
No Coverage for Property Damage That is Limited to Work Completed by Subcontractor
April 25, 2012 — Tred Eyerly, Construction Law Hawaii
The issue before the 11th Circuit was whether, under Florida law, a general contractor had coverage for a property damage claim limited to the defective work performed by a subcontractor, and not affecting any other portion of the project. The court found no coverage in Amerisure Mut. Ins. Co. v. Auchter Co., 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 5412 (11th Cir. March 15, 2012).
Amelia Island Company contracted with Auchter Company, a general contractor, for construction of an inn and conference room. Auchter subcontracted with Register Contracting Company to install the Inn’s roof. Pursuant to the Florida Building Code, installation of the roof required that it be able to withstand 110 m.p.h. winds.
Register completed installing the roof tiles in January 1998. Beginning in 2002, the tiles began dislodging from the roof. During the 2004 hurricane season, three hurricanes caused more tiles to come off the roof. Some of these tiles hit other tiles, cracking them.
In 2006, the parties went to arbitration over the costs of repairs for the roof.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
Supreme Court of New York Denies Motion in all but One Cause of Action in Kikirov v. 355 Realty Assoc., et al.
April 28, 2011 — April 28, 2011 Beverley BevenFlorez - Construction Defect Journal
In the construction defect suit Kikirov v. 355 Realty Associates, LLC, et al., the Supreme Court of the State of New York granted a dismissal of the plaintiff’s fourth cause of action, but denied the defendants’ motion in all other respects. The plaintiff alleged breach of contract, among other claims. “355 Realty was the sponsor of 355 Kings Highway Condominium, a condominium project located at 355 Kings Highway, in Brooklyn, New York. The condominium units were allegedly marketed as ‘ultra luxury condos,’ and a ‘Manhattan style condominium building,’ which would be the ‘epitome of luxury and quality.’ The construction of the six-story 28 unit residential condominium building began in approximately November 2003. […] Plaintiff entered into a purchase agreement, dated December 21, 2005, with 355 Realty (which was executed on behalf of 355 Realty by Michael Marino, as its member) for the purchase of Unit 2G in the building.”
The plaintiff alleged that construction defects emerged soon after moving into the unit: “After taking occupancy of his condominium unit, plaintiff allegedly experienced serious leakage and moisture problems in his unit, which caused a dangerous mold condition to develop, in addition to causing actual damage to the structural elements of his unit. According to plaintiff, the walls, moldings, and wood floors of his unit are constantly wet and moist, and there is severe buckling of the wood floors. Plaintiff claims that these problems have caused his unit to be uninhabitable. Plaintiff alleges that he has been forced to remove all of his personal belongings from his unit and has been unable to occupy his unit.”
According to the plaintiff, Foremost attempted to repair the defects, but only made the situation worse: “Specifically, plaintiff asserts that Foremost’s contractors opened his walls to remove the stained drywall, but never corrected the cause of the leaks, destroyed the walls, and never properly taped and painted the sheet rock. Plaintiff alleges that Foremost repaired the openings in a defective manner. Plaintiff also claims that his floor was repaired at that time by a subcontractor hired by Foremost, but the basic structural problem was never resolved and the leaks continued, compromising the beams and causing the mold conditions, in addition to all of the physical damage present in the unit. On or about July 16, 2009, plaintiff allegedly sent a notice of the defects to 355 Realty and to the managing agent designated by the condominium board, by certified mail, return receipt requested. Plaintiff asserts that defendants have failed and refused to repair and remedy the defective condition, and that the damage is extensive and requires major structural repairs.”
The plaintiff filed suit on May 4, 2010, and the original complaint asserted eight causes of action. “By decision and order dated September 13, 2010, the court granted a motion by defendants to dismiss plaintiff’s second cause of action for breach of implied covenants of good faith and fair dealing, his third cause of action for breach of implied warranties, his fifth cause of action for negligence as against 355 Realty, Michael Marino, Anthony Piscione, Ahron Hersh, and Toby Hersh, his seventh cause of action for negligence as against Vision, Foremost, and MMJ, and his eighth cause of action for violations of General Business Law § 349 and § 350, and granted plaintiff leave to replead his first cause of action for breach of contract as against 355 Realty, Michael Marino, Anthony Piscione, Ahron Hersh, and Toby Hersh, his fourth cause of action for breach of statutory warranties, and his sixth cause of action for breach of contract as against Vision, Foremost, and MMJ.”
