Insurer Rejects Claim on Dolphin Towers
July 22, 2011 — CDJ Staff
A year after residents were forced to leave Dolphin Towers in Sarasota, Florida because of concrete problems, some residents are defaulting on their obligations, abandoning their units. In June, the building’s insurer, Great American, rejected a claim, arguing that the building’s problems were due to latent defects, not covered under the policy. Repair estimates, previously put at $8.2 million, have now risen to $11.5 million. If homeowners cover this cost, it would require an assessment of about $100,000 for each unit.
About thirty owners are in arrears on dues and fees. Charlotte Ryan, the president of the Dolphin Tower board, wrote to owners, that “the board will have no choice but to lien your property and pursue foreclosure if you do nothing to bring your delinquencies up to date.” However, as homeowners default, the funding for repairs is imperiled. The board has already spent more than $500,000 on shoring up the building and hiring consultants. Their lawyers, on the other hand, are working on a contingency basis.
Read the full story…
Contractor’s Coverage For Additional Insured Established by Unilateral Contract
November 18, 2011 — Tred Eyerley, Insurance Law Hawaii
The contractor was covered as an additional insured under the subcontractor’s policy even though the parties had never actually signed an agreement to add the contractor to the policy. Evanston Ins. Co. v. Westchester Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 20081 (9th Cir. Oct. 3, 2011).
The policies held by Bellevue Master, the general contractor, required it to be an additional insured under any subcontractor’s liability policy. Northwest Tower Crane Services was a subcontractor. Bellevue Master LLC, faxed a message that Northwest could continue to be a subcontractor on the project if it complied with Bellevue Master’s insurance requirements. Northwest contacted its insurance broker and requested an insurance certificate be issued to Bellevue Master so that it would be an additional insured under Northwest’s policy.
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
Renovation Contractors: Be Careful How You Disclose Your Projects
December 9, 2011 — Derek J. Lindenschmidt, Colorado Construction Litigation
In Palu and Beyer v. Toney, 2011 WL 2560249 (Bankr. D. Colo.), the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado determined that a Colorado District Court order granting summary judgment in favor of plaintiff home buyers was binding on the Bankruptcy Court in the defendant contractor’s bankruptcy proceeding based on issue preclusion.
Pertinent to this column is the subject matter of the summary judgment motion: Colorado’s Seller’s Property Disclosure (Form LC-18-5-04). In the underlying state court action, the plaintiff home buyers filed a motion for summary judgment contending that the defendant contractor represented to them, through the Seller’s Property Disclosure, that there were no present or past conditions involving moisture or water problems, roof problems or leaks, skylight problems, or gutter downspout problems.
In granting plaintiffs’ motion, the state court determined that the defendant contractor made these representations on her Seller’s Property Disclosure despite witnessing water leaking from the skylight onto the floor and being aware of repairs to the roof, skylight, and interior drywall prior to the sale of the property.
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Reprinted courtesy of Derek J. Lindenschmidt of Higgins, Hopkins, McClain & Roswell, LLP. Mr. Lindenschmidt can be contacted at lindenschmidt@hhmrlaw.com
Insurer Has Duty to Disclose Insured's Interest In Obtaining Written Explanation of Arbitration Award
October 23, 2012 — Tred Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
The issue faced by the Minnesota Supreme Court was whether the insurer had a duty to disclose the insured's interest in obtaining a written explanation of an arbitration award that identified the claims of recovery and the portions of the award attributable to each. Remodeling Dimensions, Inc. v. Integrity Mut. Ins. Co., 2012 LEXIS Minn. 404 (Minn. Sup. Ct., Aug. 22, 2012).
Remodeling Dimensions, Inc. ("RDI") built an addition for the homeowners and installed windows in the original part of the house. After construction began, the homeowners also asked RDI to fix the master bedroom window in the original part of the house.
After completion of the project, the house sustained storm damage.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
Washington Court of Appeals Upholds Standard of Repose in Fruit Warehouse Case
August 4, 2011 — CDJ Staff
On July 28, the Washington Court of Appeals ruled in Clasen Fruit & Cold Storage v. Frederick & Michael Construction Co., Inc. that more than six years had passed since a contractor had concluded work and so granted a summary dismissal of the suit.
