ANAHEIM CALIFORNIA CONSTRUCTION EXPERT WITNESS
DIRECTORY AND CAPABILITIES

The Colorado Court of Appeals Rules that a Statutory Notice of Claim Triggers an Insurer’s Duty to Defend.

Gene and Diane Melssen d/b/a Melssen Construction (“Melssen”) built a custom home for the Holleys, during which period of time Melssen retained a CGL insurance coverage from Auto Owners Insurance Company. Soon after completion of the house, the Holleys noticed cracks in the drywall and, eventually, large cracks developed in the exterior stucco and basement slab. Thereafter, the Holleys contacted Melssen, the structural engineer, an attorney, and Auto-Owners, which assigned a claims adjuster to investigate the claim.

In April 2008, the Holleys sent Melssen a statutory notice of claim pursuant to C.R.S. § 13-20-803.5 (“NOC”). In this NOC, the Holleys claimed approximately $300,000 in damages related to design and construction defects. The Holleys also provided a list of claimed damages and estimated repairs, accompanied by two reports from the Holleys’ consultant regarding the claimed design and construction defects. In June 2008, Melssen tendered the defense and indemnity of the claim to Auto-Owners. While Auto-Owners did not deny the claim at that time, it did not inspect the property or otherwise adjust the claim. Thereafter, in October 2008, Auto-Owners sent Melssen a letter denying coverage on the basis that the damage occurred outside of the applicable policy period.

Ultimately, Melssen settled the claims against it for $140,000.

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Reprinted courtesy of David McLain, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC. Mr. McLain can be contacted at mclain@hhmrlaw.com

Construction Law Client Alert: California Is One Step Closer to Prohibiting Type I Indemnity Agreements In Private Commercial Projects

On June 1, 2011 by majority vote, the California Senate passed Senate Bill 474, which would amend Civil Code section 2782, and add Civil Code section 2782.05. The passage of this new law is a critical development for real estate developers, general contractors and subcontractors because it will affect how these projects are insured and how disputes are resolved.

Civil Code section 2782 was amended in 2007 to prohibit Type I indemnity agreements for residential projects only. Since 2007, various trade associations and labor unions have lobbied to expand those very same restrictions to other projects. These new provisions apply to contracts, entered into after January 1, 2013, that are not for residential projects, and that are not executed by a public entity. The revisions provide that any provision in a contract purporting to indemnify, hold harmless, and defend another for their negligence or other fault is against public policy and void. These provisions cannot be waived.

A provision in a contract requiring additional insured coverage is also void and unenforceable to the extent it would be prohibited under the new law. Moreover, the new law does not apply to wrap-up insurance policies or programs, or a cause of action for breach of contract or warranty that exists independently of the indemnity obligation.

The practical impact of this new law is that greater participation in wrap-up insurance programs will likely result. While many wrap-up programs suffer from problems such as insufficient limits, and disputes about funding the self-insured retention, the incentive for the developer or general contractor to utilize wrap-up insurance will be greater than ever before because they will no longer be able to spread the risk of the litigation to the trades and the trade carriers.

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Reprinted courtesy of Steve Cvitanovic of Haight Brown & Bonesteel, LLP.

Construction on the Rise in Denver

In another sign of a recovery in the housing industry, the Denver Business Journal reports that the pace of new home construction has accelerated in the Denver area. According to the article, in the first seven months of 2012, forty-eight percent more permits were issued than in the first seven months of 2011. In July, 2012, there were sixty-six percent more permits than a year previously. For the Denver metropolitan area, July was the sixteenth consecutive month in which permits were up from a year previously.

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Colorado Statutes of Limitations and Repose, A First Step in Construction Defect Litigation

Grund Dagner, a law firm operating in Denver and Boulder, Colorado notes on their blog that when defending a construction defect claim, one of their first steps is to determine if the claims are affected by the statutes of limitations or repose, and that they “have had much success raising these defenses with the court before trial.”

Colorado has a two-year statute of limitations, starting from when the homeowner discovers the defect. Further, Colorado’s statute of repose precludes lawsuits beginning “more than six years after the substantial completion of the improvement to the real property.”

Grund Dagner notes that they “recently obtained dismissal of claims related to eight of 22 buildings in a condominium project, where the homeowners in those building observed the defects more than two years before the HOA initiated its claims against our client.”