The plaintiff amended their complaint on October 18, 2010, and “has repleaded these three causes of action by asserting a first cause of action for breach of contract as against 355 Realty, Michael Marino, Anthony Piscione, Ahron Hersh, and Toby Hersh, a second cause of action for breach of statutory warranties, and a third cause of action for breach of contract as against Vision, Foremost, and MMJ. In addition, plaintiff, in his amended complaint, has added a fourth cause of action for fraud.”
The defendants, on the other hand, “argue that each of the four causes of action alleged by plaintiff in his amended complaint fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, and that plaintiff’s amended complaint must be dismissed pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7). Defendants also cite to CPLR 3211 (a) (1), and (5), asserting that dismissal is also required based upon documentary evidence and the Statute of Limitations contained in the limited warranty.”The defendants’ motion to dismiss the first cause of action, breach of contract against 355 Realty, was denied: “While defendants dispute that the alleged defects are actually structural in nature, plaintiff’s allegations as to their structural nature are sufficient, at this juncture, to withstand defendants’ motion to dismiss. Thus, dismissal of plaintiff’s first cause of action must be denied.”
Next, the court reviewed the second cause of action, which was breach of statutory warranties: “Defendants’ motion also seeks dismissal of plaintiff’s second cause of action for breach of statutory warranties, which alleges that, under applicable law, including General Business Law § 777-a, et seq., the sponsor warranted to purchasers of units that the units would be constructed in a skillful, careful, and workmanlike manner, consistent with proper design, engineering, and construction standards and practices, and free of material latent, design, and structural defects. Defendants argue that General Business Law § 777-a, known as the housing merchant implied warranty, is inapplicable to this case because it is limited to the construction of a ‘new home,’ defined in General Business Law § 777 (5) as ‘any single family house or for-sale unit in a multi-unit residential structure of five stories or less.’ As noted above, the building in which plaintiff’s condominium unit is located is a six-story building.”
The motion to dismiss the second cause of action is denied. The court provided this reasoning: “the full text of the offering plan has not been provided, the court is unable to examine the entire written agreement so as to determine the purpose of the inclusion of the text of General Business Law § 777.”
In the third cause of action, the plaintiff alleges “a breach of contract claim as against Vision, Foremost, and MMJ based upon their contract with 355 Realty, pursuant to which they agreed to be the general contractors/construction managers for the condominium, to undertake oversight responsibility for the design and construction of the condominium, to prepare and/or review drawings, plans, and specifications for the condominium, and to otherwise manage and oversee the project. Plaintiff alleges that Vision, Foremost, and MMJ breached their contractual obligations in that the condominium units were improperly and inadequately designed and constructed, and completed in an incompetent and unworkmanlike manner, with material design and construction defects.”
The motion to dismiss the third cause of action was denied as well: “Plaintiff alleges, in his amended complaint, that Vision, Foremost, and MMJ have acknowledged notice of the defects and have not denied that they are responsible for providing a warranty to plaintiff. Plaintiff also refers to this warranty, in his amended complaint, by noting that paragraph 16 of the purchase agreement stated that the ‘[s]eller shall not be liable to . . . the [p]urchaser for any matter as to which an assignable warranty . . . has been assigned . . . to [p]urchaser and in such case the sole recourse of such . . . [p]urchaser . . . shall be against the warrantor . . . except that in the event a contractor or subcontractor is financially unable or refuses to perform its warranty . . . [s]eller shall not be excused from its obligations enumerated in the [offering p]lan under Rights and Obligations of Sponsor.’ Consequently, the court finds that dismissal of plaintiff’s third cause of action as against Foremost and MMJ must also be denied.”
In the fourth cause of action, the plaintiff alleges “that defendants made false statements and representations orally, in advertisements, and in the purchase agreement, that the condominium was properly and adequately designed and constructed and completed in a competent and workmanlike manner, in accordance with the condominium plans and specifications and proper design, engineering, and construction standards and practices consistent with applicable standards for a first class, luxury condominium in Brooklyn.”
