Badly Constructed Masonry Walls Not an Occurrence in Arkansas Law
May 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The US District Court for Maryland has granted a summary judgment in the case Konover Construction Corp. v. ATC Associates to Massachusetts Bay Insurance Company and denied a request for dismissal from ACT. Konover (KBE) was contracted by Wal-Mart to build a Wal-Mart store and a Sam’s Club in Port Covington, Maryland. Superus, Inc. was hired by KBE to build the masonry walls. Superus purchased a policy from Massachusetts Bay Insurance which named KBE as an additional insured. Wal-Mart hired ATC Associates to independently test and inspect the concrete structural steel, and masonry.
After the building was in use, a large crack appeared which was attributed a latent construction defect. Other cracks were discovered. Upon investigation, it was discovered that there were “voids or foam in the concrete block surrounding the reinforcing steel that should have been filled with grout,” and in some cases, “reinforcing steel was missing or not installed in accordance with the specifications.” KBE paid for the repair and remediation and Wal-Mart assigned all rights and interests against ATC to KBE.
KBE filed suit against ATC. ATC called for dismissal on the grounds that Wal-Mart had no claims as the problems had been remediated. Wal-Mart then provided KBE with additional agreements to give them enforceable rights against ATC and Superus. KBE filed a fourteen claims against ATC, Superus, and Massachusetts Bay. In the current case, Massachusetts Bay sought summary judgment and ATC sought dismissal of all claims against it.
Massachusetts Bay claims that they need not indemnify Superus, as “there is no evidence adequate to establish that Superus’ defective work caused any collateral and/or resulting damage that was not subject to an Impaired Property exclusion, and that, in any event, no damage occurred during the policy period.”
As Wal-Mart is headquarted in Arkansas, certain contracts were under Arkansas law. Under the Arkansas courts, “defective workmanship, standing alone and resulting in damages only to the work product itself, is not an ‘occurrence.’” The court determined that collateral or resultant damage would be covered. The court found that “it is clear under Arkansas law, and the parties appear to agree, that Massachusetts Bay is not obligated to indemnify KBE for any repairs to the masonry walls themselves, including any cracks or gaps in the walls.” The court also found that “there is no evidence adequate to prove that any allegedly resultant property damage was caused by Superus’ faulty construction of the walls.” The court also noted that “if the building code violation and structural integrity problem were ‘property damage,’ insurance coverage would be barred by the Impaired Property Exclusion.” Based on these findings, the court concluded that Massachusetts Bay is entitled to summary judgment.
While the court dismissed the case against Massachusetts Bay, the court declined ATC’s motion to dismiss. The court noted that ACT’s alleged negligence in conducting inspections “created only a risk of economic loss for KBE.” Although hired by Wal-Mart, ATC “transmitted its daily testing and inspection reports of the Wal-Mart and Sam’s Club projects directly to KBE.” The court found that “KBE has made a plausible claim.”
ATC also claimed that KBE contributed to the negligence due to the negligence of its subcontractor. The court concluded that it was plausible that “ATC will not be able to carry its burden of proving KBE was contributorily negligent.” The court was less sanguine about KBE’s fraud claim, but though it “may not now appear likely to have merit, it is above the ‘plausibility’ line.”
In conclusion, KBE may not continue its case against Massachusetts Bay. However, the judge allowed the other proceedings to continue.
Read the court’s decision…
Flooded Courtroom May be Due to Construction Defect
September 1, 2011 — CDJ Staff
The General Services Administration wouldn’t pin it on a construction defect, but a spokesperson said that a pipe that was misaligned during installation was the likely cause of a flood in the Thomas F. Eagleton US Courthouse on August 23. According to the St. Louis Dispatch, the burst pipe caused a 17-story waterfall in the courthouse, soaking ceilings and floors, and drenching the building’s contents.
The building was dedicated eleven years ago. During the nearly ten years before the building was complete, there were construction disputes and soil contamination issues.
Read the full story…
Court Voids Settlement Agreement in Construction Defect Case
September 1, 2011 — CDJ Staff
A U.S. District Court Judge in Florida has ruled in favor of a company that sought to void a settlement agreement. The case, Water v. HDR Engineering, involved claims of construction defects at Florida’s C.W. Bill Young Regional Reservoir. The Tampa Bay Water Authority attributed these to both HDR Engineering’s design and Bernard Construction Company which had built the embankment. Bernard Construction filed a complaint against their subcontractor, McDonald.
Tampa Bay Water settled with Bernard Construction and McDonald, in an agreement that set a minimum and maximum settlement, but also would “prohibit Barnard and McDonald from presenting any evidence on several claims and positions of TBW, to require Barnard to call certain witnesses at trial, to preclude Barnard and McDonald from calling other witnesses, and to restrict the filing of trial and post-trial motions.” HDR Engineering moved to void the agreement as collusive.
The judge that the agreement¬? contained “133 paragraphs of ‘Agreed Facts’ that the parties stipulated would survive any order declaring the Settlement Agreement void or unenforceable.” He characterized these as stipulating “that Barnard neither caused nor contributed to TBW’s damages.” HDR motioned that a summary judgment be given to Barnard Engineering.
The court found that “the evidence identified by TBW is patently insufficient to survive summary judgment.” Further, TBW’s expert initially held Barnard responsible for “lenses, pockets, streaks and layers within the embankment,” but then later withdrew this assigning the responsibility to HDR. Further, the court notes that, “TBW’s arguments that lenses, pockets, streaks, and layers in the soil wedge caused or contributed to its damages and that Barnard is liable for those damages have been foreclosed by the Agreed Facts.”
As TBW failed to provide sufficient evidence to withstand summary judgment, the court granted summary judgment, mooted the claim against McDonald, and terminated the agreement between TBW and the other parties.
Read the court’s decision…
The Ever-Growing Thicket Of California Civil Code Section 2782
January 6, 2012 — Michael D. Worthing, Borton Petrini
California Civil Code section 2782 imposes limits on indemnity and defense provisions in construction contracts. Since the initial adoption of S.B. 8001 in 2002 (eff. January 1, 2003) section 27822 has been revised several times, and legislative history suggests that interest groups representing builders, developers and sub-contractors, as well as the insurance industry, have seen legislative action on these indemnity and defense issues as part of the overall response to the same economic pressures resulting from construction defect litigation that gave rise to S.B. 800. Amendments in 2005, 2007, 2008 and 2011 (each effective January 1 of the following year) have increasingly entangled the provisions of Section 2782 with various provisions of S.B. 800. The application of section 2782 to construction contracts, and in particular contracts between developer-builders and subcontractors, executed after January 1, 2006, will require a concurrent reading and understanding of S.B. 800, the application of which is itself still in flux.
