Construction Defect Notice in the Mailbox? Respond Appropriately
August 4, 2011 — Douglas Reiser, Builders Counsel
Recently, I have seen a rash of ignored construction defect notices. What is a construction defect notice? It’s a statutorily required notice, sent from a homeowner to a contractor, listing a number of defects found at their property. If you get one, don’t ignore it.
The Revised Code of Washington includes a number of provisions intended for residential construction disputes. Among them is the “Notice to Customer” requirement in RCW 18.27.114, which can preempt a contractor’s lien rights, and the “Notice of Construction Defects” found in RCW 64.50.020.
The Notice of Construction Defects is a standard notice mandated by RCW 64.50, a chapter in the Revised Code of Washington, intended to provide a pre-litigation resolution process for contractors and consumers. The chapter applies only to those losses “caused by a defect in the construction of a residence or in the substantial remodel of a residence.”(See “Action” RCW 64.50.010).
Unfortunately, many contractors will simply ignore these notices or tell the homeowner to make a warranty claim. But, the notice actually provides a contractor with a forty-five (45) day window to alleviate the dispute.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of Douglas Reiser of Reiser Legal LLC. Mr. Reiser can be contacted at info@reiserlegal.com
Association May Not Make Claim Against Builder in Vermont Construction Defect Case
October 23, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The Vermont Supreme Court issued a ruling on September 28 on Long Trail House Condominium Association. The case was heard by a panel of two Supreme Court justices, Marilyn Skoglund and Brian Burgess, and three justices specially assigned for the case, Kupersmith, Davenport, and Johnson. The decision came down with a 3-2 split; Judges Kupersmith and Johnson joining in a dissent.
In the underlying case, Stratton Corporation entered into an agreement with Engelberth Construction in which Engelberth would supply “recommendations on construction feasibility, consultation as to the selection of materials and equipment, assistance with zoning requirements and permits, and cooperation with the ‘design team’ to provide valuable engineering services.” Engelberth was not responsible to determine that the drawings and specifications were in accordance with the law and building codes, nor were they responsible “for the design team’s designs, errors, or omissions.”
Subsequent to the agreement was a construction project which culminated in the incorporation of the Long Trail House Condominium Association. The condominium owners initiated a lawsuit over alleged defects. Stratton, Intrawest, and the association settled claims for $7,025,00 with Stratton and Intrawest both pursuing claims against Engelberth. This case is still unsettled.
The association progressed on remediation, which cost about $1,500,00 more than was provided by the settlement, and so the association also sued Engelberth. In this case, the court granted a summary judgment to Engelberth, concluding that negligence claim was barred both “by the economic loss rule and that the absence of contractual privity was fatal to the warranty claims.”
The court upheld both determinations of the lower court. The court noted that “the economic loss rule ‘prohibits recovery in tort for purely economic losses’” and that “in tort law, duties are imposed by law to protect the public from harm.” A negligence claim could only be supported with evidence of “some accompanying physical harm, which does not include economic loss.”
The association made the claim that the economic loss rule applies only when there is a contractual relationship between the two parties. The court rejected this argument, citing a reference that “economic interests are protected, if at all, by contract principles, rather than tort principles.”
Nor did the court find it persuasive that a “professional services” exception to the economic loss doctrine applied, noting that the court has rejected this notion in two prior cases. The noted that the association’s losses were purely economic, and their inability to settle those claims with Engelberth did not mean that they had not means of settling them, as they were able to settle these very claims with Stratton and Intrawest.
The association also raised claims of an implied warranty, resting on the construction contract between Engelberth and Stratton. This was also rejected by the court, noting that Vermont “case law plainly contemplates the existence of contractual privity before a breach of implied warranty claim can be raised.” The court noted that there was neither a contract nor a sale between Engelberth and the association, and thus there were no grounds for an implied warranty. The court concluded that “the Association’s warranty remedy lies against the entity that sold it the condominium units and implicitly warranted through the sale that the units were built in a good and workmanlike manner and that they were suitable for habitation.”
