Arbitrator May Use Own Discretion in Consolidating Construction Defect Cases
September 1, 2011 — CJD Staff
The Mississippi Court of Appeals has ruled in the case of Harry Baker Smith Architects II, PLLC v. Sea Breeze I, LLC. Sea Breeze contracted with Harry Baker Smith Architects II, PLLC (HBSA) to design a condominium complex, which would be built by Roy Anderson Corporation. All parties agreed to arbitration.
Subsequently, Sea Breeze alleged defects and sought arbitration against the architectural firm and started a separate arbitration proceeding against the contractor. The special arbitrator appointed by the American Arbitrators Association determined that it would be proper to consolidate the two actions “since they arose from a common question of fact or law.” HBSA filed in chancery court seeking injunctive relief and a reversal of the decision. Sea Breeze and Roy Anderson filed a motion to compel the consolidated arbitration.
The court noted that the special arbitrator “established that the contract between Sea Breeze and Roy Anderson expressly allowed for consolidation of the two cases.” Further, the arbitrator “concluded that HBSA expressly agreed to consolidation by written consent through its 2008 letter, through which it insisted upon Roy Anderson’s involvement ‘in any mediation and/or arbitration.’”
The court concluded that the chancery court “did not have the power to fulfill HBSA’s request.” The court affirmed the chancery court’s judgment.
Read the court’s decision…
Construction Defects as Occurrences, Better Decided in Law than in Courts
December 9, 2011 — CDJ Staff
Construction defect claims are now occurrences for insurance purposes in four states, Arkansas, Colorado, Hawaii, and South Carolina, yet there are still frustrations for commercial general liability policyholders. Business Insurance describes court decisions on whether construction defect claims are covered as “incongruous,” and this drives up coverage and litigation costs. Construction firms often find they are defending themselves on two fronts, both the construction defect claim and also whether their insurance covers it.
Frank Armstrong, the Senior Vice President and National Director of Construction Claims for Willis North America says that the problem starts with the word “occurrence,” as various state courts have different interpretations of the word. “Certain pieces of it don’t fit well, at lest according to some courts in the country, with coverage for construction defect risks.”
Another insurance executive, Julian Ehlich, the Senior Vice President of Claims for Aon Risk Solutions’ construction services group notes that “jurisdictions differ, so policyholders don’t know what they’re going to get.”
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Home Builder Doesn’t See Long Impact from Hurricane
November 7, 2012 — CDJ Staff
No one needs to tell Toll Brothers about the impact of Hurricane Sandy. The Wall Street Journal reports that the home building company lost power as a result of the storm. Martin Connor, the company’s CFO, told the Journal that he did not expect the hurricane to have a big effect on sales. Luckily for the company, many of its large projects are either sufficiently completed to provide shelter or too early in the process to be affected by the storm. “This type of weather event has limited impact on the market. It may move settlements later, and may defer people a weekend or two until they go out shopping. But it doesn’t have a long impact.”
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SB800 Cases Approach the Courts
July 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
California’s Right to Repair Law turns ten this year and cases under the statute are finally coming to trial, as John V. O’Meara of Bremer Whyte Brown & O’Meara writes for the Martindale-Hubble Legal Library. Mr. O’Meara notes that SB800 eliminated “the traditional definitions of construction defect,” replacing them with “functionality standards.” He argues that these standards are not uniform: “some standards require damage and others do not.” He also wonders what terms like “significant cracks,” “intended water” and “materially comply” mean in a court.
Mr. O’Meara states that “defendants in construction defect cases have a right to know the standards that apply to a case, the definitions that will be presented to the jury, and the burden of proof that attaches.”
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Limiting Plaintiffs’ Claims to a Cause of Action for Violation of SB-800
November 18, 2011 — Samir R. Patel, Esq. and Todd E. Verbick, Esq., Lorber, Greenfield & Polito, LLP
There has been a fair share of publicity about the SB-800 amendments to the Civil Code (Civil Code section 896, et seq.) that codified construction defect litigation in 2002. Most of the publicity is geared toward the pre-litigation standards allowing a builder the right to repair before litigation is commenced by a homeowner. Less focus and attention has been given to the fact that violation of the SB-800 performance standards is being used by plaintiff’s counsel as an additional tool in the plaintiff’s pleading tool box against builders. Closer scrutiny to SB-800 reveals that those provisions should in fact act as a limitation to the pleading tools available to plaintiffs and an additional tool for builders in the defense of cases governed by SB-800.
