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    California Builders Right To Repair Current Law Summary:

    Current Law Summary: SB800 (codified as Civil Code §§895, et seq) is the most far-reaching, complex law regulating construction defect litigation, right to repair, warranty obligations and maintenance requirements transference in the country. In essence, to afford protection against frivolous lawsuits, builders shall do all the following:A homeowner is obligated to follow all reasonable maintenance obligations and schedules communicated in writing to the homeowner by the builder and product manufacturers, as well as commonly accepted maintenance practices. A failure by a homeowner to follow these obligations, schedules, and practices may subject the homeowner to the affirmative defenses.A builder, under the principles of comparative fault pertaining to affirmative defenses, may be excused, in whole or in part, from any obligation, damage, loss, or liability if the builder can demonstrate any of the following affirmative defenses in response to a claimed violation:


    Construction Expert Witness Contractors Licensing
    Guidelines Anaheim California

    Commercial and Residential Contractors License Required.


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    Building Industry Association Southern California - Desert Chapter
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    77570 Springfield Ln Ste E
    Palm Desert, CA 92211
    http://www.desertchapter.com

    Building Industry Association Southern California - Riverside County Chapter
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    3891 11th St Ste 312
    Riverside, CA 92501


    Building Industry Association Southern California
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    Irvine, CA 92614
    http://www.biasc.org

    Building Industry Association Southern California - Orange County Chapter
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    Building Industry Association Southern California - Baldy View Chapter
    Local # 0532
    8711 Monroe Ct Ste B
    Rancho Cucamonga, CA 91730
    http://www.biabuild.com

    Building Industry Association Southern California - LA/Ventura Chapter
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    28460 Ave Stanford Ste 240
    Santa Clarita, CA 91355


    Building Industry Association Southern California - Building Industry Association of S Ca Antelope Valley
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    Construction Expert Witness News and Information
    For Anaheim California

    Florida Appeals Court Rules in Favor of Homeowners Unaware of Construction Defects and Lack of Permits

    Construction Defects in Home a Breach of Contract

    Differing Rulings On Construction Defect Claims Leave Unanswered Questions For Builders, and Construction Practice Groups. Impact to CGL Carriers, General Contractors, Builders Remains Unclear

    Former New York Governor to Head Construction Monitoring Firm

    Tennessee Court: Window Openings Too Small, Judgment Too Large

    Home Builder Doesn’t See Long Impact from Hurricane

    Businesspeople to Nevada: Revoke the Construction Defect Laws

    Ghost Employees Steal Jobs from Legit Construction Firms

    Construction Defect Not a RICO Case, Says Court

    Coverage Rejected Under Owned Property and Alienated Property Exclusions

    Colorado Senate Bill 12-181: 2012’s Version of a Prompt Pay Bill

    Construction Company Head Pleads Guilty to Insurance and Tax Fraud

    Homebuilding Still on the Rise

    Construction Law: Unexpected, Fascinating, Bizarre

    Fourteen More Guilty Pleas in Las Vegas Construction Defect Scam

    Texas Court of Appeals Conditionally Grant Petition for Writ of Mandamus to Anderson

    Application of Efficient Proximate Cause Doctrine Supports Coverage

    Georgia Supreme Court Rules Construction Defects Can Constitute an Occurrence in CGL Policies

    Australian Developer Denies Building Problems Due to Construction Defects

    Tenth Circuit Finds Insurer Must Defend Unintentional Faulty Workmanship

    Colorado statutory “property damage” caused by an “occurrence”

    New Buildings in California Soon Must Be Greener

    Construction Upturn in Silicon Valley

    Brown Paint Doesn’t Cover Up Construction Defects

    Insurance Firm Under No Duty to Defend in Hawaii Construction Defect Case

    Court Orders House to be Demolished or Relocated

    Montrose Language Interpreted: How Many Policies Are Implicated By A Construction Defect That Later Causes a Flood?

    New Construction Laws, New Forms in California

    Couple Sues Attorney over Construction Defect Case, Loses

    There Is No Non-Delegable Duty on the Part of Residential Builders in Colorado

    Certificate of Merit to Sue Architects or Engineers Bill Proposed

    Las Vegas Home Builder Still in Bankruptcy

    Save A Legal Fee? Sometimes You Better Talk With Your Construction Attorney

    Harmon Towers Case to Last into 2014

    Battle of “Other Insurance” Clauses

    Homeowners Sue Over Sinkholes, Use Cash for Other Things

    The Flood Insurance Reform Act May be Extended to 2016

    Unfinished Building Projects Litter Miami

    Homeowner may pursue negligence claim for construction defect, Oregon Supreme Court holds

    Court finds subcontractor responsible for defending claim

    OSHA Cites Construction Firm for Safety Violations

    Construction Defects and Contractor-Owners

    Recent Case Brings Clarity and Questions to Statute of Repose Application

    Hawaii State Senate Requires CGL Carriers to Submit Premium Information To State Legislature

    Federal District Court Predicts Florida Will Adopt Injury In Fact Trigger

    Virginia Chinese Drywall “property damage” caused by an “occurrence” and number of “occurrences”

    West Coast Casualty Promises Exciting Line Up at the Nineteenth Annual Conference

    Insurer Has Duty to Disclose Insured's Interest In Obtaining Written Explanation of Arbitration Award

    Construction Jobs Expected to Rise in Post-Hurricane Rebuilding

    Former Zurich Executive to Head Willis North America Construction Insurance Group

    Preparing For the Worst with Smart Books & Records

    Colorado “occurrence”

    Architectural Firm Disputes Claim of Fault

    Nevada Bill Aims to Reduce Legal Fees For Construction Defect Practitioners

    Condo Owners Worried Despite Settlement

    Ohio Court of Appeals Affirms Judgment in Landis v. Fannin Builders

    Construction Suit Ends with Just an Apology

    Construction Defect Destroys Home, Forty Years Later

    Continuous Trigger of Coverage Adopted for Loss Under First Party Policy

    Follow Up on Continental Western v. Shay Construction

    No Coverage for Negligent Misrepresentation without Allegations of “Bodily Injury” or “Property Damage”

    Kansas Man Caught for Construction Scam in Virginia

    Faulty Workmanship Exclusion Does Not Bar Coverage

    California Bill Would Notify Homeowners on Construction Defect Options

    Loose Bolts Led to Sagging Roof in Construction Defect Claim

    CC&Rs Not the Place for Arbitration Agreement, Court Rules

    Federal Court Denies Summary Judgment in Leaky Condo Conversion

    Joinder vs. Misjoinder in Colorado Construction Claims: Roche Constructors v. One Beacon

    Insurer’s Discovery Requests Ruled to be Overbroad in Construction Defect Suit

    History of Defects Leads to Punitive Damages for Bankrupt Developer

    New Web Site Tracks Settled Construction Defect Claims

    Home Repair Firms Sued for Fraud

    Court Rejects Anti-SLAPP Motion in Construction Defect Suit

    High School Gym Closed by Construction Defects

    Court Strikes Down Reasonable Construction Defect Settlement

    After Katrina Came Homes that Could Withstand Isaac

    Subcontractor Not Liable for Defending Contractor in Construction Defect Case

    The Ever-Growing Thicket Of California Civil Code Section 2782

    Wisconsin “property damage” caused by an “occurrence.”

