Colorado Senate Bill 12-181: 2012’s Version of a Prompt Pay Bill
May 10, 2012 — W. Berkeley Mann, Jr., Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC
A potentially important legislative bill has been introduced in waning days of the 2012 legislative session, which would change many of the commercial practices that prevail in the construction industry. Senate Bill 12-181 applies to all building and construction contracts and would prohibit any contract provision that requires a contractor, subcontractor, or supplier to waive their lien in advance of payment. It also would ban any “choice of law” provisions that make a Colorado-based construction contract subject to enforcement only in another state, or under the laws of another state.
The bill also seeks to change many existing commercial practices between contractors, subcontractors, and suppliers. It is presently unclear whether the bill allows parties to contract around these payment procedure provisions, or whether these requirements are simply “gap filling” provisions that pertain if there are no written contract terms specified on these issues. The proposed statute would mandate payment to subcontractors and material suppliers due within seven days in the absence of a dispute about the work or materials being billed. After this seven day period, the bill would require the payment of interest at the rate of 1.5% monthly (18% annually). In any later suit for payment, the creditor would also be able to collect reasonable attorneys’ fees. Additionally, non-payment to a subcontractor or supplier who is later found to be entitled to prompt payment would excuse the subcontractor or supplier, and its surety bond provider, from any further performance under the contract.
It is presently unclear whether the bill allows parties to contract around these payment procedure provisions. However, it is clear that the bill provides some leeway for change orders, as long as there is (1) negotiation in good faith between the parties concerning the changed scope of work, and (2) a 50% payment of a subcontractor’s costs by the changing party within 30 days of the change order work being done. Additionally, the bill provides for retainage, but in an amount of no more than 5%.
The bill is presently set for hearing before the Colorado Senate Committee on Business, Labor, and Technology Committee on May 2, 2012 at 1:30 p.m.
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Reprinted courtesy of W. Berkeley Mann, Jr. of Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC. Mr. Mann can be contacted at mann@hhmrlaw.com.
Consulting Firm Indicted and Charged with Falsifying Concrete Reports
August 17, 2011 — CDJ Staff
The New York Times reports that a company paid to inspect concrete at major public works projects in New York has been charged with falsifying results. They had been hired by the city three years ago after their predecessor was found to have falsified results.
According to the Times, investigators found nothing legitimate in nearly three thousand reports. The owner and five employees of American Standard Testing and Consulting Laboratories have been indicted on twenty-nine counts, including charges under New York’s racketeering law. Prison terms could be up to twenty-five years.
Prior to the city’s contract with American Standard, the city employed a firm called Testwell. Testwell was found in 2008 to have falsified its test results.
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Construction Defect Litigation at San Diego’s Alicante Condominiums?
March 25, 2011 — Alicante HOA Website
According to recent posts in the Alicante HOA website, construction experts and legal counsel have been retained. The HOA board has been informed that testing of a variety of the building’s components are underway or will begin in the near future.
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In Colorado, Primary Insurers are Necessary Parties in Declaratory Judgment Actions
December 9, 2011 — Heather M. Anderson, Colorado Construction Litigation
The United States District Court for the District of Colorado recently ruled that primary insurers are necessary parties, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 19, in a declaratory judgment action being pursued by an excess carrier. See Insurance Co. of State of Pennsylvania v. LNC Communities II, LLC, 2011 WL 5548955 (D. Colo. 2011). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19 is almost identical to Colorado Rule of Civil Procedure 19 and pertains to the joinder of persons needed for “just adjudication.” The Insurance Co. of the State of Pennsylvania (“ICSOP”) sought a declaratory judgment that it did not have a duty to defend or indemnify the defendants (collectively referred to as “Lennar Companies”) with regard to the underlying lawsuit brought by The Falls at Legend Trail Owners Association, Inc. (the “HOA”). Id. at *2. In its lawsuit, the HOA alleged Lennar Companies were liable for construction defects at The Falls at Legend Trail residential development.