Frederick & Michael Construction Co., Inc. (F&M) was contracted to construct several buildings for Clasen Fruit and Cold Storage. These were completed in March, 1999. The buildings suffered wind damage to the roofs in 2001, 2003, 2005, and 2006. In the first two incidents, F&M repaired the roofs with Clasen paying for repairs.
In 2005, Clasen hired Continuous Gutter to make repairs. The final incident was the collapse of the roof of one building. This was attributed to “excessive moisture in the roof’s vapor barriers.” At this point, Clasen demanded that F&M pay for repair and replacement costs. In 2008, Clasen sued F&M for damages for breach of contract and negligent design and construction of the roof.
The decision then covered the meanings, in Washington law, of “termination of services” and “substantial completion.” The panel concluded that construction was “substantially completed in 1997” and “relevant services” by 2001. “But Clasen did not sue until 2008, some seven years after termination of any roof related services.”
Read the court’s decision…
Insurance for Defective Construction Now in Third Edition
November 7, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Available both in print and online, the International Risk Management Institute, Inc has brought out a third edition of Insurance for Defective Construction. The work is written by Patrick J. Wielinski of Cokinos, Bosien & Young, a Dallas-Fort Worth law firm. Mr. Wielinski practice focuses on insurance coverage. Insurance for Defective Construction is described as “a must read for anyone who buys, sell, or underwrites construction insurance or who becomes involved in construction claims.”
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Hawaii Building Codes to Stay in State Control
March 1, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The Hawaii State Senate voted down Senate Bill 2692. Had it been passed, the State Building Code Council would have been abolished and building codes would have become the responsibility of county governments. The bill was opposed by the Insurance Institute for Business and Home Safety. Their director of code development, Wanda Edwards said that the bill “would have undermined key components that are essential to an effective state building code regime.”
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Construction Defects Lead to Demolition
May 26, 2011 — CDJ Staff
Ten years after it was built, demolition of Seattle’s McGuire Building has begun, as Jeanne Lang Jones reports in the Puget Sound Business Journal. Construction defects had rendered the 25-story apartment building uninhabitable. The major problem was corroded steel cabling. According to the report, “the building’s owners reached an undisclosed settlement last year with St. Louis-based contractor McCarthy Building Companies.”
Read the full story…
United States District Court Confirms That Insurers Can Be Held Liable Under The CCPA.
June 19, 2012 — Chad Johnson
In D.R. Horton, Inc.-Denver v. The Travelers Indem. Co. of Am., 10-CV-02826-WJM-KMT, 2012 WL 527204 (D. Colo. Feb. 16, 2012), the court was asked to rule on Travelers’[1] motion to dismiss D.R. Horton, Inc. ?Äì Denver’s (“DRH”) claim that Travelers violated the Colorado Consumer Protection Act (“CCPA”).
In the underlying construction defect case (“CD case”), DRH, as the developer and general contractor of a construction project, tendered the defense of the CD case to certain subcontractors and to Travelers as an insurer to those subcontractors. Travelers accepted the duty to defend DRH. DRH hired counsel to defend it, and the attorney fees and costs of suit were billed to Travelers. However, for a period of over five years, Travelers failed to actually pay any portion of the defense of DRH. Finally, on October 31, 2008, Travelers offered checks for payment of only 4% of the costs and fees incurred. DRH then returned the checks to Travelers and provided Travelers with authority to support its position that the amounts in Travelers’ checks were inadequate. Thereafter, Travelers dug its heels in, and resubmitted the same checks.
DRH was then forced to file a coverage action against Travelers for declaratory judgment, breach of contract, bad faith breach of insurance contract, and deceptive trade practices under the CCPA. In its motion to dismiss DRH’s CCPA claim, Travelers’ argued that DRH failed to plead specific facts that Travelers engaged in a deceptive trade practice under C.R.S. § 6-1-105, and DRH failed to plead sufficient facts showing that Travelers’ actions significantly affect the public ?Äì a necessary element of a CCPA claim.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of Chad Johnson, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC. Mr. Johnson can be contacted at johnson@hhmrlaw.com
Contractor’s Home Not Covered for Construction Defects
September 13, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The US District Court in Seattle has rejected most of the claims made by a Des Moines man over insurance coverage for water damage to his home. Judge John C. Coughenour granted summary judgment to Liberty Northwest in Ayar v. Liberty Northwest Insurance Corporation.
