High School Gym Closed by Construction Defects
October 28, 2011 — CDJ Staff
The high school gym in Lake Oswego, Oregon has been shut down because testing has revealed that the construction defects have lead to deterioration of the structural integrity of the roof. The school district noted that there was a chance of collapse if there were a “significant seismic event or heavy rain and winds and snow.” The school district has been in a lawsuit with the builders since 2008, which was recently settled for $600,000.
The school board is still determining whether the original contractor will be asked to correct the defect or if they will bid the job out.
Read the full story...
Limitations of Liability in Subcontractors’ Contracts May Not Be Enforceable in Colorado to Limit Claims by Construction Professionals.
October 23, 2012 — Heidi J. Gassman, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell
The Colorado Homeowner Protection Act of 2007 (“HPA”), codified at C.R.S. § 13-20-806(7), specifically voids express waivers of, or limitations on, a residential property owner’s ability to enforce any rights, remedies, and damages provided by law in a construction defect case. Practically speaking, this means that limitation of liability provisions in contracts between construction professionals and residential homeowners are void and will not be enforced in Colorado. The HPA can extend even further, however, to subcontractors on residential projects, as seen in a recent District Court ruling.
The HPA was tested in Thacker v. Gallery Homes, et al., v. Terracon Consultants, Inc., et al., Larimer County District Court Case No. 2007CV1195. Gallery Homes hired Terracon to provide geotechnical and structural engineering services at the Colony Ridge subdivision in Loveland, Colorado. Terracon performed work for Gallery Homes under three separate contracts, each of which included a provision limiting Terracon’s total liability to Gallery Homes.
After the project was completed, two homeowners filed suit against Gallery Homes for alleged construction defects involving movement of their basement floor systems and foundations and damage to porches, patios, garages, and driveways. Gallery Homes sued Terracon as a third-party defendant, and Terracon sought to enforce its limitation of liability provisions via a partial summary judgment motion.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of Heidi J. Gassman, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC. Ms. Gassman can be contacted at gassman@hhmrlaw.com
Orange County Home Builder Dead at 93
April 25, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Randall E. Presley was a homebuilder in Southern California for more than thirty years, acting as head of Presley Development Company from 1956 until selling the firm to Lyon Homes in 1987. The two companies merged in 1991 as the Presley Cos. Mr. Presley saw the need in the 1950s to provide people in Southern California with low- to medium-priced quality homes.
His firm built more than 160 communities and was among the ten largest homebuilding firms in the country, expanding beyond California. Mr. Presley was 93 when he succumbed to pneumonia. He is survived by a wife, three children, seven grandchildren, and 11 great-grandchildren.
Read the full story…
Contractor’s Home Not Covered for Construction Defects
September 13, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The US District Court in Seattle has rejected most of the claims made by a Des Moines man over insurance coverage for water damage to his home. Judge John C. Coughenour granted summary judgment to Liberty Northwest in Ayar v. Liberty Northwest Insurance Corporation.
Sayad Ayar was the general contractor for the construction of his house. As a homeowner held a $1.5 million insurance policy from Liberty Northwest (LNW) that excluded “faulty, inadequate, or defective construction.”
In 2008, less than three years after his house was constructed, Mr. Ayar filed a claim after water leaked through his living room ceiling. LNW hired an engineering firm to investigate the damage. The engineering firm, CASE Forensics, concluded that the water intrusion was due to “the failure to install an adequate and continuous waterproof membrane, flashing, and drainage system within the balcony at the time of construction.” Ayar’s expert attributed the leakage to “damage done to the weather deck waterproofing during a storm event with high winds,” which would be covered under the policy. CASE Forensics reviewed these conclusions and rejected them. LNW denied coverage.
Further problems lead to further investigations, and in each case, LNW attributed the problems to construction defects. During this process, LNW “authorized Ayar to cut into the ceiling’s drywall in order to assist in determining the source of the water intrusion.” Mr. Ayar moved his family to a rental home. He requested that LNW cover the rental and other other costs.
LNW’s adjuster concluded that no coverage was available, but recommended paying Mr. Ayar $19,648.68 to reinstall drywall and repair the hole in the ceiling. The insurance company paid $2,000 to cover the cost of cutting into the ceiling. The also claimed the amount of drywall he removed was “excessive” and would not cover his relocation as “his home had been livable and because the loss was not covered.”
Ayar made four claims to the court in support of the argument that LNW misrepresented “pertinent facts or insurance policy provisions.” The court rejected three of these, noting that as all water damage was excluded, LNW’s citation of other sources of water intrusion was not a misrepresentation. “LNW did not rely on this provision as the reason for denying coverage.” Nor was LNW’s reference to “fungi, wet or dry rot” a misrepresentation. As for their reference to construction defects, it “was clearly appropriate given that the construction defect exclusion was the principal basis or denying the claim.” However, the court found that regarding the removal of drywall, “a triable issue of the facts exists.”
Ayar also claimed that LNW did not conduct a reasonable investigation, but the court found no evidence to support this conclusion. “This is not a case where the insurer failed to investigate or did so only half-heartedly.” Although the thoroughness of the investigation could not questioned, the court concluded that its timing could. Ayar claimed that LNW engaged in unreasonable delays. LNW counters that the delays were due to “Ayar’s own obstructive behavior and failure to cooperate with LNW’s investigation.”
The court dismissed all of Ayar’s claims, with the exception of whether LNW should have informed him that they would not pay for drywall repair unless there was damage, and whether LNW’s investigation failed to conclude its investigation within a thirty-day time line.