The court dismissed the fourth cause of action stating, “it must be dismissed because it is duplicative of his first cause of action for breach of contract.” Therefore, “defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s amended complaint is granted to the extent that it seeks dismissal of plaintiff’s fourth cause of action, and it is denied in all other respects.”
Read the court’s decision…
South Carolina Law Clarifies Statue of Repose
July 11, 2011 — CDJ Staff
A new law in South Carolina, H 3375, fixes a loophole in that state’s statute of repose. State law puts a cap of eight years on construction defects, but the 2008 law that set that limit had a loophole that would allow for construction defect claims to start thirteen years after construction. The law also provides a cap on punitive damages.
The measure was backed by the Carolinas Association of General Contractors. Their spokesperson said that the legislation “increases our state’s ability to be economically competitive and helps protect our members from frivolous lawsuits.”
Read the full story…
Read South Carolina H 3375…
Official Tried to Influence Judge against Shortchanged Subcontractor
February 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
A contractor testified in the trial of former Cuyahoga County Commissioner Jimmy Dimora. According to Fox 8 in Cleveland, Ohio, Sean Newman, the president of Letter Perfect testified that his company was a subcontractor on the reconstruction of the locker rooms at the Cleveland Browns Stadium. Newman said his company was paid only $400,000 of their $650,000 bid. When Letter Perfect sued the contractor, D.A.S. Construction, Dimora called the judge to influence her to rule in favor of D.A.S.
The judge in the earlier case, Bridgett McCafferty, has been found guilty of lying to the FBI during their investigation and is serving a 14-month prison sentence.
Read the full story…
Construction Defect Exception Does Not Lift Bar in Payment Dispute
September 13, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The Court of appeals of Oregon has affirmed the ruling of a lower court, agreeing that ORS 701.131(1) bars John Pincetich from pursuing a payment dispute against his clients, Thomas and Frances Nolan. The Nolans hired Mr. Pincetich to build a home, during which time Mr. Pinchtich lost his license due to a lapse in liability insurance. Mr. Pincetich was reinstated after reestablishing insurance.
After the house was concluded, a dispute over payment arose. The Nolans claimed that Mr. Pincetich was unable to bring an action against them as ORS 701.131(1)(b) specifies that the contractor must hold a license “continuously while performing the work for which compensation is sought.” As there were fourteen days in which Mr. Pincetich did not hold a license, the trial court concluded that this law did not apply.
Mr. Pincetich claimed that in hiring him, the defendants became residential developers. Mr. Pincetich argued that developers are exempted under ORS 701.121(2)(C), but this was rejected by the trial court. This formed the basis of his appeal. The appeals court concluded that the exception he cited was motivated to “further benefit consumers by providing authority for unlicensed contractors to pursue third-party claims in construction-defect cases.” The court concluded that Mr. Pincetich’s reasoning would “allow unlicensed contractors to do the very thing that the claims bar is intended to prevent them from doing.”
Read the court’s decision…
Ensuing Loss Found Ambiguous, Allowing Coverage
August 16, 2012 — Tred Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
The court determined the ensuing loss provision was ambiguous and found coverage for the home owners in Platek v. Town of Hamburg, 2012 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 5371 (N.Y. App. Div. July 6, 2012).
The burst of a water main caused water damage to the insureds' basement. Allstate disclaimed coverage under exclusion 4 for losses caused by "[w]ater . . . on or below the surface of the ground, regardless of its source . . . [,] includ[ing] water . . . which exerts pressure on or flows, seeps or leaks through any part of the residence premises."
Another policy provision covered "sudden and accidental direct physical loss caused by fire, explosion or theft resulting from item []. . . 4 . . . ." Plaintiffs argued that this exception applied because their claimed loss was caused by an "explosion" of the water main.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
Utah Construction Defect Claims Dependant on Contracts
July 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
An owner who wants to sue a subcontractor directly may find limited ability to do so under Utah court decisions. Writing on the JDSupra site, Stewart O. Peay and Mark O. Morris of Snell & Wilmer discuss the distinction the Utah courts make between contractor (with whom an owner has direct contracts) and subcontractors (with whom an owner does not). In the Utah courts, construction defect claims must be based on contract, rather than tort. With no contract, there is no way to pursue claims against a subcontractor alone.
