ANAHEIM CALIFORNIA CONSTRUCTION EXPERT WITNESS
DIRECTORY AND CAPABILITIES

Defective Shingle Claims Valid Despite Bankruptcy

The Third Circuit Court has allowed claims to go forward against Owens Corning for making allegedly defective shingles. The shingles split, leading to leaking roofs. The building products manufacturer filed for bankruptcy in 2000, which “extinguished” claims against it. The company was facing millions in liabilities over asbestos lawsuits.

The lawsuit was filed in 2009. The courts initially found the lawsuit timely, but the Third Circuit Court later applied determined the exposure stated before the bankruptcy. On appeal, the court has reversed this and is again allowing the suit to proceed.

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Construction Defects in Home a Breach of Contract

The Supreme Court of North Dakota has ruled in Leno v. K & L Homes, affirming the verdict of the lower court. K & L Homes argued that district court had erred in several ways, including by refusing to instruct the jury on comparative fault, denying a request for inspection, and not allowing a defendant to testify on his observations during jury viewing.

The Lenos purchased a home constructed by K & L Homes, after which they alleged they found cracks, unevenness, and shifting, which they attributed to improper construction. They claimed negligence on the part of K & L Homes. K & L Homes responded that the Lenos were responsible for damage to the home. The Lenos dropped their negligence claim, arguing breach of contract and implied warranties.

Before the trial, after the discovery period had passed, K & L Homes requested to inspect the home. This was rejected by the court. Kelly Moldenhauer, the owner of K & L Homes sought to testify about his observations during the jury’s viewing of the house. The court denied this too. The jury found that K & L was in breach of contract and awarded damages to the Lenos.

The North Dakota Supreme Court noted that K & L Homes gave “warranties that the home had been built according to local building codes and laws, and that the house was fit for its particular purpose as a residence.” The court found that a defective home breached this warranty. Further, the home violated an implied warranty of fitness.

The district court had denied K & L’s request to inspect the home, as the discovery period had ended and it would not give the Lenos time to do further discovery of their own. At the time of the request, there was only twenty-two days before the trial. The Supreme Court ruled that this was not an abuse of discretion of the part of the district court.

The Lenos had requested that Moldenhauer’s testimony not be permitted, as it would “have the same effect as if the court had granted K & L Homes’ pretrial request for inspection.” K & L Homes agreed to this in court, replying, “okay.”

The decision affirms the judgment of the district court and the damages awarded to the Lenos by the jury.

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General Contractor/Developer May Not Rely on the Homeowner Protection Act to Avoid a Waiver of Consequential Damages in an AIA Contract

Recently, in Caribou Ridge Homes, LLC v. Zero Energy, LLC, et al., Case No. 10CV1094, Boulder County District Court Judge Ingrid S. Bakke entered a ruling and order on the Plaintiff’s Motion for Determination of Question of Law Pursuant to C.R.C.P. 56(h) on Issue of Damages. The Order found that the Plaintiff was not a homeowner intended to be protected by the Homeowner Protection Act (the “HPA”) and thus could not pursue its claims for consequential damages against Defendant.

By way of background, on June 18, 2008, Plaintiff Caribou Ridge Homes, LLC (“Caribou”) entered into a Standard Form Agreement Between Owner and Contractor AIA Document A114-2001 (the “Contract”) with Defendant Zero Energy, LLC (“Zero Energy”). Plaintiff hired Zero Energy to serve as a general contractor for the construction of a single-family home in the Caribou Ridge subdivision in Nederland, Colorado. A provision in the contract contained a mutual waiver of consequential damages (“Waiver”).

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Reprinted courtesy Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC

Arbitration Clause Found Ambiguous in Construction Defect Case

The California Court of Appeals ruled on September 28 in the case of Burch v. Premier Homes. Ms. Burch bought a home after negotiating various addendums to the contract. The contract was a standard California Association of Realtors contract to which both the buyer and seller made additions. At issue in this case was paragraph 17 of the contract which included that “Buyer and Seller agree that any dispute or claim in Law or equity arising between them out of this Agreement or resulting transaction, which is not settled through mediation, shall be decided by neutral, binding arbitration.”

