Plans Go High Tech
April 25, 2012 — CDJ Staff
One construction executive described it as “the wave of the future.” What is it? Accessing building plans on an iPad. According to an article in MacWorld, several companies are now offering solutions to distribute and update construction plans on iPads. Changes to plans and notes can be distributed quickly through cloud computing.
Alan Dillon, a senior superintendent at DPR Construction told MacWorld, “I can take my iPad into the field and have my whole set of drawings.” He described a set of drawings for a large construction project as “five or six inches thick.” Danielle Douthet, of Level 10 Construction said it “can help everyone be on the same page more quickly, and make sure that everybody is working off the most current set of documents.”
And it’s not just building plans. Other firms offer building management applications designed to be taken into the field on mobile devices.
Read the full story…
Florida trigger
August 4, 2011 — CDCoverage.com
In Mid-Continent Casualty Co. v. Siena Home Corp., No. 5:08-CV-385-Oc-10GJK (M.D. Fla. July 8, 2011), insured residential real estate developer Siena was sued by homeowners seeking damages for moisture penetration property damage resulting from exterior wall construction defects. Siena’s CGL insurer Mid-Continent filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment of no duty to defend or indemnify in part on the basis that the alleged “property damage” did not manifest during the Mid-Continent policy period.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of CDCoverage.com
Insurance Firm Under No Duty to Defend in Hawaii Construction Defect Case
September 13, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The US District Court for Hawaii has granted a motion for summary judgment in Evanston Insurance v. Nagano. The case is related to a construction defect claim, Hu v. Nagano, and the issue at hand is whether Evanston Insurance is obligated to defend the Naganos in the underlying case.
The Hus hired Eric Nagano and his firm PMX to construct a house. Mr. Nagano’s firm was insured by Evanston, however, he lost his contractor’s license in “approximately March 2006.” Mr. Nagano sought the Hus’ authorization to allow HC Builders to take over the contract. HC Builders is headed by Mr. Nagano’s wife, Hiroko, who has held a contractor’s license since “approximately September 2006.” Ms. Nagano and HC Builders were also insured by Evanston Insurance. The house, started by PMX was finished by HC Builders.
The Hus authorized construction to begin in July 2003, but “construction did not commence until approximately October 2004 and, even after commencement, there were numerous delays resulting in months of inactivity on the Project.” The Hus had expressed to Mr. Nagano and PMX “that the construction period could not exceed twelve months after July 1, 2003.” As a result of the delays, “the Hus’ community association fined them because of the prolonged construction and the Hus’ construction lender assessed extension fees and fines for exceeding the term of the loan.”
The Hus noted that the project did not have a licensed contractor from March through September 2006. In the end, the Hus “allege that Defendants did not fulfill the obligations under the Construction Contract,” and that “the Project was ‘grossly delayed’ and the construction was ‘riddled with defects.’” Despite an Owner’s Notice of Completion filed in December 2007, the residence “had no electricity, no hot water, ... no installed appliances” and “parts of the flooring were either missing or incomplete.” And then it leaked.
The Naganos tendered the defense to Evanston. The Naganos “allege the defense is limited because Evanston: allowed default to be entered against the Naganos (the default was later set aside); delayed retaining experts; and limited the ability of the Naganos’ retained counsel to perform necessary actions to advance the case.” Evanston argues that it “does not have a duty to defend or indemnify Defendants against the Hus’ claims,” as the Hus’ claims are not covered under the policy. Further, the PMX policies have an exclusion for breach of contract.
The court concluded that all of the claims made by the Hus were based in contract and therefore were outside of the terms of the Naganos insurance coverage, as the courts have "construed Hawaii law as not providing for insurance coverage for contract related claims." Therefore, Evanston does not have a duty to defend the Naganos.
Read the court’s decision…
Surveyors Statute Trumps Construction Defect Claim in Tennessee
June 19, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The Tennessee Court of Appeals has issued an opinion in the case of Dale v. B&J Enters. (Tenn. App., 2012), affirming the ruling of the Chancery Court for Knox County. The homeowners purchased properties in Knoxville, Tennessee in 2007 and 2008. Subsequently, according to the complaint, they found “significant sink holes and depressions throughout the subdivision.” The plaintiffs determined that a previous developer in 2004 had been aware of the sink holes. The Knox County Metropolitan Planning Commission, upon giving approval, made requirements that included that sink holes, even if they were filled, had to be designated on the site plans. The developer did not indicate these locations on the final plans. The plaintiffs made claims of “failure to disclose, misrepresentation, misrepresentation by concealment, and violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act.” They filed their suit in June 2009.