Read the court’s decision…
Statutes of Limitations May be the Colorado Contractors’ Friend
April 18, 2011 — April 18, 2011 Beverley BevenFlorez - Construction Defect Journal
Albert Wolf, a principal in Wolf Slatkin & Madison P. C., has written an interesting article on statutes of limitations in construction defect claims in Colorado. While Wolf states that in most cases, “construction defect claims against construction industry participants (contractors, subcontractors, architects, engineers, etc.) requires that suits be started within two years after construction defects have been or should have been—in the exercise of reasonable diligence (care)—discovered,” if a project used the AIA General Conditions (AIA Document A2010) before the 2007 edition, the “statutes of limitations begin to run (accrue) at either substantial completion or breach by the contractor (installation of defective work), depending on the circumstances.”
“That’s a huge difference,” Wolf writes in his article. “For example, if the structural defect caused by faulty foundation work is not discovered or discoverable until walls begin to exhibit cracking more than two years after the building is completed, the owner’s claim against the contractor may be barred if the AIA provision is applied.”
Read the full story...
The Ever-Growing Thicket Of California Civil Code Section 2782
January 6, 2012 — Michael D. Worthing, Borton Petrini
California Civil Code section 2782 imposes limits on indemnity and defense provisions in construction contracts. Since the initial adoption of S.B. 8001 in 2002 (eff. January 1, 2003) section 27822 has been revised several times, and legislative history suggests that interest groups representing builders, developers and sub-contractors, as well as the insurance industry, have seen legislative action on these indemnity and defense issues as part of the overall response to the same economic pressures resulting from construction defect litigation that gave rise to S.B. 800. Amendments in 2005, 2007, 2008 and 2011 (each effective January 1 of the following year) have increasingly entangled the provisions of Section 2782 with various provisions of S.B. 800. The application of section 2782 to construction contracts, and in particular contracts between developer-builders and subcontractors, executed after January 1, 2006, will require a concurrent reading and understanding of S.B. 800, the application of which is itself still in flux.
The time a construction contract was executed will likely determine which version of section 2782, read in connection with provisions of S.B.800, is applicable. Because of the nature of construction defect litigation, the determination of relative rights and liabilities of developer-builders vis-à-vis subcontractors under construction contracts does not become the subject of litigation, and legal and judicial interpretation, until years after the contracts were entered and work performed. As of the date this article is submitted, there has been no case law interpreting or applying any of the post S.B. 800 amendments, in part, and perhaps primarily, because litigation arising from construction contracts executed after January 1, 2006, has not yet reached the appellate courts.
SECTION 2782 AT THE TIME S.B. 800 WAS ENACTED
Section 2782 was originally enacted in 1967 and amended several times to the version in effect when S.B. 800 became law, at which time the section was relatively simple and straightforward. It then consisted of two subdivisions, which have essentially remained unchanged until the most recent amendment during the 2011 legislative session.
Section 2782 (a) prohibited, and still prohibits, provisions in construction contracts that “purport to indemnify the promisee against liability for damages for death or bodily injury to persons, injury to property, or any other loss, damage or expense arising from the sole negligence or willful misconduct of the promise.” This provision essentially prohibits what had been referred to as so-called Type I or “specific” indemnity provisions. In such agreements, the indemnitor [the promisor, that is, the person or entity indemnifying] will indemnify the indemnitee [the promisee, that is, the person or entity being protected by the indemnity] for the indemnitee’s own negligence, whether active or passive, whether the indemnitee is solely negligent or concurrently negligent with the indemnitor. (See, MacDonald & Kruse, Inc. v. San Jose Steel Co. (1972) 29 Cal.App.3d 413, 419.)3 Section 2782 (a) has remained essentially intact since the enactment of S.B. 800. It still must be considered and applied to interpret a construction contract. Generally, it will apply to contracts not involving a public agency; the next part of section 2782 specifically governs such contracts.
The second subdivision prohibits provisions in any construction contract with a public agency which purport to impose on the contractor, or relieve the public agency from, liability for the active negligence of the public agency. Subdivision (b) has been revised by the 2011 amendment, discussed below. If a construction contract with the public agency is for residential construction, the standards of S.B. 800 likely apply.4
This was the extent of section 2782 on January 1, 2003, when S.B. 800 went into effect, and remained so until January 1, 2006. This version will govern interpretation and application of indemnity and defense provisions in construction contracts executed before January 1, 2006.5
2005 AMENDMENT
The first “post S.B. 800” change to Section 2782 was in enacted in 2005, effective January 1, 2006, and added two new sections. Subdivision (c) stated (in somewhat greater detail than paraphrased here) that for residential construction contracts, or amendments thereto, entered into after January 1, 2006, a subcontractor cannot be required to indemnify (including the cost to defend) a builder for construction defects that arise out of negligence or design defects of the builder or other independent contractors, or that do not arise out of the scope of the subcontractor=s scope of work. The term “residential construction” was defined by reference to S.B.800 generally, and the term “builder” was defined by reference to section 911 (a part of S.B. 800), for the first time expressly connecting provisions of section 2782 to S.B. 800. Contractual provisions not expressly prohibited were reserved to the agreement of the parties.
