Equipment Costs? It’s a Steal!
July 8, 2011 — CDJ Staff
KCBD reports on the problems of a Lubbock, Texas contractor. It’s hard to do the job when your tools keep getting stolen. Corey Meadows, owner of Top Cut Interiors, told KCBD that he had chained an air compressor to a table saw. Since the thieves couldn’t cut the chain, they cut the table saw “and just took the air compressor and the chain.” Meadows estimates the thieves cost him $2,000 in damaged or stolen equipment and time lost.
Read the full story…
Insurer’s Motion for Summary Judgment Based on Earth Movement Exclusion Denied
October 28, 2011 — Tred Eyerley, Insurance Law Hawaii
After carefully dissecting the earth movement exclusion, the court denied the insurer’s motion for summary judgment. High Street Lofts Condominium Assoc., Inc. v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109043 (D. Colo. Sept. 26, 2011).
The City of Boulder performed road repair work near High Street’s property, some of which involved the use of a vibrating compactor to compact and set the roadbed. High Street noticed damage to its building, such as cracks in walls, sloping of floors and separations of porches from the building itself. High Street contacted the City of Boulder, who forwarded the complaint to its contractor, Concrete Express, Inc.
High Street also filed a claim with its business insurer, American Family, who denied the claim. American Family relied on an opinion letter by High Street’s engineer. The letter indicated that the damage was the result of "soil consolidation/settlement," in response to the construction activities. Based on this letter American Family concluded the claim was excluded under the policy’s earth movement exclusion.
High Street sued American Family, who moved for summary judgment.
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
Federal District Court Predicts Florida Will Adopt Injury In Fact Trigger
October 23, 2012 — Tred Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
The U. S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida was confronted with determining whether Florida would follow the manifestation or injury in fact trigger in Axis Surplus Ins. Co. v. Contravest Constr. Co., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104502 (D. Fla. June 5, 2012).
The homeowner's association sued the insureds for alleged negligent construction and development of individual dwelling units and common areas of their condominium. Due to this negligence, severe damage was caused by water intrusion. The Association's members only became aware of the defects through the retention of construction experts.
The insured had CGL coverage with Axis, with policies issued from 2003 to 2007. Coverage was denied for the periods 2003-2004 and 2004-2005. Axis provided a defense under the policies issued for 2005-2006 and 2006-2007, but under a reservation of rights. Axis sought a declaration that it had no duty to defend or indemnify because the damage manifested before its policy periods.
For coverage to exist, "property damage" must have "occurred" during Axis' policy period.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
BUILD Act Inching Closer To Reality
July 8, 2011 — Douglas Reiser, Builders Counsel
A select group of Senators have launched a marketing campaign for the BUILD Act. If this is the first you are hearing about the BUILD Act, do not fret. The Act still has a long way to go, but if successful it would bring a national infrastructure bank.
I have been fascinated with the concept of a national infrastructure bank for quite some time. The idea has been around since the Clinton years ? and perhaps beyond. The Act’s purpose is to create a national bank (American Infrastructure Financing Authority) to provide loans and loan guarantees to encourage private investment in upgrading America’s infrastructure. For a number of years, we have seen similar legislation float around Congress. But, none of those initiatives have gained as much traction as BUILD.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of Douglas Reiser of Reiser Legal LLC. Mr. Reiser can be contacted at info@reiserlegal.com
Battle of “Other Insurance” Clauses
March 23, 2011 —
Tred R. Eyerly -
Insurance Law Hawaii - March 23, 2011
The New York Court of Appeals considered the impact of competing “other insurance” provisions located in both a CGL policy and a D&O policy. See Fieldston Property Owners Assoc., Inc. v. Hermitage Ins. Co., Inv., 2011 N.Y. LEXIS 254 (N.Y. Feb. 24, 2011).
In the underlying case, Fieldston’s officers were charged with making false statements and fraudulent claims with respect to a customer's right to access its property from adjacent streets. Suit was eventually filed against Fieldston and its officers, alleging several causes of action including injurious falsehood. Damages were sought.
Fieldston’s CGL policy was issued by Hermitage. The “other insurance” provision stated, “If other valid and collectible insurance is available to the insured for a loss we cover . . . our obligations are limited,” but also stated it would share with all other insurance as a primary policy.
