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    California Builders Right To Repair Current Law Summary:

    Current Law Summary: SB800 (codified as Civil Code §§895, et seq) is the most far-reaching, complex law regulating construction defect litigation, right to repair, warranty obligations and maintenance requirements transference in the country. In essence, to afford protection against frivolous lawsuits, builders shall do all the following:A homeowner is obligated to follow all reasonable maintenance obligations and schedules communicated in writing to the homeowner by the builder and product manufacturers, as well as commonly accepted maintenance practices. A failure by a homeowner to follow these obligations, schedules, and practices may subject the homeowner to the affirmative defenses.A builder, under the principles of comparative fault pertaining to affirmative defenses, may be excused, in whole or in part, from any obligation, damage, loss, or liability if the builder can demonstrate any of the following affirmative defenses in response to a claimed violation:


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    Construction Expert Witness News and Information
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    ANAHEIM CALIFORNIA CONSTRUCTION EXPERT WITNESS
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    Ghost Employees Steal Jobs from Legit Construction Firms

    September 13, 2012 — CDJ Staff

    Firms that skirt labor laws for construction workers can undercut firms that are obeying those laws. In a piece in Raleigh, North Carolina’s News & Observer, Doug Burton, a commercial masonry contractor summed it up: “my competitors are cheating.” The article describes the low-bidding firms “called their workers independent contractors ? or treated them like ghosts, paid under the table and never acknowledged.” The cost to the state is “unpaid medical bills for injured workers, uncollected business and personal taxes, and payments not made to a depleted state unemployment reserve.”

    One firm examined in the article, Martin’s Bricklaying, employs mostly immigrant Mexican laborers, many of whom are in the country illegally. One employee told the News & Observer, “we don’t complain.”

    Read the full story…


    The Ever-Growing Thicket Of California Civil Code Section 2782

    January 6, 2012 — Michael D. Worthing, Borton Petrini

    California Civil Code section 2782 imposes limits on indemnity and defense provisions in construction contracts. Since the initial adoption of S.B. 8001 in 2002 (eff. January 1, 2003) section 27822 has been revised several times, and legislative history suggests that interest groups representing builders, developers and sub-contractors, as well as the insurance industry, have seen legislative action on these indemnity and defense issues as part of the overall response to the same economic pressures resulting from construction defect litigation that gave rise to S.B. 800. Amendments in 2005, 2007, 2008 and 2011 (each effective January 1 of the following year) have increasingly entangled the provisions of Section 2782 with various provisions of S.B. 800. The application of section 2782 to construction contracts, and in particular contracts between developer-builders and subcontractors, executed after January 1, 2006, will require a concurrent reading and understanding of S.B. 800, the application of which is itself still in flux.

    The time a construction contract was executed will likely determine which version of section 2782, read in connection with provisions of S.B.800, is applicable. Because of the nature of construction defect litigation, the determination of relative rights and liabilities of developer-builders vis-à-vis subcontractors under construction contracts does not become the subject of litigation, and legal and judicial interpretation, until years after the contracts were entered and work performed. As of the date this article is submitted, there has been no case law interpreting or applying any of the post S.B. 800 amendments, in part, and perhaps primarily, because litigation arising from construction contracts executed after January 1, 2006, has not yet reached the appellate courts.

    SECTION 2782 AT THE TIME S.B. 800 WAS ENACTED

    Section 2782 was originally enacted in 1967 and amended several times to the version in effect when S.B. 800 became law, at which time the section was relatively simple and straightforward. It then consisted of two subdivisions, which have essentially remained unchanged until the most recent amendment during the 2011 legislative session.

    Section 2782 (a) prohibited, and still prohibits, provisions in construction contracts that “purport to indemnify the promisee against liability for damages for death or bodily injury to persons, injury to property, or any other loss, damage or expense arising from the sole negligence or willful misconduct of the promise.” This provision essentially prohibits what had been referred to as so-called Type I or “specific” indemnity provisions. In such agreements, the indemnitor [the promisor, that is, the person or entity indemnifying] will indemnify the indemnitee [the promisee, that is, the person or entity being protected by the indemnity] for the indemnitee’s own negligence, whether active or passive, whether the indemnitee is solely negligent or concurrently negligent with the indemnitor. (See, MacDonald & Kruse, Inc. v. San Jose Steel Co. (1972) 29 Cal.App.3d 413, 419.)3 Section 2782 (a) has remained essentially intact since the enactment of S.B. 800. It still must be considered and applied to interpret a construction contract. Generally, it will apply to contracts not involving a public agency; the next part of section 2782 specifically governs such contracts.

    The second subdivision prohibits provisions in any construction contract with a public agency which purport to impose on the contractor, or relieve the public agency from, liability for the active negligence of the public agency. Subdivision (b) has been revised by the 2011 amendment, discussed below. If a construction contract with the public agency is for residential construction, the standards of S.B. 800 likely apply.4

    This was the extent of section 2782 on January 1, 2003, when S.B. 800 went into effect, and remained so until January 1, 2006. This version will govern interpretation and application of indemnity and defense provisions in construction contracts executed before January 1, 2006.5

    2005 AMENDMENT

    The first “post S.B. 800” change to Section 2782 was in enacted in 2005, effective January 1, 2006, and added two new sections. Subdivision (c) stated (in somewhat greater detail than paraphrased here) that for residential construction contracts, or amendments thereto, entered into after January 1, 2006, a subcontractor cannot be required to indemnify (including the cost to defend) a builder for construction defects that arise out of negligence or design defects of the builder or other independent contractors, or that do not arise out of the scope of the subcontractor=s scope of work. The term “residential construction” was defined by reference to S.B.800 generally, and the term “builder” was defined by reference to section 911 (a part of S.B. 800), for the first time expressly connecting provisions of section 2782 to S.B. 800. Contractual provisions not expressly prohibited were reserved to the agreement of the parties.