What subdivision (c) took away was partially given back by subdivision (d). It stated that “subdivision (c) does not prohibit a subcontractor and builder from mutually agreeing to the timing or immediacy of the defense and provisions for reimbursement of defense fees and costs, so long as that agreement, upon final resolution of the claims, does not waive or modify the provisions of subdivision (c).”6 In addition, it stated that this subdivision (c) did not affect the obligations of an insurance carrier under Presley Homes, Inc. v. American States Insurance Company (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 571, which holds that where an insurer has a duty to defend a developer pursuant to an additional insured endorsement obtained under a subcontractor’s policy, that duty generally applies to the entire action, even if the suit involves both covered and uncovered claims, or a single claim only partially covered by the policy. Finally, subdivision (d) stated that the amendment did not affect the builder’s or subcontractor’s obligations under S.B. 800. Both of these latter provisions, relating to the Presley Homes case, and obligations under S.B. 800, have been carried forward essentially intact in subsequent amendments of section 2782.
This version of section 2782 will be applicable to any contract between a builder as defined by section 911 (see fn. 4, above) and a subcontractor executed between January 1, 2006, and December 31, 2008. Thus, a general contractor, etc., who is not a builder is not subject to the provisions added by the 2005 amendment; this changed with the next amendment.
It is not clear whether this version would apply to a contract entered before January 1, 2006, but amended after that date. Subdivision (c) applies to “all construction contracts, and amendments thereto, entered into after January 1, 2006, for residential construction.” It would seem that the clearest and most logical construction would apply it only to contracts originally made after January 1, 2006, and thereafter amended, but there has been no judicial determination of this issue.
In addition, logically it would seem that this version of section 2782 should be applicable to construction contracts for residential construction between a builder and a subcontractor, entered between January 1, 2006, and December 31, 2008; however, legislative history relating to the 2008 amendment discussed below suggests a different result might occur.
2007 AMENDMENT
The second “post S.B. 800” amendment in 2007 (effective January 1, 2008), added subdivisions (e)(1) and (e)(2).
Subdivision (e)(1) added general contractors and subcontractors not affiliated with the builder and imposed essentially the same restrictions on provisions to indemnify, including the cost to defend, them as had been imposed on the “builder” by the 2005 amendment. The amendment refers to section 911 (b), again part of S.B. 800, to define general contractors, etc., not affiliated with the builder.
Subdivision (e)(1) essentially repeated the provisions of subdivision (d) permitting agreement to the timing and immediacy of the defense, the reference to the Presley Homes case, and the general contractor’s or subcontractor’s obligations under S.B. 800.
It appears this amendment was an attempt to harmonize the new restrictions on indemnity and defense provisions with S.B. 800. The 2005 amendment, whether by oversight or intent, covered only builders and not general contractors, although both classes are subject to the provisions of S.B. 800; the 2007 amendment added non-builder-affiliated general contractors.
Again, logically, it would seem that this version of section 2782 should be applicable to construction contracts for residential construction between a general contractor or contractor not affiliated with a builder and a subcontractor, entered between January 1 and December 31, 2008; however, legislative history relating to the 2008 amendment discussed below suggests a different result might occur. The same potential uncertainty regarding applicability to a contract entered before January 1, 2008, but amended after that date, exists for this provision as for the prior amendment, discussed above.
2008 AMENDMENT
The third “post S.B. 800” amendment in 2008 (effective January 1, 2009), reorganized the language relating to prohibited indemnity provisions, added a reference to insurance in that same prohibition, extensively rewrote the provisions governing agreements relating to the timing or immediacy of defense, added language preserving equitable indemnity claims, and added language defining “construction defect” by reference to the standards set forth in S.B. 800.
Subdivisions (a) and (b) remained unchanged.
Subdivision (c) now made a combined reference to builders (again by reference to section 911), as well as general contractors or contractors not affiliated with the builder (again by reference to section 911 (b)), rather than dealing with the two groups in separate but nearly identical subdivisions as previously. It otherwise restated the same limitations that were previously set forth separately in subdivisions (c) and (e), as well as the reference to the Presley Homes case, and the general contractor’s or subcontractor’s obligations under S.B. 800, but with one important addition. The word “insure” was added to the description of prohibited provisions, to-wit: “provisions? that purport to insure or indemnify, including the cost to defend, the builder, [etc.]? are unenforceable” to the extent they arise out of claims of the type previously described.
It is unclear what impact the addition of this single word “insure” will have; and, it will have to be read in light of the preservation of the language that it shall not affect the obligations of an insurance carrier under the holding of the Presley Homes case. Suppose a carrier had issued an additional insured endorsement under which it would otherwise be required to defend a builder or general contractor consistent with the Presley Homes rule: would this newly added single word (restricting the construction contract, to which the carrier is not a party) give the carrier a basis for denying coverage under the insurance contract? Or would the continued inclusion of the express language that it does not affect the obligations of an insurance carrier under Presley Homes control? That is surely an issue that will have to be worked out by the courts.
The new subdivision (d) addressed defense obligations. Again it permitted parties to agree to the timing and immediacy of the defense and provision for reimbursement of defense fees and costs, but imposed a very detailed scheme that appears to limit the extent of such agreement. A subcontractor owes no defense or indemnity obligation until the builder or general contractor provides a written tender of the claim, which has the same force and effect as notice of commencement of a legal proceeding. Upon that tender the subcontractor shall elect to follow one of two ways of performing: subdivision (d) (1) permits the subcontractor to defend with counsel of its choice and to control the defense, if the subcontractor gives written notice of this election within a reasonable time after receipt of the written tender and in no event later than 90 days following that receipt; subdivision (d) (2) provides an alternative by which the subcontractor pays a reasonable allocated share of the builder’s or general contractor’s defense fees and costs within 30 days of receipt of an invoice, subject to reallocation upon final resolution of the claim by settlement or judgment. Subdivision (e) sets forth remedies available to the builder or general contractor if a subcontractor fails to timely and adequately perform its obligations under either of the two alternatives in subdivision (d), including compensatory and consequential damages, reasonable attorneys’ fees in connection with the first alternative, and interest on defense and indemnity costs in connection with the second alternative. Subdivision (e) ends with provisions relating to reallocation of defense costs, and damages for failure to reallocate.
