Fifth Circuit Reverses Insurers’ Summary Judgment Award Based on "Your Work" Exclusion
November 18, 2011 — Tred Eyerley, Insurance Law Hawaii
Application of the facts to the "your work" exclusion was the key to resolving coverage issued in Am. Home Assurance Co. v. Cat Tech L.L.C., 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 21076 (5th Cir. Oct. 5, 2011).
Ergon Refining, Inc. hired Cat Tech L.L.C. to service a hydrotreating reactor. In January 2005, Cat Tech replaced certain parts in the reactor. After Cat Tech finished the job and left, Ergon noticed a high pressure drop in the reactor, forcing it to be shut down. Cat Tech returned in February 2005, removed, repaired and replaced the damaged parts, and loaded new parts. After completion, a second large pressure drop occurred during the reactor’s start-up process. The reactor was shut down until October 2005, when Ergon hired a different contractor to perform the repair work. Additional damage to the reactor was found.
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
Alaska Supreme Court Dismisses Claims of Uncooperative Pro Se Litigant in Defect Case
August 11, 2011 — CDJ Staff
The Alaska Supreme Court found that in the case of Khalsa v. Chose, Ms. Khalsa? failure to cooperate with the courts has obligated them to dismiss her claims against Mr. Chose. Ms. Khalsa bought a home kit from Mandala Custom Homes of Nelson, British Columbia, Canada. Mr. Chose, one of the owners of Mandala was paid by Ms. Khalsa to supervise assembly in Fairbanks. After construction, the roof developed leaks. Ms. Khalsa stated that when climbing a ladder to inspect a skylight leak, she fell and injured herself.
During the subsequent suit, Khalsa proved uncooperative. She skipped a pretrial conference. She attended a hearing that set discovery deadlines but then did not comply with discovery, including her failure to provide medical records documenting her injuries. She eventually said that she would only be able to travel from Arizona to Alaska if the defendants paid for her and her caretaker?s expenses.
When finally deposed, Khalsa terminated the deposition after five minutes, alleging the deposition was “intentionally designed to cause [her] to endure further emotional distress, due to the psychological trauma . . . that was caused or contributed to by the defendants.”
Eventually, the lower court sanctioned her twice. In July, 2008, the court concluded that her failure to provide medical records required dismissal of her injury lawsuit. In October of that year, the court dismissed all remaining claims due to her “pattern of excuses and long delays in providing information for discovery culminating in her refusal to participate in her deposition by the defendants.” Further, Khalsa has argued that the trial court displayed “prejudice and bias toward the pro se plaintiff.”
The Alaska Supreme Court rejected all of Ms. Khalsa?s claims, dismissing her case. They did, however, note that she has thirty days to file an appeal.
Read the court’s decision…
When is a Construction Project truly “Complete”? That depends. (law note)
August 2, 2012 — Melissa Dewey Brumback, Construction Law North Carolina
Long-time readers of the blog may remember my earlier post on substantial completion. However, in looking over my blog stats to see what search terms lead people here, it looks like this is hot topic. The blog searches came in two general categories:
1. Those searching strictly for a definition of substantial completion. Some examples:
- What does “substantial completion” mean?
- when does a building achieve substantial completion
- contracts “substantial completion”
- substantial completion undefined
- when is a project substantially complete
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Reprinted courtesy of Melissa Dewey Brumback of Ragsdale Liggett PLLC. Ms. Brumback can be contacted at mbrumback@rl-law.com.
Ghost Employees Steal Jobs from Legit Construction Firms
September 13, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Firms that skirt labor laws for construction workers can undercut firms that are obeying those laws. In a piece in Raleigh, North Carolina’s News & Observer, Doug Burton, a commercial masonry contractor summed it up: “my competitors are cheating.” The article describes the low-bidding firms “called their workers independent contractors ? or treated them like ghosts, paid under the table and never acknowledged.” The cost to the state is “unpaid medical bills for injured workers, uncollected business and personal taxes, and payments not made to a depleted state unemployment reserve.”