    What subdivision (c) took away was partially given back by subdivision (d). It stated that “subdivision (c) does not prohibit a subcontractor and builder from mutually agreeing to the timing or immediacy of the defense and provisions for reimbursement of defense fees and costs, so long as that agreement, upon final resolution of the claims, does not waive or modify the provisions of subdivision (c).”6 In addition, it stated that this subdivision (c) did not affect the obligations of an insurance carrier under Presley Homes, Inc. v. American States Insurance Company (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 571, which holds that where an insurer has a duty to defend a developer pursuant to an additional insured endorsement obtained under a subcontractor’s policy, that duty generally applies to the entire action, even if the suit involves both covered and uncovered claims, or a single claim only partially covered by the policy. Finally, subdivision (d) stated that the amendment did not affect the builder’s or subcontractor’s obligations under S.B. 800. Both of these latter provisions, relating to the Presley Homes case, and obligations under S.B. 800, have been carried forward essentially intact in subsequent amendments of section 2782.

    This version of section 2782 will be applicable to any contract between a builder as defined by section 911 (see fn. 4, above) and a subcontractor executed between January 1, 2006, and December 31, 2008. Thus, a general contractor, etc., who is not a builder is not subject to the provisions added by the 2005 amendment; this changed with the next amendment.

    It is not clear whether this version would apply to a contract entered before January 1, 2006, but amended after that date. Subdivision (c) applies to “all construction contracts, and amendments thereto, entered into after January 1, 2006, for residential construction.” It would seem that the clearest and most logical construction would apply it only to contracts originally made after January 1, 2006, and thereafter amended, but there has been no judicial determination of this issue.

    In addition, logically it would seem that this version of section 2782 should be applicable to construction contracts for residential construction between a builder and a subcontractor, entered between January 1, 2006, and December 31, 2008; however, legislative history relating to the 2008 amendment discussed below suggests a different result might occur.

    2007 AMENDMENT

    The second “post S.B. 800” amendment in 2007 (effective January 1, 2008), added subdivisions (e)(1) and (e)(2).

    Subdivision (e)(1) added general contractors and subcontractors not affiliated with the builder and imposed essentially the same restrictions on provisions to indemnify, including the cost to defend, them as had been imposed on the “builder” by the 2005 amendment. The amendment refers to section 911 (b), again part of S.B. 800, to define general contractors, etc., not affiliated with the builder.

    Subdivision (e)(1) essentially repeated the provisions of subdivision (d) permitting agreement to the timing and immediacy of the defense, the reference to the Presley Homes case, and the general contractor’s or subcontractor’s obligations under S.B. 800.

    It appears this amendment was an attempt to harmonize the new restrictions on indemnity and defense provisions with S.B. 800. The 2005 amendment, whether by oversight or intent, covered only builders and not general contractors, although both classes are subject to the provisions of S.B. 800; the 2007 amendment added non-builder-affiliated general contractors.

    Again, logically, it would seem that this version of section 2782 should be applicable to construction contracts for residential construction between a general contractor or contractor not affiliated with a builder and a subcontractor, entered between January 1 and December 31, 2008; however, legislative history relating to the 2008 amendment discussed below suggests a different result might occur. The same potential uncertainty regarding applicability to a contract entered before January 1, 2008, but amended after that date, exists for this provision as for the prior amendment, discussed above.

    2008 AMENDMENT

    The third “post S.B. 800” amendment in 2008 (effective January 1, 2009), reorganized the language relating to prohibited indemnity provisions, added a reference to insurance in that same prohibition, extensively rewrote the provisions governing agreements relating to the timing or immediacy of defense, added language preserving equitable indemnity claims, and added language defining “construction defect” by reference to the standards set forth in S.B. 800.

    Subdivisions (a) and (b) remained unchanged.

    Subdivision (c) now made a combined reference to builders (again by reference to section 911), as well as general contractors or contractors not affiliated with the builder (again by reference to section 911 (b)), rather than dealing with the two groups in separate but nearly identical subdivisions as previously. It otherwise restated the same limitations that were previously set forth separately in subdivisions (c) and (e), as well as the reference to the Presley Homes case, and the general contractor’s or subcontractor’s obligations under S.B. 800, but with one important addition. The word “insure” was added to the description of prohibited provisions, to-wit: “provisions? that purport to insure or indemnify, including the cost to defend, the builder, [etc.]? are unenforceable” to the extent they arise out of claims of the type previously described.

    It is unclear what impact the addition of this single word “insure” will have; and, it will have to be read in light of the preservation of the language that it shall not affect the obligations of an insurance carrier under the holding of the Presley Homes case. Suppose a carrier had issued an additional insured endorsement under which it would otherwise be required to defend a builder or general contractor consistent with the Presley Homes rule: would this newly added single word (restricting the construction contract, to which the carrier is not a party) give the carrier a basis for denying coverage under the insurance contract? Or would the continued inclusion of the express language that it does not affect the obligations of an insurance carrier under Presley Homes control? That is surely an issue that will have to be worked out by the courts.