Application of these requirements in actual litigation is likely to be cumbersome and potentially fraught with conflicts. If retained pursuant to subdivision (d) (1) does the attorney represent the builder, the subcontractor, or both? To whom does the attorney owe his or her fiduciary duty? Can an appropriate informed written consent be formulated, for example, under Rule 3-310 of the California Rules of Professional Conduct, or Rule 1.7, ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct? Could an attorney retained by a subcontractor blame the subcontractor if that is in the developer’s best interests? If multiple subcontractors elect to defend directly, how would the defense be coordinated among the potentially multiple attorneys so retained? Would an attorney retained by one subcontractor be able, or inclined, to blame another subcontractor who also chose to defend directly, in other words, what would prevent inconsistent defense positions amongst the various counsel retained by subcontractors for the developer? There may be solutions to such practical and professional considerations but it seems an ethical thicket awaits any attorney involved in such circumstances.
Subdivision (e) and (f) preserve equitable indemnity claims for the builder, general contractor or subcontractor, the first in general, the second as against any supplier, design profession, or product manufacturer. Finally, the 2008 amendment added for the first time, in subdivision (h), language defining "construction defect" as used in section 2782 as a violation of standards set forth in S.B. 800.
The inclusion of these last three subsections would seem to work against simplification of litigation. A builder or general contractor is likely to allege a claim for equitable indemnity against any and all subcontractors in addition to claims for contractual indemnity and defense (however limited by the other provisions of section 2782). Nothing in the section suggests the subcontractor should, or even can, somehow take on the representation of the builder, etc., in connection with a claim of equitable indemnity back against the subcontractor.
And the limited definition of “construction defect” in subdivision (h) appears to raise an issue of the applicability of the limitations set forth in subdivision (c). Although there is a school of thought that section 941 limits residential construction defect claims only to breach of the performance standards under S.B. 800, it is still common for CD complaints to plead other legal theories, e.g., breach of contract, breach of warranty, negligence, etc., in addition to violation of S.B. 800 standards. With the addition of subdivision (h) it is arguable that the restrictions on indemnity and defense provisions spelled out in subdivisions (c) and (d), both of which relate to claims for residential construction defects, are applicable only to claims for violation of S.B. 800 standards, and not other residential construction defect claims. In other words, a developer might conceivably still be entitled to a broader scope of indemnity and concomitant defense for other types of claims, such as breach of contract, breach of warranty, negligence, etc., so long as the indemnity does not violate the limitation of subdivision (a) against Type I indemnity, which as noted above, has remained intact through these revisions.
Finally, it would seem that this version of section 2782 should be applicable to contracts executed between builders, general contractors, etc., on the one hand and subcontractors on the other hand on and after January 1, 2009. And, as noted above in connection with the 2005 and 2007 amendments, logic would suggest that those versions would ordinarily apply to contracts executed during the time periods mentioned above. But, the Legislative Counsel’s Digest for the 2008 amendment as it finally was enacted into law includes the following statements:
This bill would delete the provisions applicable to construction contracts entered into on or after January 1, 2008, that purport to indemnify the general contractor or contractor not affiliated with the builder. The bill would revise the provisions applicable to contracts entered into after January 1, 2006, to instead apply to contracts entered into after January 1, 2009, and to apply to agreements that purport to insure or indemnify the builder or the general contractor or contractor not affiliated with the builder, as described.
Although it seems a startling result, this legislative history suggests an argument can be made that the 2008 amendment retroactively nullified the effect of the 2005 and 2007 amendments, so that contracts executed from January 1, 2006, as to builders or January 1, 2008, for general contractors, etc., through December 31, 2008, are still governed by the provisions of section 2782 as it was on the books prior to the first post-S.B. 800 amendment in 2005.
2011 AMENDMENT
Section 2782 has been amended yet again in the 2011 session of the California Legislature, effective January 1, 2012; however, the substantive changes affect certain contracts entered on or after January 1, 2013. All of the provisions contained in the 2008 amendment have been carried forward in the most recent amendment, although re-numbered: (c) became (d), etc., through (h) becoming (i). So, the law governing construction contracts entered into after January 1, 2009, for residential construction, as between a builder, or a general contractor, etc., not affiliated with a builder, and regarding insurance, indemnity or defense relating to claims for construction defects, remains the same as in the 2008 amendment.
As noted above the substantive changes to section 2782 all affect contracts entered into on or after January 1, 2013. Subdivision (b) has been amended such that any provision in a contract with a public agency that purports to impose on any contractor, etc., or relieve the public agency from, liability for the active negligence of the public agency will be void and unenforceable. A new subdivision (c) has been added that imposes a similar restriction on construction contracts with the owner of privately owned real property to be improved and as to which the owner is not acting as a contractor or supplier of materials or equipment to the work. This new restriction in subdivision (c) does not apply to a homeowner performing a home improvement project on his or her own single family dwelling.