The time a construction contract was executed will likely determine which version of section 2782, read in connection with provisions of S.B.800, is applicable. Because of the nature of construction defect litigation, the determination of relative rights and liabilities of developer-builders vis-à-vis subcontractors under construction contracts does not become the subject of litigation, and legal and judicial interpretation, until years after the contracts were entered and work performed. As of the date this article is submitted, there has been no case law interpreting or applying any of the post S.B. 800 amendments, in part, and perhaps primarily, because litigation arising from construction contracts executed after January 1, 2006, has not yet reached the appellate courts.
SECTION 2782 AT THE TIME S.B. 800 WAS ENACTED
Section 2782 was originally enacted in 1967 and amended several times to the version in effect when S.B. 800 became law, at which time the section was relatively simple and straightforward. It then consisted of two subdivisions, which have essentially remained unchanged until the most recent amendment during the 2011 legislative session.
Section 2782 (a) prohibited, and still prohibits, provisions in construction contracts that “purport to indemnify the promisee against liability for damages for death or bodily injury to persons, injury to property, or any other loss, damage or expense arising from the sole negligence or willful misconduct of the promise.” This provision essentially prohibits what had been referred to as so-called Type I or “specific” indemnity provisions. In such agreements, the indemnitor [the promisor, that is, the person or entity indemnifying] will indemnify the indemnitee [the promisee, that is, the person or entity being protected by the indemnity] for the indemnitee’s own negligence, whether active or passive, whether the indemnitee is solely negligent or concurrently negligent with the indemnitor. (See, MacDonald & Kruse, Inc. v. San Jose Steel Co. (1972) 29 Cal.App.3d 413, 419.)3 Section 2782 (a) has remained essentially intact since the enactment of S.B. 800. It still must be considered and applied to interpret a construction contract. Generally, it will apply to contracts not involving a public agency; the next part of section 2782 specifically governs such contracts.
The second subdivision prohibits provisions in any construction contract with a public agency which purport to impose on the contractor, or relieve the public agency from, liability for the active negligence of the public agency. Subdivision (b) has been revised by the 2011 amendment, discussed below. If a construction contract with the public agency is for residential construction, the standards of S.B. 800 likely apply.4
This was the extent of section 2782 on January 1, 2003, when S.B. 800 went into effect, and remained so until January 1, 2006. This version will govern interpretation and application of indemnity and defense provisions in construction contracts executed before January 1, 2006.5
2005 AMENDMENT
The first “post S.B. 800” change to Section 2782 was in enacted in 2005, effective January 1, 2006, and added two new sections. Subdivision (c) stated (in somewhat greater detail than paraphrased here) that for residential construction contracts, or amendments thereto, entered into after January 1, 2006, a subcontractor cannot be required to indemnify (including the cost to defend) a builder for construction defects that arise out of negligence or design defects of the builder or other independent contractors, or that do not arise out of the scope of the subcontractor=s scope of work. The term “residential construction” was defined by reference to S.B.800 generally, and the term “builder” was defined by reference to section 911 (a part of S.B. 800), for the first time expressly connecting provisions of section 2782 to S.B. 800. Contractual provisions not expressly prohibited were reserved to the agreement of the parties.
What subdivision (c) took away was partially given back by subdivision (d). It stated that “subdivision (c) does not prohibit a subcontractor and builder from mutually agreeing to the timing or immediacy of the defense and provisions for reimbursement of defense fees and costs, so long as that agreement, upon final resolution of the claims, does not waive or modify the provisions of subdivision (c).”6 In addition, it stated that this subdivision (c) did not affect the obligations of an insurance carrier under Presley Homes, Inc. v. American States Insurance Company (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 571, which holds that where an insurer has a duty to defend a developer pursuant to an additional insured endorsement obtained under a subcontractor’s policy, that duty generally applies to the entire action, even if the suit involves both covered and uncovered claims, or a single claim only partially covered by the policy. Finally, subdivision (d) stated that the amendment did not affect the builder’s or subcontractor’s obligations under S.B. 800. Both of these latter provisions, relating to the Presley Homes case, and obligations under S.B. 800, have been carried forward essentially intact in subsequent amendments of section 2782.
This version of section 2782 will be applicable to any contract between a builder as defined by section 911 (see fn. 4, above) and a subcontractor executed between January 1, 2006, and December 31, 2008. Thus, a general contractor, etc., who is not a builder is not subject to the provisions added by the 2005 amendment; this changed with the next amendment.
It is not clear whether this version would apply to a contract entered before January 1, 2006, but amended after that date. Subdivision (c) applies to “all construction contracts, and amendments thereto, entered into after January 1, 2006, for residential construction.” It would seem that the clearest and most logical construction would apply it only to contracts originally made after January 1, 2006, and thereafter amended, but there has been no judicial determination of this issue.
In addition, logically it would seem that this version of section 2782 should be applicable to construction contracts for residential construction between a builder and a subcontractor, entered between January 1, 2006, and December 31, 2008; however, legislative history relating to the 2008 amendment discussed below suggests a different result might occur.
2007 AMENDMENT
The second “post S.B. 800” amendment in 2007 (effective January 1, 2008), added subdivisions (e)(1) and (e)(2).
Subdivision (e)(1) added general contractors and subcontractors not affiliated with the builder and imposed essentially the same restrictions on provisions to indemnify, including the cost to defend, them as had been imposed on the “builder” by the 2005 amendment. The amendment refers to section 911 (b), again part of S.B. 800, to define general contractors, etc., not affiliated with the builder.
Subdivision (e)(1) essentially repeated the provisions of subdivision (d) permitting agreement to the timing and immediacy of the defense, the reference to the Presley Homes case, and the general contractor’s or subcontractor’s obligations under S.B. 800.
It appears this amendment was an attempt to harmonize the new restrictions on indemnity and defense provisions with S.B. 800. The 2005 amendment, whether by oversight or intent, covered only builders and not general contractors, although both classes are subject to the provisions of S.B. 800; the 2007 amendment added non-builder-affiliated general contractors.
Again, logically, it would seem that this version of section 2782 should be applicable to construction contracts for residential construction between a general contractor or contractor not affiliated with a builder and a subcontractor, entered between January 1 and December 31, 2008; however, legislative history relating to the 2008 amendment discussed below suggests a different result might occur. The same potential uncertainty regarding applicability to a contract entered before January 1, 2008, but amended after that date, exists for this provision as for the prior amendment, discussed above.
2008 AMENDMENT
The third “post S.B. 800” amendment in 2008 (effective January 1, 2009), reorganized the language relating to prohibited indemnity provisions, added a reference to insurance in that same prohibition, extensively rewrote the provisions governing agreements relating to the timing or immediacy of defense, added language preserving equitable indemnity claims, and added language defining “construction defect” by reference to the standards set forth in S.B. 800.
