United States District Court Confirms That Insurers Can Be Held Liable Under The CCPA.
June 19, 2012 — Chad Johnson
In D.R. Horton, Inc.-Denver v. The Travelers Indem. Co. of Am., 10-CV-02826-WJM-KMT, 2012 WL 527204 (D. Colo. Feb. 16, 2012), the court was asked to rule on Travelers’[1] motion to dismiss D.R. Horton, Inc. ?Äì Denver’s (“DRH”) claim that Travelers violated the Colorado Consumer Protection Act (“CCPA”).
In the underlying construction defect case (“CD case”), DRH, as the developer and general contractor of a construction project, tendered the defense of the CD case to certain subcontractors and to Travelers as an insurer to those subcontractors. Travelers accepted the duty to defend DRH. DRH hired counsel to defend it, and the attorney fees and costs of suit were billed to Travelers. However, for a period of over five years, Travelers failed to actually pay any portion of the defense of DRH. Finally, on October 31, 2008, Travelers offered checks for payment of only 4% of the costs and fees incurred. DRH then returned the checks to Travelers and provided Travelers with authority to support its position that the amounts in Travelers’ checks were inadequate. Thereafter, Travelers dug its heels in, and resubmitted the same checks.
DRH was then forced to file a coverage action against Travelers for declaratory judgment, breach of contract, bad faith breach of insurance contract, and deceptive trade practices under the CCPA. In its motion to dismiss DRH’s CCPA claim, Travelers’ argued that DRH failed to plead specific facts that Travelers engaged in a deceptive trade practice under C.R.S. § 6-1-105, and DRH failed to plead sufficient facts showing that Travelers’ actions significantly affect the public ?Äì a necessary element of a CCPA claim.
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Reprinted courtesy of Chad Johnson, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC. Mr. Johnson can be contacted at johnson@hhmrlaw.com
Insurer Not Liable for Construction Defect Revealed by Woodpecker
September 13, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has ruled that an insurance provision that excluded construction defects must stand in Friedberg v. Chubb, granting a summary judgment to the insurance firm.
The Friedbergs discovered extensive water damage to their home after a woodpecker drilled a hole in a vertical support. They sought insurance coverage under their Chubb “Masterpiece” policy. The decision quotes the policy as covering “all risk of physical loss” “unless stated otherwise or an exclusion applies.” These exclusions included “gradual or sudden loss,” “structural movement,” and “faulty planning, construction or maintenance,” but the policy covered “ensuing covered loss unless another exclusion applies.”
Chubb’s expert determined that the Friedbergs’ home had defective construction, and “attributed the damage to the beams and walls below the beam to a failure to install control joints.” After Chubb denied coverage, the Friedbergs sued, although the court ruled that “even under the Friedbergs’ theory, the water damage was a loss caused by faulty construction and therefore excluded under the policy.”
On appeal, the Friedbergs argued that “the loss resulted from the combination of both faulty construction and the presence of water” and that Minnesota’s “concurrent causation” doctrine must apply, which according to the decision, “when a loss results from both a covered peril and an excluded peril, coverage exists unless the excluded peril is the ‘overriding cause’ of the loss.” The court rejected this reasoning, noting that “once the house was plagued with faulty construction, it was a foreseeable and natural consequence that water would enter.”
The Friedbergs also contended that “the damage caused by the intrusion of water into their home is an ‘ensuing covered loss’ for which they are due coverage.” The court also rejected this claim, noting that Minnesota law excludes defective construction from the ensuing loss provision. The court said that “the Friedbergs’ reading of their ensuing-loss clause, by contrast, would dramatically limit their policy’s faulty-construction exclusion, because almost ‘any loss cause by’ faulty construction could also be characterized as an ensuing loss under an all-risk policy.”