Sayad Ayar was the general contractor for the construction of his house. As a homeowner held a $1.5 million insurance policy from Liberty Northwest (LNW) that excluded “faulty, inadequate, or defective construction.”
In 2008, less than three years after his house was constructed, Mr. Ayar filed a claim after water leaked through his living room ceiling. LNW hired an engineering firm to investigate the damage. The engineering firm, CASE Forensics, concluded that the water intrusion was due to “the failure to install an adequate and continuous waterproof membrane, flashing, and drainage system within the balcony at the time of construction.” Ayar’s expert attributed the leakage to “damage done to the weather deck waterproofing during a storm event with high winds,” which would be covered under the policy. CASE Forensics reviewed these conclusions and rejected them. LNW denied coverage.
Further problems lead to further investigations, and in each case, LNW attributed the problems to construction defects. During this process, LNW “authorized Ayar to cut into the ceiling’s drywall in order to assist in determining the source of the water intrusion.” Mr. Ayar moved his family to a rental home. He requested that LNW cover the rental and other other costs.
LNW’s adjuster concluded that no coverage was available, but recommended paying Mr. Ayar $19,648.68 to reinstall drywall and repair the hole in the ceiling. The insurance company paid $2,000 to cover the cost of cutting into the ceiling. The also claimed the amount of drywall he removed was “excessive” and would not cover his relocation as “his home had been livable and because the loss was not covered.”
Ayar made four claims to the court in support of the argument that LNW misrepresented “pertinent facts or insurance policy provisions.” The court rejected three of these, noting that as all water damage was excluded, LNW’s citation of other sources of water intrusion was not a misrepresentation. “LNW did not rely on this provision as the reason for denying coverage.” Nor was LNW’s reference to “fungi, wet or dry rot” a misrepresentation. As for their reference to construction defects, it “was clearly appropriate given that the construction defect exclusion was the principal basis or denying the claim.” However, the court found that regarding the removal of drywall, “a triable issue of the facts exists.”
Ayar also claimed that LNW did not conduct a reasonable investigation, but the court found no evidence to support this conclusion. “This is not a case where the insurer failed to investigate or did so only half-heartedly.” Although the thoroughness of the investigation could not questioned, the court concluded that its timing could. Ayar claimed that LNW engaged in unreasonable delays. LNW counters that the delays were due to “Ayar’s own obstructive behavior and failure to cooperate with LNW’s investigation.”
The court dismissed all of Ayar’s claims, with the exception of whether LNW should have informed him that they would not pay for drywall repair unless there was damage, and whether LNW’s investigation failed to conclude its investigation within a thirty-day time line.
Read the court’s decision…
Preparing for Trial on a Cause of Action for Violation of Civil Code section 895, et seq.
May 10, 2012 — Samir R. Patel, Esq., Lorber, Greenfield, & Polito, LLP
In 2002, the California Legislature enacted the Right to Repair Act (hereinafter “SB-800”), as codified in Title VII of the Civil Code. As set forth in Civil Code section 895, et seq., SB-800 established a set of standards for residential construction, and provides a statutory protocol to address alleged violations of those standards. SB-800 applies to all new single family homes sold after January 1, 2003, and it created its own cause of action governed completely by its own terms, in that in order to state a cause of action under SB-800, a plaintiff may only allege a violation of the Act. (Civ. Code, § 938.) Under Civil Code sections 896, 897, 943, and 944, the Legislature made it clear that it intended to create a single cause of action for construction defects in homes that fall under the purview of SB-800. By passing SB-800, the Legislature eliminated multiple and often redundant or conflicting causes of action, burdens of proof, statutes of limitations, and types of damages that were common in construction defect actions prior to the enactment of the same.
Civil Code section 895, et seq. has significantly changed the landscape of construction defect lawsuits. Yet, for years, the only attention given to the statutes focused solely on the codified pre-litigation process that requires plaintiffs and builders to meet and confer regarding defects and attempt a process to repair the alleged defects before litigation is pursued. A major impediment to the implementation of the pre-litigation procedures has often been that the statutes specifically state that the information obtained during the pre-litigation process is admissible at trial. Hence, through use of the pre-litigation process, plaintiffs’ counsel can engage in a builder funded fishing expedition and later use the information obtained to advance their litigation goals. As such, many builders have chosen to opt out of codified pre-litigation process altogether, an option which the builder can elect within their Purchase and Sale Agreements.