One firm examined in the article, Martin’s Bricklaying, employs mostly immigrant Mexican laborers, many of whom are in the country illegally. One employee told the News & Observer, “we don’t complain.”
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History of Defects Leads to Punitive Damages for Bankrupt Developer
March 1, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The South Carolina Court of Appeals has ruled that evidence of construction defects at a developer’s other projects were admissible in a construction defect lawsuit. They issued their ruling on Magnolia North Property Owners’ Association v. Heritage Communities, Inc. on February 15, 2012.
Magnolia North is a condominium complex in South Carolina. The initial builder, Heritage Communities, had not completed construction when they filed for bankruptcy protection under Chapter 11. The remaining four buildings were completed by another contractor. The Property Owners’ Association subsequently sued Heritage Communities, Inc. (HCI) alleging defects. The POA also sued Heritage Magnolia North, and the general contractor, BuildStar.
The trial court ruled that all three entities were in fact one. On appeal, the defendants claimed that the trial court improperly amalgamated the defendants. The appeals court noted, however, that “all these corporations share officers, directors, office space, and a phone number with HCI.” Until Heritage Communities turned over control of the POA to the actual homeowners, all of the POA’s officers were officers of HCI. The appeals court concluded that “the trial court’s ruling that Appellants’ entities were amalgamated is supported by the law and the evidence.”
Heritage also claimed that the trial court should not have allowed the plaintiffs to produce evidence of construction defects at other Heritage properties. Heritage argued that the evidence was a violation of the South Carolina Rules of Evidence. The court cited a South Carolina Supreme Court case which made an exception for “facts showing the other acts were substantially similar to the event at issue.” The court noted that the defects introduced by the plaintiffs were “virtually identical across all developments.” This included identical use of the same products from project to project. Further, these were used to demonstrate that “HCI was aware of water issues in the other projects as early as 1998, before construction on Magnolia North had begun.”
The trial case ended with a directed verdict. Heritage charged that the jury should have determined whether the alleged defects existed. The appeals court noted that there was “overwhelming evidence” that Heritage failed “to meet the industry standard of care.” Heritage did not dispute the existence of the damages during the trial, they “merely contested the extent.”
Further, Heritage claimed in its appeal that the case should have been rejected due to the three-year statute of limitations. They note that the first meeting of the POA was on March 8, 2000, yet the suit was not filed until May 28, 2003, just over three years. The court noted that here the statute of limitation must be tolled, as Heritage controlled the POA until September 9, 2002. The owner-controlled POA filed suit “approximately eight months after assuming control.”
The court also applied equitable estoppel to the statute of limitations. During the time in which Heritage controlled the board, Heritage “assured the unit owners the construction defects would be repaired, and, as a result, the owners were justified in relying on those assurances.” Since “a reasonable owner could have believed that it would be counter-productive to file suit,” the court found that also prevented Heritage from invoking the statute of limitations. In the end, the appeals court concluded that the even apart from equitable tolling and equitable estoppel, the statute of limitations could not have started until the unit owners took control of the board in September, 2002.
Heritage also contested the jury’s awarding of damages, asserting that “the POA failed to establish its damages as to any of its claims.” Noting that damages are determined “with reasonable certainty or accuracy,” and that “proof with mathematical certainty of the amount of loss or damage is not required,” the appeals court found a “sufficiently reasonable basis of computation of damages to support the trial court’s submission of damages to the jury.” Heritage also claimed that the POA did not show that the damage existed at the time of the transfer of control. The court rejected this claim as well.
Finally, Heritage argued that punitive damages were improperly applied for two reasons: that “the award of punitive damages has no deterrent effect because Appellants went out of business prior to the commencement of the litigation” and that Heritages has “no ability to pay punitive damages.” The punitive damages were upheld, as the relevant earlier decision includes “defendant’s degree of culpability,” “defendants awareness or concealment,” “existence of similar past conduct,” and “likelihood of deterring the defendant or others from similar conduct.”