The seller/defendant’s Addendum 2 “included provisions relating to the arbitration of disputes that may arise.” Ms. Burch’s realtor, Lisa Morrin, told Burch that “she had never seen a proposed contractual provision that would require a home buyer to agree to arbitrate with a builder over construction defects.” Ms. Burch told Morrin that she did not want to buy the property if she would have to give up her rights under California law.

As part of Addendum 2, the buyer had to buy a warranty from the Home Buyers Warranty Corporation. The sale was held up for a while, as Ms. Burch waited for a copy of the warranty. When she received it, she took further exception to Addendum 2. Scott Warren of Premier Homes said he could not sell the property without Addendum 2. Ms. Burch told her realtor that despite the claims made by Mr. Warren that this was for her benefit, she felt it was more to the benefit of Premier Homes. Don Aberbrook of HBW agreed to the clause, contained in the final sentence of Addendum 2, being struck.

Subsequent to buying the home, Burch submitted a claim concerning construction defects. HBW denied the claim and Burch began an action against the defendants. Premier filed a motion to compel arbitration which Burch opposed.

The trial court ruled that the striking out of the arbitration clause at the end of Addendum 2 “created a conflict with respect to the parties’ intent as to the scope of arbitration.” The trial court found that “the parties’ intention was to preserve Burch’s right to make state law claims including her right to a jury trial for any non-warranty claims against the builder.”

The appeals court in their ruling looked at the standard of review and concluded that the purchase agreement was ambiguous and that extrinsic evidence was required to resolve that ambiguity. As the contract contained contradictory provisions as to whether or not arbitration was required, it was necessary for the trial court to examine these claims. The appeals court found that the evidence supported the conclusions of the trial court.

Finally, the appeals court found that “there was no valid agreement to arbitrate disputes.” The court noted that arbitration can only happen by mutual consent and “it is clear that Burch did not enter into an agreement to arbitrate any construction defect disputes she might have.”

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Ensuing Loss Provision Found Ambiguous

After the insurer denied coverage in a homeowner’s policy for construction defects under various exclusions, the court found the ensuing loss provision was ambiguous.Kesling v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38857 (D. Colo. March 22, 2012).

After purchasing a home from the sellers, the insureds noticed problems with the deck of the home. Massive cracking appeared, causing lifting and leaking on the deck and water running through the exterior foundation wall into the home. There was also damage to the roof and crawlspace.

The insureds had a homeowner’s policy with American Family, which covered accidental direct physical loss to property described in the policy unless the loss was excluded. They requested coverage for "conditions, defects and damages." American Family denied coverage because wear and tear, as well as damage to foundations, floors and roofs were excluded. The policy did provide coverage, however, for "any resulting loss to property described . . . above, not excluded or excepted in this policy.

When coverage was denied, the insureds sued American Family.

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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com

There is No Non-Delegable Duty on the Part of Residential Builders in Colorado

Recently, in the Arapahoe District Court, the Honorable Michael Spear, issued an order holding that builders do not owe a non-delegable duty to homeowners. In Marx and Corken v. Alpert Custom Homes, Inc., et al., Judge Spear’s order came in response to plaintiffs’ motion for determination of question of law seeking a finding that the defendants owed a non-delegable duty to the plaintiffs and thus, to strike defendants’ designation of nonparties at fault. After being fully briefed, Judge Spear, found that such a non-delegable duty does not exist.

The case arises from the construction of a single-family residence in Aurora, Colorado. Through the construction and interaction with Alpert Custom Homes, Inc. and Scott and Sally Alpert, the defendants, Paul Marx and Kay Corken, the plaintiffs claimed they suffered various damages and losses, and brought claims for breach of contract-warranty, breach of contract, violation of the Colorado Consumer Protection Act, breaches of the implied covenant of good faith, promissory estoppel, willful breach of contract, and quantum meruit. During litigation, the defendants filed a designation of nonparties at fault, which named several parties which were at fault for the alleged construction defects at issue in the case. The pertinent nonparties named were subcontractors of defendant Alpert Custom Homes, Inc. during the construction of the residence.

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Reprinted courtesy of Brady Iandiorio, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC. Mr. Iandiorio can be contacted at iandiorio@hhmrlaw.com

MGM Seeks to Demolish Harmon Towers

Citing public safety concerns and the cost of repair, MGM Resorts International is seeking to demolish the unfinished hotel tower. The company has a few hurdles to go through before they start laying the charges to implode the structure. Any plans would have to be approved by not only Clark County officials, but also the district court has an order blocking any activity during litigation between MGM and the general contractor on the project, Perini Building Company.