    The new subdivision (d) addressed defense obligations. Again it permitted parties to agree to the timing and immediacy of the defense and provision for reimbursement of defense fees and costs, but imposed a very detailed scheme that appears to limit the extent of such agreement. A subcontractor owes no defense or indemnity obligation until the builder or general contractor provides a written tender of the claim, which has the same force and effect as notice of commencement of a legal proceeding. Upon that tender the subcontractor shall elect to follow one of two ways of performing: subdivision (d) (1) permits the subcontractor to defend with counsel of its choice and to control the defense, if the subcontractor gives written notice of this election within a reasonable time after receipt of the written tender and in no event later than 90 days following that receipt; subdivision (d) (2) provides an alternative by which the subcontractor pays a reasonable allocated share of the builder’s or general contractor’s defense fees and costs within 30 days of receipt of an invoice, subject to reallocation upon final resolution of the claim by settlement or judgment. Subdivision (e) sets forth remedies available to the builder or general contractor if a subcontractor fails to timely and adequately perform its obligations under either of the two alternatives in subdivision (d), including compensatory and consequential damages, reasonable attorneys’ fees in connection with the first alternative, and interest on defense and indemnity costs in connection with the second alternative. Subdivision (e) ends with provisions relating to reallocation of defense costs, and damages for failure to reallocate.

    Application of these requirements in actual litigation is likely to be cumbersome and potentially fraught with conflicts. If retained pursuant to subdivision (d) (1) does the attorney represent the builder, the subcontractor, or both? To whom does the attorney owe his or her fiduciary duty? Can an appropriate informed written consent be formulated, for example, under Rule 3-310 of the California Rules of Professional Conduct, or Rule 1.7, ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct? Could an attorney retained by a subcontractor blame the subcontractor if that is in the developer’s best interests? If multiple subcontractors elect to defend directly, how would the defense be coordinated among the potentially multiple attorneys so retained? Would an attorney retained by one subcontractor be able, or inclined, to blame another subcontractor who also chose to defend directly, in other words, what would prevent inconsistent defense positions amongst the various counsel retained by subcontractors for the developer? There may be solutions to such practical and professional considerations but it seems an ethical thicket awaits any attorney involved in such circumstances.

    Subdivision (e) and (f) preserve equitable indemnity claims for the builder, general contractor or subcontractor, the first in general, the second as against any supplier, design profession, or product manufacturer. Finally, the 2008 amendment added for the first time, in subdivision (h), language defining "construction defect" as used in section 2782 as a violation of standards set forth in S.B. 800.

    The inclusion of these last three subsections would seem to work against simplification of litigation. A builder or general contractor is likely to allege a claim for equitable indemnity against any and all subcontractors in addition to claims for contractual indemnity and defense (however limited by the other provisions of section 2782). Nothing in the section suggests the subcontractor should, or even can, somehow take on the representation of the builder, etc., in connection with a claim of equitable indemnity back against the subcontractor.

    And the limited definition of “construction defect” in subdivision (h) appears to raise an issue of the applicability of the limitations set forth in subdivision (c). Although there is a school of thought that section 941 limits residential construction defect claims only to breach of the performance standards under S.B. 800, it is still common for CD complaints to plead other legal theories, e.g., breach of contract, breach of warranty, negligence, etc., in addition to violation of S.B. 800 standards. With the addition of subdivision (h) it is arguable that the restrictions on indemnity and defense provisions spelled out in subdivisions (c) and (d), both of which relate to claims for residential construction defects, are applicable only to claims for violation of S.B. 800 standards, and not other residential construction defect claims. In other words, a developer might conceivably still be entitled to a broader scope of indemnity and concomitant defense for other types of claims, such as breach of contract, breach of warranty, negligence, etc., so long as the indemnity does not violate the limitation of subdivision (a) against Type I indemnity, which as noted above, has remained intact through these revisions.

    Finally, it would seem that this version of section 2782 should be applicable to contracts executed between builders, general contractors, etc., on the one hand and subcontractors on the other hand on and after January 1, 2009. And, as noted above in connection with the 2005 and 2007 amendments, logic would suggest that those versions would ordinarily apply to contracts executed during the time periods mentioned above. But, the Legislative Counsel’s Digest for the 2008 amendment as it finally was enacted into law includes the following statements:

    This bill would delete the provisions applicable to construction contracts entered into on or after January 1, 2008, that purport to indemnify the general contractor or contractor not affiliated with the builder. The bill would revise the provisions applicable to contracts entered into after January 1, 2006, to instead apply to contracts entered into after January 1, 2009, and to apply to agreements that purport to insure or indemnify the builder or the general contractor or contractor not affiliated with the builder, as described.

    Although it seems a startling result, this legislative history suggests an argument can be made that the 2008 amendment retroactively nullified the effect of the 2005 and 2007 amendments, so that contracts executed from January 1, 2006, as to builders or January 1, 2008, for general contractors, etc., through December 31, 2008, are still governed by the provisions of section 2782 as it was on the books prior to the first post-S.B. 800 amendment in 2005.

    2011 AMENDMENT

    Section 2782 has been amended yet again in the 2011 session of the California Legislature, effective January 1, 2012; however, the substantive changes affect certain contracts entered on or after January 1, 2013. All of the provisions contained in the 2008 amendment have been carried forward in the most recent amendment, although re-numbered: (c) became (d), etc., through (h) becoming (i). So, the law governing construction contracts entered into after January 1, 2009, for residential construction, as between a builder, or a general contractor, etc., not affiliated with a builder, and regarding insurance, indemnity or defense relating to claims for construction defects, remains the same as in the 2008 amendment.