Read the full story...Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
Federal Court Denies Summary Judgment in Leaky Condo Conversion
August 4, 2011 — CDJ Staff
In the US District Court for Illinois, Judge William Hibber has rejected the request for summary judgment sought by the developers of a condominium building in the case of Nautilus Ins. Co. v. 1735 W. Diversey, LLC (the insureds). The insureds renovated a building at 1735 W. Diversey, Chicago, converting it into condominiums. After the project was completed and all units sold, and a condominium association form, one of the owners found that unit suffered leaks during rainstorms. The condo board hired a firm, CRI, to investigate the cause of the leakage. CRI found “water infiltration through the exterior brick masonry walls, build-up of efflorescence on the interior surfaces of the masonry, and periodic spalling of portions of the brick masonry.”
The redevelopment firm had purchased coverage from Nautilus. “Shortly after the Board filed its first complaint, the Insureds tendered the mater to Nautilus and requested that it indemnify and defend them from the Board's underlying claims. Nautilus, however, rejected the Insureds’ tender and denied coverage under both insurance policies.” Nautilus stated that the water leakage did not constitute an occurrence under the policies. The court cited these policies in which an occurrence is defined as “an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful conditions.” The Illinois courts have determined that construction defects are not accidents.
The court concluded that the insured did not bring forth claims within the coverage of the policies and denied the motion for summary judgment.
Read the court’s decision…
Construction Case Alert: Appellate Court Confirms Engineer’s Duty to Defend Developer Arises Upon Tender of Indemnity Claim
January 27, 2010 — By
Steven M. Cvitanovic,
Haight Brown & Bonesteel, LLP, January 27, 2010
In the recent case of UDC-Universal Development, L.P. v. CH2M Hill, 2010 Cal.App.LEXIS 47 (filed January 15, 2010), the Sixth District Court of Appeal provided a stunning illustration of the far-reaching effects of the California Supreme Court’s holding in Crawford v. Weather Shield Manufacturing Inc. (2008) 44 Cal.4th 541. In Crawford, the Court held the duty to defend under an indemnity agreement arose upon the mere tender of defense of a claim covered by the indemnity.
In the UDC case, CH2M Hill provided engineering and environmental planning services to developer UDC on a project that ultimately wound up in a construction defect lawsuit by the homeowners association ( HOA ). UDC tendered its defense to CH2M Hill, the tender was rejected, and UDC filed a cross-complaint for negligence, breach of contract and indemnity against CH2M Hill and others. After the HOA’s construction defect claims were settled, UDC proceeded to trial against CH2M Hill. The jury found in favor of CH2M Hill on the claims for negligence and breach of contract. At the request of the parties prior to trial, the trial court ruled on the application of the indemnity agreement in light of Crawford and, in so doing, found that the defense obligation arose upon the tender and that CH2M Hill breached that duty despite the jury finding in favor of CH2M Hill.
The Court of Appeal affirmed, noting that the defense obligation arose as soon as the defense was tendered and did not depend on the outcome of the litigation, and that the HOA’s general description of the defects along with an allegation that Doe engineers were negligent triggered the duty to defend.
Although this case did not expand the crushing impact of Crawford’s holding, it is
Read the full story...
Driver’s Death May Be Due to Construction Defect
August 16, 2012 — CDJ Staff
A man driving a rental truck collided with a parking ramp at the Mall of America in Bloomington, Minnesota, leading to his death when the ramp broke and crushed the cab of the truck. One expert said that the ramp should have been built to withstand the impact. Tim Galarnyk told Fox News that the building feature didn’t’ even bear weight, describing it as “a cosmetic facial panel.” Nevertheless, in a contest with a truck he said the ramp portion should “peel it like a tin can before it takes the concrete element down.”
The Mall of American is not commenting on the accident.
Read the full story…
Although Property Damage Arises From An Occurrence, Coverage Barred By Business Risk Exclusions
July 8, 2011 — Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
The homeowners hired the insured to raise the structure of their home twenty-four inches above the flood zone. Lafayette Ins. Co. v. Peerboom, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58985 (S.D. Miss. June 2, 2011). When the insured’s crew returned from lunch one day, they found the house had fallen from hydraulic jacks being used to raise the structure a few inches at a time. There was substantial damage to the entire structure.