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Supreme Court of New York Denies Motion in all but One Cause of Action in Kikirov v. 355 Realty Assoc., et al.

In the construction defect suit Kikirov v. 355 Realty Associates, LLC, et al., the Supreme Court of the State of New York granted a dismissal of the plaintiff’s fourth cause of action, but denied the defendants’ motion in all other respects. The plaintiff alleged breach of contract, among other claims. “355 Realty was the sponsor of 355 Kings Highway Condominium, a condominium project located at 355 Kings Highway, in Brooklyn, New York. The condominium units were allegedly marketed as ‘ultra luxury condos,’ and a ‘Manhattan style condominium building,’ which would be the ‘epitome of luxury and quality.’ The construction of the six-story 28 unit residential condominium building began in approximately November 2003. […] Plaintiff entered into a purchase agreement, dated December 21, 2005, with 355 Realty (which was executed on behalf of 355 Realty by Michael Marino, as its member) for the purchase of Unit 2G in the building.”

The plaintiff alleged that construction defects emerged soon after moving into the unit: “After taking occupancy of his condominium unit, plaintiff allegedly experienced serious leakage and moisture problems in his unit, which caused a dangerous mold condition to develop, in addition to causing actual damage to the structural elements of his unit. According to plaintiff, the walls, moldings, and wood floors of his unit are constantly wet and moist, and there is severe buckling of the wood floors. Plaintiff claims that these problems have caused his unit to be uninhabitable. Plaintiff alleges that he has been forced to remove all of his personal belongings from his unit and has been unable to occupy his unit.”

According to the plaintiff, Foremost attempted to repair the defects, but only made the situation worse: “Specifically, plaintiff asserts that Foremost’s contractors opened his walls to remove the stained drywall, but never corrected the cause of the leaks, destroyed the walls, and never properly taped and painted the sheet rock. Plaintiff alleges that Foremost repaired the openings in a defective manner. Plaintiff also claims that his floor was repaired at that time by a subcontractor hired by Foremost, but the basic structural problem was never resolved and the leaks continued, compromising the beams and causing the mold conditions, in addition to all of the physical damage present in the unit. On or about July 16, 2009, plaintiff allegedly sent a notice of the defects to 355 Realty and to the managing agent designated by the condominium board, by certified mail, return receipt requested. Plaintiff asserts that defendants have failed and refused to repair and remedy the defective condition, and that the damage is extensive and requires major structural repairs.”

The plaintiff filed suit on May 4, 2010, and the original complaint asserted eight causes of action. “By decision and order dated September 13, 2010, the court granted a motion by defendants to dismiss plaintiff’s second cause of action for breach of implied covenants of good faith and fair dealing, his third cause of action for breach of implied warranties, his fifth cause of action for negligence as against 355 Realty, Michael Marino, Anthony Piscione, Ahron Hersh, and Toby Hersh, his seventh cause of action for negligence as against Vision, Foremost, and MMJ, and his eighth cause of action for violations of General Business Law § 349 and § 350, and granted plaintiff leave to replead his first cause of action for breach of contract as against 355 Realty, Michael Marino, Anthony Piscione, Ahron Hersh, and Toby Hersh, his fourth cause of action for breach of statutory warranties, and his sixth cause of action for breach of contract as against Vision, Foremost, and MMJ.”

The plaintiff amended their complaint on October 18, 2010, and “has repleaded these three causes of action by asserting a first cause of action for breach of contract as against 355 Realty, Michael Marino, Anthony Piscione, Ahron Hersh, and Toby Hersh, a second cause of action for breach of statutory warranties, and a third cause of action for breach of contract as against Vision, Foremost, and MMJ. In addition, plaintiff, in his amended complaint, has added a fourth cause of action for fraud.”

The defendants, on the other hand, “argue that each of the four causes of action alleged by plaintiff in his amended complaint fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, and that plaintiff’s amended complaint must be dismissed pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7). Defendants also cite to CPLR 3211 (a) (1), and (5), asserting that dismissal is also required based upon documentary evidence and the Statute of Limitations contained in the limited warranty.”The defendants’ motion to dismiss the first cause of action, breach of contract against 355 Realty, was denied: “While defendants dispute that the alleged defects are actually structural in nature, plaintiff’s allegations as to their structural nature are sufficient, at this juncture, to withstand defendants’ motion to dismiss. Thus, dismissal of plaintiff’s first cause of action must be denied.”