    As noted above the substantive changes to section 2782 all affect contracts entered into on or after January 1, 2013. Subdivision (b) has been amended such that any provision in a contract with a public agency that purports to impose on any contractor, etc., or relieve the public agency from, liability for the active negligence of the public agency will be void and unenforceable. A new subdivision (c) has been added that imposes a similar restriction on construction contracts with the owner of privately owned real property to be improved and as to which the owner is not acting as a contractor or supplier of materials or equipment to the work. This new restriction in subdivision (c) does not apply to a homeowner performing a home improvement project on his or her own single family dwelling.

    The 2011 bill amending section 2782 also added a new section 2782.05, which will make void and unenforceable any provision in any construction contract (again, entered on or after January 1, 2013) that purports to insure or indemnify, including the cost to defend, a general contractor, construction manager, or other subcontractor, by a subcontractor for claims that arise out of the active negligence or willful misconduct of the general contractor, etc., or other independent contractors, etc., or to the extent the claims do not arise out of the scope of work of the subcontractor. However, the section also includes a long list of situations to which it does not apply, including all of those covered by section 2782 (residential construction subject to S.B. 800, public agency contracts subject to section 2782 (b), and direct contracts with private property owners subject to the new section 2782 (c)) as well as eight other categories. This apparently is intended to serve as a “catch-all” to extend a limitation on indemnity agreements to all construction contracts not previously swept into this widening legislative scheme, although the exact phrasing is slightly different.7

    The new section 2782.05 then permits a mutual agreement to the timing or immediacy of a defense under a scheme essentially identical to that imposed in the 2008 amendment to section 2782: defend with counsel of choice, and maintain control of the defense; or, pay a reasonable allocated share of defense fees and costs. The same logistical and ethical difficulties presented by the 2008 scheme discussed above would likely be present in cases that fall under the new section 2782.05.

    CONCLUSION

    The California Legislature has been revising section 2782 since shortly after the adoption of S.B. 800. Each revision has been more complicated than the last, and each has tied certain provisions of section 2782 more closely to S.B. 800. In particular, with regard to construction defect claims relating to residential dwellings which are subject to S.B. 800, the Legislature has apparently attempted to exercise more and more control over the scope of allowable indemnity and dictated a very narrow scheme to govern how the defense obligation arising from a contractual indemnity is to be implemented. It seems likely that any attempt to manage the defense of a construction defect case under the options that allow a subcontractor to defend directly and control the defense will create a logistical problem and an ethical difficulty for any attorney attempting to defend a developer at the behest and direction of a subcontractor. Finally, as set forth in the current version of section 2782 relating to contractual indemnity and defense of S.B. 800 type cases (subdivisions (c) through (h) in the 2008 version, now subdivisions (d) through (i) in the 2011 amendment), the Legislature has apparently narrowed the application to only claims of violation of S.B. 800 standards. This may have, in essence, removed the restrictions on indemnity and defense provisions as they relate to other theories pleaded against developers in construction defense cases, e.g., breach of contract, breach of warranty, negligence, and the like. It is not at all clear that the Legislature has accomplished what it set out do accomplish. Rather, the law may have come full circle back to where it began, except for one legal theory, i.e. violation of S.B. 800 standards, currently being used in residential construction defect cases. For any other legal theory the limitation of section 2782 (a) may be solely controlling.

    1. California Civil Code section 43.99, and sections 895 to 945.5.
    2. All statutory references in this article are to the California Civil Code unless otherwise specified.
    3. Type I or specific indemnity does not exactly match the scope of proscribed indemnity as described in section 2782 (a) but it is the closest. More recent case law in California has eschewed a mechanical application of the MacDonald & Kruse typology in favor of examining the precise text of the actual contract (See, e.g., St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Frontier Pacific Ins. Co. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1234, 1246, n. 6) but some recent cases still use the Type I, II and II classifications. And, an understanding of that “historical” typology is useful as an aid to evaluating and understanding express indemnity in general.
    4. The provisions of S.B. 800 other than the prelitigation procedures of sections 910 through 938 apply to general contractors, subcontractors, etc., pursuant to section 936. The prelitigation procedures generally involve a “builder,” which is specifically defined in section 911 (a) by reference to entities or individuals in the business of selling residential units to the public or of building, developing, or constructing residential units for public purchase. Pursuant to section 911 (b) the term builder does not include general contractors, etc., not affiliated with the builder. Thus, a general contractor who constructs residential housing pursuant to a contract with a public agency is still subject to claims for violation of the standards set forth in sections 896 and 897, resulting from its negligent act or omission or breach of contract, pursuant to section 936.
    5. As noted above, there has been no case law yet interpreting any of the “post S.B. 800” changes to Section 2782. One of the most important legal decisions relating to express indemnity and defense obligations and rights between developer-builders and sub-contractors was published after two of the amendments but based upon contracts executed and the language of section 2782 prior to January 1, 2006. (See, Crawford v. Weather Shield Mfg., Inc. (2008) 44 Cal.4th 541, 547, 566-67, fn. 14).
    6. Subcontractor dissatisfaction with the perceived inadequacy of protection afforded by this provision apparently became the impetus for a 2008 amendment to section 2782, discussed below, at least based upon the numerous (form) letters submitted to legislators in connection therewith.
    7. Section 2782 (a), where we started, and which has continued without change, prohibits indemnity for claims arising out of the sole negligence or willful misconduct of the promisee; sole negligence can be either active or passive. The various versions relating to residential construction prohibit indemnity for the negligence of the builder, etc., suggesting there is no express contractual indemnity for the negligence of the subcontractor if the builder, etc., is at all negligent. This is tempered a bit by the preservation of the right to equitable indemnity, which will now be found in section 2782 (g) and (h).