Read the court’s decision …
Fifth Circuit Asks Texas Supreme Court to Clarify Construction Defect Decision
November 7, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The Fifth Circuit Court has withdrawn its decision in Ewing Construction Company v. Amerisure Insurance Company, pending clarification from the Texas Supreme Court of its decision in Gilbert Texas Construction, L.P. v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s London. The Fifth Circuit had applied the Gilbert case in determining that a contractual liability exclusion barred coverage for faulty workmanship. The Insurance Journal reports that this decision was both applauded and criticized, with a concern noted that “an insurer would now have its pick of either the ‘your work’ exclusion or the contractual liability exclusion without the exception for subcontracted work.”
The Fifth Circuit is now asking the Texas Supreme Court two questions to clarify Gilbert, which Brian S. Martin and Suzanne M. Patrick see as a sign that the Court has realized that it overly expanded the scope of the earlier ruling. A response is expected from the Texas Supreme Court by spring 2013.
Read the full story…
Application of Efficient Proximate Cause Doctrine Supports Coverage
January 6, 2012 — Tred Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
Relying on the efficient proximate cause doctrine, the court determined coverage potentially existed for damage caused by water. Union Sav. Bank v. Allstate Indem. Co., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134398 (S.D. Ind. Nov. 21, 2011).
The Tods purchased property that was mortgaged by Union Savings. The Tods obtained a Landlords Policy for the property from Allstate. When the Tods were in default on their loan, Union Savings notified them that foreclosure proceedings would commence. Union Savings sent an appraiser to the property who discovered water in the basement. Water and electricity to the building were off. Union Savings notified Allstate and later filed a formal claim under the mortgagee clause in the Landlords Policy. This clause stated, "A covered loss will be payable to the mortgagees named on the policy declaration. . . ."
Allstate denied coverage, citing exclusions for water damage.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
Preparing for Trial on a Cause of Action for Violation of Civil Code section 895, et seq.
May 10, 2012 — Samir R. Patel, Esq., Lorber, Greenfield, & Polito, LLP
In 2002, the California Legislature enacted the Right to Repair Act (hereinafter “SB-800”), as codified in Title VII of the Civil Code. As set forth in Civil Code section 895, et seq., SB-800 established a set of standards for residential construction, and provides a statutory protocol to address alleged violations of those standards. SB-800 applies to all new single family homes sold after January 1, 2003, and it created its own cause of action governed completely by its own terms, in that in order to state a cause of action under SB-800, a plaintiff may only allege a violation of the Act. (Civ. Code, § 938.) Under Civil Code sections 896, 897, 943, and 944, the Legislature made it clear that it intended to create a single cause of action for construction defects in homes that fall under the purview of SB-800. By passing SB-800, the Legislature eliminated multiple and often redundant or conflicting causes of action, burdens of proof, statutes of limitations, and types of damages that were common in construction defect actions prior to the enactment of the same.
Civil Code section 895, et seq. has significantly changed the landscape of construction defect lawsuits. Yet, for years, the only attention given to the statutes focused solely on the codified pre-litigation process that requires plaintiffs and builders to meet and confer regarding defects and attempt a process to repair the alleged defects before litigation is pursued. A major impediment to the implementation of the pre-litigation procedures has often been that the statutes specifically state that the information obtained during the pre-litigation process is admissible at trial. Hence, through use of the pre-litigation process, plaintiffs’ counsel can engage in a builder funded fishing expedition and later use the information obtained to advance their litigation goals. As such, many builders have chosen to opt out of codified pre-litigation process altogether, an option which the builder can elect within their Purchase and Sale Agreements.
Recently, counsel for builders throughout California have turned their attention to the “exclusive remedy” aspect of SB-800 by seeking, often successfully, to limit plaintiffs to a single cause of action for violation of SB-800. Civil Code section 943 makes clear that a cause of action for violation of SB-800 performance standards is a plaintiff’s sole remedy for a residential construction defect action. Civil Code section 943 states:
Except as provided in this title, no other cause of action for a claim covered by this title or for damages recoverable under 944 is allowed. (Civ. Code, § 943.) Â
The question remains: what is the benefit of requiring plaintiffs to trim down their complaint and eliminate their tried and true common law causes of action, and requiring them to pursue only a single cause of action for violation of SB800?
