South Carolina Legislature Redefining Occurrences to Include Construction Defects in CGL Policies
April 1, 2011 — April 1, 2011 Beverley BevenFlorez - Construction Defect Journal
The question of what circumstances must be in place for construction defects to be covered in a general commercial liability (CGL) policies is being raised by the courts and the legislature in South Carolina. The Insurance Journal reports that the American Insurance Association as well as the Property and Casualty Insurers Association of America are speaking out on the issue.
The problem seems to be centered on what defines an “occurrence.” CGL policies were not meant to cover faulty workmanship, according to the filing by the South Carolina Supreme Court. In January of this year, the South Carolina Supreme Court reversed the ruling in Crossmann Communities v Harleysville Mutual declaring that “Respondents cannot show the damage here was the result of an occurrence. Rather, the damage was a direct result and the natural and expected consequence of faulty workmanship; faulty workmanship did not cause an occurrence resulting in damage.” They focused their attention on the word “accident,” stating that there is a fortuity element that is not diminished.
The South Carolina legislature reacted by producing a bill that would add new language directly negating the ruling by the Supreme Court. The South Carolina bill S-431 would change the definition of an occurrence in regards to construction defects as follows: “For a liability insurance policy issued to a construction professional, an ‘occurrence’ means, at a minimum: (1) an accident; or (2) continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful condition or substance. No additional requirement of a fortuitous event is needed to constitute an ‘occurrence.’”
S-431 is currently residing in the House Committee on Labor, Commerce and Industry.
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Gut Feeling Does Not Disqualify Expert Opinion
July 6, 2011 — CDJ Staff
The New Jersey Supreme Court issued a ruling in June on the case of Nevins v. Toll in which they reversed an earlier decision and remanded the case to a lower court for retrial. At issue in the case was the testimony of the plaintiff’s expert, J. Anthony Dowling. In depositions, Mr. Dowling said that his estimates for repair were based on a “gut feeling.” Dowling said he had “very little” experience in cost estimates for single-family homes. The defendants sought to bar Dowling’s testimony which was granted by the judge. Without an expert, Ms. Nevin’s case was dismissed.
Describing Dowling’s report as “far from a model of how an expert’s opinion in a construction case should be presented,” the court noted that Dowling is not a professional expert witness. However, the court did note that Dowling is a professional cost estimator. Despite Mr. Dowling using his “gut feeling” to construct his estimate, the New Jersey Supreme Court felt that whether his estimate is convincing is “a question for the jury.”
Read the court’s opinion…
Insurer Has Duty to Defend Despite Construction Defects
January 6, 2012 — CDJ Staff
In a case the judge attributed to “shoddy masonry work,” the US District Court of Illinois has rendered a decision in AMCO Insurance Company v. Northern Heritage Builders. Northern Heritage built a home in Chicago for Michael McGrath (who joined Northern Heritage as a defendant). According to the decision, “seven months after he moved into the house, McGrath noticed water coming in the house and warped millwork.” This was attributed to porous block, installed by the mason with Northern Heritage’s knowledge.
McGrath sued National Heritage for both the damage to his house and its contents. The court rejected his claim for the contents. For the damages to his house, he was awarded $601,570.50 in damages. He also sued his homeowner’s insurance carrier for damages not covered in his suit against National Heritage. There he was awarded $1,130,680.16.
AMCO informed National Heritage that it had neither duty to defend nor duty to indemnify. The judge considered whether AMCO had a duty to defend. Under Illinois law, “damage to a construction project resulting from construction defects is not an ‘accident’ or ‘occurrence’ because it represents the natural and ordinary consequence of faulty construction.” However, it is noted that while if the defects lead only to damage to the project itself, there is no occurrence, “if the building owner asserts damages to other property besides the construction itself, there is an ‘occurrence’ and ‘property damage.’” The judge further noted that were construction defects an occurrence, “shoddy work” would be rewarded by double pay, once by the homeowner and a second time by the insurer. Judge Kendall concluded that as McGrath had alleged damage to the contents of his house, AMCO had a duty to defend National Heritage.
