ANAHEIM CALIFORNIA CONSTRUCTION EXPERT WITNESS
DIRECTORY AND CAPABILITIES

AFL-CIO Joins in $10 Billion Infrastructure Plan

The AFL-CIO has announced plans to generate up to $10 billion in funding for infrastructure development, training construction workers, and making buildings more energy efficient, pledging $20 million to retrofit buildings. Bloomberg News reports that union officials made the announcement in Chicago at the Clinton Global Initiative, releasing a statement from Richard Trumka, president of the union, “we, at the AFL-CIO, believe that together, with our partners in business and government, we can profitably invest significant resources to make America more competitive and energy efficient.” A foot injury prevented Mr. Trumka from attending the event.

The statement also quoted Mark Ayers, president of the Building and Construction Trades Department of the AFL-CIO, “the time is now to become intensely focused on the creation of jobs.”

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California Supreme Court to Examine Arbitration Provisions in Several Upcoming Cases

Glen C. Hansen, writing on Abbott & Kinderman’s Land Use Law Blog looks at several cases pending before the California Supreme Court which ask if a developer can insist on arbitration of construction defect claims, based on provision in the CC&Rs. Currently, there is a split of opinions in the California appeals courts on the issue.

Four of the cases are in California’s Fourth Appellate District. In the earliest case, Villa Milano Homeowners Association v. Il Davorge, from 2000, the court concluded that the arbitration clause was sufficient to require that construction defect claims undergo arbitration. However, the Fourth Appellate District Court concluded in three later cases that the arbitration clauses did not allow the developer to compel arbitration. In two cases, argued in 2008 and 2010, the court concluded that to do otherwise would deprive the homeowners of their right to a jury trial. In the most recent case, Villa Vicenza Homeowners Association v. Nobel Court Development, the court decided that the CC&Rs did not create contractual rights for the developer.

The Second Appellate District Court came to a similar decision in Promenade at Playa Vista Homeowners Association v. Western Pacific Housing, Inc. In their decision, the court noted that CC&Rs could be enforced by homeowners and homeowners associations, but not developers.

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Insurer’s Motion for Summary Judgment Based on Earth Movement Exclusion Denied

After carefully dissecting the earth movement exclusion, the court denied the insurer’s motion for summary judgment. High Street Lofts Condominium Assoc., Inc. v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109043 (D. Colo. Sept. 26, 2011).

The City of Boulder performed road repair work near High Street’s property, some of which involved the use of a vibrating compactor to compact and set the roadbed. High Street noticed damage to its building, such as cracks in walls, sloping of floors and separations of porches from the building itself. High Street contacted the City of Boulder, who forwarded the complaint to its contractor, Concrete Express, Inc.

High Street also filed a claim with its business insurer, American Family, who denied the claim. American Family relied on an opinion letter by High Street’s engineer. The letter indicated that the damage was the result of "soil consolidation/settlement," in response to the construction activities. Based on this letter American Family concluded the claim was excluded under the policy’s earth movement exclusion.

High Street sued American Family, who moved for summary judgment.

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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com

Toxic Drywall Not Covered Under Homeowner’s Policy

The Duphuys of Baton Rouge Louisiana found themselves needing to argue both sides of an issue, according to the judge in Duphuy v. USAA Casualty Insurance Company. The Duphuys alleged that the drywall in their home “emits odorous gases that cause damage to air-condition and refrigerator coils, copper tubing, electrical wiring, computer wiring, and other household items.” Additionally, they reported damage to “their home’s insulation, trimwork, floors, cabinets, carpets, and other items” which they maintained were “covered under the ‘ensuing loss’ portion of their policy.”

Their insurer declined coverage, stating that the damages were not a “direct, physical loss,” and even if they were “four different exclusions independently exclude coverage, even if such loss occurred.” The policy excludes defective building materials, latent defects, pollutants, and corrosion damage. The court noted that “ambiguities in policy exclusions are construed to afford coverage to the insured.”

