ANAHEIM CALIFORNIA CONSTRUCTION EXPERT WITNESS
DIRECTORY AND CAPABILITIES

Know the Minnesota Statute of Limitations for Construction Defect Claims

Writing on the Benson Kerrane Storz Nelson web site, Alex Nelson gives an overview of the Minnesota laws covering statutes of limitation and repose. He notes that frequently when his firm declines to take a construction defect case its’ over a missed statute of limitation. He describes the time periods as both “short” and “ambigious.” The briefest limit is that a homeowner “has only 6 months within which to give written notice of the defect to the builder once the defect has manifested itself.” Any legal action must commence within two years of the same point.

The Minnesota statutes also have a six-year limitation, which starts for a single home at transfer of title to the first purchaser or when the purchaser takes possession, whichever happens first. For a condo, it is the last of “completion of the common element,” first unit sale or “Termination of Declarant control.” Fraud or misrepresentation also has a six-year limit, while negligence claims are limited to within the first two years “after the manifestation of the defect.”

The statues of repose also provide limits to filing construction defect lawsuits. Mr. Nelson points out that the longest are for negligence, fraud, and “major construction defects,” all of which have a ten-year limit. On the other hand, claims against general workmanship and materials must be made in the first year.

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Another Colorado District Court Refuses to Apply HB 10-1394 Retroactively

In Martinez v. Mike Wells Construction Company, 09CV227, Teller County District Court Judge Edward S. Colt refused to apply C.R.S. § 13-20-808 retroactively to provide coverage for the underlying construction defect allegations. According to the recitation of facts in Judge Colt’s March 2011 order, Martinez contracted with Mike Wells Construction to serve as the general contractor for the construction of a home. At that time, Mike Wells Construction was insured through ProBuilders Specialty Insurance Company, RRG. Disputes arose between Martinez and Mike Wells Construction, resulting in Martinez ordering it off of the project in mid-November 2007 and terminating its right to work there by letter dated November 28, 2007.

Mike Wells, the owner of the corporation, subsequently died. Martinez sued Mike Wells Construction in July 2009 for breach of contract and various claims relating to alleged defecting workmanship. Martinez provided notice of the suit to the special administrator of the probate estate. No answer having been filed, the court entered a default judgment against Mike Wells Construction and Martinez sought to garnish Mike Wells Construction’s ProBuilders insurance policy.

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Reprinted courtesy of Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC. Mr. McClain can be contacted at mclain@hhmrlaw.com

New Web Site Tracks Settled Construction Defect Claims

Peter Lissner, a former Nevada homebuilder, has created a new site to help track homes that have been involved in construction defect litigation. His site, housefaxreview.com, collections documentation about homes where claims of construction defects have been made. He told The Builders Magazine concerns about “the number of homes that have been served notices, received compensation, yet the homes weren’t repaired.” On the site, the creator is identified as “a family owned builder.” According to the site, “the builder had no claims until the neighborhood reached the statutory claims limit 10 years.”

Lissner also claims that in many cases, after settling construction defect lawsuits, the homeowners sell to subsequent buyers without disclosing the lawsuit or their failure to repair. “Who is going to let the new homeowner know about the issue?” he asks.

Documents on the site are priced according to their relevance. Lissner notes that those who provide documents to the site will receive free access.

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Parking Garage Collapse May Be Due to Construction Defect

A parking garage under construction at the Doral campus of Miami Dade College collapsed on October 9. Experts state that the collapse may have been due to errors in the construction process, either in the fabrication of the pre-cast components or in their assembly. The Bradenton Herald quotes Mark Santos, a structural engineer, who “would look at erection procedures ?Äì that’s probably the one question to ask first.”

During the failure, floors separated from the south wall of the structure. The contractor responsible for the garage, Ajax Building Corp, said there was “no indication of any potential cause.”

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When Does a Claim Against an Insurance Carrier for Failing to Defend Accrue?

The following is an update on our December 20, 2010 article regarding United States Fire Insurance Company v. Pinkard Construction Company, Civil Action No. 09-CV-01854-MSK-MJW, and its underlying dispute, Legacy Apartments v. Pinkard Construction Company, Case No. 2003 CV 703, Boulder County Dist. Ct. That article can be found here.

The present action, St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Co., et al. v. The North River Insurance Co., et al., Civil Action No. 10-CV-02936-MSK-CBS, encompasses the coverage battle that ensued between Pinkard’s insurers, Travelers Indemnity Company of America (“Travelers”) and United States Fire Insurance Company (“USFI”), following the settlement of Legacy’s construction defect claims against Pinkard. A short history of the underlying facts is as follows:

In 1995, Pinkard constructed the Legacy Apartments housing complex in Longmont, Colorado. Following construction, Legacy notified Pinkard of water leaks associated with various elements of construction. Legacy ultimately filed suit against Pinkard in 2003, and would go on to clarify and amend its defect claims in 2004, 2006, and again in 2008. Following Pinkard’s notification of Legacy’s claims, USFI provided a defense to Pinkard, but Travelers refused to do so, on the purported basis that Legacy’s allegations did not implicate property damage under the terms of Travelers’ policy.