She then looked at the issue of whether AMCO had a duty to indemnify. Should they pay the $601,570.50? Judge Kendall noted that “the duty to indemnify is narrower than the duty to defend.” The key point here was that once McGrath’s insurance carrier covered him for the damage to the contents of his house, “AMCO’s duty to defend ended.” Once McGrath “only sought damages for the natural consequences of faulty workmanship” there was no occurrence, hence nothing for AMCO to cover.
Judge Kendall granted a summary dismissal of AMCO’s claim that they had no duty to defend while upholding their claim that they had no duty to indemnify.
Read the court’s decision…
Celebrities Lose Case in Construction Defect Arbitration
May 26, 2011 — CDJ Staff
An arbitration panel has ruled that problems with the Idaho home of actors Tom Hanks and Rita Wilson were not due to construction defects but rather to “poor design and bad architectural advice.” The couple had settled with the architectural firm, Lake Flato of San Antonio, Texas for $900,000 and was subsequently seeking $3 million from Storey Construction of Ketchum, Idaho.
Problems with the couple’s home “included leaking roofs, inadequate drainage, fireplaces that did not vent properly and an inadequate air-conditioning system. In 2003, sliding snow from the roof damaged kitchen windows and roof components.”
The arbitration panel, according to the report in the Idaho Mountain Express and Guide, noted that “Hanks and Wilson were responsible for the full $167,623 cost of arbitration, but further denied a Storey Construction counterclaim that alleged Hanks and Wilson filed their claim out of malice.”
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Loose Bolts Led to Sagging Roof in Construction Defect Claim
February 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Though the sagging roof is neither leaking nor a safety hazard, the town of Waynesville, North Carolina is suing the builder of its new fire station, as reported in the Smoky Mountain News. The engineers who examined the roof found a substantial number of loose bolts in the roof trusses. Additionally, the trusses themselves have become bent.
Tom Galloway, Waynesville’s Town Manager said “it needs to be remedied and fixed.” He said that the builder, Construction Logic, “never indicated a willingness to fix the roof.” The town is seeking the cost of repair, which Galloway estimated could be $400,000, and an additional $30,000 in damages. The suit states that Construction Logic failed to follow the plan specifications for the roof.
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Fifth Circuit Asks Texas Supreme Court to Clarify Construction Defect Decision
November 7, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The Fifth Circuit Court has withdrawn its decision in Ewing Construction Company v. Amerisure Insurance Company, pending clarification from the Texas Supreme Court of its decision in Gilbert Texas Construction, L.P. v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s London. The Fifth Circuit had applied the Gilbert case in determining that a contractual liability exclusion barred coverage for faulty workmanship. The Insurance Journal reports that this decision was both applauded and criticized, with a concern noted that “an insurer would now have its pick of either the ‘your work’ exclusion or the contractual liability exclusion without the exception for subcontracted work.”
The Fifth Circuit is now asking the Texas Supreme Court two questions to clarify Gilbert, which Brian S. Martin and Suzanne M. Patrick see as a sign that the Court has realized that it overly expanded the scope of the earlier ruling. A response is expected from the Texas Supreme Court by spring 2013.
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Building Boom Leads to Construction Defect Cases
August 2, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Professor Evan McKenzie of the University of Illinois at Chicago says that rise of construction defect litigation in the Las Vegas area followed the same pattern it did in other places, according to an article in the Las Vegas Review Journal. “Step one,” according to Professor McKenzie, “there was this enormous growth in construction. Then these attorneys began to swarm in from all over, especially Southern California.” McKenzie noted that during a building boom, construction “outpaces the ability of building inspectors to do their job.”
But, despite his contention that “rapid growth in housing stock” leads to “shoddy construction,” another problem of growth was that “eventually there were too many lawyers chasing too many condominium complexes and subdivisions.” What came next was that “attorneys start coming up with cases that really aren’t good cases.” It’s in the interest of these attorneys that HOA boards sue.
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Connecticut Gets Medieval All Over Construction Defects
February 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The Hartford Courant reports that Connecticut is trying a very old tactic in a construction defect suit. The law library building at the University of Connecticut suffered from leaks which have now been repaired. The state waited twelve years after was complete to file lawsuit, despite that Connecticut has a six-year statute of limitations on construction defect claims. Connecticut claims that the statute of limitations does apply to the state.
The state is arguing that a legal principle from the thirteenth century allows it to go along with its suit. As befits a medieval part of common law, the principle is called “nullum tempus occurrit regi,” or “time does not run against the king.” In 1874, the American Law Register said that nullum tempus occurrit reipublicae “has been adopted in every one of the United States” and “is now firmly established law.”