Architectural Record reports that MGM states it would take “approximately 18 months to conduct test and come up with an approved, permitted design to fix the Harmon.” MGM feels that repairs would then take another two to three years. Perini contends that they could “provide stamped drawings detailing all necessary repairs within three months.” They attribute MGM’s desire to demolish the building as “buyer’s remorse.”

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Renovation Contractors: Be Careful How You Disclose Your Projects

In Palu and Beyer v. Toney, 2011 WL 2560249 (Bankr. D. Colo.), the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado determined that a Colorado District Court order granting summary judgment in favor of plaintiff home buyers was binding on the Bankruptcy Court in the defendant contractor’s bankruptcy proceeding based on issue preclusion.

Pertinent to this column is the subject matter of the summary judgment motion: Colorado’s Seller’s Property Disclosure (Form LC-18-5-04). In the underlying state court action, the plaintiff home buyers filed a motion for summary judgment contending that the defendant contractor represented to them, through the Seller’s Property Disclosure, that there were no present or past conditions involving moisture or water problems, roof problems or leaks, skylight problems, or gutter downspout problems.

In granting plaintiffs’ motion, the state court determined that the defendant contractor made these representations on her Seller’s Property Disclosure despite witnessing water leaking from the skylight onto the floor and being aware of repairs to the roof, skylight, and interior drywall prior to the sale of the property.

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Reprinted courtesy of Derek J. Lindenschmidt of Higgins, Hopkins, McClain & Roswell, LLP. Mr. Lindenschmidt can be contacted at lindenschmidt@hhmrlaw.com

Court Clarifies Sequence in California’s SB800

As California’s Right-To-Repair law, SB800, nears its ninth birthday, it has remained “largely untested in the legal system” as noted by Megan MacNee of Wood, Smith, Henning & Berman LLP on the site RealEstateRama. She writes that some homeowners have requested documents prior to filing a claim, which she describes as an attempt to “game the system,” and “analogous to requiring a party to litigation to comply with discovery before a complaint is filed.”

The court determined that homeowners may not request documents from the builder until they have actually filed a claim. The court noted that SB800 lacks any clear indication that homeowners may request documents before filing a claim (and also does not indicate that a builder would have to provide documents in these circumstances). The court concluded that the section that sets up the prelitigation procedures occurs before they section on documents discovery.¬? “Because the document request is part of the prelitigation procedure, and the prelitigation procedure does not begin until the homeowner has served notice of a claim, it follows that there can be no prelitigation obligation to produce documents under section 912, subdivision (a) unless the homeowner has commenced the prelitigation procedure by serving notice of a claim.”

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Damron Agreement Questioned in Colorado Casualty Insurance v Safety Control Company, et al.

Safety Control and EMC appealed the judgment in Colorado Casualty Insurance Company versus Safety Control Company, Inc., et al. (Ariz. App., 2012). The Superior Court in Maricopa County addressed “the validity and effect of a Damron agreement a contractor and its excess insurer entered into that assigned their rights to sue the primary insurer.” Judge Johnsen stated, “We hold the agreement is enforceable but remand for a determination of whether the stipulated judgment falls within the primary insurer’s policy.”

The Opinion provides some facts and procedural history regarding the claim. “The Arizona Department of Transportation (“ADOT”) hired DBA Construction Company (“DBA”) to perform a road-improvement project on the Loop 101 freeway. Safety Control Company, Inc. was one of DBA’s subcontractors. As required by the subcontract, Safety Control purchased from Employer’s Mutual Casualty Company (“EMC”) a certificate of insurance identifying DBA as an additional insured on a policy providing primary coverage for liability arising out of Safety Control’s work.”

A collision occurred on site, injuring Hugo Roman. Roman then sued ADT and DBA for damages. “Colorado Casualty tendered DBA’s defense to the subcontractors, including Safety Control. Safety Control and EMC rejected the tender. Roman eventually settled his claims against DBA and ADOT. DBA and ADOT stipulated with Roman for entry of judgment of $750,000; Roman received $75,000 from DBA (paid by Colorado Casualty) and $20,000 from ADOT, and agreed not to execute on the stipulated judgment. Finally, DBA, ADOT and Colorado Casualty assigned to Roman their rights against the subcontractors and other insurers.”