Recently, counsel for builders throughout California have turned their attention to the “exclusive remedy” aspect of SB-800 by seeking, often successfully, to limit plaintiffs to a single cause of action for violation of SB-800. Civil Code section 943 makes clear that a cause of action for violation of SB-800 performance standards is a plaintiff’s sole remedy for a residential construction defect action. Civil Code section 943 states:
Except as provided in this title, no other cause of action for a claim covered by this title or for damages recoverable under 944 is allowed. (Civ. Code, § 943.) Â
The question remains: what is the benefit of requiring plaintiffs to trim down their complaint and eliminate their tried and true common law causes of action, and requiring them to pursue only a single cause of action for violation of SB800?
The construction standards enumerated within SB-800 include fifty-plus functionality standards. On their face, any benefit to pursuing a construction defect action under a single cause of action for violation of SB-800 initially appears trivial at best, in light of the fact that a jury may be very confused with the complexity of the functionality standards set forth within the Civil Code. Nevertheless, Title VII of the Civil Code actually contains numerous provisions that builders can utilize to their benefit throughout the process of construction defect litigation, including during preparation for trial.
First and foremost, counsel for builders can assert numerous affirmative defenses that will be beneficial if the matter proceeds to trial. These affirmative defenses, as codified in Civil Code section 945.5, include mitigation, in whole or in part, for damages caused by: an unforeseen act of nature; a homeowner’s failure to allow reasonable and timely access for inspections and repair under the pre-litigation procedures; the homeowner’s failure to follow the builder’s recommendations and commonly accepted homeowner maintenance obligations; ordinary wear and tear; misuse; abuse; or neglect. Builders should include these affirmative defenses within their responsive pleadings and as trial approaches, prepare appropriate motions in limine and request special jury instructions regarding the same. As frustrated builders and their attorneys are well aware, many construction defect suits result from a homeowner’s failure to properly maintain their property in a manner that is consistent with normal maintenance procedures and guidelines. Furthermore, within the ten year statute of limitations for most defects, ordinary wear and tear is often attributable to numerous deficiencies alleged by plaintiffs. The affirmative defense for a homeowner’s failure to allow inspections and repairs is also vital, as plaintiffs’ counsel may encourage a homeowner to forego the repair and seek monetary damages, allowing plaintiffs’ counsel to ultimately obtain their share of attorney’s fees. Therefore, the SB-800 statutes provide the builder with recourse and distinctive mitigation defenses that were previously and confusingly mixed into tort and contract related defenses. These affirmative defenses can also be utilized by counsel during the cross-examination of plaintiff homeowners and expert witnesses. Defense counsel should fully grasp these defenses and utilize them as defense themes throughout litigation.
As a plaintiff is limited to a single cause of action for violation of SB-800, if defense counsel has failed to properly eliminate excessive tort and contract causes of action prior to trial, a motion for summary adjudication, or at the very least, a motion for judgment on the pleadings should be brought to limit the introduction of evidence outside of a single cause of action for violation of SB-800. Practical judges are always looking for ways to streamline and expedite trials, and they are currently ruling that SB-800 is the exclusive remedy available to plaintiffs. In fact, plaintiffs’ firms in SB-800 matters are now voluntarily limiting their complaints to this one cause of action.
Special jury instructions can also be crafted to limit a jury’s computation of damages pursuant to Civil Codesection 944, which provides the method for computing damages within a construction defect action, as follows:
If a claim for damages is made under this title, the homeowner is only entitled to damages for the reasonable value of repairing any violation of the standards set forth in this title, the reasonable cost of repairing any damages caused by the repair efforts, the reasonable cost of repairing and rectifying any damages resulting from the failure of the home to meet the standards, the reasonable cost of removing and replacing any improper repair by the builder, reasonable relocation and storage expenses, lost business income if the home was used as a principal place of a business licensed to be operated from the home, reasonable investigative costs for each established violation, and all other costs or fees recoverable by contract or statute. (Civ. Code, § 944.) [Emphasis added.]