Subdivisions (a) and (b) remained unchanged.
Subdivision (c) now made a combined reference to builders (again by reference to section 911), as well as general contractors or contractors not affiliated with the builder (again by reference to section 911 (b)), rather than dealing with the two groups in separate but nearly identical subdivisions as previously. It otherwise restated the same limitations that were previously set forth separately in subdivisions (c) and (e), as well as the reference to the Presley Homes case, and the general contractor’s or subcontractor’s obligations under S.B. 800, but with one important addition. The word “insure” was added to the description of prohibited provisions, to-wit: “provisions? that purport to insure or indemnify, including the cost to defend, the builder, [etc.]? are unenforceable” to the extent they arise out of claims of the type previously described.
It is unclear what impact the addition of this single word “insure” will have; and, it will have to be read in light of the preservation of the language that it shall not affect the obligations of an insurance carrier under the holding of the Presley Homes case. Suppose a carrier had issued an additional insured endorsement under which it would otherwise be required to defend a builder or general contractor consistent with the Presley Homes rule: would this newly added single word (restricting the construction contract, to which the carrier is not a party) give the carrier a basis for denying coverage under the insurance contract? Or would the continued inclusion of the express language that it does not affect the obligations of an insurance carrier under Presley Homes control? That is surely an issue that will have to be worked out by the courts.
The new subdivision (d) addressed defense obligations. Again it permitted parties to agree to the timing and immediacy of the defense and provision for reimbursement of defense fees and costs, but imposed a very detailed scheme that appears to limit the extent of such agreement. A subcontractor owes no defense or indemnity obligation until the builder or general contractor provides a written tender of the claim, which has the same force and effect as notice of commencement of a legal proceeding. Upon that tender the subcontractor shall elect to follow one of two ways of performing: subdivision (d) (1) permits the subcontractor to defend with counsel of its choice and to control the defense, if the subcontractor gives written notice of this election within a reasonable time after receipt of the written tender and in no event later than 90 days following that receipt; subdivision (d) (2) provides an alternative by which the subcontractor pays a reasonable allocated share of the builder’s or general contractor’s defense fees and costs within 30 days of receipt of an invoice, subject to reallocation upon final resolution of the claim by settlement or judgment. Subdivision (e) sets forth remedies available to the builder or general contractor if a subcontractor fails to timely and adequately perform its obligations under either of the two alternatives in subdivision (d), including compensatory and consequential damages, reasonable attorneys’ fees in connection with the first alternative, and interest on defense and indemnity costs in connection with the second alternative. Subdivision (e) ends with provisions relating to reallocation of defense costs, and damages for failure to reallocate.
Application of these requirements in actual litigation is likely to be cumbersome and potentially fraught with conflicts. If retained pursuant to subdivision (d) (1) does the attorney represent the builder, the subcontractor, or both? To whom does the attorney owe his or her fiduciary duty? Can an appropriate informed written consent be formulated, for example, under Rule 3-310 of the California Rules of Professional Conduct, or Rule 1.7, ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct? Could an attorney retained by a subcontractor blame the subcontractor if that is in the developer’s best interests? If multiple subcontractors elect to defend directly, how would the defense be coordinated among the potentially multiple attorneys so retained? Would an attorney retained by one subcontractor be able, or inclined, to blame another subcontractor who also chose to defend directly, in other words, what would prevent inconsistent defense positions amongst the various counsel retained by subcontractors for the developer? There may be solutions to such practical and professional considerations but it seems an ethical thicket awaits any attorney involved in such circumstances.
Subdivision (e) and (f) preserve equitable indemnity claims for the builder, general contractor or subcontractor, the first in general, the second as against any supplier, design profession, or product manufacturer. Finally, the 2008 amendment added for the first time, in subdivision (h), language defining "construction defect" as used in section 2782 as a violation of standards set forth in S.B. 800.
The inclusion of these last three subsections would seem to work against simplification of litigation. A builder or general contractor is likely to allege a claim for equitable indemnity against any and all subcontractors in addition to claims for contractual indemnity and defense (however limited by the other provisions of section 2782). Nothing in the section suggests the subcontractor should, or even can, somehow take on the representation of the builder, etc., in connection with a claim of equitable indemnity back against the subcontractor.
And the limited definition of “construction defect” in subdivision (h) appears to raise an issue of the applicability of the limitations set forth in subdivision (c). Although there is a school of thought that section 941 limits residential construction defect claims only to breach of the performance standards under S.B. 800, it is still common for CD complaints to plead other legal theories, e.g., breach of contract, breach of warranty, negligence, etc., in addition to violation of S.B. 800 standards. With the addition of subdivision (h) it is arguable that the restrictions on indemnity and defense provisions spelled out in subdivisions (c) and (d), both of which relate to claims for residential construction defects, are applicable only to claims for violation of S.B. 800 standards, and not other residential construction defect claims. In other words, a developer might conceivably still be entitled to a broader scope of indemnity and concomitant defense for other types of claims, such as breach of contract, breach of warranty, negligence, etc., so long as the indemnity does not violate the limitation of subdivision (a) against Type I indemnity, which as noted above, has remained intact through these revisions.
Finally, it would seem that this version of section 2782 should be applicable to contracts executed between builders, general contractors, etc., on the one hand and subcontractors on the other hand on and after January 1, 2009. And, as noted above in connection with the 2005 and 2007 amendments, logic would suggest that those versions would ordinarily apply to contracts executed during the time periods mentioned above. But, the Legislative Counsel’s Digest for the 2008 amendment as it finally was enacted into law includes the following statements:
This bill would delete the provisions applicable to construction contracts entered into on or after January 1, 2008, that purport to indemnify the general contractor or contractor not affiliated with the builder. The bill would revise the provisions applicable to contracts entered into after January 1, 2006, to instead apply to contracts entered into after January 1, 2009, and to apply to agreements that purport to insure or indemnify the builder or the general contractor or contractor not affiliated with the builder, as described.
Although it seems a startling result, this legislative history suggests an argument can be made that the 2008 amendment retroactively nullified the effect of the 2005 and 2007 amendments, so that contracts executed from January 1, 2006, as to builders or January 1, 2008, for general contractors, etc., through December 31, 2008, are still governed by the provisions of section 2782 as it was on the books prior to the first post-S.B. 800 amendment in 2005.