The 2011 bill amending section 2782 also added a new section 2782.05, which will make void and unenforceable any provision in any construction contract (again, entered on or after January 1, 2013) that purports to insure or indemnify, including the cost to defend, a general contractor, construction manager, or other subcontractor, by a subcontractor for claims that arise out of the active negligence or willful misconduct of the general contractor, etc., or other independent contractors, etc., or to the extent the claims do not arise out of the scope of work of the subcontractor. However, the section also includes a long list of situations to which it does not apply, including all of those covered by section 2782 (residential construction subject to S.B. 800, public agency contracts subject to section 2782 (b), and direct contracts with private property owners subject to the new section 2782 (c)) as well as eight other categories. This apparently is intended to serve as a “catch-all” to extend a limitation on indemnity agreements to all construction contracts not previously swept into this widening legislative scheme, although the exact phrasing is slightly different.7
The new section 2782.05 then permits a mutual agreement to the timing or immediacy of a defense under a scheme essentially identical to that imposed in the 2008 amendment to section 2782: defend with counsel of choice, and maintain control of the defense; or, pay a reasonable allocated share of defense fees and costs. The same logistical and ethical difficulties presented by the 2008 scheme discussed above would likely be present in cases that fall under the new section 2782.05.
CONCLUSION
The California Legislature has been revising section 2782 since shortly after the adoption of S.B. 800. Each revision has been more complicated than the last, and each has tied certain provisions of section 2782 more closely to S.B. 800. In particular, with regard to construction defect claims relating to residential dwellings which are subject to S.B. 800, the Legislature has apparently attempted to exercise more and more control over the scope of allowable indemnity and dictated a very narrow scheme to govern how the defense obligation arising from a contractual indemnity is to be implemented. It seems likely that any attempt to manage the defense of a construction defect case under the options that allow a subcontractor to defend directly and control the defense will create a logistical problem and an ethical difficulty for any attorney attempting to defend a developer at the behest and direction of a subcontractor. Finally, as set forth in the current version of section 2782 relating to contractual indemnity and defense of S.B. 800 type cases (subdivisions (c) through (h) in the 2008 version, now subdivisions (d) through (i) in the 2011 amendment), the Legislature has apparently narrowed the application to only claims of violation of S.B. 800 standards. This may have, in essence, removed the restrictions on indemnity and defense provisions as they relate to other theories pleaded against developers in construction defense cases, e.g., breach of contract, breach of warranty, negligence, and the like. It is not at all clear that the Legislature has accomplished what it set out do accomplish. Rather, the law may have come full circle back to where it began, except for one legal theory, i.e. violation of S.B. 800 standards, currently being used in residential construction defect cases. For any other legal theory the limitation of section 2782 (a) may be solely controlling.
- California Civil Code section 43.99, and sections 895 to 945.5.
- All statutory references in this article are to the California Civil Code unless otherwise specified.
- Type I or specific indemnity does not exactly match the scope of proscribed indemnity as described in section 2782 (a) but it is the closest. More recent case law in California has eschewed a mechanical application of the MacDonald & Kruse typology in favor of examining the precise text of the actual contract (See, e.g., St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Frontier Pacific Ins. Co. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1234, 1246, n. 6) but some recent cases still use the Type I, II and II classifications. And, an understanding of that “historical” typology is useful as an aid to evaluating and understanding express indemnity in general.
- The provisions of S.B. 800 other than the prelitigation procedures of sections 910 through 938 apply to general contractors, subcontractors, etc., pursuant to section 936. The prelitigation procedures generally involve a “builder,” which is specifically defined in section 911 (a) by reference to entities or individuals in the business of selling residential units to the public or of building, developing, or constructing residential units for public purchase. Pursuant to section 911 (b) the term builder does not include general contractors, etc., not affiliated with the builder. Thus, a general contractor who constructs residential housing pursuant to a contract with a public agency is still subject to claims for violation of the standards set forth in sections 896 and 897, resulting from its negligent act or omission or breach of contract, pursuant to section 936.
- As noted above, there has been no case law yet interpreting any of the “post S.B. 800” changes to Section 2782. One of the most important legal decisions relating to express indemnity and defense obligations and rights between developer-builders and sub-contractors was published after two of the amendments but based upon contracts executed and the language of section 2782 prior to January 1, 2006. (See, Crawford v. Weather Shield Mfg., Inc. (2008) 44 Cal.4th 541, 547, 566-67, fn. 14).
- Subcontractor dissatisfaction with the perceived inadequacy of protection afforded by this provision apparently became the impetus for a 2008 amendment to section 2782, discussed below, at least based upon the numerous (form) letters submitted to legislators in connection therewith.
- Section 2782 (a), where we started, and which has continued without change, prohibits indemnity for claims arising out of the sole negligence or willful misconduct of the promisee; sole negligence can be either active or passive. The various versions relating to residential construction prohibit indemnity for the negligence of the builder, etc., suggesting there is no express contractual indemnity for the negligence of the subcontractor if the builder, etc., is at all negligent. This is tempered a bit by the preservation of the right to equitable indemnity, which will now be found in section 2782 (g) and (h).
Courtesy of Michael D. Worthing of Borton Petrini, LLP. Mr. Worthing can be contacted at mworthing@bortonpetrini.com.
Contractor Burns Down Home, Insurer Refuses Coverage
May 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
InsuranceStep reports that a Connecticut insurance company has rejected a claim over a fire in a remodeling project that killed five people. Utica First Insurance states that the coverage was invalid as the insured, Tiberias Construction, had misrepresented information about the company and the work performed in applying for insurance. During a remodel, the contractor allegedly placed fireplace ashes near trash. The trash ignited, leading to the house fire.
Read the full story…
Florida Appeals Court Rules in Favor of Homeowners Unaware of Construction Defects and Lack of Permits
December 9, 2011 — CDJ Staff
The Florida Court of Appeals has ruled that a homeowner is not liable for defects in unpermitted alterations, reversing a lower court’s decision in Jensen v. Bailey. The Jensens sold their house to the Baileys. During the sale, the Jensens filled out a property disclosure statement, checking “no” to a question about “any improvement or additions to the property, whether by your or by others that have been constructed in violation of building codes or without necessary permits.”