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Reprinted courtesy of David M. McLain, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC. Mr. McLain can be contacted at mclain@hhmrlaw.com

Battle of “Other Insurance” Clauses

The New York Court of Appeals considered the impact of competing “other insurance” provisions located in both a CGL policy and a D&O policy. See Fieldston Property Owners Assoc., Inc. v. Hermitage Ins. Co., Inv., 2011 N.Y. LEXIS 254 (N.Y. Feb. 24, 2011).

In the underlying case, Fieldston’s officers were charged with making false statements and fraudulent claims with respect to a customer's right to access its property from adjacent streets. Suit was eventually filed against Fieldston and its officers, alleging several causes of action including injurious falsehood. Damages were sought.

Fieldston’s CGL policy was issued by Hermitage. The “other insurance” provision stated, “If other valid and collectible insurance is available to the insured for a loss we cover . . . our obligations are limited,” but also stated it would share with all other insurance as a primary policy.

Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com

Construction Worker Dies after Building Collapse

A Bronx construction worker died when the pillars gave way in the basement where he was working. The two-story commercial building collapsed, burying Mr. Kebbeh under about six feet of rubble. The New York Times reports that firefighters dug him out with their bare hands. Mr. Kebbeh was taken to Jacobi Medical Center where he died. Two other construction workers escaped unharmed.

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Boyfriend Pleads Guilty in Las Vegas Construction Defect Scam Suicide

One of the odder twists of the Las Vegas construction defect scandal was the charge that Nancy Quon’s boyfriend helped her in an initial suicide attempt. Quon, implicated by not charged in the case of taking control of homeowner boards in order to profit from construction defect settlements. William Webb was alleged to have bought the drug GBH in order to allow Quon, his girlfriend, to commit suicide. Ms. Quon later overdosed on a combination of alcohol and prescription drugs.

In addition to pleading guilty to the drug charges, Webb also made a plea bargain with prosecutors in which he did not admit guilt in an insurance fraud charge, but acknowledged that prosecutors would likely be successful at obtaining a conviction. Webb will be sentenced February 7 and is expected to receive a sentence of six years imprisonment.

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School District Marks End of Construction Project by Hiring Lawyers

A school district in northeastern Pennsylvania has retained legal services as they approach the end of a construction project. The Mid Valley School Board cited concerns about the project’s budget, but Randy Parry, Superintendent of Mid Valley schools referenced “possible litigation at the end of the project.” Mr. Parry told the Scranton Times Tribune that construction delays could be a reason for litigation.

In addition to approving an additional $20,000 for legal representation, the board also approved $21,579 for additional project costs.

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Arbitration Clause Found Ambiguous in Construction Defect Case

The California Court of Appeals ruled on September 28 in the case of Burch v. Premier Homes. Ms. Burch bought a home after negotiating various addendums to the contract. The contract was a standard California Association of Realtors contract to which both the buyer and seller made additions. At issue in this case was paragraph 17 of the contract which included that “Buyer and Seller agree that any dispute or claim in Law or equity arising between them out of this Agreement or resulting transaction, which is not settled through mediation, shall be decided by neutral, binding arbitration.”

The seller/defendant’s Addendum 2 “included provisions relating to the arbitration of disputes that may arise.” Ms. Burch’s realtor, Lisa Morrin, told Burch that “she had never seen a proposed contractual provision that would require a home buyer to agree to arbitrate with a builder over construction defects.” Ms. Burch told Morrin that she did not want to buy the property if she would have to give up her rights under California law.

As part of Addendum 2, the buyer had to buy a warranty from the Home Buyers Warranty Corporation. The sale was held up for a while, as Ms. Burch waited for a copy of the warranty. When she received it, she took further exception to Addendum 2. Scott Warren of Premier Homes said he could not sell the property without Addendum 2. Ms. Burch told her realtor that despite the claims made by Mr. Warren that this was for her benefit, she felt it was more to the benefit of Premier Homes. Don Aberbrook of HBW agreed to the clause, contained in the final sentence of Addendum 2, being struck.

Subsequent to buying the home, Burch submitted a claim concerning construction defects. HBW denied the claim and Burch began an action against the defendants. Premier filed a motion to compel arbitration which Burch opposed.

The trial court ruled that the striking out of the arbitration clause at the end of Addendum 2 “created a conflict with respect to the parties’ intent as to the scope of arbitration.” The trial court found that “the parties’ intention was to preserve Burch’s right to make state law claims including her right to a jury trial for any non-warranty claims against the builder.”

The appeals court in their ruling looked at the standard of review and concluded that the purchase agreement was ambiguous and that extrinsic evidence was required to resolve that ambiguity. As the contract contained contradictory provisions as to whether or not arbitration was required, it was necessary for the trial court to examine these claims. The appeals court found that the evidence supported the conclusions of the trial court.

Finally, the appeals court found that “there was no valid agreement to arbitrate disputes.” The court noted that arbitration can only happen by mutual consent and “it is clear that Burch did not enter into an agreement to arbitrate any construction defect disputes she might have.”