    Courtesy of Michael D. Worthing of Borton Petrini, LLP. Mr. Worthing can be contacted at mworthing@bortonpetrini.com.


    Tacoma Construction Site Uncovers Gravestones

    August 11, 2011 — CDJ Staff

    The Seattle Times reports that a transit construction project has uncovered about twenty-five gravestones. The area was historically sensitive, as it is in territory once occupied by the Puyallup Tribe. At current report, no human remains have been found and the article cites the project?s archeological consultant as describing the gravestones as “not historically significant.”

    Read the full story…


    There is No Non-Delegable Duty on the Part of Residential Builders in Colorado

    August 2, 2012 — Brady Iandiorio, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC

    Recently, in the Arapahoe District Court, the Honorable Michael Spear, issued an order holding that builders do not owe a non-delegable duty to homeowners. In Marx and Corken v. Alpert Custom Homes, Inc., et al., Judge Spear’s order came in response to plaintiffs’ motion for determination of question of law seeking a finding that the defendants owed a non-delegable duty to the plaintiffs and thus, to strike defendants’ designation of nonparties at fault. After being fully briefed, Judge Spear, found that such a non-delegable duty does not exist.

    The case arises from the construction of a single-family residence in Aurora, Colorado. Through the construction and interaction with Alpert Custom Homes, Inc. and Scott and Sally Alpert, the defendants, Paul Marx and Kay Corken, the plaintiffs claimed they suffered various damages and losses, and brought claims for breach of contract-warranty, breach of contract, violation of the Colorado Consumer Protection Act, breaches of the implied covenant of good faith, promissory estoppel, willful breach of contract, and quantum meruit. During litigation, the defendants filed a designation of nonparties at fault, which named several parties which were at fault for the alleged construction defects at issue in the case. The pertinent nonparties named were subcontractors of defendant Alpert Custom Homes, Inc. during the construction of the residence.

    Read the full story…

    Reprinted courtesy of Brady Iandiorio, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC. Mr. Iandiorio can be contacted at iandiorio@hhmrlaw.com


    Judge Rejects Extrapolation, Harmon Tower to Remain Standing

    November 7, 2012 — CDJ Staff

    CityCenter has filed an emergency motion asking the Nevada Supreme Court to intervene in Judge Elizabeth Gonzalez’ order that the building’s defects cannot be extrapolated from those tested. CityCenter’s structural engineering expert “evaluated 397 of the Harmon’s critical structural elements and found all but one defective,” according to the article on Vegas.Inc. Judge Gonzalez would not permit this to be extrapolated to the untested 1,072, as the locations tested were not random.

    Judge Gonzalez also ruled that if CityCenter does additional testing, they may not appeal her order that ruled the extrapolation inadmissible. CityCenter argued to the Nevada Supreme Court that “the notion that CityCenter should be forced to incur additional millions of dollars in testing costs and sanctions ?Äì on the condition that it waive its right to appeal this ruling ?Äì just to be permitted to present its own damages evidence, shocks the conscience.”

    Gonzalez gave the okay to CityCenter to demolish the building, but its demolition would make any further testing impossible. Under Gonzalez’ ruling, the untested structural elements cannot b assumed to be defective.

    Read the full story…


    OSHA Cites Construction Firm for Safety Violations

    August 16, 2012 — CDJ Staff

    S.J. Louis Construction of Texas Ltd. has been cited by OHSH for one serious and one repeat safety violation, according to a report in Insurance Journal. OSHA officials saw S.J. Louis employees working in an unshored trench along a highway service road. The company had cited for this violation previously. Without shoring of trenches deeper than five feet there is a risk of serious injury or death.

    Read the full story…


    Bill Seeks to Protect Legitimate Contractors

    December 20, 2012 — CDJ Staff

    The California construction industry sees Senate Bill 863 as a needed help to legitimate construction businesses. The bill introduces regulations that will help shut down fraudulent contractors and help reduce workers’ compensation fraud. John Upshaw of the Independent Roofing Contractors of California described the revenue lost to California and other states as “phenomenal,” saying that “we need to continue the coordinated efforts if we are to see true workers’ compensation reform.”

    Read the full story…


    Green Buildings Could Lead to Liabilities

    March 28, 2012 — CDJ Staff

    Attempts to build “green,” reducing energy costs and increasing the use of sustainable building materials, may lead to more lawsuits, according to a report issued by the British Columbia Construction Association. The report warned those who were going to build green look into the implications. The report looked at the result of green building practices and requirements adopted in the United States.

    The report warns that “the use of novel, less harmful building material or new construction techniques may give rise to liability due to: contractor inexperience with installation; lack of long-term evaluation of green materials; lack of understanding of how new building materials may impact existing traditional building systems; or warranties provided unintentionally about the durability or effectiveness of unproven materials or techniques.”

    Manley McLachlan, president of the BCAA noted that they are aware of “legal action around the performance of the buildings,” noting that while fast-growing trees help toward LEED certification, their wood is more prone to mold. He also felt that low-VOC paints needed more testing to prove their durability as exterior finishes.