The court did determine that the Duphuys were not in “a situation where the plaintiffs caused the risk for which they now seek coverage.” The judge cited an earlier case, In re Chinese Drywall, “a case with substantially similar facts and construing the same policy” and in that case, “property damage” was determined to “include the loss of use of tangible property.” The court’s conclusion was that the Duphuys “suffered a direct, physical loss triggering coverage under their policy.”

Unfortunately for the Duphuys, at this point the judge noted that while they had a “direct, physical loss,” the exclusions put them “in the tough predicament of claiming the drywall is neither defective nor its off-gassing corrosive or a pollutant, but nonetheless damage-causing.”

In the earlier Chinese Drywall case, the judge found that “faulty and defective materials” “constitutes a physical thing tainted by imperfection or impairment.” The case “found the drywall served its intended purpose as a room divider and insulator but nonetheless qualified under the exclusion, analogizing the drywall to building components containing asbestos that courts have previously determined fit under the same exclusion.” In the current case, the judge concluded that the drywall was “outside the realm of coverage under the policy.”

The court also found that it had to apply the corrosion exclusion, noting that the plaintiffs tried to evade this by stating, “simplistically and somewhat disingenuously, that the damage is not caused by corrosion but by the drywall itself.” The plaintiffs are, however, parties to another Chinese drywall case, Payton v. Knauf Gips KG, in which “they directly alleged that ‘sulfides and other noxious gases, such as those emitted from [Chinese] drywall, cause corrosion and damage to personal property.’” As the court pointed out, the Duphuys could not claim in one case that the corrosion was caused by gases emitted by the drywall and in another claim it was the drywall itself. “They hope their more ambiguous allegations will be resolved in their favor and unlock the doors to discovery.”

The court quickly noted that “the remaining damage allegations are too vague and conclusory to construe” and permitted “exploration of the latent defect and pollution exclusions.”

The judge concluded that the plaintiffs did not provide sufficient facts to establish coverage under the ensuing loss provision, stating that the “plaintiffs must allege, at the very least, how the drywall causes damage to the trimwork, carpet, etc., not simply that it does so.” Given the court’s determinations in the case, the plaintiffs’ motion was dismissed.

Read the court’s decision…

Homebuilding on the Rise in Nation’s Capitol

Is the homebuilding crunch over in DC? The Washington Post has reported that while new home construction is up throughout the country, in the DC area, construction has reached levels last seen in 2006. From January to August 2012, there were more than 19,000 building permits issued in the area, nearly doubling the number issued by that point in 2011.

While building is on a quicker pace, what’s being built has changed. As compared to 2006, there are more townhomes, condos, and smaller homes being built. The article notes that 11 percent of new construction is condos, while in 2006, it was only 5 percent.

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Businesspeople to Nevada: Revoke the Construction Defect Laws

The Nevada chapter of the National Federation of Independent Businesses has said that Nevada’s construction defect and minimum wage laws are hampering job growth. The organization conducted a survey, and although only about two percent of the members responded, they passed the opinions of the group on to Governor Brian Sandoval. Sandoval has said, according to the report by Fox News Reno, that he wants the state to be more business friendly. He supports reforms to Nevada’s construction defect laws, saying that he’d “like to see some reform” on the issue of mandatory attorney’s fees.

Randi Thompson, the spokesperson for the Nevada chapter of the National Federation of Independent Businesses, said that members of her organization would like to see current Nevada construction defect law revoked. She described current law as “driven towards lawyers and not toward protecting consumers.”

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The King of Construction Defect Scams

Echoing Businessweek, the Las Vegas Sun agrees that the Nevada HOA scandal is the “king of all Vegas real estate scams,” and says that the Nevada legislatures should take action. The Sun notes that the case involves only 12 out of 2,356 HOAs in Southern Nevada.

