Contractor Liable for Soils Settlement in Construction Defect Suit
February 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The California Court of Appeals ruled on January 9 in Burrow v. JTL Dev. Corp., a construction defect case in which houses suffered damage due to improperly compacted soil, upholding the decision of the lower court.
Turf Construction entered into a deal with JTL to develop a parcel they acquired. A third firm, Griffin Homes, withdrew from the agreement “when a geotechnical and soils engineering firm reported significant problems with soil stability on 14 of the lots.” Turf Construction then took over compacting and grading the lots. Turf “had never compacted or graded a residential tract before.” Robert Taylor, the owner of Turf, “testified he knew there was a significant problem with unstable soils.”
After homes were built, the plaintiffs bought homes on the site. Shortly thereafter, the homes suffered damage from soil settlement “and the damage progressively worsened.” They separately filed complaints which the court consolidated.
During trial, the plaintiff’s expert said that there had been an inch and a half in both homes and three to five inches in the backyard and pool areas. “He also testified that there would be four to eight inches of future settlement in the next fifteen to twenty years.” The expert for Turf and JTL “testified that soil consolidation was complete and there would be no further settlement.”
Turf and JTL objected to projections made by the plaintiffs’ soil expert, William LaChappelle. Further, they called into question whether it was permissible for him to rely on work by a non-testifying expert, Mark Russell. The court upheld this noting that LaChappelle “said that they arrived at the opinion together, through a cycle of ‘back and forth’ and peer review, and that the opinion that the soil would settle four to eight inches in fifteen to twenty years was his own.”
Turf and JTL contended that the court relied on speculative damage. The appeals court disagreed, stating that the lower court based its award “on evidence of reasonably certain damage.”
Turf also that it was not strictly liable, since it did not own or sell the properties. The court wrote that they “disagree because Turf’s grading activities rendered it strictly liable as a manufacturer of the lots.” The court concluded that “Turf is strictly liable as a manufacturer of the lots.”
Judge Coffee upheld the decision of the lower court with Judges Yegan and Perren concurring.
Read the court’s decision…
Dust Infiltration Due to Construction Defect Excluded from Policy
September 9, 2011 — CDJ Staff
A summary judgment was affirmed in the case of Brown v. Farmers Group, by the California Court of Appeals. The Browns bought a new home in Oakley, California. At the time, they signed disclosure statement “acknowledging that the area around their home experienced gusty winds and would be in development for years to come, which might result in dust and airborne mold.”
The Browns found an unusual amount of dust in their home, which became worse when they ran their heating and air conditioning system. Shelia Brown was later diagnosed with chronic valley fever, which was attributed to airborne mold. The Browns contacted Farmers which investigated the house. Although the adjustor from Farmers said the Browns would be covered, Farmers denied the claim.
After the Browns moved out of the house, an inspector found that the HVAC line in the attic was disconnected, sending dust into the home. The Browns brought action against Mid-Century Insurance, which managed the policy, and Farmers. The identified the HVAC defect, window problems, and valley fever as causes, suing for breach of contact, breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and the intentional infliction of emotional distress.
The court rejected all these claims. The policy with Farmers excluded losses due to defective construction. This ruled out the faulty HVAC system and any problems there might have been from the windows. The policy also specifically excluded losses from contamination, fungi, pathogens, and noxious substances. The court further found that the adjustor’s opinion was irrelevant to the question of what the policy actually covered. Finally, the court found no evidence of intentional infliction of emotional stress.
On review, the appeals court upheld the trial court’s conclusions and affirmed the summary judgment.
Read the court’s decision…
Mississippi exclusions j(5) and j(6) “that particular part”
June 7, 2011 — CDCoverage.com
In Lafayete Ins. Co. v. Peerboom, No. 3:10cv336 (S.D. Miss. June 2, 2011), claimant homeowner Peerboom hired insured contractor Absolute to raise Peerboom’s house two feet to avoid future flooding. While Absolute was raising the house, it fell, resulting in physical injury to the home. Peerboom sued Absolute for negligence, breach of contract, and fraud, seeking damages for the destruction of the home. Absolute’s CGL insurer Lafayette defended under a reservation of rights and filed a declaratory judgment action.