The construction standards enumerated within SB-800 include fifty-plus functionality standards. On their face, any benefit to pursuing a construction defect action under a single cause of action for violation of SB-800 initially appears trivial at best, in light of the fact that a jury may be very confused with the complexity of the functionality standards set forth within the Civil Code. Nevertheless, Title VII of the Civil Code actually contains numerous provisions that builders can utilize to their benefit throughout the process of construction defect litigation, including during preparation for trial.
First and foremost, counsel for builders can assert numerous affirmative defenses that will be beneficial if the matter proceeds to trial. These affirmative defenses, as codified in Civil Code section 945.5, include mitigation, in whole or in part, for damages caused by: an unforeseen act of nature; a homeowner’s failure to allow reasonable and timely access for inspections and repair under the pre-litigation procedures; the homeowner’s failure to follow the builder’s recommendations and commonly accepted homeowner maintenance obligations; ordinary wear and tear; misuse; abuse; or neglect. Builders should include these affirmative defenses within their responsive pleadings and as trial approaches, prepare appropriate motions in limine and request special jury instructions regarding the same. As frustrated builders and their attorneys are well aware, many construction defect suits result from a homeowner’s failure to properly maintain their property in a manner that is consistent with normal maintenance procedures and guidelines. Furthermore, within the ten year statute of limitations for most defects, ordinary wear and tear is often attributable to numerous deficiencies alleged by plaintiffs. The affirmative defense for a homeowner’s failure to allow inspections and repairs is also vital, as plaintiffs’ counsel may encourage a homeowner to forego the repair and seek monetary damages, allowing plaintiffs’ counsel to ultimately obtain their share of attorney’s fees. Therefore, the SB-800 statutes provide the builder with recourse and distinctive mitigation defenses that were previously and confusingly mixed into tort and contract related defenses. These affirmative defenses can also be utilized by counsel during the cross-examination of plaintiff homeowners and expert witnesses. Defense counsel should fully grasp these defenses and utilize them as defense themes throughout litigation.
As a plaintiff is limited to a single cause of action for violation of SB-800, if defense counsel has failed to properly eliminate excessive tort and contract causes of action prior to trial, a motion for summary adjudication, or at the very least, a motion for judgment on the pleadings should be brought to limit the introduction of evidence outside of a single cause of action for violation of SB-800. Practical judges are always looking for ways to streamline and expedite trials, and they are currently ruling that SB-800 is the exclusive remedy available to plaintiffs. In fact, plaintiffs’ firms in SB-800 matters are now voluntarily limiting their complaints to this one cause of action.
Special jury instructions can also be crafted to limit a jury’s computation of damages pursuant to Civil Codesection 944, which provides the method for computing damages within a construction defect action, as follows:
If a claim for damages is made under this title, the homeowner is only entitled to damages for the reasonable value of repairing any violation of the standards set forth in this title, the reasonable cost of repairing any damages caused by the repair efforts, the reasonable cost of repairing and rectifying any damages resulting from the failure of the home to meet the standards, the reasonable cost of removing and replacing any improper repair by the builder, reasonable relocation and storage expenses, lost business income if the home was used as a principal place of a business licensed to be operated from the home, reasonable investigative costs for each established violation, and all other costs or fees recoverable by contract or statute. (Civ. Code, § 944.) [Emphasis added.]
Civil Code section 944 specifically prohibits recovery for damages outside the scope of its explicit language as it states “the homeowner is only entitled to ... damages for the reasonable value of repairing any violation of the standards set forth in this title....” [Emphasis added.] The statute ultimately provides a “reasonableness” standard for the computation of damages that did not exist when computing damages on traditional common law tort and contract claims. Therefore, defense counsel should prepare special jury instructions to limit evidence of damages introduced at trial to the reasonable value of repairing any violation of the standards, and to exclude any evidence of damages beyond the reasonableness standard. Defense counsel should seize the opportunity to utilize the theme of “reasonableness” when attacking plaintiffs’ allegations and plaintiffs’ proposed repair methodology throughout the discovery process and at trial.
Defense counsel may also prepare a motion in limine or special jury instruction regarding the limitation of evidence regarding defects that did not cause resultant damage. Civil Code section 897 states:
Intent of Standards
The standards set forth in this chapter are intended to address every function or component of a structure. To the extent that a function or component of a structure is not addressed by these standards, it shall be actionable if it causes damage. (Civ. Code, § 897.) [Emphasis added.]