To date, 25 people have plead guilty in the case. At the center were an attorney and contractor who allegedly referred work to each other. To enable this, they assembled a wider conspiracy of people who enriched by the process. In the words of the Sun, those involved “upended the concept of a ‘common interest’ community.”

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Seven Former North San Diego County Landfills are Leaking Contaminants

Deborah Sullivan Brennan of the North County Times reported that seven former dumps in San Diego are leaking contaminants into the surrounding groundwater. John R. Odermatt, a senior engineering geologist for the California Regional Water Quality Control Board s San Diego region, told the North County Times, “the risk to most county residents is very small or negligible, while local water supplies located in more rural areas may be at a somewhat elevated but unquantified level of risk.”

This issue is causing heavy scrutiny of a new proposed landfill in Gregory Canyon. The landfill would be located on 308 acres of undeveloped land near Pala, alongside the San Luis Rey River. The group “Save Gregory Canyon” has been speaking out against the landfill, stating that “the project threatens major detrimental impacts to both surface and groundwater, as well as a potential compromise of the two major San Diego Water Authority pipelines nearby.” Richard Felago, a Gregory Canyon Ltd. Consultant, told the North County Times that the 8-foot-thick liner, composed of layers of gravel and synthetic material, would not leak.

The appeal hearing is being rescheduled later this month after one of the three panelists recused himself due to having a competing interest in the property, according to the article by Gary Warth in the North County Times.

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General Contractor/Developer May Not Rely on the Homeowner Protection Act to Avoid a Waiver of Consequential Damages in an AIA Contract

Recently, in Caribou Ridge Homes, LLC v. Zero Energy, LLC, et al., Case No. 10CV1094, Boulder County District Court Judge Ingrid S. Bakke entered a ruling and order on the Plaintiff’s Motion for Determination of Question of Law Pursuant to C.R.C.P. 56(h) on Issue of Damages. The Order found that the Plaintiff was not a homeowner intended to be protected by the Homeowner Protection Act (the “HPA”) and thus could not pursue its claims for consequential damages against Defendant.

By way of background, on June 18, 2008, Plaintiff Caribou Ridge Homes, LLC (“Caribou”) entered into a Standard Form Agreement Between Owner and Contractor AIA Document A114-2001 (the “Contract”) with Defendant Zero Energy, LLC (“Zero Energy”). Plaintiff hired Zero Energy to serve as a general contractor for the construction of a single-family home in the Caribou Ridge subdivision in Nederland, Colorado. A provision in the contract contained a mutual waiver of consequential damages (“Waiver”).

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Reprinted courtesy Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC

Save A Legal Fee? Sometimes You Better Talk With Your Construction Attorney

I love writing this column, because I think it’s refreshing for contractors to hear that they don’t always need an attorney. Today’s post is the “Un-Save a Legal Fee” because I want to point out a specific illustration of when you definitely need your attorney. Using a construction contract template can be fine, but you always need to consider its application to each project ? or it could bite you in the rear.

Seattle attorney Paul Cressman published a prime depiction of bad contract management, last week. A Florida appellate court struck down a general contractor’s “pay if paid” clause when it became ambiguous because of some incorporated language from its prime contract. Specifically, a clause in the prime contract required the general contractor to pay all subcontractors before receiving payment from the owner, while the general contractor’s “pay if paid” clause required its subcontractors to wait for payment until it arrived from the owner.

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Construction Defect Case Not Over, Despite Summary Judgment

The Supreme Court of Oregon has concluded in an en banc decision that a motion to reconsider a summary judgment is not a motion for a new trial. In coming to their conclusion the court overturned an earlier Oregon Supreme Court case, Carter v. U.S. National Bank. Although the decision does not bear on construction defects, the underlying case did. Due to the decision, these claims can now be evaluated in a trial.