The homeowners sued, asserting several claims, including negligence and breach of contract. The complaint alleged the homeowners entered a contract with the insured to raise their structure while maintaining its integrity. However, the insured failed to use proper equipment, which caused the house to fall and be completely destroyed.
The insured tendered the claim to its insurer, Lafayette Insurance Company. Lafayette defended under a reservation of rights and filed suit for a declaratory judgment. Lafayette’s subsequent motion for summary judgment contended there was no “occurrence” alleged in the underlying complaint and, even if there was, the business risk exclusions barred coverage.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
Developer’s Fraudulent Statements Are His Responsibility Alone in Construction Defect Case
February 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The Texas Court of Appeals ruled on December 21 in the case of Helm v Kingston, a construction defect case. After purchasing what was described as “an extremely well-built” two-bedroom townhouse, Mr. Kingston made complaints of construction defects. Greenway Development did not repair the defects to Kingston’s satisfaction, and he filed notice of suit. In his suit, he claimed that GDI and its president, John Helm, had committed fraud and negligent misrepresentation. Kingston claimed that Helm “fraudulently induced Kingston to believe that the townhouse evidenced the highest quality of workmanship when in fact the quality of workmanship was atrocious.” Helms brought a counterclaim that Kingston’s suit was frivolous.
About four years after Kingston purchased the townhome, the suit proceeded to trial. The trial court determined that Helm was not “liable in his individual capacity,” but this was reversed at appeal.
A second trial was held ten years later on the question of whether Kingston’s unit was a townhome or an apartment. A jury found that Helm “engaged in a false, misleading or deceptive act or practice that Kingston relied on to his detriment.” Kingston was awarded $75,862.29 and an additional $95,000 in attorney fees by the jury. Helms made an unsuccessful appeal to the Appeals Court, after which Kingston was awarded an additional $10,000. Helms then made an unsuccessful appeal to the Texas Supreme Court, which lead to an additional $3,000 for Kingston. There was also a verdict of $48,770.09 in pre-judgment interest and “five percent post-judgment interest accruing from the date of the judgment until the time the judgment is paid. Helm appealed.
In his appeal, Helm raised seven issues, which the court reorganized into five Kingston raised one issue on cross-appeal.
Helms’ first claim was that Kingston “failed to satisfy the requirement of” Texas’s Residential Construction Liability Act and that by not filing under the RCLA, Kingston’s fraud and misrepresentation claims were preempted. Further Helms claimed that the RCLA limited Kingston’s damages. The court rejected this, as the RCLA deals with complaints made to a contractor and not only did Helm fail to “conclusively establish” his “status as a ‘contractor’ under the statutory definition,” Helm testified that he was “not a contactor” at the pre-trial hearing.
Helms’s second claim was that Kingston’s later claim of a misconstructed firewall should be barred, claiming that Kingston “‘had knowledge of a defect in the firewall’ as early as 1997 but did not assert them until 2007.” The court rejected this because Kingston’s claim was that “Helm ‘fraudulently induced Kingston to believe that the townhouse evidenced the highest quality of workmanship when in fact the quality of the workmanship was atrocious.’”
Helms also challenged whether his statements that the residence was of “good quality” constituted fraud and misrepresentation under Texas’s Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act. The court concluded that Helm was in a position to make knowledgeable statements and further that “residential housing units are not artistic works for which quality is inherently a matter of subjective judgment.” Helm also claimed that Kingston could have avoided certain repair expenses through the “exercise of reasonable care.” Helms argued that the repairs could have been made for $6,400. The court disagreed, as these claims were cited only to invoke the DTPA, and that later petitions established additional defects.
Helms’s next claim was that he was not allowed to designate responsible third parties. The court rejected this because there GDI represented matters concerning the residence only through Helm’s statements. The court noted that “Helm is correct that?third parties may be liable for fraud if they ‘participated in the fraudulent transactions and reaped the benefits,’” but they note that “Helm never specifically alleged that GDI or CREIC participated in Helm’s alleged fraudulent transactions.