In the case of Connecticut, Connecticut Solicitor General Gregory D’Auria said that “the statute of limitations does not apply to the state.” He also noted that “the state did not ‘wait’ to file the lawsuit. The lawsuit was filed only after all other options and remedies were exhausted.”
Connecticut also argued that “nullus tempus occurrit regi” applied in another construction defect case at the York Correctional Institution. The judge in that case ruled in December 2008 to let the case proceed. But in the library case, Judge William T. Cremins ruled in February 2009 that the statute of limitations should apply to the state as well. Both cases have been appealed, with the library case moving more quickly toward the Connecticut Supreme Court.
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Washington Supreme Court Sides with Lien Claimants in Williams v. Athletic Field
September 30, 2011 — Douglas Reiser, Builders Counsel
The Washington Supreme Court issued their opinion today on Williams v. Athletic Field, perhaps the most talked about construction law case in the past few years. I have discussed this case exhaustively here on Builders Counsel. Today we have a resolution.
In an unanimous opinion issued today, the high court sided with lien filers who followed a sample form provided in RCW 60.04.091. Additionally, the court found that a lien company - and presumably other persons - could sign the lien for the lien claimant, as an agent, without invalidating the lien.
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Reprinted courtesy of Douglas Reiser of Reiser Legal LLC. Mr. Reiser can be contacted at info@reiserlegal.com
Faulty Workmanship may be an Occurrence in Indiana CGL Policies
April 7, 2011 — April 7, 2011 Beverley BevenFlorez - Construction Defect Journal
The question of whether construction defects can be an occurrence in Commercial General Liabilities (CGL) policies continues to find mixed answers. The United States District Court in Indiana denied the Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment in the case of General Casualty Insurance v. Compton Construction Co., Inc. and Mary Ann Zubak stating that faulty workmanship can be an occurrence in CGL policies.
Judge Theresa L. Springmann cited Sheehan Construction Co., et al. v. Continental Casualty Co., et al. for her decision, ”The Indiana Supreme Court reversed summary judgment, which had been granted in favor of the insurer in Sheehan, holding that faulty workmanship can constitute an ‘accident’ under a CGL policy, which means any damage would have been caused by an ‘occurrence’ triggering the insurance policy’s coverage provisions. The Indiana Supreme Court also held that, under identically-worded policy exclusion terms that are at issue in this case, defective subcontractor work could provide the basis for a claim under a CGL policy.”
As we reported on April 1st, South Carolina’s legislature is currently working on bill S-431 that would change the wording of CGL policies in their state to include construction defects. Ray Farmer, Southwest region vice president of the American Insurance Association spoke out against the bill. “CGL policies were never meant to cover faulty workmanship by the contractor,” he said. “The bill’s supplementary and erroneous liability provisions will only serve to unnecessarily impact construction costs in South Carolina.”
Read the Opinion and order...
Read the court’s ruling...
Read the American Insurance Association statement...
Contractor’s Coverage For Additional Insured Established by Unilateral Contract
November 18, 2011 — Tred Eyerley, Insurance Law Hawaii
The contractor was covered as an additional insured under the subcontractor’s policy even though the parties had never actually signed an agreement to add the contractor to the policy. Evanston Ins. Co. v. Westchester Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 20081 (9th Cir. Oct. 3, 2011).
The policies held by Bellevue Master, the general contractor, required it to be an additional insured under any subcontractor’s liability policy. Northwest Tower Crane Services was a subcontractor. Bellevue Master LLC, faxed a message that Northwest could continue to be a subcontractor on the project if it complied with Bellevue Master’s insurance requirements. Northwest contacted its insurance broker and requested an insurance certificate be issued to Bellevue Master so that it would be an additional insured under Northwest’s policy.
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
An Upward Trend in Commercial Construction?
March 28, 2012 — Melissa Dewey Brumback, Construction Law North Carolina
Year-end economic indicators demonstrate that private commercial construction may be increasing in 2012, primarily as demand grows for new projects built in the United States.
According to an article in Businessweek, the Architecture Billings Index held at 52 in December, indicating a modest expansion in the market. The American Institute of Architects said that the commercial and industrial component of the number climbed to 54.1 in December, the highest in 10 months.