The case, Association of Unit Owners of Timbercrest Condominiums v. Warren, came about after an apartment complex was converted into condominium units. The developers hired Big Al’s Construction for some of the remodeling work. The condominium association later sued the developer and the contractor over claims of construction defects. The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, which the court granted.

But that wasn’t the end of things. The plaintiff soon filed a “motion to reconsider,” noting that the summary judgment seemed to be in conflict with both law and other recent rulings, and additionally, the grounds for the decision were not in the order. The judge then notified the parties that the court had “pulled the trigger too quickly” and had seven questions for the parties to answer.

The court dismissed all claims against the defendants. The defendants filed their responses, objecting that that “‘there is no such thing’ as a motion for reconsideration.” Further, while “the rules do allow for post-judgment review of pre-judgment rulings through a motion for a new trial,” the plaintiffs had not filed for a new trial. But did they need one? They did file an appeal.

The judge in the case admitted that there was no such thing as a motion to reconsider, and felt bad about prematurely signing the judgment. The case was sent to the Court of Appeals to determine if the motion to reconsider was a request for a new trial. The Court of Appeals concurred.

In reviewing the decision, the Oregon Supreme Court concluded that there were a maximum of three questions to address. Was the motion for reconsideration a motion for a new trial? If so, was the later notice of appeal premature? And if so, was the plaintiff required to file a new appeal? The court determined that the answer to the first question was no.

Prior decisions pointed to the conclusion “that a motion for reconsideration of a summary judgment amounts to a motion for a new trial,” but here the court concluded that “our prior cases erred,” and turned to the summary judgment rule for clarification. The court noted that “the rule contemplates that summary judgment and trial are separate and distinct events.” With this conclusion, the Oregon Supreme Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings.

Read the court’s decision…

Crane Dangles and So Do Insurance Questions

Hurricane Sandy sent a construction crane dangling from the top of One57, a condo construction project in New York City. In response to the risk, the nearby Parker Meridian and other nearby buildings were evacuated until the crane could be stabilized. Businessweek reports that One57 involves “a tangle of companies,” including the developer, Extell Development and the contractor, Lend Lease Construction. Pinnacle Industries was responsible for providing and operating the crane.

The insurance claims are yet to be made, but they will likely include the costs of evacuating nearby buildings and to cover any damage to the building itself. David DeLaRue, a vice president in construction practice at Willis Group Holdings said there would be two questions: “Did our insured do anything to cause that loss? Does this policy cover it?”

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Damage During Roof Repairs Account for Three Occurrences

Southgate Gardens Condominium had buildings damaged by Hurricane Wilma in 2005. See Mid-Continent Cas. Co. v. Basedeo, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 11864 (11th Cir. June 12, 2012). First State Development Corporation was hired by Southgate to do repairs.

On November 1, 2005, First State completed tarping on the buildings. Thereafter, on November 11, 2005, First State contracted with Southgate to remove and replace the roofs of the Southgate Buildings.

The tarps placed by First State were inadequate and allowed water to enter the unit of Wayne Basdeo and cause damage. Further, when it attached the tarps, First State caused holes to be made in the roofs of buildings, leading to additional damage. First State also left open the mansards (a type of roof which has two slopes on all all sides, but with the lower slope steeper that the upper one). Finally, the peeled-back condition of the roofing allowed rain to enter.

Basdeo filed a claim with Mid-Continent.

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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com

No-Show Contractor Can’t Hide from Construction Defect Claim

The failure of R. J. Haas to produce documents or make himself available for deposition has worn out the patience of the US District Court in San Jose. Judge Howard Lloyd issued a ruling inProbuilders Specialty Ins. Co. v. Valley Corp. (N.D. Cal., 2012).

Probuilders issued an insurance policy covering Haas for their work on the construction of a single-family home for Ty and Karen Levine. The Levines sued Haas for “shoddy and incomplete work.” Probuilders contends that Haas “made material misrepresentations with respect to verifying that the subcontractors had insurance.” Since November 2011, Haas has been without legal counsel in this matter.