Civil Code section 944 specifically prohibits recovery for damages outside the scope of its explicit language as it states “the homeowner is only entitled to ... damages for the reasonable value of repairing any violation of the standards set forth in this title....” [Emphasis added.] The statute ultimately provides a “reasonableness” standard for the computation of damages that did not exist when computing damages on traditional common law tort and contract claims. Therefore, defense counsel should prepare special jury instructions to limit evidence of damages introduced at trial to the reasonable value of repairing any violation of the standards, and to exclude any evidence of damages beyond the reasonableness standard. Defense counsel should seize the opportunity to utilize the theme of “reasonableness” when attacking plaintiffs’ allegations and plaintiffs’ proposed repair methodology throughout the discovery process and at trial.
Defense counsel may also prepare a motion in limine or special jury instruction regarding the limitation of evidence regarding defects that did not cause resultant damage. Civil Code section 897 states:
Intent of Standards
The standards set forth in this chapter are intended to address every function or component of a structure. To the extent that a function or component of a structure is not addressed by these standards, it shall be actionable if it causes damage. (Civ. Code, § 897.) [Emphasis added.]
Defense counsel can argue that the introduction of any evidence supporting a claim for construction-related deficiencies that are not enumerated within Civil Code section 896, or for deficiencies where no damage has occurred is prohibited and must be excluded at trial. This requirement of resultant damages is familiar as the general rule was previously established in Aas v. Superior Court (2000) 24 Cal.4th 627, in which the California Supreme Court held that there is no tort recovery for construction defects that have not actually caused property damage. The legislature effectively codified this rule within Civil Code section 897.
A motion in limine can also be crafted to limit expert testimony to the standards enumerated in Civil Code section 896, and to deficiencies that caused damage pursuant to Civil Code 897. The motion in limine can be based upon Civil Code section 943 and the fact that claims for defects in homes which were sold after January 1, 2003 may only be pursued under a single cause of action for violation of SB-800. As such, expert testimony should be controlled by the standards set forth in Civil Code section 896. Furthermore, throughout a construction defect matter, defense counsel should ensure that their experts are well versed with the standards and that they can provide testimony that utilizes the same. Defense counsel’s knowledge of the standards will also be helpful during the cross-examination of plaintiffs’ expert witnesses.
If, despite the efforts of defense counsel, the complaint still has numerous causes of action, or if only some homes fall under the purview of SB-800 while others do not, defense counsel can utilize a motion to bifurcate trial. The motion’s basis is that a cause of action for violation of SB-800 will require the introduction of evidence regarding the violations of the fifty-plus standards, and the tort and contract-based claims would also require the introduction of a wide range of evidence to prove each cause of action. For example, in order to prove the tort causes of action, plaintiffs must prove elements such as: duty, breach, proximate and actual causation, and that the builder placed the homes into the stream of commerce. (See Richards v. Stanley (1954) 43 Cal.2d 60, 63; Kriegler v. Eichler Homes, Inc. (1969) 269 Cal.App.2d 224, 227.) On the contract causes of action, plaintiffs must prove the existence of a valid written contract for the sale of the home, including proof regarding the existence of basic contractual elements such as offer, acceptance, and consideration. (Civ. Code, § 1624 subd. (a); Roth v. Malson (1997) 67 Cal.App.4th 552, 557.) Defense counsel can argue that exposing the jury to elements that may or may not be applicable to all of the homes in the action will complicate and confuse the jury. Thus, concurrently exposing the jury to the SB-800 claims and the non-SB-800 claims will necessitate undue consumption of time, and create the substantial danger of undue prejudice of confusing the issues or misleading the jury.
One of the most important and relevant features of the SB-800 statutes is that they include shortened statutes of limitation as to certain enumerated defects. The codified statutes of limitations apply from the date of “close of escrow,” and are much more definitive than statutes of limitations regarding tort and contract claims. Therefore, they can be utilized within a motion for summary adjudication in cases where only one or a few defects are alleged. For example, under Civil Code section 896, et seq., there is a five year limitation on paint (Civ. Code, § 896, subd. (g)(1)); a four year limitation on plumbing fixtures (Civ. Code, § 896, subd. (e)); a three year limitation on landscaping (Civ. Code § 896, subd. (g)(12)); and a one year limitation on irrigation systems and drainage (Civ. Code, § 896, subd. (g)(7)). The non-SB-800 claims are subject to a four year statute of limitation for patent defects and a ten year statute of limitation for latent defects. (See Code of Civ. Proc., §§ 337.1, 337.15.) The contrast between the statute of limitations for the SB-800 claims and non-SB-800 claims can complicate a matter at trial, further establishing the necessity to limit plaintiffs to a single cause of action for violation of SB-800. Hence, defense counsel should also utilize a motion to bifurcate the statute of limitations issues from the issue of liability if a question of fact exists. If successful on the motion to bifurcate, plaintiff’s counsel will be barred from the introducing evidence at trial regarding a defect where the statute of limitations has run.