Lennar Companies held two primary insurance policies, one issued by OneBeacon Insurance Company f/k/a General Accident Insurance Company (“General Accident”) and the other issued by American Safety Risk Retention Group, Inc. (“American Safety”). Lennar Companies also carried excess policies issued by ICSOP and Ohio Casualty Insurance Company (“Ohio Casualty”).
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Reprinted courtesy of Heather M. Anderson of Higgins, Hopkins, McClain & Roswell, LLP. Ms Anderson can be contacted at anderson@hhmrlaw.com
Lower Court “Eminently Reasonable” but Wrong in Construction Defect Case
July 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Noting that “circuit court’s orders are eminently reasonable, logical and just” the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia has granted a writ to halt enforcement of these orders and to compel arbitration instead in the case of State v. Tucker. The initial case concerned claims that an HVAC system had been improperly designed, constructed, manufactured, or maintained, leading to serious problems. Glenmark Holding, the owner of the Suncrest Executive Plaza brought a lawsuit against seven defendants. Three of the defendants, Morgan Keller, Inc, York International Corporation, and Johnson Controls, Inc. argued that Glenmark was obligated to enter into arbitration.
Glenmark and the other defendants argued that the motions for arbitration should be denied “so all the claims and cross-claims of the parties could be litigated in one forum, in one proceeding.” The circuit court noted that arbitration is preferred over litigation because of its supposed “expeditious, economic resolution of issues,” but that in this case, “the petitioners would expend additional, not fewer resources responding to the parties’ claims and cross-claims.” As “compulsory arbitration would be insufficient and inequitable” the court denied the request, finding the arbitration clauses “unconscionable and, therefore, unenforceable.”
Morgan Keller, York, and Johson argued that “the interpretation of arbitration clauses is governed exclusively by the Federal Arbitration Act.” The appeals court found that “the circuit court was within its authority to consider Glenmark’s claim that the arbitration clauses were unenforceable.” However, the appeals court rejected the circuit court’s conclusion about the “piecemeal” resolution of the conflict, as it contradicts a Supreme Court ruling. The Supreme Court stated in 1983 that the FAA “requires piecemeal resolution when necessary to give effect to an arbitration agreement.” In a 1985 decision, the Court held that a court could “not substitute [its] own views of economy and efficiency.”
Nor could the court find the arbitration clause to be unconscionable or unenforceable. The court noted that the contract was a standard AIA form, and was amended by the parties involved, whom the court characterized as “commercially sophisticated.” The court found that the agreement limited the rights of all parties and was not one-sided.
As the arbitration clause was neither unconscionable nor unenforceable, and Supreme Court rulings preclude a court from substituting its own procedures, even when these are “eminently reasonable, logical and just,” the appeals court halted the order of the circuit court, sending the matter to arbitration.
Read the court’s decision…
Loss Caused by Seepage of Water Not Covered
July 10, 2012 — Tred Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
The anti-concurrent clause in a homeowner’s policy barred coverage for damage caused by hidden seepage. Boazova v. Safety Ins. Co., 2012 Mass. LEXIS 462 (Mass. May 29, 2012).
The insured had a concrete patio built along the rear wall of her house at a grade higher than the home’s foundation. Years later, severe deterioration was discovered in the floor joists, wall studs and other parts of the home. The insured held a homeowner’s policy with Safety. An inspector hired by Safety determined the deterioration was caused by the placement of the concrete patio slab adjacent to the wall of the house, allowing water to seep onto the top of the foundation.
Safety denied coverage because the damage was caused by a combination of surface water, deterioration, settling and improper construction of the concrete patio.
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
Hovnanian Increases Construction Defect Reserves for 2012
January 6, 2012 — CDJ Staff
In their fourth quarter earnings call, executives of Hovnanian Enterprises made some projections for investors, covering the company’s plans for 2012. During the call, Ara K. Hovnanian, the firm’s CEO, discussed their reserves to meet construction defect claims. The firm does an annual actuarial study of their construction defect reserves.