The typical construction defect complaint contains the boiler plate versions of numerous causes of action. These causes of action include Strict Liability, Negligence, Negligence Per Se, Breach of Contract, Breach of Contract – Third-Party Beneficiary, Breach of Express Warranties, Breach of Implied Warranties, among others. The wide array of causes of action leave a defendant “pinned to the wall” because they require a complex defense on a multitude of contract and tort related causes of action. Furthermore, the statutes of limitations as to these claims widely differ depending upon if the particular defect is considered latent or patent. The truth of the matter remains, no matter what the circumstances, if a construction defect matter ultimately goes to trial, it is inevitable that plaintiffs will obtain a judgment on at least one of these causes of action.
On its own, the Strict Liability cause of action can be a thorn in a defendant’s side. A builder is obviously placing a product into the stream of commerce and strict liability is a tough standard to defend against, particularly when it concerns intricate homes comprised of multiple components that originally sold for hundreds of thousands of dollars. A Negligence cause of action can also be difficult to defend because the duty of care for a builder is what a “reasonable” builder would have done under the circumstances. An interpretation of this duty of care can easily sway a jury that will almost always consist of sympathetic homeowners. A Negligence Per Se cause of action can also leave a defendant vulnerable to accusations that a builder violated the Uniform Building Code or a multitude of other obscure municipal construction-related code provisions during the construction of the home. Lastly, the Breach of Contract cause of action leaves a builder relying on dense and intricate purchase and sale agreements with dozens of addenda which leave the skeptical jurors turned off by what they view as one-side, boilerplate provisions. Ultimately, when a matter is about to go to trial, the complexity of these complaints can benefit a plaintiff and increase a plaintiff’s bargaining power against a defendant who is attempting to avoid a potentially large judgment.
Enter the SB-800 statutes. The SB-800 statutes apply to all homes sold after January 1, 2003. Civil Code section 938 specifically states that “[t]his title applies only to new residential units where the purchase agreements with the buyer was signed by the seller on or after January 1, 2003.” (Civil Code §, 938.) As time progresses, more residential construction defect cases will exclusively fall under the purview of SB-800. Slowly but surely more SB-800 governed litigation is being filed, and its exclusive application is looming on the horizon.
On its surface, this “right to repair” regime has left builders with a lot to be desired despite the fact that it is supposed to allow the builder the opportunity to cure any deficiencies in their product before litigation can be filed by potential plaintiffs. However, the application of the time line for repair has shown to be impractical for anything but the most minor problems involving only small numbers of residential units. Moreover, the fact that the fruits of the builder’s investigation into the claimed defects in the pre-litigation context can freely be used as evidence against it in litigation makes builders proceed with trepidation in responding with a repair. For these reasons, more SB-800 litigation can be expected to result due to the shortcomings of the pre-litigation procedures, and savvy defense counsel should anticipate the issues to be dealt with in presenting the defense of such cases at trial.
This fact should not necessarily be met with fear or disdain. Within the SB-800 statutes, the legislature made it clear that they were creating a new cause of action for construction defect claims, but it further made it clear that this cause of action is a plaintiff’s exclusive remedy. The legislature giveth, but at the same time, the legislature taketh away. Throughout numerous provisions within the SB-800 statutes, the Civil Code states that claims for construction defects as to residential construction are exclusively governed by the Civil Code, and that the Civil Code governs any and all litigation arising under breaches of these provisions. Civil Code section 896 specifically states:
In any action seeking recovery of damages arising out of, or related to deficiencies in, the residential construction … the claimant’s claims or causes of action shall be limited to violation of, the following standards, except as specifically set forth in this title. (Civil Code §, 896.)
Civil Code section 896 then provides approximately fifty-plus standards by which a construction defect claim is assessed under that provision. Civil Code section 896 covers everything from plumbing to windows, and from foundations to decks, and in several instances expressly dictates statutes of limitations as to specific areas of construction that severely truncate the 10-year latent damage limitations period. As for any construction deficiencies that are not enumerated within Civil Code section 896, Civil Code section 897 explicitly defines the intent of the standards and provides a method to assess deficiencies that are not addressed in Civil Code section 896. Civil Code section 897 states:
Intent of Standards
The standards set forth in this chapter are intended to address every function or component of a structure. To the extent that a function or component of a structure is not addressed by these standards, it shall be actionable if it causes damage. (Civil Code §, 897.)
Therefore, Civil Code section 897 acts as a catch-all by which defects that are not covered within Civil Code section 896 can be evaluated on a damage standard mirroring the Aas case (damages must be present and actual). The result of sections 896 and 897 being read in combination is a comprehensive, all-inclusive set of performance standards by which any defect raised by Plaintiffs can be evaluated and resolved under a single SB-800 based cause of action.