Read the court’ decision…
Oregon agreement to procure insurance, anti-indemnity statute, and self-insured retention
March 5, 2011 — By
CDCoverage.com, March 5, 2011
In Continental Casualty Ins. Co. v. Zurich American Ins. Co., No. 09-35484 (9th Cir. Oct. 28, 2010), general contractor TCR was sued by an employee of subcontractor Safeway for bodily injuries suffered while working on the project. In the subcontract, Safeway agreed to procure primary insurance providing coverage for TCR for liability arising out of Safeway’s negligence. Safeway’s CGL policy included a self-insured retention that had to be satisfied before the insurer had a duty to defend. TCR filed suit against Safeway alleging that
Read the full story...Reprinted courtesy of CDCoverage.com
Gut Feeling Does Not Disqualify Expert Opinion
July 6, 2011 — CDJ Staff
The New Jersey Supreme Court issued a ruling in June on the case of Nevins v. Toll in which they reversed an earlier decision and remanded the case to a lower court for retrial. At issue in the case was the testimony of the plaintiff’s expert, J. Anthony Dowling. In depositions, Mr. Dowling said that his estimates for repair were based on a “gut feeling.” Dowling said he had “very little” experience in cost estimates for single-family homes. The defendants sought to bar Dowling’s testimony which was granted by the judge. Without an expert, Ms. Nevin’s case was dismissed.
Describing Dowling’s report as “far from a model of how an expert’s opinion in a construction case should be presented,” the court noted that Dowling is not a professional expert witness. However, the court did note that Dowling is a professional cost estimator. Despite Mr. Dowling using his “gut feeling” to construct his estimate, the New Jersey Supreme Court felt that whether his estimate is convincing is “a question for the jury.”
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Homeowners Must Comply with Arbitration over Construction Defects
January 6, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The California Court of Appeals has upheld a decision by the Superior Court of Kern County that homeowners must comply with arbitration procedures in their construction defect claim. The California Court of Appeals ruled on December 14 in the case of Baeza v. Superior Court of Kern County, denying the plaintiff’s petition that the trial court vacate its order.
The plaintiffs in the case are homeowners in various developments built by Castle & Cook. The homes were sold with a contract that provided for “nonadversarial prelitigation procedures, including mediation, and judicial reference.” The homeowners made defect claims and argued that Castle & Cooke failed to comply with statutory disclosure requirements and that some of the contracts violate related statutes.
The appeals court found that there was no ground for appeal of the lower court’s order to continue with prelitigation procedures. The court noted that the plaintiffs could not seek a review of the mediation until a judgment was issued, but that then the issue would be moot. The court felt that there were issues presented that needed clarification, and so they reviewed this case. This was cleared for publication.
The court considered the intent of the legislature in passing the Right to Repair Act, noting that “under the statutory scheme, the builder has the option of contracting for an alternative nonadversarial prelitigation procedure,” as established in Chapter 4. The court noted that Chapter 4 “contains no specifics regarding what provisions the alternative nonadversarial contractual provisions may or must include.”
The plaintiffs contended that the builder was in violation of the standards set out in Section 912, however the court responded that these sections set out one set of procedures, but they concluded that “if the Legislature had intended the section 912 disclosure provisions…it could have made the requirements applicable to all builders by locating them in a section outside Chapter 4.”
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Fifth Circuit Reverses Insurers’ Summary Judgment Award Based on "Your Work" Exclusion
November 18, 2011 — Tred Eyerley, Insurance Law Hawaii
Application of the facts to the "your work" exclusion was the key to resolving coverage issued in Am. Home Assurance Co. v. Cat Tech L.L.C., 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 21076 (5th Cir. Oct. 5, 2011).
Ergon Refining, Inc. hired Cat Tech L.L.C. to service a hydrotreating reactor. In January 2005, Cat Tech replaced certain parts in the reactor. After Cat Tech finished the job and left, Ergon noticed a high pressure drop in the reactor, forcing it to be shut down. Cat Tech returned in February 2005, removed, repaired and replaced the damaged parts, and loaded new parts. After completion, a second large pressure drop occurred during the reactor’s start-up process. The reactor was shut down until October 2005, when Ergon hired a different contractor to perform the repair work. Additional damage to the reactor was found.
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
Can Negligent Contractors Shift Blame in South Carolina?