After moving in, the Baileys discovered several problems with the home. One involved a defective sewer connection leading to repeated backups. The Baileys also found problems with remodeling the Jensens had done in the kitchen, master bath, and bedroom. The remodeling work was not done with required permits nor was it up to code.
The court noted that an earlier case, Johnson v. Davis, established four criteria: “the seller of a home must have knowledge of a defect in the property; the defect must materially affect the value of the property; the defect must not be readily observable and must be unknown to the buyer; and the buyer must establish that the seller failed to disclose the defect to the buyer.” The court found that the first of these criteria was crucial to determining the case.
In the Johnson ruling, the then Chief Justice dissented, fearing that the courts “would ultimately construe Johnson’s requirement of actual knowledge to permit a finding of liability based on constructive knowledge,” quoting Justice Boyd, “a rule of constructive knowledge will develop based on the reasoning that if the seller did not know of the defect, he should have known about it before attempting to sell the property.” The Appeals Court concluded that the lower court hit this point in ruling on Jensen v. Bailey.
Citing other Florida cases, the court noted that the Johnson rule does require “proof of the seller’s actual knowledge of the defect.” The court cited a case in which it was concluded that the seller “should have known” that there was circumstantial evidence was that the seller did know about the defects, as the seller had been involved in the construction of the home.
In the case of the Jensens, the lower court concluded that they did not know that the work was defective, nor did they know that they were obligated to obtain permits for it. The Appeals Court found this one fact sufficient to reverse the decision and remand the case to the lower court for a final judgment in favor of the Jensens.
Read the court’s decision…
Arbitration Clause Not Binding on Association in Construction Defect Claim
June 19, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Determining that a community’s CC&Rs do not form an agreement to arbitrate, the California Court of Appeals has reversed the decision of the Superior Court inVerano Condo. Homeowners the Ass’n v. La Cima Dev., LLC (Cal. App., 2012). La Cima purchased an apartment complex in December 2004, which they converted into condominiums. In the process, La Cima created the CC&Rs, under which the Verano Condominium Homeowners Association came into being. One section of the CC&Rs included arbitration clauses. Additionally, the purchase agreements for individual condominium units also contained arbitration clauses. Subsequently, the owners became aware of construction defect both in units and in the common areas. The Association sued La Cima both in its own interest and on behalf of its members. La Cima moved to compel arbitration, which was denied by the trial court. La Cima appealed.
The court concluded that “CC&Rs are insufficient to form an agreement to arbitrate between La Cima and the Association.” The court noted that “no evidence exists to show the Association consented to the terms of the CC&Rs, either explicitly or implicitly.”
The court agreed with La Cima that the arbitration agreement applied to those owners who had purchased their units directly from La Cima. Moreover, as the conversion to condominiums involved interstate commerce, in part because a Delaware company was selling condominiums located in California, the court held that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) applied, and as such “even a state constitutional standard, such as the the jury waiver provision requirements of the California Constitution, cannot be used to circumvent the FAA in the face of an otherwise valid arbitration agreement.”
However, the court also held that there was “no agreement in the CC&Rs between La Cima and owners who did not purchase units directly from La Cima,” adding that “no meeting of the minds between La Cima and these later purchasers and their successors occurred.” The court did not believe that “the Legislature intended that CC&Rs would be used to provide continuing and irrevocable contractual development or role as a representative of the owners of the development.”
The purpose of the CC&Rs, according to the court are to “protect owners from one another and permit enforcement of its terms by the Association.” The court stated that “La Cima relinquished its interests in the land by selling its property and may not assert any rights under the CC&Rs following the transfer of its ownership interest.
In its conclusion, the court determined that claims must be organized in three classes. The claims the association made against La Cima for defects in the common area “are not subject to any valid agreement to arbitrate.” The second category are those owners who did not purchase their units directly from La Cima. Here, also, the court found that the units “are similarly not subject to a valid arbitration agreement.”
The third category, however, was “owners who purchased units directly from La Cima.” The court held that these arbitration agreements were valid, and if the claims were to be taken up by the association, the association could only submit these claims to arbitration. The lower court was instructed to separate these claims, as here La Cima’s motion could be granted.
Read the court’s decision…
Mortar Insufficient to Insure Summary Judgment in Construction Defect Case
January 6, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The US District Court of Nevada issued a summary judgment in the case of R&O Construction Company V. Rox Pro International Group, Ltd. on December 19, 2011. The case involved the installation of stone veneer at a Home Depot location (Home Depot was not involved in the case). R&O’s subcontractor, New Creation Masonry, purchased the stone veneer from Arizona Stone. Judge Larry Hicks noted that “the stone veneer failed and R&O was forced to make substantial structural repairs to the Home Depot store.”
Rox Pro asked the court for a summary judgment, which the court granted only in part. The court looked at two issues in the case, whether the installation instructions constituted a breach of implied warranty of merchantability, and whether there was a breach of an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose.
Judge Hicks found that there was a breach of implied warranty of merchantability. The instructions drafted by Real Stone and distributed by Arizona Stone were not sufficient for affixing the supplied stones, according to R&O’s expert, a claim the plaintiffs dispute. “Because there is an issue of material fact concerning the installation guidelines, the court shall deny Arizona Stone’s motion for a summary judgment on this issue.”