    Read the full story…


    Consumer Protection Act Whacks Seattle Roofing Contractor

    July 21, 2011 — Douglas Reiser, Builders Council

    It’s been over 1 year since we last visited the CertainTeed Corp. v. Seattle Roof Brokers lawsuit. After my original post, the contractor, James Garcia, appeared at Builders Counsel in a comment to defend himself. It appears that 1 year later, the court decided to side with CertainTeed and award them significant attorneys’ fees. Ready for the whole story? Its a pricey one.

    Back in July 2010, good friend Mike Atkins (Seattle Trademark Attorney) authored a post about a Seattle roofing contractor who had been sued for false advertising on his website. The lawsuit was raised by CertainTeed, a roofing material producer, whose products were the target of a Seattle contractor’s ire. Seattle Roof Brokers, owned by James Garcia, published content on its website, remarking that CertainTeed products have a history of “premature failure” and that they “will fail?.resale inspection after 15-20 years.”

    CertainTeed filed its action to obtain an injunction and damages under the Consumer Protection Act.

    Read the full story…

    Reprinted courtesy of Douglas Reiser of Reiser Legal LLC. Mr. Reiser can be contacted at info@reiserlegal.com


    Foundation Arbitration Doesn’t Preclude Suing Over Cracks

    March 28, 2012 — CDJ Staff

    The Louisiana Court of Appeals has reversed the decision of a lower court, allowing a construction defect case to go through. In Greer v. Town Construction Company, the Greers hired Town Construction to build a home in Baton Rouge. The business relationship went sour, with disputes over “costs, change orders, workmanship, and timeliness issues.”

    Town Construction filed an arbitration claim for the unpaid contract balance. In the counterclaim, the Greers made claims of mold and mildew problems, and wall cracks that they attributed to a “structural defect in the foundation.” In arbitration, Town Construction was awarded the full contract balance plus extra costs and interest, while the Greers were awarded for their structural claims.

    Three years later, the Greers found additional cracks and filed a suit against Town Construction. Town Construction argued that the Greer’s lawsuit should be dismissed, as the claims had already been through the arbitration process. The district court agreed with Town Construction and dismissed the suit.

    The appeals court noted that the Greers would have no ground for a suit if the arbitration was a “valid and final judgment,” and went on to note that there was no evidence in the trial record that the arbitration met this qualification. The court noted that although it was clear that both parties had agreed to the decisions of the arbiter, under Louisiana law, arbitration is not final until it has been “rendered by a court with jurisdiction over subject mater and over parties.”

    The court remanded the case to the lower court, noting that “the district court is obligated to first determine whether a valid arbitration award is in existence and had been confirmed before considering the merits of the exception. The court noted that their decision “should not be read to express any opinion as to the merits of the claims or as to the propriety of damages sought in the Greer’s lawsuit.”

    Read the court’s decision…


    BUILD Act Inching Closer To Reality

    July 8, 2011 — Douglas Reiser, Builders Counsel

    A select group of Senators have launched a marketing campaign for the BUILD Act. If this is the first you are hearing about the BUILD Act, do not fret. The Act still has a long way to go, but if successful it would bring a national infrastructure bank.

    I have been fascinated with the concept of a national infrastructure bank for quite some time. The idea has been around since the Clinton years ? and perhaps beyond. The Act’s purpose is to create a national bank (American Infrastructure Financing Authority) to provide loans and loan guarantees to encourage private investment in upgrading America’s infrastructure. For a number of years, we have seen similar legislation float around Congress. But, none of those initiatives have gained as much traction as BUILD.

    Read the full story…

    Reprinted courtesy of Douglas Reiser of Reiser Legal LLC. Mr. Reiser can be contacted at info@reiserlegal.com


    Bad Faith and a Partial Summary Judgment in Seattle Construction Defect Case

    February 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff

    The US District Court of Washington has issued a ruling in the case of Ledcor Industries v. Virginia Surety Company, Inc. Ledcor was the builder of a mixed-use real estate project in Seattle called the Adelaide Project. Ledcor purchased an insurance policy from Virginia Surety covering the project. After the completion of the project, Ledcor received complaints of construction defects from the homeowners, which they forwarded to Virginia Surety.

    Virginia Surety denied coverage on several grounds. Absent any lawsuit, Virginia claimed that there was “not yet any duty to defend or indemnify.” Further, as the policy commenced ten days after work on the project was substantially completed, Virginia cited a provision in the policy that excluded coverage for damage that occurred before the policy began. As problems included water intrusion, Virginia noted an exclusion for fungal damage. Finally, Virginia noted that it was not clear whether damage was due to Ledcor’s own actions.

    The homeowners sued over the construction defects. Ledcor settled these suits before trial. In this, they were defended by, and settlements were paid by American Home, another of Ledcor’s insurers. Ledcor claims that Virginia Surety acted in bad faith by denying coverage and by its failure to investigate the ongoing nature of the work at the project.

    The judge determined that Virginia Surety acted in bad faith when it invoked the fungus exclusion. Virginia noted that fungal damage “‘would have been’ referenced in the list of construction defects,” however, the HOAs claimed only “water stains” and “water damage,” and made no mention of mold or fungus. The court found that Virginia Surety “was not entitled to deny coverage simply because it may have suspected that mold or fungus damage existed.” The court noted that further proceedings would be needed to determine what portion of the settlement Virginia is obligated to pay.

    The court found that there were matters of fact to be determined on the further issues in the case. The judge wrote that although Virginia acted in bad faith in invoking the fungus exclusion, it still had to be determined if they were in breach of contract by failing to defend Ledcor. Ledcor still needs to show that the damages claimed by the HOA were due to work actually covered by Virginia Surety.