Colorado Casualty attempted to recover what “it had paid to defend DBA and ADOT and settle with Roman. However, Roman intervened, and argued that “Colorado Casualty had assigned its subrogation rights to him as part of the settlement agreement.” The suit was not dismissed, but the Superior Court allowed Roman to intervene. “Roman then filed a counterclaim against Colorado Casualty and a cross-claim against the subcontractors.”

All claims were settled against all of the defendants except Safety Control and EMC. “The superior court ruled on summary judgment that EMC breached a duty to defend DBA and that as a result, ‘DBA was entitled to settle with Roman without EMC’s consent as long as the settlement was not collusive or fraudulent.’ After more briefing, the court held the stipulated judgment was neither collusive nor procured by fraud and that EMC therefore was liable to Roman on the stipulated judgment and for his attorney’s fees. The court also held Safety Control breached its subcontract with DBA by failing to procure completed-operations insurance coverage and would be liable for damages to the extent that EMC did not satisfy what remained (after the other settlements) of the stipulated judgment and awards of attorney’s fees.” Safety Control and EMC appealed the judgment.

Four reasons were given for the decision of the ruling. First, “the disagreement between Roman and Colorado Casualty does not preclude them from pursuing their claims against EMC and Safety Control.” Second, “the settlement agreement is not otherwise invalid.” Third, “issues of fact remain about whether the judgment falls within the EMC policy.” Finally, “Safety Control breached the subcontract by failing to procure ‘Completed Operations’ coverage for DBA.”

In conclusion, the Superior Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded . “Although, as stated above, we have affirmed several rulings of the superior court, we reverse the judgment against EMC and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion to determine whether the stipulated judgment was a liability that arose out of Safety Control’s operations. In addition, we affirm the superior court’s declaratory judgment against Safety Control but remand so that the court may clarify the circumstances under which Safety Control may be liable for damages and may conduct whatever further proceedings it deems appropriate to ascertain the amount of those damages. We decline all parties’ requests for attorney’s fees pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-341.01 without prejudice to a request for fees incurred in this appeal to be filed by the prevailing party on remand before the superior court.”

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Nevada Supreme Court Reverses Decision against Grader in Drainage Case

The Nevada Supreme Court has issued an opinion in the case of Rayburn Lawn & Landscape Designers v. Plaster Development Corporation, reversing the decision of the lower court and remanding the case for a new trial.

The case originated in a construction defect suit in which Plaster Development Corporation was sued by homeowners. Plaster filed a third-party complaint against its subcontractor, Reyburn. The testimony of Reyburn’s owner was considered to be admission of liability and so the court limited the scope of Reyburn’s closing argument and did not allow the jury to determine the extent of Reyburn’s liability. Reyburn appealed.

Plaster, in their case, cited California’s Crawford v. Weather Sheild MFG, Inc. The court held the application of these standards, but noted that the “an indemnitor’s duty to defend an indemnitee is limited to those claims directly attributed to the indemnitor’s scope of work and does not include defending against claims arising from the negligence of other subcontractors and the indemnittee’s own negligence.”

On the matter of law against Reyburn, the court concluded, “Given the conflicting evidence at trial as to whether Reyburn’s work was implicated in the defective retaining walls and sidewalls, and viewing the evidence and inferences in Reyburn’s favor, we conclude that a reasonable jury could have granted relief in favor of Reyburn.” The Nevada Supreme Court conduced that the district court should not have granted Plaster’s motion for judgement.

Further, the Nevada Supreme Court found that the district court should have apportioned the fees and costs to those claims directly attributed to Reyburn’s scope of work, “if any,” and should not have assigned all attorney costs and court fees to Reyburn.

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Court Rules on a Long List of Motions in Illinois National Insurance Co v Nordic PCL

The case Illinois National Insurance Co. v Nordic PCL, et al. “involves a dispute about whether insurance benefits are available to a general contractor who built structures that allegedly have construction defects. Plaintiffs Illinois National Insurance Company (‘Illinois National’) and National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, PA (‘National Union’) (collectively, the ‘Insurers’), commenced this action for declaratory relief against Defendant Nordic PCL Construction, Inc., f/k/a Nordic Construction, Ltd. ("Nordic"), on August 23, 2011.”