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Reprinted courtesy of CDCoverage.com
Exact Dates Not Needed for Construction Defect Insurance Claim
March 1, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The Texas Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court in Vines-Herrin Custom Homes v Great American Lloyds Insurance Company on December 21, 2011. Vines-Herrin Custom Homes built a single-family home in Plano, Texas in 1999. They obtained a commercial general liability policy from Great American, later purchasing coverage from Mid-Continent, which the decision describes as “a sister company of Great American.”
While the home was under construction, Emil G. Cerullo sought to purchase it. At the time, it was under contract to another buyer. Two months later, Vines-Herrin told Cerullo that the deal had “fell through.” Cerullo bought the house with modifications from the original plan. Upon moving in, Cerullo began having water intrusion and other problems. “Cerullo noticed water gathering on window sills and damage to the sheetrock and baseboard.” Additional problems followed, including cracks, leaks, “and in early 2002, the ceiling and roof began to sag.”
Cerullo sued Vines-Herrin, claiming negligent construction. Vines-Herrin filed a claim seeking defense and indemnification under the insurance policies. Coverage was denied and Vines-Herrin filed suit to require coverage and also bringing claims for “breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, breach of contract, and DTPA and insurance code violations.”
In May, 2006 Vines-Herrin stated that it had no more defense funds and went into arbitration with Cerullo. The underlying construction defect action was settled for about $2.5 million. As part of the settlement, “Cerullo became the rightful owner of all remaining claims, rights, and causes of action against” Vines-Herrin’s insurers. He then joined the coverage lawsuit.
The non-jury trial was held under the controlling law of the time which “imposed a duty to defend only if the property damage manifested or became apparent during the policy period.” The court concluded in Cerullo’s favor. During the post-judgment motions, the Texas Supreme Court rejected the manifestation rule. Under this ruling, the trial court set aside its judgment and found in favor of the insurance companies. The trial court noted that although “the Residence was covered by an uninterrupted period of insurance (which began before the Residence was constructed) and that the damages to the Residence manifested during the uninterrupted period of insurance coverage,” “Mr. Cerullo failed to allege the date when actual physical damage to the property occurred.”
The first claim by Cerullo and Vines-Herrin was that the “Final Judgment” occurred in October 2004, and that all proceedings thereafter were void. The court rejected this as the “final judgment” is not “final for the purposes of an appeal unless it actually disposes of every pending claim and party or unless it clearly and unequivocally states that it finally disposes of all claims and all parties.” Despite the use of the word “final,” the trial court’s decision did not do this.
The second issue was the application of the Texas Supreme Court case Don’s Building Supply Inc. v. OneBeacon Insurance. In this case, framing rot due to defective stucco was not discovered until after the end of the policy period. The Supreme Court noted that “the key date is when injury happens, not when someone happens on it.”
The appeals court found that the trial court misapplied the Don’s Building Supply decision. Rather than an exact date, “so long as that damage occurred within the policy period, coverage was provided.” The appeals court noted that “Cerullo alleged the house was constructed in 1999 and he purchased it in May 2000.” “By April of 2001, Cerullo noticed that the windowsills in the study were showing signs of leakage and water damage.” As the court put it, “the petitions then alleged a litany of defects.”
The court noted that coverage by Great American was in effect from November 9, 1999 to November 9, 2000. In May of 2000, the house suffered “substantial flooding from a rainstorm that caused damage.” This was during the policy period. “As a matter of law, actual damages must occur no later than when they manifest.”
The court concluded that as damage manifested during the period of coverage, so must have the damage. The court ruled that “contrary to the trial court’s determination otherwise, the evidence showed Great American’s duty to indemnify was triggered, and expert testimony establishing the exact date of injury was not required to trigger the duty.”
Read the court’s decision…
School District Marks End of Construction Project by Hiring Lawyers
June 19, 2012 — CDJ Staff
A school district in northeastern Pennsylvania has retained legal services as they approach the end of a construction project. The Mid Valley School Board cited concerns about the project’s budget, but Randy Parry, Superintendent of Mid Valley schools referenced “possible litigation at the end of the project.” Mr. Parry told the Scranton Times Tribune that construction delays could be a reason for litigation.