2011 AMENDMENT
Section 2782 has been amended yet again in the 2011 session of the California Legislature, effective January 1, 2012; however, the substantive changes affect certain contracts entered on or after January 1, 2013. All of the provisions contained in the 2008 amendment have been carried forward in the most recent amendment, although re-numbered: (c) became (d), etc., through (h) becoming (i). So, the law governing construction contracts entered into after January 1, 2009, for residential construction, as between a builder, or a general contractor, etc., not affiliated with a builder, and regarding insurance, indemnity or defense relating to claims for construction defects, remains the same as in the 2008 amendment.
As noted above the substantive changes to section 2782 all affect contracts entered into on or after January 1, 2013. Subdivision (b) has been amended such that any provision in a contract with a public agency that purports to impose on any contractor, etc., or relieve the public agency from, liability for the active negligence of the public agency will be void and unenforceable. A new subdivision (c) has been added that imposes a similar restriction on construction contracts with the owner of privately owned real property to be improved and as to which the owner is not acting as a contractor or supplier of materials or equipment to the work. This new restriction in subdivision (c) does not apply to a homeowner performing a home improvement project on his or her own single family dwelling.
The 2011 bill amending section 2782 also added a new section 2782.05, which will make void and unenforceable any provision in any construction contract (again, entered on or after January 1, 2013) that purports to insure or indemnify, including the cost to defend, a general contractor, construction manager, or other subcontractor, by a subcontractor for claims that arise out of the active negligence or willful misconduct of the general contractor, etc., or other independent contractors, etc., or to the extent the claims do not arise out of the scope of work of the subcontractor. However, the section also includes a long list of situations to which it does not apply, including all of those covered by section 2782 (residential construction subject to S.B. 800, public agency contracts subject to section 2782 (b), and direct contracts with private property owners subject to the new section 2782 (c)) as well as eight other categories. This apparently is intended to serve as a “catch-all” to extend a limitation on indemnity agreements to all construction contracts not previously swept into this widening legislative scheme, although the exact phrasing is slightly different.7
The new section 2782.05 then permits a mutual agreement to the timing or immediacy of a defense under a scheme essentially identical to that imposed in the 2008 amendment to section 2782: defend with counsel of choice, and maintain control of the defense; or, pay a reasonable allocated share of defense fees and costs. The same logistical and ethical difficulties presented by the 2008 scheme discussed above would likely be present in cases that fall under the new section 2782.05.
CONCLUSION
The California Legislature has been revising section 2782 since shortly after the adoption of S.B. 800. Each revision has been more complicated than the last, and each has tied certain provisions of section 2782 more closely to S.B. 800. In particular, with regard to construction defect claims relating to residential dwellings which are subject to S.B. 800, the Legislature has apparently attempted to exercise more and more control over the scope of allowable indemnity and dictated a very narrow scheme to govern how the defense obligation arising from a contractual indemnity is to be implemented. It seems likely that any attempt to manage the defense of a construction defect case under the options that allow a subcontractor to defend directly and control the defense will create a logistical problem and an ethical difficulty for any attorney attempting to defend a developer at the behest and direction of a subcontractor. Finally, as set forth in the current version of section 2782 relating to contractual indemnity and defense of S.B. 800 type cases (subdivisions (c) through (h) in the 2008 version, now subdivisions (d) through (i) in the 2011 amendment), the Legislature has apparently narrowed the application to only claims of violation of S.B. 800 standards. This may have, in essence, removed the restrictions on indemnity and defense provisions as they relate to other theories pleaded against developers in construction defense cases, e.g., breach of contract, breach of warranty, negligence, and the like. It is not at all clear that the Legislature has accomplished what it set out do accomplish. Rather, the law may have come full circle back to where it began, except for one legal theory, i.e. violation of S.B. 800 standards, currently being used in residential construction defect cases. For any other legal theory the limitation of section 2782 (a) may be solely controlling.
- California Civil Code section 43.99, and sections 895 to 945.5.
- All statutory references in this article are to the California Civil Code unless otherwise specified.
- Type I or specific indemnity does not exactly match the scope of proscribed indemnity as described in section 2782 (a) but it is the closest. More recent case law in California has eschewed a mechanical application of the MacDonald & Kruse typology in favor of examining the precise text of the actual contract (See, e.g., St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Frontier Pacific Ins. Co. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1234, 1246, n. 6) but some recent cases still use the Type I, II and II classifications. And, an understanding of that “historical” typology is useful as an aid to evaluating and understanding express indemnity in general.
- The provisions of S.B. 800 other than the prelitigation procedures of sections 910 through 938 apply to general contractors, subcontractors, etc., pursuant to section 936. The prelitigation procedures generally involve a “builder,” which is specifically defined in section 911 (a) by reference to entities or individuals in the business of selling residential units to the public or of building, developing, or constructing residential units for public purchase. Pursuant to section 911 (b) the term builder does not include general contractors, etc., not affiliated with the builder. Thus, a general contractor who constructs residential housing pursuant to a contract with a public agency is still subject to claims for violation of the standards set forth in sections 896 and 897, resulting from its negligent act or omission or breach of contract, pursuant to section 936.
- As noted above, there has been no case law yet interpreting any of the “post S.B. 800” changes to Section 2782. One of the most important legal decisions relating to express indemnity and defense obligations and rights between developer-builders and sub-contractors was published after two of the amendments but based upon contracts executed and the language of section 2782 prior to January 1, 2006. (See, Crawford v. Weather Shield Mfg., Inc. (2008) 44 Cal.4th 541, 547, 566-67, fn. 14).
- Subcontractor dissatisfaction with the perceived inadequacy of protection afforded by this provision apparently became the impetus for a 2008 amendment to section 2782, discussed below, at least based upon the numerous (form) letters submitted to legislators in connection therewith.
- Section 2782 (a), where we started, and which has continued without change, prohibits indemnity for claims arising out of the sole negligence or willful misconduct of the promisee; sole negligence can be either active or passive. The various versions relating to residential construction prohibit indemnity for the negligence of the builder, etc., suggesting there is no express contractual indemnity for the negligence of the subcontractor if the builder, etc., is at all negligent. This is tempered a bit by the preservation of the right to equitable indemnity, which will now be found in section 2782 (g) and (h).
Courtesy of Michael D. Worthing of Borton Petrini, LLP. Mr. Worthing can be contacted at mworthing@bortonpetrini.com.
Home Sales Still Low, But Enough to Spur Homebuilders
August 16, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Although new home sales are still fifty percent below the average over the last forty years, the housing rebound has sent stock of homebuilders up 53 percent this year, during the same period, the S&P 500 rose only 12 percent. The San Francisco Chronicle reports that from 2005 through 2011, homebuilder stocks trailed the S&P 500.
The growth isn’t limited to homebuilders alone. Building suppliers are also seeing a growth in sales, with profits for companies that make gypsum wallboard, cabinetry, plumbing products, and other items used in home building.