The final issue in the decision was about court costs, and here the court denied claims on both sides. Helm argued that the award of legal fees were excessive, as they exceeded the actual damages. The court noted that they “may not substitute our judgment for that of the jury,” and also that “the ratio between the actual damages awarded and the attorney’s fees is not a factor that determines the reasonableness of the fees.” But the court also rejected Kingston’s claim for post-judgment interest on $10,312.30 that Helm had deposited in the trial court’s registry. The court noted that the monies were to be paid out upon final judgment, but the mandate did not include any reference to interest.
Read the court’s decision…
Eighth Circuit Remands to Determine Applicability of Collapse Exclusion
January 6, 2012 — Tred Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
The Eighth Circuit determined a jury instruction regarding the applicability of the "all-risk" policy’s exclusion for "collapse" was inadequate. See KAAPA Ethanol, LLC v. Affiliated FM Ins. Co., 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 22158 (8th Cir. Nov. 3, 2011).
KAAPA had nine large, cylindrical, stainless steel tanks fabricated at its location. Soon after operations began in 2003, some of the tanks experienced unusual movement and began to shift. A geotechnical engineer found "silty clay" had been used for infill instead of compacted granular fill called for in engineering drawings. A year long plan to repair all nine tanks was implemented.
Affiliated’s "all-risk" policy excluded damage caused by faulty workmanship. It also excluded damage caused by settling or cracking. The settling exclusion went on to provide, "This exclusion will not apply to loss or damage resulting from collapse of: a building or structure; or material part of a building or structure." Affiliated denied coverage because of the faulty workmanship and settling exclusions.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
US Courts in Nevada Busy with Yellow Brass
August 2, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Judge Robert C. Jones, the chief judge of the United States District Court of Nevada, and Judge Peggy A. Leen, a magistrate judge with the same court, have issued orders in cases involving allegations of high-zinc yellow brass plumbing components. Judge Jones issued orders on Waterfall Homeowners Association v. Viega, Inc. and Greystone Nevada, LLC v. Anthem Highlands Community Association on July 9, 2012. Judge Leen issued orders on Southern Terrace Homeowners Association v. Viega, Inc. on July 10, and The Seasons Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Richmond American Homes of Nevada, Inc. on July 19.
Chief Judge Jones held an omnibus hearing on Waterfall v. Viega on June 12. During that hearing “Chief Judge Jones had already agreed that the claims against the product manufacturers should be be severed from the majority of the other claims and that discovery should proceed on different tracks.” Judge Leen ordered that the Southern Terrace claims be referred to Chief Judge Jones to determine if it should be consolidated with other yellow brass cases.
Chief Judge Jones’s decision in Greystone Nevada rests on issues of whether the affected homeowners had signed arbitration agreements. The judge found that the “Defendant’s claims that the seven homeowners they have identified are subsequent purchasers who need not arbitrate with Greystone is definitively refuted by the evidence.”
Judge Leen cites the Greystone decision in her ruling on Seasons Homeowners Association v. Richmond American Homes of Nevada. Richmond seeks to compel individual arbitration, stating that “the arbitration clause used singular rather than plural terms, and therefore, class arbitration was foreclosed.” Judge Leen determined that “under Nevada law, a homeowners association has statutory authority to represent homeowners associations in these types of actions. She did, however, accept Richmond’s argument that they could compel arbitration.
The Waterfall order involves an attempt by two homeowners associations to seek a class action against seventeen defendants, the first twelve of whom are described as “the Viega Defendants” and “the Uponor Defendants.” Chief Judge Jones notes that “many of these Defendants have been sued in identical class actions by the same law firms, but with different named defendants.” The homeowner association seek to “represent their own 998 members directly but also wish to represent up to 10,000 homeowner associations representing up to 250,000 similarly situated homeowner members throughout the Las Vega area via this class action.”
The judge has denied the Viega Defendants’ attempt to deny class certification, noting that the plaintiffs “argue that they intend to argue for class certification under Rule 23(b)(3). He also denied the motions by the two groups of the Viega Defendants. The U.S. Viega Defendants sought to be dismissed from the case for a variety of reasons. The judge noted of the claim that the plaintiffs had no injury of fact and are not alleging actual damage is contradicted by the allegations of actual damage made by the plaintiffs. ”They have alleged that the parts are defective and have already begun to corrode in at least a few sample circumstances, even if they have not yet failed.” To the argument that there re not particular claims made against defendants, the judge notes, “it is clear from the Complaint which Defendants are alleged to have manufactured and sold which brands of allegedly defective products, and which Defendants are alleged to have installed them.”