July 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Clay Olson looks back to a 1991 Carolina case, Nelson v. Concrete Supply Company. The court concluded in that case that “a plaintiff in South Carolina may recover only if his/her negligence does not exceed that of the defendant’s and amount of plaintiff’s recovery shall be reduced in proportion to amount of his or her negligence; if there is more than one defendant, plaintiff’s negligence shall be compared to combined negligence of all defendants.” In 2005, he reports, as part of tort reform in South Carolina, the legislature further addressed this.
He then suggests a possible outcome of this is that negligent contractors may be able to shift some of the blame (and cost of the settlement) to other defendants who may not be to blame. He offers a scenario in which a contractor is sued for construction defects and a jury has to allocate responsibility for indivisible damage. “A jury need only find the two subcontractors to have each contributed 15% of the indivisible damage.” He adds in another 15% for claims against the architect. Minor blame is given to the manufacturers, and suddenly the negligent contractor is paying less than 50% of the total settlement.
He notes that the previous system in place also had its problems, but notes that this one may not be “fair and equitable.”
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Exact Dates Not Needed for Construction Defect Insurance Claim
March 1, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The Texas Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court in Vines-Herrin Custom Homes v Great American Lloyds Insurance Company on December 21, 2011. Vines-Herrin Custom Homes built a single-family home in Plano, Texas in 1999. They obtained a commercial general liability policy from Great American, later purchasing coverage from Mid-Continent, which the decision describes as “a sister company of Great American.”
While the home was under construction, Emil G. Cerullo sought to purchase it. At the time, it was under contract to another buyer. Two months later, Vines-Herrin told Cerullo that the deal had “fell through.” Cerullo bought the house with modifications from the original plan. Upon moving in, Cerullo began having water intrusion and other problems. “Cerullo noticed water gathering on window sills and damage to the sheetrock and baseboard.” Additional problems followed, including cracks, leaks, “and in early 2002, the ceiling and roof began to sag.”
Cerullo sued Vines-Herrin, claiming negligent construction. Vines-Herrin filed a claim seeking defense and indemnification under the insurance policies. Coverage was denied and Vines-Herrin filed suit to require coverage and also bringing claims for “breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, breach of contract, and DTPA and insurance code violations.”
In May, 2006 Vines-Herrin stated that it had no more defense funds and went into arbitration with Cerullo. The underlying construction defect action was settled for about $2.5 million. As part of the settlement, “Cerullo became the rightful owner of all remaining claims, rights, and causes of action against” Vines-Herrin’s insurers. He then joined the coverage lawsuit.
The non-jury trial was held under the controlling law of the time which “imposed a duty to defend only if the property damage manifested or became apparent during the policy period.” The court concluded in Cerullo’s favor. During the post-judgment motions, the Texas Supreme Court rejected the manifestation rule. Under this ruling, the trial court set aside its judgment and found in favor of the insurance companies. The trial court noted that although “the Residence was covered by an uninterrupted period of insurance (which began before the Residence was constructed) and that the damages to the Residence manifested during the uninterrupted period of insurance coverage,” “Mr. Cerullo failed to allege the date when actual physical damage to the property occurred.”
The first claim by Cerullo and Vines-Herrin was that the “Final Judgment” occurred in October 2004, and that all proceedings thereafter were void. The court rejected this as the “final judgment” is not “final for the purposes of an appeal unless it actually disposes of every pending claim and party or unless it clearly and unequivocally states that it finally disposes of all claims and all parties.” Despite the use of the word “final,” the trial court’s decision did not do this.
The second issue was the application of the Texas Supreme Court case Don’s Building Supply Inc. v. OneBeacon Insurance. In this case, framing rot due to defective stucco was not discovered until after the end of the policy period. The Supreme Court noted that “the key date is when injury happens, not when someone happens on it.”
The appeals court found that the trial court misapplied the Don’s Building Supply decision. Rather than an exact date, “so long as that damage occurred within the policy period, coverage was provided.” The appeals court noted that “Cerullo alleged the house was constructed in 1999 and he purchased it in May 2000.” “By April of 2001, Cerullo noticed that the windowsills in the study were showing signs of leakage and water damage.” As the court put it, “the petitions then alleged a litany of defects.”