Defense counsel can argue that the introduction of any evidence supporting a claim for construction-related deficiencies that are not enumerated within Civil Code section 896, or for deficiencies where no damage has occurred is prohibited and must be excluded at trial. This requirement of resultant damages is familiar as the general rule was previously established in Aas v. Superior Court (2000) 24 Cal.4th 627, in which the California Supreme Court held that there is no tort recovery for construction defects that have not actually caused property damage. The legislature effectively codified this rule within Civil Code section 897.
A motion in limine can also be crafted to limit expert testimony to the standards enumerated in Civil Code section 896, and to deficiencies that caused damage pursuant to Civil Code 897. The motion in limine can be based upon Civil Code section 943 and the fact that claims for defects in homes which were sold after January 1, 2003 may only be pursued under a single cause of action for violation of SB-800. As such, expert testimony should be controlled by the standards set forth in Civil Code section 896. Furthermore, throughout a construction defect matter, defense counsel should ensure that their experts are well versed with the standards and that they can provide testimony that utilizes the same. Defense counsel’s knowledge of the standards will also be helpful during the cross-examination of plaintiffs’ expert witnesses.
If, despite the efforts of defense counsel, the complaint still has numerous causes of action, or if only some homes fall under the purview of SB-800 while others do not, defense counsel can utilize a motion to bifurcate trial. The motion’s basis is that a cause of action for violation of SB-800 will require the introduction of evidence regarding the violations of the fifty-plus standards, and the tort and contract-based claims would also require the introduction of a wide range of evidence to prove each cause of action. For example, in order to prove the tort causes of action, plaintiffs must prove elements such as: duty, breach, proximate and actual causation, and that the builder placed the homes into the stream of commerce. (See Richards v. Stanley (1954) 43 Cal.2d 60, 63; Kriegler v. Eichler Homes, Inc. (1969) 269 Cal.App.2d 224, 227.) On the contract causes of action, plaintiffs must prove the existence of a valid written contract for the sale of the home, including proof regarding the existence of basic contractual elements such as offer, acceptance, and consideration. (Civ. Code, § 1624 subd. (a); Roth v. Malson (1997) 67 Cal.App.4th 552, 557.) Defense counsel can argue that exposing the jury to elements that may or may not be applicable to all of the homes in the action will complicate and confuse the jury. Thus, concurrently exposing the jury to the SB-800 claims and the non-SB-800 claims will necessitate undue consumption of time, and create the substantial danger of undue prejudice of confusing the issues or misleading the jury.
One of the most important and relevant features of the SB-800 statutes is that they include shortened statutes of limitation as to certain enumerated defects. The codified statutes of limitations apply from the date of “close of escrow,” and are much more definitive than statutes of limitations regarding tort and contract claims. Therefore, they can be utilized within a motion for summary adjudication in cases where only one or a few defects are alleged. For example, under Civil Code section 896, et seq., there is a five year limitation on paint (Civ. Code, § 896, subd. (g)(1)); a four year limitation on plumbing fixtures (Civ. Code, § 896, subd. (e)); a three year limitation on landscaping (Civ. Code § 896, subd. (g)(12)); and a one year limitation on irrigation systems and drainage (Civ. Code, § 896, subd. (g)(7)). The non-SB-800 claims are subject to a four year statute of limitation for patent defects and a ten year statute of limitation for latent defects. (See Code of Civ. Proc., §§ 337.1, 337.15.) The contrast between the statute of limitations for the SB-800 claims and non-SB-800 claims can complicate a matter at trial, further establishing the necessity to limit plaintiffs to a single cause of action for violation of SB-800. Hence, defense counsel should also utilize a motion to bifurcate the statute of limitations issues from the issue of liability if a question of fact exists. If successful on the motion to bifurcate, plaintiff’s counsel will be barred from the introducing evidence at trial regarding a defect where the statute of limitations has run.