The court was asked to rule on a long list of motions: “Counterclaim Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice in Support of Their (1) Motion to Dismiss the Counterclaim and (2) Motion to Strike Portions of the Counterclaim, ECF No. 16 (‘Request for Judicial Notice’); Counterclaim Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Counterclaim Filed October 24, 2011, ECF No. 14 (‘Motion to Dismiss Counterclaim’); Counterclaim Defendants’ Motion to Strike Portions of the Counterclaim Filed October 24, 2011, ECF No. 15 (‘Motion to Strike’); Third-Party Defendant Marsh USA, Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Stay Proceedings in Favor of Pending State Action, ECF No. 33 (‘Marsh’s Motion To Dismiss Or Stay’); Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff Nordic PCL Construction, Inc., f/k/a Nordic Construction Ltd.’s Substantive Joinder to Third-Party Defendant Marsh USA Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Stay Proceedings in Favor of Pending State Action, ECF No. 36 (‘Nordic’s Joinder’); and Third-Party Defendant Marsh USA, Inc.’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings on Counts V and VI of Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff Nordic PCL Construction, Inc.’s Third-Party Complaint, ECF No. 29 (‘Marsh’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings’).”

In result, the court reached the following decisions: “The court GRANTS IN RELEVANT PART the Insurers’ Request for Judicial Notice to the extent it covers matters relevant to these motions; GRANTS IN PART the Insurers’ Motion to Dismiss Counterclaim, but gives Nordic leave to amend the Counterclaim in certain respects; DENIES the Insurers’ Motion to Strike; DENIES Marsh’s Motion To Dismiss Or Stay and Nordic’s Joinder; and GRANTS Marsh’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.”

The court provides a bit of background on the case: “This action arises out of alleged construction defects involving two projects on which Nordic acted as the general contractor. Nordic is a defendant in a pending state court action with respect to one of the projects and says it spent more than $400,000 on repairs with respect to the other project. Nordic tendered the defense of the pending state court action to the Insurers and sought reimbursement of the cost of repairs already performed. The Insurers responded by filing this action to determine their rights under the insurance policies issued to Nordic.”

Furthermore, the court presented a brief procedural history: “The Insurers commenced this declaratory action in this court on August 23, 2011. The Complaint asserts two claims, one seeking a declaration that the Insurers have no duty to provide a defense or indemnification regarding the Safeway Action, the other seeking such a declaration regarding the Moanalua Claims. Along with its Answer, Nordic filed a Counterclaim against the Insurers. The Counterclaim asserts breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, misrepresentations and omissions of material fact, and bad faith, and seeks declaratory relief against the Insurers.”

The procedural history continues: “Nordic also filed a Third-Party Complaint against Marsh, the broker that had procured the Policies from the Insurers for Nordic. Nordic alleges that it reasonably believed that the Policies would provide completed operations insurance coverage for the types of construction defects alleged in the Safeway Action and Moanalua Claims. The Third-Party Complaint asserts breach of contract, negligence, promissory estoppel, breach of fiduciary duties, implied indemnity, and contribution and equitable subrogation.”

In conclusion, “The court GRANTS IN RELEVANT PART the Insurers’ Request for Judicial Notice. With regard to the Insurers’ Motion to Dismiss Counterclaim, the court GRANTS the motion as to Count I (breach of contract), Count II (duty of good faith and fair dealing), Count III (fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation), the portion of Count IV (bad faith) premised on fraud, and Count IV (declaratory relief). The court DENIES the motion as to Count IV (bad faith) that is not premised on fraud. Except with respect to the "occurrence" issue, which the court disposes of here on the merits, and Count V, which concerns only a form of relief, Nordic is given leave to amend its Counterclaim within three weeks of the date of this order. The court DENIES the Insurers’ Motion to Strike, DENIES Marsh’s Motion to Dismiss or Stay and Nordic’s Joinder, and GRANTS Marsh’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings with respect to Counts V and VI of the Third-Party Complaint.”

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Judge Concludes Drywall Manufacturer Sold in Florida

A Florida judge has concluded that the Chinese drywall manufacturer Taishan actively sought to sell its products in Florida and cannot now claim that it was not involved. Judge Joseph Farnia also noted that the main distributor of the drywall was, as noted in the Miami Herald, an arm of the company. Lennar Hones has sued the firm after installing drywall manufactured by the company in hundreds of homes.