    Retaining Wall Contractor Not Responsible for Building Damage

    Renovation Contractors: Be Careful How You Disclose Your Projects

    Destruction of Construction Defect Evidence Leads to Sanctions against Plaintiff

    Underpowered AC Not a Construction Defect

    Williams v. Athletic Field: Hugely Important Lien Case Argued Before Supreme Court

    Delays in Filing Lead to Dismissal in Moisture Intrusion Lawsuit

    Construction Law Alert: A Specialty License May Not Be Required If Work Covered By Another License

    When is a Construction Project truly “Complete”? That depends. (law note)

    Boyfriend Pleads Guilty in Las Vegas Construction Defect Scam Suicide

    Court Requires Adherence to “Good Faith and Fair Dealing” in Construction Defect Coverage

    Lower Court “Eminently Reasonable” but Wrong in Construction Defect Case
    Corporate Profile

    ANAHEIM CALIFORNIA CONSTRUCTION EXPERT WITNESS
    DIRECTORY AND CAPABILITIES

    Leveraging from more than 5500 construction defect and claims related expert witness designations, the Anaheim, California Construction Expert Witness Group provides a wide range of trial support and consulting services to Anaheim's most acknowledged construction practice groups, CGL carriers, builders, owners, and public agencies. Drawing from a diverse pool of construction and design professionals, BHA is able to simultaneously analyze complex claims from the perspective of design, engineering, cost, or standard of care.

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    Construction Expert Witness News & Info
    Anaheim, California

    Colorado Court of Appeals Finds Damages to Non-Defective Property Arising From Defective Construction Covered Under Commercial General Liability Policy

    December 20, 2012 — Heidi Gassman, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell

    The recently decided case of Colorado Pool Systems, Inc. v. Scottsdale Insurance Company (Colo. Ct. App. 10CA2638, October 25, 2012), confirms that absent specific exclusions in the policy, a commercial general liability (“CGL”) policy covers damages to non-defective property arising from a builder’s own defective workmanship.

    Colorado Pool Systems, Inc. (“Colorado Pool”) was hired as a subcontractor to install a swimming pool at Founders Village Pool and Community Center (“Founders Village”) in Castle Rock, Colorado.  After the concrete shell of the pool was placed, some of the rebar frame was found to be too close to the surface.  Founders Village demanded that Colorado Pool remove and replace the pool, and Colorado Pool contacted its insurance carrier, Scottsdale Insurance Company (“Scottsdale”), with which Colorado Pool held a CGL policy.  After inspecting the pool, Scottsdale’s claims adjuster stated that the insurance policy would cover losses associated with removing and replacing the pool.

    Read the full story…

    Reprinted courtesy of Heidi Gassman, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC. Ms. Gassman can be contacted at gassman@hhmrlaw.com


    Broker Not Liable for Failure to Reveal Insurer's Insolvency After Policy Issued

    March 28, 2012 — Tred Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii

    Faced with an issue of first impression in California, the Court of Appeals held that a broker was not liable for failing to reveal the insurer's insolvency occurring after issuance of the policy. Pacific Rim Mechanical Contractors, Inc. v. Aon Risk Ins. Serv. West, Inc., 2012 Cal. App. LEXIS 232 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 28, 2012).

    The developer for a construction project in downtown San Diego retained Aon as its broker to secure coverage. Aon procured a general liability policy for the project with Legion Indemnity Company. Legion was solvent when it issued the policy.

    The developer hired Pacific Rim (“PacRim”) as one of several subcontractors on the project. The parties entered into a contract in which the developer agreed to provide PacRim with liability insurance through an Owner Controlled Insurance Program (“OCIP”). Aon was not a party to the contract and PacRim was never its client. PacRim, however, enrolled in the OCIP by contacting Aon and providing all necessary paperwork.

    Read the full story…

    Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com


    Colorado “occurrence”

    January 6, 2012 — CDCoverage.com

    In Greystone Construction, Inc. v. National Fire & Marine Insurance Co., No. 09-1412 (10th Cir. November 1, 2011), general contractors Greystone and Branan were each sued by purchases of homes built by each alleging defective construction performed by subcontractors. CGL insurer American Family Mutual Insurance Company defended both Greystone and Brannon while co-insurer National Fire & Marine Insurance Company denied a defense. Greystone, Branan, and American Family sued National Fire for contribution towards defense costs. The federal district trial court entered summary judgment for National Fire.

    Read the full story…

    Reprinted courtesy of CDCoverage.com


    Court Requires Adherence to “Good Faith and Fair Dealing” in Construction Defect Coverage

    September 30, 2011 — CDJ Staff

    The California Court of Appeals has ruled in the case of Allied Framers, Inc. v. Golden Bear Insurance Company. Allied had been sued in a construction defect case and its primary insurer had become insolvent. Coverage for Allied’s defense was paid for by the California Insurance Guarantee Association through June 8, 2006. When warned that CIGA’s involvement was ending, Allied notified Golden Bear, which declined to provide coverage.

    In the matters that followed, Golden Bear claimed that Allied had not exhausted its $1 million in primary insurance. Allied then showed that $1 million had already been paid out in the case. A few months thereafter, Golden Bear offered a $500,000 settlement on behalf of Allied which was rejected. Thereafter, Golden Bear hired new counsel to defend Allied. Golden Bear received, but allegedly did not pay, invoices Allied sent from their former counsel. Golden Bear finally settled the construction defect case for $2 million.

    Allied’s original counsel sued Allied for payment. Golden Bear declined coverage. Allied then claimed that Golden Bear liable on several counts, arising from its failure to settle the construction defect action earlier than it did and its failure to pay Allied’s counsel. Golden Bear demurred, arguing that Allied had now exhausted is coverage with the $2 million settlement. The lower court sustained Golden Bear’s demurrer, dismissing Allied’s complaints.

    The appeal court reviewed Allied’s seven complaints and sustained most of them. However, the court did reverse the trial court’s order in regard to Allied’s complaint that Golden Bear breached an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The appeals court was not convinced that Golden Bear properly evaluated the settlement demand in the underlying construction defect case. The court found three other ways in which Golden Bear’s actions might show bad faith, in refusing to pay defense fees “after promising [Allied] such costs would be paid in full,” “failing to advise Allied about ‘actual or potential negative consequences of agreeing to the proposed settlement,’” and that their choice of counsel “failed to protect [Allied’s] interests in the negotiation.”