Next, the court reviewed the second cause of action, which was breach of statutory warranties: “Defendants’ motion also seeks dismissal of plaintiff’s second cause of action for breach of statutory warranties, which alleges that, under applicable law, including General Business Law § 777-a, et seq., the sponsor warranted to purchasers of units that the units would be constructed in a skillful, careful, and workmanlike manner, consistent with proper design, engineering, and construction standards and practices, and free of material latent, design, and structural defects. Defendants argue that General Business Law § 777-a, known as the housing merchant implied warranty, is inapplicable to this case because it is limited to the construction of a ‘new home,’ defined in General Business Law § 777 (5) as ‘any single family house or for-sale unit in a multi-unit residential structure of five stories or less.’ As noted above, the building in which plaintiff’s condominium unit is located is a six-story building.”

The motion to dismiss the second cause of action is denied. The court provided this reasoning: “the full text of the offering plan has not been provided, the court is unable to examine the entire written agreement so as to determine the purpose of the inclusion of the text of General Business Law § 777.”

In the third cause of action, the plaintiff alleges “a breach of contract claim as against Vision, Foremost, and MMJ based upon their contract with 355 Realty, pursuant to which they agreed to be the general contractors/construction managers for the condominium, to undertake oversight responsibility for the design and construction of the condominium, to prepare and/or review drawings, plans, and specifications for the condominium, and to otherwise manage and oversee the project. Plaintiff alleges that Vision, Foremost, and MMJ breached their contractual obligations in that the condominium units were improperly and inadequately designed and constructed, and completed in an incompetent and unworkmanlike manner, with material design and construction defects.”

The motion to dismiss the third cause of action was denied as well: “Plaintiff alleges, in his amended complaint, that Vision, Foremost, and MMJ have acknowledged notice of the defects and have not denied that they are responsible for providing a warranty to plaintiff. Plaintiff also refers to this warranty, in his amended complaint, by noting that paragraph 16 of the purchase agreement stated that the ‘[s]eller shall not be liable to . . . the [p]urchaser for any matter as to which an assignable warranty . . . has been assigned . . . to [p]urchaser and in such case the sole recourse of such . . . [p]urchaser . . . shall be against the warrantor . . . except that in the event a contractor or subcontractor is financially unable or refuses to perform its warranty . . . [s]eller shall not be excused from its obligations enumerated in the [offering p]lan under Rights and Obligations of Sponsor.’ Consequently, the court finds that dismissal of plaintiff’s third cause of action as against Foremost and MMJ must also be denied.”

In the fourth cause of action, the plaintiff alleges “that defendants made false statements and representations orally, in advertisements, and in the purchase agreement, that the condominium was properly and adequately designed and constructed and completed in a competent and workmanlike manner, in accordance with the condominium plans and specifications and proper design, engineering, and construction standards and practices consistent with applicable standards for a first class, luxury condominium in Brooklyn.”

The court dismissed the fourth cause of action stating, “it must be dismissed because it is duplicative of his first cause of action for breach of contract.” Therefore, “defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s amended complaint is granted to the extent that it seeks dismissal of plaintiff’s fourth cause of action, and it is denied in all other respects.”

School District Settles Construction Lawsuit

The Franklin County, Pennsylvania Public Opinion reports that an area school is coming to an end with its construction lawsuit. The school district was sued by its contractors for a combined $1.4 million, which the school district withheld when the project was not completed on schedule. Lobar Inc. claimed that the district additionally owed interest and should pay attorney fees. The school claimed that only $1.15 million was due under the contract. Under the settlement, they will be paying $1.136 million.

Read the full story…

Delays in Filing Lead to Dismissal in Moisture Intrusion Lawsuit

The Alabama Court of Civil Appeals has upheld a summary judgment in the case of Franklin v. Mitchell. Walter Mitchell, doing business as Southern Classic Construction built a new home for the Franklins. The Franklins moved into the home in October 2001. In April 2006 they discovered sagging floors in both the bathroom and kitchen. They contacted Mitchell who suggested the flooring might be defective. The Franklins spent eight months attempting to contact the flooring manufacturer.