The court noted that coverage by Great American was in effect from November 9, 1999 to November 9, 2000. In May of 2000, the house suffered “substantial flooding from a rainstorm that caused damage.” This was during the policy period. “As a matter of law, actual damages must occur no later than when they manifest.”
The court concluded that as damage manifested during the period of coverage, so must have the damage. The court ruled that “contrary to the trial court’s determination otherwise, the evidence showed Great American’s duty to indemnify was triggered, and expert testimony establishing the exact date of injury was not required to trigger the duty.”
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In Re Golba: The Knaubs v. Golba and Rollison, Debtors
June 19, 2012 — Brady Iandiorio
Now comes another cautionary tale for builders and developers, especially those using single purpose business entities to handle individual construction projects. The United States Bankruptcy Court in Denver, Colorado, through the Honorable Michael Romero, provided an order regarding plaintiffs’ problems with a home they purchased from an entity controlled or represented by defendants. Plaintiffs, Kelvin and Holly Knaub (the “Knaubs”) filed adversary proceedings against debtor Robert Golba in his bankruptcy proceeding and against debtor Greg Rollison in his separate bankruptcy proceeding. The adversary proceedings were partially consolidated to proceed in parallel but not substantively.
The Knaubs purchased a home from Gemm Homes (“Gemm”) in May 2003. Problems stemming from the foundation caused the Knaubs to seek an explanation and ultimately a solution from Gemm and then from Avalon Homes (“Avalon”), which the Knaubs claim is just a continuation of Gemm. Through their complaint, the Knaubs seek relief for 1) damages caused by fraudulent representations and false pretenses under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A), based on Golba’s misrepresentation that Gemm and Rollison were not involved in Avalon; 2) damages caused by actual fraud under § 523(a)(2)(A), based on Golba’s and Rollison’s alleged conspiracy fraudulently to convey the assets of Gemm to the Avalon entities; and 3) damages caused by breach of fiduciary duty under § 523(a)(4), alleging Gemm was an insolvent company which owed a fiduciary duty to its creditors, and alleging Golba participated in transferring Gemm’s assets to Avalon for no consideration. In the Golba action, the third claim for relief was dismissed.
The facts of the case are important and somewhat convoluted. In an effort to make the cases clear, the evidence, allegations, and facts will be laid out in detail below. The Knaubs’ house was purchased from Gemm and soon after both Gemm and Rollison had an engineering company perform an analysis which discovered the foundation was not laid on stable ground.
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Reprinted courtesy of Brady Iandiorio, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC. Mr. Iandiorio can be contacted at iandiorio@hhmrlaw.com
Ghost Employees Steal Jobs from Legit Construction Firms
September 13, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Firms that skirt labor laws for construction workers can undercut firms that are obeying those laws. In a piece in Raleigh, North Carolina’s News & Observer, Doug Burton, a commercial masonry contractor summed it up: “my competitors are cheating.” The article describes the low-bidding firms “called their workers independent contractors ? or treated them like ghosts, paid under the table and never acknowledged.” The cost to the state is “unpaid medical bills for injured workers, uncollected business and personal taxes, and payments not made to a depleted state unemployment reserve.”
One firm examined in the article, Martin’s Bricklaying, employs mostly immigrant Mexican laborers, many of whom are in the country illegally. One employee told the News & Observer, “we don’t complain.”
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Ohio Court of Appeals Affirms Judgment in Landis v. Fannin Builders
April 20, 2011 — April 20, 2011 Beverley BevenFlorez - Construction Defect Journal
The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment in Landis v. William Fannin Builders. Landis contracted Fannin Builders to build their home. The case involved staining problems on the T1-11 siding chosen by the plaintiffs.