The monthly survey of U.S.-based architecture firms is one of the main indicators of nonresidential construction, and these numbers suggest that modest improvement may be on the horizon.
The information is confirmed by data from the Census Bureau that shows that spending on lodging, office, commercial and manufacturing buildings grew 8.2 percent in November to $9.2 billion from a year ago. These types of commercial and industrial projects are historically canaries in the mine and are usually the first part of the industry to improve as the economy expands.
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Reprinted courtesy of Melissa Dewey Brumback of Ragsdale Liggett PLLC. Ms. Brumback can be contacted at mbrumback@rl-law.com.
After Construction Defect Case, Repairs to Austin Building
August 2, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The Austin Business Journal reports that remediation is about to begin on Met Center 10, a building that was “at the center of a complex structural defect case.” Claims were made that Grubb & Ellis failed to disclose known structural defects to a group of investors who purchased the building. The brokerage was ordered to pay $6.75 million. Repairs will take an estimated six months at a cost of $3.7 million.
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Construction Defect Notice in the Mailbox? Respond Appropriately
August 4, 2011 — Douglas Reiser, Builders Counsel
Recently, I have seen a rash of ignored construction defect notices. What is a construction defect notice? It’s a statutorily required notice, sent from a homeowner to a contractor, listing a number of defects found at their property. If you get one, don’t ignore it.
The Revised Code of Washington includes a number of provisions intended for residential construction disputes. Among them is the “Notice to Customer” requirement in RCW 18.27.114, which can preempt a contractor’s lien rights, and the “Notice of Construction Defects” found in RCW 64.50.020.
The Notice of Construction Defects is a standard notice mandated by RCW 64.50, a chapter in the Revised Code of Washington, intended to provide a pre-litigation resolution process for contractors and consumers. The chapter applies only to those losses “caused by a defect in the construction of a residence or in the substantial remodel of a residence.”(See “Action” RCW 64.50.010).
Unfortunately, many contractors will simply ignore these notices or tell the homeowner to make a warranty claim. But, the notice actually provides a contractor with a forty-five (45) day window to alleviate the dispute.
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Reprinted courtesy of Douglas Reiser of Reiser Legal LLC. Mr. Reiser can be contacted at info@reiserlegal.com
Contractors Admit Involvement in Kickbacks
December 9, 2011 — CDJ Staff
Two New Jersey contractors have pleaded guilty to charges that they made false representations for a government contract in a case related to kickbacks for construction work done in two school districts. New Jersey is recommending that the two men, Martin Starr and Stephen Gallagher, will each pay $50,000 in penalties, serve up to a year in jail, and be unable to accept public contracts for five years.
Last month, another individual in the case, Kenneth Disko, who had been the engineer for the school district, pleaded guilty on a similar charge. In addition to a $50,000 penalty, he will be serving three to five years in prison. A fourth conspirator, Robert Berman, the former business administrator for one of the school districts, has to pay a $13,000 fine and cooperate with the investigation. He is also barred from public employment in New Jersey and has been terminated from his position.
Starr admitted to preparing fictitious quotes which appeared to be from other contractors in order that his firm would seem to be the lowest bidder. Gallagher helped in preparing the fictitious bids and also provided cash kickbacks to Disko.
Read the full story…
Is There a Conflict of Interest When a CD Defense Attorney Becomes Coverage Counsel Post-Litigation?
September 1, 2011 — Chad Johnson of Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC
In Weitz Co., LLC v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado was asked to rule on a motion to disqualify counsel in an insurance coverage action. 11-CV-00694-REB-BNB, 2011 WL 2535040 (D. Colo. June 27, 2011). Motions to disqualify counsel are viewed with suspicion, as courts “must guard against the possibility that disqualification is sought to ‘secure a tactical advantage in the proceedings.’” Id. at *2 (citing Religious Technology Center v. F.A.C.T. Net, Inc., 945 F. Supp. 1470, 1473 (D. Colo. 1996).