Read the court’s decision…

Contractors with Ties to Trustees Reaped Benefits from LA Community College Modernization Program

In the latest installment of the “Billions To Spend” series of investigative reports focused on construction defects, management, and cost issues relevant to LACC’s Community College Modernization Projects, the LA Times examines the costs associated with the various layers of construction management and benefits that accrued to contractors with ties to LACC trustees.

The reporting by the Times is seemingly critical of the project’s utilization of “body shops” an industry term for companies that function as employers of record. The article segment published today cites a number of circumstances wherein their utilization appears to have escalated costs substantially.

“To gauge the cost of the staffing system, The Times reviewed thousands of pages of financial records from April 2007, when URS began managing the program, to July 2010. Reporters identified two dozen contractors serving as conduits for pay and benefits for employees they did not supervise.



At least 230 people were employed in this manner, at a total cost of about $40 million, the records show.



Approximately $18 million of the total was paid to the employees, according to the Times analysis. The remaining $22 million went to profit and overhead for contractors, the records indicate.



For employees on its own payroll, the district says that medical and other benefits increase compensation costs 40% above base salaries. So if the district had employed its construction staff directly, the total cost for the period studied would have been $25 million instead of $40 million, a savings of $15 million, The Times calculated.”

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Tacoma Construction Site Uncovers Gravestones

The Seattle Times reports that a transit construction project has uncovered about twenty-five gravestones. The area was historically sensitive, as it is in territory once occupied by the Puyallup Tribe. At current report, no human remains have been found and the article cites the project?s archeological consultant as describing the gravestones as “not historically significant.”

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Construction Law Client Alert: California Is One Step Closer to Prohibiting Type I Indemnity Agreements In Private Commercial Projects

On June 1, 2011 by majority vote, the California Senate passed Senate Bill 474, which would amend Civil Code section 2782, and add Civil Code section 2782.05. The passage of this new law is a critical development for real estate developers, general contractors and subcontractors because it will affect how these projects are insured and how disputes are resolved.

Civil Code section 2782 was amended in 2007 to prohibit Type I indemnity agreements for residential projects only. Since 2007, various trade associations and labor unions have lobbied to expand those very same restrictions to other projects. These new provisions apply to contracts, entered into after January 1, 2013, that are not for residential projects, and that are not executed by a public entity. The revisions provide that any provision in a contract purporting to indemnify, hold harmless, and defend another for their negligence or other fault is against public policy and void. These provisions cannot be waived.

A provision in a contract requiring additional insured coverage is also void and unenforceable to the extent it would be prohibited under the new law. Moreover, the new law does not apply to wrap-up insurance policies or programs, or a cause of action for breach of contract or warranty that exists independently of the indemnity obligation.

The practical impact of this new law is that greater participation in wrap-up insurance programs will likely result. While many wrap-up programs suffer from problems such as insufficient limits, and disputes about funding the self-insured retention, the incentive for the developer or general contractor to utilize wrap-up insurance will be greater than ever before because they will no longer be able to spread the risk of the litigation to the trades and the trade carriers.

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Reprinted courtesy of Steve Cvitanovic of Haight Brown & Bonesteel, LLP.

Construction Defect Journal Marks First Anniversary

November 2011 marked the first anniversary of the Construction Defect Journal. During the first year our staff and contributors in the insurance and legal communities have compiled several hundred articles of interest to the construction defect and claims community.

Each of these articles are maintained in the CDJ archives, and are accessible at http://www.constructiondefectjournal.com/archives.html. Each story in the archives is listed in the order it was posted to the archives. Each story in the archives opens up in its own page, so you can easily locate topics and articles of interest.

If you’re new to Construction Defect Journal, or just want peruse past articles, please take a moment to visit the CDJ Archives page. Also please feel encouraged to submit your firm’s articles or legal publications of interest to the CD community at http://www.constructiondefectjournal.com/submitStory.html.

The Ever-Growing Thicket Of California Civil Code Section 2782

California Civil Code section 2782 imposes limits on indemnity and defense provisions in construction contracts. Since the initial adoption of S.B. 800¹ in 2002 (eff. January 1, 2003) section 2782² has been revised several times, and legislative history suggests that interest groups representing builders, developers and sub-contractors, as well as the insurance industry, have seen legislative action on these indemnity and defense issues as part of the overall response to the same economic pressures resulting from construction defect litigation that gave rise to S.B. 800. Amendments in 2005, 2007, 2008 and 2011 (each effective January 1 of the following year) have increasingly entangled the provisions of Section 2782 with various provisions of S.B. 800. The application of section 2782 to construction contracts, and in particular contracts between developer-builders and subcontractors, executed after January 1, 2006, will require a concurrent reading and understanding of S.B. 800, the application of which is itself still in flux.

The time a construction contract was executed will likely determine which version of section 2782, read in connection with provisions of S.B.800, is applicable. Because of the nature of construction defect litigation, the determination of relative rights and liabilities of developer-builders vis-à-vis subcontractors under construction contracts does not become the subject of litigation, and legal and judicial interpretation, until years after the contracts were entered and work performed. As of the date this article is submitted, there has been no case law interpreting or applying any of the post S.B. 800 amendments, in part, and perhaps primarily, because litigation arising from construction contracts executed after January 1, 2006, has not yet reached the appellate courts.