Civil Code section 943 makes clear that a cause of action for violation of SB-800 performance standards is a plaintiff’s sole remedy for a residential construction defect action. Specifically, Civil Code section 943 states:
Except as provided in this title, no other cause of action for a claim covered by this title or for damages recoverable under 944 is allowed. In addition to the rights under this title, this title does not apply to any action by a claimant to enforce a contract or express contractual provision, or any action for fraud, personal injury, or violation of a statute. (Civil Code §, 943.)
Civil Code section 944 provides the method for computing damages within a construction defect action, as follows:
If a claim for damages is made under this title, the homeowner is only entitled to damages for the reasonable value of repairing any violation of the standards set forth in this title, [and] the reasonable cost of repairing any damages caused by the repair efforts… . (Civil Code §, 944.)
A cursory review of these statutes yields the conclusion that the legislature was attempting to create an exclusive cause of action that trumps all other causes of action where SB-800 applies. The remedy available to plaintiffs is limited to that allowed by the Civil Code. As noted above, “[n]o other cause of action for a claim covered by this title…is allowed.” (Civil Code §, 943.) Therefore, Civil Code sections 896, 897, 943, and 944 specifically prohibit the contract-based and tort-based causes of action typically pled by plaintiffs.
Plaintiff’s counsel has seized upon the language of section 943 to advance the argument that SB-800 still allows a plaintiff to advance typical contract and tort based causes of action. On the surface, this argument may seem compelling, but a minimum of scrutiny of the express language of section 943 dispels this notion. Section 943 says that it provides rights “[i]n addition” to those under the SB-800 Civil Code provisions. Clearly, the language in section 943 is intended to expressly underscore the fact that a plaintiff is not precluded from seeking relief in addition to that allowed under SB-800 for damages not arising from a breach of the SB-800 standards or for damages in addition to those recoverable under Section 944. This language does not provide an unfettered license to bring a Strict Liability, Negligence or other cause of action against a builder where SB-800 applies.
In fact, this language only keeps the door open for plaintiffs to pursue such causes of action not arising from a breach of the SB-800 standards should there be such supporting allegations. For example, if a plaintiff alleges that a builder breached an “express contractual provision” related to the timing of the completion of the home and close of escrow, and the contract specifies damages in this regard, a plaintiff may have a viable separate cause of action for Breach of Contract for recovery of those damages precisely because that is not an issue expressly dealt with in SB-800 in the performance standards under sections 896 and 897, or in the damage recovery terms under 944. As it stands, the vast majority of complaints are seeking redress for violation of the same primary right; that is, defects specifically outlined in Section 896 and 897 or which result in damages as stated in Section 944.
So, how does a builder defend against a complaint that contains multiple causes of action regarding construction defects for a home sold after January 1, 2003? There are numerous ways to approach this. First and foremost, these superfluous and improper causes of action can be attacked by demurrer seeking dismissal of all causes of action other than the cause of action alleging violation of SB-800. If the the time period within which to file a demurrer has passed already, a motion for judgment on the pleadings can be utilized to attack the improper causes of action in the same way as a demurrer can be used for this purpose.
The limitation to a demurrer or motion for judgment on the pleadings is that the judge is restricted to viewing only the four corners of the pleading when making a ruling. It is typical for plaintiffs’ counsel to cleverly (or one might even say, disingenuously) leave the complaint purposely vague to avoid a successful defense attack on the pleadings by not including the original date the residence was sold. In that instance, a motion for summary adjudication can be used to attack a plaintiff’s complaint. By simply providing evidence that the homes were originally sold after January 1, 2003, the improper causes of action should be subject to dismissal by summary adjudication. If the plaintiff is a subsequent purchaser, the builder still has recourse to enforce the pleading limitations under SB-800. Civil Code section 945 states that “[t]he provisions, standards, rights, and obligations set forth in this title are binding upon all original purchasers and their successors-in-interest.” (Civil Code §, 945.)
Attacking a plaintiff’s complaint to eliminate multiple causes of action can have numerous benefits. The practical result is that a plaintiff will only have one viable cause of action. The advantage is that the SB-800 performance standards include the defined performance standards and shortened statutes of limitations periods with regard to specific issues. Furthermore, as to defects which are not specifically provided for in Civil Code section 896, Civil Code section 897 requires a proof of actual damages. Therefore, a plaintiff must provide evidence of current damages and not simply conditions that may potentially cause damage in the future.