Defense counsel should also seek to simplify the construction standards for the jury. Ultimately, by drafting jury instructions and a special verdict form that is easy to navigate, counsel can promote an easy interpretation of the standards enumerated within the Civil Code. The best route for drafting a special verdict form is to draft it as a check-list, similar to a traditional real estate walk-through check-list. By incorporating the shortened statutes of limitations into the special verdict form, defense counsel can effectively frame the case for the jury. The special verdict form should also allow the jury to easily eliminate any claim for damages that is mitigated, in whole or in part, through the codified affirmative defenses. Defense counsel should also consider drafting a trial brief that effectively and simplistically provides the trial court judge with an understanding of the specific defects before the court, and simultaneously notes which Civil Code standards are implicated and the scope of the same. If the trial judge is not well versed in construction defect litigation, defense counsel should be all the more careful in breaking down the parameters and limitations codified within SB-800 for the court.
The strategies outlined within this article are only a few tactics that can be utilized to defend a construction defect suit. Depending on the defect allegations within any particular case, defense counsel should become intimately familiar with Title VII of the Civil Code and use all aspects of the same to their advantage. If not, plaintiffs’ counsel will have the advantage during “court-house step” settlement discussions and at trial.
Printed courtesy of Samir R. Patel, Esq. of Lorber, Greenfield, & Polito, LLP. Mr. Patel can be contacted at spatel@lorberlaw.com.
Ensuing Losses From Faulty Workmanship Must be Covered
May 10, 2012 — Tred Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
Coverage for damages resulting from faulty workmanship in the construction of an apartment complex was at issue in The Bartram, LLC v. Landmark Am. Ins. Co., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44535 (N.D. Fla. March 30, 2012).
The owner of the apartments, Bartram, had primary coverage and three layers of excess coverage. Each contract excluded loss from faulty workmanship. The policies provided, however, "if loss or damage by a Covered Cause of Loss results, we will pay for that resulting loss or damage."
Bartram contended water intrusion occurred because of faulty workmanship, which caused damage to the buildings’ exterior and interior finishes, wood sheathing, framing, balcony systems, drywall ceilings and stucco walls. This damage was separate from the work needed to simply fix the faulty workmanship. Therefore, Bartram argued, the ensuing losses that resulted from the water intrusion was covered.
The insurer argued the ensuing loss exception was not applicable if the ensuing loss was directly related to the original excluded loss.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
Construction Defect Claim Did Not Harm Homeowner, Court Rules
September 30, 2011 — CDJ Staff
The Minnesota Court of Appeals has ruled in Creswell v. Estate of Howe, a case in which a woman bought a home and then sued the seller’s estate, both sets of real estate agents, and the homeowner’s association over construction defects. A district court ruled against her, granting summary judgment to the other parties.
After buying a townhome “as is,” Catherine Creswell claims to have shared a thought with her agent that the homeowners association was, in the words of her agent, “trying to hide something.” Later, Creswell found that a few days before her closing, the board had discussed problems with “roofs, siding and soundproofing of the townhomes.” The court noted that “it was clear from the documents that appellant [Creswell] received that the association had known about various construction defects for many years, some of which affected [her] unit.”
Creswell initially sued the estate, the man who negotiated the sale for his mother’s estate, the real estate companies and the agents involved, the homeowners association, and four board members. Later she sued for punitive damages, dropped a claim for interference with contractual relations, and dismissed her claims against the individual board members. The court dismissed all of Creswell’s claims awarding costs to those she sued.
The appeals court has affirmed the decision of lower court, noting that Creswell “did not provide us with any argument why the district court erred in dismissing her unjust-enrichment, breach of contract, or rescission claims against the various respondents.” Nor did she provide evidence to support her claims of “breach of duty, fraud, and violation of consumer protection statutes.”
The court noted that Creswell could not sue the homeowners association over the construction defects because she “failed to prove that she was damaged by the association’s nondisclosure.” The court noted that “there are no damages in this case,” as Creswell “was never assessed for any repairs, she had not paid anything out-of-pocket for repairs, and she has presented no evidence that the value of her individual unit has declined because of the alleged undisclosed construction defects.”
The court granted the other parties motion to dismiss and denied Creswell’s motion to supplement the record. Costs were awarded to the respondents.
Read the court’s decision…
Limitations of Liability in Subcontractors’ Contracts May Not Be Enforceable in Colorado to Limit Claims by Construction Professionals.