Taishan’s activities in Florida included not only distributing samples, but also hosting tours of their plants in China for construction executives, and even making customized runs. According to other reports, has lost past cases over defects in their drywall.

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Seven Former North San Diego County Landfills are Leaking Contaminants

Deborah Sullivan Brennan of the North County Times reported that seven former dumps in San Diego are leaking contaminants into the surrounding groundwater. John R. Odermatt, a senior engineering geologist for the California Regional Water Quality Control Board s San Diego region, told the North County Times, “the risk to most county residents is very small or negligible, while local water supplies located in more rural areas may be at a somewhat elevated but unquantified level of risk.”

This issue is causing heavy scrutiny of a new proposed landfill in Gregory Canyon. The landfill would be located on 308 acres of undeveloped land near Pala, alongside the San Luis Rey River. The group “Save Gregory Canyon” has been speaking out against the landfill, stating that “the project threatens major detrimental impacts to both surface and groundwater, as well as a potential compromise of the two major San Diego Water Authority pipelines nearby.” Richard Felago, a Gregory Canyon Ltd. Consultant, told the North County Times that the 8-foot-thick liner, composed of layers of gravel and synthetic material, would not leak.

The appeal hearing is being rescheduled later this month after one of the three panelists recused himself due to having a competing interest in the property, according to the article by Gary Warth in the North County Times.

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Appeals Court Upholds Decision by Referee in Trial Court for Antagan v Shea Homes

In the case Antangan v. Shea Homes Ltd. Partnership (Cal. App., 2012), Plaintiffs appealed “an order vacating a judgment and entering a modified judgment in their construction defect action against defendants Shea Homes, Inc. and Shea Homes Limited Partnership,” while the Defendant, Shea Homes Limited Partnership (Shea Homes) appealed “an order of the judicial referee denying its motion to strike and tax costs.”

On the Antagon issue, the appeals court concluded that “the trial court did not err by vacating and modifying its judgment so that the cost of referee’s fees would be equally divided by the parties and consistent with a prior stipulation they filed in court.”

On the Shea Homes issue, the appeals court concluded: “1) the judicial referee did not err by ruling that plaintiffs’ offers to compromise (§ 998) were validly served on Shea Homes’ counsel, 2) the offers substantially complied with statutory requirements, 3) the offers were not required to be apportioned, and 4) the referee’s award of $5,000 as costs for a person assisting plaintiffs’ counsel was not an abuse of discretion.” The appeals court affirmed the judgment.

Here is a brief history of the trial case: “Plaintiffs Chito Antangan, Jimmy Alcova and other homeowners brought an action against defendants Shea Homes, Inc. and Shea Homes Limited Partnership for damages alleging that the properties they purchased from these ‘developer defendants’ were defective. Plaintiffs claimed numerous construction defects required them ‘to incur expenses’ for ‘restoration and repairs’ and the value of their homes had been diminished.”

In response, Shea Homes filed a motion for an order to appoint a judicial referee. The motion was granted and it was ruled that “a referee would ‘try all issues’ and ‘report a statement of decision to this court.’”

On May 10, 2010 the judicial referee (Thompson) “awarded plaintiffs damages and various costs, and ruled that ‘Shea Homes shall bear all of the Referee’s fees.’” The latter ruling would become a matter for contention later on.

In July of 2010, the plaintiffs “sought, among other things, $54,409.90 for expert fees, and $14,812.50 for the services of Melissa Fox for ‘exhibit preparation & trial presentation.’ Shea Homes filed a motion to strike and/or tax costs claiming: 1) Fox was a paralegal, 2) plaintiffs were not entitled to attorney’s fees, and 3) the fees for Fox’s services were an indirect and improper method to obtain attorney’s fees. The referee disagreed and awarded $5,000 for Fox’s services. The referee also ruled that plaintiffs had properly served valid offers to compromise (§ 998) on Shea Homes’ counsel in 2009. He said those offers to defendants in the case at that time did not have to be apportioned.”

“Antangan contends the trial court erred when it vacated and modified its original judgment, which ordered Shea Homes to pay all the referee’s fees. We disagree.”