Homebuilders have also been able to raise prices. Standard Pacific Corp of Irvine, California has raised prices and cut incentives. Nevertheless, the buyers still come. PulteGroup and D.R. Horton are also raising prices.
Read the full story…
New Web Site Tracks Settled Construction Defect Claims
June 19, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Peter Lissner, a former Nevada homebuilder, has created a new site to help track homes that have been involved in construction defect litigation. His site, housefaxreview.com, collections documentation about homes where claims of construction defects have been made. He told The Builders Magazine concerns about “the number of homes that have been served notices, received compensation, yet the homes weren’t repaired.” On the site, the creator is identified as “a family owned builder.” According to the site, “the builder had no claims until the neighborhood reached the statutory claims limit 10 years.”
Lissner also claims that in many cases, after settling construction defect lawsuits, the homeowners sell to subsequent buyers without disclosing the lawsuit or their failure to repair. “Who is going to let the new homeowner know about the issue?” he asks.
Documents on the site are priced according to their relevance. Lissner notes that those who provide documents to the site will receive free access.
Read the full story…
Insurer Beware: Failure to Defend Ends with Hefty Verdict
June 1, 2011 — Douglas Reiser in the Builders Counsel Blog
Served with a lawsuit that you turned over to your insurer? Insurer refusing to defend you? Well, find some hope in this news. Washington’s IFCA has the claws to ensure that insurers perform their duties.
Contractors heavily rely on the defense provisions of their Commercial General Liability (CGL) policies. In construction, a legal dispute can easily rear its head when you least expect it. Luckily, Washington registered contractors are required to maintain CGL insurance. That insurance often provides contractors with adequate legal defense in the event that they are sued.
But, what if your insurer turns down the defense request? They might be staring at massive damages. A current Reiser Legal client, Australia Unlimited, Inc., recently won a large verdict against Hartford Insurance, after the insurer unreasonably denied their claim. The firm who represented Australia Unlimited Inc. in that case, Hackett Beecher and Hart, were successful in procuring a $5.43 Million verdict
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of Douglas Reiser of Reiser Legal LLC. Mr. Reiser can be contacted at info@reiserlegal.com
The Colorado Court of Appeals Rules that a Statutory Notice of Claim Triggers an Insurer’s Duty to Defend.
October 23, 2012 — David M. McLain, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell
Gene and Diane Melssen d/b/a Melssen Construction (“Melssen”) built a custom home for the Holleys, during which period of time Melssen retained a CGL insurance coverage from Auto Owners Insurance Company. Soon after completion of the house, the Holleys noticed cracks in the drywall and, eventually, large cracks developed in the exterior stucco and basement slab. Thereafter, the Holleys contacted Melssen, the structural engineer, an attorney, and Auto-Owners, which assigned a claims adjuster to investigate the claim.
In April 2008, the Holleys sent Melssen a statutory notice of claim pursuant to C.R.S. § 13-20-803.5 (“NOC”). In this NOC, the Holleys claimed approximately $300,000 in damages related to design and construction defects. The Holleys also provided a list of claimed damages and estimated repairs, accompanied by two reports from the Holleys’ consultant regarding the claimed design and construction defects. In June 2008, Melssen tendered the defense and indemnity of the claim to Auto-Owners. While Auto-Owners did not deny the claim at that time, it did not inspect the property or otherwise adjust the claim. Thereafter, in October 2008, Auto-Owners sent Melssen a letter denying coverage on the basis that the damage occurred outside of the applicable policy period.
Ultimately, Melssen settled the claims against it for $140,000.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of David McLain, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC. Mr. McLain can be contacted at mclain@hhmrlaw.com
Michigan Supreme Court Concludes No Statute of Repose on Breach of Contract
July 19, 2011 — CDJ Staff
Judge Marilyn Kelly of the Michigan Supreme Court has remanded the case of Miller-Davis Co. v. Ahrens Constr. Inc. (Mich., 2011) to the Court of Appeals, after determining that the court had improperly applied the statute of repose. She reversed their judgment, pending a new trial.
Ahrens Construction was a subcontractor, hired by Miller-Davis to build and install a natatorium room at a YMCA camp in Kalamazoo, Michigan. After its installation, the YMCA discovered a severe condensation problem, causing moisture to “rain” from the roof. The architect, testifying for Miller-Davis, alleged that the problems were due to improper installation by Ahrens. Ahrens claimed that the condensation problem was due to a design error.
When the roof was removed and reconstructed, the moisture problem ended. Ahrens argued that the alleged defects were caused by the removal. Further, in trial Ahrens raised the issue of the statute of repose. The court found in favor of Miller-Davis and did not address the statute of repose.
The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, determining that the statute of repose had barred the suit. This rendered the other issues moot.
The Michigan Supreme concluded that the issue at hand was “a suit for breach of contract,” and that the Michigan statute of repose is limited to tort actions. They remanded the case to the Court of Appeals to address the issues that had been mooted by the application of the statute of repose.
Read the court’s decision…
Florida Property Bill Passes Economic Affairs Committee with Amendments
April 14, 2011 — April 14, 2011 Beverley BevenFlorez - Construction Defect Journal
The Florida Property Bill (HBB 803) was passed by the Economic Affairs Committee by a vote of 11-7, according to Property Casualty 360, after adopting nine new amendments. The additions to the bill included limiting notice of claims to a set number of years, extending the statute of limitation on property claims from five years to six years, among others.
HB 803 and SB 408, the Senate companion bill, focus primarily on residential property insurance. They make changes to the Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund, while also promoting increased notification of policy changes to policyholders. Sections of the bills provide minor fixes such as renaming Citizens Property Insurance Corporation to Taxpayer-Funded Property Insurance Corporation. However, other sections of the bills contain more significant policy changes such as sinkhole coverage and hurricane claims.
The bills’ intent, according to the SunSentinel.com, is to reduce fraudulent claims and to bring new insurers into the insurance market. However, SunSentinel.com also reports that the bills may drastically increase property insurance premiums.
Read the full Property Casualty 360 article...
Read the full Sun Sentinel article...
No Coverage For Damage Caused by Chinese Drywall
October 28, 2011 — Tred Eyerley, Insurance Law Hawaii
The pollution exclusion barred coverage for alleged property damage and bodily injury in Evanston Ins. Co. v. Harbor Walk Dev., LLC, No. 2:10cv312 (E.D. Va. Sept. 9, 2011).
Homeowners sued the insured, Harbor Walk, in three lawsuits, alleging the Chinese drywall installed in their homes emitted sulfides and other noxious gases. This caused corrosion and damage to the air-conditioning and ventilation units, refrigeration coils, copper tubing, faucets, metal surfaces, electrical appliances and other personal items. The homeowners also alleged the compounds emitted by the drywall caused bodily injury, such as allergic reactions, headaches, etc.