SECTION 2782 AT THE TIME S.B. 800 WAS ENACTED

Section 2782 was originally enacted in 1967 and amended several times to the version in effect when S.B. 800 became law, at which time the section was relatively simple and straightforward. It then consisted of two subdivisions, which have essentially remained unchanged until the most recent amendment during the 2011 legislative session.

Section 2782 (a) prohibited, and still prohibits, provisions in construction contracts that “purport to indemnify the promisee against liability for damages for death or bodily injury to persons, injury to property, or any other loss, damage or expense arising from the sole negligence or willful misconduct of the promise.” This provision essentially prohibits what had been referred to as so-called Type I or “specific” indemnity provisions. In such agreements, the indemnitor [the promisor, that is, the person or entity indemnifying] will indemnify the indemnitee [the promisee, that is, the person or entity being protected by the indemnity] for the indemnitee’s own negligence, whether active or passive, whether the indemnitee is solely negligent or concurrently negligent with the indemnitor. (See, MacDonald & Kruse, Inc. v. San Jose Steel Co. (1972) 29 Cal.App.3d 413, 419.)³ Section 2782 (a) has remained essentially intact since the enactment of S.B. 800. It still must be considered and applied to interpret a construction contract. Generally, it will apply to contracts not involving a public agency; the next part of section 2782 specifically governs such contracts.

The second subdivision prohibits provisions in any construction contract with a public agency which purport to impose on the contractor, or relieve the public agency from, liability for the active negligence of the public agency. Subdivision (b) has been revised by the 2011 amendment, discussed below. If a construction contract with the public agency is for residential construction, the standards of S.B. 800 likely apply.⁴

This was the extent of section 2782 on January 1, 2003, when S.B. 800 went into effect, and remained so until January 1, 2006. This version will govern interpretation and application of indemnity and defense provisions in construction contracts executed before January 1, 2006.⁵

2005 AMENDMENT

The first “post S.B. 800” change to Section 2782 was in enacted in 2005, effective January 1, 2006, and added two new sections. Subdivision (c) stated (in somewhat greater detail than paraphrased here) that for residential construction contracts, or amendments thereto, entered into after January 1, 2006, a subcontractor cannot be required to indemnify (including the cost to defend) a builder for construction defects that arise out of negligence or design defects of the builder or other independent contractors, or that do not arise out of the scope of the subcontractor=s scope of work. The term “residential construction” was defined by reference to S.B.800 generally, and the term “builder” was defined by reference to section 911 (a part of S.B. 800), for the first time expressly connecting provisions of section 2782 to S.B. 800. Contractual provisions not expressly prohibited were reserved to the agreement of the parties.

What subdivision (c) took away was partially given back by subdivision (d). It stated that “subdivision (c) does not prohibit a subcontractor and builder from mutually agreeing to the timing or immediacy of the defense and provisions for reimbursement of defense fees and costs, so long as that agreement, upon final resolution of the claims, does not waive or modify the provisions of subdivision (c).”⁶ In addition, it stated that this subdivision (c) did not affect the obligations of an insurance carrier under Presley Homes, Inc. v. American States Insurance Company (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 571, which holds that where an insurer has a duty to defend a developer pursuant to an additional insured endorsement obtained under a subcontractor’s policy, that duty generally applies to the entire action, even if the suit involves both covered and uncovered claims, or a single claim only partially covered by the policy. Finally, subdivision (d) stated that the amendment did not affect the builder’s or subcontractor’s obligations under S.B. 800. Both of these latter provisions, relating to the Presley Homes case, and obligations under S.B. 800, have been carried forward essentially intact in subsequent amendments of section 2782.

This version of section 2782 will be applicable to any contract between a builder as defined by section 911 (see fn. 4, above) and a subcontractor executed between January 1, 2006, and December 31, 2008. Thus, a general contractor, etc., who is not a builder is not subject to the provisions added by the 2005 amendment; this changed with the next amendment.

It is not clear whether this version would apply to a contract entered before January 1, 2006, but amended after that date. Subdivision (c) applies to “all construction contracts, and amendments thereto, entered into after January 1, 2006, for residential construction.” It would seem that the clearest and most logical construction would apply it only to contracts originally made after January 1, 2006, and thereafter amended, but there has been no judicial determination of this issue.

In addition, logically it would seem that this version of section 2782 should be applicable to construction contracts for residential construction between a builder and a subcontractor, entered between January 1, 2006, and December 31, 2008; however, legislative history relating to the 2008 amendment discussed below suggests a different result might occur.

2007 AMENDMENT

The second “post S.B. 800” amendment in 2007 (effective January 1, 2008), added subdivisions (e)(1) and (e)(2).