Antagon contended that the trial court erred when it vacated and modified its original judgment regarding Shea Homes paying the referee’s fees. The appeals court disagreed: “A trial court has inherent authority to vacate or correct a judgment that is void on its face, incorrect, or entered by mistake. (§ 473; Rochin v. Pat Johnson Manufacturing Co. (1998),67 Cal.App.4th 1228; Olivera

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Exclusions Bar Coverage for Damage Caused by Chinese Drywall

The insured homeowners were unsuccessful in arguing around the policy's exclusions when seeking coverage for damage caused by Chinese drywall. Ross v. C. Adams. Constr. & Design, L.L.C., 2011 La. App. LEXIS 769 (La. Ct. App. June 14, 2011).

Before the insureds purchased and moved into their home, it was renovated. After moving in, the insures discovered foreign gypsum drywall, or Chinese drywall. The insureds submitted a claim to Louisiana Citizens Property Insurance Company. In an investigation, the insurer confirmed the presence of Chinese drywall and damage to the metal surfaces caused by corrosion. Louisiana Citizens refused coverage and the insureds sued. The trial court denied the insured's motion for summary judgment and granted summary judgment to Louisiana Citizens.

The court of appeal affirmed. Initially, the court determined the insureds sustained a direct physical loss. The inherent qualities of the Chinese drywall created a physical loss to the home and required that the drywall be removed and replaced.

Four exclusions, however, barred coverage. First, damages due to faulty or defective materials were excluded from coverage. The Chinese drywall emitted high levels of sulfuric gas which caused the damage to the insured's plumbing, electrical wiring and metal components.

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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com

Louisiana Politicians Struggle on Construction Bills, Hospital Redevelopment

Louisiana politicians are still working on a compromise in the state’s construction budget, as reported in the Times-Picayune. Rob Marrianneax, the chair of the Senate Revenue and Fiscal Affairs Committee, removed a $45 million request from Governor Bobby Jindal and added $4 million for projects that Jindal vetoed last year.

Two senators have formed competing plans to fund redevelopment construction for New Orleans’s Methodist Hospital. Mitch Landrieu, the mayor of New Orleans, hoped for $30 million dollars in state bonds. Senator Cynthia Willard-Lewis proposed an amendment that would supply $1.6 million, while Senator J.P. Morrell has an amendment that would supply $4 million.

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Tennessee Court: Window Openings Too Small, Judgment Too Large

The Tennessee Court of Appeals has issued a ruling in the case of Dayton v. Ackerman, upholding the decision of the lower court, even as they found that the award was incorrectly computed. The Daytons purchased a house that had been designed and built by the Ackermans, who operated a construction business. The court noted that the warranty with the house promised that “for a period of 60 days, the following items will be free of defects in materials or workmanship: doors (including hardware); windows; electric switches; receptacles; and fixtures; caulking around exterior openings; pluming fixtures; and cabinet work.”

Soon, the Daytons began to experience problems with the house. Many were addressed by the Ackermans, but the Daytons continued to have problems with the windows. Neither side could specify a firm date when the Ackermans were contacted by the Daytons about the window problems. The Ackermans maintained that more than two years passed before the Daytons complained about the windows. The lower court found the Daytons more credible in this.

Initially, the Daytons included the window manufacturer in their suit, but after preliminary investigations, the Daytons dropped Martin Doors from their suit. Martin Doors concluded that the windows were improperly installed, many of them “jammed into openings that were too small for them.”

After the Daytons dismissed Martin Doors, the Ackermans sought to file a third party complaint against them. This was denied by the court, as too much time had elapsed. The Ackermans also noted that not all of the window installations were defective, however, the courts found that the Daytons ought not to have mismatched windows.

Unfortunately for the Daytons, the window repair was done incorrectly and the windows were now too small for the openings. The firm that did the repair discounted the windows and Daytons concealed the problem with plantation shutters, totalling $400 less than the original lowest estimate. However, the appeals court noted that it was here that the trial court made their computation error. Correcting this, the appeals court assessed the Ackermans $12,016.20 instead of $13,016.20.

Finally, the Ackerman’s expert was excluded as he had changed his testimony between deposition and trial. The trial reviewed the expert’s testimony and had it been admissible, it would not have changed the ruling.

Read the court’s decision…