The defendants in the initial case, argued that they did not create the final plat, the site plan indicating the features and lot lines. This had been the work of the previous developer. In September, 2009, the plaintiffs amended their complaint to include the previous developer and its engineering firm. The engineering firm disavowed any responsibility. The developer noted that the surveyor, Benchmark Associates, had “failed to properly include the sink holes and/or depressions on the final plat.” In June, 2010, the plaintiffs added Benchmark.
Benchmark argued that the plaintiffs’ claims should be dismissed, as Tennessee has a four-year statute of limitations on claims against surveyors. The final plat was recorded on May 19, 2006, and the plaintiff filed their claims against Benchmark on June 16, 2010, slightly less than a month over four years. The plaintiffs argued that “the real issue [was] the tortious misrepresentation by Benchmark.” The Chancery Court found for Benchmark.
On appeal, the plaintiffs raised three issues. They argued that the trial court applied the wrong section of the law, and should have applied the section applying to construction and not surveyors. They also argued that the timeliness of the claim should be based on when the defects were discovered. The also raised the question of whether the laws concerning surveyors bar claims for misrepresentation. The appeals court upheld the decision of the Chancery Court.
For the plaintiff’s first claim, although the statute addressing deficiencies in construction mentions surveying, an earlier court ruling found that the legislature had removed a reference to surveyors in one part of the statute, but failed to do so in the second part. The earlier court had concluded that the “obvious intent of the legislature was to place all limits on actions against surveyors into the new statute.” As the applicable statute states that “any such action not instituted within this four (4) year period shall be forever barred,” the court held that the plaintiffs’ claims must be time barred. Further, as the intent of the legislature was determined to “place all limits on actions against surveyors into one statute,” the court felt that it could not apply the Consumer Protection Act.
Read the court’s decision…
Arbitration Clause Found Ambiguous in Construction Defect Case
October 28, 2011 — CDJ Staff
The California Court of Appeals ruled on September 28 in the case of Burch v. Premier Homes. Ms. Burch bought a home after negotiating various addendums to the contract. The contract was a standard California Association of Realtors contract to which both the buyer and seller made additions. At issue in this case was paragraph 17 of the contract which included that “Buyer and Seller agree that any dispute or claim in Law or equity arising between them out of this Agreement or resulting transaction, which is not settled through mediation, shall be decided by neutral, binding arbitration.”
The seller/defendant’s Addendum 2 “included provisions relating to the arbitration of disputes that may arise.” Ms. Burch’s realtor, Lisa Morrin, told Burch that “she had never seen a proposed contractual provision that would require a home buyer to agree to arbitrate with a builder over construction defects.” Ms. Burch told Morrin that she did not want to buy the property if she would have to give up her rights under California law.
As part of Addendum 2, the buyer had to buy a warranty from the Home Buyers Warranty Corporation. The sale was held up for a while, as Ms. Burch waited for a copy of the warranty. When she received it, she took further exception to Addendum 2. Scott Warren of Premier Homes said he could not sell the property without Addendum 2. Ms. Burch told her realtor that despite the claims made by Mr. Warren that this was for her benefit, she felt it was more to the benefit of Premier Homes. Don Aberbrook of HBW agreed to the clause, contained in the final sentence of Addendum 2, being struck.
Subsequent to buying the home, Burch submitted a claim concerning construction defects. HBW denied the claim and Burch began an action against the defendants. Premier filed a motion to compel arbitration which Burch opposed.
The trial court ruled that the striking out of the arbitration clause at the end of Addendum 2 “created a conflict with respect to the parties’ intent as to the scope of arbitration.” The trial court found that “the parties’ intention was to preserve Burch’s right to make state law claims including her right to a jury trial for any non-warranty claims against the builder.”
The appeals court in their ruling looked at the standard of review and concluded that the purchase agreement was ambiguous and that extrinsic evidence was required to resolve that ambiguity. As the contract contained contradictory provisions as to whether or not arbitration was required, it was necessary for the trial court to examine these claims. The appeals court found that the evidence supported the conclusions of the trial court.