In addition to approving an additional $20,000 for legal representation, the board also approved $21,579 for additional project costs.
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Building Inspector Jailed for Taking Bribes
September 30, 2011 — CDJ Staff
The LA Times reports that Raoul Germain, a city Los Angeles building inspector has been sentenced to 21 months in prison after pleading guilty to taking bribes. Germain was caught as part of an FBI sting operation in which he approved work in exchange for thousands of dollars in bribes. The Times notes that that in some cases, Germain never visited the construction sites. Germain was offered a chance to cooperate with investigators. His lawyer, Steve Cron asked the Times, “What do you think happens to someone who cooperates?”
In addition to Germain, another city inspector has pleaded guilty to taking bribes and two more employees of the Department of Building and Safety have been fired in connection with the investigation.
Read the full story…
Pictorial Construction Terminology Dictionary — A Quick and Helpful Reference
July 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Does it seem like contractors speak their own language? Construction defect professionals can be hampered by not knowing the terminology. The Bert L. Howe & Associates, Inc. web site has a handy Pictorial Construction Terminology Dictionary in which more than a thousand terms are not only defined, but illustrated with pictures that give a visual component to each definition.
Whether you’re wondering what a balustrade is, or you need to identify a joist girder, or hundreds of other terms, the Pictorial Construction Terminology Dictionary is there to help you. It can be found at http://www.berthowe.com/bhapedia.php.
Fifth Circuit Asks Texas Supreme Court to Clarify Construction Defect Decision
November 7, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The Fifth Circuit Court has withdrawn its decision in Ewing Construction Company v. Amerisure Insurance Company, pending clarification from the Texas Supreme Court of its decision in Gilbert Texas Construction, L.P. v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s London. The Fifth Circuit had applied the Gilbert case in determining that a contractual liability exclusion barred coverage for faulty workmanship. The Insurance Journal reports that this decision was both applauded and criticized, with a concern noted that “an insurer would now have its pick of either the ‘your work’ exclusion or the contractual liability exclusion without the exception for subcontracted work.”
The Fifth Circuit is now asking the Texas Supreme Court two questions to clarify Gilbert, which Brian S. Martin and Suzanne M. Patrick see as a sign that the Court has realized that it overly expanded the scope of the earlier ruling. A response is expected from the Texas Supreme Court by spring 2013.
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Irene May Benefit Construction Industry
September 1, 2011 — CDJ Staff
Noting that while it wasn’t the $15 billion disaster some predicted, Hurricane Irene still caused quite a bit of damage on its path up the Eastern Seaboard. Martha White, reporting for MSNBC cites Kinetc Analysis Corp. with an estimate of $7 billion in damage. Carl Van Horn, a professor of public policy at Rutgers University expected an initial decline in construction jobs, due to projects delayed due to the storm’s arrival, but he said, “a few weeks later, employment picks up as people rebuild.”
Kinetic says that one unknown is how much of the damage is insured. They expect only $3 billion of damage will be covered by insurance. This would likely put a drag on consumer spending, as homeowners would have to dig into their own pockets to pay for repairs, according to Karl Smith, associate professor of economics and government at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
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Federal District Court Continues to Find Construction Defects do Not Arise From An Occurrence
May 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Coverage for construction defects continues to be hotly contested in Hawaii state and federal courts. In a recent decision, Judge Mollway felt bound to follow the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Burlington Ins. Co. v. Oceanic Design & Constr., Inc., 383 F.3d 940, 944 (9th Cir. 2004), where the court found construction defect claims arise from breach of contract, not from an occurrence. Judge Mollway’s most recent decision on the issue is Illinois Nat. Ins. Co. v. Nordic PCL Constr., Inc., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58464 (D. Haw. April 26, 2012).