Mr. Hovnanian noted that there have been no changes for the past several years, but this year they are increasing their reserves by about $6.3 million. Additionally, the firm has added $2.5 million to their legal reserves. Mr. Hovnanian stated “we do not anticipate that changes of this magnitude will be recurring as we look forward to 2012.”
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Construction Workers Face Dangers on the Job
November 18, 2011 — CDJ Staff
OSHA calculates that for each 33,000 active construction workers, one will die on the job each year, making their risk over the course of their careers at one out of every 200 workers. This puts it many times over OSHA’s definition of “significant risk” of 1 death per 1,000 workers over the course of their careers. According to an article in People’s World, “the main risk of death is from falls.”
At a talk at the American Public Health Association’s meeting, one expert noted that “construction workers make up 6 percent to 8 percent of all workers, but account for 20 percent of all deaths on the job every year.”
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No Duty to Indemnify When Discovery Shows Faulty Workmanship Damages Insured’s Own Work
November 7, 2012 — Tred Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
Our post last week addressed the duty to defend when alleged faulty workmanship caused loss to property adjacent to where the insured was working. See Pamerin Rentals II, LLC v. R.G. Hendricks & Sons Constr., Inc., 2012 Wis. App. LEXIS 698 (Wis. Ct. App. Sept. 5, 2012) [post here]. Today, we report on recent developments in the same case where the court determined, despite earlier finding the insurer owed a defense, it had no duty to indemnify. Pamperin Rentals II, LLC v. R.G. Hendricks & Sons Constr., Inc., 2012 Wisc. App. LEXIS 793 (Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 10, 2012).
Hendricks contracted to “prepare the site and supply and install concrete, tamped concrete, and colored concrete” at several service stations. The owner sued Hendricks, alleging the concrete “was defective and/or the work performed was not done in a workman-like manner and resulted in damages, and will require replacement.”
Pekin Insurance Company agreed to defend Hendricks subject to a reservation of rights.
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
No Coverage for Negligent Misrepresentation without Allegations of “Bodily Injury” or “Property Damage”
February 10, 2012 — Tred Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
Jeff City Industries was the general contractor for a sewer system improvement project in Branson, Missouri. Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. United HRB Gen. Contractors, Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 145666 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 19, 2011). Branson sued Jeff City, alleging breach of the construction contract for the project. The claims included improperly bedded sewer piping, improper aligning portions of trenching for the sewer piping, improper service line connections to the sewer piping, etc.
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
Colorado Court of Appeals Rejects Retroactive Application of C.R.S. § 13-20-808.
April 25, 2012 — Chad W. Johnson, Higgins, Hopkins, McClain & Roswell, LLC
In TCD, Inc. v. American Family Mutual Insurance Company, TCD appealed the district court’s summary judgment ruling in favor of American Family. TCD, Inc. v. American Family Mutual Insurance Company Colo. App. No. 11CA1046 (April 12, 2012). TCD was the general contractor on a project to construct a building for Frisco General Gateway Center, LLC (“Gateway”). TCD subcontracted with a roofer named Petra Roofing and Remodeling Company (“Petra”) to performing the roofing work for the building. The subcontract required Petra to defend and indemnify TCD and to name TCD as an additional insured under its CGL policy. American Family issued a CGL policy to Petra that named TCD as an additional insured from 2006-2007.
TCD filed suit against Gateway seeking payment for its work at the project. Gateway counterclaimed against TCD for breach of contract, negligence, and violation of the CCPA. TCD demanded that American Family defend it from the counterclaims pursuant to Petra’s policies. American Family denied coverage and a separate coverage suit ensued. At the trial court level, the court entered summary judgment for American Family because the counterclaims of Gateway did not trigger the duty to defend or indemnify TCD as an additional insured.
On appeal, TCD argued that: 1) the counterclaims raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding American Family’s duty to defend; 2) the court should hear evidence beyond the four corners of the complaint; and, 3) the court should apply C.R.S. § 13-20-808 retroactively.