Subdivision (e)(1) added general contractors and subcontractors not affiliated with the builder and imposed essentially the same restrictions on provisions to indemnify, including the cost to defend, them as had been imposed on the “builder” by the 2005 amendment. The amendment refers to section 911 (b), again part of S.B. 800, to define general contractors, etc., not affiliated with the builder.

Subdivision (e)(1) essentially repeated the provisions of subdivision (d) permitting agreement to the timing and immediacy of the defense, the reference to the Presley Homes case, and the general contractor’s or subcontractor’s obligations under S.B. 800.

It appears this amendment was an attempt to harmonize the new restrictions on indemnity and defense provisions with S.B. 800. The 2005 amendment, whether by oversight or intent, covered only builders and not general contractors, although both classes are subject to the provisions of S.B. 800; the 2007 amendment added non-builder-affiliated general contractors.

Again, logically, it would seem that this version of section 2782 should be applicable to construction contracts for residential construction between a general contractor or contractor not affiliated with a builder and a subcontractor, entered between January 1 and December 31, 2008; however, legislative history relating to the 2008 amendment discussed below suggests a different result might occur. The same potential uncertainty regarding applicability to a contract entered before January 1, 2008, but amended after that date, exists for this provision as for the prior amendment, discussed above.

2008 AMENDMENT

The third “post S.B. 800” amendment in 2008 (effective January 1, 2009), reorganized the language relating to prohibited indemnity provisions, added a reference to insurance in that same prohibition, extensively rewrote the provisions governing agreements relating to the timing or immediacy of defense, added language preserving equitable indemnity claims, and added language defining “construction defect” by reference to the standards set forth in S.B. 800.

Subdivisions (a) and (b) remained unchanged.

Subdivision (c) now made a combined reference to builders (again by reference to section 911), as well as general contractors or contractors not affiliated with the builder (again by reference to section 911 (b)), rather than dealing with the two groups in separate but nearly identical subdivisions as previously. It otherwise restated the same limitations that were previously set forth separately in subdivisions (c) and (e), as well as the reference to the Presley Homes case, and the general contractor’s or subcontractor’s obligations under S.B. 800, but with one important addition. The word “insure” was added to the description of prohibited provisions, to-wit: “provisions? that purport to insure or indemnify, including the cost to defend, the builder, [etc.]? are unenforceable” to the extent they arise out of claims of the type previously described.

It is unclear what impact the addition of this single word “insure” will have; and, it will have to be read in light of the preservation of the language that it shall not affect the obligations of an insurance carrier under the holding of the Presley Homes case. Suppose a carrier had issued an additional insured endorsement under which it would otherwise be required to defend a builder or general contractor consistent with the Presley Homes rule: would this newly added single word (restricting the construction contract, to which the carrier is not a party) give the carrier a basis for denying coverage under the insurance contract? Or would the continued inclusion of the express language that it does not affect the obligations of an insurance carrier under Presley Homes control? That is surely an issue that will have to be worked out by the courts.

The new subdivision (d) addressed defense obligations. Again it permitted parties to agree to the timing and immediacy of the defense and provision for reimbursement of defense fees and costs, but imposed a very detailed scheme that appears to limit the extent of such agreement. A subcontractor owes no defense or indemnity obligation until the builder or general contractor provides a written tender of the claim, which has the same force and effect as notice of commencement of a legal proceeding. Upon that tender the subcontractor shall elect to follow one of two ways of performing: subdivision (d) (1) permits the subcontractor to defend with counsel of its choice and to control the defense, if the subcontractor gives written notice of this election within a reasonable time after receipt of the written tender and in no event later than 90 days following that receipt; subdivision (d) (2) provides an alternative by which the subcontractor pays a reasonable allocated share of the builder’s or general contractor’s defense fees and costs within 30 days of receipt of an invoice, subject to reallocation upon final resolution of the claim by settlement or judgment. Subdivision (e) sets forth remedies available to the builder or general contractor if a subcontractor fails to timely and adequately perform its obligations under either of the two alternatives in subdivision (d), including compensatory and consequential damages, reasonable attorneys’ fees in connection with the first alternative, and interest on defense and indemnity costs in connection with the second alternative. Subdivision (e) ends with provisions relating to reallocation of defense costs, and damages for failure to reallocate.

Application of these requirements in actual litigation is likely to be cumbersome and potentially fraught with conflicts. If retained pursuant to subdivision (d) (1) does the attorney represent the builder, the subcontractor, or both? To whom does the attorney owe his or her fiduciary duty? Can an appropriate informed written consent be formulated, for example, under Rule 3-310 of the California Rules of Professional Conduct, or Rule 1.7, ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct? Could an attorney retained by a subcontractor blame the subcontractor if that is in the developer’s best interests? If multiple subcontractors elect to defend directly, how would the defense be coordinated among the potentially multiple attorneys so retained? Would an attorney retained by one subcontractor be able, or inclined, to blame another subcontractor who also chose to defend directly, in other words, what would prevent inconsistent defense positions amongst the various counsel retained by subcontractors for the developer? There may be solutions to such practical and professional considerations but it seems an ethical thicket awaits any attorney involved in such circumstances.