They note that the Utah couts do not “accept negligence and negligent misrepresentation claims that many other jurisdictions embrace.” They recommend that in setting up contracts for a construction project, owners should ensure that they are provided with “third-party beneficiary rights to purse claims against subs.” They suggest that “the owner may require his generals to include language in the various subcontracts that incorporates some or all of the terms of the prime contract into the subcontracts.” Additionally they suggest that the owner “require the general to include ‘flow down’ provisions in the various subcontracts.”
Read the full story…
Construction Defect Journal Marks First Anniversary
January 6, 2012 — CDJ Staff
November 2011 marked the first anniversary of the Construction Defect Journal. During the first year our staff and contributors in the insurance and legal communities have compiled several hundred articles of interest to the construction defect and claims community.
Each of these articles are maintained in the CDJ archives, and are accessible at http://www.constructiondefectjournal.com/archives.html. Each story in the archives is listed in the order it was posted to the archives. Each story in the archives opens up in its own page, so you can easily locate topics and articles of interest.
If you’re new to Construction Defect Journal, or just want peruse past articles, please take a moment to visit the CDJ Archives page. Also please feel encouraged to submit your firm’s articles or legal publications of interest to the CD community at http://www.constructiondefectjournal.com/submitStory.html.
Instant Hotel Tower, But Is It Safe?
March 28, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Broad Sustainable Building has leapfrogged in China’s construction boom by building a thirty-story hotel in just fifteen days in the city of Changsha. According to an article in the Los Angeles Times, most of the building was prefabricated, but most prefabricated buildings require a longer time for assembly. Broad claimed that it cut no corners on safety. However, Zhang Li, a Beijing architect, told the Times that “incredible speed also means incredible risk.”
At the completion date, the interior was still partially finished. Some rooms were furnished, while others weren’t quite so ready. The hotel will be used to house clients who are visiting Broad and some of its employees.
Broad called their process “the most profound innovation in human history” and predicted that soon a third of new buildings worldwide would be constructed this way. The company anticipates using the same process to build taller buildings, with hopes of eventually constructing a 150-story building.
China is currently undergoing a building boom which Zhang attributed to a desire to catch up to the developed world. As a result of this boom, he noted that building inspections are often skipped in China to speed up building.
Read the full story…
Statute of Limitations Upheld in Construction Defect Case
September 30, 2011 — CDJ Staff
The Missouri Court of Appeals has ruled in Ball v. Friese Construction Co., finding that Mr. Ball’s claims were barred by the statute of limitations.
Mr. Ball hired Friese Construction Company to build a single-family home. The sale was completed on March 29, 2001. That December, Mr. Ball complained of cracks in the basement floor. SCI Engineering, n engineering firm, hired by Friese, determined that the home’s footing had settled and recommended that Mr. Ball hire a structural engineer to determine if the footings were properly designed and sized. In September 2002, the structural engineer, Strain Engineering, determined that the cracks were due to slab movement, caused in part by water beneath the slab, recommending measures to move water away from the foundation. In 2005, Mr. Ball sent Friese correspondence “detailing issues he was having with the home, including problems with the basement slab, chimney structure, drywall tape, and doors.” All of these were attributed to the foundation problems. In 2006, Friese stated that the slab movement was due to Ball’s failure to maintain the storm water drains.
In 2009, Ball received a report from GeoTest “stating the house was resting on highly plastic clay soils.” He sued Friese in May, 2010. Friese was granted a summary judgment dismissing the suit, as the Missouri has a five-year statute of limitations. Ball appealed on the grounds that the extent of the damage could not be determined until after the third expert report. The appeals court rejected this claim, noting that a reasonable person would have concluded that after the conclusion of SCI and Strain Engineering that “injury and substantial damages may have occurred.”
The court concluded that as there were not “continuing wrongs causing new and distinct damages,” he should have filed his lawsuit after the first two expert reports, not waiting seven years for a third expert to opine.
Read the court’s decision…