Read the full story… Reprinted courtesy of Chad W. Johnson of Higgins, Hopkins, McClain & Roswell, LLC. Mr. Johnson can be contacted at johnson@hhmrlaw.com.
South Carolina Legislature Redefining Occurrences to Include Construction Defects in CGL Policies
April 1, 2011 — April 1, 2011 Beverley BevenFlorez - Construction Defect Journal
The question of what circumstances must be in place for construction defects to be covered in a general commercial liability (CGL) policies is being raised by the courts and the legislature in South Carolina. The Insurance Journal reports that the American Insurance Association as well as the Property and Casualty Insurers Association of America are speaking out on the issue.
The problem seems to be centered on what defines an “occurrence.” CGL policies were not meant to cover faulty workmanship, according to the filing by the South Carolina Supreme Court. In January of this year, the South Carolina Supreme Court reversed the ruling in Crossmann Communities v Harleysville Mutual declaring that “Respondents cannot show the damage here was the result of an occurrence. Rather, the damage was a direct result and the natural and expected consequence of faulty workmanship; faulty workmanship did not cause an occurrence resulting in damage.” They focused their attention on the word “accident,” stating that there is a fortuity element that is not diminished.
The South Carolina legislature reacted by producing a bill that would add new language directly negating the ruling by the Supreme Court. The South Carolina bill S-431 would change the definition of an occurrence in regards to construction defects as follows: “For a liability insurance policy issued to a construction professional, an ‘occurrence’ means, at a minimum: (1) an accident; or (2) continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful condition or substance. No additional requirement of a fortuitous event is needed to constitute an ‘occurrence.’”
S-431 is currently residing in the House Committee on Labor, Commerce and Industry.
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Houses Can Still Make Cents: Illinois’ Implied Warranty of Habitability
March 1, 2011 — Original Story by
Marisa L. Saber Cozen O’Connor Subrogation & Recovery Law BlogIn a report published earlier this week Marisa L. Saber writes about the implied warranty of habitability in the context of construction defect litigation. The piece speaks of the difficulties in alleging tort theories against builders and vendors in light of Illinois’ expansion of the economic loss doctrine, and how the implied warranty of habitability may provide another avenue for recovery.
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Harmon Towers Duty to Defend Question Must Wait, Says Court
March 1, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The Harmon Towers project in Las Vegas was eventually halted short of the planned forty-seven stories after “it was determined that there was substantial defective construction, including defective installation of reinforcing steel throughout the Harmon.” The American Home Insurance Company and Lexington Insurance Company put forth a claim that they had no duty to defend Perini Construction, the builder of the defective Harmon Towers. Further, American Home seeks to recover the monies American reimbursed Perini. The United States District Court of Nevada ruled in the case of American Home Assurance Co. v. Perini Building on February 3, 2012.
The two insurance companies covered Perini and its subcontractors, Century Steel, Pacific Coast Steel, and Ceco Concrete Construction. Century Steel was the initial subcontractor for the reinforcing steel; they were later acquired by Pacific Coast Steel. In this current case, Perini Construction is the sole defendant.
Perini sought a dismissal of these claims, arguing that without the subcontractors joined to the case, “the Court cannot afford complete relief among existing parties.” The court rejected this claim, noting that the court can determine the duties of the insurance companies to Perini, which the court described as “separate and distinct from those of the subcontractors.” The subcontractors “have not claimed an interest in the subject matter of the action.” The court concluded that it could determine whether Perini was entitled or not to coverage without affecting the subcontractors. The court rejected Perini’s claim.
Perini also asked the court to abstain from the case, arguing that it was better heard in a state court. The court noted that several considerations cover whether a case is heard in state or federal courts. The court noted that if the case weighed heavily on state law, the state courts would be the obvious location. Further, if there were a parallel action in the state courts, “there is a presumption that the whole suit should be heard in state courts.” This is, however, no parallel state suit, although the court noted that Perini has “threatened” to do so.