On the other hand, the judge did not find that the instructions had any bearing as to whether R&O bought the stone, since the stone was selected by the shopping center developer. This issue was, in the view of the judge, appropriately dismissed.
Read the court’s decision…
Who Is To Blame For Defective — And Still LEED Certified — Courthouse Square?
September 1, 2011 — Douglas Reiser, Builders Counsel
Remember Courthouse Square? I sure do. We have talked about the closed and evacuated LEED certified building a couple of times here on Builders Counsel. Well, it’s back in the news. This time building professionals are pointing fingers — but there is some talk about a fix. Still, its LEED certification remains.
If you read my past articles about Courthouse Square, you can get caught up on this mess. The short of it is that Salem, Oregon had the five-story government building and bus mall completed in 2000 for $34 Million. It was awarded LEED certification during the USGBC’s infancy. Last year, it became public that the building had significantly defective concrete and design. The Salem-Keizer Transit District worked with the City of Salem to shut the building down, and it has not been occupied since.
Last fall, Courthouse Square failed thorough forensic testing leading to a lengthy bout with a number of insurers. The contractors and designers had been hauled into court, but the Transit District was able to settle with the architect and contractors. The only remaining party involved in the lawsuit appears to be the engineering firm, Century West Engineering. Most expert reports have pinned the responsibility for the poor design and materials on Century West’s shoulders.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of Douglas Reiser of Reiser Legal LLC. Mr. Reiser can be contacted at info@reiserlegal.com
Colorado Senate Bill 12-181: 2012’s Version of a Prompt Pay Bill
May 10, 2012 — W. Berkeley Mann, Jr., Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC
A potentially important legislative bill has been introduced in waning days of the 2012 legislative session, which would change many of the commercial practices that prevail in the construction industry. Senate Bill 12-181 applies to all building and construction contracts and would prohibit any contract provision that requires a contractor, subcontractor, or supplier to waive their lien in advance of payment. It also would ban any “choice of law” provisions that make a Colorado-based construction contract subject to enforcement only in another state, or under the laws of another state.
The bill also seeks to change many existing commercial practices between contractors, subcontractors, and suppliers. It is presently unclear whether the bill allows parties to contract around these payment procedure provisions, or whether these requirements are simply “gap filling” provisions that pertain if there are no written contract terms specified on these issues. The proposed statute would mandate payment to subcontractors and material suppliers due within seven days in the absence of a dispute about the work or materials being billed. After this seven day period, the bill would require the payment of interest at the rate of 1.5% monthly (18% annually). In any later suit for payment, the creditor would also be able to collect reasonable attorneys’ fees. Additionally, non-payment to a subcontractor or supplier who is later found to be entitled to prompt payment would excuse the subcontractor or supplier, and its surety bond provider, from any further performance under the contract.
It is presently unclear whether the bill allows parties to contract around these payment procedure provisions. However, it is clear that the bill provides some leeway for change orders, as long as there is (1) negotiation in good faith between the parties concerning the changed scope of work, and (2) a 50% payment of a subcontractor’s costs by the changing party within 30 days of the change order work being done. Additionally, the bill provides for retainage, but in an amount of no more than 5%.
The bill is presently set for hearing before the Colorado Senate Committee on Business, Labor, and Technology Committee on May 2, 2012 at 1:30 p.m.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of W. Berkeley Mann, Jr. of Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC. Mr. Mann can be contacted at mann@hhmrlaw.com.
No-Show Contractor Can’t Hide from Construction Defect Claim
June 19, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The failure of R. J. Haas to produce documents or make himself available for deposition has worn out the patience of the US District Court in San Jose. Judge Howard Lloyd issued a ruling inProbuilders Specialty Ins. Co. v. Valley Corp. (N.D. Cal., 2012).
Probuilders issued an insurance policy covering Haas for their work on the construction of a single-family home for Ty and Karen Levine. The Levines sued Haas for “shoddy and incomplete work.” Probuilders contends that Haas “made material misrepresentations with respect to verifying that the subcontractors had insurance.” Since November 2011, Haas has been without legal counsel in this matter.
Despite Probuilder’s attempts, the court noted that “Hass any not provided any documents in response to the plaintiff’s three sets of requests for production of documents.” Haas also “has refused to make himself available for deposition.” Haas was first scheduled for deposition in September, 2011. Subsequently, Haas has rescheduled his deposition repeatedly, postponing it to January 4, then February 13, and then agreed to be deposed “before the then-scheduled March 15 mediation,” after which he said he would “be unavailable to be deposed before April.
The court noted that although Haas “hay have had legitimate reasons for wishing to continue his deposition, such as illness and his attempt to retain new counsel,” however, the court concluded that “Haas has had ample time to retain new counsel and prepare for deposition.
The court also found fault with Haas’s objections to certain terms in the Request for Admissions, among them “named,” “independent contractor,” and “work,” noting that Haas called these “vague and ambiguous.” The court called it “quibbling,” and noted that the federal courts disfavor this. Later in the decision, the court made it clear that Haas “is obligated under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to respond to discovery requests.” And concludes, “that he has apparently been seeking to retain new counsel for over five months does not give him license to ignore plaintiff’s discovery requests entirely.
The court granted Probuilders the option of filing a motion for sanctions. Mr. Haas did not attend or participate.
Read the court’s decision…
Time to Repair Nevada’s Construction Defect Laws?
February 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The Builders Magazine writes that during the previous session of the Nevada legislature, reforms sought by the building industry were stopped by the Speaker of the Nevada Assembly. The new session brings a new speaker and new hope for construction defect reform in Nevada.