Defense counsel should also seek to simplify the construction standards for the jury. Ultimately, by drafting jury instructions and a special verdict form that is easy to navigate, counsel can promote an easy interpretation of the standards enumerated within the Civil Code. The best route for drafting a special verdict form is to draft it as a check-list, similar to a traditional real estate walk-through check-list. By incorporating the shortened statutes of limitations into the special verdict form, defense counsel can effectively frame the case for the jury. The special verdict form should also allow the jury to easily eliminate any claim for damages that is mitigated, in whole or in part, through the codified affirmative defenses. Defense counsel should also consider drafting a trial brief that effectively and simplistically provides the trial court judge with an understanding of the specific defects before the court, and simultaneously notes which Civil Code standards are implicated and the scope of the same. If the trial judge is not well versed in construction defect litigation, defense counsel should be all the more careful in breaking down the parameters and limitations codified within SB-800 for the court.
The strategies outlined within this article are only a few tactics that can be utilized to defend a construction defect suit. Depending on the defect allegations within any particular case, defense counsel should become intimately familiar with Title VII of the Civil Code and use all aspects of the same to their advantage. If not, plaintiffs’ counsel will have the advantage during “court-house step” settlement discussions and at trial.
Printed courtesy of Samir R. Patel, Esq. of Lorber, Greenfield, & Polito, LLP. Mr. Patel can be contacted at spatel@lorberlaw.com.
Courts Are Conflicted As To Whether "Good Faith" Settlement Determinations Can Be Reviewed Via Writ Petition Or Appeal
July 10, 2012 — Stephen A. Sunseri and Aarti Kewalramani, Gatzke Dillon & Ballance LLP
The Court of Appeal, Second District, Division Three, ruled in Oak Springs Villas Homeowners Association v. Advanced Truss Systems, Inc., et al., (June 14, 2012, B234568) __ Cal.App.4th __ [2012 WL 2149923], that a non-settling defendant cannot appeal a trial court's good faith settlement determination. Instead, a non-settling defendant may only file a petition for writ of mandate pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 877.6 to challenge a good faith determination. This decision comes on the heels of a 2011 ruling in Cahill v. San Diego Gas & Electric Co. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 939, which found that a writ petition is not the sole means of challenging a trial court's good faith settlement determination.
In Oak Springs Villas, supra, the condominium homeowners' association sued a developer, general contractor, and various subcontractors for alleged construction deficiencies and resultant property damage. The association eventually settled with the developer, but not with a truss manufacturer. The trial court approved the developer's motion for good faith settlement determination, and the truss manufacturer immediately appealed, instead of filing a writ petition. On appeal, the developer argued the good faith determination was not an appealable order. The truss manufacturer argued Cahill applied, as well as an older case, Justus v. Atchison (1977) 19 Cal.3d 564, which allowed for appeals when no remaining issues exist as to the appealing party.
The Court of Appeal ruled in the developer's favor and declined to follow Cahill, stating the truss manufacturer should have filed a writ petition, as expressly required under Section 877.6, subdivision (e). The Court also believed Justus was inapplicable because a non-settling party should not be allowed to have two review opportunities ?Äì one after an adverse good faith ruling, and then another after the ultimate conclusion of the case.
However, the greater effect is that Cahill and Oak Springs Villas simultaneously stand in conflict and appear to be valid law. One case allows for an appeal of a good faith settlement determination, while the other requires strict adherence to the statute. The Supreme Court is likely to review the issue. In the meantime, parties challenging good faith rulings are advised to consult the statutory requirements under Section 877.6, subdivision (e).
Printed courtesy of Stephen A. Sunseri and Aarti Kewalramani, Gatzke Dillon & Ballance LLP. Mr. Sunseri can be contacted at ssunseri@gdandb.com and Ms. Kewalramani can be contacted at akewalramani@gdandb.com.