Weitz Company, LLC (“Weitz”) is a general contractor and defendant in an underlying construction defect suit which had concluded before the action bringing rise to this order. In the underlying action, Weitz made third-party claims against subcontractors, including NPW Contracting (“NPW”). Weitz was listed as an additional insured under NPW’s policies with both Ohio Casualty Insurance Company and Mountain States Mutual Casualty Company (collectively “the Carriers”). The Carriers accepted Weitz’s tender of defense under a reservation of rights. However, neither insurance carrier actually contributed to Weitz’s defense costs in the underlying action. At the conclusion of the construction defect action, the parties unsuccessfully attempted to apportion the attorney’s fees and costs. Eventually, Weitz brought suit against the recalcitrant carriers. The Lottner firm, which had previously represented Weitz in the underlying construction defect action, continued to represent Weitz in this coverage action.
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Reprinted courtesy of Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC. Mr. Johnson can be contacted at johnson@hhmrlaw.com
Arizona Court of Appeals Decision in $8.475 Million Construction Defect Class Action Suit
May 9, 2011 — May 9, 2011 Beverley BevenFlorez - Construction Defect Journal
In the case of Leflet v. Fire (Ariz. App., 2011), which involved an $8.475 million settlement in a construction defect class action suit, the question put forth to the Appeals court was “whether an insured and an insurer can join in a Morris agreement that avoids the primary insurer’s obligation to pay policy limits and passes liability in excess of those limits on to other insurers.” The Appeals court provided several reasons for their decision to affirm the validity of the settlement agreement as to the Non-Participatory Insurers (NPIs) and to vacate and remand the attorney fee awards.
First, the Appeals court stated, “The settlement agreement is not a compliant Morris agreement and provides no basis for claims against the NPIs.” They conclude, “Appellants attempt to avoid the doctrinal underpinnings of Morris by arguing that ‘the cooperation clause did not prohibit Hancock from assigning its rights to anyone, including Appellants.’ This narrow reading of the cooperation clause ignores the fact that Hancock did not merely assign its rights — it assigned its rights after stipulating to an $8.475 million judgment that neither it nor its Direct Insurers could ever be liable to pay. Neither Morris nor any other case defines such conduct as actual ‘cooperation’—rather, Morris simply defines limited circumstances in which an insured is relieved of its duty to cooperate. Because Morris agreements are fraught with risk of abuse, a settlement that mimics Morris in form but does not find support in the legal and economic realities that gave rise to that decision is both unenforceable and offensive to the policy’s cooperation clause.”
The Appeals court further concluded that “even if the agreement had qualified under Morris, plaintiffs did not provide the required notice to the NPIs.” The court continued, “Because an insurer who defends under a reservation of rights is always aware of the possibility of a Morris agreement, the mere threat of Morris in the course of settlement negotiations does not constitute sufficient notice. Instead, the insurer must be made aware that it may waive its reservation of rights and provide an unqualified defense, or defend solely on coverage and reasonableness grounds against the judgment resulting from the Morris agreement. The NPIs were not given the protections of this choice before the agreement was entered, and therefore can face no liability for the resulting stipulated judgment.”
Next, the Appeals court declared that “the trial court abused its discretion in awarding attorney’s fees under A.R.S § 12-341.” The Appeals court reasoned, “In this case, the NPIs prevailed in their attack on the settlement. But the litigation did not test the merits of their coverage defenses or the reasonableness of the settlement amount. And Plaintiffs never sued the NPIs, either in their own right or as the assignees of Hancock. Rather, the NPIs intervened to test the conceptual validity of the settlement agreement (to which they were not parties) before such an action could commence. In these circumstances, though it might be appropriate to offset a fee award against some future recovery by the Plaintiff Leflet v. Fire (Ariz. App., 2011) class, the purposes of A.R.S. § 12-341.01 would not be served by an award of fees against them jointly and severally. We therefore conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding fees against Plaintiffs ‘jointly and severally.’”
The Appeals court made the following conclusion: “we affirm the judgment of the trial court concerning the validity of the settlement agreement as to the NPIs. We vacate and remand the award of attorney’s fees. In our discretion, we decline to award the NPIs the attorney’s fees they have requested on appeal pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-341.01(A).”
Read the court’s decision…
Court Rules on a Long List of Motions in Illinois National Insurance Co v Nordic PCL
May 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The case Illinois National Insurance Co. v Nordic PCL, et al. “involves a dispute about whether insurance benefits are available to a general contractor who built structures that allegedly have construction defects. Plaintiffs Illinois National Insurance Company (‘Illinois National’) and National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, PA (‘National Union’) (collectively, the ‘Insurers’), commenced this action for declaratory relief against Defendant Nordic PCL Construction, Inc., f/k/a Nordic Construction, Ltd. ("Nordic"), on August 23, 2011.”