October 23, 2012 — Heidi J. Gassman, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell
The Colorado Homeowner Protection Act of 2007 (“HPA”), codified at C.R.S. § 13-20-806(7), specifically voids express waivers of, or limitations on, a residential property owner’s ability to enforce any rights, remedies, and damages provided by law in a construction defect case. Practically speaking, this means that limitation of liability provisions in contracts between construction professionals and residential homeowners are void and will not be enforced in Colorado. The HPA can extend even further, however, to subcontractors on residential projects, as seen in a recent District Court ruling.
The HPA was tested in Thacker v. Gallery Homes, et al., v. Terracon Consultants, Inc., et al., Larimer County District Court Case No. 2007CV1195. Gallery Homes hired Terracon to provide geotechnical and structural engineering services at the Colony Ridge subdivision in Loveland, Colorado. Terracon performed work for Gallery Homes under three separate contracts, each of which included a provision limiting Terracon’s total liability to Gallery Homes.
After the project was completed, two homeowners filed suit against Gallery Homes for alleged construction defects involving movement of their basement floor systems and foundations and damage to porches, patios, garages, and driveways. Gallery Homes sued Terracon as a third-party defendant, and Terracon sought to enforce its limitation of liability provisions via a partial summary judgment motion.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of Heidi J. Gassman, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC. Ms. Gassman can be contacted at gassman@hhmrlaw.com
Construction Defects Not Occurrences under Ohio Law
November 7, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Concluding the “claims of defective construction or workmanship brought by a property owners are not claims for ‘property damage’ caused by an ‘occurrence’ under a commercial general liability policy,” the Supreme Court of Ohio has ruled in Westfield Insurance Co. v. Custom Agri Systems, Inc. In the underlying case, Custom Agri Systems, Inc. built a grain bin as a subcontractor to Younglove Construction, LLC. Younglove had been contracted by PSD Development, which withheld payment, claiming it had suffered damages due to defects in Custom Agri System’s work. Younglove filed a complaint against Custom Agri, which filed complaints against its subcontractors. Custom Agri also requested that its insurer, Westfield Insurance Company, defend and indemnify it. Westfield claimed that it had no such duty. The Ohio Supreme Court concurred.
The decision notes that “Custom was being sued under two general theories: defective construction and consequential damages resulting from the defective construction.” Westfield argued that none of the claims were “for ‘property damage’ caused by an ‘occurrence” and therefore none of the claims were covered under the CGL policy.” Further, Westfield argued that “even if the claims were for property damage caused by an occurrence, they were removed from coverage by an exclusion in the policy.”
The case was filed in the US District Court which issued a summary judgment for Westfield. The plaintiff appealed and Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals certified the questions to the Supreme Court of Ohio.
The court noted that “all of the claims against which Westfield is being asked to defect and indemnify Custom relate to Custom’s work itself.” And so, the court concluded that they “must decide whether Custom’s alleged defective construction of and workmanship on the steel grain bin constitute property damage caused by an ‘occurrence.’” However, the court noted that under the terms of the insurance contract, an occurrence is defined as “an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful conditions,” and the court noted that the “natural and commonly accepted meaning” of “accident” is something “unexpected, as well as unintended.”
The Ohio Supreme Court also looked at court decisions in other places, and found that in many similar cases, courts have concluded that construction defects are not occurrences.
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Pfeifer argues that “if the defective construction is accidental, it constitutes an ‘occurrence’ under a CGL policy.” Justice Pfeifer characterized the majority’s definition of “accidental” as “broad, covering unexpected, unintentional happenings.”
Read the court’s decision…
Town Files Construction Lawsuit over Dust
August 16, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Washington Township in Ohio has filed a lawsuit against Underground Utilities for their handling of construction fill on a road project. The City of Mansfield had hired the firm to improve road safety. The lawsuit is over the company’s actions in processing soil for fill, which they are doing on three vacant lots that are zoned for residential use. Washington Township Trustee Jack Butler told the Mansfield Journal that “what brought the lawsuit to a head was the fact that the contractor did not control the dust.” Subsequent receiving notices of zoning violations, the company began to move its operation to another site.
Read the full story…
Contractors Admit Involvement in Kickbacks
December 9, 2011 — CDJ Staff
Two New Jersey contractors have pleaded guilty to charges that they made false representations for a government contract in a case related to kickbacks for construction work done in two school districts. New Jersey is recommending that the two men, Martin Starr and Stephen Gallagher, will each pay $50,000 in penalties, serve up to a year in jail, and be unable to accept public contracts for five years.