After a year and a half of discussion on how to resolve the problem of uneven staining on the siding, Landis filed suit “against Fannin Builders, alleging claims for breach of contract, breach of the express limited warranty, and violation of the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act (“OCSPA”). Fannin Builders, in turn, filed a third-party complaint against 84 Lumber, alleging claims for breach of contract and indemnification. With the trial court’s leave, Fannin Builders also later amended its answer to add a counterclaim against appellees for breach of contract and unjust enrichment. In the counterclaim, Fannin Builders alleged that appellees still owed it $3,908.98 for the construction of appellees’ home.”
“In its decision, the trial court found in appellees’ favor on their breach of contract claim and against appellees on their claims for breach of the express limited warranty and violation of the OCSPA. Additionally, the trial court found in Fannin Builders’ favor on its counterclaim for breach of contract and against Fannin Builders on its third-party claims for breach of contract and indemnity. The trial court determined that appellees’ damages amounted to $66,906.24, and after setting off the $3,908.98 that appellees owed Fannin Builders under the construction contract, the trial court awarded appellees $62,997.26. The trial court reduced its decision to judgment on May 18, 2010.”
Fannin Builders appealed this judgment and assigned the following errors:
[1.] The Trial Court Erred as a Matter of Law by Concluding that Appellant Breached its Contract with Appellees when it provided a Semi-Transparent Oil-Based Stain that Simply did not Meet their Approval.
[a.] The Contract does not Contain a Satisfaction Clause.
[b.] Even if the Court Implies a Satisfaction Clause, the Court Should Apply an Objective Standard.
[2.] The Trial Court Erred as a Matter of Law by Failing to Consider Appellant’s Right to Cure.
[3.] The Trial Court committed Reversible Error by not Assessing Damages Using “Diminished Value Standard,” and by Creating a Remedy that Constitutes Economic Waste.
[4.] The Trial Court Erred as a Matter of Law by Concluding that Appellant is Barred from Seeking Indemnification When 84 [Lumber] Never Fulfilled its Obligations Pursuant to the Settlement Agreement Entered on August 2, 2005.
In response to the first assigned error, the Court of Appeals stated: “Because the failure to provide siding of a uniform color, not appellees’ displeasure, breached the contract, we reject Fannin Builders’ contention that the trial court implied a satisfaction clause into the contract and found a breach of that clause. Accordingly, we overrule Fannin Builders’ first assignment of error.”
The Court of Appeals overruled the second assignment of error and provided the following reasoning: “Although Fannin Builders depends upon a term of the limited warranty for its right to cure, the trial court concluded that no breach of the limited warranty occurred. Fannin Builders breached the duty of workmanlike conduct implicit in the construction contract, not the limited warranty requiring it to satisfy the BIA’s Quality Standards. Consequently, the limited warranty does not apply to this case, and thus, it does not prevent appellees’ recovery of damages.”
The Appeals Court found “the trial court’s award of damages” was “both reasonable and supported by competent, credible evidence,” and therefore concluded “that the trial court did not err in setting appellees’ damages at $62,997.26.” The Fannin Builders third assignment of error was overruled.
The fourth and final assignment of error was also overruled by the Court of Appeals. “While Fannin Builders correctly asserts that 84 Lumber never installed the replacement siding, it ignores the fact that it ordered 84 Lumber to remove the replacement siding from appellees’ property. Thus, Fannin Builders precluded 84 Lumber from completely performing under the August 2, 2005 letter agreement. […] Consequently, Fannin Builders cannot now claim that the letter agreement is unenforceable or that it is entitled to indemnification from 84 Lumber. Because Fannin Builders assumed all liability for the defective siding in the letter agreement, it is responsible for appellees’ damages.”
James A. Zitesman, Columbus, Ohio Business Attorney, compared the case to Jones v. Centex (Ohio App. 2010), which had a different verdict:
“The common thread is the implied warranty of good workmanship. In the Jones case, the Court found that the buyers had in fact waived all implied warranties, including the implied warranty of good workmanship. In the contract between Jones and Centex, the builder stated that it “…would not sell the property to Purchasers without this waiver.” Probably should have been a sign to the buyers.