Ohio Casualty’s and Beazer’s Motions were Granted in Part, and Denied in Part
May 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The case Trinity Homes LLC and Beazer Homes Investments LLC has reached the summary judgment stage. The remaining plaintiffs are Trinity Homes LLC (Trinity) and Beazer Homes Investments LLC (Beazer), and the only defendant remaining is Ohio Casualty Insurance Company (Ohio Casualty). “Ohio Casualty has filed a motion for summary judgment (Dkt. #409) on all claims against it, and Trinity and Beazer have filed a cross-motion seeking partial summary judgment (Dkt. #431) in their favor.” Ohio Casualty’s Motion for Summary Judgment was granted in part and denied in part, and Beazer’s motion was granted in part and denied in part.
The court’s ruling presented a bit of background on the companies involved in the litigation: “Trinity is an Indiana limited liability company with its principal place of business in Indiana and is one of several construction related companies owned by Beazer, which is a limited liability company incorporated under the laws of Delaware having its principal place of business in Atlanta, Georgia. Beazer’s predecessor, Beazer Homes Investment Corporation, acquired the stock of Crossman Communities, Inc. in 2002. Crossman and its subsidiary owned all interests in Trinity. Beazer and Trinity are in the business of residential real estate development and construction.”
Furthermore, “Ohio Casualty’s home office is in Ohio, where it is incorporated. It sells insurance policies to commercial entities such as Plaintiffs. It purchased a book of business from Great American Insurance Company, a subsidiary of which had sold commercial general liability policies (‘CGL’) and umbrella liability policies to Trinity, covering the period of time between May 1, 1994 through May 1, 1999. For ease of reference, we will refer to these policies as the Ohio Casualty policies. Trinity sold and acted as a general contractor for the construction of new homes in Central Indiana throughout the period of time in which the Ohio Casualty policies were in place.”
The court disagreed with almost every argument put forth by Ohio Casualty. However, they did concede “that Ohio Casualty is obligated to indemnify Trinity only for damages arising during its policy periods for pro rata liability as opposed to several and indivisible, by reason of its having limited its indemnity obligation to ‘those sums’ that Trinity becomes liable to pay for property damage which ‘occurs during the policy period.’”
Finally, the court ruled that “Ohio Casualty Company’s Motion For Summary Judgment (Dkt. #409) is GRANTED IN PART, that is, to the extent that Beazer is not an insured under the Ohio Casualty insurance policies, but the motion is DENIED in all other respects.”
The court further ruled that “Trinity and Beazer’s Motion For Partial Summary Judgment (Dkt. #431) is GRANTED IN PART, that is: (1) Trinity is an insured under the Ohio Casualty CGL and umbrella policies in effect for the time period from May 1, 1994 to May 1, 1999; (2) the claims at issue in the Underlying Lawsuits are "property damage" claims resulting from an "occurrence" and are therefore within the policy coverage provided under the Ohio Casualty Policy; and (3) none of the exclusions in the Ohio Casualty Policy bars coverage. Trinity and Beazer’s Motion is DENIED in all other respects. Moreover, material questions of fact remain with respect to whether payments made to the 54 homeowners, who were part of the putative class in the underlying Colon class action but were not included in the certified settlement class, were voluntary payments and as such do not qualify for indemnification. Material questions of fact also preclude a summary ruling on the issue of whether Ohio Casualty is estopped from raising their voluntary nature as a defense to indemnity.”
Read the court’s decision…
No Resulting Loss From Deck Collapsing Due to Rot
July 10, 2012 — Tred Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawwaii
The Washington Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision that the ensuing loss provision provided coverage for a deck that collapsed due to rot and decay. Sprague v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 2012 Wash. LEXIS 375 (Wash. May 17, 2012). Our prior post on the Court of Appeals’ decision is here.
The Sprague’s home had a deck supported by six "fin walls." The fin walls were encased in a foam and stucco coating. Twenty years after they purchased the home, it was discovered that the fin walls were in an advanced state of decay. Engineers discovered that construction defects caused the supports to rot. The deck was in danger of imminent collapse.