Last month, another individual in the case, Kenneth Disko, who had been the engineer for the school district, pleaded guilty on a similar charge. In addition to a $50,000 penalty, he will be serving three to five years in prison. A fourth conspirator, Robert Berman, the former business administrator for one of the school districts, has to pay a $13,000 fine and cooperate with the investigation. He is also barred from public employment in New Jersey and has been terminated from his position.
Starr admitted to preparing fictitious quotes which appeared to be from other contractors in order that his firm would seem to be the lowest bidder. Gallagher helped in preparing the fictitious bids and also provided cash kickbacks to Disko.
Read the full story…
Eleventh Circuit Asks Georgia Supreme Court if Construction Defects Are Caused by an "Occurrence"
December 20, 2012 — Tred Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
The Eleventh Circuit certified a question to the Georgia Supreme Court, asking whether property damage can constitute an "occurrence" under a CGL policy where its effects are not felt on "other property." HDI-Gerling Am. Ins. Co. v. Morrison Homes, Inc., 2012 U.S. App. Ct. LEXIS 23813 (11th Cir. Nov. 19, 2012).
The general contractor, Taylor Morrison Services, Inc., was covered by a CGL policy issued by Gerling. The policy excluded "expected or intended injury," contractual liability," and business risk exclusions. Morrison was sued by homeowners in a class action suit. Morrison had allegedly omitted four inches of gravel required beneath the base of the concrete foundations by the Uniform Building Code. Thereafter, the houses sustained water intrusion, cracks in the floors and driveways, and warped and buckling flooring.
Gerling defended, but sued Morrison for a declaratory judgment.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
Colorado statutory “property damage” caused by an “occurrence”
August 4, 2011 — CDCoverage.com
Colorado General Assembly House Bill 10-1394 was signed into law by the Governor on May 21, 2010, codified at Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-20-808 (2010)
13-20-808. Insurance policies issued to construction professionals
(1) (a) The general assembly finds and determines that:
(I) The interpretation of insurance policies issued to construction professionals is of vital importance to the economic and social welfare of the citizens of Colorado and in furthering the purposes of this part 8.
(II) Insurance policies issued to construction professionals have become increasingly complex, often containing multiple, lengthy endorsements and exclusions conflicting with the reasonable expectations of the insured.
(III) The correct interpretation of coverage for damages arising out of construction defects is in the best interest of insurers, construction professionals, and property owners.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of CDCoverage.com
Good Signs for Housing Market in 2013
December 20, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Dan Green, a loan officer at Waterstone Mortgage, is optimistic about the construction market in 2013. He notes that the rise in building permit, housing starts, and housing completions are all good signs. Mortgage rates are still low, making these new homes attractive to buyers.
Read the full story…
Homeowners Sue Over Sinkholes, Use Cash for Other Things
January 6, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Quoting one homeowner as saying that his house “can fall in the ground for all I care, I made my money,” the Tampa Bay Times looks at the issue of sinkhole claims in Florida. Homeowners “have paid off mortgages, put in pools, replaced roofs, or otherwise used money from sinkhole claims to do something besides fix sinkhole damage.
It’s been tough for insurance companies. Citizens Property Insurance took in $32 million in premiums for sinkhole coverage in 2010, but paid out $245 million in sinkhole claims. The Tampa Bay Times notes that some of those claims come from settling problems caused by their repairs, including one settlement of $350,000 for repairs to a house worth $39,000.
One couple, after receiving $217,000 from Citizens, sold the house to a company that bought unrepaired sinkhole homes for $190,000. The home has been sold since and remains unrepaired.
Sometimes the preferred solution by the insurance company isn’t the cheapest either. One couple was informed that Citizens was going to spend $150,000 to have the hole filled with grout. After they settled with the insurance company, they fixed the problem by installing steel piers, at a cost of about $45,000.
Read the full story…
Court Consolidates Cases and Fees in Soil Construction Defect Case
August 16, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The California Court of Appeals has ruled in Burrow v. JTL Development. JTL Development had appealed a judgement in a construction defect case in which JTL Development and Highland Development were found liable for damage due to homes built on unstable and improperly compacted soil. The two companies were sued by the two sets of homeowners, the Burrows and the Balls, and their cases were consolidated at trial. Each family was awarded $700,000 in damages. This judgement had also been appealed and affirmed by the appeals court. In the current case, an additional $235,800 in cost-of-proof sanctions had been awarded to the two families.