The German Viega firms also sought to be dismissed from the suit, noting that “they have no property, employees, accounts, advertisements, etc. in Nevada and have not sold any products in Nevada.” However, the judge notes that “at least Waterfall, and perhaps Red Bluff, was still under construction when Viega, Inc. became the sole shareholder of Vanguard Industries, Inc.”
Finally, both of Chief Judge Jones’s rulings cite a related case in the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota involving a class action settlement for those with F1807 systems. He notes in both these cases that “Plaintiffs disclaimed any claims based upon F1807 components.”
Read the courts' decisions…
Waterfall Homeowners Association v. Viega, Inc.
Greystone Nevada, LLC v. Anthem Highlands Community Association
Southern Terrace Homeowners Association v. Viega, Inc.
The Seasons Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Richmond American Homes of Nevada, Inc.
Colorado Senate Bill 12-181: 2012’s Version of a Prompt Pay Bill
May 10, 2012 — W. Berkeley Mann, Jr., Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC
A potentially important legislative bill has been introduced in waning days of the 2012 legislative session, which would change many of the commercial practices that prevail in the construction industry. Senate Bill 12-181 applies to all building and construction contracts and would prohibit any contract provision that requires a contractor, subcontractor, or supplier to waive their lien in advance of payment. It also would ban any “choice of law” provisions that make a Colorado-based construction contract subject to enforcement only in another state, or under the laws of another state.
The bill also seeks to change many existing commercial practices between contractors, subcontractors, and suppliers. It is presently unclear whether the bill allows parties to contract around these payment procedure provisions, or whether these requirements are simply “gap filling” provisions that pertain if there are no written contract terms specified on these issues. The proposed statute would mandate payment to subcontractors and material suppliers due within seven days in the absence of a dispute about the work or materials being billed. After this seven day period, the bill would require the payment of interest at the rate of 1.5% monthly (18% annually). In any later suit for payment, the creditor would also be able to collect reasonable attorneys’ fees. Additionally, non-payment to a subcontractor or supplier who is later found to be entitled to prompt payment would excuse the subcontractor or supplier, and its surety bond provider, from any further performance under the contract.
It is presently unclear whether the bill allows parties to contract around these payment procedure provisions. However, it is clear that the bill provides some leeway for change orders, as long as there is (1) negotiation in good faith between the parties concerning the changed scope of work, and (2) a 50% payment of a subcontractor’s costs by the changing party within 30 days of the change order work being done. Additionally, the bill provides for retainage, but in an amount of no more than 5%.
The bill is presently set for hearing before the Colorado Senate Committee on Business, Labor, and Technology Committee on May 2, 2012 at 1:30 p.m.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of W. Berkeley Mann, Jr. of Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC. Mr. Mann can be contacted at mann@hhmrlaw.com.
Lockton Expands Construction and Design Team
July 19, 2011 — CDJ Staff
Lockton Companies, LLC, the largest privately held independent insurance broker, has announced that it is expanding its construction and design team with the hiring of Karen Erger and Tom Miller.
Ms. Erger will provide professional liability practice management, loss prevention, contract and complex claims management consulting services to Lockton's architectural, engineering and construction clients in her role as Vice President, Director of Practice Management. Her background includes construction litigation at a leading construction law firm, professional liability claims defense and claims consulting for major professional liability underwriters.
Miller joins Lockton as a Senior Vice President within the Design and Construction Unit. His role will be dedicated to serving the needs of engineering, architecture and construction firms performing services around the globe. He has spent more than 15 years concentrating on professional liability for design professionals and contractors in multiple roles. He previously managed the professional liability underwriting of one of the largest construction insurers and has developed numerous manuscript insurance products as well as focused on strategic planning to enhance business unit opportunities.
Read the full story…
Allowing The Use Of a General Verdict Form in a Construction Defect Case Could Subject Your Client to Prejudgment Interest
August 16, 2012 — Heather Anderson, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC
A recent opinion from the Colorado Court of Appeals is a cautionary tale concerning the calculation of pre-judgment interest. See Hendricks v. Allied Waste Transportation, Inc., 2012 WL 1881004 (Colo. App. 2012). The Hendricks sued Allied after one of its drivers backed into the corner of their home with an Allied garbage truck. At trial, a jury awarded the Hendricks $160,100 in damages. Although the jury was instructed on the cost of repairs, diminution in value, and non-economic damages, the parties agreed to a general verdict form that did not ask the jury to specify the types of damages awarded. Id. at *1. The Hendricks sought to amend the judgment to include prejudgment interest and costs, which the trial court granted.