In March 2007, the Franklins had the home inspected. The sagging was determined to be due to a loss of strength in the decking because of condensation from the air conditioning system. Air returns were not properly sealed and drawing moisture into the structure. There was mold on the decking and floor joints.

When Mitchell was contacted by the Franklins, he told them his one-year warranty had expired but had the HVAC subcontractor, Southern Mechanical Heating & Air (owned by Mitchell’s father, Jim Mitchell), look at the situation. SMHA replaced and braced subfloors. Later, they entered the crawl space to tape ducts, seal the air return, and insulate the air vent housing. The Franklins were not satisfied with the repairs, as not all the ducts were taped, nor were the air vent housings insulated.

Franklin complained to Walter Mitchell who again cited his one-year warranty. Jim Mitchell said he would not report complaints to his insurer, stating that the repairs were unnecessary, that the work had been done correctly in the first place, and it was only done at the request of Walter Mitchell.

In February 2009, the Franklins sued Walker Mitchell. Mitchell denied the claims, citing in part the statute of limitations. Mitchell also filed complaints against three subcontractors, including his father’s firm. Mitchell received a summary judgment as the case started after Alabama’s six-year statute of limitations.

The appeals court rejected the Franklin’s argument that the claim of damage did not start until they were aware it was due to a construction defect. The court noted that as Walter Mitchell was licensed as a “residential home builder, the statute the Franklins cite did not apply, as it concerns architects, engineers, and licensed general contactors.”

Nor did they feel that Mitchells’ claim that his warranty had expired were sufficient to override the statute of limitations, quoting an earlier case, “Vague assurances do not amount to an affirmative inducement to delay filing suit.” Their claim of subsequent negligent repairs was rejected because Mitchell did not direct the specific actions taken by his father’s firm.

Read the court’s decision…

David McLain to Speak at the CDLA 2012 Annual Conference

The Colorado Dense Lawyers Association will be holding their 2012 Annual Conference from July 26 through the 28, in Crested Butte, Colorado. The CDLA provides benefits to its member defense trial lawyers, including educational and information resources.

David McLain of Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC will be joining in a discussion with William J. McConnell, PE of Vertex Engineering on Saturday, July 28. Their topic will be common building code violations alleged in construction defect cases and how to respond to these allegations.

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Insurer Able to Refuse Coverage for Failed Retaining Wall

The Eleventh District of the US Court of Appeals has ruled in the case of Nix v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Company. In this case, the Nixes filed a claim after a portion of the retaining wall in their home collapsed and their basement flooded. State Farm denied the claim “on the ground that the policy excluded coverage for collapses caused by defects in construction and for damage caused by groundwater.”

The court reviewed the Nixes’ policy and found that State Farm’s statement did specifically exclude both of these items. In reviewing the lower court’s ruling, the appeals court noted that State Farm’s expert witness, Mark Voll, determined that the retaining wall “lacked reinforcing steel, as required by a local building code, and could not withstand the pressure created by groundwater that had accumulated during a heavy rainfall.” Additionally, a french drain had been covered with clay soil and so had failed to disperse the groundwater.

The Nixes argued that the flooding was due to a main line water pipe, but their opinions were those of Terry Nix and the contractor who made temporary repairs to the wall. “Those opinions were not admissible as lay testimony. Neither Nix nor the contractor witnessed the wall collapse or had personal knowledge about the construction of the Nixes’ home.”

The lower court granted a summary judgment to State Farm which has been upheld by the appeals court.

Read the court’s decision…

Homeowners Must Comply with Arbitration over Construction Defects

The California Court of Appeals has upheld a decision by the Superior Court of Kern County that homeowners must comply with arbitration procedures in their construction defect claim. The California Court of Appeals ruled on December 14 in the case of Baeza v. Superior Court of Kern County, denying the plaintiff’s petition that the trial court vacate its order.

The plaintiffs in the case are homeowners in various developments built by Castle & Cook. The homes were sold with a contract that provided for “nonadversarial prelitigation procedures, including mediation, and judicial reference.” The homeowners made defect claims and argued that Castle & Cooke failed to comply with statutory disclosure requirements and that some of the contracts violate related statutes.

The appeals court found that there was no ground for appeal of the lower court’s order to continue with prelitigation procedures. The court noted that the plaintiffs could not seek a review of the mediation until a judgment was issued, but that then the issue would be moot. The court felt that there were issues presented that needed clarification, and so they reviewed this case. This was cleared for publication.