Before the trial, Dale Burrows, Charles Ball, and Laurie Ball “asked JTL and Highland to admit that they ‘approved grading plans’ for the Burrows’ and Balls’ properties; ‘had knowledge that the [properties] contained improperly compacted fill’; ‘had knowledge that the [properties were’ not properly prepared for structures’; and ‘did not provide Plaintiffs with a complete soils report’ prepared by Gorian & Associates.” These were requests 14, 19, 20, and 22. JTL and Highland denied all of these.
At trial, the Burrows and Balls proved that all these were true. JTL and Highland’s geotechnical subcontractor, Gorian & Associates, had “recommended that Highland remove and re-compact the entire tract to a depth of 25 feet.” JTL and Highland did not follow this recommendation, “in order to avoid expense.”
After judgment, the Burrows and Balls moved for $582,587.45 for “attorneys’ fees and costs incurred proving the truth of requests for admission.” JTL and Highland claimed that only Dale Burrows could recover fees, but that also the fees were not recoverable. Joe Lynch of Highland “declared that he always believed the soils under the Burrows and Balls homes were properly compacted.” The Burrows and Balls responded with six identical sets of requests for admissions and the court awarded each of them twenty-five percent of $235,800, with JTL and Highland each responsible for fifty percent.
The appeals court noted that JTL and Highland filed a timely appeal and goes on to notes the four circumstances under which a responding party does not have to pay costs and fees. The court concluded that none of these were met. Instead of waiving the request, JTL and Highland denied the request, stating “without in any manner waiving the foregoing objection, responding party denies the request for admission.”
Nor was the admission “of no substantial importance,” instead the court said that the matters were of “substantial importance,” and the “trial would have been shortened by their admission. Highland and JTL “relied on Gorian when it denied the request,” but the trial court “discredited Lynch’s assertions,” finding that “Highland knew the soil was improperly compacted.”
As all plaintiffs had identical discovery requests, the court rejected the claim that only Dale Burrows was entitled to an award.
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Insurance Company Prevails in “Chinese Drywall” Case
June 17, 2011 — CDJ Staff
The Louisiana Court of Appeals rejected an appeal to reverse a summary judgment granted to Louisiana Citizens Property Insurance Company. Terrence and Rhonda Ross contracted for a remodel of their home in which Chinese-made drywall was used. When the drywall emitted harmful gasses, the Rosses filed a claim under their insurance policy. This claim was rejected under four exclusions: for faulty materials, latent defect, loss by corrosion, and loss by pollution. After the claim was denied, the Rosses sued Louisiana Citizens.
In April 2010, the lower court granted a summary judgment, followed by a May, 2010 order dismissing the Rosses’ claims against Louisiana Citizens. The Rosses appealed this decision. In the court’s review, they agreed with Louisiana Citizens and the lower court on all counts. Although the Rosses maintained that the drywall was not defective (as it still functioned as drywall), the court ruled that its emission of sulfuric gases was a defect. Further, as it was in place for two years before this became evident, it was also a latent defect. Damage to the Rosses’ home consisted of corrosion damage caused by the pollutants in the drywall.
The Rosses made an additional claim that since their policy covered smoke damage, this should be covered, as the harm was done by sulfuric gases. The court noted that the contract specifies “fumes or vapors from a boiler, furnace, or related equipment,” none of which apply in this case.
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Read Her Lips: “No New Buildings”
November 18, 2011 — CDJ Staff
Martha Johnson, the head of the General Services Administration, has said that her agency will not be building any new buildings in the near future. Among other duties, the GSA is responsible for the building, renovating, and leasing of federal office space. The White House had proposed $840 million in new construction, the Senate only $56 million. The House did not appropriate any money for the agency to use for new construction.
In addition to cutbacks on new buildings, Congress is suggesting only $280 million in repairs of existing government buildings. In order to cut back, the GSA has dropped plans to renovate their own offices in favor of renovations at the Department of Homeland Security and the Food and Drug Administration.
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