Harbor Walk’s insurer, Evanston, filed for a declaratory judgment that the pollution exclusion precluded coverage.
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
Limiting Plaintiffs’ Claims to a Cause of Action for Violation of SB-800
November 18, 2011 — Samir R. Patel, Esq. and Todd E. Verbick, Esq., Lorber, Greenfield & Polito, LLP
There has been a fair share of publicity about the SB-800 amendments to the Civil Code (Civil Code section 896, et seq.) that codified construction defect litigation in 2002. Most of the publicity is geared toward the pre-litigation standards allowing a builder the right to repair before litigation is commenced by a homeowner. Less focus and attention has been given to the fact that violation of the SB-800 performance standards is being used by plaintiff’s counsel as an additional tool in the plaintiff’s pleading tool box against builders. Closer scrutiny to SB-800 reveals that those provisions should in fact act as a limitation to the pleading tools available to plaintiffs and an additional tool for builders in the defense of cases governed by SB-800.
The typical construction defect complaint contains the boiler plate versions of numerous causes of action. These causes of action include Strict Liability, Negligence, Negligence Per Se, Breach of Contract, Breach of Contract – Third-Party Beneficiary, Breach of Express Warranties, Breach of Implied Warranties, among others. The wide array of causes of action leave a defendant “pinned to the wall” because they require a complex defense on a multitude of contract and tort related causes of action. Furthermore, the statutes of limitations as to these claims widely differ depending upon if the particular defect is considered latent or patent. The truth of the matter remains, no matter what the circumstances, if a construction defect matter ultimately goes to trial, it is inevitable that plaintiffs will obtain a judgment on at least one of these causes of action.
On its own, the Strict Liability cause of action can be a thorn in a defendant’s side. A builder is obviously placing a product into the stream of commerce and strict liability is a tough standard to defend against, particularly when it concerns intricate homes comprised of multiple components that originally sold for hundreds of thousands of dollars. A Negligence cause of action can also be difficult to defend because the duty of care for a builder is what a “reasonable” builder would have done under the circumstances. An interpretation of this duty of care can easily sway a jury that will almost always consist of sympathetic homeowners. A Negligence Per Se cause of action can also leave a defendant vulnerable to accusations that a builder violated the Uniform Building Code or a multitude of other obscure municipal construction-related code provisions during the construction of the home. Lastly, the Breach of Contract cause of action leaves a builder relying on dense and intricate purchase and sale agreements with dozens of addenda which leave the skeptical jurors turned off by what they view as one-side, boilerplate provisions. Ultimately, when a matter is about to go to trial, the complexity of these complaints can benefit a plaintiff and increase a plaintiff’s bargaining power against a defendant who is attempting to avoid a potentially large judgment.
Enter the SB-800 statutes. The SB-800 statutes apply to all homes sold after January 1, 2003. Civil Code section 938 specifically states that “[t]his title applies only to new residential units where the purchase agreements with the buyer was signed by the seller on or after January 1, 2003.” (Civil Code §, 938.) As time progresses, more residential construction defect cases will exclusively fall under the purview of SB-800. Slowly but surely more SB-800 governed litigation is being filed, and its exclusive application is looming on the horizon.
On its surface, this “right to repair” regime has left builders with a lot to be desired despite the fact that it is supposed to allow the builder the opportunity to cure any deficiencies in their product before litigation can be filed by potential plaintiffs. However, the application of the time line for repair has shown to be impractical for anything but the most minor problems involving only small numbers of residential units. Moreover, the fact that the fruits of the builder’s investigation into the claimed defects in the pre-litigation context can freely be used as evidence against it in litigation makes builders proceed with trepidation in responding with a repair. For these reasons, more SB-800 litigation can be expected to result due to the shortcomings of the pre-litigation procedures, and savvy defense counsel should anticipate the issues to be dealt with in presenting the defense of such cases at trial.
This fact should not necessarily be met with fear or disdain. Within the SB-800 statutes, the legislature made it clear that they were creating a new cause of action for construction defect claims, but it further made it clear that this cause of action is a plaintiff’s exclusive remedy. The legislature giveth, but at the same time, the legislature taketh away. Throughout numerous provisions within the SB-800 statutes, the Civil Code states that claims for construction defects as to residential construction are exclusively governed by the Civil Code, and that the Civil Code governs any and all litigation arising under breaches of these provisions. Civil Code section 896 specifically states:
In any action seeking recovery of damages arising out of, or related to deficiencies in, the residential construction … the claimant’s claims or causes of action shall be limited to violation of, the following standards, except as specifically set forth in this title. (Civil Code §, 896.)
Civil Code section 896 then provides approximately fifty-plus standards by which a construction defect claim is assessed under that provision. Civil Code section 896 covers everything from plumbing to windows, and from foundations to decks, and in several instances expressly dictates statutes of limitations as to specific areas of construction that severely truncate the 10-year latent damage limitations period. As for any construction deficiencies that are not enumerated within Civil Code section 896, Civil Code section 897 explicitly defines the intent of the standards and provides a method to assess deficiencies that are not addressed in Civil Code section 896. Civil Code section 897 states:
Intent of Standards
The standards set forth in this chapter are intended to address every function or component of a structure. To the extent that a function or component of a structure is not addressed by these standards, it shall be actionable if it causes damage. (Civil Code §, 897.)
Therefore, Civil Code section 897 acts as a catch-all by which defects that are not covered within Civil Code section 896 can be evaluated on a damage standard mirroring the Aas case (damages must be present and actual). The result of sections 896 and 897 being read in combination is a comprehensive, all-inclusive set of performance standards by which any defect raised by Plaintiffs can be evaluated and resolved under a single SB-800 based cause of action.
Civil Code section 943 makes clear that a cause of action for violation of SB-800 performance standards is a plaintiff’s sole remedy for a residential construction defect action. Specifically, Civil Code section 943 states:
Except as provided in this title, no other cause of action for a claim covered by this title or for damages recoverable under 944 is allowed. In addition to the rights under this title, this title does not apply to any action by a claimant to enforce a contract or express contractual provision, or any action for fraud, personal injury, or violation of a statute. (Civil Code §, 943.)
Civil Code section 944 provides the method for computing damages within a construction defect action, as follows:
If a claim for damages is made under this title, the homeowner is only entitled to damages for the reasonable value of repairing any violation of the standards set forth in this title, [and] the reasonable cost of repairing any damages caused by the repair efforts… . (Civil Code §, 944.)