The court considered the intent of the legislature in passing the Right to Repair Act, noting that “under the statutory scheme, the builder has the option of contracting for an alternative nonadversarial prelitigation procedure,” as established in Chapter 4. The court noted that Chapter 4 “contains no specifics regarding what provisions the alternative nonadversarial contractual provisions may or must include.”

The plaintiffs contended that the builder was in violation of the standards set out in Section 912, however the court responded that these sections set out one set of procedures, but they concluded that “if the Legislature had intended the section 912 disclosure provisions…it could have made the requirements applicable to all builders by locating them in a section outside Chapter 4.”

Read the court’s decision…

Insurer Has Duty to Defend Despite Construction Defects

In a case the judge attributed to “shoddy masonry work,” the US District Court of Illinois has rendered a decision in AMCO Insurance Company v. Northern Heritage Builders. Northern Heritage built a home in Chicago for Michael McGrath (who joined Northern Heritage as a defendant). According to the decision, “seven months after he moved into the house, McGrath noticed water coming in the house and warped millwork.” This was attributed to porous block, installed by the mason with Northern Heritage’s knowledge.

McGrath sued National Heritage for both the damage to his house and its contents. The court rejected his claim for the contents. For the damages to his house, he was awarded $601,570.50 in damages. He also sued his homeowner’s insurance carrier for damages not covered in his suit against National Heritage. There he was awarded $1,130,680.16.

AMCO informed National Heritage that it had neither duty to defend nor duty to indemnify. The judge considered whether AMCO had a duty to defend. Under Illinois law, “damage to a construction project resulting from construction defects is not an ‘accident’ or ‘occurrence’ because it represents the natural and ordinary consequence of faulty construction.” However, it is noted that while if the defects lead only to damage to the project itself, there is no occurrence, “if the building owner asserts damages to other property besides the construction itself, there is an ‘occurrence’ and ‘property damage.’” The judge further noted that were construction defects an occurrence, “shoddy work” would be rewarded by double pay, once by the homeowner and a second time by the insurer. Judge Kendall concluded that as McGrath had alleged damage to the contents of his house, AMCO had a duty to defend National Heritage.

She then looked at the issue of whether AMCO had a duty to indemnify. Should they pay the $601,570.50? Judge Kendall noted that “the duty to indemnify is narrower than the duty to defend.” The key point here was that once McGrath’s insurance carrier covered him for the damage to the contents of his house, “AMCO’s duty to defend ended.” Once McGrath “only sought damages for the natural consequences of faulty workmanship” there was no occurrence, hence nothing for AMCO to cover.

Judge Kendall granted a summary dismissal of AMCO’s claim that they had no duty to defend while upholding their claim that they had no duty to indemnify.

Read the court’s decision…

Ceiling Collapse Attributed to Construction Defect

WSMV, Nashville reports that the ceiling collapse in a Franklin, Tennessee Kohl’s was attributed to a construction defect by fire officials. The officials noted that the ceiling was renovated at the time. No injuries were reported.

The report notes that “inspectors were supposed to look at the renovations next week, but fire officials said that will have to be delayed until another time.”

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Arizona Court of Appeals Decision in $8.475 Million Construction Defect Class Action Suit

In the case of Leflet v. Fire (Ariz. App., 2011), which involved an $8.475 million settlement in a construction defect class action suit, the question put forth to the Appeals court was “whether an insured and an insurer can join in a Morris agreement that avoids the primary insurer’s obligation to pay policy limits and passes liability in excess of those limits on to other insurers.” The Appeals court provided several reasons for their decision to affirm the validity of the settlement agreement as to the Non-Participatory Insurers (NPIs) and to vacate and remand the attorney fee awards.

First, the Appeals court stated, “The settlement agreement is not a compliant Morris agreement and provides no basis for claims against the NPIs.” They conclude, “Appellants attempt to avoid the doctrinal underpinnings of Morris by arguing that ‘the cooperation clause did not prohibit Hancock from assigning its rights to anyone, including Appellants.’ This narrow reading of the cooperation clause ignores the fact that Hancock did not merely assign its rights — it assigned its rights after stipulating to an $8.475 million judgment that neither it nor its Direct Insurers could ever be liable to pay. Neither Morris nor any other case defines such conduct as actual ‘cooperation’—rather, Morris simply defines limited circumstances in which an insured is relieved of its duty to cooperate. Because Morris agreements are fraught with risk of abuse, a settlement that mimics Morris in form but does not find support in the legal and economic realities that gave rise to that decision is both unenforceable and offensive to the policy’s cooperation clause.”