Pat Hickey, a member of the Assembly and a small business owner told The Builders Magazine that “we need to apply pressure on the legislators to fix the law.” He also recommended that people “go to Governor Sandoval and ask for his help.” Builders seeks legislation that will include right to repair and it should “define construction defect in such a way that it allows for a fair process.”
Read the full story…
Sometimes It’s Okay to Destroy Evidence
August 17, 2011 — CDJ Staff
The Minnesota Supreme Court has ruled in the case of Miller v. Lankow that Mr. Miller was within his rights to remediate his home, even though doing so destroyed the evidence of water intrusion.
Linda Lankow built a home in 1992. In 2001 or 2002, Lankow discovered a stucco problem at the garage which she attributed to moisture intrusion. She asked the original contractor to fix the wall. In 2003, Lankow attempted to sell her home, but the home inspection revealed fungal growth in the basement. Lankow made further repairs, including alterations to the landscaping.
In 2004, Lankow put her house on the market once again and entered into an agreement with David Miller. Miller declined to have an independent inspection, as the home had been repaired by professional contractors.
In 2005, Miller put the house on the market. A prospective buyer requested a moisture inspection. The inspection firm, Private Eye, Inc. found “significant moisture intrusion problems.”
Miller hired an attorney who sent letters to the contractors and to Lankow and her husband. Lankow’s husband, Jim Betz, an attorney, represented his wife and sent a letter to Miller’s attorney that Miller had declined an opportunity to inspect the home.
In 2007, Miller’s new attorney sent letters to all parties that Miller had decided to begin remediation work on the house. All stucco was removed. Miller then filed a lawsuit against the prior owners, the builders, and the realtors.
Two of the contractors and the prior owners moved for summary judgment on the grounds that Miller had spoliated evidence by removing the stucco. They requested that Miller’s expert reports be excluded. The district court found for the defendants and imposed sanctions on Miller.
The Minnesota Supreme court found that “a custodial party’s duty to preserve evidence is not boundless,” stating that “it may be particularly import to allow remediation in cases such as the one before us.” Their reasoning was that “remediation of the moisture intrusion problem in the home may be necessary, even essential, to address immediate health concerns.”
Given that Miller needed to remediate the problem in order to continue living there, and that he had given the other parties a “full and fair opportunity to inspect,” the court found that he was within his rights. The court reversed the judgment of the lower court and remanded it to them for review.
Read the court’s decision…
California Appeals Court Remands Fine in Late Completion Case
November 18, 2011 — CDJ Staff
The California Court of Appeals in Stanislaus County has reversed the decision of the lower court in Greg Opinski Construction Inc. v. City of Oakdale. The earlier court had awarded the city of judgment of $54,000 for late completion, $3,266 for repair of construction defects and interest, and $97,775 in attorneys’ fees. The late completion of the project was due to actions by the City of Oakdale, however, the court rejected Opinski’s argument that the California Supreme Court decision in Kiewit did not allow this, as his contract with the city established a procedure for claiming extensions.
The appeals court noted that the Kiewit decision has been “criticized as an unwarranted interference in the power of contracting parties to shift the risk of delays caused by one party onto the other party by forcing the second party to give the first notice of any intention to claim an extension of time based on delays caused by first.” They cited Sweet, a professor at Boalt Hall, UC Berkeley’s law school, that Kiewit “gutted” the “provision that conditions the contractor’s right to claim an extension of time for delays beyond his control.”
Further changes in California law in response to the Kiewit decision lead to the current situation which the court characterized as “if the contractor wished to claim it needed an extension of time because of delays caused by the city, the contractor was required to obtain a written change order by mutual consent or submit a claim in writing requesting a formal decision by the engineer.”
Opinski also argued that the lower court misinterpreted the contract. The Appeals court replied that “Opinski is mistaken.” He cited parts of the contract regarding the increase of time, but the court rejected these, noting that “an inability to agree is not the same as an express rejection.”
The court also rejects Opinski’s appeal that “the evidence the project was complete earlier than September 30, 2005, is weightier than the evidence to the contrary,” which they describe as “not a winning appellate argument.” The court points out that the role of an appeals court is not to reweigh the evidence, but to determine “whether the record contains substantial evidence in support of the judgment.”
The court did side with Opinski on one question of the escrow account. They rejected most of his arguments, repeating the line “Opinski is mistaken” several times. They decided that he was mistaken on the timing of the setoff decision and on whether the city was the prevailing party. However, the appeals court did find that Opinski was not liable for interest on the judgment.
The appeals court rejected the awarding of prejudgment interest to the city as the funds from which the judgment was drawn was held in an escrow account. The court noted that the city had access to the funds and could “access the funds when it determined that Opinski had breached the contract.” The appeals court noted that the judgment exhausted the escrow balance and remanded the case to the lower court to determine the amount own to Opinski.
Read the court’s decision…
Tampa Condo Owners Allege Defects
October 23, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Owners in the Bel Mare towers have filed a lawsuit alleging that the building have construction defects that could lead to problems during periods with high winds. The Tampa Bay Business Journal reports that the condo association has sued the developer, the general contractor, the architects, the structural engineers, and subcontractors.
Read the full story…
Construction Defects Lead to Demolition
May 26, 2011 — CDJ Staff
Ten years after it was built, demolition of Seattle’s McGuire Building has begun, as Jeanne Lang Jones reports in the Puget Sound Business Journal. Construction defects had rendered the 25-story apartment building uninhabitable. The major problem was corroded steel cabling. According to the report, “the building’s owners reached an undisclosed settlement last year with St. Louis-based contractor McCarthy Building Companies.”
Read the full story…