In the Landis case, the Court stated, “Contracts for the future construction of a residence include a duty, implied by law, that the builder must perform its work in a workmanlike manner.” The Court gave significant weight to the concept of the implied warranty of good workmanship. The builder relied upon the BIA Warranty which limits builders’ liability and exposure to legal issues. The trial court concluded there was no breach of the limited warranty, rather the builder “breached the duty of workmanlike conduct implicit in the construction contract, not the limited warranty requiring it to satisfy the BIAs Quality Standards.”
The Supreme Court of Ohio has accepted the Jones v. Centex Homes case for review.
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Mobile Home Owners Not a Class in Drainage Lawsuit
March 1, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Comparing it to a “complex construction defect action,” the California Court of Appeals for Orange County has rejected the claims of a group of mobile home owners that they should be certified as a class in their lawsuit against Huntington Shorecliffs Mobilehome Park. The Appeals court sustained the judgment of the lower court. The court issued a decision in the case of Criswell v. MMR Family LLC on January 17, 2012.
The claims made by the group were that the owners and operators of the mobile home park had known of an “on-going and potentially worsening shallow groundwater condition on the property” and had “exacerbated the problem by changing ‘the configuration and drainage related to the hillside that abuts’ the park.” The homeowners claimed that the class should consist of “any past or current homeowner during the same time frame” who had experienced “the accumulation of mold, fungus, and/or other toxins,” “property damage to his/her mobilehome and/or other property resulting from drainage problems, water seepage, water accumulation, moisture build-up, mold, fungus, and/or other toxins,” emotional distress related to drainage problems or mold, and finally health problems “resulting from exposure to drainage problems, water seepage, water accumulation, moisture build-up, mold, fungus, and/or other toxins, in or around one’s home, lot, or common areas of the park.”
The lower court concluded that while the limits of the class were identifiable, they failed to constitute a class in other ways. First, the people affected were small enough in number that they could be brought together. They “are not so numerous that it would be impracticable to bring them all before the Court.”
The court noted that while many of the homeowners would have issues in common, they did not find “a well-defined community of interest among the class members.” The Appeals Court wrote that “the individual issues affecting each mobile home and homeowner will predominate over the common issue of the presence of standing or pooling water in and around the park.” The court noted that each home would be affected differently by water and “the ‘accumulation of mold, fungus, and/or other toxins.’”
While the court conceded that there would be common issues, such as the “defendants’ alleged concealment of excess moisture conditions and their allegedly negligent roadwork and landscaping,” they noted that “these common issues would be swamped by the swarm of individual determinations of property damage, emotional distress, and personal injury.” The Appeals Court cited an earlier case that ruled against certification “if a class action ‘will splinter into individual trials.’” The court affirmed the judgment of the lower court that they could not proceed as a class.
Read the court’s decision…
Houses Can Still Make Cents: Illinois’ Implied Warranty of Habitability
March 1, 2011 — Original Story by
Marisa L. Saber Cozen O’Connor Subrogation & Recovery Law BlogIn a report published earlier this week Marisa L. Saber writes about the implied warranty of habitability in the context of construction defect litigation. The piece speaks of the difficulties in alleging tort theories against builders and vendors in light of Illinois’ expansion of the economic loss doctrine, and how the implied warranty of habitability may provide another avenue for recovery.
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Homebuilders Go Green in Response to Homebuyer Demand
May 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
McGrawHill Construction reports that 17 percent of new homes and remodels in 2011 were done with green building practices. Their report estimates that by 2016, this will rise to 29 to 38 percent of the market for home construction and remodeling.
Consumers see the green buildings as more desirable, particularly where they are more energy efficient. Two thirds of builders noted their customers were interested in features that would lower the energy use of their homes. Consumers also feel that green building materials are more durable and see green homes as higher quality.
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Building Boom Leads to Construction Defect Cases
August 2, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Professor Evan McKenzie of the University of Illinois at Chicago says that rise of construction defect litigation in the Las Vegas area followed the same pattern it did in other places, according to an article in the Las Vegas Review Journal. “Step one,” according to Professor McKenzie, “there was this enormous growth in construction. Then these attorneys began to swarm in from all over, especially Southern California.” McKenzie noted that during a building boom, construction “outpaces the ability of building inspectors to do their job.”