The Appeals court further concluded that “even if the agreement had qualified under Morris, plaintiffs did not provide the required notice to the NPIs.” The court continued, “Because an insurer who defends under a reservation of rights is always aware of the possibility of a Morris agreement, the mere threat of Morris in the course of settlement negotiations does not constitute sufficient notice. Instead, the insurer must be made aware that it may waive its reservation of rights and provide an unqualified defense, or defend solely on coverage and reasonableness grounds against the judgment resulting from the Morris agreement. The NPIs were not given the protections of this choice before the agreement was entered, and therefore can face no liability for the resulting stipulated judgment.”

Next, the Appeals court declared that “the trial court abused its discretion in awarding attorney’s fees under A.R.S § 12-341.” The Appeals court reasoned, “In this case, the NPIs prevailed in their attack on the settlement. But the litigation did not test the merits of their coverage defenses or the reasonableness of the settlement amount. And Plaintiffs never sued the NPIs, either in their own right or as the assignees of Hancock. Rather, the NPIs intervened to test the conceptual validity of the settlement agreement (to which they were not parties) before such an action could commence. In these circumstances, though it might be appropriate to offset a fee award against some future recovery by the Plaintiff Leflet v. Fire (Ariz. App., 2011) class, the purposes of A.R.S. § 12-341.01 would not be served by an award of fees against them jointly and severally. We therefore conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding fees against Plaintiffs ‘jointly and severally.’”

The Appeals court made the following conclusion: “we affirm the judgment of the trial court concerning the validity of the settlement agreement as to the NPIs. We vacate and remand the award of attorney’s fees. In our discretion, we decline to award the NPIs the attorney’s fees they have requested on appeal pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-341.01(A).”

Read the court’s decision…

Can We Compel Insurers To Cover Construction Defect in General Liability Policies?

Recently, I read an article on Engineering News-Record that outlines a remarkable movement by as many as four states, to mandate coverage of construction defects in contractor general liability insurance policies. Say what? Is this a reality? What will become of affordable insurance?

Commercial General Liability insurance, or CGL, is your basic liability insurance. Every contractor doing business in the State of Washington, and most likely those abroad, has this insurance. Contractors buy this insurance to protect them from unforeseen liabilities arising from their negligence - and right now it’s reasonably affordable.

Why is it so affordable in such a risk-heavy industry? Because CGL policies significantly limit the scope of their coverage. Coverage is generally afforded for damages resulting from negligence (The roofer put a hammer through the drywall contractor’s wall) or which resulted from your defective construction (the roof leaked and flooded the rest of the house). But, that coverage does not include replacement of your faulty construction (the contents of the home might be protected by your leaky roof - the leaky roof itself is not).

The debate over coverage typically stems from the definition of “occurrence,” a term used to describe the event from which coverage arises, “resulting loss,” a term used to describe the type of loss covered.

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Reprinted courtesy of Douglas Reiser of Reiser Legal LLC. Mr. Reiser can be contacted at info@reiserlegal.com

Late Filing Contractor Barred from Involving Subcontractors in Construction Defect Claim

The Colorado Court of Appeals looked at that state’s Construction Defect Action Reform Act in determining if a general contractor could add subcontractors as third-party defendants to a construction defect lawsuit. Shaw Construction, LLC was the general contraction of the Roslyn Court condominium complex, and was sued by the homeowners’ association in a construction defect case. United Builder Services was the drywall subcontractor on the project. MB Roofing had installed roofs, gutters, and downspouts. The certificate of occupancy for the last building was issued on March 10, 2004. The project architect certified completion of all known remaining architectural items in June, 2004.

The HOA filed a claim against the developers of the property on January, 21, 2009. A week later, the HOA amended its complaint to add Shaw, the general contractor. Shaw did not file its answer and third-party complaint until March 29, 2010, sending its notice of claim under the CDARA on March 30.

The subcontractors claimed that the six-year statute of limitations had ended twenty days prior. Shaw claimed that the statute of limitations ran until six years after the architect’s certification, or that the HOA’s suit had tolled all claims.