Finally, the appeals court found that “there was no valid agreement to arbitrate disputes.” The court noted that arbitration can only happen by mutual consent and “it is clear that Burch did not enter into an agreement to arbitrate any construction defect disputes she might have.”
Read the court’s decision…
Construction Defect Journal Marks First Anniversary
January 6, 2012 — CDJ Staff
November 2011 marked the first anniversary of the Construction Defect Journal. During the first year our staff and contributors in the insurance and legal communities have compiled several hundred articles of interest to the construction defect and claims community.
Each of these articles are maintained in the CDJ archives, and are accessible at http://www.constructiondefectjournal.com/archives.html. Each story in the archives is listed in the order it was posted to the archives. Each story in the archives opens up in its own page, so you can easily locate topics and articles of interest.
If you’re new to Construction Defect Journal, or just want peruse past articles, please take a moment to visit the CDJ Archives page. Also please feel encouraged to submit your firm’s articles or legal publications of interest to the CD community at http://www.constructiondefectjournal.com/submitStory.html.
South Carolina Legislature Defines "Occurrence" To Include Property Damage Arising From Faulty Workmanship
May 26, 2011 — Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
On May 17, 2011, South Carolina passed legislation to combat the restrictive interpretation of what constitutes an "occurrence" under CGL policies. S.C. Code Ann. sec. 38-61-70.
The legislation reversed a decision by the state's Supreme Court issued earlier this year. See Crossman Communities of North Carolina, Inc. v. Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co., 2011 W.L. 93716 (S.C. Jan. 7, 2011). Crossman had overruled an earlier decision by the South Carolina Supreme Court that holding that defective construction was an “occurrence.” Crossman, however, reversed course, holding that damages resulting from faulty workmanship were the “natural and probable cause” of the faulty work and, as such, did not qualify as an “occurrence.”
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
Policing Those Subcontractors: It Might Take Extra Effort To Be An Additional Insured
June 14, 2011 — Douglas Reiser, Builders Council Blog
I just came across a case that I think truly paints the insurance dilemma for contractors. Thanks to this recent Illinois case, I don’t have to make up any factual scenarios—so kudos to Attorney Robert Boylan for posting it.
In reading over my RSS feeds this weekend, I noticed a great writeup on long-time blogger Josh Glazov’s Construction Law Today. Attorney Robert Boylan’s post describes a recent Illinois case where a general contractor was denied its additional insured status on a second-tier subcontractor’s insurance. The reason for the denial: the general contractor failed to procure an agreement in writing with the second-tier subcontractor, requiring it to be listed as an additional insured.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of Douglas Reiser of Reiser Legal LLC. Mr. Reiser can be contacted at info@reiserlegal.com
South Carolina Law Clarifies Statue of Repose
July 11, 2011 — CDJ Staff
A new law in South Carolina, H 3375, fixes a loophole in that state’s statute of repose. State law puts a cap of eight years on construction defects, but the 2008 law that set that limit had a loophole that would allow for construction defect claims to start thirteen years after construction. The law also provides a cap on punitive damages.
The measure was backed by the Carolinas Association of General Contractors. Their spokesperson said that the legislation “increases our state’s ability to be economically competitive and helps protect our members from frivolous lawsuits.”
Read the full story…
Read South Carolina H 3375…
A Lien Might Just Save Your Small Construction Business
April 4, 2011 — Douglas Reiser in the Builders Counsel Blog
Many owners incorrectly believe that payment to the general contractor gets the owner off the hook for payment to subcontractors and suppliers. This assumption sometimes fosters the irresponsible owner, who fails to ensure that everyone is getting paid. Fortunately for those contractors further down the contracting chain, this assumption is incorrect.
Suppliers and subcontractors can file a lien to secure payment for their labor and materials. A filing party must offer proper notice (if applicable) and file an adequate and timely lien in the County where the work is performed. You can read our earlier posts on these topics by following this link.
A lien notice and a lien put an owner on notice that your business has provided labor and/or materials for the improvement of the owner’s property (See RCW 60.04.031 for more info). If the owner fails to take care to ensure that your business is paid the law mandates that the owner may have to pay twice.