Despite Probuilder’s attempts, the court noted that “Hass any not provided any documents in response to the plaintiff’s three sets of requests for production of documents.” Haas also “has refused to make himself available for deposition.” Haas was first scheduled for deposition in September, 2011. Subsequently, Haas has rescheduled his deposition repeatedly, postponing it to January 4, then February 13, and then agreed to be deposed “before the then-scheduled March 15 mediation,” after which he said he would “be unavailable to be deposed before April.

The court noted that although Haas “hay have had legitimate reasons for wishing to continue his deposition, such as illness and his attempt to retain new counsel,” however, the court concluded that “Haas has had ample time to retain new counsel and prepare for deposition.

The court also found fault with Haas’s objections to certain terms in the Request for Admissions, among them “named,” “independent contractor,” and “work,” noting that Haas called these “vague and ambiguous.” The court called it “quibbling,” and noted that the federal courts disfavor this. Later in the decision, the court made it clear that Haas “is obligated under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to respond to discovery requests.” And concludes, “that he has apparently been seeking to retain new counsel for over five months does not give him license to ignore plaintiff’s discovery requests entirely.

The court granted Probuilders the option of filing a motion for sanctions. Mr. Haas did not attend or participate.

Read the court’s decision…

Limiting Plaintiffs’ Claims to a Cause of Action for Violation of SB-800

There has been a fair share of publicity about the SB-800 amendments to the Civil Code (Civil Code section 896, et seq.) that codified construction defect litigation in 2002. Most of the publicity is geared toward the pre-litigation standards allowing a builder the right to repair before litigation is commenced by a homeowner. Less focus and attention has been given to the fact that violation of the SB-800 performance standards is being used by plaintiff’s counsel as an additional tool in the plaintiff’s pleading tool box against builders. Closer scrutiny to SB-800 reveals that those provisions should in fact act as a limitation to the pleading tools available to plaintiffs and an additional tool for builders in the defense of cases governed by SB-800.

The typical construction defect complaint contains the boiler plate versions of numerous causes of action. These causes of action include Strict Liability, Negligence, Negligence Per Se, Breach of Contract, Breach of Contract – Third-Party Beneficiary, Breach of Express Warranties, Breach of Implied Warranties, among others. The wide array of causes of action leave a defendant “pinned to the wall” because they require a complex defense on a multitude of contract and tort related causes of action. Furthermore, the statutes of limitations as to these claims widely differ depending upon if the particular defect is considered latent or patent. The truth of the matter remains, no matter what the circumstances, if a construction defect matter ultimately goes to trial, it is inevitable that plaintiffs will obtain a judgment on at least one of these causes of action.

On its own, the Strict Liability cause of action can be a thorn in a defendant’s side. A builder is obviously placing a product into the stream of commerce and strict liability is a tough standard to defend against, particularly when it concerns intricate homes comprised of multiple components that originally sold for hundreds of thousands of dollars. A Negligence cause of action can also be difficult to defend because the duty of care for a builder is what a “reasonable” builder would have done under the circumstances. An interpretation of this duty of care can easily sway a jury that will almost always consist of sympathetic homeowners. A Negligence Per Se cause of action can also leave a defendant vulnerable to accusations that a builder violated the Uniform Building Code or a multitude of other obscure municipal construction-related code provisions during the construction of the home. Lastly, the Breach of Contract cause of action leaves a builder relying on dense and intricate purchase and sale agreements with dozens of addenda which leave the skeptical jurors turned off by what they view as one-side, boilerplate provisions. Ultimately, when a matter is about to go to trial, the complexity of these complaints can benefit a plaintiff and increase a plaintiff’s bargaining power against a defendant who is attempting to avoid a potentially large judgment.