Nordic constructed a grocery store for Safeway. In addition to the grocery store, Nordic built a 165-space rooftop parking deck, retail shops and related improvements. After opening for business in 2007, Safeway experienced significant leaks. Safeway demanded that Nordic repair the parking deck. Nordic sent the demand letter to the insurer, who agreed to appoint counsel subject to a reservation of rights.
Safeway filed suit against Nordic in state court alleging, among other things, breach of contract and negligence. The insurer provided Nordic with a defense, but Nordic hired independent counsel.
The insurer filed for declaratory relief in federal district court.
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Insurer Not Liable for Construction Defect Revealed by Woodpecker
September 13, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has ruled that an insurance provision that excluded construction defects must stand in Friedberg v. Chubb, granting a summary judgment to the insurance firm.
The Friedbergs discovered extensive water damage to their home after a woodpecker drilled a hole in a vertical support. They sought insurance coverage under their Chubb “Masterpiece” policy. The decision quotes the policy as covering “all risk of physical loss” “unless stated otherwise or an exclusion applies.” These exclusions included “gradual or sudden loss,” “structural movement,” and “faulty planning, construction or maintenance,” but the policy covered “ensuing covered loss unless another exclusion applies.”
Chubb’s expert determined that the Friedbergs’ home had defective construction, and “attributed the damage to the beams and walls below the beam to a failure to install control joints.” After Chubb denied coverage, the Friedbergs sued, although the court ruled that “even under the Friedbergs’ theory, the water damage was a loss caused by faulty construction and therefore excluded under the policy.”
On appeal, the Friedbergs argued that “the loss resulted from the combination of both faulty construction and the presence of water” and that Minnesota’s “concurrent causation” doctrine must apply, which according to the decision, “when a loss results from both a covered peril and an excluded peril, coverage exists unless the excluded peril is the ‘overriding cause’ of the loss.” The court rejected this reasoning, noting that “once the house was plagued with faulty construction, it was a foreseeable and natural consequence that water would enter.”
The Friedbergs also contended that “the damage caused by the intrusion of water into their home is an ‘ensuing covered loss’ for which they are due coverage.” The court also rejected this claim, noting that Minnesota law excludes defective construction from the ensuing loss provision. The court said that “the Friedbergs’ reading of their ensuing-loss clause, by contrast, would dramatically limit their policy’s faulty-construction exclusion, because almost ‘any loss cause by’ faulty construction could also be characterized as an ensuing loss under an all-risk policy.”
Read the court’ decision…
Limitations of Liability in Subcontractors’ Contracts May Not Be Enforceable in Colorado to Limit Claims by Construction Professionals.
October 23, 2012 — Heidi J. Gassman, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell
The Colorado Homeowner Protection Act of 2007 (“HPA”), codified at C.R.S. § 13-20-806(7), specifically voids express waivers of, or limitations on, a residential property owner’s ability to enforce any rights, remedies, and damages provided by law in a construction defect case. Practically speaking, this means that limitation of liability provisions in contracts between construction professionals and residential homeowners are void and will not be enforced in Colorado. The HPA can extend even further, however, to subcontractors on residential projects, as seen in a recent District Court ruling.
The HPA was tested in Thacker v. Gallery Homes, et al., v. Terracon Consultants, Inc., et al., Larimer County District Court Case No. 2007CV1195. Gallery Homes hired Terracon to provide geotechnical and structural engineering services at the Colony Ridge subdivision in Loveland, Colorado. Terracon performed work for Gallery Homes under three separate contracts, each of which included a provision limiting Terracon’s total liability to Gallery Homes.
After the project was completed, two homeowners filed suit against Gallery Homes for alleged construction defects involving movement of their basement floor systems and foundations and damage to porches, patios, garages, and driveways. Gallery Homes sued Terracon as a third-party defendant, and Terracon sought to enforce its limitation of liability provisions via a partial summary judgment motion.
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Reprinted courtesy of Heidi J. Gassman, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC. Ms. Gassman can be contacted at gassman@hhmrlaw.com
Faulty Workmanship may be an Occurrence in Indiana CGL Policies
April 7, 2011 — April 7, 2011 Beverley BevenFlorez - Construction Defect Journal
The question of whether construction defects can be an occurrence in Commercial General Liabilities (CGL) policies continues to find mixed answers. The United States District Court in Indiana denied the Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment in the case of General Casualty Insurance v. Compton Construction Co., Inc. and Mary Ann Zubak stating that faulty workmanship can be an occurrence in CGL policies.