The appeals court rejected all of the claims made by Heritage, fully upholding the decision of the trial court.
Read the court’s decision…
One Colorado Court Allows Negligence Claim by General Contractor Against Subcontractor
December 20, 2012 — Heather Anderson , Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell
Judge Paul King of the Douglas County District Court recently confirmed that subcontractors in residential construction owe an independent duty, separate and apart from any contractual duties, to act without negligence in the construction of a home in Colorado. See Order, dated September 7, 2010, Sunoo v. Hickory Homes, Inc. et al., Case No. 2007CV1866; see alsoCosmopolitan Homes, Inc. v. Weller, 663 P.2d 1041 (Colo. 1983); A.C. Excavating v. Yacht Club II Homeowners Ass’n, Inc., 114 P.3d 862 (Colo. 2005). He also verified that the holding in the B.R.W. Inc. v. Dufficy & Sons, Inc., 99 P.3d 66 (Colo. 2004)[1] case does not prohibit general contractors, such as Hickory Homes, from enforcing a subcontractor’s independent duty to act without negligence in the construction of a home.
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Reprinted courtesy of Heather Anderson, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC. Ms. Anderson can be contacted at anderson@hhmrlaw.com
Crane Dangles and So Do Insurance Questions
November 7, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Hurricane Sandy sent a construction crane dangling from the top of One57, a condo construction project in New York City. In response to the risk, the nearby Parker Meridian and other nearby buildings were evacuated until the crane could be stabilized. Businessweek reports that One57 involves “a tangle of companies,” including the developer, Extell Development and the contractor, Lend Lease Construction. Pinnacle Industries was responsible for providing and operating the crane.
The insurance claims are yet to be made, but they will likely include the costs of evacuating nearby buildings and to cover any damage to the building itself. David DeLaRue, a vice president in construction practice at Willis Group Holdings said there would be two questions: “Did our insured do anything to cause that loss? Does this policy cover it?”
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Montrose Language Interpreted: How Many Policies Are Implicated By A Construction Defect That Later Causes a Flood?
March 17, 2011 — By Shaun McParland Baldwin, March 17, 2011
The Court of Appeals of Indiana recently addressed the “Montrose” language added to the CGL ISO form in 2001 in the context of a construction defect claim where a fractured storm drain caused significant flooding a year after the drain was damaged. The insuring agreement requires that “bodily injury” or “property damage” be caused by an “occurrence” and that the “bodily injury” or “property damage” occur during the policy period. The Montrose language adds that the insurance applies only if, prior to the policy period, no insured knew that the “bodily injury” or “property damage” had occurred in whole or in part. Significantly, it also states that any “bodily injury“ or “property damage” which occurs during the policy period and was not, prior to the policy period known to have occurred, includes a continuation, change or resumption of that “bodily injury” or “property damage” after the end of the policy period.
In Grange Mutual Cas. Co. v. West Bend Mut. Ins. Co., No. 29D04-0706-PL-1112 (Ct. App. IN March 15, 2011), http://www.ai.org/judiciary/opinions/pdf/03151109ehf.pdf, Sullivan was the General Contractor for a school construction project. Its subcontractor, McCurdy, installed the storm drain pipes. One of the storm pipes was fractured in 2005 while McCurdy was doing its installation work. More than a year later, the school experienced significant water damage due to flooding. It was later discovered that the flooding was due to the fractured storm drain. Sullivan’s insurer paid $146,403 for the water damage. That insurer brought a subrogation claim against McCurdy and its two insurers: West Bend and Grange. West Bend had issued CGL coverage to McCurdy while the construction was ongoing , including the date in which the storm pipe was fractured. Grange issued CGL coverage to McCurdy at the time of the flooding. Those two carriers jointly settled the subrogation claim and then litigated which insurer actually owed coverage for the loss. Significantly, the loss that was paid included only damages from the flooding, not any damages for the cost of repairing the pipe.