Allied appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by awarding the Hendricks prejudgment interest from the date their property was damaged. Id. at *7. The Colorado Court of Appeals found no error, and affirmed.
Read the full story…5
Reprinted courtesy of Heather Anderson, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC. Ms. Anderson can be contacted at anderson@hhmrlaw.com
Supreme Court of Oregon Affirms Decision in Abraham v. T. Henry Construction, et al.
April 20, 2011 — April 20, 2011 Beverley BevenFlorez - Construction Defect Journal
After reviewing the decision in Abraham v. T. Henry Construction, et al., the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed that a tort claim for property damage arising from construction defects may exist even when the homeowner and the builder are in a contractual relationship.
When the case was initially filed, the plaintiffs alleged breach of contract and negligence. The defendants moved for summary judgment arguing that one, the claim was barred by the six-year statute of limitations and two, no special relationship (such as one between a doctor and patient) existed. The court agreed with the defendants. However, the Court of Appeals while affirming the trial court’s decision on breach of contract reversed the decision on negligence. The Court of Appeals stated that an administrative or statute rule could establish a standard of care independent from the contract.
The Oregon Supreme Court gave an example of cases where a tort claim could exist when a contract is present: “If an individual and a contractor enter into a contract to build a house, which provides that the contractor will install only copper pipe, but the contractor installs PVC pipe instead (assuming both kinds of pipe comply with the building code and the use of either would be consistent with the standard of care expected of contractors), that failure would be a breach of contract only. […] If the failure to install the copper pipe caused a reduction in the value of the house, the plaintiff would be able to recover that amount in an action for breach of contract. […] On the other hand, if the contractor installed the PVC pipe in a defective manner and those pipes therefore leaked, causing property damage to the house, the homeowner would have claims in both contract and tort. […] In those circumstances, the obligation to install copper instead of PVC pipe is purely contractual; the manner of installing the pipe, however, implicates both contract and tort because of the foreseeable risk of property damage that can result from improperly installed pipes.”
Read the court’s decision…
Coverage Rejected Under Owned Property and Alienated Property Exclusions
June 6, 2011 —
Tred R. Eyerly,
Insurance Law HawaiiThe insured’s request for a defense when sued in a construction defect action was denied under the owned property exclusion and the alienated property exclusion in1777 Lafayette Partners v. Golden Gate Ins. Co., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48562 (N.D. Cal. April 29, 2011).
In 1999, Lafayette Partners purchased an abandoned walnut processing factory to convert into living and working units. The property was developed into a rental property from 2000-2001, and thereafter rented. In May 2003, Lafayette Partners entered into a sales agreement with Wolff Enterprises LLC. The sale closed in February 2005. Wolff then converted the rental units into condominiums.
In December 2007, the Walnut Factory Owners Association sued Wolff for construction defects. In Lafayette Partners was added to the suit in 2009. The suit alleged a variety of defective conditions, including the roofs, exteriors, windows, electrical , plumbing, and mechanical components and systems.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
Insurer Has Duty to Defend in Water Intrusion Case
July 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has upheld a summary judgment against an insurance company in a construction defect suit. Lagestee-Mulder, Incorporated (LMI) was hired by Crown Centre to construct a multi-story office building in Franfort, Illinois. LMI hired Frontrunner Glass & Metal to supply and install windows and doors. Frontrunner purchased an insurance policy from Consolidated which named LMI as an additional insured. The project experienced water intrusion and other construction defects and Crown sued LMI. Consolidated denied coverage. LMI sued Consolidated and the US District Court granted a summary judgment against Consolidated.
The appeals court reviewed the grounds for summary judgment and determined that under Illinois law, Consolidated had a duty to defend. The court cited an earlier opinion that “if the underlying compliant alleges facts within or potentially within policy coverage, an insurer is obligated to defend its insured even if the allegations are groundless, false, or fraudulent.”
Read the court’s decision…