Subdivision (e) and (f) preserve equitable indemnity claims for the builder, general contractor or subcontractor, the first in general, the second as against any supplier, design profession, or product manufacturer. Finally, the 2008 amendment added for the first time, in subdivision (h), language defining "construction defect" as used in section 2782 as a violation of standards set forth in S.B. 800.

The inclusion of these last three subsections would seem to work against simplification of litigation. A builder or general contractor is likely to allege a claim for equitable indemnity against any and all subcontractors in addition to claims for contractual indemnity and defense (however limited by the other provisions of section 2782). Nothing in the section suggests the subcontractor should, or even can, somehow take on the representation of the builder, etc., in connection with a claim of equitable indemnity back against the subcontractor.

And the limited definition of “construction defect” in subdivision (h) appears to raise an issue of the applicability of the limitations set forth in subdivision (c). Although there is a school of thought that section 941 limits residential construction defect claims only to breach of the performance standards under S.B. 800, it is still common for CD complaints to plead other legal theories, e.g., breach of contract, breach of warranty, negligence, etc., in addition to violation of S.B. 800 standards. With the addition of subdivision (h) it is arguable that the restrictions on indemnity and defense provisions spelled out in subdivisions (c) and (d), both of which relate to claims for residential construction defects, are applicable only to claims for violation of S.B. 800 standards, and not other residential construction defect claims. In other words, a developer might conceivably still be entitled to a broader scope of indemnity and concomitant defense for other types of claims, such as breach of contract, breach of warranty, negligence, etc., so long as the indemnity does not violate the limitation of subdivision (a) against Type I indemnity, which as noted above, has remained intact through these revisions.

Finally, it would seem that this version of section 2782 should be applicable to contracts executed between builders, general contractors, etc., on the one hand and subcontractors on the other hand on and after January 1, 2009. And, as noted above in connection with the 2005 and 2007 amendments, logic would suggest that those versions would ordinarily apply to contracts executed during the time periods mentioned above. But, the Legislative Counsel’s Digest for the 2008 amendment as it finally was enacted into law includes the following statements:

This bill would delete the provisions applicable to construction contracts entered into on or after January 1, 2008, that purport to indemnify the general contractor or contractor not affiliated with the builder. The bill would revise the provisions applicable to contracts entered into after January 1, 2006, to instead apply to contracts entered into after January 1, 2009, and to apply to agreements that purport to insure or indemnify the builder or the general contractor or contractor not affiliated with the builder, as described.

Although it seems a startling result, this legislative history suggests an argument can be made that the 2008 amendment retroactively nullified the effect of the 2005 and 2007 amendments, so that contracts executed from January 1, 2006, as to builders or January 1, 2008, for general contractors, etc., through December 31, 2008, are still governed by the provisions of section 2782 as it was on the books prior to the first post-S.B. 800 amendment in 2005.

2011 AMENDMENT

Section 2782 has been amended yet again in the 2011 session of the California Legislature, effective January 1, 2012; however, the substantive changes affect certain contracts entered on or after January 1, 2013. All of the provisions contained in the 2008 amendment have been carried forward in the most recent amendment, although re-numbered: (c) became (d), etc., through (h) becoming (i). So, the law governing construction contracts entered into after January 1, 2009, for residential construction, as between a builder, or a general contractor, etc., not affiliated with a builder, and regarding insurance, indemnity or defense relating to claims for construction defects, remains the same as in the 2008 amendment.

As noted above the substantive changes to section 2782 all affect contracts entered into on or after January 1, 2013. Subdivision (b) has been amended such that any provision in a contract with a public agency that purports to impose on any contractor, etc., or relieve the public agency from, liability for the active negligence of the public agency will be void and unenforceable. A new subdivision (c) has been added that imposes a similar restriction on construction contracts with the owner of privately owned real property to be improved and as to which the owner is not acting as a contractor or supplier of materials or equipment to the work. This new restriction in subdivision (c) does not apply to a homeowner performing a home improvement project on his or her own single family dwelling.

The 2011 bill amending section 2782 also added a new section 2782.05, which will make void and unenforceable any provision in any construction contract (again, entered on or after January 1, 2013) that purports to insure or indemnify, including the cost to defend, a general contractor, construction manager, or other subcontractor, by a subcontractor for claims that arise out of the active negligence or willful misconduct of the general contractor, etc., or other independent contractors, etc., or to the extent the claims do not arise out of the scope of work of the subcontractor. However, the section also includes a long list of situations to which it does not apply, including all of those covered by section 2782 (residential construction subject to S.B. 800, public agency contracts subject to section 2782 (b), and direct contracts with private property owners subject to the new section 2782 (c)) as well as eight other categories. This apparently is intended to serve as a “catch-all” to extend a limitation on indemnity agreements to all construction contracts not previously swept into this widening legislative scheme, although the exact phrasing is slightly different.⁷

The new section 2782.05 then permits a mutual agreement to the timing or immediacy of a defense under a scheme essentially identical to that imposed in the 2008 amendment to section 2782: defend with counsel of choice, and maintain control of the defense; or, pay a reasonable allocated share of defense fees and costs. The same logistical and ethical difficulties presented by the 2008 scheme discussed above would likely be present in cases that fall under the new section 2782.05.