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Reprinted courtesy of Shaun McParland Baldwin of Tressler LLP. Ms Baldwin can be contacted at sbaldwin@tresslerllp.com
Florida Appeals Court Rules in Favor of Homeowners Unaware of Construction Defects and Lack of Permits
December 9, 2011 — CDJ Staff
The Florida Court of Appeals has ruled that a homeowner is not liable for defects in unpermitted alterations, reversing a lower court’s decision in Jensen v. Bailey. The Jensens sold their house to the Baileys. During the sale, the Jensens filled out a property disclosure statement, checking “no” to a question about “any improvement or additions to the property, whether by your or by others that have been constructed in violation of building codes or without necessary permits.”
After moving in, the Baileys discovered several problems with the home. One involved a defective sewer connection leading to repeated backups. The Baileys also found problems with remodeling the Jensens had done in the kitchen, master bath, and bedroom. The remodeling work was not done with required permits nor was it up to code.
The court noted that an earlier case, Johnson v. Davis, established four criteria: “the seller of a home must have knowledge of a defect in the property; the defect must materially affect the value of the property; the defect must not be readily observable and must be unknown to the buyer; and the buyer must establish that the seller failed to disclose the defect to the buyer.” The court found that the first of these criteria was crucial to determining the case.
In the Johnson ruling, the then Chief Justice dissented, fearing that the courts “would ultimately construe Johnson’s requirement of actual knowledge to permit a finding of liability based on constructive knowledge,” quoting Justice Boyd, “a rule of constructive knowledge will develop based on the reasoning that if the seller did not know of the defect, he should have known about it before attempting to sell the property.” The Appeals Court concluded that the lower court hit this point in ruling on Jensen v. Bailey.
Citing other Florida cases, the court noted that the Johnson rule does require “proof of the seller’s actual knowledge of the defect.” The court cited a case in which it was concluded that the seller “should have known” that there was circumstantial evidence was that the seller did know about the defects, as the seller had been involved in the construction of the home.
In the case of the Jensens, the lower court concluded that they did not know that the work was defective, nor did they know that they were obligated to obtain permits for it. The Appeals Court found this one fact sufficient to reverse the decision and remand the case to the lower court for a final judgment in favor of the Jensens.
Read the court’s decision…
Brown Paint Doesn’t Cover Up Construction Defects
April 25, 2012 — CDJ Staff
In a decision that describes the case as illustrating “the perils that real estate brokers and their agents assume when acting as a dual listing agent to both the buyers and sellers of the same house,” the California Court of Appeals has issued a decision in William L. Lyon & Associates v. The Superior Court of Placer County. Lyon & Associates sought summary judgment to dismiss the claims of the Henleys who bought a home in a transaction where a Lyon agent represented both sides.
The prior owners of the home, the Costas, had used a Lyon agent in purchasing their home. When they later sought to sell it, that agent “became aware of some of the house’s defects and problems.” In response, the Costas sought the help of another agent, Connie Gidal, also of Lyons & Associates. Photos taken in the presence of Ms. Gidal show defects of the paint and stucco. The Costas also took the step of painting the house dark brown. During the sale process, “rain caused many of the painted-over defects to reappear.” The Costas “purchased more dark brown paint and covered up the newly visible damage prior to inspection by the Henleys.”
With the damage concealed, the Henleys bought the home in May 2006. The agreement with Lyons & Associates noted that “a dual agent is obligated to disclose known facts materially affecting the value or desirability of the property to both parties.” Escrow closed on May 9, 2006. The contract with the broker included a two-year limit on the time to bring legal action.
The Henleys moved in during June 2006, and “began to discover construction defects that had been concealed by the Costas.” In addition to the painted-over stucco problems, the Henleys found that the Costas had “installed quartzite stone overlays on the backyard steps in a manner that caused water intrusion on the house’s stucco walls.”