The court was asked to rule on a long list of motions: “Counterclaim Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice in Support of Their (1) Motion to Dismiss the Counterclaim and (2) Motion to Strike Portions of the Counterclaim, ECF No. 16 (‘Request for Judicial Notice’); Counterclaim Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Counterclaim Filed October 24, 2011, ECF No. 14 (‘Motion to Dismiss Counterclaim’); Counterclaim Defendants’ Motion to Strike Portions of the Counterclaim Filed October 24, 2011, ECF No. 15 (‘Motion to Strike’); Third-Party Defendant Marsh USA, Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Stay Proceedings in Favor of Pending State Action, ECF No. 33 (‘Marsh’s Motion To Dismiss Or Stay’); Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff Nordic PCL Construction, Inc., f/k/a Nordic Construction Ltd.’s Substantive Joinder to Third-Party Defendant Marsh USA Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Stay Proceedings in Favor of Pending State Action, ECF No. 36 (‘Nordic’s Joinder’); and Third-Party Defendant Marsh USA, Inc.’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings on Counts V and VI of Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff Nordic PCL Construction, Inc.’s Third-Party Complaint, ECF No. 29 (‘Marsh’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings’).”
In result, the court reached the following decisions: “The court GRANTS IN RELEVANT PART the Insurers’ Request for Judicial Notice to the extent it covers matters relevant to these motions; GRANTS IN PART the Insurers’ Motion to Dismiss Counterclaim, but gives Nordic leave to amend the Counterclaim in certain respects; DENIES the Insurers’ Motion to Strike; DENIES Marsh’s Motion To Dismiss Or Stay and Nordic’s Joinder; and GRANTS Marsh’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.”
The court provides a bit of background on the case: “This action arises out of alleged construction defects involving two projects on which Nordic acted as the general contractor. Nordic is a defendant in a pending state court action with respect to one of the projects and says it spent more than $400,000 on repairs with respect to the other project. Nordic tendered the defense of the pending state court action to the Insurers and sought reimbursement of the cost of repairs already performed. The Insurers responded by filing this action to determine their rights under the insurance policies issued to Nordic.”
Furthermore, the court presented a brief procedural history: “The Insurers commenced this declaratory action in this court on August 23, 2011. The Complaint asserts two claims, one seeking a declaration that the Insurers have no duty to provide a defense or indemnification regarding the Safeway Action, the other seeking such a declaration regarding the Moanalua Claims. Along with its Answer, Nordic filed a Counterclaim against the Insurers. The Counterclaim asserts breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, misrepresentations and omissions of material fact, and bad faith, and seeks declaratory relief against the Insurers.”
The procedural history continues: “Nordic also filed a Third-Party Complaint against Marsh, the broker that had procured the Policies from the Insurers for Nordic. Nordic alleges that it reasonably believed that the Policies would provide completed operations insurance coverage for the types of construction defects alleged in the Safeway Action and Moanalua Claims. The Third-Party Complaint asserts breach of contract, negligence, promissory estoppel, breach of fiduciary duties, implied indemnity, and contribution and equitable subrogation.”
In conclusion, “The court GRANTS IN RELEVANT PART the Insurers’ Request for Judicial Notice. With regard to the Insurers’ Motion to Dismiss Counterclaim, the court GRANTS the motion as to Count I (breach of contract), Count II (duty of good faith and fair dealing), Count III (fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation), the portion of Count IV (bad faith) premised on fraud, and Count IV (declaratory relief). The court DENIES the motion as to Count IV (bad faith) that is not premised on fraud. Except with respect to the "occurrence" issue, which the court disposes of here on the merits, and Count V, which concerns only a form of relief, Nordic is given leave to amend its Counterclaim within three weeks of the date of this order. The court DENIES the Insurers’ Motion to Strike, DENIES Marsh’s Motion to Dismiss or Stay and Nordic’s Joinder, and GRANTS Marsh’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings with respect to Counts V and VI of the Third-Party Complaint.”
Read the court’s decision…