However, the issue of who is to blame for the problems at Harmon Towers has not been resolved. The court concluded that until the “underlying action” was concluded, it was premature to consider the issues raised in this case while the earlier lawsuit was still in progress. The court denied Perini’s motion to dismiss the case. Given that the outcome of the earlier construction defect case may lead to further litigation in state court, the District Court granted Perini’s motion to abstain, but staying their judgment until the construction defect case is resolved.
Read the court’s decision…
Allowing The Use Of a General Verdict Form in a Construction Defect Case Could Subject Your Client to Prejudgment Interest
August 16, 2012 — Heather Anderson, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC
A recent opinion from the Colorado Court of Appeals is a cautionary tale concerning the calculation of pre-judgment interest. See Hendricks v. Allied Waste Transportation, Inc., 2012 WL 1881004 (Colo. App. 2012). The Hendricks sued Allied after one of its drivers backed into the corner of their home with an Allied garbage truck. At trial, a jury awarded the Hendricks $160,100 in damages. Although the jury was instructed on the cost of repairs, diminution in value, and non-economic damages, the parties agreed to a general verdict form that did not ask the jury to specify the types of damages awarded. Id. at *1. The Hendricks sought to amend the judgment to include prejudgment interest and costs, which the trial court granted.
Allied appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by awarding the Hendricks prejudgment interest from the date their property was damaged. Id. at *7. The Colorado Court of Appeals found no error, and affirmed.
Read the full story…5
Reprinted courtesy of Heather Anderson, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC. Ms. Anderson can be contacted at anderson@hhmrlaw.com
After $15 Million Settlement, Association Gets $7.7 Million From Additional Subcontractor
November 7, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The stucco subcontractor for a condominium complex did not join in with the other defendants in a settlement of more than $15 million, preferring to take the case to a jury trial. That jury has found the stucco installer liable for $7.7 million to make repairs. Mark Wiechnik of Herrick Feinstein LLP wrote about the case on the Lexology web site. Mr. Wiechnik notes that the jury was shown “samples of rotted wood taken from the property as well as numerous pictures of damage resulting from the various defects.”
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Product Exclusion: The Big Reason Behind The Delay of LEED 2012
July 10, 2012 — Douglas Reiser, Builders Counsel
By now, you have probably heard that the USGBC has decided to delay implementation of its previously named “LEED 2012” rating system. What you might not know is exactly why this is happening. Rest assured that the decision was not made willy nilly ?Äì LEED 2012 had many industrial groups running for the hills.
I have spent the past few weeks reading a number of articles on the backlash. LEED 2012 was intended to create a seismic shift; it was not a mere update. A strict focus on reduction of chemicals, created mass panic that a large number of material providers’ products would essentially be banned from green projects ?Äì meaning most local, state and federal projects.
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Reprinted courtesy of Douglas Reiser of Reiser Legal LLC. Mr. Reiser can be contacted at info@reiserlegal.com
Ohio Adopts Energy-Efficient Building Code
June 19, 2012 — CDJ Staff
In a compromise between environmental groups, who were looking for stricter standards, and homebuilders, who were trying to contain building costs, the state of Ohio has adopted buildings codes that will increase the energy efficiency of new homes. The estimated costs are about $1,100 with estimated annual savings of $230. According to Corey Roblee of the International Code Council, “It’s something needed in the state of Ohio.”
The Ohio Home Builders Association opposed a proposal to adopt the guidelines of the International Code Council. Builders will be able to either follow the ICC guidelines or they can use the Ohio guidelines to meet the same energy efficiency. Vincent Squillace, the executive vice president of the OHBA, said, “We came up with an equivalent code that’s more strict but is about $2,000 cheaper per home to implement than the original code.”
The new code will require that at least 75% of lighting must be high efficiency, increases the degree of insulation, and specifies more efficient windows, among other changes.
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