CONCLUSION

The California Legislature has been revising section 2782 since shortly after the adoption of S.B. 800. Each revision has been more complicated than the last, and each has tied certain provisions of section 2782 more closely to S.B. 800. In particular, with regard to construction defect claims relating to residential dwellings which are subject to S.B. 800, the Legislature has apparently attempted to exercise more and more control over the scope of allowable indemnity and dictated a very narrow scheme to govern how the defense obligation arising from a contractual indemnity is to be implemented. It seems likely that any attempt to manage the defense of a construction defect case under the options that allow a subcontractor to defend directly and control the defense will create a logistical problem and an ethical difficulty for any attorney attempting to defend a developer at the behest and direction of a subcontractor. Finally, as set forth in the current version of section 2782 relating to contractual indemnity and defense of S.B. 800 type cases (subdivisions (c) through (h) in the 2008 version, now subdivisions (d) through (i) in the 2011 amendment), the Legislature has apparently narrowed the application to only claims of violation of S.B. 800 standards. This may have, in essence, removed the restrictions on indemnity and defense provisions as they relate to other theories pleaded against developers in construction defense cases, e.g., breach of contract, breach of warranty, negligence, and the like. It is not at all clear that the Legislature has accomplished what it set out do accomplish. Rather, the law may have come full circle back to where it began, except for one legal theory, i.e. violation of S.B. 800 standards, currently being used in residential construction defect cases. For any other legal theory the limitation of section 2782 (a) may be solely controlling.

1. California Civil Code section 43.99, and sections 895 to 945.5.
2. All statutory references in this article are to the California Civil Code unless otherwise specified.
3. Type I or specific indemnity does not exactly match the scope of proscribed indemnity as described in section 2782 (a) but it is the closest. More recent case law in California has eschewed a mechanical application of the MacDonald & Kruse typology in favor of examining the precise text of the actual contract (See, e.g., St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Frontier Pacific Ins. Co. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1234, 1246, n. 6) but some recent cases still use the Type I, II and II classifications. And, an understanding of that “historical” typology is useful as an aid to evaluating and understanding express indemnity in general.
4. The provisions of S.B. 800 other than the prelitigation procedures of sections 910 through 938 apply to general contractors, subcontractors, etc., pursuant to section 936. The prelitigation procedures generally involve a “builder,” which is specifically defined in section 911 (a) by reference to entities or individuals in the business of selling residential units to the public or of building, developing, or constructing residential units for public purchase. Pursuant to section 911 (b) the term builder does not include general contractors, etc., not affiliated with the builder. Thus, a general contractor who constructs residential housing pursuant to a contract with a public agency is still subject to claims for violation of the standards set forth in sections 896 and 897, resulting from its negligent act or omission or breach of contract, pursuant to section 936.
5. As noted above, there has been no case law yet interpreting any of the “post S.B. 800” changes to Section 2782. One of the most important legal decisions relating to express indemnity and defense obligations and rights between developer-builders and sub-contractors was published after two of the amendments but based upon contracts executed and the language of section 2782 prior to January 1, 2006. (See, Crawford v. Weather Shield Mfg., Inc. (2008) 44 Cal.4th 541, 547, 566-67, fn. 14).
6. Subcontractor dissatisfaction with the perceived inadequacy of protection afforded by this provision apparently became the impetus for a 2008 amendment to section 2782, discussed below, at least based upon the numerous (form) letters submitted to legislators in connection therewith.
7. Section 2782 (a), where we started, and which has continued without change, prohibits indemnity for claims arising out of the sole negligence or willful misconduct of the promisee; sole negligence can be either active or passive. The various versions relating to residential construction prohibit indemnity for the negligence of the builder, etc., suggesting there is no express contractual indemnity for the negligence of the subcontractor if the builder, etc., is at all negligent. This is tempered a bit by the preservation of the right to equitable indemnity, which will now be found in section 2782 (g) and (h).

Courtesy of Michael D. Worthing of Borton Petrini, LLP. Mr. Worthing can be contacted at mworthing@bortonpetrini.com.

Anti-Concurrent Causation Clause Bars Coverage for Landslide and Water Leak

The insured unsuccessfully attempted to get around the policy’s anti-concurrent causation clause by arguing a covered cause of loss was a contributing factor. See Stor/Gard, Inc. v. Strathmore Ins. Co., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63217 (D. Mass. May 4, 2012).

A building at the insured’s storage facility was damaged when heavy rain caused a mass of soil to slide down a slope, causing soil and a retaining wall to fall on the building. The accident caused a partial collapse of the building. The insurer hired two soil engineers, each of whom concluded that a landslide caused the accident. The reports also noted, however, that a leak from the property’s drainage system resulted in a very small percentage of water infiltrating the ground.

The insurer denied coverage based upon an exclusion for landslides.

Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com

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Harsh New Time Limits on Construction Defect Claims

A recent Colorado Supreme Court decision, Smith v. Executive Custom Homes, Inc., 230 P.3d 1186 (Colo. 2010), considerably shortens the time limit for bringing many construction defect lawsuits. Homeowners and homeowner associations risk losing the right to seek reimbursement from builders, developers and other construction professionals unless they carefully and quickly act upon discovery of evidence of any potential construction defect.

The Statute of Limitations for Construction Defect Claims
Colorado’s construction defect statute of limitations limits the time for homeowners and homeowners associations to bring lawsuits for construction defects against “construction professionals,” including developers, general contractors, builders, engineers, architects, other design professionals, inspectors and subcontractors. The statute requires homeowners and associations to file suit within two years “after the claim for relief arises.” A claim for relief “arises” when a homeowner or association discovers or reasonably should have discovered the physical manifestation of a construction defect.

The two-year time limitation applies to each construction defect separately, and will begin to run upon the appearance of a “manifestation” of a construction defect (which may include, for example, a condition as simple as a roof leak or drywall cracks), even if the homeowner or association does not know the cause of the apparent problem.

The Smith Opinion and its Effect on the Statute of Limitations
In Smith v. Executive Custom Homes, Inc., the plaintiff homeowner, Mrs. Smith, slipped on ice that had accumulated on her sidewalk because of a leaking gutter and suffered injury. When she first noticed the leak, she reported it to her property manager, who reported it to the builder. The builder attempted to repair the gutter, unbeknownst to Mrs. Smith, and she did not notice further problems until approximately one year after she first observed the leak, when she fell and suffered serious injury. She sued the builder within two years of her injury, but nearly three years after she first learned of the leak.

The Colorado Supreme Court dismissed Mrs. Smith’s claims as untimely and held that under the construction defect statute of limitations, the two-year period for suing for injuries due to construction defects begins when the homeowner first observes the physical manifestation of the defect, even if the resulting injury has not yet occurred. The court acknowledged that this ruling could result in “unfair results,” especially if a serious and unforeseeable injury occurs more than two years after the first time the homeowner noticed the problem, and as a result the victim is unable to seek redress from those responsible for the defect.

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Reprinted courtesy of Scott F. Sullan, Esq., Mari K. Perczak, Esq., and Leslie A. Tuft, Esq. of Sullan², Sandgrund, Smith & Perczak, P.C., and they can be contacted through their web site.

Association May Not Make Claim Against Builder in Vermont Construction Defect Case

The Vermont Supreme Court issued a ruling on September 28 on Long Trail House Condominium Association. The case was heard by a panel of two Supreme Court justices, Marilyn Skoglund and Brian Burgess, and three justices specially assigned for the case, Kupersmith, Davenport, and Johnson. The decision came down with a 3-2 split; Judges Kupersmith and Johnson joining in a dissent.

In the underlying case, Stratton Corporation entered into an agreement with Engelberth Construction in which Engelberth would supply “recommendations on construction feasibility, consultation as to the selection of materials and equipment, assistance with zoning requirements and permits, and cooperation with the ‘design team’ to provide valuable engineering services.” Engelberth was not responsible to determine that the drawings and specifications were in accordance with the law and building codes, nor were they responsible “for the design team’s designs, errors, or omissions.”

Subsequent to the agreement was a construction project which culminated in the incorporation of the Long Trail House Condominium Association. The condominium owners initiated a lawsuit over alleged defects. Stratton, Intrawest, and the association settled claims for $7,025,00 with Stratton and Intrawest both pursuing claims against Engelberth. This case is still unsettled.

The association progressed on remediation, which cost about $1,500,00 more than was provided by the settlement, and so the association also sued Engelberth. In this case, the court granted a summary judgment to Engelberth, concluding that negligence claim was barred both “by the economic loss rule and that the absence of contractual privity was fatal to the warranty claims.”

The court upheld both determinations of the lower court. The court noted that “the economic loss rule ‘prohibits recovery in tort for purely economic losses’” and that “in tort law, duties are imposed by law to protect the public from harm.” A negligence claim could only be supported with evidence of “some accompanying physical harm, which does not include economic loss.”

The association made the claim that the economic loss rule applies only when there is a contractual relationship between the two parties. The court rejected this argument, citing a reference that “economic interests are protected, if at all, by contract principles, rather than tort principles.”

Nor did the court find it persuasive that a “professional services” exception to the economic loss doctrine applied, noting that the court has rejected this notion in two prior cases. The noted that the association’s losses were purely economic, and their inability to settle those claims with Engelberth did not mean that they had not means of settling them, as they were able to settle these very claims with Stratton and Intrawest.

The association also raised claims of an implied warranty, resting on the construction contract between Engelberth and Stratton. This was also rejected by the court, noting that Vermont “case law plainly contemplates the existence of contractual privity before a breach of implied warranty claim can be raised.” The court noted that there was neither a contract nor a sale between Engelberth and the association, and thus there were no grounds for an implied warranty. The court concluded that “the Association’s warranty remedy lies against the entity that sold it the condominium units and implicitly warranted through the sale that the units were built in a good and workmanlike manner and that they were suitable for habitation.”

Read the court’s decision …