    Ledcor made an additional claim that Virginia Surety violated Washington’s laws concerning the insurance industry. Here, the court noted that the improper exclusion for fungus issues “constitutes a per se unfair trade practice.” Six other claims were made under this law. The court found that Virginia Surety did not misrepresent “pertinent facts or insurance policy provisions.” It also issued its denial letter promptly, satisfying the fifth provision. However, Virginia Surety did violate the second provision, in that it failed “to acknowledge and act reasonably promptly upon communications with respect to claims.” Two other issues could not be determined.

    Judge Martinez’s decision granted a summary judgment to Ledcor on the issue of bad faith. An additional summary judgment was granted that Virginia Surety violated Washington’s Insurance Fair Conduct Act. Judge Martinez did not grant summary judgment on any of the other issues Ledcor raised.

    Read the court’s decision…


    Texas Court of Appeals Conditionally Grant Petition for Writ of Mandamus to Anderson

    April 25, 2011 — April 25, 2011 Beverley BevenFlorez - Construction Defect Journal

    The Texas Court of Appeals conditionally grant mandamus relief to Anderson Construction Company and Ronnie Anderson (collectively “Anderson”)… from the trial court in a construction defect lawsuit filed by Brent L. Mainwaring and Tatayana Mainwaring. See Tex. Prop. Code Ann. 27.001-.007 (West 2000 & Supp. 2010). Relators contend the trial court abused its discretion by compelling discovery while the case was abated by operation of law.

    The Court of Appeals opinion describes what led up to the proceedings: “The Mainwarings’ original petition identified certain defects in their Anderson-constructed home. Those defects concerned the roof trusses and framing, air conditioning, mortar and masonry, exterior doors and windows, and weep holes. With respect to the five areas of defects identified in their original petition, the Mainwarings gave Anderson the statutorily required notice on January 13, 2010. After implementing agreed extensions, Anderson made an offer of settlement for the defects the Mainwarings identified in their notice. Almost eight months later, the Mainwarings filed an amended petition adding defects they had not included in their original petition and notice. The additional defects the Mainwarings included in their amended petition had not been addressed by Anderson’s offer of settlement.”

    Following these events, Anderson claimed the Mainwarings did not respond in writing to their settlement offer. “Anderson filed a verified plea in abatement on December 2, 2010. In the trial court, Anderson claimed that the Mainwarings failed to respond in writing to Anderson’s settlement offer, as required by Section 27.004(b) of the RCLA. See Tex. Prop. Code Ann. 27.004(b)(1). The Mainwarings moved to compel discovery responses from Anderson. The Mainwarings alleged that they rejected Anderson’s settlement offer, and that if their response was insufficient, they contend that Anderson’s offer was rejected by operation of law on the twenty-fifth day after the Mainwarings received it. See Tex. Prop. Code Ann. 27.004(i). The Mainwarings’ motion to compel was not supported by affidavit. See Tex. Prop. Code Ann. 27.004(d)(2). On January 13, 2011, Anderson filed a verified supplemental plea in abatement. Anderson alleged that the Mainwarings failed to provide written notice concerning the newly alleged defects and complained the Mainwarings were attempting to circumvent the inspection and resolution procedure of the RCLA. Over Anderson’s objection that the lawsuit had been abated, the trial court granted the Mainwarings’ motion to compel discovery.”

    After listening to both sides, the Court of Appeals offered this reasoning for their opinion: “The parties do not dispute that Anderson inspected the property before the Mainwarings alleged the existence of additional defects in their amended pleading, nor do the Mainwarings claim that Anderson has been given an opportunity to inspect the additional defects the Mainwarings identified in their amended pleadings. We conclude the trial court did not have the discretion to deny or lift the abatement until the Mainwarings established their compliance with the statute. In other words, the Mainwarings are required to provide Anderson a reasonable opportunity to inspect the additional defects identified by their amended pleading, which will allow Anderson the opportunity to cure or settle with respect to the newly identified defects.”

    The Court of Appeals spoke directly on the issue of mandamus relief: “The Mainwarings contend that mandamus relief is not available because the trial court’s ruling does not prevent Anderson from making settlement offers during the discovery process. ‘An appellate remedy is “adequate” when any benefits to mandamus review are outweighed by the detriments.’ In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 136 (Tex. 2004). The failure to abate a case is typically not subject to mandamus. See In re Allstate Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co., 85 S.W.3d 193, 196 (Tex. 2002) (citing Abor v. Black, 695 S.W.2d 564, 567 (Tex. 1985)). In this case, however, the case was abated by operation of law. By ignoring the statutory abatement, the trial court interfered with the statutory procedure for developing and resolving construction defect claims. See In re Kimball Hill Homes Tex., Inc., 969 S.W.2d 522, 525 (Tex. App. Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, orig. proceeding) (An appeal provides an inadequate remedy for the trial court’s failure to observe automatic abatement pursuant to the RCLA.). The benefits of mandamus review are not outweighed by the detriments of mandamus review in this case.“

    In conclusion, “The trial court had no discretion to compel discovery while the case was abated, and Anderson, who has been compelled to respond to discovery during a period the case was under an automatic abatement, has no adequate remedy on appeal. Accordingly, we conditionally grant the petition for writ of mandamus. The writ will issue only if the trial court fails to vacate its order of February 3, 2011, and fails to refrain from proceeding with the case until a motion to reinstate is filed that establishes compliance with the notice and inspection requirements of the Residential Construction Liability Act.”