    Read the court’s decision…


    Increased Expenditure on Injuries for New York City School Construction

    August 16, 2012 — CDJ Staff

    You can buy a lot of bandages for $270 million, but even though the expenses are related to the New York City schools, the money is being budgeted by the School Construction Agency as what they expect to pay for injuries and liability expenses related to school construction. The New York Post notes that this is nearly ten times what the city spent in 2000 on workers' compensation and liability claims. Michael Elmdendorf of the General Contractors Association likened injury compensation to a broken slot machine, telling the Post, "when you pull that lever, you win." A spokesperson from the Department of Education, Margie Feinberg, attributed the rise to higher medical care costs.

    Read the full story…


    Homeowners Not Compelled to Arbitration in Construction Defect Lawsuit

    January 6, 2012 — CDJ Staff

    A California appeals court has ruled that developers cannot enforce CC&Rs in a case where a developer cited an arbitration clause it had inserted into the CC&R. The homeowners are alleging construction defect and wished to sue the developer who claimed a right to this under the CC&Rs.

    The Marina del Rey Argonaut reports that particular appeal dealt only with whether the developer could compel arbitration. The underlying construction defect issues will subsequently have to be determined at trial.

    The attorney for the homeowners’ association, Dan Clifford, noted that “arbitration has to be agreed to by both parties.” The covenant was drafted by the developer and in addition to requiring arbitration, it had a clause that it could not be amended without the consent of the developers. The court ruled that CC&Rs “can be enforced only by the homeowners association, the owner of a condominium or both.”

    Read the full story…


    History of Defects Leads to Punitive Damages for Bankrupt Developer

    March 1, 2012 — CDJ Staff

    The South Carolina Court of Appeals has ruled that evidence of construction defects at a developer’s other projects were admissible in a construction defect lawsuit. They issued their ruling on Magnolia North Property Owners’ Association v. Heritage Communities, Inc. on February 15, 2012.

    Magnolia North is a condominium complex in South Carolina. The initial builder, Heritage Communities, had not completed construction when they filed for bankruptcy protection under Chapter 11. The remaining four buildings were completed by another contractor. The Property Owners’ Association subsequently sued Heritage Communities, Inc. (HCI) alleging defects. The POA also sued Heritage Magnolia North, and the general contractor, BuildStar.

    The trial court ruled that all three entities were in fact one. On appeal, the defendants claimed that the trial court improperly amalgamated the defendants. The appeals court noted, however, that “all these corporations share officers, directors, office space, and a phone number with HCI.” Until Heritage Communities turned over control of the POA to the actual homeowners, all of the POA’s officers were officers of HCI. The appeals court concluded that “the trial court’s ruling that Appellants’ entities were amalgamated is supported by the law and the evidence.”

    Heritage also claimed that the trial court should not have allowed the plaintiffs to produce evidence of construction defects at other Heritage properties. Heritage argued that the evidence was a violation of the South Carolina Rules of Evidence. The court cited a South Carolina Supreme Court case which made an exception for “facts showing the other acts were substantially similar to the event at issue.” The court noted that the defects introduced by the plaintiffs were “virtually identical across all developments.” This included identical use of the same products from project to project. Further, these were used to demonstrate that “HCI was aware of water issues in the other projects as early as 1998, before construction on Magnolia North had begun.”

    The trial case ended with a directed verdict. Heritage charged that the jury should have determined whether the alleged defects existed. The appeals court noted that there was “overwhelming evidence” that Heritage failed “to meet the industry standard of care.” Heritage did not dispute the existence of the damages during the trial, they “merely contested the extent.”

    Further, Heritage claimed in its appeal that the case should have been rejected due to the three-year statute of limitations. They note that the first meeting of the POA was on March 8, 2000, yet the suit was not filed until May 28, 2003, just over three years. The court noted that here the statute of limitation must be tolled, as Heritage controlled the POA until September 9, 2002. The owner-controlled POA filed suit “approximately eight months after assuming control.”

    The court also applied equitable estoppel to the statute of limitations. During the time in which Heritage controlled the board, Heritage “assured the unit owners the construction defects would be repaired, and, as a result, the owners were justified in relying on those assurances.” Since “a reasonable owner could have believed that it would be counter-productive to file suit,” the court found that also prevented Heritage from invoking the statute of limitations. In the end, the appeals court concluded that the even apart from equitable tolling and equitable estoppel, the statute of limitations could not have started until the unit owners took control of the board in September, 2002.

    Heritage also contested the jury’s awarding of damages, asserting that “the POA failed to establish its damages as to any of its claims.” Noting that damages are determined “with reasonable certainty or accuracy,” and that “proof with mathematical certainty of the amount of loss or damage is not required,” the appeals court found a “sufficiently reasonable basis of computation of damages to support the trial court’s submission of damages to the jury.” Heritage also claimed that the POA did not show that the damage existed at the time of the transfer of control. The court rejected this claim as well.

    Finally, Heritage argued that punitive damages were improperly applied for two reasons: that “the award of punitive damages has no deterrent effect because Appellants went out of business prior to the commencement of the litigation” and that Heritages has “no ability to pay punitive damages.” The punitive damages were upheld, as the relevant earlier decision includes “defendant’s degree of culpability,” “defendants awareness or concealment,” “existence of similar past conduct,” and “likelihood of deterring the defendant or others from similar conduct.”

    The appeals court rejected all of the claims made by Heritage, fully upholding the decision of the trial court.

    Read the court’s decision…


    Court Voids Settlement Agreement in Construction Defect Case

    September 1, 2011 — CDJ Staff

    A U.S. District Court Judge in Florida has ruled in favor of a company that sought to void a settlement agreement. The case, Water v. HDR Engineering, involved claims of construction defects at Florida’s C.W. Bill Young Regional Reservoir. The Tampa Bay Water Authority attributed these to both HDR Engineering’s design and Bernard Construction Company which had built the embankment. Bernard Construction filed a complaint against their subcontractor, McDonald.

    Tampa Bay Water settled with Bernard Construction and McDonald, in an agreement that set a minimum and maximum settlement, but also would “prohibit Barnard and McDonald from presenting any evidence on several claims and positions of TBW, to require Barnard to call certain witnesses at trial, to preclude Barnard and McDonald from calling other witnesses, and to restrict the filing of trial and post-trial motions.” HDR Engineering moved to void the agreement as collusive.

    The judge that the agreement¬? contained “133 paragraphs of ‘Agreed Facts’ that the parties stipulated would survive any order declaring the Settlement Agreement void or unenforceable.” He characterized these as stipulating “that Barnard neither caused nor contributed to TBW’s damages.” HDR motioned that a summary judgment be given to Barnard Engineering.