The Appellate Courts have yet to directly address and interpret these SB-800 provisions. The time for that is undoubtedly drawing near. For now, however, plaintiffs will have to find ways to accurately plead construction defect claims within the confines of one cause of action for breach of the performance standards enumerated within the Civil Code.
Printed courtesy of Lorber, Greenfield & Polito, LLP. Mr. Patel can be contacted at spatel@lorberlaw.com and Mr. Verbick at tverbick@lorberlaw.com.
Destruction of Construction Defect Evidence Leads to Sanctions against Plaintiff
July 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Stating that the plaintiff’s actions have left the defendants in a situation where they “cannot properly defend the action,” a judge in the US District Court of New York has sanctioned the plaintiffs in Aktas v. JMC Dev. Co.
The plaintiffs hired JMC Development and Stephen Jung, an architect, to renovate their vacation home in Adirnodack, New York. As work progressed, “due to disagreements regarding the completion date and payments for the project, the relationship began to deteriorate.” The plaintiffs hired George Villar as an owner’s representative who “testified that he deemed the workmanship to be ‘poor.’”
Subsequently, the locks where changed on the home, preventing JMC from performing any additional work, after which drywall was removed, which Villar stated was so that “the engineer come and look at the framing.” Subsequently, Villar sent a letter to JMC stating that the work was “performed in an inadequate, negligent and un-professional manner.” Villar informed JMC that they were not to visit the property. Subsequently, the plaintiffs hired another firm. “Plaintiffs testified that the materials were ‘carted away’ and ‘thrown out.’”
The plaintiffs filed a suit against JMC and others. JMC filed a motion requesting that the plaintiffs be sanctioned for their spoliation of evidence. The court noted that “the plaintiffs recognized that litigation was imminent,” and that they “had a duty to preserve the evidence. As all of JMC’s work was destroyed, there is no evidence of whether or not the work was defective. The court concluded that it will “issue an adverse inference charge that permits the jury to infer that the missing evidence was favorable to the defendants.”
In conclusion, the court granted in part the spoliation sanctions. They granted JMC a summary judgment dismissing the plaintiffs’ claims of fraud.
Read the court’s decision…
Analysis of the “owned property exclusion” under Panico v. State Farm
March 8, 2011 — March 8, 2011, Colorado Construction Litigation
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit recently concluded that the “owned property exclusion” applied to bar coverage for claims of property damage. See Panico v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 2011 WL 322830 (10th Cir. 2011). In Panico, the plaintiffs sold property in Aspen, Colorado to the Taylors, who sued the Panicos upon discovering the property was not as represented. After refusing to defend, the Panicos sued State Farm for breach of contract. The district court concluded that the Taylors’ claims were not covered under the Panicos insurance policies and granted summary judgment in State Farm’s favor. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed.
Mr. Panico built the house on the property as well as several additions to the house. As the Taylors lived in Florida, they primarily relied on their real estate agent and an inspector to ensure the property was acceptable. According to their complaint, the Taylors discovered that the house was “virtually uninhabitable due to serious design and construction defects, mold, rodents, and drainage problems.” Id. at *1. In their complaint, the Taylors asserted three claims for relief against the Panicos based upon misrepresentation and fraudulent concealment about the condition of the property.
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Reprinted courtesy of Heather M. Anderson of Higgins, Hopkins, McClain & Roswell, LLP. Ms Anderson can be contacted at anderson@hhmrlaw.com
Plaintiffs In Construction Defect Cases to Recover For Emotional Damages?
March 16, 2011 — March 16, 2011 - Construction Defect Journal Staff
A recent post to the Markusson, Green, Jarvis Blog reports on an important appeals decision which promises to impact construction defect litigation in Colorado.
The post provides analysis on the recovery of inconvenience damages. The focus of the piece is centered on Hildebrand v. New Vista Homes II, LLC, 08CA2645, 2010 WL 4492356 (Colo. Ct. App. Nov. 10, 2010), wherein it was held that " the plain language of Construction Defect Action Reform Act permits recovery of damages for inconvenience, and that the trial court did not err by allowing inconvenience damages to go to the jury".
According to the MGJ Blog "The Hildebrand decision is important because it provides Construction Defect Plaintiffs with a foothold for collecting emotional damages. While several questions of law remain as to who or under exactly what circumstances a Plaintiff may recover these types of damages, the Hildebrand case has clearly set forth that emotional damages may be considered as part of actual damages pursuant to CDARA."