    Read the trial court’s decision…


    Changes to Arkansas Construction and Home Repair Laws

    September 30, 2011 — CDJ Staff

    A new law, set to take effect in 2012, lowers the ceiling on when work must be done by a licensed contractor. Through the end of the year, projects costing $20,000 or more had to be done by an Arkansas licensed contractor. As of January 1, 2012, that new limit will be $2,000.

    This will apply to all single-family residences and according to Lovely County Citizen, covers “construction, alteration, renovation, repair, modification, improvement, removal, demotion, or addition to a pre-existing structure.” Residential building contractors will be required to have workers compensation insurance, as will home improvement contactors if they take jobs worth more than $20,000.

    Morris Dillow, a building inspector in Holiday Island, said, “It will get these scammers out of here who are ripping people off.” He cited the example of a contractor who after getting paid for roof repairs and painting, left the job unfinished.

    Read the full story…


    Texas covered versus uncovered allocation and “legally obligated to pay.”

    April 27, 2011 — April 27, 2011, by CDCoverage.com

    In Markel American Ins. Co. v. Lennar Corp., No. 14-10-00008-CV (Tex. Ct. App. April 19, 2011), insured homebuilder Lennar filed suit against its insurer Markel seeking recovery of costs incurred by Lennar to repair water damage to homes resulting from defective EIFS siding. Following a jury trial, judgment was entered in favor of Lennar and against Markel. On appeal, the intermediate appellate court reversed. Applying Texas law, the court first held that Lennar failed to satisfy its burden of allocating damages between covered and uncovered. In a prior decision, the court had held that, while the costs incurred by Lennar for the repair of the resulting water damage

    Read the full story…

    Reprinted courtesy of CDCoverage.com


    State Farm Too Quick To Deny Coverage, Court Rules

    July 22, 2011 — CDJ Staff

    On July 13, 2011, Judge Sarah S. Vance of the US District Court issued a rule in the case of Travelers Cas. & Surety Co. of Am. v. Univ. Facilities, Inc. (E.D. La., 2011). In this case, Stanley Smith Drywall was contracted by Capstone Building Corporation to “perform undisclosed work at the facility believed to involve the installation of drywall.” The project involved the design and construction of student residences for the Southeastern Louisiana University in Hammond, Louisiana. In May, 2009, University Facilities, Inc. (UFI) sued Capstone Development Corporation and Capstone On-Campus Management.

    State Farm insured Stanley Smith Drywall and they sought a declaration that they have no duty: “(1) to insure Stanley Smith or CBC, or (2) to defend or indemnify any party against UFI's claims in the pending arbitration.” State Farm contends “(1) there is no "occurrence" to trigger coverage under the policy; (2) only breach of contract claims are asserted; (3) there is no property damage alleged; and (4) various coverage limitations and exclusions apply to prevent coverage.’

    The court concluded that “whether State Farm has a duty to defend in the arbitration must be determined by considering the claims asserted in the arbitration.” However, the arbitration claims were not made part of the record. There, “, the Court cannot determine as a matter of law State Farm's duty to defend on the present record.” The same was true of State Farm’s duty to indemnify. “Stanley Smith and CBC assert that State Farm's motion for summary judgment was filed before any discovery was conducted in the arbitration proceeding or in this case. The Court finds that State Farm has failed to develop the record sufficiently to establish that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to its duty to indemnify Stanley Smith or CBC in the arbitration.’

    The court denied State Farm’s motion for a summary judgment on its duty to defend and indemnify.

    Read the court’s decision…


    Judge Concludes Drywall Manufacturer Sold in Florida

    September 13, 2012 — CDJ Staff

    A Florida judge has concluded that the Chinese drywall manufacturer Taishan actively sought to sell its products in Florida and cannot now claim that it was not involved. Judge Joseph Farnia also noted that the main distributor of the drywall was, as noted in the Miami Herald, an arm of the company. Lennar Hones has sued the firm after installing drywall manufactured by the company in hundreds of homes.

    Taishan’s activities in Florida included not only distributing samples, but also hosting tours of their plants in China for construction executives, and even making customized runs. According to other reports, has lost past cases over defects in their drywall.

    Read the full story…


    Summary Judgment in Construction Defect Case Cannot Be Overturned While Facts Are Still in Contention in Related Cases

    September 9, 2011 — CDJ Staff

    The Alabama Court of Civil Appeals has dismissed an appeal of a summary judgment in the case Bella Investments, Inc. v. Multi Family Services, Inc. MFS was hired by Bella to be the general contractor for a hotel in Gardendale, Alabama. MFS hired various subcontractors, including the architect for the project. After completion of the hotel in April, 2006, Bella made requests for MFS to repair cracked floor tiles.

    In August, 2008, Bella sued MFS, the architect, and various fictitiously named defendants. Subsequently, Bella amended its complaint, naming some of the fictitiously named defendants.

    MFS in turn claimed that Bella’s claims were void under the statute of limitations and that Bella was in beach of contact by failing to pay MFS the full amount owed. MFS moved for summary judgment under the statute of limitations, which was granted by the court.

    Bella requested that the court “alter, amend, or vacate its summary judgment order.” When this was denied, Bella appealed to the Alabama Supreme Court, which transferred the appeal to the Court of Civil Appeals. The Court of Appeals refused to vacate the summary judgment as claims that form part of the case against MFS are also part of Bella’s claims against the other defendants. For this reason, the court upheld the summary judgment.

    Read the court’s decision…