The trial court granted summary judgment to the subcontractors, determining that “substantial completion occurs ‘when an improvement to real property achieves a degree of completion at which the owner can conveniently utilize the improvement of the purpose it was intended.’”

The appeals court noted that “Shaw correctly points out that the CDARA does not define ‘substantial completion.’” The court argued that Shaw’s interpretation went against the history and intent of the measure. “Historically, a construction professional who received a complaint responded by ‘cross-nam[ing] or add[ing] everybody and anybody who had a part to play in the construction chain.’” The court concluded that the intent of the act was to prevent unnamed subcontractors from being tolled.

The court further rejected Shaw’s reliance on the date of the architect’s certification as the time of “substantial completion,” instead agreeing with the trial court that “the architect’s letter on which Shaw relies certified total completion.”

The appeals court upheld the trial court’s determination that the statute of limitation began to run no later than March 10, 2004 and that Shaw’s complaint of March 29, 2010 was therefore barred. The summary judgment was upheld.

Read the court’s decision…

The Complete and Accepted Work Doctrine and Construction Defects

Matthew C. Bouchard of Lewis & Roberts PLLC, writes how North Carolina is “bucking the trend” on the “complete and accepted work doctrine.” As he notes, in most states “a contractor can be found liable for personal injuries suffered by third parties from accidents occurring after the contractor’s work is completed and accepted.” But one exception is North Carolina.

He gives the example of a case, Lamb v. D.S. Duggins Welding, Inc., in which a site superintendent was “injured by the alleged negligence of the project’s steel deck installer, a sub-subcontractor in the contractual chain” “after the sub-sub’s work had been completed and accepted.” The trial court held that the “completed and accepted work doctrine” ended the subcontractor’s liability. The case noted that “employees of the general contractor had modified the installation of the perimeter safety cable in question after the sub-sub had demobilized from the site.”

Mr. Bouchard notes that “once a project is accepted and turned over, the contractor typically loses control over maintenance of the new facility.” However, he notes that “where the contractor’s work constitutes negligence ?Ķ the doctrine may not apply.” Nor does it end breach of contract claims. It only covers third parties.

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Analysis of the “owned property exclusion” under Panico v. State Farm

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit recently concluded that the “owned property exclusion” applied to bar coverage for claims of property damage. See Panico v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 2011 WL 322830 (10th Cir. 2011). In Panico, the plaintiffs sold property in Aspen, Colorado to the Taylors, who sued the Panicos upon discovering the property was not as represented. After refusing to defend, the Panicos sued State Farm for breach of contract. The district court concluded that the Taylors’ claims were not covered under the Panicos insurance policies and granted summary judgment in State Farm’s favor. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed.

Mr. Panico built the house on the property as well as several additions to the house. As the Taylors lived in Florida, they primarily relied on their real estate agent and an inspector to ensure the property was acceptable. According to their complaint, the Taylors discovered that the house was “virtually uninhabitable due to serious design and construction defects, mold, rodents, and drainage problems.” Id. at *1. In their complaint, the Taylors asserted three claims for relief against the Panicos based upon misrepresentation and fraudulent concealment about the condition of the property.

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Reprinted courtesy of Heather M. Anderson of Higgins, Hopkins, McClain & Roswell, LLP. Ms Anderson can be contacted at anderson@hhmrlaw.com

Drug Company Provides Cure for Development Woes

Vertex Pharmaceuticals is poised to become the holder of Boston’s biggest commercial lease, paying $72.5 million for 1.1 million square feet on Boston’s waterfront. Vertex’s new buildings are still under construction, but the plans have spurred other development in the Fan Pier area, according to the New York Times. The Times quotes Mary A. Burke, a senior economist at the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston that the Vertex project gives “a big push” to the “momentum for economic growth.”

The Fallon Company is building Vertex’s new laboratory and office space. They are separately planning to build a high-rise with 150 luxury condominium units. According to Joseph Fallon, the chief executive and president of the Fallon Company, there is already a waiting list of 50 buyers for the condominiums.

Across the street from the Vertex site, a group including Morgan Stanley and Boston Global Investors is planning a 23-block mixed use project that would include 1.2 million square feet of retail space. Additionally, the New England Development and the Hanover Group is building a 356-unit apartment building at the adjacent Pier 4.

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