Judge Theresa L. Springmann cited Sheehan Construction Co., et al. v. Continental Casualty Co., et al. for her decision, ”The Indiana Supreme Court reversed summary judgment, which had been granted in favor of the insurer in Sheehan, holding that faulty workmanship can constitute an ‘accident’ under a CGL policy, which means any damage would have been caused by an ‘occurrence’ triggering the insurance policy’s coverage provisions. The Indiana Supreme Court also held that, under identically-worded policy exclusion terms that are at issue in this case, defective subcontractor work could provide the basis for a claim under a CGL policy.”
As we reported on April 1st, South Carolina’s legislature is currently working on bill S-431 that would change the wording of CGL policies in their state to include construction defects. Ray Farmer, Southwest region vice president of the American Insurance Association spoke out against the bill. “CGL policies were never meant to cover faulty workmanship by the contractor,” he said. “The bill’s supplementary and erroneous liability provisions will only serve to unnecessarily impact construction costs in South Carolina.”
Read the Opinion and order...
Read the court’s ruling...
Read the American Insurance Association statement...
Ohio Adopts Energy-Efficient Building Code
June 19, 2012 — CDJ Staff
In a compromise between environmental groups, who were looking for stricter standards, and homebuilders, who were trying to contain building costs, the state of Ohio has adopted buildings codes that will increase the energy efficiency of new homes. The estimated costs are about $1,100 with estimated annual savings of $230. According to Corey Roblee of the International Code Council, “It’s something needed in the state of Ohio.”
The Ohio Home Builders Association opposed a proposal to adopt the guidelines of the International Code Council. Builders will be able to either follow the ICC guidelines or they can use the Ohio guidelines to meet the same energy efficiency. Vincent Squillace, the executive vice president of the OHBA, said, “We came up with an equivalent code that’s more strict but is about $2,000 cheaper per home to implement than the original code.”
The new code will require that at least 75% of lighting must be high efficiency, increases the degree of insulation, and specifies more efficient windows, among other changes.
Read the full story…
Gilroy Homeowners Sue over Leaky Homes
February 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Two years into a lawsuit against Shapell Homes, the builder of a subdivision called Eagle Ridge in Gilroy, California, homeowners have joined or left the lawsuit. About fifty homeowners are still in the suit, which contends that construction defects have lead to water intrusion in their homes. The lawyer for the homeowners contends that more than a hundred homes have construction defects.
One homeowner said that soon after he joined the suit, Sharpell sent workers to his home who repaired problems to his satisfaction. “They came in within two weeks and fixed everything,” said Frank Lowry. Another homeowner, Wilson Haddow, said that he was “quite happy” after Shapell repaired problems.
Others weren’t quite so happy. Greg Yancey said that problems had “been a nightmare” and that “it just doesn’t feel like home.” He said that his “house is possessed,” with problems that include walls that bow out and a balcony that drips rainwater to the front door. His home is currently worth far less than the $700,000 he paid in 2007.
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Residential Construction: Shrinking Now, Growing Later?
August 17, 2011 — CDJ Staff
Jim Haugey, the Chief Economist for Reed Construction Data noted that new residential construction spending fell 0.2% in June and a slightly larger drop of 0.5% in residential remodeling. While economic growth is still low, Haugey states that homebuilders have “record low inventories.” He forecasts a shrinkage of 1.5% in 2011, followed by about 20% growth in 2012.
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Construction Defect Case Not Over, Despite Summary Judgment
November 7, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The Supreme Court of Oregon has concluded in an en banc decision that a motion to reconsider a summary judgment is not a motion for a new trial. In coming to their conclusion the court overturned an earlier Oregon Supreme Court case, Carter v. U.S. National Bank. Although the decision does not bear on construction defects, the underlying case did. Due to the decision, these claims can now be evaluated in a trial.