Safeco denied coverage. The all-risk policy did not exclude collapse, but did exclude coverage for losses causes by mold, wet or dry rot.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
Colorado Senate Bill 12-181: 2012’s Version of a Prompt Pay Bill
May 10, 2012 — W. Berkeley Mann, Jr., Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC
A potentially important legislative bill has been introduced in waning days of the 2012 legislative session, which would change many of the commercial practices that prevail in the construction industry. Senate Bill 12-181 applies to all building and construction contracts and would prohibit any contract provision that requires a contractor, subcontractor, or supplier to waive their lien in advance of payment. It also would ban any “choice of law” provisions that make a Colorado-based construction contract subject to enforcement only in another state, or under the laws of another state.
The bill also seeks to change many existing commercial practices between contractors, subcontractors, and suppliers. It is presently unclear whether the bill allows parties to contract around these payment procedure provisions, or whether these requirements are simply “gap filling” provisions that pertain if there are no written contract terms specified on these issues. The proposed statute would mandate payment to subcontractors and material suppliers due within seven days in the absence of a dispute about the work or materials being billed. After this seven day period, the bill would require the payment of interest at the rate of 1.5% monthly (18% annually). In any later suit for payment, the creditor would also be able to collect reasonable attorneys’ fees. Additionally, non-payment to a subcontractor or supplier who is later found to be entitled to prompt payment would excuse the subcontractor or supplier, and its surety bond provider, from any further performance under the contract.
It is presently unclear whether the bill allows parties to contract around these payment procedure provisions. However, it is clear that the bill provides some leeway for change orders, as long as there is (1) negotiation in good faith between the parties concerning the changed scope of work, and (2) a 50% payment of a subcontractor’s costs by the changing party within 30 days of the change order work being done. Additionally, the bill provides for retainage, but in an amount of no more than 5%.
The bill is presently set for hearing before the Colorado Senate Committee on Business, Labor, and Technology Committee on May 2, 2012 at 1:30 p.m.
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Reprinted courtesy of W. Berkeley Mann, Jr. of Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC. Mr. Mann can be contacted at mann@hhmrlaw.com.
School District Marks End of Construction Project by Hiring Lawyers
June 19, 2012 — CDJ Staff
A school district in northeastern Pennsylvania has retained legal services as they approach the end of a construction project. The Mid Valley School Board cited concerns about the project’s budget, but Randy Parry, Superintendent of Mid Valley schools referenced “possible litigation at the end of the project.” Mr. Parry told the Scranton Times Tribune that construction delays could be a reason for litigation.
In addition to approving an additional $20,000 for legal representation, the board also approved $21,579 for additional project costs.
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Ohio Court Finds No Coverage for Construction Defect Claims
March 1, 2012 — Tred Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
Charles and Valerie Myers hired Perry Miller to build their home. Myers v. United Ohio Ins. Co., 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 287 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 26, 2012). After completion of the home, Miller was again hired to construct an addition which included a full basement, staircases, bathroom, bedroom, hallway and garage.
After the addition was completed, one of the basement walls began to crack and bow. Miller began to make repairs, but eventually stopped working on the project. Other contractors were hired to make repairs, but further problems developed. A second basement wall began to bow and crack, allowing water into the basement. The wall eventually had to be replaced. Subsequently, the roof over the addition began to leak in five or six places before the drywall could be painted. The leaks caused water stains on the drywall and cause it to separate and tear. It was discovered the roof needed to be replaced.
The Myers sued Miller and his insurer, United Ohio Insurance Company. The trial court ruled that the policy did not provide coverage for faulty workmanship, but did provide coverage for consequential damages caused by repeated exposure to the elements. United Ohio conceded liability in the amount of $2,000 to repair water damage to the drywall. United Ohio was also found liable for $51,576, which included $31,000 to repair the roof and ceiling and $18,576 to replace the basement wall.
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
AFL-CIO Joins in $10 Billion Infrastructure Plan
June 30, 2011 — CDJ Staff
The AFL-CIO has announced plans to generate up to $10 billion in funding for infrastructure development, training construction workers, and making buildings more energy efficient, pledging $20 million to retrofit buildings. Bloomberg News reports that union officials made the announcement in Chicago at the Clinton Global Initiative, releasing a statement from Richard Trumka, president of the union, “we, at the AFL-CIO, believe that together, with our partners in business and government, we can profitably invest significant resources to make America more competitive and energy efficient.” A foot injury prevented Mr. Trumka from attending the event.
The statement also quoted Mark Ayers, president of the Building and Construction Trades Department of the AFL-CIO, “the time is now to become intensely focused on the creation of jobs.”
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