In May 2009, the Henleys sued the Costas, Ron McKim Construction, Lyons & Associates, and Ms. Gidal. Their complaint alleged that Lyons & Associates had committed breach of contact, negligence, fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and negligent nondisclosure in connection with the construction defects. The Costas named Lyons in a cross complaint. Lyons moved for summary judgments on the grounds that the two-year statute of limitations had expired before the complaint and cross-complaint were filed. Both the Henleys and the Costas opposed this claim. The court denied the motion and Lyons appealed.
The appeals court upheld the denial, noting that the both California Supreme Court decision and later action by the legislature compels real estate brokers and salespersons “to conduct a reasonably competent and diligent visual inspection of the property offered for sale.” The court noted that under California law, brokers have responsibilities to both sellers and buyers. The section of law cited by Lyons applies to seller’s agents. The court rejected the contention by Lyons that they were “cooperating brokers.” The Henleys were “not constrained by the two-year statute of limitations.”
Lyons contended that even if California’s statute did not apply, there was a contractual limit of two years. The court also rejected this, agreeing with the Henleys that “the two-year limitation period must be extended by the discovery rule.”
The court noted that “Lyon & Associates may not reap the benefit of a shortened contractual limitation period when its own alleged malfeasance contributed to the delay in the discovery of the buyer’s injury.” The court found that the Henleys could proceed with their breach of contract claim, because, “when a breach of contract is committed in secret, such as the intentional nondisclosure of a real estate broker regarding a previously visible construction defect, the contractual limitations period is properly held subject to the discovery rule.” The court felt that the interpretation favored by the California Association of Realtors would “halve the applicable statute of limitations period.”
In addition to rejecting Lyon request for summary judgment on the claims made by the Henleys, the court also rejected the request of summary judgment on the claims made by the Costas, concluding that neither claim is time-barred. Costs were awarded to both the Henleys and Costas.
Read the court’s decision…
Claims Under Colorado Defect Action Reform Act Count as Suits
July 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The Colorado Court of Appeals has affirmed the judgment of the lower court in Melssen v. Auto-Owners Insurance. The Melssens built a custom home for the Holleys, during which time the Melssens retained a comprehensive general liability policy from Auto-Owners, which “obligated Auto-Owerns to defend the Melssens with respect to any ‘suit’ seeking damages for ‘property damage’ during the policy period.” Soon after the house was constructed, cracks developed in the drywall, then outside stucco and basement slab. The Holleys contended that “approximately $300,000 of damages to the Holleys’ property was caused by the Melssens’ engineering and construction defects” and filed a claim under the Colorado Defect Action Reform Act (CDARA). The Melssens “demanded Auto-Owners defend and indemnify the Melssens and forwared Auto-Owners the notice of claim.”
Although the Melssens notified Auto-Owners in June 2008, it was not until October 2008 that Auto-Owners denied coverage stating that the claims were sustained outside the policy period. The Melssens filed an action against Auto-Owners. At trial, the jury ruled in favor of the Melssens awarding them damages, to which the trial court added costs and attorney fees.
On appeal, Auto-Owners contended that the trial court erred in allowing the Melssens to argue that the CDARA notice of claim “was the functional equivalent of a complaint commencing a suit.” The appeals court found that “the CDARA notice of claim process constituted an alternative dispute resolution proceeding under the policy.” The court agreed that jury should not have been asked to determine if a CDARA action is a “suit,” but as the jury found for the Melssens, the concluding it “constituted harmless error.” Further, the court found that an action under the CDARA satisfied the definition of a “suit.”
The court found for the Melssens, affirming the lower court’s decision and remanding the case to the lower court for the awarding of appeals costs to the Melssens.
Read the court’s decision…
Partial Settlement in DeKalb Construction Management Case
July 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The DeKalb County School District has made a partial settlement in a lawsuit over their claims of mismanagement of construction projects. The Atlanta Journal-Constitution reports that the school board settled with E. R. Mitchell & Co., the smaller of two firms that they have sued. As part of the settlement, Mitchell will be testifying against their former partner. Claims from the other side of the lawsuit are that the school board improperly fired the Heery/Mitchell partnership. The superintendant who fired the company, Crawford Lewis, and his chief operations office, Pat Reid, have since been charged with criminal conspiracy to defraud the construction program. A lawyer for Heery said that “we believe that when presented to a jury, Heery will be vindicated.”