The case, Association of Unit Owners of Timbercrest Condominiums v. Warren, came about after an apartment complex was converted into condominium units. The developers hired Big Al’s Construction for some of the remodeling work. The condominium association later sued the developer and the contractor over claims of construction defects. The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, which the court granted.
But that wasn’t the end of things. The plaintiff soon filed a “motion to reconsider,” noting that the summary judgment seemed to be in conflict with both law and other recent rulings, and additionally, the grounds for the decision were not in the order. The judge then notified the parties that the court had “pulled the trigger too quickly” and had seven questions for the parties to answer.
The court dismissed all claims against the defendants. The defendants filed their responses, objecting that that “‘there is no such thing’ as a motion for reconsideration.” Further, while “the rules do allow for post-judgment review of pre-judgment rulings through a motion for a new trial,” the plaintiffs had not filed for a new trial. But did they need one? They did file an appeal.
The judge in the case admitted that there was no such thing as a motion to reconsider, and felt bad about prematurely signing the judgment. The case was sent to the Court of Appeals to determine if the motion to reconsider was a request for a new trial. The Court of Appeals concurred.
In reviewing the decision, the Oregon Supreme Court concluded that there were a maximum of three questions to address. Was the motion for reconsideration a motion for a new trial? If so, was the later notice of appeal premature? And if so, was the plaintiff required to file a new appeal? The court determined that the answer to the first question was no.
Prior decisions pointed to the conclusion “that a motion for reconsideration of a summary judgment amounts to a motion for a new trial,” but here the court concluded that “our prior cases erred,” and turned to the summary judgment rule for clarification. The court noted that “the rule contemplates that summary judgment and trial are separate and distinct events.” With this conclusion, the Oregon Supreme Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings.
Read the court’s decision…
Fire Reveals Defects, Appeals Court Affirms Judgment against Builder
July 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The Arizona Court of Appeals has ruled in the case of Simms v. Nance Construction. After a fire damaged his home, Jerry Simms discovered some construction defects in the work of the builder, Nance Construction. Nance Construction completed the home in 2000 and it was damaged by fire in 2001. In the course of Simms’ suit against his neighbor, “defense experts opined both that Dusty Creek had negligently repaired the damage to Simms’ residence and that many defects found in the houses were the result of defects in the original construction.” Nance offered to make roof repairs. Simms responded with a list of “numerous construction defects,” stating this was “not a comprehensive and final list of items.” Nance offered to repair some while disputing others. Simms entered a lawsuit against Nance and other parties.
Nance first sought a summary judgment, “asserting that Simms had failed to adequately disclose the repairs for which he sought to hold Nance responsible.” The court denied this. It also would not allow Nance to introduce evidence that Simms had been denied a license by the Arizona Department of Gaming over “questionable business practices, illegal activities, and financial transactions with a person purportedly involved in organized crime.”
During the suit, Simms contracted with Advanced Repair Technologies “for repairs that included a complete remodel of the roof and the exterior stucco system.” Nance later claimed that the cost of ART’s repair was unreasonable, claiming that it should have cost about $600,000 instead of the $1.5 million for which Simms contracted. The jury found against Nance, with a judgment of $870,200 of which half was due to the roofing subcontractor.
After the verdict, Nash moved for a new trial, stating that the jury should have heard expert testimony on whether the contract price was reasonable. Nance also “argued that the trial court had erred in refusing to allow Nance to impeach Simms’ credibility with his purported prior acts of dishonesty.” These motions were denied and Nance appealed.
The appeals court upheld the trial court on all counts. The court found that, despite the contention made by Nance, the jury had sufficient information to determine if the cost of the repairs were reasonable. The court also found that Simms had given Nance an opportunity to propose repairs. The law, however, “does not require the Plaintiff to accept an offer for repairs,” adding that “the record makes clear that the parties were far apart in their belief of the nature of repairs necessary.” Nor did the court find that Nance should have been allowed to introduce evidence to impeach Simms’ credibility.
Although judgment of the lower court was affirmed, the court took the discretion to decline to award attorneys’ fees to Simms, although he was awarded costs.
Read the court’s decision…