A cursory review of these statutes yields the conclusion that the legislature was attempting to create an exclusive cause of action that trumps all other causes of action where SB-800 applies. The remedy available to plaintiffs is limited to that allowed by the Civil Code. As noted above, “[n]o other cause of action for a claim covered by this title…is allowed.” (Civil Code §, 943.) Therefore, Civil Code sections 896, 897, 943, and 944 specifically prohibit the contract-based and tort-based causes of action typically pled by plaintiffs.
Plaintiff’s counsel has seized upon the language of section 943 to advance the argument that SB-800 still allows a plaintiff to advance typical contract and tort based causes of action. On the surface, this argument may seem compelling, but a minimum of scrutiny of the express language of section 943 dispels this notion. Section 943 says that it provides rights “[i]n addition” to those under the SB-800 Civil Code provisions. Clearly, the language in section 943 is intended to expressly underscore the fact that a plaintiff is not precluded from seeking relief in addition to that allowed under SB-800 for damages not arising from a breach of the SB-800 standards or for damages in addition to those recoverable under Section 944. This language does not provide an unfettered license to bring a Strict Liability, Negligence or other cause of action against a builder where SB-800 applies.
In fact, this language only keeps the door open for plaintiffs to pursue such causes of action not arising from a breach of the SB-800 standards should there be such supporting allegations. For example, if a plaintiff alleges that a builder breached an “express contractual provision” related to the timing of the completion of the home and close of escrow, and the contract specifies damages in this regard, a plaintiff may have a viable separate cause of action for Breach of Contract for recovery of those damages precisely because that is not an issue expressly dealt with in SB-800 in the performance standards under sections 896 and 897, or in the damage recovery terms under 944. As it stands, the vast majority of complaints are seeking redress for violation of the same primary right; that is, defects specifically outlined in Section 896 and 897 or which result in damages as stated in Section 944.
So, how does a builder defend against a complaint that contains multiple causes of action regarding construction defects for a home sold after January 1, 2003? There are numerous ways to approach this. First and foremost, these superfluous and improper causes of action can be attacked by demurrer seeking dismissal of all causes of action other than the cause of action alleging violation of SB-800. If the the time period within which to file a demurrer has passed already, a motion for judgment on the pleadings can be utilized to attack the improper causes of action in the same way as a demurrer can be used for this purpose.
The limitation to a demurrer or motion for judgment on the pleadings is that the judge is restricted to viewing only the four corners of the pleading when making a ruling. It is typical for plaintiffs’ counsel to cleverly (or one might even say, disingenuously) leave the complaint purposely vague to avoid a successful defense attack on the pleadings by not including the original date the residence was sold. In that instance, a motion for summary adjudication can be used to attack a plaintiff’s complaint. By simply providing evidence that the homes were originally sold after January 1, 2003, the improper causes of action should be subject to dismissal by summary adjudication. If the plaintiff is a subsequent purchaser, the builder still has recourse to enforce the pleading limitations under SB-800. Civil Code section 945 states that “[t]he provisions, standards, rights, and obligations set forth in this title are binding upon all original purchasers and their successors-in-interest.” (Civil Code §, 945.)
Attacking a plaintiff’s complaint to eliminate multiple causes of action can have numerous benefits. The practical result is that a plaintiff will only have one viable cause of action. The advantage is that the SB-800 performance standards include the defined performance standards and shortened statutes of limitations periods with regard to specific issues. Furthermore, as to defects which are not specifically provided for in Civil Code section 896, Civil Code section 897 requires a proof of actual damages. Therefore, a plaintiff must provide evidence of current damages and not simply conditions that may potentially cause damage in the future.
The Appellate Courts have yet to directly address and interpret these SB-800 provisions. The time for that is undoubtedly drawing near. For now, however, plaintiffs will have to find ways to accurately plead construction defect claims within the confines of one cause of action for breach of the performance standards enumerated within the Civil Code.
Printed courtesy of Lorber, Greenfield & Polito, LLP. Mr. Patel can be contacted at spatel@lorberlaw.com and Mr. Verbick at tverbick@lorberlaw.com.
Mandatory Arbitration Provision Upheld in Construction Defect Case
May 18, 2011 — May 18, 2011 Beverley BevenFlorez - Construction Defect Journal
The Superior Court of New Jersey reversed the decision in Frumer v. National Home Insurance Company (NHIC) and the Home Buyers Warranty Corporation (HBW), stating that the mandatory arbitration provision within the Frumer’s home warranty policy was binding.
The Frumers alleged that the construction defects were discovered immediately after moving into their million dollar home. After failing to achieve any results from dealing with the builder, they turned to their home warranty. There was some dispute over claims, and a settlement offer was rejected by the Frumers. The Frumers elected to commence litigation rather than utilize the binding arbitration.
The NHIC and the HBW filed a motion to compel arbitration, however, the motion judge denied the motion: “…the Warranty leaves open the option for [plaintiffs] to commence litigation, which [plaintiffs have] done in this case. The clause also states that ‘the filing of a claim against this limited Warranty shall constitute the election of remedy and shall bar the Homeowner from all other remedies.’ However, the provision does not state that the filing of a claim elects arbitration as the exclusive remedy, and any ambiguity in the language must be inferred against the drafter.”
The NHIC and the HBW appealed the decision. The Superior Court reversed the decision: “Where, such as here, the homeowner files a claim against the warranty for workmanship/systems defects, the warranty clearly and unequivocally establishes binding arbitration as the exclusive remedy. There is, however, no election of remedies for a dispute involving a major structural defect claim. The warranty clearly and unequivocally establishes binding arbitration as the exclusive remedy.”
Charles Curley of Halberstadt Curley in Conshohocken, Pa., the local counsel for National Home and Home Buyers, told the New Jersey Law Journal that “the ruling reaffirms New Jersey’s commitment to enforcing arbitration agreements and requiring people to go to mandatory arbitration when the contracts call for it.”
“At this point, their hope is that the warranty company will do what it's supposed to do — repair covered defects,” Eric McCullough, the Frumer’s lawyer said to the New Jersey Law Journal.
Read the full story…
Condo Owners Worried Despite Settlement
September 13, 2012 — CDJ Staff
KB Homes may have settled a construction defect claim with Willowbrook Condominium Association, but some of the owners are still concerned about the repair process. The Sarasota, Florida Herald Tribune reports that one homeowner’s living room “ends with a white tarp.” He told the paper, “We feel like we’re not even owners of our own home.” A neighbor wondered “what happens when people get displaced while their homes are gutted?”
As part of the agreement, the condominium association will be selecting a contractor to repair the problems, while the cost will be paid by KB Homes. Nevertheless, at least one owner fears for their ability to resell his home, noting that even after repairs have been made, “do you think someone’s going to come in here and buy?”