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of Douglas Reiser of Reiser Legal LLC. Mr. Reiser can be contacted at info@reiserlegal.com
SB800 Cases Approach the Courts
July 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
California’s Right to Repair Law turns ten this year and cases under the statute are finally coming to trial, as John V. O’Meara of Bremer Whyte Brown & O’Meara writes for the Martindale-Hubble Legal Library. Mr. O’Meara notes that SB800 eliminated “the traditional definitions of construction defect,” replacing them with “functionality standards.” He argues that these standards are not uniform: “some standards require damage and others do not.” He also wonders what terms like “significant cracks,” “intended water” and “materially comply” mean in a court.
Mr. O’Meara states that “defendants in construction defect cases have a right to know the standards that apply to a case, the definitions that will be presented to the jury, and the burden of proof that attaches.”
Read the full story…
In Colorado, Primary Insurers are Necessary Parties in Declaratory Judgment Actions
December 9, 2011 — Heather M. Anderson, Colorado Construction Litigation
The United States District Court for the District of Colorado recently ruled that primary insurers are necessary parties, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 19, in a declaratory judgment action being pursued by an excess carrier. See Insurance Co. of State of Pennsylvania v. LNC Communities II, LLC, 2011 WL 5548955 (D. Colo. 2011). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19 is almost identical to Colorado Rule of Civil Procedure 19 and pertains to the joinder of persons needed for “just adjudication.” The Insurance Co. of the State of Pennsylvania (“ICSOP”) sought a declaratory judgment that it did not have a duty to defend or indemnify the defendants (collectively referred to as “Lennar Companies”) with regard to the underlying lawsuit brought by The Falls at Legend Trail Owners Association, Inc. (the “HOA”). Id. at *2. In its lawsuit, the HOA alleged Lennar Companies were liable for construction defects at The Falls at Legend Trail residential development.
Lennar Companies held two primary insurance policies, one issued by OneBeacon Insurance Company f/k/a General Accident Insurance Company (“General Accident”) and the other issued by American Safety Risk Retention Group, Inc. (“American Safety”). Lennar Companies also carried excess policies issued by ICSOP and Ohio Casualty Insurance Company (“Ohio Casualty”).
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Reprinted courtesy of Heather M. Anderson of Higgins, Hopkins, McClain & Roswell, LLP. Ms Anderson can be contacted at anderson@hhmrlaw.com
Mississippi exclusions j(5) and j(6) “that particular part”
June 7, 2011 — CDCoverage.com
In Lafayete Ins. Co. v. Peerboom, No. 3:10cv336 (S.D. Miss. June 2, 2011), claimant homeowner Peerboom hired insured contractor Absolute to raise Peerboom’s house two feet to avoid future flooding. While Absolute was raising the house, it fell, resulting in physical injury to the home. Peerboom sued Absolute for negligence, breach of contract, and fraud, seeking damages for the destruction of the home. Absolute’s CGL insurer Lafayette defended under a reservation of rights and filed a declaratory judgment action.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of CDCoverage.com
Injured Construction Worker Settles for Five Hundred Thousand
October 28, 2011 — CDJ Staff
An upstate New York man who was injured when an unsecured truss fell off the railings of a scissor lift has settled for $500,000. As the accident happened at the building site for a casino for the Seneca Nation, attorneys for the construction firm had argued that New York labor laws were inapplicable as the injury happened on Seneca Nation land. The state appeals court ruled that as none of the parties involved were Native Americans, it was not internal to the affairs of the Seneca Nation.
Read the full story...
Insurer Unable to Declare its Coverage Excess In Construction Defect Case
January 6, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has upheld a summary judgment in the case of American Family Mutual Insurance Co. v. National Fire & Marine Insurance Co. Several other insurance companies were party to this case. In the earlier case, the US District Court of Appeals for Arizona had granted a summary judgment to Ohio Casualty Group and National Fire & Marine Insurance Company. At the heart of it, is a dispute over construction defect coverage.
The general contractor for Astragal Luxury Villas, GFTDC, contracted with American Family to provide it with a commercial liability policy. Coverage was issued to various subcontractors by Ohio Casualty and National Fire. These policies included blanket additional insured endorsements that provided coverage to GFTDC. The subcontractor policies had provisions making their coverage excess over other policies available to GFTDC.
The need for insurance was triggered when the Astragal Condominium Unit Owners Association filed a construction defect claim in the Arizona Superior Court. CFTDC filed a third-party claim against several subcontractors. The case was settled with American Family paying the settlement, after which it filed seeking reimbursement from the subcontractor’s insurers. The court instead granted summary judgment in favor of Ohio Casualty and National Fire.