Enter the SB-800 statutes. The SB-800 statutes apply to all homes sold after January 1, 2003. Civil Code section 938 specifically states that “[t]his title applies only to new residential units where the purchase agreements with the buyer was signed by the seller on or after January 1, 2003.” (Civil Code §, 938.) As time progresses, more residential construction defect cases will exclusively fall under the purview of SB-800. Slowly but surely more SB-800 governed litigation is being filed, and its exclusive application is looming on the horizon.

On its surface, this “right to repair” regime has left builders with a lot to be desired despite the fact that it is supposed to allow the builder the opportunity to cure any deficiencies in their product before litigation can be filed by potential plaintiffs. However, the application of the time line for repair has shown to be impractical for anything but the most minor problems involving only small numbers of residential units. Moreover, the fact that the fruits of the builder’s investigation into the claimed defects in the pre-litigation context can freely be used as evidence against it in litigation makes builders proceed with trepidation in responding with a repair. For these reasons, more SB-800 litigation can be expected to result due to the shortcomings of the pre-litigation procedures, and savvy defense counsel should anticipate the issues to be dealt with in presenting the defense of such cases at trial.

This fact should not necessarily be met with fear or disdain. Within the SB-800 statutes, the legislature made it clear that they were creating a new cause of action for construction defect claims, but it further made it clear that this cause of action is a plaintiff’s exclusive remedy. The legislature giveth, but at the same time, the legislature taketh away. Throughout numerous provisions within the SB-800 statutes, the Civil Code states that claims for construction defects as to residential construction are exclusively governed by the Civil Code, and that the Civil Code governs any and all litigation arising under breaches of these provisions. Civil Code section 896 specifically states:

In any action seeking recovery of damages arising out of, or related to deficiencies in, the residential construction … the claimant’s claims or causes of action shall be limited to violation of, the following standards, except as specifically set forth in this title. (Civil Code §, 896.)

Civil Code section 896 then provides approximately fifty-plus standards by which a construction defect claim is assessed under that provision. Civil Code section 896 covers everything from plumbing to windows, and from foundations to decks, and in several instances expressly dictates statutes of limitations as to specific areas of construction that severely truncate the 10-year latent damage limitations period. As for any construction deficiencies that are not enumerated within Civil Code section 896, Civil Code section 897 explicitly defines the intent of the standards and provides a method to assess deficiencies that are not addressed in Civil Code section 896. Civil Code section 897 states:

Intent of Standards

The standards set forth in this chapter are intended to address every function or component of a structure. To the extent that a function or component of a structure is not addressed by these standards, it shall be actionable if it causes damage. (Civil Code §, 897.)

Therefore, Civil Code section 897 acts as a catch-all by which defects that are not covered within Civil Code section 896 can be evaluated on a damage standard mirroring the Aas case (damages must be present and actual). The result of sections 896 and 897 being read in combination is a comprehensive, all-inclusive set of performance standards by which any defect raised by Plaintiffs can be evaluated and resolved under a single SB-800 based cause of action.

Civil Code section 943 makes clear that a cause of action for violation of SB-800 performance standards is a plaintiff’s sole remedy for a residential construction defect action. Specifically, Civil Code section 943 states:

Except as provided in this title, no other cause of action for a claim covered by this title or for damages recoverable under 944 is allowed. In addition to the rights under this title, this title does not apply to any action by a claimant to enforce a contract or express contractual provision, or any action for fraud, personal injury, or violation of a statute. (Civil Code §, 943.)

Civil Code section 944 provides the method for computing damages within a construction defect action, as follows:

If a claim for damages is made under this title, the homeowner is only entitled to damages for the reasonable value of repairing any violation of the standards set forth in this title, [and] the reasonable cost of repairing any damages caused by the repair efforts… . (Civil Code §, 944.)

A cursory review of these statutes yields the conclusion that the legislature was attempting to create an exclusive cause of action that trumps all other causes of action where SB-800 applies. The remedy available to plaintiffs is limited to that allowed by the Civil Code. As noted above, “[n]o other cause of action for a claim covered by this title…is allowed.” (Civil Code §, 943.) Therefore, Civil Code sections 896, 897, 943, and 944 specifically prohibit the contract-based and tort-based causes of action typically pled by plaintiffs.