    The court found that “the evidence identified by TBW is patently insufficient to survive summary judgment.” Further, TBW’s expert initially held Barnard responsible for “lenses, pockets, streaks and layers within the embankment,” but then later withdrew this assigning the responsibility to HDR. Further, the court notes that, “TBW’s arguments that lenses, pockets, streaks, and layers in the soil wedge caused or contributed to its damages and that Barnard is liable for those damages have been foreclosed by the Agreed Facts.”

    As TBW failed to provide sufficient evidence to withstand summary judgment, the court granted summary judgment, mooted the claim against McDonald, and terminated the agreement between TBW and the other parties.

    Read the court’s decision…


    Underpowered AC Not a Construction Defect

    November 7, 2012 — CDJ Staff

    After buying a home in Louisiana, Mike Gines determined that the home’s air conditioning unit was insufficient to maintain an appropriate temperature. He contacted the home builder, D.R. Horton, Inc., which worked with the air conditioning installer, Reliant Heating & Air Conditioning, in order to repair the system. When the problems persisted, Gines filed a class action petition against Horton and Reliant in state court. Horton and Reliant moved the case to the federal courts, whereupon Gines asserted the defendants were in violation of the Louisiana New Home Warranty Act (NHWA). Horton stated that the claim under the NHWA was invalid, because Gines had not alleged actual physical damage to his home.

    The district court granted Horton’s motion to dismiss. Gines sought a reversal from the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals and sought to have two questions of state law addressed by the Louisiana Supreme Court.

    The district court ruled that the NHWA was the “sole remedy under Louisiana law for a purchaser of a new home with construction defects. Gines argued that court erred in this, but also conceded that this was the conclusion of the Louisiana Supreme Court.

    Further, Gines argued that a provision in the NHWA that allows the inclusion of construction defects that do not cause damage was satisfied by paragraph 6 of the contract. The court noted that Gines did not attach a copy of the contract to either the original or amended complaint, and so the court does not need to address these claims. However, the court cautioned that if a copy had been included, they still would have rejected the claim, as “the cited language does not indicate a waiver of the physical damage requirement.” They also note that “paragraph 13 of the contract shows that Gines was aware to the absence of any such waiver in the contract.”

    The court concludes that “the moral of this story is that in order to avoid the harsh result that has obtained here, the buyer of a newly constructed home in Louisiana should seek to obtain in the contract of sale an express waiver of the actual damage requirement of the NHWA.” The appeals court affirmed the decision of the circuit court and denied the application to certify questions to the Louisiana Supreme Court.

    Read the court’s decision…


    Construction Jobs Expected to Rise in Post-Hurricane Rebuilding

    November 7, 2012 — CDJ Staff

    Businessweek reports that construction jobs and materials will see increased demand as property owners in New York and New Jersey rebuild after hurricane Sandy. Tom Jeffery, of Irvine, California-based CoreLogic, a real estate information service, noted that “a high percent of damaged properties are going to be repaired.” Experts estimate property damage to total anywhere from $7 billion to $40 billion.

    It is also estimated that about 739,000 properties in the area are underwater in the way that has nothing to do with flooding, with negative equity of 25 percent or more. Many of these homeowners are likely to walk away from their mortgages.

    Ken Simonson, chief economist of the Associated General Contractors of America, expects “localized spikes in construction employment throughout November and the winter.” Martin Connor, the chief financial officer of Toll Brothers, expects to see more a rise in labor costs than in materials.

    Read the full story…


    Policing Those Subcontractors: It Might Take Extra Effort To Be An Additional Insured

    June 14, 2011 — Douglas Reiser, Builders Council Blog

    I just came across a case that I think truly paints the insurance dilemma for contractors. Thanks to this recent Illinois case, I don’t have to make up any factual scenarios—so kudos to Attorney Robert Boylan for posting it.

    In reading over my RSS feeds this weekend, I noticed a great writeup on long-time blogger Josh Glazov’s Construction Law Today. Attorney Robert Boylan’s post describes a recent Illinois case where a general contractor was denied its additional insured status on a second-tier subcontractor’s insurance. The reason for the denial: the general contractor failed to procure an agreement in writing with the second-tier subcontractor, requiring it to be listed as an additional insured.

    Read the full story…

    Reprinted courtesy of Douglas Reiser of Reiser Legal LLC. Mr. Reiser can be contacted at info@reiserlegal.com


    Negligent Misrepresentation in Sale of Building Altered without Permits

    September 30, 2011 — CDJ Staff

    The Supreme Court of New Hampshire has ruled in the case Wyle v. Lees. The Leeses owned a two-unit apartment building in North Conway, New Hampshire. They hired a contractor to add a third, larger apartment, including a two-car garage. The Leeses and their contractor submitted a building permit application. They were informed that site plan review was required. After receiving approval on the site plan, construction started. At no point did they obtain a building permit and the construction was never inspected. The Leeses subsequently added more space to the unit, reducing parking spaces below the minimum required. Again, they did not obtain a building permit.

    In 2007, three years after all these changes were complete, the Leeses sold their building to Mr. Wyle. To the question “are you aware of any modifications or repairs made without the necessary permits?” they answered “no.” About six weeks after closing, Wyle “received a letter from the town code enforcement officer regarding the legality of the removal of a garage door from the new unit.” A subsequent inspection revealed “numerous building and life safety code violations.”

    Mr. Wyle brought a claim against the Leeses for negligent misrepresentation. The defendants filed a motion “seeking to preclude economic loss damages.” At a two-day bench trial, Mr. Wyle won. The Leeses appealed.

    The appeals court found that “the defendants negligently misrepresented that the premises were licensed for immediate occupancy and that the defendants had obtained all necessary permits,” and thus upheld the lower court’s finding of negligent misrepresentation. The appeals court also rejected the Leeses’ argument that damages must be apportioned on all parties, including “the plaintiff himself, the plaintiff’s building inspector, and the defendant’s contractor,” finding a lack of “adequate evidence.”

    The Leeses further argued that they were unaware that modifications and repairs were accomplished without the required permits. The appeals court noted that “the trial court found that both the conditional approval and final approval for the site plan stated that a building permit and a certificate of occupancy were required prior to any use.” The court concluded that the Leeses “knew or should have known of the falsity of their representation.”

    The appeals affirmed the findings of the trial court.

    Read the court’s decision…


    Pipes May Be Defective, But Owners Lack Standing

    September 13, 2012 — CDJ Staff

    The United States District Court in Minnesota has determined that Steven and Cecilia Thundander cannot make a class-action claim against Uponor, Inc. over the plumbing in their home, as they do not have Article III standing. In this situation, the alleged defect is that Uponor made fraudulent claims that the pipes met National Sanitation Foundation (NSF) standards for use in potable water systems. Uponor submitted samples of other pipes, and their substitution was discovered when the NSF made an inspection of the manufacturing facility. The court noted that “the Thunanders contend that Uponor failed to inform homeowners, plumbers and consumers that it had been selling pipe that failed to meet NSF toxicity requirements at the time of sale and installation.”