Read the full story…
AFL-CIO Joins in $10 Billion Infrastructure Plan
June 30, 2011 — CDJ Staff
The AFL-CIO has announced plans to generate up to $10 billion in funding for infrastructure development, training construction workers, and making buildings more energy efficient, pledging $20 million to retrofit buildings. Bloomberg News reports that union officials made the announcement in Chicago at the Clinton Global Initiative, releasing a statement from Richard Trumka, president of the union, “we, at the AFL-CIO, believe that together, with our partners in business and government, we can profitably invest significant resources to make America more competitive and energy efficient.” A foot injury prevented Mr. Trumka from attending the event.
The statement also quoted Mark Ayers, president of the Building and Construction Trades Department of the AFL-CIO, “the time is now to become intensely focused on the creation of jobs.”
Read the full story…
Construction Defect Journal Seeks Article Submissions Regarding SB800 and Other Builders Right to Repair Laws
October 28, 2011 — CDJ Staff
As we approach the tenth anniversary of the passage and signing of SB800, California’s right-to-repair law, we’d like to hear your reactions to the law, your experiences with it, and your thoughts on it and right-to-repair laws in other states.
We invite you to submit articles either reacting to SB800 or on other matters relevant to construction defect and claims issues. You can promote your firm’s capabilities and get valuable exposure through the publication of your articles. Construction Defect Journal is widely read by our highly targeted audience of decision makers, construction attorneys, builders, owners, and claims professionals.
Articles may contain relevant images, your firm’s name, and links to your corporate website or third parties and can be submitted through e-mail to submitstory@constructiondefectjournal.com. Please remember to include your contact information if you would like it to be published with your content. If you are submitting photos or PDF documents with your article, please send them as e-mail attachments. Items submitted are assumed to be cleared for publishing upon receipt by CDJ.
Normally articles are published in full, although we reserve the right to edit content for space purposes. All articles submitted are considered for publication. For additional questions please contact editor@constructiondefectjournal.com.
Another Guilty Plea In Nevada Construction Defect Fraud Case
April 25, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The eleventh defendant has entered a guilty plea in the ongoing federal investigation of construction defect fraud in the Las Vegas area. Mahin Quintero plead guilty to producing a false authentication feature, a misdemeanor. Ms. Quintero’s part in the scheme was to falsely authenticate signatures on loan documents for straw buyers. Ms. Quintero stated in court that she had been ordered to destroy her notary book three years ago. According to her plea bargain, the straw buyers did not appear in front of her when she notarized their signatures. As part of the scheme, the straw buyers would take control of homeowners associates, sending construction defect complaints and repairs to favored firms.
Read the full story…
Developer’s Fraudulent Statements Are His Responsibility Alone in Construction Defect Case
February 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The Texas Court of Appeals ruled on December 21 in the case of Helm v Kingston, a construction defect case. After purchasing what was described as “an extremely well-built” two-bedroom townhouse, Mr. Kingston made complaints of construction defects. Greenway Development did not repair the defects to Kingston’s satisfaction, and he filed notice of suit. In his suit, he claimed that GDI and its president, John Helm, had committed fraud and negligent misrepresentation. Kingston claimed that Helm “fraudulently induced Kingston to believe that the townhouse evidenced the highest quality of workmanship when in fact the quality of workmanship was atrocious.” Helms brought a counterclaim that Kingston’s suit was frivolous.
About four years after Kingston purchased the townhome, the suit proceeded to trial. The trial court determined that Helm was not “liable in his individual capacity,” but this was reversed at appeal.
A second trial was held ten years later on the question of whether Kingston’s unit was a townhome or an apartment. A jury found that Helm “engaged in a false, misleading or deceptive act or practice that Kingston relied on to his detriment.” Kingston was awarded $75,862.29 and an additional $95,000 in attorney fees by the jury. Helms made an unsuccessful appeal to the Appeals Court, after which Kingston was awarded an additional $10,000. Helms then made an unsuccessful appeal to the Texas Supreme Court, which lead to an additional $3,000 for Kingston. There was also a verdict of $48,770.09 in pre-judgment interest and “five percent post-judgment interest accruing from the date of the judgment until the time the judgment is paid. Helm appealed.
In his appeal, Helm raised seven issues, which the court reorganized into five Kingston raised one issue on cross-appeal.
Helms’ first claim was that Kingston “failed to satisfy the requirement of” Texas’s Residential Construction Liability Act and that by not filing under the RCLA, Kingston’s fraud and misrepresentation claims were preempted. Further Helms claimed that the RCLA limited Kingston’s damages. The court rejected this, as the RCLA deals with complaints made to a contractor and not only did Helm fail to “conclusively establish” his “status as a ‘contractor’ under the statutory definition,” Helm testified that he was “not a contactor” at the pre-trial hearing.
Helms’s second claim was that Kingston’s later claim of a misconstructed firewall should be barred, claiming that Kingston “‘had knowledge of a defect in the firewall’ as early as 1997 but did not assert them until 2007.” The court rejected this because Kingston’s claim was that “Helm ‘fraudulently induced Kingston to believe that the townhouse evidenced the highest quality of workmanship when in fact the quality of the workmanship was atrocious.’”
Helms also challenged whether his statements that the residence was of “good quality” constituted fraud and misrepresentation under Texas’s Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act. The court concluded that Helm was in a position to make knowledgeable statements and further that “residential housing units are not artistic works for which quality is inherently a matter of subjective judgment.” Helm also claimed that Kingston could have avoided certain repair expenses through the “exercise of reasonable care.” Helms argued that the repairs could have been made for $6,400. The court disagreed, as these claims were cited only to invoke the DTPA, and that later petitions established additional defects.
Helms’s next claim was that he was not allowed to designate responsible third parties. The court rejected this because there GDI represented matters concerning the residence only through Helm’s statements. The court noted that “Helm is correct that?third parties may be liable for fraud if they ‘participated in the fraudulent transactions and reaped the benefits,’” but they note that “Helm never specifically alleged that GDI or CREIC participated in Helm’s alleged fraudulent transactions.
The final issue in the decision was about court costs, and here the court denied claims on both sides. Helm argued that the award of legal fees were excessive, as they exceeded the actual damages. The court noted that they “may not substitute our judgment for that of the jury,” and also that “the ratio between the actual damages awarded and the attorney’s fees is not a factor that determines the reasonableness of the fees.” But the court also rejected Kingston’s claim for post-judgment interest on $10,312.30 that Helm had deposited in the trial court’s registry. The court noted that the monies were to be paid out upon final judgment, but the mandate did not include any reference to interest.
Read the court’s decision…