Plaintiff’s counsel has seized upon the language of section 943 to advance the argument that SB-800 still allows a plaintiff to advance typical contract and tort based causes of action. On the surface, this argument may seem compelling, but a minimum of scrutiny of the express language of section 943 dispels this notion. Section 943 says that it provides rights “[i]n addition” to those under the SB-800 Civil Code provisions. Clearly, the language in section 943 is intended to expressly underscore the fact that a plaintiff is not precluded from seeking relief in addition to that allowed under SB-800 for damages not arising from a breach of the SB-800 standards or for damages in addition to those recoverable under Section 944. This language does not provide an unfettered license to bring a Strict Liability, Negligence or other cause of action against a builder where SB-800 applies.

In fact, this language only keeps the door open for plaintiffs to pursue such causes of action not arising from a breach of the SB-800 standards should there be such supporting allegations. For example, if a plaintiff alleges that a builder breached an “express contractual provision” related to the timing of the completion of the home and close of escrow, and the contract specifies damages in this regard, a plaintiff may have a viable separate cause of action for Breach of Contract for recovery of those damages precisely because that is not an issue expressly dealt with in SB-800 in the performance standards under sections 896 and 897, or in the damage recovery terms under 944. As it stands, the vast majority of complaints are seeking redress for violation of the same primary right; that is, defects specifically outlined in Section 896 and 897 or which result in damages as stated in Section 944.

So, how does a builder defend against a complaint that contains multiple causes of action regarding construction defects for a home sold after January 1, 2003? There are numerous ways to approach this. First and foremost, these superfluous and improper causes of action can be attacked by demurrer seeking dismissal of all causes of action other than the cause of action alleging violation of SB-800. If the the time period within which to file a demurrer has passed already, a motion for judgment on the pleadings can be utilized to attack the improper causes of action in the same way as a demurrer can be used for this purpose.

The limitation to a demurrer or motion for judgment on the pleadings is that the judge is restricted to viewing only the four corners of the pleading when making a ruling. It is typical for plaintiffs’ counsel to cleverly (or one might even say, disingenuously) leave the complaint purposely vague to avoid a successful defense attack on the pleadings by not including the original date the residence was sold. In that instance, a motion for summary adjudication can be used to attack a plaintiff’s complaint. By simply providing evidence that the homes were originally sold after January 1, 2003, the improper causes of action should be subject to dismissal by summary adjudication. If the plaintiff is a subsequent purchaser, the builder still has recourse to enforce the pleading limitations under SB-800. Civil Code section 945 states that “[t]he provisions, standards, rights, and obligations set forth in this title are binding upon all original purchasers and their successors-in-interest.” (Civil Code §, 945.)

Attacking a plaintiff’s complaint to eliminate multiple causes of action can have numerous benefits. The practical result is that a plaintiff will only have one viable cause of action. The advantage is that the SB-800 performance standards include the defined performance standards and shortened statutes of limitations periods with regard to specific issues. Furthermore, as to defects which are not specifically provided for in Civil Code section 896, Civil Code section 897 requires a proof of actual damages. Therefore, a plaintiff must provide evidence of current damages and not simply conditions that may potentially cause damage in the future.

The Appellate Courts have yet to directly address and interpret these SB-800 provisions. The time for that is undoubtedly drawing near. For now, however, plaintiffs will have to find ways to accurately plead construction defect claims within the confines of one cause of action for breach of the performance standards enumerated within the Civil Code.

Printed courtesy of Lorber, Greenfield & Polito, LLP. Mr. Patel can be contacted at spatel@lorberlaw.com and Mr. Verbick at tverbick@lorberlaw.com.