American Family appealed to the Ninth Circuit for a review of the summary judgment, arguing that the “other insurance” clauses were “mutually repugnant and unenforceable.” The Ninth Circuit cited a case from the Arizona Court of Appeals that held that “where two policies cover the same occurrence and both contain ‘other insurance’ clauses, the excess insurance provisions are mutually repugnant and must be disregarded. Each insurer is then liable for a pro rate share of the settlement or judgment.”
The court noted that unlike other “other insurance” cases, the American Family policy “states that it provides primary CGL coverage for CFTDC and is rendered excess only if there is ‘any other primary insurance’ available to GFTDC as an additional insured.” They note that “the American Family policy purports to convert from primary to excess coverage only if CFTDC has access to other primary insurance as an additional insured.”
In comparison, the court noted that “the ‘other insurance’ language in Ohio Casualty’s additional insured endorsement cannot reasonably be read to contradict, or otherwise be inconsistent with, the ‘other primary insurance’ provision in the American Family policy.” They find other reasons why National Fire’s coverage did not supersede American Family’s. In this case, the policy is “written explicitly to apply in excess.”
Finally, the Astragal settlement did not exhaust American Family’s coverage, so they were obligated to pay out the full amount. The court upheld the summary dismissal of American Family’s claims.
Read the court’s decision…
Appeals Court Upholds Decision by Referee in Trial Court for Antagan v Shea Homes
May 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
In the case Antangan v. Shea Homes Ltd. Partnership (Cal. App., 2012), Plaintiffs appealed “an order vacating a judgment and entering a modified judgment in their construction defect action against defendants Shea Homes, Inc. and Shea Homes Limited Partnership,” while the Defendant, Shea Homes Limited Partnership (Shea Homes) appealed “an order of the judicial referee denying its motion to strike and tax costs.”
On the Antagon issue, the appeals court concluded that “the trial court did not err by vacating and modifying its judgment so that the cost of referee’s fees would be equally divided by the parties and consistent with a prior stipulation they filed in court.”
On the Shea Homes issue, the appeals court concluded: “1) the judicial referee did not err by ruling that plaintiffs’ offers to compromise (§ 998) were validly served on Shea Homes’ counsel, 2) the offers substantially complied with statutory requirements, 3) the offers were not required to be apportioned, and 4) the referee’s award of $5,000 as costs for a person assisting plaintiffs’ counsel was not an abuse of discretion.” The appeals court affirmed the judgment.
Here is a brief history of the trial case: “Plaintiffs Chito Antangan, Jimmy Alcova and other homeowners brought an action against defendants Shea Homes, Inc. and Shea Homes Limited Partnership for damages alleging that the properties they purchased from these ‘developer defendants’ were defective. Plaintiffs claimed numerous construction defects required them ‘to incur expenses’ for ‘restoration and repairs’ and the value of their homes had been diminished.”
In response, Shea Homes filed a motion for an order to appoint a judicial referee. The motion was granted and it was ruled that “a referee would ‘try all issues’ and ‘report a statement of decision to this court.’”
On May 10, 2010 the judicial referee (Thompson) “awarded plaintiffs damages and various costs, and ruled that ‘Shea Homes shall bear all of the Referee’s fees.’” The latter ruling would become a matter for contention later on.
In July of 2010, the plaintiffs “sought, among other things, $54,409.90 for expert fees, and $14,812.50 for the services of Melissa Fox for ‘exhibit preparation & trial presentation.’ Shea Homes filed a motion to strike and/or tax costs claiming: 1) Fox was a paralegal, 2) plaintiffs were not entitled to attorney’s fees, and 3) the fees for Fox’s services were an indirect and improper method to obtain attorney’s fees. The referee disagreed and awarded $5,000 for Fox’s services. The referee also ruled that plaintiffs had properly served valid offers to compromise (§ 998) on Shea Homes’ counsel in 2009. He said those offers to defendants in the case at that time did not have to be apportioned.”
“Antangan contends the trial court erred when it vacated and modified its original judgment, which ordered Shea Homes to pay all the referee’s fees. We disagree.”