    The Court noted that the Thunanders have not tested their piping to determine if they “demonstrate toxicity or lack of compliance with the NSF 61 standards,” noting also that the Complaint seeks to require Uponor to instruct the plaintiffs on “how to test the piping and water to determine the level of risk.” Lacking testing, the Court could not find that the Thundanders have defective pipes. The Court found that the “Plaintiffs have failed to adequately plead an injury in fact sufficient to confer standing as to their product liability claims.”

    The Court also concluded that it could not determine if the Plaintiff’s warranty actions could not be applied, as they “have failed to allege a plausible defect.” Even in the presence of a defect, the Court noted that more than eight years had passed before the filing of the suit, when the warranties under both Indiana and Minnesota law have a four-year statute of limitations. The Court also rejected the Thunanders tort claims, once again because “Plaintiffs have not tested their pipes,” noting that “a tort requires the existence of an injury.”

    In conclusion, Judge Nelson rejected the entirety of the complaint, granting the motions to dismiss by the defendants. However, despite the problems with the Thunanders’ claims, she found that they were not “patently frivolous or groundless.” Therefore, she denied attorney fees requested by one of the defendants.

    Read the court’s decision…


    New Jersey Court Rules on Statue of Repose Case

    May 26, 2011 — CDJ Staff

    A three-judge panel issued a per curium ruling on May 23 in Fairview Heights Condo. v. Investors (N.J. Super., 2011), a case which the members of a condominium board argued: “that the judge erred by: 1) dismissing plaintiff’s claims against RLI based upon the statute of repose; 2) dismissing the breach of fiduciary duty claims against the Luppinos based upon a lack of expert opinion; 3) barring the testimony of Gonzalez; and 4) barring the May 23, 1989 job site report.” The court rejected all claims from the condominium board.

    The court found that the building must be unsafe for the statute of repose to apply. They noted, “the judge made no findings on whether the water seepage, or the property damage caused by such seepage, in any way rendered the building, or any of the units, unsafe.” Further, “without a specific finding on the question of whether the defects had rendered the building ‘unsafe,’ defendants were not entitled to the benefit of the ten-year statute of repose.“

    On the second point, the court also upheld the lower court’s findings regarding the management company:

    “The report submitted by Berman establishes that the EIFS product was defective in its design and would therefore have failed from the outset. The defects in that product were, according to Berman, not prone to repair or other mitigation. Therefore, even if defendants did not appropriately inspect or repair the EIFS, their failure to do so would have had no impact on the long-term performance of the EIFS exterior cladding. As plaintiff failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact on these questions, the judge properly granted summary judgment to the Luppinos on plaintiff’s breach of fiduciary duty claim.”

    On the final two points, the judges noted “plaintiff maintains that the judge committed reversible error when he excluded the Gonzalez certification and the 1989 job site report prepared by Raymond Brzuchalski.” They saw “no abuse of discretion related to the exclusion of the Gonzalez certification, and reject plaintiff’s arguments to the contrary.” Of the job site report, they found, “no abuse of discretion in the judge's finding that the Brzuchalski 1989 job site report did not satisfy the requirements of N.J.R.E.803(c)(6).”

    Read the court’s decision


    Defective Shingle Claims Valid Despite Bankruptcy

    June 19, 2012 — CDJ Staff

    The Third Circuit Court has allowed claims to go forward against Owens Corning for making allegedly defective shingles. The shingles split, leading to leaking roofs. The building products manufacturer filed for bankruptcy in 2000, which “extinguished” claims against it. The company was facing millions in liabilities over asbestos lawsuits.

    The lawsuit was filed in 2009. The courts initially found the lawsuit timely, but the Third Circuit Court later applied determined the exposure stated before the bankruptcy. On appeal, the court has reversed this and is again allowing the suit to proceed.

    Read the full story…


    Pennsylvania Court Extends Construction Defect Protections to Subsequent Buyers

    December 20, 2012 — CDJ Staff

    The Pennsylvania courts have long held that there is an implied warranty of habitability for the initial purchaser of a home. Now, as some defects may not immediately show up, the court has extended that implied warranty to second and subsequent purchasers. As Marc D. Brookman, David I. Haas, and Christopher Bender of Duane Morris note, “this judicially created doctrine shifts the risk of a latent defect in the construction of a new home from the purchaser to the builder-vendor.”

    The Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded that a contractual relationship is not needed for an implied warranty of habitability. The court’s concern was inequalities would result when a home was sold while other homes were protected by being within the statute of repose.

    Read the full story…


    The Hidden Dangers of Construction Defect Litigation

    March 28, 2012 — David M. McLain, Colorado Construction Litigation

    David M. McLain, writing at Colorado Construction Litigation, has an interesting blog post republishing his article in Common Interests magazine, the monthly periodical of the Rocky Mountain Chapter of the Community Associations Institute. In his article, he touches on a number of pitfalls in construction defect litigation, including the potential conflicts of interests facing HOAs. He also considers the problems homeowners can face, including both “strong-arm tactics” taken by attorneys to compel homeowners to join the lawsuit, or situations in which the interests of the HOA do not match those of the homeowners. He writes:

    There is also a conflict of interest with individual owners who attempt to opt out of the case. This can lead to shocking strong-arm tactics on the part of plaintiffs’ attorneys. In one instance, a plaintiffs’ attorney sent a letter to an individual homeowner that stated that as a 1/58th owner of the common elements, if he refused to go along with the suit, and there was ultimately a finding in favor of the HOA which was in any way limited by his refusal to participate, he would be personally liable for 1/58th of the HOA’s total damages. In another instance, a different plaintiffs’ attorney sent a letter to a homeowner who wanted the builder to perform warranty repairs, informing the owner that if he let the builder perform any repairs, the attorney would bill the HOA according to the fee agreement entered by the HOA board (without knowledge or consent of non-board members) and that the HOA would assess the homeowner for that expense. These are just two examples of conflicts which may arise between the HOA board and individual homeowners when the HOA pursues CD cases.

    Another example of a conflict which will arise as a result of CD litigation occurs post-settlement. When an HOA settles for less than 100% of the amount necessary to fund all repairs outlined by its experts, plus attorneys’ fees and litigation costs, there will obviously be a shortfall in the amount necessary to fix the development. The HOA board must then choose to impose a special assessment to cover the shortfall or to make some, but not all, of the repairs outlined by its experts. In choosing the latter, the conflict arises with respect to which homes get fixed and which do not. In this situation, the HOA board has acted as the attorney-in-fact for the individual owners by bringing claims on their behalf, and has compromised those claims without their knowledge or consent.

    Read the full story…

    Reprinted courtesy of David M. McLain of Higgins, Hopkins, McClain & Roswell, LLC. Mr. McClain can be contacted at mclain@hhmrlaw.com.