Insurer Must Cover Construction Defects Claims under Actual Injury Rule

The Texas Court of Appeals held that the insured need not prove the exact dates physical damage occurred in order to trigger defense and indemnity coverage. Vines-Herrin Custom Homes, LLC v. Great Am. Lloyds Ins. Co., 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 10027 (Tex. Ct. App. Dec. 21, 2011).

In 1999, the insured built a home. He was insured under a CGL policy issued by Great American from November 9, 1998 to November 9, 2000. Thereafter, the insured held a CGL policy issued by Mid-Continent from November 9, 2000 to September 18, 2002.

After construction was completed, the insured sold the house to the buyer in May 2000. After moving in, the buyer found numerous construction defects in the home, including water entering cracks in the home, and sinking and sagging of parts of the house. The buyer sued the insured, who sought coverage under the two policies. When the insurers refused to defend the underlying suit, the insured sued for a declaratory judgment.

The underlying case went to arbitration and an award of $2.4 million was granted to the buyer. The insured assigned to the buyer his claims against the insurers.

Read the full story…

Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com

Arbitration Clause Found Ambiguous in Construction Defect Case

The California Court of Appeals ruled on September 28 in the case of Burch v. Premier Homes. Ms. Burch bought a home after negotiating various addendums to the contract. The contract was a standard California Association of Realtors contract to which both the buyer and seller made additions. At issue in this case was paragraph 17 of the contract which included that “Buyer and Seller agree that any dispute or claim in Law or equity arising between them out of this Agreement or resulting transaction, which is not settled through mediation, shall be decided by neutral, binding arbitration.”

The seller/defendant’s Addendum 2 “included provisions relating to the arbitration of disputes that may arise.” Ms. Burch’s realtor, Lisa Morrin, told Burch that “she had never seen a proposed contractual provision that would require a home buyer to agree to arbitrate with a builder over construction defects.” Ms. Burch told Morrin that she did not want to buy the property if she would have to give up her rights under California law.

As part of Addendum 2, the buyer had to buy a warranty from the Home Buyers Warranty Corporation. The sale was held up for a while, as Ms. Burch waited for a copy of the warranty. When she received it, she took further exception to Addendum 2. Scott Warren of Premier Homes said he could not sell the property without Addendum 2. Ms. Burch told her realtor that despite the claims made by Mr. Warren that this was for her benefit, she felt it was more to the benefit of Premier Homes. Don Aberbrook of HBW agreed to the clause, contained in the final sentence of Addendum 2, being struck.

Subsequent to buying the home, Burch submitted a claim concerning construction defects. HBW denied the claim and Burch began an action against the defendants. Premier filed a motion to compel arbitration which Burch opposed.

The trial court ruled that the striking out of the arbitration clause at the end of Addendum 2 “created a conflict with respect to the parties’ intent as to the scope of arbitration.” The trial court found that “the parties’ intention was to preserve Burch’s right to make state law claims including her right to a jury trial for any non-warranty claims against the builder.”

The appeals court in their ruling looked at the standard of review and concluded that the purchase agreement was ambiguous and that extrinsic evidence was required to resolve that ambiguity. As the contract contained contradictory provisions as to whether or not arbitration was required, it was necessary for the trial court to examine these claims. The appeals court found that the evidence supported the conclusions of the trial court.

Finally, the appeals court found that “there was no valid agreement to arbitrate disputes.” The court noted that arbitration can only happen by mutual consent and “it is clear that Burch did not enter into an agreement to arbitrate any construction defect disputes she might have.”

Read the court’s decision…

Going Green for Lower Permit Fees

Clay County, Kansas is offering rebates on building permits for green homes. According to the Kansas City Star, building permits in the county are typically $2,500. The county will rebate anything from half to all of the permit fee, depending on how well the builder meets green standards. The county will monitor and inspect the process to make certain that builders adhere to their promises for green construction. The county hopes this will encourage green building by offsetting the cost.

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