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Bar to Raise on Green Standard
November 7, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Next June, members of the U.S. Green Building Council will be voting on changes to the LEED green building standard. “The bar is getting raised,” said Navad Malin of BuildingGreen, a consulting and publishing firm, in an article in USA Today. Under the proposed guidelines, builders would have to project energy and water use for five years as part of the certification process. However, if the occupants aren’t as green as the builders anticipated, the buildings will not lose their certification.
The new rules will include higher energy standards, award points for avoiding potentially hazardous materials, and even determine what kind of plumbing items can be used.
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US Courts in Nevada Busy with Yellow Brass
August 2, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Judge Robert C. Jones, the chief judge of the United States District Court of Nevada, and Judge Peggy A. Leen, a magistrate judge with the same court, have issued orders in cases involving allegations of high-zinc yellow brass plumbing components. Judge Jones issued orders on Waterfall Homeowners Association v. Viega, Inc. and Greystone Nevada, LLC v. Anthem Highlands Community Association on July 9, 2012. Judge Leen issued orders on Southern Terrace Homeowners Association v. Viega, Inc. on July 10, and The Seasons Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Richmond American Homes of Nevada, Inc. on July 19.
Chief Judge Jones held an omnibus hearing on Waterfall v. Viega on June 12. During that hearing “Chief Judge Jones had already agreed that the claims against the product manufacturers should be be severed from the majority of the other claims and that discovery should proceed on different tracks.” Judge Leen ordered that the Southern Terrace claims be referred to Chief Judge Jones to determine if it should be consolidated with other yellow brass cases.
Chief Judge Jones’s decision in Greystone Nevada rests on issues of whether the affected homeowners had signed arbitration agreements. The judge found that the “Defendant’s claims that the seven homeowners they have identified are subsequent purchasers who need not arbitrate with Greystone is definitively refuted by the evidence.”
Judge Leen cites the Greystone decision in her ruling on Seasons Homeowners Association v. Richmond American Homes of Nevada. Richmond seeks to compel individual arbitration, stating that “the arbitration clause used singular rather than plural terms, and therefore, class arbitration was foreclosed.” Judge Leen determined that “under Nevada law, a homeowners association has statutory authority to represent homeowners associations in these types of actions. She did, however, accept Richmond’s argument that they could compel arbitration.
The Waterfall order involves an attempt by two homeowners associations to seek a class action against seventeen defendants, the first twelve of whom are described as “the Viega Defendants” and “the Uponor Defendants.” Chief Judge Jones notes that “many of these Defendants have been sued in identical class actions by the same law firms, but with different named defendants.” The homeowner association seek to “represent their own 998 members directly but also wish to represent up to 10,000 homeowner associations representing up to 250,000 similarly situated homeowner members throughout the Las Vega area via this class action.”
The judge has denied the Viega Defendants’ attempt to deny class certification, noting that the plaintiffs “argue that they intend to argue for class certification under Rule 23(b)(3). He also denied the motions by the two groups of the Viega Defendants. The U.S. Viega Defendants sought to be dismissed from the case for a variety of reasons. The judge noted of the claim that the plaintiffs had no injury of fact and are not alleging actual damage is contradicted by the allegations of actual damage made by the plaintiffs. ”They have alleged that the parts are defective and have already begun to corrode in at least a few sample circumstances, even if they have not yet failed.” To the argument that there re not particular claims made against defendants, the judge notes, “it is clear from the Complaint which Defendants are alleged to have manufactured and sold which brands of allegedly defective products, and which Defendants are alleged to have installed them.”