    The Ever-Growing Thicket Of California Civil Code Section 2782

    January 6, 2012 — Michael D. Worthing, Borton Petrini

    California Civil Code section 2782 imposes limits on indemnity and defense provisions in construction contracts. Since the initial adoption of S.B. 8001 in 2002 (eff. January 1, 2003) section 27822 has been revised several times, and legislative history suggests that interest groups representing builders, developers and sub-contractors, as well as the insurance industry, have seen legislative action on these indemnity and defense issues as part of the overall response to the same economic pressures resulting from construction defect litigation that gave rise to S.B. 800. Amendments in 2005, 2007, 2008 and 2011 (each effective January 1 of the following year) have increasingly entangled the provisions of Section 2782 with various provisions of S.B. 800. The application of section 2782 to construction contracts, and in particular contracts between developer-builders and subcontractors, executed after January 1, 2006, will require a concurrent reading and understanding of S.B. 800, the application of which is itself still in flux.

    The time a construction contract was executed will likely determine which version of section 2782, read in connection with provisions of S.B.800, is applicable. Because of the nature of construction defect litigation, the determination of relative rights and liabilities of developer-builders vis-à-vis subcontractors under construction contracts does not become the subject of litigation, and legal and judicial interpretation, until years after the contracts were entered and work performed. As of the date this article is submitted, there has been no case law interpreting or applying any of the post S.B. 800 amendments, in part, and perhaps primarily, because litigation arising from construction contracts executed after January 1, 2006, has not yet reached the appellate courts.

    SECTION 2782 AT THE TIME S.B. 800 WAS ENACTED

    Section 2782 was originally enacted in 1967 and amended several times to the version in effect when S.B. 800 became law, at which time the section was relatively simple and straightforward. It then consisted of two subdivisions, which have essentially remained unchanged until the most recent amendment during the 2011 legislative session.

    Section 2782 (a) prohibited, and still prohibits, provisions in construction contracts that “purport to indemnify the promisee against liability for damages for death or bodily injury to persons, injury to property, or any other loss, damage or expense arising from the sole negligence or willful misconduct of the promise.” This provision essentially prohibits what had been referred to as so-called Type I or “specific” indemnity provisions. In such agreements, the indemnitor [the promisor, that is, the person or entity indemnifying] will indemnify the indemnitee [the promisee, that is, the person or entity being protected by the indemnity] for the indemnitee’s own negligence, whether active or passive, whether the indemnitee is solely negligent or concurrently negligent with the indemnitor. (See, MacDonald & Kruse, Inc. v. San Jose Steel Co. (1972) 29 Cal.App.3d 413, 419.)3 Section 2782 (a) has remained essentially intact since the enactment of S.B. 800. It still must be considered and applied to interpret a construction contract. Generally, it will apply to contracts not involving a public agency; the next part of section 2782 specifically governs such contracts.

    The second subdivision prohibits provisions in any construction contract with a public agency which purport to impose on the contractor, or relieve the public agency from, liability for the active negligence of the public agency. Subdivision (b) has been revised by the 2011 amendment, discussed below. If a construction contract with the public agency is for residential construction, the standards of S.B. 800 likely apply.4

    This was the extent of section 2782 on January 1, 2003, when S.B. 800 went into effect, and remained so until January 1, 2006. This version will govern interpretation and application of indemnity and defense provisions in construction contracts executed before January 1, 2006.5

    2005 AMENDMENT

    The first “post S.B. 800” change to Section 2782 was in enacted in 2005, effective January 1, 2006, and added two new sections. Subdivision (c) stated (in somewhat greater detail than paraphrased here) that for residential construction contracts, or amendments thereto, entered into after January 1, 2006, a subcontractor cannot be required to indemnify (including the cost to defend) a builder for construction defects that arise out of negligence or design defects of the builder or other independent contractors, or that do not arise out of the scope of the subcontractor=s scope of work. The term “residential construction” was defined by reference to S.B.800 generally, and the term “builder” was defined by reference to section 911 (a part of S.B. 800), for the first time expressly connecting provisions of section 2782 to S.B. 800. Contractual provisions not expressly prohibited were reserved to the agreement of the parties.

    What subdivision (c) took away was partially given back by subdivision (d). It stated that “subdivision (c) does not prohibit a subcontractor and builder from mutually agreeing to the timing or immediacy of the defense and provisions for reimbursement of defense fees and costs, so long as that agreement, upon final resolution of the claims, does not waive or modify the provisions of subdivision (c).”6 In addition, it stated that this subdivision (c) did not affect the obligations of an insurance carrier under Presley Homes, Inc. v. American States Insurance Company (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 571, which holds that where an insurer has a duty to defend a developer pursuant to an additional insured endorsement obtained under a subcontractor’s policy, that duty generally applies to the entire action, even if the suit involves both covered and uncovered claims, or a single claim only partially covered by the policy. Finally, subdivision (d) stated that the amendment did not affect the builder’s or subcontractor’s obligations under S.B. 800. Both of these latter provisions, relating to the Presley Homes case, and obligations under S.B. 800, have been carried forward essentially intact in subsequent amendments of section 2782.

    This version of section 2782 will be applicable to any contract between a builder as defined by section 911 (see fn. 4, above) and a subcontractor executed between January 1, 2006, and December 31, 2008. Thus, a general contractor, etc., who is not a builder is not subject to the provisions added by the 2005 amendment; this changed with the next amendment.

    It is not clear whether this version would apply to a contract entered before January 1, 2006, but amended after that date. Subdivision (c) applies to “all construction contracts, and amendments thereto, entered into after January 1, 2006, for residential construction.” It would seem that the clearest and most logical construction would apply it only to contracts originally made after January 1, 2006, and thereafter amended, but there has been no judicial determination of this issue.

    In addition, logically it would seem that this version of section 2782 should be applicable to construction contracts for residential construction between a builder and a subcontractor, entered between January 1, 2006, and December 31, 2008; however, legislative history relating to the 2008 amendment discussed below suggests a different result might occur.

    2007 AMENDMENT

    The second “post S.B. 800” amendment in 2007 (effective January 1, 2008), added subdivisions (e)(1) and (e)(2).

    Subdivision (e)(1) added general contractors and subcontractors not affiliated with the builder and imposed essentially the same restrictions on provisions to indemnify, including the cost to defend, them as had been imposed on the “builder” by the 2005 amendment. The amendment refers to section 911 (b), again part of S.B. 800, to define general contractors, etc., not affiliated with the builder.

    Subdivision (e)(1) essentially repeated the provisions of subdivision (d) permitting agreement to the timing and immediacy of the defense, the reference to the Presley Homes case, and the general contractor’s or subcontractor’s obligations under S.B. 800.

    It appears this amendment was an attempt to harmonize the new restrictions on indemnity and defense provisions with S.B. 800. The 2005 amendment, whether by oversight or intent, covered only builders and not general contractors, although both classes are subject to the provisions of S.B. 800; the 2007 amendment added non-builder-affiliated general contractors.