Antagon contended that the trial court erred when it vacated and modified its original judgment regarding Shea Homes paying the referee’s fees. The appeals court disagreed: “A trial court has inherent authority to vacate or correct a judgment that is void on its face, incorrect, or entered by mistake. (§ 473; Rochin v. Pat Johnson Manufacturing Co. (1998),67 Cal.App.4th 1228; Olivera
Read the court’s decision…
Court Orders House to be Demolished or Relocated
April 26, 2011 — April 26, 2011 Beverley BevenFlorez - Construction Defect Journal
Decision Affirmed in Central Arkansas Foundation Homes, LLC v. Rebecca Choate
The Arkansas Court of Appeals affirmed the decision by the trial court in Central Arkansas Foundation Homes, LLC v. Rebecca Choate. In the trial case, Central Arkansas Foundation Homes (CAFH) sought payment for a home built for Choate, while Choate alleged that the builders committed multiple construction defects including using the wrong foundation materials and positioning the house in the wrong direction.
After the house was built, CAFH contacted Choate regarding payment, however, Choate alleged that the finished product did not match the contract. “ After CAFH completed construction, it obtained permanent home financing for Choate and tried to contact her to close the transaction. Choate did not respond until October 2005, when she sent CAFH a list of alleged construction defects, including that the house was facing in the wrong direction; that it was not built on a slab; and that the fireplace, garbage disposal, driveway, and storage area were missing. CAFH replied to Choate in writing, telling her that she had until January 6, 2006, to close on the house or CAFH would sell it. The correspondence enclosed worksheets showing that the amount Choate would owe at closing exceeded $94,000, which included interest that had accrued on the as-yet unpaid construction loan.”
Initially, the court found in favor of CAFH. “On April 18, 2007, Choate’s attorney withdrew from representing her. Soon thereafter, CAFH’s attorney asked the court to set a final hearing on the case. The attorney purportedly sent Choate a letter by regular mail on May 15, 2007, advising her that the case was set for trial on July 9, 2007. Choate, however, did not appear. CAFH did appear, and its general manager, John Oldner, testified to events leading up to the case and the amount of damages claimed. According to Oldner, the interest on the construction loan had accrued to the point that CAFH now sought $104,965.88 from Choate. The court found in favor of CAFH and entered judgment for that amount, plus attorney fees, on July 18, 2007. The court ruled that CAFH could sell the house and either remit any excess to Choate or look to Choate for the deficiency if the sales price did not cover the judgment.”
However, Choate successfully argued that she did not receive notice of the trial. A new trial was ordered, and the outcome was quite different. “On June 6, 2008, the circuit court entered judgment for Choate, ruling that the house was not in substantial compliance with the parties’ contract and that the contract should be rescinded. The court found that the house suffered from numerous construction defects, that the contract contemplated a slab rather than a concrete-pier foundation, and that CAFH ignored Choate’s complaints that the house was facing the wrong way. The judgment directed CAFH to hold Choate harmless on the construction loan, to deed Choate’s two acres back to her, and to remove the house from Choate’s property.”
The Court of Appeals “found that Choate would be unjustly enriched by retaining the benefit of the septic systems and utility lines that CAFH installed on her land. The court therefore awarded $5340 to CAFH as a quantum-meruit recovery for the value of that work. CAFH contends that the award is not sufficient, but we see no clear error.” In the end, the Court of Appeals provided this reason for declining to reverse the trial court’s decision: “The court in this case apparently concluded that the house constructed by CAFH was so fundamentally at odds with Choate’s contractual expectations that she was not unjustly enriched and should simply be, as nearly as possible, returned to the status quo ante. Accordingly, the court ordered the house removed from her property and permitted CAFH to either relocate the house or salvage the house’s materials and unused appliances. We decline to reverse the court’s weighing of the equities in this manner.”
Read the court’s decision…
MGM Seeks to Demolish Harmon Towers
September 1, 2011 — CJD Staff
Citing public safety concerns and the cost of repair, MGM Resorts International is seeking to demolish the unfinished hotel tower. The company has a few hurdles to go through before they start laying the charges to implode the structure. Any plans would have to be approved by not only Clark County officials, but also the district court has an order blocking any activity during litigation between MGM and the general contractor on the project, Perini Building Company.
Architectural Record reports that MGM states it would take “approximately 18 months to conduct test and come up with an approved, permitted design to fix the Harmon.” MGM feels that repairs would then take another two to three years. Perini contends that they could “provide stamped drawings detailing all necessary repairs within three months.” They attribute MGM’s desire to demolish the building as “buyer’s remorse.”
Read the full story…