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Water District Denied New Trial in Construction Defect Claim
August 16, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The United District Court in Tampa, Florida has rejected the motion by Tampa Bay Water for a new trial in their claims that HDR Engineering negligently designed the C.W. Bill Young Regional Reservoir. The claims went to a jury trial, at the end of nineteen days, the jury deliberated for four hours, finding for HDR Engineering. In rejecting Tampa Bay’s motion, the judge noted that “on close examination, TBW’s contentions have little to do with the factual determinations of the jury, which evidently concluded that TBW did not meet its burden of proof, an unsurprising conclusion, considering HDR’s evidence and the weaknesses in TBW’s evidence.”
The court cited an earlier decision that “a new trial may be granted where the jury’s ‘verdict is against the great, not merely the greater weight of the evidence.’” However, the court found that the jury’s verdict “was well supported by the evidence” and that “TBW’s case showed signs of weakness at virtually every turn.” TBW’s expert “changed his opinion late in the case concerning the culpability of the contractor.” As a result, “Brumund’s change in opinions effectively bolstered HDR’s faulty construction defense.”
TBW also raised claims a pre-trial order prevented it “from introducing evidence that HDR did not fulfill its contractual quality control responsibilities” and that evidentiary rulings prevented “TBW from introducing evidence concerning quality control.” However, TBW dismissed its claims over quality control, then “attempted no less than three times during ?Ķ testimony to introduce evidence of the purpose of the quality control requirement and quality control assurance.”
TBW also contended “that it was precluded from introducing evidence that HDR’s inspectors never reported that the protective layer exceeded three feet after inspecting the work as part of HDR’s quality control duties.” The court noted that “TBW asked these very questions of HDR’s Engineer of Record.” The court also found that testimony regarding photographs of the construction was properly excluded as TBW never entered the photos into evidence.
TBW had made an argument for a jury view. Prior the trial “after discussion, and to their credit, the parties agreed to a jointly-prepared helicopter ‘flyover’ video.” The court noted that “the size and physical characteristics of the reservoir were adequately and effectively depicted in the video.” The hazards the jury did not, then, have to encounter included the narrow, unpaved rim of the reservoir, snakes, and alligators.
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Anti-Assignment Provision Unenforceable in Kentucky
December 20, 2012 — Tred Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
On a certified question from the Federal District Court, the Supreme Court of Kentucky decided that an anti-assignment provision in a policy is unenforceable.Wehr Constructors v. Paducah Div. Assur. Co. of Am., 2012 Ky. LEXIS 183 (Ky. Oct. 25, 2012).
Before building an addition to its hospital, Murray Calloway County Hospital purchased a builder's risk policy from Assurance Company of America.The policy provided, "Your rights and duties under this policy may not be transferred without Assurance's written consent . . . ." The Hospital contracted with Wehr Constructors to install concrete subsurfaces and vinyl floors in order to expand the hospital. After installation, a portion of the floors and subsurface work was damaged. The Hospital submitted a claim to Assurance for $75,000, but the claim was denied.
Wehr sued the Hospital to recover money for its work on the construction project. In settling the case, the Hospital assigned to Wehr any claim or rights the Hospital had against Assurance.
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
Construction Defect Destroys Home, Forty Years Later
June 19, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Fire investigators in Monroe, North Carolina have blamed a nail as the source of a fire that lead to a home being declared a total loss. The nail, part of the original construction, nicked a wire within a wall, causing a short, which started a fire. The home was built in the late 1960s.
WBTV reported that the homeowner was awakened by a power outage. He went outside and saw flames coming from a vent in the roof. He was unable to contain the fire with a garden hose. Neighbors called firemen who were able to stop the blaze.
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CC&Rs Not the Place for Arbitration Agreement, Court Rules
May 24, 2011 — CDJ Staff
In January, the California Court of Appeals ruled that an arbitration clause inserted in a development’s CC&Rs by the developer could not be enforced. The case, Villa Vicenza Homeowners Association v. Noble Court Development, involved a case in which, according to the opinion, “following the first sale Nobel controlled the board of directors of the Association and because the initial condominium buyers noticed defects in common areas and common facilities and did not believe Nobel had provided a reserve fund sufficient to repair the defects, the condominium owners brought a derivative action on behalf of the Association against Nobel.”
The court concluded, “The use of CC&R's as a means of providing contractual rights to parties with no interest in or responsibility for a common interest development is also problematic from the standpoint of determining what if any consideration would support such third-party agreements. By their terms the CC&R's bind all successors, even those with whom a third party such as Nobel has never had any contractual relationship and to whom Nobel has not provided any consideration.” The court determined that “the trial court did not err in denying Nobel's motion to compel arbitration.”
Read the court’s decision