    Again, logically, it would seem that this version of section 2782 should be applicable to construction contracts for residential construction between a general contractor or contractor not affiliated with a builder and a subcontractor, entered between January 1 and December 31, 2008; however, legislative history relating to the 2008 amendment discussed below suggests a different result might occur. The same potential uncertainty regarding applicability to a contract entered before January 1, 2008, but amended after that date, exists for this provision as for the prior amendment, discussed above.

    2008 AMENDMENT

    The third “post S.B. 800” amendment in 2008 (effective January 1, 2009), reorganized the language relating to prohibited indemnity provisions, added a reference to insurance in that same prohibition, extensively rewrote the provisions governing agreements relating to the timing or immediacy of defense, added language preserving equitable indemnity claims, and added language defining “construction defect” by reference to the standards set forth in S.B. 800.

    Subdivisions (a) and (b) remained unchanged.

    Subdivision (c) now made a combined reference to builders (again by reference to section 911), as well as general contractors or contractors not affiliated with the builder (again by reference to section 911 (b)), rather than dealing with the two groups in separate but nearly identical subdivisions as previously. It otherwise restated the same limitations that were previously set forth separately in subdivisions (c) and (e), as well as the reference to the Presley Homes case, and the general contractor’s or subcontractor’s obligations under S.B. 800, but with one important addition. The word “insure” was added to the description of prohibited provisions, to-wit: “provisions? that purport to insure or indemnify, including the cost to defend, the builder, [etc.]? are unenforceable” to the extent they arise out of claims of the type previously described.

    It is unclear what impact the addition of this single word “insure” will have; and, it will have to be read in light of the preservation of the language that it shall not affect the obligations of an insurance carrier under the holding of the Presley Homes case. Suppose a carrier had issued an additional insured endorsement under which it would otherwise be required to defend a builder or general contractor consistent with the Presley Homes rule: would this newly added single word (restricting the construction contract, to which the carrier is not a party) give the carrier a basis for denying coverage under the insurance contract? Or would the continued inclusion of the express language that it does not affect the obligations of an insurance carrier under Presley Homes control? That is surely an issue that will have to be worked out by the courts.

    The new subdivision (d) addressed defense obligations. Again it permitted parties to agree to the timing and immediacy of the defense and provision for reimbursement of defense fees and costs, but imposed a very detailed scheme that appears to limit the extent of such agreement. A subcontractor owes no defense or indemnity obligation until the builder or general contractor provides a written tender of the claim, which has the same force and effect as notice of commencement of a legal proceeding. Upon that tender the subcontractor shall elect to follow one of two ways of performing: subdivision (d) (1) permits the subcontractor to defend with counsel of its choice and to control the defense, if the subcontractor gives written notice of this election within a reasonable time after receipt of the written tender and in no event later than 90 days following that receipt; subdivision (d) (2) provides an alternative by which the subcontractor pays a reasonable allocated share of the builder’s or general contractor’s defense fees and costs within 30 days of receipt of an invoice, subject to reallocation upon final resolution of the claim by settlement or judgment. Subdivision (e) sets forth remedies available to the builder or general contractor if a subcontractor fails to timely and adequately perform its obligations under either of the two alternatives in subdivision (d), including compensatory and consequential damages, reasonable attorneys’ fees in connection with the first alternative, and interest on defense and indemnity costs in connection with the second alternative. Subdivision (e) ends with provisions relating to reallocation of defense costs, and damages for failure to reallocate.

    Application of these requirements in actual litigation is likely to be cumbersome and potentially fraught with conflicts. If retained pursuant to subdivision (d) (1) does the attorney represent the builder, the subcontractor, or both? To whom does the attorney owe his or her fiduciary duty? Can an appropriate informed written consent be formulated, for example, under Rule 3-310 of the California Rules of Professional Conduct, or Rule 1.7, ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct? Could an attorney retained by a subcontractor blame the subcontractor if that is in the developer’s best interests? If multiple subcontractors elect to defend directly, how would the defense be coordinated among the potentially multiple attorneys so retained? Would an attorney retained by one subcontractor be able, or inclined, to blame another subcontractor who also chose to defend directly, in other words, what would prevent inconsistent defense positions amongst the various counsel retained by subcontractors for the developer? There may be solutions to such practical and professional considerations but it seems an ethical thicket awaits any attorney involved in such circumstances.

    Subdivision (e) and (f) preserve equitable indemnity claims for the builder, general contractor or subcontractor, the first in general, the second as against any supplier, design profession, or product manufacturer. Finally, the 2008 amendment added for the first time, in subdivision (h), language defining "construction defect" as used in section 2782 as a violation of standards set forth in S.B. 800.

    The inclusion of these last three subsections would seem to work against simplification of litigation. A builder or general contractor is likely to allege a claim for equitable indemnity against any and all subcontractors in addition to claims for contractual indemnity and defense (however limited by the other provisions of section 2782). Nothing in the section suggests the subcontractor should, or even can, somehow take on the representation of the builder, etc., in connection with a claim of equitable indemnity back against the subcontractor.

    And the limited definition of “construction defect” in subdivision (h) appears to raise an issue of the applicability of the limitations set forth in subdivision (c). Although there is a school of thought that section 941 limits residential construction defect claims only to breach of the performance standards under S.B. 800, it is still common for CD complaints to plead other legal theories, e.g., breach of contract, breach of warranty, negligence, etc., in addition to violation of S.B. 800 standards. With the addition of subdivision (h) it is arguable that the restrictions on indemnity and defense provisions spelled out in subdivisions (c) and (d), both of which relate to claims for residential construction defects, are applicable only to claims for violation of S.B. 800 standards, and not other residential construction defect claims. In other words, a developer might conceivably still be entitled to a broader scope of indemnity and concomitant defense for other types of claims, such as breach of contract, breach of warranty, negligence, etc., so long as the indemnity does not violate the limitation of subdivision (a) against Type I indemnity, which as noted above, has remained intact through these revisions.

    Finally, it would seem that this version of section 2782 should be applicable to contracts executed between builders, general contractors, etc., on the one hand and subcontractors on the other hand on and after January 1, 2009. And, as noted above in connection with the 2005 and 2007 amendments, logic would suggest that those versions would ordinarily apply to contracts executed during the time periods mentioned above. But, the Legislative Counsel’s Digest for the 2008 amendment as it finally was enacted into law includes the following statements:

    This bill would delete the provisions applicable to construction contracts entered into on or after January 1, 2008, that purport to indemnify the general contractor or contractor not affiliated with the builder. The bill would revise the provisions applicable to contracts entered into after January 1, 2006, to instead apply to contracts entered into after January 1, 2009, and to apply to agreements that purport to insure or indemnify the builder or the general contractor or contractor not affiliated with the builder, as described.