But, despite his contention that “rapid growth in housing stock” leads to “shoddy construction,” another problem of growth was that “eventually there were too many lawyers chasing too many condominium complexes and subdivisions.” What came next was that “attorneys start coming up with cases that really aren’t good cases.” It’s in the interest of these attorneys that HOA boards sue.
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Court Clarifies Sequence in California’s SB800
December 20, 2012 — CDJ Staff
As California’s Right-To-Repair law, SB800, nears its ninth birthday, it has remained “largely untested in the legal system” as noted by Megan MacNee of Wood, Smith, Henning & Berman LLP on the site RealEstateRama. She writes that some homeowners have requested documents prior to filing a claim, which she describes as an attempt to “game the system,” and “analogous to requiring a party to litigation to comply with discovery before a complaint is filed.”
The court determined that homeowners may not request documents from the builder until they have actually filed a claim. The court noted that SB800 lacks any clear indication that homeowners may request documents before filing a claim (and also does not indicate that a builder would have to provide documents in these circumstances). The court concluded that the section that sets up the prelitigation procedures occurs before they section on documents discovery.¬? “Because the document request is part of the prelitigation procedure, and the prelitigation procedure does not begin until the homeowner has served notice of a claim, it follows that there can be no prelitigation obligation to produce documents under section 912, subdivision (a) unless the homeowner has commenced the prelitigation procedure by serving notice of a claim.”
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Construction Suit Ends with Just an Apology
February 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
After suing a contractor for failing to complete the remodeling of their home, an Orange County couple has settled for an apology. Douglas J. Pettibone represented the contractor, who had lost his business after a broken neck, multiple surgeries, and an addiction to pain medicine. Mr. Pettibone represented his client pro bone. The case was settled in arbitration by JAMS.
Mr. Pettibone noted that his client gave “a heartfelt and very moving apology.” The remodeling was completed by another contractor, two years after Thorp Construction stopped work on the project. After the apology, the case was dismissed.
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Policyholder Fails to Build Adequate Record to Support Bad Faith Claim
May 19, 2011 — May 19, 2011 -
Tred R. Eyerly,
Insurance Law HawaiiThe importance of careful preparation and documentation was the take away lesson in a Texas bad faith case, C.K. Lee v. Catlin Specialty Ins. Co., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19145 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 28, 2011).
C.K. Lee owned a commercial shopping center in Houston. Catlin issued a commercial property policy to Lee. On September 12, 2008, Hurricane Ike hit and caused substantial property damage throughout the Texas Gulf Coast area. On September 24, 2008, Lee submitted a claim for damage to the roof of his shopping center to Catlin.
Catlin hired Engle Martin to represent its interests in adjusting the claim. Engle Martin eventually adjusted over 200 Ike-related claims for Catlin.
In November 2008, Engle Martin and Emergency Services Inc., retained by Lee, inspected Lee’s property. Engle Martin observed evidence of roof repairs that had apparently been made both before and after Hurricane Ike. Engle Martin decided it was necessary to use an infrared scan of the roof to help identify which damages, if any, were attributable to wind and which, if any, were attributable to sub par, prior repairs or natural deterioration.
Engle Martin retained Project, Time & Cost (PT&C) to conduct the infrared inspection. PT&C’s inspection determined there was no wind-related damage to the roof and no breaches or openings created by wind. Instead, the roof had exceeded its life expectancy and was in need of replacement due to normal wear and weathering. Consequently, Catlin decided that the damage to Lee’s roof was not caused by winds from Hurricane Ike.
Meanwhile, Lee’s contractor, Emergency Services, prepared a report estimating that the total cost of repairing the roof would be $871,187. Engle Martin’s estimate for repair of the roof was $22,864.
Lee filed suit for breach of contract, breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, and violations of the Texas Insurance Code. Catlin moved for summary judgment on all claims but breach of contract, arguing that because there was a bona fide dispute concerning the cause of the damages and whether they were covered under the policy, there was no evidence of bad faith or violations of the Texas Insurance Code.
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com