The German Viega firms also sought to be dismissed from the suit, noting that “they have no property, employees, accounts, advertisements, etc. in Nevada and have not sold any products in Nevada.” However, the judge notes that “at least Waterfall, and perhaps Red Bluff, was still under construction when Viega, Inc. became the sole shareholder of Vanguard Industries, Inc.”
Finally, both of Chief Judge Jones’s rulings cite a related case in the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota involving a class action settlement for those with F1807 systems. He notes in both these cases that “Plaintiffs disclaimed any claims based upon F1807 components.”
Read the courts' decisions…
Waterfall Homeowners Association v. Viega, Inc.
Greystone Nevada, LLC v. Anthem Highlands Community Association
Southern Terrace Homeowners Association v. Viega, Inc.
The Seasons Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Richmond American Homes of Nevada, Inc.
A Performance-Based Energy Code in Seattle: Will It Save Existing Buildings?
August 11, 2011 — Douglas Reiser, Builders Counsel
The City of Seattle has one of the most stringent energy codes in the nation. Based upon the Washington State Energy Code (which has been embroiled in litigation over its high standards), the code demands a lot from commercial developers. But, does it prevent developers from saving Seattle?s classic and old buildings? Perhaps.
The general compliance procedure requires buildings to be examined during the permitting process. This means that buildings are examined before they begin operating. The procedure is not malleable and is applicable to all buildings, old and new, big and small.
The downside of this procedure is that it eliminates awarding compliance to those buildings exhibiting a number of passive features, such as siting, thermal mass, and renewable energy production. This problem has prevented a number of interesting and architecturally pleasing existing building retrofits from getting off the ground. The cost of complying with the current system can be 20% more, and it might prevent builders from preserving a building?s historical integrity.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of Douglas Reiser of Reiser Legal LLC. Mr. Reiser can be contacted at info@reiserlegal.com
Read Her Lips: “No New Buildings”
November 18, 2011 — CDJ Staff
Martha Johnson, the head of the General Services Administration, has said that her agency will not be building any new buildings in the near future. Among other duties, the GSA is responsible for the building, renovating, and leasing of federal office space. The White House had proposed $840 million in new construction, the Senate only $56 million. The House did not appropriate any money for the agency to use for new construction.
In addition to cutbacks on new buildings, Congress is suggesting only $280 million in repairs of existing government buildings. In order to cut back, the GSA has dropped plans to renovate their own offices in favor of renovations at the Department of Homeland Security and the Food and Drug Administration.
Read the full story…
Texas “your work” exclusion
January 6, 2012 — CDCoverage.com
In American Home Assurance Co. v. Cat Tech, L.L.C., No. 10-20499 (5th Cir. Oct. 5, 2011), claimant Ergon hired insured Cat Tech to perform service on a reactor at Ergon’s refinery. During a start-up of the reactor after Cat Tech had completed its work, the reactor suffered damage. Cat Tech performed additional service and repairs. However, again upon start-up of the reactor, it suffered additional damage. Ergon hired another contractor to repair the reactor. Ergon initiated arbitration proceedings against Cat Tech. Cat Tech’s CGL insurer American Home defended Cat Tech against the Ergon arbitration under a reservation of rights.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of CDCoverage.com
Insurers Reacting to Massachusetts Tornadoes
August 11, 2011 — CDJ Staff
The Patriot-Ledger reports that insurers could pay out as much as $200 million to cover homes damaged or destroyed in the tornadoes that hit central and southern Massachusetts in June, 2011. Joseph Murphy, Commissioner of the State Division of Insurance didn?t foresee problems with insurers covering these claims. “At this point, there doesn’t seem to be any one company overexposed in that area,” he told the Patriot-Ledger.
Insurance executives did not think the tornadoes would cause them to raise rates. Steve Chevalier, CEO of NLC Companies, said, “it’s a major event for those impacted by it, but it’s not close to a financial hit to us.”
One insurer noted that the winter weather generated more claims; however the cumulative value of those claims was $15 million.
Read the full story…