    Although it seems a startling result, this legislative history suggests an argument can be made that the 2008 amendment retroactively nullified the effect of the 2005 and 2007 amendments, so that contracts executed from January 1, 2006, as to builders or January 1, 2008, for general contractors, etc., through December 31, 2008, are still governed by the provisions of section 2782 as it was on the books prior to the first post-S.B. 800 amendment in 2005.

    2011 AMENDMENT

    Section 2782 has been amended yet again in the 2011 session of the California Legislature, effective January 1, 2012; however, the substantive changes affect certain contracts entered on or after January 1, 2013. All of the provisions contained in the 2008 amendment have been carried forward in the most recent amendment, although re-numbered: (c) became (d), etc., through (h) becoming (i). So, the law governing construction contracts entered into after January 1, 2009, for residential construction, as between a builder, or a general contractor, etc., not affiliated with a builder, and regarding insurance, indemnity or defense relating to claims for construction defects, remains the same as in the 2008 amendment.

    As noted above the substantive changes to section 2782 all affect contracts entered into on or after January 1, 2013. Subdivision (b) has been amended such that any provision in a contract with a public agency that purports to impose on any contractor, etc., or relieve the public agency from, liability for the active negligence of the public agency will be void and unenforceable. A new subdivision (c) has been added that imposes a similar restriction on construction contracts with the owner of privately owned real property to be improved and as to which the owner is not acting as a contractor or supplier of materials or equipment to the work. This new restriction in subdivision (c) does not apply to a homeowner performing a home improvement project on his or her own single family dwelling.

    The 2011 bill amending section 2782 also added a new section 2782.05, which will make void and unenforceable any provision in any construction contract (again, entered on or after January 1, 2013) that purports to insure or indemnify, including the cost to defend, a general contractor, construction manager, or other subcontractor, by a subcontractor for claims that arise out of the active negligence or willful misconduct of the general contractor, etc., or other independent contractors, etc., or to the extent the claims do not arise out of the scope of work of the subcontractor. However, the section also includes a long list of situations to which it does not apply, including all of those covered by section 2782 (residential construction subject to S.B. 800, public agency contracts subject to section 2782 (b), and direct contracts with private property owners subject to the new section 2782 (c)) as well as eight other categories. This apparently is intended to serve as a “catch-all” to extend a limitation on indemnity agreements to all construction contracts not previously swept into this widening legislative scheme, although the exact phrasing is slightly different.7

    The new section 2782.05 then permits a mutual agreement to the timing or immediacy of a defense under a scheme essentially identical to that imposed in the 2008 amendment to section 2782: defend with counsel of choice, and maintain control of the defense; or, pay a reasonable allocated share of defense fees and costs. The same logistical and ethical difficulties presented by the 2008 scheme discussed above would likely be present in cases that fall under the new section 2782.05.

    CONCLUSION

    The California Legislature has been revising section 2782 since shortly after the adoption of S.B. 800. Each revision has been more complicated than the last, and each has tied certain provisions of section 2782 more closely to S.B. 800. In particular, with regard to construction defect claims relating to residential dwellings which are subject to S.B. 800, the Legislature has apparently attempted to exercise more and more control over the scope of allowable indemnity and dictated a very narrow scheme to govern how the defense obligation arising from a contractual indemnity is to be implemented. It seems likely that any attempt to manage the defense of a construction defect case under the options that allow a subcontractor to defend directly and control the defense will create a logistical problem and an ethical difficulty for any attorney attempting to defend a developer at the behest and direction of a subcontractor. Finally, as set forth in the current version of section 2782 relating to contractual indemnity and defense of S.B. 800 type cases (subdivisions (c) through (h) in the 2008 version, now subdivisions (d) through (i) in the 2011 amendment), the Legislature has apparently narrowed the application to only claims of violation of S.B. 800 standards. This may have, in essence, removed the restrictions on indemnity and defense provisions as they relate to other theories pleaded against developers in construction defense cases, e.g., breach of contract, breach of warranty, negligence, and the like. It is not at all clear that the Legislature has accomplished what it set out do accomplish. Rather, the law may have come full circle back to where it began, except for one legal theory, i.e. violation of S.B. 800 standards, currently being used in residential construction defect cases. For any other legal theory the limitation of section 2782 (a) may be solely controlling.

    1. California Civil Code section 43.99, and sections 895 to 945.5.
    2. All statutory references in this article are to the California Civil Code unless otherwise specified.
    3. Type I or specific indemnity does not exactly match the scope of proscribed indemnity as described in section 2782 (a) but it is the closest. More recent case law in California has eschewed a mechanical application of the MacDonald & Kruse typology in favor of examining the precise text of the actual contract (See, e.g., St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Frontier Pacific Ins. Co. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1234, 1246, n. 6) but some recent cases still use the Type I, II and II classifications. And, an understanding of that “historical” typology is useful as an aid to evaluating and understanding express indemnity in general.
    4. The provisions of S.B. 800 other than the prelitigation procedures of sections 910 through 938 apply to general contractors, subcontractors, etc., pursuant to section 936. The prelitigation procedures generally involve a “builder,” which is specifically defined in section 911 (a) by reference to entities or individuals in the business of selling residential units to the public or of building, developing, or constructing residential units for public purchase. Pursuant to section 911 (b) the term builder does not include general contractors, etc., not affiliated with the builder. Thus, a general contractor who constructs residential housing pursuant to a contract with a public agency is still subject to claims for violation of the standards set forth in sections 896 and 897, resulting from its negligent act or omission or breach of contract, pursuant to section 936.
    5. As noted above, there has been no case law yet interpreting any of the “post S.B. 800” changes to Section 2782. One of the most important legal decisions relating to express indemnity and defense obligations and rights between developer-builders and sub-contractors was published after two of the amendments but based upon contracts executed and the language of section 2782 prior to January 1, 2006. (See, Crawford v. Weather Shield Mfg., Inc. (2008) 44 Cal.4th 541, 547, 566-67, fn. 14).
    6. Subcontractor dissatisfaction with the perceived inadequacy of protection afforded by this provision apparently became the impetus for a 2008 amendment to section 2782, discussed below, at least based upon the numerous (form) letters submitted to legislators in connection therewith.
    7. Section 2782 (a), where we started, and which has continued without change, prohibits indemnity for claims arising out of the sole negligence or willful misconduct of the promisee; sole negligence can be either active or passive. The various versions relating to residential construction prohibit indemnity for the negligence of the builder, etc., suggesting there is no express contractual indemnity for the negligence of the subcontractor if the builder, etc., is at all negligent. This is tempered a bit by the preservation of the right to equitable indemnity, which will now be found in section 2782 (g) and (h).

    Courtesy of Michael D. Worthing of Borton Petrini, LLP. Mr. Worthing can be contacted at mworthing@bortonpetrini.com.